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Fulfilling a Crucial Role
National Inteffigence Support Teams
James M. Lose
In the early and mid-1990s, even as achieve the administrations national
the US Department of Defense objectives.
worked to reduce its Cold War-size
budgets, it found its military forces Since the fall of the Soviet Union in
becoming embroiled in numerous
1991, the likelihood that the United
low-intensity conflicts around the engaged in a full-scale
States will be
world. The global situation that conflict has decreased to the extent
President Bush characterized as the that few, leaders in Govern
New World Order soon proved to
the~US
ment believe that, other than on the
be world in disorder. New threats
a
Korean Peninsula or in the Middle
have emerged that pose new chal
East, US forces will be required to
lenges for the Intelligence fight awar in the next~15 to 20 years.
One means of
Community (IC). Accordingly, the The possibility of the US military
IC has employed several recent inno
providing timely, becoming involved in other crises
vations to meet these new tasks. One
tailored national abroad, however, has risen sign ifi
such innovation that has proven to be
cantly a~ the nation se~ks to advance
invaluable during recent US military
inteffigence support to its interests through the policies of
operations is the National Intelli
engagement and enlargement.
deployed forces is gence Support Team (NIST).2
through a NIST. The unique unconventional nature of
these new compels the com
threats
~9 The National
Environment
Security mander to rely more heavily on his
intelligence officer th~n he may deem
necessary in more conventional com
In A NationalSecurity Strategy of bat operations. With this increased
Engagement and Enlargement, Presi reliance~on intelligenc~, the intelli
dent Clinton describes the new gence officers at the theater and
dangers to our nations security as tactical levels have looked to the
being more varied than ever before. national IC for to fill the
suppo~t
The emerging threats to US security commanders information shortfalls.
he addresses include regional aggres Consequently, the IC has sought to
sions; the spread of weapons of mass provide support to th4 tactical com
destruction; ethnic, religious, and manderwith historically
national rivalries; international terror unprecedented vigor. One means of
ism; transnational drug trafficking; providix~g timely, tailored national
and international organized crime. intelligence support to deployed
His strategy for responding to these forces is through a NIST.
threats states that, in order to advance
its national objectives, the United
States must continue tobe engaged in and
Background, Mission,
the world through its leadership, and Functions
its national security strategy must be
based on enlarging the world com
Based on the lessons learned from
munity of secure, democratic, and DESERT SHIELD and
free market nations.3 The
Operations
James M. Lose is a Captain in the military DESERT STORM, all national-level
US Marine is one foreign policy tool available to
Corps.
87
NISTs
The NIST concept is
designed to create a
dynamic flow of
agencies combined their separate this development with the Task Force
deployed intelligence support cells
inteffigence to and Eagle (TFE) G2 and explained to her
into one NIST.4 A NIST normally from a Joint Task that, no matter what we did, the
is composed of personnel from DIA, requests for information (RFIs) from
NSA, NIMA, and the CIA who are
Force operational area. National would surely continue.
deployed upon request by the mili A NIST can provide Nevertheless, the team assured her
tary commander to facilitate the flow that we would clear our responses
of timely all-source intelligence
unique inteffigence either with her or one of the watch
between a Joint Task Force (JTF) and support to a JTF officers and that no NIST member
Washington, DC,
durin~g crises would pass information back to
or
commander.
contingency operations. Teams are National that pertained to ongoing or
specifically configured to meet the future operations. This arrangement
needs of the deployed commander. appeased the briefers in Washington,
Since their inception, NISTs have since they received intelligence from
provided intelligence support to someone on the scene, and the G2
Operations PROVIDE RELIEF requesting encyclopedic intelligence was satisfied with the agreement not
or querying analytic resources with
(Kenya), SOUTHERN WATCH to pass operational details via intelli
quick questions that do not require
(Saudi Arabia), RESTORE HOPE gence channels.
new tasking of national assets. The
(Somalia), DENY FLIGHT and
NISTs can also facilitate the flow of
PROVIDE PROMISE (the Bal One of the best examples of the
information to and from the Area of
kans), UPHOLD DEMOCRACY reach-back capability was NIST
(Haiti), JOINT ENDEAVOR (Bos Responsibility via e-mail or video Tuzlas early successes in communi
teleconference (VTC) 7
nia), GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE cating Task Force Eagles essential
and GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL elements of information (EEl) to the
(Zaire), JOINT GUARD and The direct link to Washington is the national IC. At the outset of Opera
JOINT FORGE (Bosnia), SHIN most controversial of a NISTs roles, tion JOINT ENDEAVOR, although
ING PRESENCE (Israel), JOINT and it may sometimes be viewed by thousands of US troops had begun
GUARDIAN (Kosovo), and NOBLE the JTF J2 as a two-edged sword.
deploying to Bosnia, the intelligence
ANVIL (Albania). The reach-back capability that JTF
production from IC agencies seemed
J2s desire often becomes a reach-for to focus on briefings emanating from
The NIST concept is designed to ward for national agencies that want inside the Beltway and not on the
cre
ate a dynamic flow of intelligence to
on-the-scene reporting, information intelligence needs of the tactical com
and from the JTF operational area.6 on operational issues, details for brief mander. This frustrated the TFE G2.
A NIST is able to provide unique ings, or other information directly After gaining her approval, NIST
from the NIST. The way in which Tuzla sent TFEs EEls to the various
intelligence support to a JTF com
mander in several ways. First, and queries from Washington-based Balkans-oriented intelligence task
national IC agencies (often referred forces throughout the IC.
most frequently, the NIST provides
to in the field simply as National)
reach-back to national IC agencies
are handled determines whether the
and thorough knowledge of each
a In addition,
once the production
supported command will begin to
focus
agencys resources and capabilities began to shift and tactical intel
that normally does not exist at the view the NIST as the National Intel
ligence requirements gained
JTF level. Team members provide a ligence Spy Team. My first NIST attention, NIST-Tuzia coordinated
direct agency liaison for the JTF, and deployment to Bosnia provides one with theater and national intelligence
they have an excellent understanding example of how this issue can be organizations, various US Army
of where to go in their parent agency managed. (Europe) units, and the other NISTs
toobtain the best support for the in-theater to host weekly analyst-to
commanders priority intelligence Shortly after the NIST arrived in analyst \TC chats to answer com
requirements. This reach-back capa Tuzla in December 1995, questions mon questions and have analysts at
bility usually is accomplished from National became an almost all levels interact in an informal set
informally, with team members either daily occurrence. Our team discusse~I ting. As a testament to its value, the
88
NISTs
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and
the Secretary of Defense receive, but
which are accessibleto few others.
For example, DIAs former Yugosla
viaIntelligence Task Force may
prepare ~ point paper or desk note for
the Joint Staff J2 in response to a
question the Chairman may have
about the situation in Bosnia. The
NIST can request and disseminate
this pro~iuct so that the JTF com
mander and the J2 are aware of the
questions that CJCS has about their
operation. By doing so, the NIST
may potentially assist in reconciling
conflict~ng intelligence reports or in
correcting misreporting.9
Fourth, a NIST enables a JTF corn
mander~to submit RFIs that require
an answerfrom the national IC
NIST members in front of Task Force Eagle Headquarters (author is on right). within 24 hours or less. Elements of
March 1996. Photo courtesy of the author.
the NIST accomplish this by corn
munica~ing either with the National
Military Joint Intelligence Center,
Balkans analysts VTC, as it Before the deployment to Tuzla, the which is located with the National
became known, has taken place on a TFE commander requested that the
Military Command Center in the
weekly basis since January 1996 and NIST, which had been pre-posi and is the national clearing
Pentagon
is hosted by the Director of Central tioned in Germany to join the 1st house fc~r all RFIs, with each ele
or
Intelligences Balkan Task Force. Armored Division, provide a threat ments parent organization.1In
warning capability for forward- those instances when direct connec
A second aspect of a NISTs
unique deployed units that were involved tivity to1 national agencies is essential,
with the Sava River crossing into Bos
intelligence support is that it pro the NIST will coordinate with the
vides a threat warning capacity to the nia. With less than an hours notice,
intelligencecenter of the supported
JTF and enhances the commanders atwo-person team from the NISTs theater avoid duplication of effort
to
overall force protection capability. NSA element was ready for and ensure that national assets are not
The NSA element of a NIST usually deployment. tasked when the theater could have
contains a few personnel from the answered the JTFs RFI.
National Security Operations Cen Third, a NIST offers several prod
ters Special Support Activity. They ucts from each of its parent agencies
provide a small mobile SATCOM that may otherwise be unavailable to
Lessons Learned From Haiti
system that allows the JTF com a JTF. These products may carry clas
and Bosnia
mander to receive threat warning sifications that no JTF
broadcasts from NSA Headquarters communications systems are cleared
that pertain to his
operating area. to handle but that a NIST is able to Two major operations in which
The NSA element also receives priori disseminate via itsagency-only sys NISTs participatedOperations
tized near-real-time intelligence tems. Furthermore, certain daily UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti
messages its computer systems,
over publications accessible to a NIST can and JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bos
in the
which connect directly into the NSA offer unique insight into the intelli
nia_pr~vide examples of areas
network in Ft. Meade, Maryland.8 gence products that the Chairman of NIST where
p~ogram support to
89
NISTs
future crisis or contingency opera
tions could be improved. A total of
nine separate NISTs provided sup
port to both peacekeeping operations
in two separate Unified Commands.
In Haiti, the mission for the com
bined military force, under the
operational control of US Atlantic
Command (USACOM), was to
establish and maintain a secure gov
ernment in order to facilitate the
return and proper functionin~ 1of the
elected Government of Haiti.
Early on, USACOM requested
national intelligence
support, and, in
the end, NISTs were deployed aboard
the USS Mount Whitney, the USS
Wasp, and to the JTF Joint Intelli
gence Center in Port-au-Prince.
Many lessons from the NISTs and NIST and Task Force Eagle personnel with Senator John McCain (on right) during a
the supported commanders proved to Congressional visit to Tuzla, Bosnia. February 1996. Photo courtesy of the author.
be beneficial when planning support
to future operations:
Third, the NISTs liaison withand headquarters informed about JTF
The first lesson is that early coordina coordination betweenHUMINT operational activities in order to cue
tion between the NIST and the collectors in-country and their par national collection resources. On D
supported command is critical. Dur ent in
organizations Washington Day, the NIST contingent arrived in-
ing the pre-deployment phase of the proved essential to operating in an country and rapidly established con
operation, the NIST can pre-posi environment like that encountered nectivity with the IC. As the
tion its equipment, conduct by US forces in Haiti. Information operation progressed successfully,
from HUMINT highly NIST support decreased quickly; it
necessary training, and coordinate its
sources was
roles and responsibilities with the valuable, and collection from waseventually reduced to one indi
national assets was tailored to the J2s vidual before being withdrawn
JTF J2. For Haiti, the NIST was not
read in as to when D-Day would Priority Intelligence Requirements. entirely in early 1995. This last point
occur and was unable to plan apparently was lost on those who
effectively. Fourth, the NIST must be located managed NIST support to the next
with the JTF JIC if it is to provide major deployment of US forces,
the best possible support to the JTF Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR
Second, the NIST chief has to be J2. This took place eventually in now JOINT FORGE.
briefed the Operations Plan in UPHOLD DEMOC
on
Operation
order to prepare the team for
deploy RACY, and it was considered an
and The mission of the multinational,
ment more effectively coordinate essential lesson learned for future
12 NATO-led Implementation Force
national intelligence support. The contingencies.
NIST chief has to maintain strict (IFOR), which conducted Operation
JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE) in Bos
operational security and avoid pass In supporting this complex peace nia,was to patrol the Zone of
ing any operational details to the keeping operation, the reach-back
Separation (as prescribed by the Day
Pentagon or other Washington that the NIST provided to Washing
ton accords) in order to separate the
sanctums. ton kept the various intelligence
90
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NISTs
NISTs deployed for an
extended period
inevitably become
former warring factions and help cre center to ask for national support in
ate aclimate for peace. After more intelligence the form of personnel augmentation
than four years of war in Bosnia augmentation instead or liaison officers.
among three ethnically divided and
of their intended role
heavilyarmed adversaries, OJE began This leads to a second lesson learned:
in December 1995. At one time, as crisis support. NISTs deployed for an extended
NIST-Naples supported the Corn period inevitably become intelligence
mander4n-Chief Allied Forces
Southern European Command
9 augmentation instead of fulfilling
their intended role as crisis support
(CINCSOUTH) in Operation PRO teams. Forexample, the team may be
VIDE PROMISE, while NIST used as a bodysnatch for non-NIST
Vicenza supported NATOs Com design of the program is for NISTs to tasks, such as leading the JTFs
bined Air Operations Center and the deploy for short periods to provide ground order-of-battle cell, single-
air operations over the Balkans, direct intelligence connectivity source SIGINT section, and so forth.
Operation DENY FLIGHT. between a JTF and the national IC. In the of NIST-Hungary, by Fall
case
Once a potential crisis begins to 1996 the analysts who were deployed
Two months before the start of OJE, develop, the NIST program office in to NIST-Hungary were actually sub
at the request of the CINC, NIST the Pentagon should start its deploy mitting more RFIs on the situation in
for ment planning cycle by identifying Zaire than the Balkans.
representatives began preparing on
the deployment of two additional qualified personnel from each of the
teams to the theater. NIST-Tuzia member agencies and preparing the Similarly, Naples and
the NISTs in
would support the Commander of teams equipment. for about five
Vicenza deployed
were
Task Force Eagle and be located in years. The last NATO airstrikes in
the Multinational Division North If a warning order is published and Bosnia took place in 1995. CINC
with the US Armys 1st Armored time permits, the team chief may SOUTH, the commander whom
Division G2, and NIST-ARRC travel briefly to the supported com NIST-Naples supported, relin
would support the Commander, mand to conduct liaison and to pre quished command of the mission
Allied Command Element, Rapid stage equipment that has to be pallet when NATOs IFOR became SFOR
Reaction Corps (ARRC) and be ized. If the CJCS issues a (Stabilization Force) in December
located with the US National Intelli Deployment Order, depending on 1996. Even though CINCSOUTH
gence Cell in Ilidza, a suburb of the commands requirements, a had no command over troops in Bos
Sarajevo. In January 1996, two more lightly tailored NIST consisting of nia, it retained a NIST until 1997.
NISTs were established: NIST only enough individuals and equip
IFOR supported the IFOR Com ment to operate the team and to meet It is difficult to believe that the intel
mander at his headquarters in the the commanders needs (in essence, ligence operations in Bosnia would
American Embassy compound in bare bones computer and commu have been compromised significantly
Sarajevo. NIST-Hungary supported nications support) will deploy to the if both NISTs in Italy had been
the Commander, US Army Europe theater. closed in 1996. The fact that the
(Forward) in Tazsar. Thus, six teams continued to exist, even after
NISTs supported OJE from January After several weeks, if the crisis is not the operational tempo slowed dra
to December 1996. resolved, additional capabilities (such matically, lends credence to the
as larger communications systems charge that the NIST can serve as a
The deployment of six teams in Bos with broader bandwidth capacity) can convenient bypass of theater intelli
nia for about a year duplicated be deployed to the region. At D+90 gence centers. A NIST is intended to
intelligence efforts, reduced national days, the supported command should provide direct access back to Wash
agencies capabilities to provide sup reevaluate its intelligence require ington only in emergency situations.
port in other potential crises, and ments and bring the NIST back to It is not designed as a remedy for the
depleted valuable, limited intelli the United States, request the NIST ater intelligence shortfalls.14 After 90
gence resources, including personnel for an additional 90 days, or coordi to 180 days of a NISTs deployment,
and sophisticated equipment.3 The nate with the theater intelligence the theater intelligence architecture
92
NISTs
A NIST should not be
used as an easy
panacea requested by
should be prepared to replace NIST the theaters to cure all
90 to days. To paraphrase one
180
capabilities, which may include ask intelligence scholar and author, a cri
ing Washington for national agency their inteffigence ills. sis is or~ly a crisis for a few weeks.17
liaison officers, if necessary. A NIST Following that logic, if a NIST is
should not be used as a cover for
9~ deployed only in support of a crisis,
then the length of most deployments
permanent deficiencies in the intelli
gence support structure of a unified should be measured in weeks or
command. months. Nevertheless, a mechanism
has to be put in place to allow exten
them. Who from National would tell sion of deployments in extreme cases,
Finally, another lesson learned, which CINC what the commander needs
a and a restriction should be placed on
applies to both Operations handle crisis in his theater?
to a own the number of extensions the the
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and
While would argue that
JOINT ENDEAVOR, is that an
no one an aters can request. Ut~til a CJCSI is
Instruction issued by the Joint Chiefs augmentation of regional intelligence signed and published, the intelli
of Staff (called a CJCSI) on the NIST analysts or of communications equip gence agencies involved in the NIST
ment has to be requested by the
should be written to replace the cur program, the theater intelligence cen
rent NIST Concept of Operations.
appropriate means, the NIST is not ters, an~1 future JTF commanders are
that means. Equipment, personnel, unlikely to benefit from the lessons of
For this document have credibility
to
and funds are becoming too scarce to the Haiti and Bosnia deployments.
with JTF commanders and J2s, it
needs to be signed by the Chairman provide a NIST to support every ech
elon of command in every theater One doctrinal matter that has
of the JCS and each of the CINCs.
hotspot. Furthermore, the readiness been resolved the
Such an Instruction is likely to be the recently pertains to
of the program to respond to bona Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
one means for ending disputes fide crises suffers (lack of ability to
between theater and national intelli among~the agencies involved in the
train new personnel, wear and tear on
gence centers over the management program. The original MOA, writ
of the RFI process, and would pre equipment, and so forth). When six ten in 1993, had became outdated.
NISTs were deployed in support of With the creation of NIMA in 1996,
vent NISTs from being used as
thepeacekeeping mission in Bosnia, the NI~T membership has increased
augmentation.
one can only imagine what it would from tl-~e original three agencies to
have been like if Iraq invaded Kuwait include NIMA. The MOA has been
16
again. updated to reflect this change.
Suggested Improvements
A NIST, in short, should not be used The new document should have
Based on the lessons learned from requested by the for
as an easy panacea includ4d specific requirement
a
NIST deployments to Haiti and Bos theaters to cure all their intelligence the member agencies to send area
nia, certain adaptations of the ills. The NISTs mission has to
experts, familiar with the region where
program need to be enacted. Below I remain that of supporting crisis or the crisis has occurred. Too often,
offer several recommendations for contingency operations. All other
NISTs overall
agency~managers keep such special
enhancing a capabili requirements for national intelli ists inside the Beltway to brief
ties and support to crisis operations, gence support should be handled by rather than
policymakers, deploy
while at the same time preventing other means. them fOrward with a NIST to the
future deployments from lasting sev
There is the argu
JTF. validity to
eral years.5 ment that sometimes there are too
Instructions and Memoranda few analysts to spare to send one with
Some IC officials would argue that it a NIST. Further, analysts who are
is time the NISTs mission be NIST doctrine should be solidified in deployed for an period lose
extended
changed. If it is augmentation or a CJCSI, which should clearly define their n~uiona1 perspective; they may
enhanced communications that com a NISTs mission and responsibilities become too focused on the minutia
manders want, then the reasoning is and specify a maximum length of of the ~ituation and lose their broader
that national agencies should provide time for a NIST deployment, such as outlook.
93
NISTs
Nonetheless, it seems a small price to
pay for the advantages of allowing an
analyst to develop an on-the-ground
situational awareness and a keen
understanding of what kind of intelli
gence support the tactical
commander requires. One CIA ana
lyst assigned to a NIST at the
beginning of an operation possessed
such a high degree of acumen and
area expertise that he proved to be the
teams greatest asset. He routinely
rounded up the JTF analysts, many
of whom had little or no background
in the region, to focus their analyses
on the pertinent issues.
This analyst gained an invaluable
appreciation for what the military
customer requires, something that
cannot be achieved from a desk in
NIST communications equipment, February 1998. Photo courtesy of the author.
Langley. For this reason, the MOA
should stipulate that regional ana
lysts will deploy forward with the
NIST, at least at the onset of a cri
quarterly VTCs with each CINCs intel acquainted with JDISS, and the sup
sis. To entice qualified members, ligence center to discuss and review pro ported commands have their own
NIST deployments should continue INMARSAT capability. The NIST
posed NIST support in crises and to
to be seen as career-enhancing and be
exercises in each command. program should strive to adopt com
made as attractive as possible to mercial off-the-shelf systems that are
potential volunteers. smaller,more rugged, and less expen
siveto operate. For instance, the
Technical Capabilities
SATCOM system that provides the
Educational Program broadest bandwidth possible with the
A finalrecommendation, based on smallest satellite dish and least expen
technological advances in the IC, is sive fees is the ideal.
To ensure that NISTs are used according that the NIST program should seek
to joint doctrine, aneducational pro
to adopt cutting-edge communica
gram is required. The NIST program tions and computer In his remarks CIA audience
technology in to a
management oflice should conduct fre order to enhance the capabilities it regarding intelligence support to the
quent visits to each of the Unified and brings to the fight. In the past, humanitarian assistance operation in
sub-Unified Commands to train the the NISTs brought with them computer Somalia, Gen. Anthony Zinni,
the program. In addition, it USMC, warned of the of
aters on and communications systems with pitfalls
should participate in theater exercises which personnel in the commands stovepipe~ reporting.l Using a
more often by deploying smaller teams the
were generally unfamiliar, such as common communications path is an
to limit cost. During the exercises, the in which NIST
Joint Deployable Intelligence Sup area performance has
could demonstrate various func improved during the last several
team
port System (JDISS) and
tionsby managing time-sensitive RFIs, INMARSAT mobile satellite commu deployments. Previously, when
providing unique intelligence products, nications terminals. This technology NISTs deployed, member agencies
and soforth. Another educational prac is now more than five years old; most were unable to use the same commu
tice that should be developed is hosting intelligence analysts are well nications path. For security reasons,
94
NISTs
some agencies hesitated to use the tional funding for more frequent with the increased threats to US
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Com visits to the CINCs and for acquir national security, the NIST could be
munications System (JWICS), the ing more state-of-the art systems. called on more frequently in the next
TOP SECRET compartmented Because the NISTs annual budget decade than it was during the previ
secure intelligence network managed already includes travel expenses and ous one.
by DIA. Now, however, the capabil equipment upgrades, a slight increase
ity exists for information
on this in expenditures should be feasible.
system be double encrypted as it
to The greatest cost would be in person
NOTES
moves through the JWICS. This nel hoursprimarily the time it rakes
allows all the agencies of the NIST to to a CJCSI. A goal of one
publish
use one common communications year, from the first draft to publica 1. A partial listing of low-intensity con
flicts includes: combating terrorism;
platform, thereby reducing the scope tion, should be established to exclusion zone operations; ensuring
of the NISTs deployable equipment complete the project. Again, when freedom of navigation; noncombatant
by thousands of pounds and reduc compared to the expense of the devia evacuation operations; recovery opera
ing the number of personnel needed tions from doctrine (six NISTs tion~ show of force; truce keeping (or
to operate the various communica deployed for more than a year sup peacekeeping); and support and assis
operations such control
tions systems from each agency.19 porting the same operation), the cost tance as arms
of doctrinal updates is minimal. support, domestic support, foreign
humanitarian assistance, insurgency
Another technological advance the
support, nation assistance, and sup
NIST should embrace is the Joint
port to counterdrug operations. Aryea
Intelligence Virtual Architecture A Continuing Role Gottlieb and Ann E. Story, Beyond
(JIVA) initiative and the collabora the Range of Military Operations,
tive environment it espouses. JIVA Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1995,
The question of whether the NIST
allows from p. 103.
intelligence specialists program has outlived its utility is one
around the world to work together on that has been raised after each major
issues using commercial soft 2. From 1995 to the present, the author
specific deployment. It seems fitting that has worked in DIA, Directorate for
ware. Using JIVA and its after seven years of operations and
collaborative technology, the NIST Intlligence, J2, Deputy Directorate
some 1200 intelligence and commu
for Crisis Operations, NIST Divi
could gain access to broader and nications professionals have been sion. He deployed as the DIA
deeper analytic resources, while main deployed, the NIST program should Elei~nent Leader with the first NIST
taining a smaller footprint at the undergo the scrutiny of an exhaus inu~ Bosnia and Herzegovina (NIST
deployed location. JIVA-related tive review process. The lessons of Tu4la) in support of Operation
innovations provide analysts with an the deployment to Haiti were incor JOINT ENDEAVOR, and served as
the Chief of the NIST supporting
environment in which they can porated and improved on for the
Operation DELIBERATE GUARD
exchange ideas, similar to the ana NIST deployment to Bosnia. But the in Vicenza, Italy.
lysts VTC, except with less lessons from OJE, the first mission to
bandwidth. While these recommen Bosnia, and from its current opera 3. A National Security
dations are not critical to the overall Strategy ofEngage
tions in JOINT GUARD and and Enlargement, the White
ment
success of the program, they would SOUTHERN WATCH need to be House, February 1996, pp. 2-3, p. 12.
allow the NIST to hone the support enshrined in joint doctrine.
itprovides during future
4. Concept of Operations for the National
deployments. From its the NIST pro
inception, Intelligence Support Team, Washing
gram has taken the lead in providing ton, DC; DIA, 22 March 1995, p. 1.
tailored and timely national intelli
Reasonable Cost
gence support to US forces deployed 5. JCS, Joint Pub 2-02, National Intelli
in overseas crises. As long as intelli Support to Joint Operations (Final
gence
The benefit of implementing these
gence gaps are perceived to exist Coordination Draft); Washington,
recommendations far exceeds the between the national and the tactical DC; GPO, November 1997, p. V-6.
cost. the NIST program
Fiscally, levels, the NIST will continue to have
office would need to allocate addi critical missionto fulfill. In fact, 6. Concept of Operations,
a
p. 3.
95
NISTs
7. JCS, J2 NIST briefing, The National Draft, 7 February 1997; Lt. Col. Ives,
Intelligence Support Team Brief, USA, p. 1.
Intelink, URL: <http:www.dia.ic.gov/
intel/j2/j2o/j2o 1/brief/sldOO9.html>. 15. The NIST in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,
Accessed 29 April 1998.
deployed in 1992 in support of Oper
ation SOUTHERN WATCH. It is
8. The National Intelligence Support still
operating. Until recently, four
Team Brief. other NISTs were deployed in sup
port of Operation JOINT GUARD:
9. Ibid. Naples (which closed on 1 April
1998) and Vicenza (which closed on
24 May 1998), Italy; Sarajevo and
10. Concept of Operations, p. 3. Tuzia, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
11. Operation UPHOLD DEMOC 16. Twelve NMIST (the NISTs prede
RACY, An Assessment ofIntelligence cessor) teams were deployed in
and Communications Systems and Net support of Operations DESERT
works ; Washington, DC, Office of SHIELD and DESERT STORM.
the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1
December 1955; pp. 1-2. 17. Mark Lowenthal, lecture presented to
the Joint Military Intelligence Col
12. Ibid., pp. 4-23. lege, Washington, DC, 9 May 1998.
18. General Zinni, USMC, lecture pre
13. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR,
sented at CIA, Office of Military
Joint Universal Lessons Learned,
Draft, 30 January 1997, Lt. Cdr. Paul Affairs, Langley, VA. Videotape, no
date.
Jaeger, USN, p. 2.
19. National Intelligence Support to
14. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR,
Join Operations, Joint Pub 2-02,
Joint Universal Lessons Learned,
Appendix C.
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