No Drums, No
Bugles
a
Recollections of
Richard I... HoIm
Case Officer in Laos,
1962-1964
In
in
early January 1962, I arrived Vientiane, Laos, for my first
served in Indonesia
dLiring the
communist rebellion in the late
assignment with We Central Intelligence Agency. Young
case
1950s, where he had almost
been captured and
was
eventu
officers like
myself.
has
ing completed basic training for
the Clandestine Service
and
ally exfiltrated by submarine. Lanclry, now Lairs deputy, car
ried
a
swagger stick. and it
was
then
tion,
paramilitary were being sent
(PM) instruc
out
easy to
picture him handling
in
tough
Lair
and
dangerous
situations.
support of President Kennedys decision to hold the line against
communist
was one
soft-spoken
sensed a
and
quiet,
was
Young
case
officers
expansion. Trying
hut
man
who
were
to
help
the Laotians maintain
reflecting
came
on
issues.
When he
being
sent out in
support
their territorial integrity and
their
to
conclusions, you knew
hut and
of President decision
to
Kennedys
independent
hold the line
ment wasa
govern tall order for a new
against communist expansion in Southeast
Asia]..
.
officer.
The demand for
quick
the) were well considered. Landry had a gruff exterior was in reality a considerate
caring
kids
man.
a
tall order for officer.
a
new
decisionmaking and constant flexibility to handle the unex pected in a war zone proved to he excellent preparation for my long career as a case officer in
the field.
He worried about
his subordinates, he
was
especially the sending up coun
ways. both
and
try.
In their
own
great guys work for.
were
splendid
to
Assignment
I traveled
to
Laos
Tribal
Operations
forces, known
were
Vientiane with
Lao communist
us
as
colleaguesthe together and now would serve together in South
three had trained
east
four of
the Pathet Lao (PL), the
Asia.
In the
area
of the
airport operations.
ers.
reserved for Air America
we were
met
by
13i11
Lair and Pat
Landry,
among oth
challenging govetnments Royal Lao Army (FAR) through out the country. Although badly organized and poorly trained and equipped, the lL was holstered by support from
North Vietnam, whose units were called the VC (Vietnam
ese
These officers
were
already
legends. Agencys paramilitary
tions in Laos.
Bill Lair headed the
opera
come
Communists).
He had
to
Southeast Asia in the
early
The
opposing
FAR
forces in Laos
a
at
1950s and spent
Richard L. Holin served
than 35 years in the CIA
Directorate of
more
a
decade in
the time also included
rene
Thailand organizing and train
gade
captain, Kong Le.
an
ing
the elite Thai Police group
Unit (PARU).
who commanded
ion of
elite battal
Operations.
called the Police Air Reconnais
sance
Landry
had
parachutists. Angered by corruption in the FAR, he had
1
Laos
staged
a
coup in Vientiane in coup failed, he
covert
action
to
holster the
The CIAs
working with different tribal/
ethnic groups, such
as
1960. When the
had broken
to
awa\
Lao government.
the
from the FAR
paramilitary
were
efforts in Laos
Hniong
in
the mountainous
form what he called neutral This group, known fought the FAR. hut
Of
divided
roughly along
There
in
north and the Lao in the
ist forces.
as
geographic
lines:
werc
lowlands
the XL, not the PL
the VC.
separate programs Laos, where I was initially
north
assigned.
The United States had
use
central Laosalso
Although
Lao had
a
the Hmong and the
common
opted
to
known
as
the Panhandle
enemy,
they
Agency for International
where I would later be
did
not
like each other.
None
Development (AID) programs, AID advisers, and ultimately
assigned;
and south Laos.
theless, they had their
reasons
and
own
Each program involved
us working objectives were com plementaiy. North Vietnams primary goal was to make free
for
with
their
use
of
eastern Laos to
support
its
war
against South Vietnam.
The average tribesman could
not
have
communism and
distinguished between capitalism, but
the ethnic groups felt threat
ened
and
ers
by
the Lao communists
their Vietnamese support
and decided
to
fight they
to
and
preserve their autonomy
their territoiy.
from
us was
All
wanted mate
financial
and
rial support
The
our
biggest
and
most active
of
programs
was
the
one
in
north Laos supporting the
Hmong tribe.
with leader
Bill Lair struck
at
a
the first agreement
meeting
it
Vang
Pao in Dccciii
her
1960
For the
Hmong,
began more than a fighting and dying.
decade of
In 1962, we knew them as the i\le,, and addressed them thai way rcgu1art~ It
was
simple
\ears,
a
ignorance
I
as
on
Our
pan
In
later
as
to discover
that Men
thing
pejorative terni tin, t me:int sonic 111cc liarharian in local usage
2
Laos
Although
First Posting
In
the
Hmong and
a conunon
the Lao had
mid-Iuly 1962,
me
told
thai I
to
was
assigned region
Ban
Landry being Na just west
Pal
enemy, they each other. Nonetheless, they had their own
reasons
did not like
bulldozer, hut I quickly judged that some cratering charges
would
at
least
lanit
help.
With such the
for
working
us.
charges,
weeks.
predicted that
in
two
of
with
strip would he ready
I cabled
the Plain des jars (PDJ).
was
The
Landry
for the
quiet, and I was to concentrate on getting a land ing strip lengthened. Only single-engine planes or helicop
ters
explosives.
The second
day,
Panit showed
could land, and
we
needed
operator, and an explosives expert. All four could provide
basic training, and all
were
me
the outposts around Ban
a
Na, which formed
semi-circle
an
it to handle
twin-engine planes.
a
facing
area
the Plaine des Jarres,
I was flown to Ban Na in
sin
jump qualified.
confidence and
They exuded
a
under the control of the PL
gle-engine Hello-Courier. short-takeoff-and-landing
A
willingness
to
and the KL since
1960.
and
Each
get
things
done.
outpost had
a
mortar
(STOL) aircraft, the Hello did
yeoman service for Air America.
machinegun emplacements
small shelter in which
ate
and
sonic
Settling
Before
we
In
15 Hmong
and
slept.
at
At
departed,
me
my
pilot
introduced
to
Panit, the
work with
me
leader of the four-man PARU
team
that ~~oulcl
in Ban Na.
The
team mem
Toiengthen the landing strip, Panit had begun work to remove a big hump in the middle of an adjacent sloping
area.
each stop, we looked while the team leader
maps
explained why the particular outpost was placed where it was.
Each site afforded of
a a
bers, who had been at Ban for three months, had been
selected from hundreds of
Na
\Vhen I
were
arrived, the using hoes and at the hump and
good
view
villagers
shovels
then
portion of the
western sec
personnel were at least high school gradu ates, and most spoke a language from a neighboring
country in
applicants.
All PARU
dig carrying away the dirt in wicker baskets slung on poles. What we really needed was a
to
tion of the plain. The PDJ is a prominent, and unusual, geo
graphic feature in north Laos. The plateau was so named by
k
addition trained
to at a
Thai.
They
were
jungle
camp in central Thailand and organized like the US Army
Special
Forces.
were
Counterguer
one
rilla tactics
of their
specialties.
In addition to their
general training. PARU personnel all had specific capabilities
designed
ons
to
enhance small unit
Panit
was a
operations.
man,
weap
which
meant
that he
could handle the whole range of weapons that we were pro
viding
to
the
a
Hmong.
medic,
a
His
team
/Periniezer ourpnst
at
consisted of
radio
Ban Na. tFhoios courtesy of author.)
3
Laos
We had the
length
of the
landing strip
the French colonialists because of the
enormous.
almost
Tactical
cenniries-old
strewn
doubled in just over two weeks after we received
the
Activity
reasons we at
eanhen jars thai about it.
are
cratering charges.
One of the
wanted
was
Midway
between
the
so
longer strip
that
\ve
Ban Na in
Vientiane and the border with
could
bring
more
North Vietnam. the
ers more
plain
cov
supplies
Managing my PARU team was not difficult, because they knew more about what was going on
than I did
Thai and Lao lan
to
than 30 square miles
defenses
on
build up Umong the western end of
out patrols villagers fre
At that
run
of the
time, the VC had free PD.! and truck con
the PDJ.
We sent
and individual
voys from North Vietnam arrived regularly during the
quently
enemy
to
watch what the
doing, and I to Vientiane.
dry
guages
are
similar, and the
was
bringing supplies for the
season
types of
IL
and
1Imong
all
spoke
most
at
Least basic
reported regularly
I had arrived
season was
KL units
Lao in addition to their native
in the
area.
tongue. My
was
important role
to Lair
during
enemy
the rainy
to serve as
the link
when
and
A
Landry
in Vientiane to
ensure
that the
Quiet Routine
team
received
villagers and my the supplies that
ale a
greatly impassable
in
decreased
roads.
mobility by
was one
That
of the
reasons our
sector was so
they needed.
This macIc
quiet
Life in Ban Na featured few
key
it. air
person, and they all knew
around
July. The Hniong got easily in the mountains.
us
highlights. Days spent working on the hump at the
were
however, which gave
the
advantage
I met
until the
next
or
Thy
to
sea
strip, training the Hmong, and walking to nearby outposts.
Our radio contacts
aware
(the
case,
regularly with the Nai Ban viLLage chicO, who, in this
was
son
started in October
We
were
November.
able
kept
us
also
a
Nai
of de day of the month.
We
(chief
of
a
group of
}Chong villages),
conduct hit-and-run attacks
to
enemy tive was
on
supply
points with rela
Our ultimate
Evenings passed quickly.
would
sit
discuss
supplies.
men
Because most
impunity.
to
goal
around
and
were
talk, hut difficult,
of the local
had become
was
retake the PDJ. thereby
on
communications since
Panit
fighters. agricultural activity
almost
at a
relieving pressure
territoty
the
Hmong
only spoke good English and none of the PARU spoke French.
Dinner
ture
as
standstill.
There
all around it.
fore, the village required food
supplies regularly
the meager
to
augment
They
were
amounts
Over the
Hump
was
always
an
adven
the PARU
strove to
things that I would like; however, there really was not of much choicepieces chicken or pork (sometimes
prepare
Periodically. I would send a cable to Landry to request a rice drop. Our sys I tem was amazingly efficient. could always count on prompt
producing.
responses
one
or
frue
to
hump
of the
removed
his word, Panit had the and the length almost clou
landing strip
to my
cables.
Within
bled in just over two weeks after we received the cratering
beef
or
horsemeat), boiled
were not
i-ice
within arrive.
days. hours, the drop
t~sro
sometimes
would
(because the Thai fond of
that
One hundred to 200
our
sticky rice), and some kind of green vegetable; all of
it boiled
or
sacks of rice would land in
stirfried
It
was
over a
drop zone. drops of uniforms, boots, tools,
and whatever else
was
We also received
charges. With the end in sight, the villagers, mostly women, worked steadily after the charges simplified their task. The Air America pilot who
came
to
check
out
the
wood fire.
as
always spicy,
needed.
gave it his OK
despite
an
a
airstrip clip in
both the Thai and the love red peppers.
Hmong
Weapons and ammo came by Helio, chopper, or parachute.
the middle and
to
the whole strip.
uphill slope Rolling
4
Laos
We knew about the
corruption, but few
Americans wanted to
uphill after landing would help planes stop, he said, and going
downhill
on
take
on
the
job
of trying
rake off
was
also
a
to
control it.
plus.
The Ban Na scrip could now handle the Caribou, a Canaclian
made STOL aircraft with great It could at low speeds. land
on
stability
strips
two
not
much
longer
Hello,
a
a
hustle and bustle evident
many pans of the
in
than those needed
by
it
the
city.
hut, with
engines and
ramp,
had
rearopening
Lao
much greater
payload. Bring
getting
closer
to
politics
mill:
at
the time would
ing
it
into Ban Na meant
have been grist for Shakes
the PDJ, A few a strategic step forward. days later, the first Caribou
more
supplies
peares
power,
a
king
without
toward
landed without
Na.
problems
at
Ban
The
pilot
spare.
said that he had
room to
royal princes working conflicting goals, cor rupt politicians selling influence and position, and military offic ers manipulating the system.
Mainly
into
because of the infusion
of aid funds and
supplies
com
Author
at
Phou Song, with the H n~ong
Back to Vientiane
In less than three weeks. I had
Laos, there was a lot of ing to he made in Vien money tiane. Grati and corruption
~i!!~gu
Ie:ider
adapted quickly
and knew the
ing walked all
to
the routine
sector
over
well, has
I
was
it.
absorbed in and enjoying my work, and felt like I was con
Working discreetly (sometimes openly.) with Lao politicians and military officers, foreign merchants siphoned off huge sums of official money.
thrived.
ourselves
as
supporting
US
policy
and
we
believed in it.
When I walked into Pat Lan
thys
ever
office,
he asked
if I hat!
I had
tributing something tangible
an
to
a
heard of Phou Song.
sa
important objective.
came
But
In retrospect,
to
a
greater under
was
not, and he
id that it
was
cable
ordering
inc
back
standing
in Laos
to
of what
going
on
us
north of Ban Na.
was
Our program
Vientiane for
reassignment.
might have enabled
more
expanding
into that area,
me
capital city was quite a change. Primarily inhabited by Lao lowlanclers who comprised
The the majority of the 3 million inhabitants of the country, Vien
effectively and perhaps would have spared some of the pain that the coun fly experienced. We knew about the corruption, hut few
work
Americans wanted to take
on
antI he needed
up there to Phou
keep things organized.
Song also had
me a
1~ARU team for
to
work with.
Al though the
area
was
quiet,
he acknowl worried
large numbers of foreigners, including Chinese,
tiane also had
the
was
job of trying
to
control it.
our our
I
edged
had
that he
was
fully
involved in
about what the P1, units
Indian, Thai. Vietnamese, and
These foreigners, mostly merchants, created French.
the
gram and considered
as
pro effort
nearhy
with
to
on
their minds.
Anti,
mess
something apart in the capital.
from the
We
saw
that, Landry said that I
leave in
a
was
few hours.
5
Laos
Communist units had moved into the valley that we had come
Phon Song
that could
he covered in less
through.
at
We
were cut
off.
than
two
days,
More than that took
round trip. too much
The accommodations
Phou
to
Song
turned
out to he
similar
was
of my time. These trips
Ban Na, hut the setting
sur
s\rere
Again, prisingly found myself watching a Helio depart, leaving me. this time, in a Hinong village high on a
mountain in north Laos.
different.
especially
Song,
or ~~as
I
challenging.
From Phou
the hulk of the
Flying.
.
.
and
Walking
walking
was
strentiousit
was
either tip
the
down.
Moreover, it
Phou
Song
It
a
bigger than Ban Na. occupied less than a third of large, Flat area more than half
was
way up the mountain for which it was named. It was near the
My work at Phou Song was more demanding than at Ban Na. Besides the routine things like logistics and training. I had I to move around constantly would cable Landiy explaining
that I had
to
middle of the rains the
season,
and
frequent
rainstorms macIc
the mountain trails
muddy
and
slippery.
were
The first times
out
was
real tests.
to see
Everyone
watching
how the for
edge of a precipitous drop into the valley. Because of the large
open space next the village, Phou
to
go to this or that
and helnncl
village and needed a Hello for the clay, and early the next
morning,
Prasert
me.
one
Song had a large drop zone and a landing strip that could easily accomino date twin-engine STOL aircraft
Thanks
to
would
arrive.
frequently
went to
with
but, after I got
know the
region,
I sometimes ivent alone.
a
eigner would ha nclle the traits. Suspecting that I would have a hard time, they macIc it as easy I took no as possible for me. pack, just my weapon and web belt. The small 1-Imong sol diers carried packs plus their
weapons
and
the AID program.
a
On those occasions
lot
food and
water.
there
was
warehouse for
stor
depended
on
the
availability
even
of
ing
rice,
clothing,
was
and other clis
French (or sometimes
materiel that
ributed
to
regulai~ly nearby villages.
Englisif) speakers.
In the
An
Emergency Situation
to
villages
that I visited,
we
would talk about what Phou Song was more secure than Ban Na because the only
enemy units
were
nearby doing and
\Ve
about needs of all kinds.
su
approaches
est
to
it
were
easy to
near
ppliecl everything
from
to
Song, take me plane to three villages in our region. At the second village, a col league was waiting for inc. He
I scheduled
a
Short lv after I got
Phou
to
monitor and block. PL camps
The
weapons and ammunition
said
that
a
Helio had gone
that the
were at
the far
schoolbooks, medicines,
and salt,
rice
end of the
other side
valley and on the from our village.
uniforms, building
nionev.
materials, and
some
For I
was
pilot might injured. Members of a Hmong patrol thought that they
down
and
be
The majority of the men from the area were fighters. Phou
of these
things,
had the
seen side
where the Helio hit This
a
Song was a focal point for our programs efforts in the area. The PARU Leader, Prasert, and his team members were quite
the middleman making arrangements for an AID
simply
of the mountain.
IF
was a
serious situation.
or
delivery
to a
given
village.
Somettmes,
able
or
friendly. pied two
airstrip.
I
The
cain
and I the
occu
houses
at
near
warehouse
the
edge
of the
quickly
decided that I
no plane was avail place I was going had no landing strip, so L would take a Hmong patrol and a cou ple of the lARU and walk. We
chopper went clown. possible effort would every immediately he made to rescue plane
those aboard.
We all knew that
the
something happened, our col leagues would come after us.
We decicted to lead
a
if
Hmong
I wrote
liked Phou Song.
limited
these walks
to
distances
patrol
to
Ihe crash site.
6
Laos
a
note
informing Landrv
and
of
our
confident that I could handle
whatever
felt
sure
decision
gave it
to
my
might
come
up
and
his emergency lineofsight radio. The pilot must have had
Hello
pilot
to
deliver.
that the
patrol
would
his mike open because lie
succeed.
picked
we
us
up
right
more
away.
But
Eight Hmong accompanied
There
was
a
us.
received
had
news.
sense a
of urgency.
fast pace The (list
The next
day
we
started climb
Intelligence
reporting available
\Ve maintained
fairly
we
ing again.
at
sance
Two
to
1-Iniong had left
a
in Vientiane indicated that PL
and took few
rests.
daybreak
above
do
reconnais
we
units had moved into the that
we
couple of hours
below that the
headed
us.
As
pushed
how
downhill toward the
The Hmong
\riIle)r thought
the far
ahead,
much
I was struck
we
by
on
depended
the
plane
was
on
side of the mountain in Front of
us.
Hmong. We had no idea where the plane might he and no
landmarks
or
villey through. We were cut off. Taking no chances, Landry planned to get us out by helicopter as soon as possible.
had
come
There
were so
a
near
there,
PL positions chopper res
to use
to
get there
the
situ
hack.
They
realized
cue was
not
feasible.
The
was
jungle
thick.
on
the
valley
was a
floor
trail of
ation, but they also counted on us for the support we could call in. There was great mutual
trust
Evasion and
Escape
to retrace
It took
our
us
10 minutes
There
and respect. after
we started, reappeared. I
sorts, hut the
undergrowth
a
had
An hour
or
almost closed in.
cross
\Ve had to
so
steps to a clearing higher up and put out a mark-erthe patrol leader had one in his
rid head up the mountain in Front of us.
the
valley
the
two scouts
could tell
news was
by
their faces that the
Despite the terrain,
we
man
bad.
aged
than
to traverse
two
the
area
in less
excitedly
with the
They talked patrol leader
pack that he used when receiv ing parachute drops while on patrol. One Hmong was posted
on I
lie trail just above the clear
instructions to
come
hours.
and then he gave it to us in French. The pilot was dead
we
ing with running
per.
for
when he
us
saw
the
chop
At mid-afternoon.
started
no
to
he had
as
probably
died
on
impact
was
None of
to
wanted the
on the ground couple of
climb.
We
were
having
tip
s~ff
the front of the
plane
helicopter
more
stay
a
trouble
keeping
Ii the
smashed in.
There had been hidden the from the
than
Hmong.
\Ve climbed for about
three hours until almost
night
no fire. They had pilots body away
minutes.
a
fall, and then started looking for place to spend the night. We
to a
crash site.
We called the l-lelio and
they
en
told
The
us
that the
pilot
was
came
clearing
we
and
It
saw
a
hut
at
the far end.
was
aban
activity far below theni that caused them
two
seen
had
to
and would he in position in five or 10 minutes. As soon
route
as
a
doned, and
That
moved in.
think
a
PT. unit
might
he
mov
Ia rge clou ci fil ledl the
~a
I
night,
away.
I did not fall I
asleep
was
ing up the mountain from the opposite direction to check out
the crash site. J10~~r many PL
\Ve had
ni
no
right
thought
more
about
idea
where I
was
and what I
doing.
but I
I
was
isolated
ever
and
vulnerable than I had
been,
was doing what I defi nitely thought was right. I felt lucky to have the chance that only a few ever have of actually making a difference. I was
ight he com ing, hut prudence dictated a We started hack, aijcl retreat. the walking was easy because
we were
Icy and obscured vision, the chopper caine in. We heard it beforewe saw it. The pilot hugged the side of the moun
tain, then swung around and touched down right in die mid
headed down and Then
we a
around the mountain.
heard the welcome sound of Hello.
clearing. He even facing us. The Air America pilots were truly out standingthey had incredible
had the door
dle of the
My colleague pulled
out
skills and guts.
7
Laos
.
We took
our
losses
even
in those
early days...
remained Paos
but
Concern and Relief
we
got the job done.
Although
at
it made
we
perfect
sense
,,
us.
at Long Tieng, Vang headquarters, to monitor
the situation.
the time,
turned
what
had gone off on out to be an unau
In the
thorizecl dangerous mission. If an Agency officer were to fall
into enemy hands, there would
end, he
was
so
relieved that
we were
hack
safely
that he did
not
yell
at us.
Landry moved headquarters to Nong Kliai, just across the Mekong River in Thailand. To
Lair and
Initially,
their program
he hell
Washington. A lot of nervous people had been following developments when it became known the night before that we were out looking for the downed pilot.
to
pay in
get there from Vientiane, could take a fiveminute
one
flight
a
Withdrawal
I spent
in Phou
Preparations
or
catch
a
riverthe
a
ferry ferry
across was
the small
just
few additional weeks
Song working
our
to
expand
Lair and
program.
But time As
a
Landry
were
wailing
to
soon ran out on us.
result
for
us
in Vientiane.
They
of
looked relieved and
see
us.
happy
that
not
political ington relating
decisions in Wash
to
the 1962
on
tug-like craft with an under powered engine. The arrival of~ the gaggle of foreigners was a jolt to what had been a sleepy little town The local popula tion adjusted quickly, however,
and welcomed the boost that presence gave to the econ oniy. Among other things, the sale of Singha beer jtinipecl
our
Lair
suggested
it would
Geneva Protocol
a
the Neu
~nxt tinie
be
had idea
to
wait for instructions.
trality of Laos, word came that we were to he withdrawn froi~
Laos.2
His
typically
low key comment
noticeably.
This
was
a
belied the
concern
and the
bitter
pill.
All of
our
responsibility he felt very strongly. We were two of the eight young American officers
for whom he
was
observations and reporting had indicated that the VC had no
intention of
lidorn,
town
a
much
larger
Thai
about 50 kilomejers fur
pulLing
accountable.
were
units out of Laos.
any of their To the con
ther south, had a large airport with a long concrete runway built
These young officers spread
thinly and worked
would
not
trary, their activittes, in east-central Laos,
especially
were
by
AID.
l.Jclorn became
a
major
area
US airbase and
staging
hardwe
have had
our
ii any other way.
We took
losses
even
in those
early
daysboth Agency officers and the pilots who were supporting
us
Despite the evi dence that we had provided, the State Department was deter mined to live by the conditions
increasing.
of the Protocol that Ambassa dor Harriman had
for combat and
supply
Lao
flights
into Laos in support of
US efforts to
support the
government.
early
Eventually, in 1963. Lair and Landry
a at
But
we
got the job done
signed.
I
moved their program head
Friends, who worked directly with Landrv in the office, later
told
me
My fellow
Agency officers and
it turned
quarters to a new facility in restricted-access compound
Udorn airbase. Their effort
arguedsuccessfully,
outthat leave the Hntong
Two advisers
inely
as
that he had been genu concerned and really torn
it would he wrong to
the situation
one
developed.
was
On
high and dry. discreetly
had grown too large to he managed out of a rented house in Nong Khai.
the
hand, he
frus
we
trated and irritated that made the decision
to
on
had
own
our
See
Declaration and Protocol
on
the
Meanwhile, in late September 1962, Landry told me that I
would be
leave with the
knew that it
ous.
But he
patrol. He would be danger also was proud of
Neutrality of Laos, 23 july 1962, Ameri Docunie,,is ca,i Foreign Policy- Ci,nt,zt /962 (\Thshington. DC US Government Printing Office. 1963), p. 1075
taking
over
their
project
\\as
in the
Panhandle, which
The
in its
early stages.
8
Laos
North Vietnamese
were
a
ing
of
and
exploiting
on
large
we
occupy chunk
I spent almost 20 months oper
port
or
other identification.
No
eastern
Laos, and
needed
ating out of Nakhon During that time, no
asked
me
lhanom.
one ever
one, least of all the border oFfi
cials,
ever
questioned
doing.
were
me
about
information
they
die
were
exactly doing. The
a
what Panhan
what I
was
doing.
the Bor
what I
was
My
coveradvisor
to
area
stretches from just north small Lao
town
cler Policewas
hackstopped
hut
no
one
Almost all Thais
con
of Thakhek,
only minimally,
seemed
too
cerned about the communist
threat.
on the Mekong River. to about midway between Savannakhet
worried.
Without
They welcomed
to
our were
fanfare,
I had moved from
support and eager
resources and
and Pakse to the south.
bounded
on
It is
the
west
by
the
Mekong,
der with
east
which is also the bor
Thailand,
and
on
the
being assigned to Laos to being assigned in Thailand. The Agency took care of all the paperwork so I was not illegal.
As the VC
help
in any way.
Both
of my ii~ai assisrantsJimmie~ and Mr. Ambrose, an inter
by
the Annamite mountain
preterwere good work The sixman
looked
a
at
their
team
PARU
range, which forms the border with North Vietnam.
violations of (he 1962
were
lot like the PARU I had
I also had
Protocol increased and verified
~~roi.keci with in Laos.
a
I
was
surprised.
to
I had
a
not
expected
handle
get
project
to
by photography signals intelligence, Ambassa dor Harriman finally conceded
and that the communists
were not
houseboy
to
named Whet.
we
This
was
along
be my staff, and well.
got
on
my own, and the
prospect was appealing I would he working with ethnic
Lao, and the collect
objective was to intelligence on the VC.
abiding by the rules. Accord ingly, restrictions on our activities gradually loosened. Early in my tour at Nakhon Pha
nom, I would have my team
Turnover
Briefing
clay
was
Much of my first
spent
The operation was in the pro cess of shifting its headquarters from Thakhek,
norm across
to
leaders
with
come to
Thailand
I
to met
checking equipment, signing the required forms about gear
and administrative matters,
and
Nakhon Pha
in
me.
Then,
began
mak
the
Mekong
ing trips
into Laos at
night.
the
looking
around Nakhon
next
Thailand.
Finally,
the
I
began
to cross
Phanom.
river into Laos
regularly during
a
day.
I never carried
pass-
clay, my me through predecessor the operational aspects of my
walked
The
The Panhandle
Project
was a
Nakhon Phanorn
quiet,
were
pretty inhabitants.
A
town
of several thousand
Some streets
general store, a few paved. small shops, the towns only
restaurant, and some govern
ment
offices
were
clustered
appeared to he a central square. My house was near the airport. which had a laterite runway capable of taking large cargo planes. Thai Airways flights arrived twice weekly from Bangkok.
around what
Lao
Panhandle, of increasing stralegic irnporiance
to
North \ieinani,
9
Laos
Myl
responsibilities, beginning
the location of each PM
and his
with
seven teams
varied
to
Two passes
mites
to and
in si2e from 15
more
team
men
than 100.
through the Anna provided access for roads
from Vietnam.
area
iiiixecl
Mr.
at
opinions about the bag of team leaders.
level of
team
From the
Thakhek
in
western
Laos,
and
Ambrose, who interpreted
knew them well
a
each meeting with the
to
leaders, also
and was
training varied widely from team to team, depending on the quafity and skills of the
team
Route 8 followed the tipper
edge
Nape
of the Nakav Plateau
to
headed
\Tietnam
he
great
help
in
leader.
Each member had
Pass.
through the Beginning in the
the months
to come.
at
least rudimentary weapons trainingall were armed and
had unifonus and boots.
We
same a rca,
Route 12 moved
eastward
the
This intioductory
the ~hole
day.
briefing took Maps were
along the bottom of Nakay Plateau and through
Further south,
east
ran
also
rice
supplied
medicines and
the Mu Gia Pass.
Route 9
everywhere. I became mu mately familiar with the geogiaphic coordinates of many places in central Laoswithin
months I could cite from
ory the coordinates of
towns
or
by airdrop. All were paid more than Lao military person nel Pay was according to rank The team leader or position.
received cash and then distrib uted the pay
team
headed
from
Savannakhet and
across
the Panhandle,
ni
straight touching
South Vietna
just below the
at
mem
demarcation line
the 17th
road
specific junctions. From
I
was
bad
a
his group. Each radio and stayed in
to
parallel.
Route 13, the
only
northsouth
road in the Panlian
north
each
to
south,
that
briefed
sup
on
regular (usually daily)
with
were us.
contact
teaiii
we
were
Two of
our
PARU
porting. My predecessot. \\rho had started the project from
scratch, had been obliged to work closely with Lao military
officeis. who
were
radio operators, and they
dIe, stretched all the way from Vientiane to Pakse, following the Lao side of the Mekong
River.
maintained
our
the base station for
These roads all had
project.
crushed laterite surfaces, but
none
were
reliable for
year
also
a
mixed
round travel,
primarily because
the rainy
hagall degree.
corrupt
The
to sonic
Evolving
com
Mission
of
flooding during
team
leaders, often
sea son.
nominated mander of
to
by
a
ilie
military
area.
The 17th
parallelthe
deniarca
given
tended
tion line between North and
Decisionniakers in had
be former military officers
South Vietnamtouched southeastern
the
allegedly had retired. were refugees who had been Nai Khongs or Nai Hans from key villages in the areas where they were now monitor ing enemy activities
Some
~~rho
edge
of the Lao
tian Panhandle
This chunk of
territory
interest
was
of strong strategic
At the
Washington already begun discussing strategic options for cutting the North Vietnamese supply route through Laos. One proposal by
the US military entailed
to
the North.
fortify 9, the
time I arrived, the United States
was
ing and defending
which
ran
Route
across
just beginning to grapple with the importance of North
use
straight
Panhandle.
However,
Team members
were
all local
Vietnamese control and
of
villagers. Sonic had been dis placed by the communist takeover of the areas along the
border with North \Tietnain, while others
were
the network of dirt roads
and
Washington policyniakers rejected the militarys proposal. Generally speaking, those of on the ground at the time
believed that trucks
limited
to
were road
us
trails running along the eastern side of the Panhandle from
north
to
south, later widely
the Ho ChiMinh
from
areas
known
Trail.
as
along
teams
men
the
Mekong.
Some had
seven
the Frenchbuilt
any
been in the FAR.
The
varied in size, from 15 than 100.
The Frenchbuilt
in the Panhandle
road network
was
system for transporting thing in the Panhandle.
would
conic
We
to more
The
sparse.
to know
better.
10
Laos
Even
as
early
Vietnamese
1962, the North were building and
as
those sites, would he Thai
with
improving roads
between Route
soon
12 and Route 9 that would
especially since I working from the side of the Mekong. But goals and a plan, we
a
anticipated,
about
a
sonic
reacted
It
more was
favorably than others.
5050
split.
Those who
take truck convoys.
Moreover,
would be moving from much mOre active
hesita ted, genera fly liked the security and comfort of living
near
during
move
the dry season,
jeeps
cou
passive organizational stage
a and
into
and sometimes trucks
id
risky
Lao
the Mekong. well inside government-controlled
overland off the limited
effort.
areas,
and/or genuinely feared
into
to
areas
i-cad network.
moving clandestinely
During
Sitting
\iJas
my first nionth in
enemycontrolled
east.
the
in Nakhon Phanoni. I
Nakhon but
one
Phanom,
of the
I met
with all
Tha
It became clear that mtich
lea iii
quickly
the
realized that tile Trail
team
leaders.
to
problem. My goal became to position tennis at key points in the easternmost parts
of the Panhandle
to
Each made the
journey
cajoling and motivating, or leader changes. would he
required
to
khek and then crossed Nakhon Phanom.
over to
10 move
those
ieaiiis
These
meet
the watch sites.
I knew that
clandes
ings became
events, ones
at
least
monthly
they
the col
several would report
to
promptly
tinely
the
monitor all traffic
roads
and trails
along being used
entered two
that the leaders
their Lao
I could
military
contacts,
rarely
time.
missed because
and
expect questions
by
the VC after
one
they
lected their
payroll
at
same
from the latter
I was
concerning
what
Laos via
through
passes the Annamites. To do
of the
that, I knew that I would have to train, motivate, and support
the
Using this as leverage, I was gradually able to develop a personal relationship with each
one.
doing.
was
I decided that it
time to
brief Lair
a nd
villager/soldier
so
members of would
to move
my teams
that elie~
take the risks
required
At those first meetings, I spent a lot of time briefing each leader
on
about my I told them that if
L;indry in derail plans for the project.
we were
into enemy-controlled areas and
our
collective mission
sites.
to
radio back reports to our base None of the teams had statld)n.
estahlish road-watch
As I
get some useful intelli gence, we needed teamswith radiospositioned a lot further
going
to
previously intelligence intelligence
been located in
posi
V., ~
tions that enabled systematic
:~p
collection
was
-
Some
being pro vided, but it was sporadic and of minimal use, coming prima rily from random patrols and villager debriefings.
Panhandle
Planning
~
A
Looking
hard
to
at my maps, it was not select the points where
I wanted to establish road-
watch sites. Cia passes
The
were
Nape
and Mu
obvious
locations, hut it would he
difficult,
I
knew,
to
get
teams to
ltainv
season niovenieni
ot
supplies
in
the Panhandle
11
Laos
east.
I showed them the sites I
at
Approval
Early
to
from the Chief
had selected
the
Nape
and
Mu Gia Passes.
I said that I
the
next
thought
reports
we on
could get daily what was moving
Vientiane
to see
morning, I flew the chief
or
there, Charles Whitehursi,
background and then about the project in the Panhandle. 1-lis questions revealed that lie already had a good idea what the problems were and a feel
for what it
Laotians.
was
into Laos via the passes and
Whitey,
known.
as
lie
was
widely
quite
like
to
deal with
also would he able
to
identify
About 40. he had
A
Savvy
about Head
which portions were headed straight to Son th Vietnam.
history. pLayer in
a
semipro baseball
his youth, he ended
Landry knew little about the infant project in central Laos, but I piqued his interest. We spent a couple of hours going I told him about over specifics. my meetings with each team
leader and outlined what
we
up in OSS in World War II. He parachuted into North Vietnam with
a
quarters. lie advised me on what I should emphasize in my cable. After reviewing the draft
and suggesting a few changes, he decided it should he sent to
team
intending to bridge between
China.
of commandos, blow up a key
Vietnam and
was
That mission
war
aban
doned when the before the
ried
out.
ended
car
Headquarters immediately. It late when I left Whiteys ~~as house, but I was elated by what had transpired.
Less than
a
plan
could be
by team, showing him each teams location. I was
had,
team
Pragmatic, smart, and unpretentious, Whitey handled
week later,
thndry
cabled
to
me
in Nakhon Phanoni
ested and
pleased that he was so inter impressed with the
aplomb.
the varied programs with Lair and Landw had
come to
agreed
say that Headquarters had to the concept, the goals,
depth
posed
of the
questions he
like him, and that for
was tue.
Finally, lie told me to draft a cable to CIA Headquar ters outlining the prolect.
certainly good enough
That
plan itself. 1-Ic sounded happy, and I sure was. The new project had been given an
and the
night,
before dinner
at
his
house, Whitey and
I talked in
official cryptonym for use iii cable traffic: Henceforth it
wouLd he known NOSE.
as
general
terms, first about my
HARD-
Landrv and I both
it
was a
thought
good crypt.
Making
In
HARDOSE Work
early 1963, my activities were still circumscribed by US sup
port for the Geneva Protocol.
Nonetheless, meetings
team
with my
leaders started
and
results
I
produce stepped them up.
to
To
improve
to
my access, I
trav
eled
town
Mukdahan, the Thai across the Mekong from
Savannakhet. for meetings with two team leaders operating in
the southern Panhandle. constraints
As into
Road-watchag
team
seIect~ng obsenaiion
aite
in
the
ea,tern
Ianhandte.
Laos at
eased, I slipped night for additional
12
Laos
Getting agreement from
team
leaders]
to move
urine and excrement from the
meetings with my
to
team
leaders
discuss
logistics, training,
their teams in enemycontrolled areas to the
east was
National Zoo and manufac tured
a
reporting, communications, and team location. Getting agree
ment to move
always touchy.
substance that
resembled and sniellecl like
what the
their
teams into
enemy-controlled areas to east was always touchy.
eastward made it
the
it did not fool the
tigers produced. But dogs in the
Panhandle of Laos. VC Countermeasures
Moving
more
even
difficult than usual
locations
and
HABDNOSE
to con
we
Headway
passed,
more
our
firm
team
often
just had
to rake their word for it.
we
Sometimes
could
to
use
collat
eral information
double-check If
we
reporting from
ML! Gia
our teams.
had overhead coverage of the Pass, for example, we could cross-check it with report ing from a team on the ground
mid-1963, the VC became increasingly aware that our teams were watching them and began using countermea sures. They patrolled areas along the roads that they were using and planted spies in the
In about
As the months
teams
became
and
more
effective.
aggressive Stay away
the
mes
from the enemy, sage I
teams.
was
preached
to all
of my
None had any
problem
villages
food
in the
area.
Our teams
along
was
Route 12.
Our
colJeagues
us. our
in Udorn often did this for
I
always pleased team reported trucks
when
on a
discreetly purchased locally, which occasion ally proved dangerous. If discovered by a VC patrol, our teams could only run. They
sometimes
with that concept. Find a spot away from the road hut with
clear
if
vision,
on a
hill
or
bluff.
possible,
and stay hidden.
teams
Rotate small
from
a
partic
base camp every
couple
of
lacked the and
ular road and air coverage on the same day confirmed the
position of the convoy. Occa sionally, independent reports from villagers could also he used
to
firepower to stand fight. In the later 1960s that changed as bigger teams with heavy firepower were
inserted.
days. and always stay out of sight. Move at night. Noth ing particularly brilliant, just common sense, and slowly it
started
to
~ork
confirm
our
road-watch
The VC sometimes used sniffer
We handed out
cameras to
and
reporting.
clogs, which caused lots of
trained
problems.
Food firm
was
One of the reports
to
drops
also served
No
to con
that and
we
forwarded
Udorn
team
locations.
drop
made unless the proper
signal was displayed in the drop zone, and the team had to be there to display the correct signal. We changed the signals periodically to keep the teams attention. They definitely
wanted
to receive
Headquarters mentioned that the presence of tigers in a given area appeared to make a difference. The VCs dogs
seemed
urine.
to
photo graph passing traffic. We also produced laminated plastic cards identifying various kinds
team
members
of trucks and other vehicles to
systematize the reporting terminology.
From the
be less effective if
excrement
or
the) smelled tiger
We had
no
spring of 1963
our
way of
onward,
coverage of the Ho
net
the rice and careful about
knowing if this was true. At F-Ieadqtiarters. an office in the
Directorate of Science and
Chi Minh road and trail
work in the
eastern
Panhandle
in
supplies
and
were
of Laos increased
steadily
the coordinates they gave and the signals they were to use.
Technology decided to try to produce a countermeasure.
Years
quantity and quality.
tion to the
to
In addi
Later, when
by ~~here
teams were
inserted
later, when
I
was
about
chopper, we knew exactly they were.
retire, I learned that the office had
analyzed samples
of tiger
daily reports that we by radio, sve started getting cassettes of film, which Our photo we sent to Udorn.
received
13
Laos
The teams took
enemy
coverage became pretty good. Some of it was useful in con
photos
even
of
patrols, trucks,
and laden with
bicycles,
elephants
sacks and
appeared.
Landrv handled all
the financial and administrative aspects of the project for
At the end of
me.
firming
to
\TC presence, which led
further relaxation of the
on our activities.
on the Ho CM Minh Trail].
cans
restrictions The
teams
photos of enemy patrols, tnicks, bicycles. and even elephants laden with
took
surprised
wanted
In turn, or logistics. they provided transport, approved landings at airstrips for resupply purposes. and
to
me
fly briefing, he by saying that he ask Headquarters to
sacks and
cans
support
extend my assignment until the summer of 1964, making it a
As the situation
changed.
more
was
full twoyear tour. I had to think a minute before respond
able
to cross
the river
fre
selected
men
for
our teams.
quently
and travel
at
by day
I
saw
instead of
senior Lao
night.
the
regularly,
sons
Army officers move but primarily for rea
We did not
teams were
a our
In late spring,
crime
Landry
a
had
me
ing. Africa Division was expecting me hack. But I was enjoying my work and felt like I
was
to
Udorn for discussions.
making
a
contribution.
So
I-Ic
was
of courtesy. hut
expecting
an
senior
I said yes.
visitor from
discuss what
wanted NOSE.
doing,
idea.
tions.
they good They raised few objec usually indirectly. I
a
had
Headquarters and update on HARD-
For the remainder of
1963. the
my
traveled
few times
and
to see
on
their camps the road
strongpoints leading into Tha
east.
khek from the
On
a
few
occasions, I was able to help them with communications
feeling things were going. There were still problems, but progress had been steady. We ~~ent over everything, including the budget, a subject that I did not
know much about,
when I asked for
In the
At that point. I was comfortable about how
Laos program, project. made
including
significant
progress and prospects were bright for 1964. Attitudes were
positive and
as
our
confidence
plan
original game high. of organizing small, wellThe
use
field,
it
trained mobile units for hit-and-run
to
in
something,
operations designed
harass and tie up VC units was only then starting to shift
incrementally
alLy
toward
more
ambitious tactics aimed
at actu
seizing and
saw
Few
any
holding ground. potential dan
certain that
cause our
gers.
We
were
actions would
setbacks
for the VC. President
In Washington, Johnson increased
overall US support for South
Vietnam.
Both
in
and in Southeast Asia,
Washington despite
ceaseless
in
political machinations
and Vientiane. Ameri
to
Saigon
cans
continued
view the
situation
through
That
rose-colored
glasses.
a superpower could be tied down and ulti
mately
Team leader
rendered impotent in its
was
debriefing patrol
returning from the Mu Cia Pass
area
conflict with North Vietnam
14
Laos
Moving into a more aggresive mode in the
eastern inconceivable.
Some harsh
to
Panhandle called
political
learned.
lessons had yet
be
for
bigger teams with more firepower.
thinking
approved
Landiys
As
a
They outline, as did Headquarters. Go slow, was
to
Uclorn.
the
guidance.
we
A Welcome Addition
and
first step,
I
needed
a
place
Early
sent
a
to do our
training.
Dick
went to see
the Thakhek
in
1964,
Lair and
Landry
to
suading
the
team
leaders, and
as
second officer, Dick Kins
sometimes the members
military commander. Corrupt and ineffective as a com
mander, he
nice
was
man, to
Nakhon Phanom
me
well, of the wisdom of gestions
I
was
our
sug
nonetheless
He
a
backstop
take
over
and
ultimately
the
project when
Dick, who was from upstate New York, was a Syra cuse University graduate and had joined the Agency a few
left.
years earlier.
teer
important and knack for listening Dick had a and explaining without being condescending. This was just
the
enough
take
guy.
agreed
out
to
let
us
over a
former Lao
Army training facility just
side Thakhek.
we
It had all that
to
right approach
with
our
Lao
would need
get started.
counterparts.
He
rest
was
a
volun Dick and
I discussed several
like the
at
of
us
and had
Recruiting
new
members for
the
next
our teams was
step.
arrived
Udorn in the fall of
1963
awhile
He
to
stayed
get
a
in Udorn
possibilities project, including
would
move us
for the future of the
one
a
We made it clear that recruits
that
more
would have dards.
or
to meet our stan
a
feel for
was a
things,
wel
into
Being
and his presence Dick was come.
most
low-key guy and I could see right away that we would get along.
Around the time that Dick
aggressive mode in the eastern Panhandle. That option would
call for
family
not a
friend of
cousin, brother, a team leader
was
sufficiently qualify
bigger firepower. At a minimum, would need company-size
teams
with
more
we
ing factor.
units
if
we
hoped
to mine
were
the roads
Overambitious
With
arrived,
about
we
started
thinking
moving management of
using, or ambush and destroy truck
convoys.
that the VC
the program hack into Laos. We rented a small house in
Thakhek, and
I sometimes
This would he
a
big step
stayed
there
Laos for
overnight meetings.3
while in
beyond road-watching and would have to be carefully planned. We would need to
recruit and train
we
sights aimed much higher than ultimately proved reasonable, we developed a plan to hit Route 12 just as it passed through the Annamites
our
at
the Mu Gia Pass.
The VC would
be shocked,
we
believed,
to see
Dick
sat in on
all of the
meet
more
men, and
the Mu Gia Pass closed to truck
ings
with
team
leaders and
me
would need additional
traffic. But,
as we soon
found
frequently caught
on
traveled with
PARU support for the
training.
up in Viet
was
when I crossed into Laos.
He
Things
nam
were
heating
as the out, not nearly as Bravo when we leader of Team
shocked
quickly. Much of our success depended upon per sonal relationships, and he established rapport easily. Per-
and southern Laos
more
explained
no
the
objective.
com
becoming
sides.
critical, for both
we
At that time,
had
hope of impeding traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and only
wanted
to
plan involved some plicated logistics. It was season, so we explained
Our
we
the
dry
that
harass the VC
more
to
After I left, in July 1964, my successor moved die whole base station 0f the
3
make their tasks cult.
We sent
an
diffi
our
would send cratering charges by truck and boat
Team Bravos
to
project
to
Sa~annakhet,
Laos
outline of
base camp.
Then
15
Laos
I felt that I had been
part
of
a
an
effort that
was
15-man
dozen
walk
to
patrol, carrying a cratering charges, would
the Nakay Plateau
where Route 12 via the Mu Gia
doing the right thing.
A Backward Look
across
the
place
The
entered
Vietnam
Pass.
patrol
would
pick
a
asked what I
was
going
to
to
do
some 35 years later, I lament many of the unintended results of our efforts from 1961-
Now,
spot along a ravine or another vulnerable place, and, at night.
1973.
The
when I got back
ters?
I said I
Headquar guessed that I
ignorance and the
plant all charges.
cut
12 of the
cratering
arrogance of Aniericansarriv ing in Southeast Asia during
The road would be
for weeks.
would go to Africa Division, where I ~s supposed to go
before I volunteered for Laos.
Lair said that if 1 would like to
return to Laos
that period were contributing factors. We came to help, but
we
The
team
leader started spew
ing
out one reason
after another
not
after home leave,
had only minimal under standing of the history, culture, and politics of the people we wanted
in to
why such an he possible.
reasons
effort would
He had
so
I would be most welcome.
aid.
were
The discussions about
Geneva
many
big
strategic presi
And
that he didnt
power issues
more
than about
even
The offer
include ~evil spirits. He pleaded with us to recon
have
to
sider.
We
was
finally did, and
sent.
no
patrol
Years
temptingI But was doing. enjoyed it would probably mean a career of running PM opera
was
Laos
or
Vietnam.
were
Our
what I
interests
onto a
superimposed
our
region where
to
dent had decided line
we
draw the
tions rather than the
classical
against
communism.
our
later,
I learned that B-52
tons
intelligence
Laos.
work that I had
to
would do it
way.
bombers
highexplosive bombs and cratering bombs all along the Trail and in the strategic passes, including
Mu Gia.
cut
dropped
of
envisioned before coming
So I held off
making
any
US
commitment until I could talk to
policies responsible
in Laos
are
largely
for the disaster that
The road
than
a
was
never
people at Headquarters. Landry, of course, was aware of
Lairs conversation. He pre
not return to
befell the Hmong. \ang Paos meeting with Bill Lair in late
for
more
few
an
days.
incredi
1960
than
was a
the
beginning people,
man
of
more
The Vietnamese did ble
dicted that I would
decade of warfare and
job of repairing and rerouting to keep supplies flow Our 12 ing southward cratering charges, even at that
Laos after consultations in
Washington. right.
In the
end, he
was
hardship although
come.
for his neither
that
day
could have foreseen the
From its
to
out
early stage,
would
not
have had
I left Nakhon Phanom
effort
origins as an organize and train the
much effect.
July 1964, traveling to Bangkok via Udorn. I was happy with the
in
Hmong
ment,
in
guerrilla
tactics
to
resist communist encroach
our
Career Decisions
previous
to
\\TQ
years.
an
I felt that I
evolved into
tion
not
program gradually a direct confronta of the local FL,
had been part of
On
one
effort that
only
More
about
me
trips May 1964, Bill
a
of my
Udorn in
was
Lair called
was
doing
the
but also of North Vietnamese
right thing.
had been pro
I had
forces.
in for
chat.
This
Beyond that,
met
we
units, increased
air
unusual
as
he mainly
ductive and successful.
con
training, larger firepower, and
introduced lit
a
support
were
cerned himself with the Hmong program and let his deputy han
dle the
as
many
whom I
intelligence liked and respected,
a
officers
tle
by
little.
But it remained
mismatch.
Despite
our
best
others,
so
I
was
curious He
and I believed that my
was
career
efforts, the Hmong
decimated.
were
slowly
I walked into his office.
off
to
good
start.
16
Laos
US
policies
in South Vietnam
drove decisions in Laos.
The
what
Hmong had
was
to
have
seen
general, and those of generals and ambassadors whom he saw as equals. He
the
lieutenant
happening, pressed on. yang
dent that with would
carry
but
they
Pao, confi
believed that US power ulti mately would save him, and the
H mong.
Many 1-Imong have come to the United States as refugees, hut thousands still languish in Thai refugee camps. Their way of life has been destroyed. They
can never return to
our
support he
Laos
In the
to
the
day, actually
\Vhen the
war
end,
ended in South Vietnam, it also ended in Laos,
where
we
our
policyniakers
failed
pushed for
conflict
sions
many of the offen sive actions undertaken as the
wore on.
assume
the moral
responsibility
with
us
that
we
owed to those who
so
-But his deci
I
forced
a
political
communist
worked
closely
dur
were
clouded,
was
believe.
arrangement in Vientiane that
ing
those tumultuous years.
by
the
stars
around himhis
virtually guaranteed
to
own,
when he
promoted
control.
And then
we
left.
17