No Drums, No Bugles
Recollections of a Case Officer in Laos, 1962-1964
Richard I... HoIm
In early January 1962, I arrived served in Indonesia dLiring the
in Vientiane, Laos, for my first communist rebellion in the late
assignment with We Central 1950s, where he had almost
Intelligence Agency. Young been captured and was eventu
case officers like myself. has ally exfiltrated by submarine.
ing completed basic training for Lanclry, now Lairs deputy, car
the Clandestine Service and ried a swagger stick. and it was
then paramilitary (PM) instruc easy to picture him handling
tion, were being sent out in tough and dangerous situations.
support of President Kennedys
decision to hold the line against Lair was soft-spoken and quiet,
communist expansion. Trying hut one sensed a man who was
Young case officers were When he
to help the Laotians maintain reflecting on issues.
being sent out in support their territorial integrity and came to conclusions, you knew
of President Kennedys their independent govern the) were well considered.
decision to hold the line ment wasa tall order for a new Landry had a gruff exterior hut
officer. The demand for quick was in reality a considerate and
against communist He worried about
decisionmaking and constant caring man.
expansion in Southeast flexibility to handle the unex his subordinates, especially the
Asia].. a tall order for a
kids he
.
pected in a war zone proved to was sending up coun
new officer. he excellent preparation for my try. In their own ways. both
long career as a case officer in were great guys and splendid to
the field. work for.
Assignment Laos Tribal Operations
I traveled to Vientiane with Lao communist forces, known
threecolleaguesthe four of us as the Pathet Lao (PL), were
had trainedtogether and now challenging the
govetnments
would serve together in South Royal Lao Army (FAR) through
east Asia. In the area of the out the country. Although
airport reserved for Air America badly organized and poorly
operations. we were met by 13i11 trained and equipped, the lL
Lair and Pat Landry, among oth was holstered by support from
ers. These officers were already North Vietnam, whose units
legends. Bill Lair headed the were called the VC (Vietnam
Agencys paramilitary opera ese Communists).
tions in Laos. He had come to
Southeast Asia in the early The opposing forces in Laos at
1950s and spent a decade in the time also included a rene
Richard L. Holin served more
Thailand organizing and train gade FAR captain, Kong Le.
ing the elite Thai Police group who commanded an elite battal
than 35 years in the CIA
Directorate of
called the Police Air Reconnais ion ofparachutists. Angered by
Operations.
sance Unit (PARU). Landry had corruption in the FAR, he had
1
Laos
staged a coup in Vientiane in covert action to holster the working with different tribal/
1960. When the coup failed, he Lao government. The CIAs ethnic groups, such as the
had broken awa\ from the FAR paramilitary efforts in Laos the mountainous
Hniong in
to form what he called neutral were divided roughly along north and the Lao in the
ist forces. This group, known geographic lines: There werc
lowlands
as the XL, fought the FAR. hut separate programs in north
not the PL Of the VC. Laos, where I was initially
assigned. central Laosalso Although the Hmong and the
The United States had opted to known as the Panhandle Lao had a common enemy, they
use Agency for International where I would later be did not like each other. None
Development (AID) programs, assigned; and south Laos.
theless, they had their own
AID advisers, and ultimately Each program involved
reasons workingfor us with
and objectives were com
their
plementaiy. North Vietnams
primary goal was to make free
use of eastern Laos to support
its war against South Vietnam.
The average tribesman could
not have distinguished between
communism and capitalism, but
the ethnic groups felt threat
ened by the Lao communists
and their Vietnamese support
ers and decided to fight to
preserve their autonomy and
their territoiy. All they wanted
from us was financial and mate
rial support
The biggest and most active of
our programs was the one in
north Laos supporting the
Hmong tribe. Bill Lair struck
the first agreement at a meeting
with leader Vang Pao in Dccciii
her 1960 For the Hmong, it
began more than a decade of
fighting and dying.
In 1962, we knew them as the i\le,, and
addressed them thai way rcgu1art~ It
was simple ignorance on Our pan In
later \ears, I as to discover that Men
as a pejorative terni tin, t me:int sonic
thing 111cc liarharian in local usage
2
Laos
Although the Hmong and
the Lao had a conunon
enemy, they did not like
First Posting bulldozer, hut I quickly judged
each other. Nonetheless,
that some cratering charges
In mid-Iuly 1962, Landry
Pal they had their own would at least help. With such
told me thai I was being reasons for working charges, lanit predicted that the
assigned to Ban Na just west of with us. strip would he ready in two
the Plain des jars (PDJ). The weeks. I cabled Landry for the
region wasquiet, and I was to explosives.
concentrate on getting a land
ing strip lengthened. Only The second day, Panit showed
single-engine planes or helicop operator, and an explosives me the outposts around Ban
ters could land, and we needed expert. All four could provide Na, which formed a semi-circle
it to handle twin-engine planes. basic training, and all were facing the Plaine des Jarres, an
I was flown to Ban Na in a sin jump qualified. They exuded area under the control of the PL
gle-engine Hello-Courier. A confidence and a willingness to and the KL since 1960. Each
short-takeoff-and-landing get things done. outpost had mortar and
(STOL) aircraft, the Hello did machinegun emplacements and
yeoman service for Air America. a small shelter in which sonic
Settling In 15 Hmong ate and slept. At
Before we departed, my pilot each stop, we looked at maps
introduced me to Panit, the Toiengthen the landing strip, while the team leader explained
leader of the four-man PARU Panit had begun work to why the particular outpost was
team that ~~oulcl work with me remove a big hump in the placed where it was.
in Ban Na. The team mem middle of an adjacent sloping
bers, who had been at Ban Na area. \Vhen I arrived, the Each site afforded a good view
for three months, had been villagers were using hoes and of a portion of the western sec
selected from hundreds of shovels dig
to at the hump and tion of the plain. The PDJ is a
applicants. All PARU
personnel then carrying away the dirt in prominent, and unusual, geo
were at least high school gradu wicker baskets slung on poles. graphic feature in north Laos.
ates, and most spoke a What we really needed was a The plateau was so named by
language from a neighboring k
country in addition to Thai.
They were trained at a jungle
camp in central Thailand and
organized like the US Army
Special Forces. Counterguer
rilla tactics were one of their
specialties.
In addition to their general
training. PARU personnel all
had specific capabilities
designed to enhance small unit
operations. Panit was a weap
ons man, which meant that he
could handle the whole range
of weapons that we were pro
the /-
viding to Hmong. His team
consisted of a medic, a radio Periniezer ourpnst at Ban Na. tFhoios courtesy of author.)
3
Laos
We had the length of the
landing strip almost
doubled in just over two
the French colonialists because Tactical Activity
weeks after we received
of the enormous. cenniries-old
eanhen jars thai are strewn
the cratering charges. One of the reasons we wanted
about it. Midway between the longer strip at Ban Na was
Vientiane and the border with so that \ve could bring in more
North Vietnam. the plain cov supplies to build up Umong
ers more than 30 square miles Managing my PARU team was defenses on the western end of
At that time, the VC had free not difficult, because they knew the PDJ. We sent out patrols
run of the PD.! and truck con more about what was going on and individual villagers fre
than I did Thai and Lao lan quently watch what the
voys from North Vietnam to
arrived regularly during the dry guages are similar, and the enemy was doing, and I
season bringing types of 1Imong all spoke at Least basic reported regularly to Vientiane.
Lao in addition to their native
supplies for the IL and KL units
in the area. tongue. My most important role I had arrived during the rainy
was to serve as the link to Lair season when enemy mobility
and Landry in Vientiane to was greatly decreased by
ensure that the villagers and my impassable roads. That was one
A Quiet Routine team received the supplies that of the reasons our sector was so
they needed. This macIc ale a quiet in July. The Hniong got
Life in Ban Na featured few key person, and they all knew around easily in the mountains.
highlights. Days spent were
it. however, which gave us the
advantage until the next Thy sea
working on the hump at the air
I met regularly with the Nai Ban son started in October or
strip, training the Hmong, and
(the viLLage chicO, who, in this November. We were able to
walking to nearby outposts.
case, was also a Nai }Chong conduct hit-and-run attacks on
Our radio contacts kept us
aware of de day of the month. (chief of a group of villages), to enemy supply points with rela
discuss supplies. Because most tive impunity. Our ultimate goal
Evenings passed quickly. We
of the local men had become was to retake the PDJ. thereby
would sit around and talk, hut
fighters. agricultural activity was relieving pressure on the Hmong
communications were difficult,
almost at a standstill. There territoty all around it.
since only spoke good
Panit
fore, the village required food
English and none of the PARU
spoke French. supplies regularly to augment
the meager amounts They were Over the Hump
producing. Periodically. I
Dinner was always an adven would send a cable to Landry to frue to his word, Panit had the
ture the PARU strove to and the length
as
request a rice drop. Our sys hump removed
prepare things that I would like; tem was amazingly efficient. I of the landing strip almost clou
however, there really was not could always count on prompt bled in just over two weeks
much choicepieces of to my cables. Within after we received the cratering
responses
chicken or pork (sometimes one or t~srodays. sometimes charges. With the end in sight,
beef or horsemeat), boiled i-ice within hours, the drop would the villagers, mostly women,
(because the Thai were not that arrive. One hundred to 200 worked steadily after the
fond of sticky rice), and some sacks of rice would land in our charges simplified their task.
kind of green vegetable; all of drop zone. We also received The Air America pilot who
it boiled or stirfried over a drops of uniforms, boots, tools, came to check out the airstrip
wood fire. It was always spicy, and whatever else was needed. gave it his OK despite a clip in
as both the Thai and the Weapons and ammo came by the middle and an uphill slope
Hmong love red peppers. Helio, chopper, or parachute. to the whole strip. Rolling
4
Laos
We knew about the
corruption, but few
Americans wanted to
uphill after landing would help
take on the job of trying
planes stop, he said, and going
downhill on rake off was also a
to control it.
plus.
The Ban Na scrip could now
handle the Caribou, a Canaclian
made STOL aircraft with great
at low speeds.
stability It could
land on strips not much longer hustle and bustle evident in
than those needed by the Hello, many pans of the city.
hut, with two engines and a
rearopening ramp, it had a
Lao politics at the time would
much greater payload. Bring have been grist for Shakes
ing it into Ban Na meant getting
peares mill: a king without
more supplies the PDJ,
closer to
power, royal princes working
a strategic step forward. A few
toward conflicting goals, cor
days later, the first Caribou
rupt politicians selling influence
landed without problems at Ban
and position, and military offic
Na. The pilot said that he had
ers manipulating the system.
room to spare.
Mainly because of the infusion
of aid funds and supplies com
Author at Phou Song, with the H n~ong
ing Laos, there was a lot of
into ~i!!~gu Ie:ider
Back to Vientiane
money to he made in Vien
tiane. Grati and corruption
In less than three weeks. I had ourselves as supporting US
thrived. Working discreetly
adapted quickly to the routine policy and we believed in it.
(sometimes openly.) with Lao
and knew the sector well, has
politicians and military officers,
ing walked all over it. I was
foreign merchants siphoned off When I walked into Pat Lan
absorbed in and enjoying my
huge sums of official money. thys office, he asked if I hat!
work, and felt like I was con
ever heard of Phou Song. I had
tributing something tangible to
not, and he id that it
an important objective. But a In retrospect, a greater under sa was
cable came ordering inc back to standing of what was going on north of Ban Na. Our program
Vientiane for reassignment. in Laos might have enabled us was expanding into that area,
to work effectively and
more antI he needed me up there to
The capital city was quite a perhaps would have spared keep things organized. Phou
change. Primarily inhabited by some of the pain that the coun
Song also had a 1~ARU team for
Lao lowlanclers who comprised fly experienced. We knew work with. Al though the
me to
the majority of the 3 million about the corruption, hut few
area was quiet, he acknowl
inhabitants of the country, Vien Americans wanted to take on
edged that he was worried
tiane also had large numbers of the job of trying to control it. I
involved in about what the P1, units nearhy
foreigners, including Chinese, was fully our pro
had their minds. Anti, with
Indian, Thai. Vietnamese, and gram and considered effort
our on
French. These foreigners, as something apart from the that, Landry said that I was to
mostly merchants, created the mess in the capital. We saw leave in a few hours.
5
Laos
Communist units had
moved into the valley
that we had come
Phon Song that could he covered in less
through. We were cut off. round trip.
than two days,
More than that took too much
The accommodations at Phou
of my time.
Song turned out to he similar to
Ban Na, hut the setting was sur
These trips s\rere especially
prisingly different.
Again, I
challenging. From Phou Song,
found myself watching a Helio
the hulk of the walking ~~as
depart, leaving me. this time, in Flying. . .
and Walking strentiousit was either tip or
a Hinong village high on a the
down. Moreover, it was
mountain in north Laos. Phou My work at Phou Song was middle of the rains season, and
Song was bigger than Ban Na. more demanding than at Ban
the frequent rainstorms macIc
It occupied less than a third of Na. Besides the routine things the mountain trails muddy and
large, Flat area more than half like logistics and training. I had The first times
a
slippery. out
to move around constantly I
way up the mountain for which were real tests. Everyone was
it was named. It was near the would cable Landiy explaining how the for
watching to see
edge of a precipitous drop into that I had to go to this or that
eigner would ha nclle the traits.
the valley. Because of the large village and needed a Hello for Suspecting that I would have a
and helnncl the clay, and early the next hard time, they macIc it as easy
open space next to
morning, one would arrive.
the village, Phou Song had a as possible for me. I took no
Prasert frequently went with
large drop zone and a landing pack, just my weapon and web
me. but, after I got to know the
strip that could easily accomino belt. The small 1-Imong sol
region, I sometimes ivent alone.
date twin-engine STOL aircraft diers carried packs plus their
On those occasions a lot food and
Thanks to the AID program. weapons and water.
there was a warehouse for stor
depended on the availability of
French (or sometimes even
ing rice, clothing, and other
materiel that clis
Englisif) speakers. An Emergency Situation
was regulai~ly
ributed to nearby villages.
In the villages that I visited, we Short lv after I got Phou
Song,
to
would talk about what nearby I scheduled planea take me to
Phou Song was more secure
enemy units were doing and to three villages in our region.
than Ban Na because the only about needs of all kinds. \Ve At the second village, a col
approaches to it were easy to su ppliecl everything from
league was waiting for inc. He
monitor and block. The
weapons and ammunition
near to said that a Helio had gone
est PL camps were at the far schoolbooks, medicines, rice down and pilot might
that the
end of the valley and on the and salt, uniforms, building beinjured. Members of a
other side from our village. materials, and For
nionev.
Hmong patrol thought that they
The majority of the men from some of these things, I was had seen where the Helio hit
the area were fighters. Phou simply the middleman making the side of the mountain. This
Song was a focal point for our arrangements for an AID was a serious situation. IF a
programs efforts in the area. delivery to a given village. plane chopper went clown.
or
The PARU Leader, Prasert, and every possible effort would
his team members were quite Somettmes, no plane was avail immediately he made to rescue
friendly. The cain and I occu able or the
place I was going those aboard. We all knew that
pied two houses near the had no landing strip, so L would ifsomething happened, our col
warehouse at the edge of the take a Hmong patrol and a cou leagues would come after us.
airstrip. I quickly decided that I ple of the lARU and walk. We We decicted to lead a Hmong
liked Phou Song. limited these walks to distances patrol to Ihe crash site. I wrote
6
Laos
a note informing Landrv of our confident that I could handle his emergency lineofsight
decision and gave it to my whatever might come up and radio. The pilot must have had
Hello pilot to deliver. felt sure that the patrol would his mike open because lie
succeed. picked us up right away. But
Eight Hmong accompanied us. we received more had news.
There was a sense of urgency. The next day we started climb Intelligence reporting available
\Ve maintained a fairly fast pace ing again. Two 1-Iniong had left in Vientiane indicated that PL
and took few rests. The (list at daybreak to do a reconnais units had moved into the villey
couple of hours we headed sance above us. As we pushed that we had through. We
come
downhill toward the \riIle)r ahead, I was struck by how were cut off. Taking no
below The Hmong thought much we depended on the chances, Landry planned to get
that the plane was on the far Hmong. We had no idea where us out by helicopter as soon as
side of the mountain in Front of the plane might he and no possible.
us. There were PL positions landmarks to use to get there
near there, so a chopper res or hack. They realized the situ
cue was not feasible. ation, but they also counted on Evasion and Escape
us for the support we could call
The jungle on the valley floor in. There was great mutual It took us 10 minutes to retrace
was thick. There was a trail of trust and respect. our steps to a clearing higher
sorts, hut the undergrowth had up and put out a mark-erthe
almost closed in. \Ve had to An hour or so after
we started, patrol leader had one in his
cross the rid head up
valley a the two scouts reappeared. I pack that he used when receiv
the mountain in Front of us. could tell by their faces that the ing parachute drops while on
Despite the terrain, we man news was bad. They talked patrol. One Hmong was posted
aged to traverse the area in less excitedly with the patrol leader on I lie trail just above the clear
than two hours. and then he gave it to us in ing with instructions to come
French. The pilot was dead running when he saw the chop
At mid-afternoon. we started to he had probably died on impact per. None of us wanted the
climb. We were having no as the front of the plane was helicopter to stay on the ground
trouble keeping tip s~ff Ii the smashed in. There had been for more than a couple of
Hmong. \Ve climbed for about no fire. They had hidden the minutes.
three hours until almost night pilots body away from the
fall, and then started looking for crash site. We called the l-lelio and they
a place to spend the night. We told us that the pilot was en
came to a clearing and saw a The two had activity far
seen route and would he in position
hut at the far end. It was aban below theni that caused them to in five or 10 minutes. As soon
doned, and we moved in. think a PT. unit might he mov as a Ia rge clou ci fil ledl the ~a I
ing up the mountain from the Icy and obscured vision, the
That night, I did not fall asleep opposite direction to check out chopper caine in. We heard it
right away. I thought about the crash site. \Ve had no idea beforewe saw it. The pilot
where I was and what I was J10~~r many PL ight he com
ni hugged the side of the moun
doing. I was more isolated and ing, hut prudence dictated a tain, then swung around and
vulnerable than I had ever been, retreat. We started hack, aijcl touched down right in die mid
but I was doing what I defi the walking was easy because dle of theclearing. He even
nitely thought was right. I felt we were headed down and had the door facing us. The Air
lucky to have the chance that around the mountain. Then we America pilots were truly out
only a few ever have of actually heard the welcome sound of a standingthey had incredible
making a difference. I was Hello. My colleague pulled out skills and guts.
7
Laos
.
We took our losses even
in those early days...
but we got the job done.
Concern and Relief remained at Long Tieng, Vang
Paos headquarters, to monitor
Although it made perfect sense
,, the situation.
at the time, we had gone off on
what turned out to be an unau Initially, Landry moved
Lair and
thorizecl dangerous mission. If us. In the end, he was so their program headquarters to
an Agency officer were to fall relieved that we were hack Nong Kliai, just across the
into enemy hands, there would safely that he did not yell at us. Mekong River in Thailand. To
he hell to Washington. A
pay in get there from Vientiane, one
lot of nervous people had been could take a fiveminute flight
following developments when it Withdrawal Preparations or catch a ferry across the
became known the night before riverthe ferry was just a small
that we were out looking for I spent a few additional weeks tug-like craft with an under
the downed pilot. in Phou Song working to powered engine. The arrival of~
the gaggle of foreigners was a
expand our program. But time
Lair and Landry were wailing soon ran out on us. As a result jolt to what had been a sleepy
for us in Vientiane. They of decisions in Wash little town The local popula
political
looked relieved and happy to
ington relating to the 1962 tion adjusted quickly, however,
see us. Lair suggested that Geneva Protocol on the Neu and welcomed the boost that
~nxt tinie it would not be our presence gave to the econ
a
trality of Laos, word came that
had idea to wait for instructions. we were to he withdrawn froi~ oniy. Among other things, the
Laos.2 sale of Singha beer jtinipecl
His typically low key comment noticeably.
belied the concern and the This was a bitter pill. All of our
responsibility he felt very observations and reporting had lidorn, a much larger Thai
strongly. We were two of the indicated that the VC had no town about 50 kilomejers fur
eight young American officers intention of pulLing any of their
ther south, had a large airport
for whom he was accountable. units out of Laos. To the con with a long concrete runway
These young officers were built by AID. l.Jclorn became a
trary, their activittes, especially
spread thinly and worked in east-central Laos, were major US airbase and staging
hardwe would not have had area for combat and supply
increasing. Despite the evi
ii any other way. We took our dence that we had provided, flights into Laos in support of
losses even in those early the State Department was deter US efforts to support the Lao
daysboth Agency officers and mined to live by the conditions government. Eventually, in
the pilots who were supporting of the Protocol that Ambassa early 1963. Lair and Landry
us But we got the job done dor Harriman had signed. moved their program head
quarters to a new facility in a
Friends, who worked directly restricted-access compound at
My fellow Agency officers and I
with Landrv in the office, later Udorn airbase. Their effort
arguedsuccessfully, it turned
told me that he had been genu it would he wrong to
had grown too large to he
outthat
inely concerned and really torn leave the Hntong high and dry. managed out of a rented house
as the situation developed. On in Nong Khai.
Two advisers discreetly
the one hand, he was frus
trated and irritated that we had Meanwhile, in late September
made the decision on our own See Declaration and Protocol on the 1962, Landry told me that I
to leave with the patrol. He Neutrality of Laos, 23 july 1962, Ameri would be taking over their
ca,i Foreign Policy- Ci,nt,zt Docunie,,is
knew that it would be danger /962 (\Thshington. DC US Government project in the Panhandle, which
ous. But he also was proud of Printing Office. 1963), p. 1075 \\as in its early stages. The
8
Laos
North Vietnamese were occupy I spent almost 20 months oper port or other identification. No
ing and exploiting a large chunk ating out of Nakhon lhanom. one, least of all the border oFfi
of eastern Laos, and we needed During that time, no one ever cials, ever questioned me about
information exactly
on what asked me what I was doing. what I was doing.
they were doing. The Panhan My coveradvisor to the Bor
die area stretches from just north cler Policewas hackstopped Almost all Thais were con
of Thakhek, a small Lao town only minimally, hut no one cerned about the communist
on the Mekong River. to about seemed too worried. Without threat. They welcomed our
midway between Savannakhet fanfare, I had moved from support and resources and were
and Pakse to the south. It is being assigned to Laos to being eager to help in any way. Both
bounded on the west by the assigned in Thailand. The of my ii~ai assisrantsJimmie~
Mekong, which is also the bor Agency took care of all the and Mr. Ambrose, an inter
der with Thailand, and on the paperwork so I was not illegal. preterwere good at their
east by the Annamite mountain work The sixman PARU team
range, which forms the border As the VC violations of (he 1962 looked a lot like the PARU I had
with North Vietnam. Protocol increased and were ~~roi.keci with in Laos. I also had
verified by photography and a houseboy named Whet. This
signals intelligence, Ambassa was to be my staff, and we got
I was surprised. I had not
dor Harriman finally conceded along well.
expected to get a project to
handle that the communists were not
on my own, and the
prospect was appealing I abiding by the rules. Accord
would he working with ethnic ingly, restrictions on our Turnover Briefing
Lao, and the activities gradually loosened.
objective was to
collect intelligence on the VC. Early in my tour at Nakhon Pha Much of my first clay was spent
The operation was in the pro nom, I would have my team checking equipment, signing
cess of shifting its headquarters
leaders come to Thailand to met the required forms about gear
from Thakhek, to Nakhon Pha with me. Then, I began mak and administrative matters,
norm across the Mekong in ing trips into Laos at night. and looking around Nakhon
Thailand. Finally, I began to cross the Phanom. The
clay, my
next
river into Laos regularly during predecessor walked
me through
the day. I never carried a pass- the operational aspects of my
The Panhandle Project
Nakhon Phanorn was a quiet,
pretty town of several thousand
inhabitants. Some streets were
paved. general store, a few
A
small shops, the towns only
restaurant, and some govern
ment offices were clustered
around what appeared to he a
central square. My house was
near the airport. which had a
laterite runway capable of
taking large cargo planes. Thai
Airways flights arrived twice
weekly from Bangkok. Lao Panhandle, of increasing stralegic irnporiance to North \ieinani,
9
Laos
Myl seven teams varied
in si2e from 15 men to
more than 100.
responsibilities, beginning with Two passes through the Anna
the location of each PM team mites provided access for roads
and his opinions about the to and from Vietnam. From the
iiiixecl bag of team leaders. Thakhek area in western Laos,
Mr. Ambrose, who interpreted level oftraining varied widely Route 8 followed the tipper
at each meeting with the team from team to team, depending edge of the Nakav Plateau and
leaders, also knew them well on the quafity and skills of the headed to \Tietnam through the
and was to he a great help in team leader. Each member had Nape Pass. Beginning in the
the months to come. atleast rudimentary weapons same a rca, Route 12 moved
trainingall were armed and eastward along the bottom of
This intioductory briefing took had unifonus and boots. We the Nakay Plateau and through
the ~hole day. Maps were also supplied medicines and the Mu Gia Pass. Further south,
everywhere. I became mu rice by airdrop. All were paid Route 9 headed east from
mately familiar with the more than Lao military person Savannakhet and ran straight
geogiaphic coordinates of many nel Pay was according to rank across the Panhandle, touching
places in central Laoswithin or position. The team leader South Vietna ni just below the
months I could cite from mem received cash and then distrib demarcation line at the 17th
ory the coordinates of specific uted the pay to his group. Each parallel. Route 13, the only
towns or road junctions. From team bad a radio and stayed in northsouth road in the Panlian
north to south, I was briefed on regular (usually daily) contact dIe, stretched all the way from
each teaiii that we were sup with us. Two of our PARU Vientiane to Pakse, following
porting. My predecessot. \\rho were radio operators, and they the Lao side of the Mekong
had started the project from maintained the base station for River. These roads all had
scratch, had been obliged to our project. crushed laterite surfaces, but
work closely with Lao military none were reliable for year
officeis. who were also a mixed round travel, primarily because
hagall corrupt to sonic Evolving Mission of flooding during the rainy
degree. The team leaders, often sea son.
nominated by ilie military com The 17th parallelthe deniarca
mander of a given area. tended tion line between North and Decisionniakers in Washington
to be former military officers South Vietnamtouched the had already begun discussing
~~rhoallegedly had retired. southeastern edge of the Lao strategic options for cutting the
Some were refugees who had tian Panhandle This chunk of North Vietnamese supply route
been Nai Khongs or Nai Hans territory was of strong strategic through Laos. One proposal by
from key villages in the areas interest to the North. At the the US military entailed fortify
where they were now monitor time I arrived, the United States ing and defending Route 9,
ing enemy activities was just beginning to grapple which ran straight across the
with the importance of North Panhandle. However,
Team members were all local Vietnamese control and use of Washington policyniakers
villagers. Sonic had been dis the network of dirt roads and rejected the militarys proposal.
placed by the communist trails running along the eastern
takeover of the areas along the side of the Panhandle from Generally speaking, those of us
border with North \Tietnain, north to south, later widely on the ground at the time
while others were from areas known as the Ho ChiMinh believed that trucks were
along the Mekong. Some had Trail. limited to the Frenchbuilt road
been in the FAR. The seven system for transporting any
teams varied in size, from 15 The Frenchbuilt road network thing in the Panhandle. We
men to more than 100. The in the Panhandle was sparse. would conic to know better.
10
Laos
Even as early 1962, the North
as those sites, especially since I anticipated, sonic reacted more
Vietnamese were building and would he working from the favorably than others. It was
improving roads between Route Thai side of the Mekong. But about a 5050 split. Those who
12 and Route 9 that would soon with goals and a plan, we hesita ted, genera fly liked the
take truck convoys. Moreover, would be moving from a security and comfort of living
during the dry season, jeeps passive organizational stage into near the Mekong. well inside
and sometimes trucks cou id a much mOre active and risky Lao government-controlled
move overland off the limited effort. areas, and/or genuinely feared
i-cad network. moving clandestinely into
During my first nionth in enemycontrolled areas to the
Sitting in Nakhon Phanoni. I Nakhon Phanom, I met with all east. It became clear that mtich
quickly realized that tile Trail but one of the team leaders. cajoling and motivating, or lea iii
\iJas problem. My goal
the Each made the journey to Tha leader changes. would he
became to position tennis at key khek and then crossed over to required 10 move those ieaiiis
points in the easternmost parts Nakhon Phanom. These meet to the watch sites. I knew that
of the Panhandle to clandes ings became at least monthly several would report promptly
tinely monitor all traffic along events, ones that the leaders to their Lao military contacts,
the roads and trails being used rarely missed because they col and I could expect questions
by the VC after they entered lected their payroll at the same from the latter concerning what
Laos via one of the two
passes time. Using this as leverage, I I was doing.
through the Annamites. To do was gradually able to develop a
that, I knew that I would have personal relationship with each I decided that it was time to
to train, motivate, and support one. brief Lair a ndL;indry in derail
the villager/soldier members of about my plans for the project.
my teams so that elie~ would At those first meetings, I spent a I told them that if we were
take the risks required to move lot of time briefing each leader going get some useful intelli
to
into enemy-controlled areas and on our collective mission to gence, we needed teamswith
radio back reports to our base estahlish road-watch sites. As I radiospositioned a lot further
statld)n. None of the teams had
previously been located in posi
tions that enabled systematic
V.,
:~p
~
intelligence collection -
Some
intelligence being pro
was
vided, but it was sporadic and
of minimal use, coming prima
rily from random patrols and
villager debriefings.
Panhandle Planning ~
Looking at my maps, it was not
hard to select the points where A
I wanted to establish road-
watch sites. The Nape and Mu
Cia passes were obvious
locations, hut it would he
difficult, I knew, to get teams to ltainv season niovenieni ot supplies in the Panhandle
11
Laos
east. I showed them the sites I Approval from the Chief background and then about the
had selected at the Nape and project in the Panhandle. 1-lis
Mu Gia Passes. I said that I Early the next morning, I flew questions revealed that lie
thought we could get daily to Vientiane to seethe chief already had a good idea what
reports on what was moving there, Charles Whitehursi, or the problems were and a feel
into Laos via the passes and Whitey, as lie was widely for what it was like to deal with
also would he able to identify known. About 40. he had quite Laotians. Savvy about Head
which portions were headed a history. A semipro baseball quarters. lie advised me on
straight to Son th Vietnam. pLayer in his youth, he ended what I should emphasize in my
up in OSS in World War II. He cable. After reviewing the draft
Landry knew little about the parachuted into North Vietnam and suggesting a few changes,
infant project in central Laos, with a team of commandos, he decided it should he sent to
but I piqued his interest. We intending to blow up a key Headquarters immediately. It
spent a couple of hours going bridge between Vietnam and ~~as late when I left Whiteys
over specifics. I told him about China. That mission was aban house, but I was elated by what
my meetings with each team doned when the war ended had transpired.
leader and outlined what we before the plan could be car
had, by team, showing
team ried Pragmatic, smart, and
out. Less than a week later, thndry
him each teams location. I was unpretentious, Whitey handled cabled me in Nakhon Phanoni
pleased that he was so inter the varied programs with to say that Headquarters had
ested and impressed with the aplomb. Lair and Landw had agreed to the concept, the goals,
depth of the questions he come to like him, and that was and the plan itself. 1-Ic sounded
posed Finally, lie told me to certainly good enough for tue. happy, and I sure was. The
draft a cable to CIA Headquar new project had been given an
ters outlining the prolect. That night, before dinner at his official cryptonym for use iii
house, Whitey and I talked in cable traffic: Henceforth it
general terms, first about my wouLd he known as HARD-
NOSE. Landrv and I both
thought it was a good crypt.
Making HARDOSE Work
In early 1963, my activities were
still circumscribed by US sup
port for the Geneva Protocol.
Nonetheless, meetings with my
team leaders started produce
to
results and I stepped them up.
To improve my access, I trav
eled to Mukdahan, the Thai
town across the Mekong from
Savannakhet. for meetings with
two team leaders operating in
the southern Panhandle. As
constraints eased, I slipped into
Road-watchag team seIect~ng obsenaiion aite in the ea,tern Ianhandte.
Laos at night for additional
12
Laos
Getting agreement from
team leaders] to move
their teams in enemy-
meetings with my team leaders urine and excrement from the
controlled areas to the
to discuss logistics, training, National Zoo and manufac
reporting, communications, and east was always touchy. tured a substance that
team location. Getting agree resembled and sniellecl like
ment to move their teams into what the tigers produced. But
enemy-controlled areas to the it did not fool the dogs in the
east was always touchy. Panhandle of Laos.
VC Countermeasures
Moving eastward made it even
more difficult than usual to con
HABDNOSE Headway
In about mid-1963, the VC
firm team locations and often we
became increasingly aware that
As the months passed, our
just had to rake their word for it.
our teams were watching them
teams became more aggressive
Sometimes we could use collat and began using countermea and more effective. Stay away
eral information to double-check
sures. They patrolled areas from the enemy, was the mes
reporting from our teams. If we
along the roads that they were sage I preached to all of my
had overhead coverage of the
using and planted spies in the teams. None had any problem
ML! GiaPass, for example, we villages in the area. Our teams
with that concept. Find a spot
could cross-check it with report sometimes discreetly purchased away from the road hut with
ing from a team on the ground food locally, which occasion clear vision, on a hill or bluff.
along Route 12. Our colJeagues ally proved dangerous. If if possible, and stay hidden.
in Udorn often did this for us. I
discovered by a VC patrol, our Rotate small teams from a
was always pleased when our
teams could only run. They base camp every couple of
team reported trucks on a partic lacked the firepower to stand days. and always stay out of
ular road and air coverage on and fight. In the later 1960s sight. Move at night. Noth
the same day confirmed the that changed as bigger teams
ing particularly brilliant, just
position of the convoy. Occa with heavy firepower were
common sense, and slowly it
sionally, independent reports inserted.
started to ~ork
from villagers could also he used
to confirm our road-watch
The VC sometimes used sniffer We handed out cameras and
reporting.
clogs, which caused lots of trained team members
photo to
problems. One of the reports graph passing traffic. We also
Food drops also served to con that we forwarded to Udorn produced laminated plastic
firm team locations. No drop and Headquarters mentioned cards identifying various kinds
was made unless the proper that the presence of tigers in a of trucks and other vehicles to
signal was displayed in the given area appeared to make a systematize the reporting
drop zone, and the team had to difference. The VCs dogs terminology.
be there to display the correct seemed to be less effective if
signal. We changed the signals the) smelled tiger excrement or From the spring of 1963
periodically to keep the teams urine. We had no way of onward, our coverage of the Ho
attention. They definitely knowing if this was true. At Chi Minh road and trail net
wanted to receive the rice and F-Ieadqtiarters. an office in the work in the eastern Panhandle
supplies and were careful about Directorate of Science and of Laos increased steadily in
the coordinates they gave and Technology decided to try to quantity and quality. In addi
the signals they were to use. produce a countermeasure. tion to the daily reports that we
Later, when teams were inserted Years later, when I was about to received by radio, sve started
by chopper, we knew exactly retire, I learned that the office getting cassettes of film, which
~~here they were. had analyzed samples of tiger we sent to Udorn. Our photo
13
Laos
The teams took photos of
enemy patrols, trucks,
bicycles, and even
coverage became pretty good. appeared. Landrv handled all
elephants laden with
Some of it was useful in con the financial and administrative
firming \TC presence, which led sacks and on the Ho
cans
aspects of the project for me.
to further relaxation of the CM Minh Trail].
restrictions on our activities. At the end of fly briefing, he
The teams photos of
took surprised me by saying that he
enemy patrols, tnicks, bicycles. wanted to ask Headquarters to
and even elephants laden with extend my assignment until the
support or logistics. In turn,
sacks and cans summer of 1964, making it a
they provided transport, full twoyear tour. I had to
approved landings at airstrips think a minute before respond
As the situation changed. was
for resupply purposes. and
able to cross the river more fre
selected for
ing. Africa Division was
men our teams.
quently and travel by day expecting me hack. But I was
instead of at night. I saw the
had enjoying my work and felt like I
In late spring, Landry me
senior Lao Army officers move crime to Udorn for discussions.
was making a contribution. So
regularly, but primarily for rea I said yes.
I-Ic was expecting a senior
sons of courtesy. We did not
visitor from Headquarters and
discuss what our teams were For the remainder of 1963. the
wanted an update on HARD-
doing, hut they had
good a Laos program, including my
NOSE. At that point. I was
idea. They raised few objec comfortable about how project. made significant
feeling
tions. usually indirectly. I progress and prospects were
things were going. There were
traveled a few times to see
still problems, but progress had bright for 1964. Attitudes were
their camps and strongpoints been steady. We ~~ent over positive and our confidence
on the road leading into Tha as high. original game
The
everything, including the
khek from the east. On a few plan of organizing small, well-
budget, a subject that I did not
occasions, I was able to help trained mobile units for use in
know much about, In the field,
them with communications
when I asked for
hit-and-run operations designed
something, it
toharass and tie up VC units
was only then starting to shift
incrementally toward more
ambitious tactics aimed at actu
alLy seizing and holding ground.
Few saw any potential dan
gers. We were certain that our
actions would cause setbacks
for the VC. In Washington,
President Johnson increased
overall US support for South
Vietnam. Both in Washington
and in Southeast Asia, despite
ceaseless political machinations
in Saigon and Vientiane. Ameri
cans continued to view the
situation through rose-colored
glasses. That
a superpower
could be tied down and ulti
mately rendered impotent in its
Team leader debriefing patrol returning from the Mu Cia Pass area conflict with North Vietnam was
14
Laos
Moving into a more
aggresive mode in the
eastern Panhandle called
inconceivable. Some harsh thinking to Uclorn.
They
lessons had yet be
for bigger teams with approved outline, as did
the
political to
more firepower. Headquarters. Go slow, was
learned.
Landiys guidance.
As a first step, we needed a
A Welcome Addition
place to do our training. Dick
and I went to see the Thakhek
Early in 1964, Lair and Landry suading the team leaders, and
military commander. Corrupt
sent a second officer, Dick Kins sometimes the members as
and ineffective as a com
man, to Nakhon Phanom to well, of the wisdom of our sug mander, he was nonetheless a
backstop me and ultimately gestions important and
was
nice enough guy. He agreed to
take over the project when I Dick had a knack for listening
let us take over a former Lao
left.Dick, who was from and explaining without being
Army training facility just out
upstate New York, was a Syra condescending. This was just side Thakhek. It had all that
cuse University graduate and the right approach with our Lao
we would need to get started.
had joined the Agency a few counterparts.
years earlier. He was a volun
Recruiting new members for
teer like the rest of us and had
Dick and I discussed several our teams was the next step.
arrived at Udorn in the fall of for the future of the
possibilities We made it clear that recruits
1963 He stayed in Udorn that
project, including one would have to meet our stan
awhile to get a feel for things, would move us into a more dards. Being a cousin, brother,
and his presence was most wel
aggressive mode in the eastern or family friend of a team leader
come. Dick was low-key guy a
Panhandle. That option would was not a sufficiently qualify
and I could see right away that call for with
bigger teams more
ing factor.
we would get along.
firepower. At a minimum, we
would need company-size units
Around the time that Dick if we hoped to mine the roads Overambitious
arrived, we started thinking that the VC using, or
were
about moving management of ambush and destroy truck With sights aimed much
our
the program hack into Laos. convoys. higher than ultimately proved
We rented a small house in reasonable, we developed a
Thakhek, and I sometimes
This would he plan to hit Route 12 just as it
a big step
stayed thereovernight while in
beyond road-watching and passed through the Annamites at
Laos for meetings.3 the Mu Gia Pass. The VC would
would have to be carefully
planned. We would need to be shocked, we believed, to see
Dick sat in on all of the meet recruit and train more men, and the Mu Gia Pass closed to truck
ings with team leaders and we would need additional traffic. But, as we soon found
frequently traveled with me PARU support for the training. out, not nearly as as the shocked
when I crossed into Laos. He
Things were heating up in Viet leader of Team Bravo when we
caught quickly. Much of our
on nam and southern Laos was explained the objective.
success depended upon per critical, for both
becoming more
sonal relationships, and he sides. At that time, we had no Our plan involved some com
established rapport easily. Per- plicated logistics. It was the
hope of impeding traffic on the dry
Ho Chi Minh Trail and only season, so we explained that
wanted to harass the VC to we would send cratering
3After I left, in July 1964, my successor
make their tasks more diffi charges by truck and boat to
moved die whole base station 0f the
cult. We sent an outline of our Team Bravos base camp. Then
project to Sa~annakhet, Laos
15
Laos
I felt that I had been part
of an effort that was
doing the right thing.
a 15-man patrol, carrying a A Backward Look
dozen cratering charges, would
walk across the Nakay Plateau
Now, some 35 years later, I
to the place where Route 12
lament many of the unintended
entered Vietnam via the Mu Gia
results of our efforts from 1961-
Pass. The patrol would pick a asked what I was going to do
1973. The ignorance and the
spot along a ravine or another when I got back Headquar
to
arrogance of Aniericansarriv
vulnerable place, and, at night. I said I
ters? guessed that I ing in Southeast Asia during
plant all 12 of the cratering would go to Africa Division, that period were contributing
charges. The road would be
where I ~s supposed to go factors. We came to help, but
cut for weeks.
before I volunteered for Laos. we had only minimal under
The team leader started spew
Lair said that if 1 would like to standing of the history, culture,
return to Laos after home leave, and politics of the people we
ing out one reason after another
I would be most welcome. wanted to aid. The discussions
why such an effort would not
in Geneva were about big
he possible. He had so many
power issues more than about
reasons that he didnt even The offer temptingI
was
Laos or Vietnam. Our strategic
have include ~evil spirits.
to
what I
enjoyed was doing. But interests were superimposed
He pleaded with us to recon
it would probably mean a region where
onto a our presi
sider. We finally did, and no
career of running PM opera dent had decided to draw the
patrol was sent.
tions rather than the classical line against communism. And
intelligence work that I had we would do it our way.
Years later, I learned that B-52
bombers of envisioned before coming to
dropped high-tons
explosive bombs and cratering Laos. So I held off making any US policies in Laos are largely
bombs all along the Trail and in commitment until I could talk to responsible for the disaster that
the strategic passes, including people at Headquarters. Lan- befell the Hmong. \ang Paos
Mu Gia. The road was never dry, of course, was aware of meeting with Bill Lair in late
cut for more than a few days. Lairs conversation. He pre 1960 was the beginning of more
The Vietnamese did an incredi than a decade of warfare and
dicted that I would not return to
ble job of repairing and hardship for his people,
Laos after consultations in
rerouting to keep supplies flow In the
although neither man that day
Washington. end, he was
ing southward Our 12 could have foreseen the out
right.
cratering charges, even at that come. From its origins as an
early stage, would not have had effort to organize and train the
much effect. I left Nakhon Phanom July in Hmong in guerrilla tactics to
1964, traveling to Bangkok via resist communist encroach
Udorn. I was happy with the ment, our program gradually
Career Decisions I felt that I
evolved into a direct confronta
previous \\TQ years.
tion not only of the local FL,
had been part of an effort that
On one of my
trips to Udorn in but also of North Vietnamese
was doing the right thing.
about May 1964, Bill Lair called forces. More training, larger
Beyond that, we had been pro
me in for a chat. This was units, increased firepower, and
ductive and successful. I had
unusual as he mainly con air support were introduced lit
cerned himself with the Hmong met many intelligence officers tle little. But it remained
by a
whom I liked and respected,
program and let his deputy han mismatch. Despite our best
dle the others, so I was curious and I believed that my career efforts, the Hmong were slowly
as I walked into his office. He was off to a good start. decimated.
16
Laos
US policies in South Vietnam lieutenantgeneral, and those of Many 1-Imong have come to the
drove decisions in Laos. The thegenerals and ambassadors United States as refugees, hut
Hmong had to have seen what whom he saw as equals. He thousands still languish in Thai
was happening, but they believed that US power ulti refugee camps. Their way of
pressed on. yang Pao, confi mately would save him, and the life has been destroyed. They
dent that with our support he H mong. can never return to Laos In the
would carry the day, actually end, our policyniakers failed to
pushed for many of the offen \Vhen the war ended in South assume the moral responsibility
sive actions undertaken as the Vietnam, it also ended in Laos, that we owed to those who
conflict wore on. -But his deci where we forced a political worked so closely with us dur
sions were clouded, I believe. arrangement in Vientiane that ing those tumultuous years.
by the stars around himhis virtually guaranteed communist
own, when he was promoted to control. And then we left.
17