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					Conflict in the Years
Ahead
Chet Richards
J. Addams & Partners, Inc.


            It will be protracted, bloody,
                             and horrible.
                                     Martin van Creveld



July 2006                    http://www.jaddams.com       Version 7.1 - August 2006
                                              Purpose

  To explore the course of conflict in the early-middle 21st century by
  comparing and contrasting the work of six of its more distinguished
  observers:
            – Bill Lind, particularly ―Strategic Defense Initiative,‖ and
              ―FMFM 1-A‖
            – Martin van Creveld: The Transformation of War
            – Col T.X. Hammes, USMC: The Sling and the Stone
            – Thomas P. M. Barnett: The Pentagon’s New Map & Blueprint for
              Action
            – Michael Scheuer (―Anonymous‖): Imperial Hubris
            – Antulio Echevarria: ―Fourth Generation War and Other Myths‖
  My purpose is not to critique these works, per se, but to consider, borrow,
  and sometimes reject what John Boyd called ―appropriate bits and pieces‖
  for constructing strategy.

July 2006                             http://www.jaddams.com
                                               Agenda
•    Boyd‘s Patterns of Conflict                   •    Moral isolation and interaction
       – Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg                        – Theme for disintegration and
       – Attrition warfare & maneuver                       collapse
         conflict                                  •    Grand strategy
•    OODA Loops                                           – Theme for vitality and growth
       – What they are not (and are)                      – Ends and means
       – How to accelerate OODA loops                     – Moral leverage
•    Moral conflict & the prism of conflict               – What Lind, van Creveld,
•    Guerrilla warfare                                      Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer
                                                            say about grand strategy
       – Blitz & guerrilla: common
         strategy                                  •    Summary

•    Generations of war                                   – Tables

•    Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert,                  – Issues among the authors
     reorient, reharmonize                                – Neither Shall the Sword
•    4GW according to Lind, van                    •    If I were emperor …
     Creveld, Hammes, Barnett,
     Scheuer, but not Echevarria

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July 2006   http://www.jaddams.com
                                                                         Pattern                                  Positive
                                                                                                               (constructive)
•   National goal                                                                                                elements
     Improve our fitness, as an organic whole, to shape and cope with an ever-changing environment.
•   Grand strategy
     Shape pursuit of national goal so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength (while undermining and isolating our adversaries) but also
     influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success.
•   Strategic aim
     Diminish adversary‘s capacity while improving our capacity to adapt as an organic whole, so that our adversary cannot cope—while we can
     cope—with events/efforts as they unfold.
•   Strategy
     Penetrate adversary‘s moral-mental-physical being to dissolve his moral fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and overload
     his system, as well as subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise subdue those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he
     depends upon, in order to destroy internal harmony, produce paralysis, and collapse adversary‘s will to resist.
•   Grand tactics
     Operate inside adversary‘s observation-orientation-decision-action loops, or get inside his mind-time-space, to create tangles of threatening
     and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes, or
     imagines, and those he must react to, to survive;
                                                                           thereby
     Enmesh adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos
     ... and/or fold adversary back inside himself;
                                                                           thereby
     Maneuver adversary beyond his moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt or endure so that he can neither divine our intentions nor focus his
     efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related decisive strokes as they penetrate, splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm him.
•   Tactics
     Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as shape
     and shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s) that tie-
     up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and strength) elsewhere.


     July 2006                                                http://www.jaddams.com                                                                      141
                                                                          Pattern
                                                                                               Negative (destructive)
•   National goal
     Improve our fitness, as an organic whole, to shape and cope with an ever-changing environment.
                                                                                                     elements
•   Grand strategy
     Shape pursuit of national goal so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength (while undermining and isolating our adversaries) but also
     influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success.
•   Strategic aim
     Diminish adversary’s capacity while improving our capacity to adapt as an organic whole, so that our adversary cannot cope—while we can
     cope—with events/efforts as they unfold.
•   Strategy
     Penetrate adversary’s moral-mental-physical being to dissolve his moral fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and
     overload his system, as well as subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise subdue those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that
     he depends upon, in order to destroy internal harmony, produce paralysis, and collapse adversary‘s will to resist.
•   Grand tactics
     Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action loops, or get inside his mind-time-space, to create tangles of
     threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes,
     or imagines, and those he must react to, to survive;
                                                                           thereby
     Enmesh adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic,
     chaos ... and/or fold adversary back inside himself;
                                                                           thereby
     Maneuver adversary beyond his moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt or endure so that he can neither divine our intentions nor focus
     his efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related decisive strokes as they penetrate, splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm
     him.
•   Tactics
     Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as
     shape and shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s)
     that tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and strength) elsewhere.

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                           Generalization

• Need fighter that can both lose energy and gain energy more
  quickly while outturning an adversary.
• In other words, suggests a fighter that can pick and choose
  engagement opportunities—yet has fast transient (―buttonhook‖)
  characteristics that can be used to either force an overshoot by
  an attacker or stay inside a hard turning defender.



                                        Boyd‘s study of strategy began as a
                                        fighter pilot and an instructor at the
                                          USAF Fighter Weapons School.




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                             Idea expansion

• Idea of fast transients suggests that, in order to win, we should
  operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries—or,
  better yet, get inside adversary‘s observation-orientation-
  decision-action time cycle or loop.
• Why? Such activity will make us appear ambiguous
  (unpredictable) thereby generate confusion and disorder among
  our adversaries—since our adversaries will be unable to
  generate mental images or pictures that agree with the
  menacing as well as faster transient rhythm or patterns they are
  competing against.


                     In other words, ―faster tempo or rhythm‖ is not
                     synonymous with ―get inside adversary’s
                     observation-orientation-decision-action‖ loop.

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                                Human nature

Goal
• Survive, survive on own terms, or improve our capacity for
  independent action.
     The competition for limited resources to satisfy these
     desires may force one to:
• Diminish adversary‘s capacity for independent action, or deny
  him the opportunity to survive on his own terms, or make it
  impossible for him to survive at all.


Implication                                               Point of Patterns of Conflict:
• Life is conflict, survival, and conquest. find yourself in this situation, make
                                       IF you
                                                         sure you are the one who wins.



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                                      Impression

•    In examining these many points of view one is bombarded with the notion that:
       – It is advantageous to possess a variety of responses that can be applied
         rapidly to gain sustenance, avoid danger, and diminish adversary‘s capacity
         for independent action.
       – The simpler organisms—those that make-up man as well as man working
         with other men in a higher level context—must cooperate or, better yet,
         harmonize their activities in their endeavors to survive as an organic
         synthesis.
       – To shape and adapt to change one cannot be passive; instead one must
         take the initiative.
•    Put more simply and directly: the above comments leave one with the
     impression that variety/rapidity/harmony/initiative (and their interaction) seem
     to be key qualities that permit one to shape and adapt to an ever-changing
     environment.
•    With this impression in mind together with our notion of getting inside an
     adversary‘s O-O-D-A loop we will proceed in our historical investigation.

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                                      Historical pattern
                    Sun Tzu The Art of War c. 400 B.C.

  Theme                                            Strategy
                                                 These represent potential asymmetries, that
  •    Harmony and trust                           • Probe enemy‘s organization and
                                                 is, things we can exploit to gain an advantage
  •    Justice and well being                           dispositions to unmask his
                                                 leading to victory over our opponents.
                                                        strengths, weaknesses, patterns of
  •    Inscrutability and enigma                        movement presentation, keep asking
                                                 Throughout this and intentions.
  •    Deception and subversion                  yourself:
                                                   • ―Shape‖ enemy‘s perception of
  •    Rapidity and fluidity                      • What were manipulate his plans and
                                                      world to the asymmetries?
                                                      actions.
  •    Dispersion and concentration               • How did the winning side achieve these
                                                      Attack enemy‘s plans as best policy.
                                                  • asymmetries?
  •    Surprise and shock
                                                      Next best disrupt his alliances. Next
                                                  • How did they use army. in ordercities
                                                      best attack his them Attack to win?
                                                      only when there is no alternative.
                                                 Sometimes Boyd will give you his answers;
                Desired outcome
                                                  • Employ cheng and to maneuvers
                                                 sometimes you will havech'idecide for
            •   Subdue enemy without             yourself.
                                                      to quickly and unexpectedly hurl
                fighting                             strength against weaknesses.
                                                 Key point: All conflict is – or should be –
                                                 ―asymmetric‖!
            •   Avoid protracted war

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                                              Historical pattern

  Early commanders                                        Impression
  •      Alexander                                        •    Early commanders seem
  •      Hannibal                                              consistent with ideas of Sun Tzu

  •      Belisarius                                       •    Western commanders more
                                                               directly concerned with winning
  •      Genghis Khan                                          the battle
  •      Tamerlane                                        •    Eastern commanders closer to
                                                               Sun Tzu in attempting to shatter
                                                               adversary prior to battle
                     Action
             Cheng and ch'i*

  * Cheng/ch'i maneuver schemes were employed by early commanders to expose adversary vulnerabilities and
      weaknesses (a la cheng) for exploitation and decisive stroke (via ch'i).




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                        Historical pattern

            Keeping in mind the ideas of Sun Tzu and our
            comments about early commanders, let‘s take a
            look at an early tactical theme and some battle
            (grand tactical) situations to gain a feel for the
            different ways that the cheng/ch'i game has been
            (and can be) played.




July 2006                 http://www.jaddams.com                 15
                                       Historical pattern
  Tactical theme (from about 300 B.C. to 1400 A.D.)
  •    Light troops (equipped with bows, javelins, light swords, etc.) perform
       reconnaissance, screening, and swirling hit-and-run actions to:
            – Unmask enemy dispositions and activities.
            – Cloud/distort own dispositions and activities.
            – Confuse, disorder enemy operations.
  •    Heavy troops (equipped with lances, bows, swords, etc.) protected by armor and
       shields:
            – Charge and smash thinned-out/scattered or disordered/bunched-up enemy
              formations generated by interaction with light troops; or
            – Menace enemy formations to hold them in tight, or rigid, arrays thereby make them
              vulnerable to missiles of swirling light troops.
  •    Light and heavy troops in appropriate combination pursue, envelop, and mop-up
       isolated remnants of enemy host.
  Idea
  •    Employ maneuver action by light troops with thrust action of heavy troops to confuse,
       break-up, and smash enemy formations.


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                         Battle of Arbela*
                           October 1, 331 B.C.


     Mazeus                  Darius                                        Bessus



                                                      Chariots




                                                            Companions




                                                                     *Also known as the Battle of
                                                                                     Gaugamela
July 2006     Parmenio       http://www.jaddams.com                                             20
                                      Battle of Arbela* (Phase II)
                            Persians Flee                                     Persians Flee


                                                                                    The heavy thrust, set up by all the
                                                                                    other action on this page. Although
                                                                                    outnumbered overall, at this point,
                                                                                    Alexander manufactured a temporary
                                                                                    but decisive advantage.



                                                    Darius
          Mazeus




                                                                     Reserve Line



Version 1.2
10 March 2005

                July 2006                   http://www.jaddams.com                                                        21
                                    Historical pattern
                     Genghis Khan and the Mongols

  Key asymmetries                                   Theme
  •    Superior mobility                            •    Widely separated strategic
  •    Superior communications                           maneuvers, with appropriate
                                                         stratagems, baited retreats,
  •    Superior intelligence                             hard-hitting tactical thrusts, and
  •    Superior leadership                               swirling envelopments to
                                                         uncover and exploit adversary
                                                         vulnerabilities and weaknesses.
                    Aim                                       in conjunction with

            Conquest, as basis to                   •    Clever and calculated use of
                                                         propaganda and terror to play
            create, preserve, and
                                                         upon adversary‘s doubts, fears,
            expand Mongol nation
                                                         and superstitions in order to
                                                         undermine his resolve and
                                                         destroy his will to resist.
                   keep this in mind
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                  Genghis Khan and Psyops

• …to play on surprise in a tortured manipulation of public fear
  and hope. The objective of such tactics was simple and always
  the same: to frighten the enemy into surrendering before an
  actual battle began.
• By striking deeply behind enemy lines, the Mongols immediately
  created havoc and panic throughout the kingdom.
• The Persian chronicler Ata-Malik Juvaini described his approach
  ―… air black as night with the dust of cavalry, fright and panic
  overcame them, and fear and dread prevailed.‖


                                                         Jack Weatherford,
                         Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World,
                                                                      p. 5



July 2006                  http://www.jaddams.com                Added August 2006
            Mongol strategic maneuver
                          (1219-1220)
                                                Chagatai   Jochi
                                   Genghis
                                    Khan
                                                                           Jebe




                     Aral
                     Sea


                                 Kizyl-Kum



                                    Khawarizm
                                      State

                         Bokhara

                                             Samarkand
                                                     (Modern Uzbekistan)




             500 miles
July 2006           http://www.jaddams.com                                        26
                  ?    Raises nagging question ?

            Even though outnumbered, why were Mongols able
            to maneuver in widely scattered arrays without being
            defeated separately or in detail?




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                                Historical patterns
                   Genghis Khan and the Mongols

 Message
 •     By exploiting superior leadership, intelligence, communications, and
       mobility as well as by playing upon adversary‘s fears and doubts via
       propaganda and terror, Mongols operated inside adversary observation-
       orientation-decision-action loops.

 Result
 •     Outnumbered Mongols created impressions of terrifying strength—by
       seeming to come out of nowhere yet be everywhere.
                                         hence,
 •     Subversive propaganda, clever stratagems, fast breaking maneuvers,
       and calculated terror not only created vulnerabilities and weaknesses but
       also played upon moral factors that drain-away resolve, produce panic,
       and bring about collapse.


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                                         Historical pattern
                                  Napoleon’s art of war

 Revolutionary army gifts to Napoleon                             Beneficial asymmetry
 •     Moral and physical energy of citizen-                      •     Mobility/fluidity of force dramatically
       soldiers and new leaders generated by the                        better than that possessed by potential
       revolution and magnified by successes                            adversaries.
       against invading allied armies
 •     Subdivision of army into smaller self-
       contained but mutually supporting units
       (divisions)                                                     ?    Raises question            ?
 •     Ability to travel light and live-off countryside               How did Napoleon exploit
       without extensive baggage, many supply
       wagons, and slow-moving resupply efforts                       this superior mobility/fluidity
 •     Rapid march associated with ―120‖ instead                      of force?
       of the standard ―70‖ steps per minute
 •     Discontinued adherence to 1791 Drill
       Regulations pertaining to the well regulated               perhaps one reason why
       and stereotype use of column and line
       formations for movement and fighting                       maneuver warfare is often
                                                                  confused with ―speed‖
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                                       Strategy of envelopment
                                                        (idealized schematic)

I. The Envelopment March                                                          II. The Reversed Front Battle




                                                                                                                                                    strategic barrier
                                                              strategic barrier




                                                                                                    of defense
                    of defense




                                                                                  pinning force
 pinning force
    Cheng




                                                                                                    line
                    line




                                         LOCs




                                                                                                                    curtain of
                                   curtain of                                                                                            maneuver
                                                    maneuver


                                                                                                                               cavalry screen
                                                  cavalry screen
                                     ch'i
                                 maneuver force                                                   Source: David G. Chandler, Waterloo: The Hundred Days, 1980.

                                                                                                                                                                        35
        July 2006                                            http://www.jaddams.com
                           The strategy of central position
                                                        (idealized schematic)
I. Advance to Contact                                                          III. The Coup de Grace

base       LOC                                   LOC            base
                                                                                         LOC                                xxxx                    base
  xxxx                                                        xxxx             base

  A                                                           B
                                                                                 xxxx
                                                                                                                            B
                                                                                     A




                            xxx                                                           xxx


                                   xxx
                     xxx


                            xxx
                                  II. The Double Battle                                         overnight forced march
                           xxxx

                            N
                                  base     LOC                                            LOC          base
                                    xxxx                                                             xxxx

                                    A                                                                 B

                                                       xx


                                                                        xxx




                                                            xxx                xxx

                                                                       xxx



                                                                       xxxx                                                      Source: David G. Chandler,
                                                                       N                                                 Waterloo: The Hundred Days, 1980.


         July 2006                                                 http://www.jaddams.com                                                                  36
                                                   Historical pattern
                                          Napoleon’s art of war
Early tactic                                                        Later tactics
―The action was opened by a cloud of sharpshooters,                 ―At the outset, a heavy bombardment would be loosed
some mounted, some on foot, who were sent forward to                against the enemy formations, causing fearful losses if
carry out a general rather than a minutely-regulated                they failed to seek shelter, and generally lowering their
mission; they proceeded to harass the enemy, escaping               power of resistance. Under cover of this fire, swarms of
from his superior numbers by their mobility, from the effect        voltigeurs would advance to within musketry range and
of his cannon by their dispersal. They were constantly              add a disconcerting ‗nuisance‘ element by sniping at
relieved to ensure that the fire did not slacken, and they          officers and the like. This preliminary phase would be
also received considerable reinforcement to increase their          followed by a series of heavy cavalry and infantry
over-all effect … Once the chink in foe’s armour had                attacks. The secret of these was careful timing and
been revealed … the horse artillery would gallop up and             coordination. The first cavalry charges were designed to
open fire with canister at close range. The attacking force         defeat the hostile cavalry and compel the enemy infantry
would meantime be moving up in the indicated direction,             to form squares‖, thereby reduce fire in any one direction
the infantry advancing in column, the cavalry in regiments          and enable the columns to get to close grips before the
or squadrons, ready to make its presence felt anywhere or           enemy could resume his linear formation. The infantry
everywhere as required. Then, when the hail of enemy                (deployed or not) and accompanying horse artillery would
bullets or cannon balls began to slacken … The soldiers             then blaze a gap in the enemy formation and finally the
would begin to run forward, those in the front ranks                cavalry would sweep forward, again, to exploit the
crossing their bayonets, as the drums beat the charge; the            other words to describe this:
                                                                    breakthrough.
sky would ring a thousand battle-cries constantly repeated:          organic, formless, reconnaissance
―En avant. En avant. Vive la Republique.‖
                                                                     pull, surfaces-and-gaps
      Essential point
      Early tactics, without apparent design, operate in a fluid, adaptable manner to uncover, expand and exploit adversary
      vulnerabilities and weaknesses while later tactics emphasize massed firepower and stereotyped formations working
      formally together to smash adversary strength.

  July 2006                                        http://www.jaddams.com                                                        37
                                            Historical pattern
                                    Napoleon’s art of war
  Critique                                                 Why?
  •      Napoleon exploited ambiguity, deception,          •     Napoleon emphasized the conduct of war
         and mobility at the strategic level,                    from the top down. He created and
                       whereas,                                  exploited strategic success to procure
                                                                 grand tactical and tactical success.
  •      He increasingly emphasized formal
         battering ram methods and de-                     •     To support his concept, he set up a highly
         emphasized loose, irregular methods                     centralized command and control system
         (e.g. skirmishers) at the tactics level—via             which, when coupled with essentially
         a return to, and increasingly heavy-                    unvarying tactical recipes, resulted in
         handed application of, the 1791 Drill                   strength smashing into strength by
         Regulations.                                            increasingly unimaginative, formalized,
                                                                 and predictable actions at lower and
                                                                 lower levels.

      Result
      Strategic maneuvers ambiguous and deceiving prior to tactical concentration; after concentration,
      ―maneuvers‖ stereotyped and obvious.
                                                       hence
      Tactical ―maneuvers‖ could not easily procure the victory because of their obvious, predictable
      nature.


July 2006                                   http://www.jaddams.com                                            38
                         Technology and the art of war
  •    The legacy of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini‘s tactical regularity and the continued use
       of large stereotyped formations for tactical assault, together with the mobilization of large
       armies and massing of enormous supplies through a narrow logistics network, ―telegraphed‖
       any punch hence minimized the possibility of exploiting ambiguity, deception, and
       mobility to generate surprise for a decisive edge.
  •    In this sense, technology was being used as a crude club that generated frightful and
       debilitating casualties on all sides during the:

                    –   American Civil War (1861-65)
                    –   Austro-Prussian War (1866)
                    –   Franco-Prussian War (1870)
                    –   Boer War (1899-1902)
                    –   Russo-Japanese War (1904-05)
                    –   World War I (1914-18)
  Point
  •    Evolution of tactics did not keep pace with increased weapons lethality developed and
       produced by 19th century technology.
                                      ?     Raises question        ?
  •    Why were the 19th century and early 20th century commanders unable to evolve better
       tactics to avoid over a half century of debilitating casualties?

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                                          World War I

  Action                                             Reaction
  •     Offensives conducted on wide                 •    Defense organized into depth of
        frontages—emphasizing few, rather                 successive belts of fortified terrain.
        than many, harmonious yet                    •    Massed artillery and machine-gun
        independent thrusts.                              fire designed to arrest and pin down
  •     Evenness of advance maintained to                 attacker.
        protect flanks and provide artillery         •    Counter-attack to win back lost
        support as advance makes                          ground.
        headway.
  •     Reserves thrown in whenever attack
        held-up—against regions or points
        of strong resistance.


      Result
      Stagnation and enormous attrition since advances made generally as expected
      along paths of hardened resistance because of dependence upon railroads and
      choice of tactics of trying to reduce strong points by massed firepower and infantry.


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                                       World War I
                                         a way out

                          Idea                                     Authors

            •   Infiltration tactics             •        Capt. Andre Laffargue
                                                 •        Gen. von Hutier?
                                                 •        Gen. Ludendorff


            •   Guerrilla tactics                •        T.E. Lawrence
                                                 •        Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck




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                                           World War I
                                       infiltration tactics                         cheng

 Key points
 •     Fire at all levels by artillery, mortars, and machine-guns is exploited to hold adversary
       attention and pin him down hence—
 •     Fire together with gas and smoke (as well as fog and mist) represent an immediate
       and ominous threat to capture adversary attention, force heads down and
       dramatically obscure view, thereby cloak infiltrators movements.
 •     Dispersed and irregular character of moving swarms (as opposed to well defined line
       abreast formations) permit infiltrators to blend against irregular and changing terrain
       features as they push forward.
 •     Taken together, the captured attention, the obscured view, and the indistinct
       character of moving dispersed/irregular swarms deny adversary the opportunity to
       picture what is taking place.
                                                                                         ch’i
 Result
 •     Infiltration teams appear to suddenly loom-up out of nowhere to blow thru, around,
       and behind disoriented defenders.
                            Note: This is the essence of maneuver warfare/3GW. Good
                                   discussions in Bruce Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics,
                                   and Stephen Biddle, Military Power.

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                                     Looming up
                           (asymmetric fast transients)

  OODA ―loops‖ in action
            The Asian soldier is a master of the approach march. His
            tradition is to attack out of nowhere—to suddenly appear where
            he is least expected.
                                              John Poole, Phantom Soldier, 139




July 2006                         http://www.jaddams.com
                     Creation of the Blitzkrieg


                               Envelopment
                             (Leuctra, Cannae)


            Flying Columns
               (Mongols)                                     Blitzkrieg
                                                          (Heinz Guderian)

       Tank Attack with                                        • Multiple narrow
                                                                 thrusts
      Motorized Vehicles
                                                               • Armored recce
         (J.F.C. Fuller)
                                                               • Commanders
                                                                 forward
                                                               • Extensive
                                 Infiltration                    communications
                                (Ludendorff)                     net
                                                               • Air in lieu of (or
                                                                 with) artillery

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                                                                          Blitzkrieg
Action
•   Intelligence—signal, photo, agent … reconnaissance (air and ground)—and patrol actions probe and test adversary before and during combat
    operations to uncover as well as shape changing patterns of strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions.
•   Adversary patterns, and associated changes, are weighed against friendly situation to expose attractive, or appropriate, alternatives that exploit
    adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses, hence help shape mission commitment and influence command intent.
•   Mission assigned. Schwerpunkt (focus of main effort) established before and shifted during combat operations to bypass adversary strength and
    strike at weakness. Nebenpunkte (other related or supporting efforts) employed to tie-up, focus, or drain-away adversary attention and strength
    (elsewhere).
•   Special seizure/disruption teams infiltrate (by air or other means) enemy rear areas where, with agents already in place, they: seize bridges and road
    crossings, sever communications, incapacitate or blow-up power stations, seize or blow-up fuel dumps … as well as sow confusion/disorder via
    ―false messages and fake orders‖.
•   Indirect and direct air firepower efforts together with (any needed) sudden/brief preliminary artillery fires are focused in appropriate areas to impede
    (or channel) adversary movement, disrupt communications, suppress forward defensive fires, obscure the advance, and divert attention.
•   Armored reconnaissance or stormtrooper teams, leading armored columns, advance rapidly from least expected regions and infiltrate adversary front
    to find paths of least resistance.
•   Armored assault teams of tanks, infantry, anti-tank guns, and combat engineers as well as other specialists, together with close artillery and air
    support, quickly open breaches (via frontal/flank fire and movement combinations) into adversary rear along paths of least resistance uncovered by
    armored reconnaissance or stormtroopers.
•   When breakthrough occurs, relatively independent mobile/armored teams led by armored recce with air support (recce, fire, and airlift when
    necessary), blow-through to penetrate at high speed deep into adversary interior. Object is to cut lines of communication, disrupt movement,
    paralyze command and envelop adversary forces and resources.
•   Motorized or foot infantry further back supported by artillery and armor pour-in to collapse isolated pockets of resistance, widen the breaches and
    secure the encirclement or captured terrain against possible counter-attack.
Idea
•   Conquer an entire region in the quickest possible time by gaining initial surprise and exploiting the fast tempo/fluidity-of-action of armored teams,
    with air support, as basis to repeatedly penetrate, splinter, envelop, and roll-up/wipe-out disconnected remnants of adversary organism in
    order to confuse, disorder, and finally shatter his will or capacity to resist.
                                                                                  Note: maneuver warfare does not mean leaving intact
                                                                                  and motivated enemy forces in your rear.
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            What happens if we don’t probe, test,
                   uncover and shape?



… the U.S. intelligence community missed the significance
of the Fedayeen organization. It was a striking omission
given the visibility of the Fedayeen in Iraqi towns and cities
and the vital importance of the Fedayeen to the regime,
but understandable given the CIA‘s dearth of human
sources … (Gordon & Trainor, Cobra II, p. 62)




July 2006               http://www.jaddams.com
                                            Which lead to:

  Essence of blitzkrieg
  Employ a Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt maneuver philosophy to generate ambiguity, realize deception,
  exploit superior mobility, and focus violence as basis to quickly:
   •    Create many opportunities to penetrate weaknesses in the form of any moral or mental
        inadequacies as well as any gaps or exposed flanks that open into adversary‘s vulnerable rear and
        interior, hence-
   •    Create and exploit opportunities to repeatedly penetrate adversary organism, at all levels (tactical,
        grand tactical, and strategic) and in many ways, in order to splinter, envelop, and roll-up/wipe-out
        isolated remnants, thereby generate confusion and disorder, hence -
   •    Create and exploit opportunities to disrupt his system for communication, command, and support,
        as well as undermine or seize those connections or centers that he depends upon, thus shake his will
        or capacity to decisively commit his back-up echelons, operational reserves, and/or strategic
        reserves, thereby magnify adversary‘s confusion and disorder and convince him to give up.
  Intent
  Create grand tactical success then exploit and expand it into strategic success for a decisive victory.
  Implication
  Blitzers, by being able to infiltrate or penetrate or get inside adversary‘s system, generate many moral-
  mental-physical non—cooperative (or isolated) centers of gravity, as well as undermine or seize those
  centers of gravity adversary depends upon, in order to magnify friction, produce paralysis, and bring about
  adversary collapse.

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                                Categories of conflict
                                                            Note: Boyd did not use the term
                                                          ―maneuver warfare‖ in his briefings.
  Now looking back and reflecting upon the panorama of military history
  we can imagine three kinds of human conflict:
            – Attrition warfare—as practiced by the Emperor Napoleon, by
              all sides during the 19th century and during World War I, by the
              Allies during World War II, and by present-day nuclear
              planners.
            – Maneuver conflict—as practiced by the Mongols, General
              Bonaparte, Confederate General Stonewall Jackson, Union
              General Ulysses S. Grant, Hitler‘s Generals (in particular
              Manstein, Guderian, Balck, Rommel) and the Americans under
              Generals Patton and MacArthur.
            – [we’ll come back to this bullet later]

  With these comments in mind let‘s look into the essentials of each.
                                                                                                Version 1.2
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                      Attrition observations

 • Firepower, as a destructive force, is king.
 • Protection (trenches, armor, dispersion, etc.) is used to weaken
   or dilute effects of enemy firepower.
 • Mobility is used to bring firepower to bear or to evade enemy fire.
 • Measures of success are (now) ―body count‖ and targets
   destroyed.
 • Seize and hold terrain objectives replaces Napoleon‘s dictum:
   Destroy enemy army.

                                 Key point: measures of success are
                                 (virtually all) quantitative and objective,
                                 and if what you‘re doing isn‘t working,
                                 you just haven‘t done it enough.

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                                Essence of attrition warfare
                                                                                 Note – moral purpose
  Create and exploit                                        Payoff
  •    Destructive force:
                                                            •    Frightful and debilitating attrition via
            Weapons (mechanical, chemical,
                                                                 widespread destruction as basis to:
            biological, nuclear, etc.) that kill, maim,
            and/or otherwise generate widespread                   –    Break enemy‘s will to resist
            destruction.                                           –    Seize and hold terrain objectives
  •    Protection:
            Ability to minimize the concentrated and
            explosive expression of destructive force
            by taking cover behind natural or                                      Aim
            manmade obstacles, by dispersion of
            people and resources, and by being                          Compel enemy to
            obscure using camouflage, smoke, etc.,
                                                                        surrender and sue
            together with cover and dispersion.
  •    Mobility:
                                                                        for peace
                                                                           Attrition – destruction – is the
            Speed or rapidity to focus destructive
            force or move away from adversary‘s
                                                                                 means, not the end.
            destructive focus.
                             Note: ―speed‖
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                 Observations regarding maneuver

 • Ambiguity, deception, novelty, mobility, and violence (or
   threat thereof) are used to generate surprise and shock.
 • Fire and movement are used in combination, like cheng/ch'i
   or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt, to tie-up, divert, or drain-
   away adversary attention and strength in order to expose as
   well as menace and exploit vulnerabilities or weaknesses
   elsewhere.
 • Indications of success tend to be qualitative and are related
   to the widespread onset of confusion and disorder, frequent
   envelopments, high prisoner counts, or any other
   phenomenon that suggests inability to adapt to change.
   It‘s the interpretation that‘s important, not the
   quantitative data themselves. Unlike attrition
   warfare, one does not typically reinforce failure.

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                                Essence of maneuver conflict
  Create, exploit, and magnify                                              Payoff
  •       Ambiguity:                                                        •      Disorientation:
            Alternative or competing impressions of events as they                   Mismatch between events one observes or
            may or may not be.                                                       imagines and events (or efforts) he must react or
  •       Deception:                                                                 adapt to.

            An impression of events as they are not.                        •      Disruption:

  •       Novelty:                                                                   State of being split-apart, broken-up, or torn
                                                                                     asunder.
            Impressions associated with events/ideas that are
            unfamiliar or have not been experienced before.                 •      Overload:

  •       Fast transient maneuvers:                                                  A welter of threatening events/efforts beyond one‘s
                                                                                     mental or physical capacity to adapt or endure.
            Irregular and rapid/abrupt shift from one maneuver
            event/state to another.
  •       Effort (cheng/ch'i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt):
                                                                      Note: High tempo, not
            An expenditure of energy or an irruption of violence—     (necessarily) high speed.
            focused into, or thru, features that permit an organic
            whole to exist.

      Aim
      Generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as disorient, disrupt, or overload those that adversary
      depends upon, in order to magnify friction, shatter cohesion, produce paralysis, and bring about his collapse;
                                                                or equivalently,
      Uncover, create, and exploit many vulnerabilities and weaknesses, hence many opportunities, to pull adversary apart
      and isolate remnants for mop-up or absorption.


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It is true that the Russian can be
superb in defense and reckless
in mass attacks, but when faced
by surprise and unforeseen
situations he is an easy prey to
panic. Field Marshal von Manstein proved in this
operation* that Russian mass attacks should be met
by maneuver, not by rigid defense.
                                               Panzer Battles,
                           Major General F. W. von Mellenthin,
                                                       p. 254


* The Kharkov Counterstroke –                             why this is called
  February & March 1943                                  ―maneuver‖ conflict

July 2006                       http://www.jaddams.com
                                               Second impression

Transients                                      Intentions
•   Observe, orient, decide and act more        •       Probe and test adversary to unmask strengths, weaknesses,
    inconspicuously, more quickly, and with             maneuvers, and intentions.
    more irregularity ...                       •       Employ a variety of measures that interweave menace-uncertainty-
                 or put another way                     mistrust with tangles of ambiguity-deception-novelty as basis to
•   Operate inside adversary‘s observation-             sever adversary’s moral ties and disorient ...
    orientation-decision action loops or get    •       Select initiative (or response) that is least expected.
    inside his mind-time-space.                 •       Establish focus of main effort together with other effort and pursue
                                                        directions that permit many happenings, offer many branches, and
                                                        threaten alternative objectives.
                                                •       Move along paths of least resistance (to reinforce and exploit
                                                        success).
                                                •       Exploit, rather than disrupt or destroy, those differences, frictions,
                                                        and obsessions of adversary organism that interfere with his ability to
                                                        cope ...
                                                •       Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload, or seize adversary‘s
    … permits                                           vulnerable, yet critical, connections, centers, and activities ... in order
                                                        to dismember organism and isolate remnants for wrap-up or
       one to                                           absorption.
                                                •       Generate uncertainty, confusion, disorder, panic, chaos ... to shatter
                                                        cohesion, produce paralysis and bring about collapse.
                                                •       Become an extraordinary commander.


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             Select the initiative (or response)
                   that is least expected
• (Genghis Khan) had secretly pushed and pulled another
  division of warriors over a distance longer than any other army
  had ever covered—two thousand miles of desert, mountain, and
  steppe—to appear deep behind enemy lines, where least
  expected. (Weatherford, p. 4)
• We intended to make our decisive thrust not immediately in the
  area where the front protruded west, but down in the southern
  sector, along the Black Sea coast. In other words, where the
  enemy would be least expecting it. Field Marshal Erich von
  Manstein on the Battle of the Kerch Peninsula, May 1942 (Lost
  Victories, p. 234). [Although outnumbered 2-to-1 and facing a
  well prepared enemy, Manstein won a spectacular victory that
  led to his promotion to Field Marshal].



July 2006                  http://www.jaddams.com         Added August 2006
                                                    Agenda

•    Conflict                                           •    Moral isolation and interaction
       –    Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg                          –    Theme for disintegration and
       –    Attrition warfare & maneuver conflict                   collapse

•    OODA Loops                                         •    Grand strategy

       –    What they are not (and are)                        –    Theme for vitality and growth

       –    How to accelerate OODA loops                       –    Ends and means

•    Moral conflict & the prism of conflict                    –    Moral leverage

•    Guerrilla warfare                                         –    What Lind, van Creveld, Hammes,
                                                                    Barnett, and Scheuer say about
       –    Blitz & guerrilla: common strategy                      grand strategy
•    Generations of war                                 •    Summary
•    Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert,                       –    Tables
     reorient, reharmonize
                                                               –    Issues among the authors
•    4GW according to Lind, van Creveld,
     Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer                              –    Neither Shall the Sword
                                                        •    If I were emperor …




July 2006                                  http://www.jaddams.com
                                       Boyd’s original concept of
                                            the OODA loop

                                                        Orient




                                 Observe                             Decide
A scheme like this would be a ―stage
model.‖ The drawbacks of such
models are well known – see for
example, Gary Klein‘s Sources of
Power, pp. 127-128.



                                                            Act

      July 2006                             http://www.jaddams.com
                                    The only drawing Boyd made of
                                       the OODA ―loop‖ (1995)
                Observe                               Orient                                   Decide                            Act
                              Implicit                                                                Implicit
  Unfolding                  Guidance                  Cultural
                                                                                                     Guidance
Circumstances                & Control                Traditions                                     & Control


                                           Genetic
                                           Heritage                Analyses &
                Observations      Feed
                                 Forward
                                                                   Synthesis     Feed           Decision              Feed      Action
                                                                                Forward                              Forward
                                                                                              (Hypothesis)                      (Test)
                                                New
                                            Information         Previous
                                                               Experience
  Outside                                                                                                                            Unfolding
Information                                                                                                                          Interaction
                                                                                                                                        With
               Unfolding
                                                                                                                                    Environment
               Interaction                         Feedback
                  With
              Environment                                    Feedback

                                                                                     J. R. Boyd, ―the Essence of Winning and Losing,‖ 1995.

              ―Orientation is the Schwerpunkt.‖ Organic Design, 16.

              ―Emphasize implicit over explicit in order to gain a favorable mismatch in friction and
               time (ours lower than any adversary‘s).‖ Organic Design, 22.

              ―Interaction permits vitality and growth, while isolation leads to decay and
               disintegration.‖ Strategic Game, 29.
    July 2006                                                  http://www.jaddams.com
                                    Prerequisites
                                Fingerspitzengefühl
 •     An ability to ―feel‖ or sense the flow of events
            – Often associated with Rommel
 •     Related to the implicit guidance and control link from orientation to
       action
 •     ―When this unminding becomes your mind, you do not dwell on
       anything and do not miss anything. In your body it comes out when a
       need faces it, to fulfill that need.‖ – Zen Master Takuan (Thomas
       Cleary, The Japanese Art of War, 65)
 •     ―You must practice all of your techniques until they become second
       nature … actual combat is extremely fast and demands that you act
       and react without thinking.‖ – Miyamoto Musashi, Book of Five Rings
 •     ―A major difference between a military that can do maneuver warfare in
       combat and one that can only talk about it is excellence in techniques.
       Sloppy technique slows down your Boyd Cycle [OODA loops] and
       makes your actions ineffective. – Bill Lind, Maneuver Warfare
       Handbook
July 2006                         http://www.jaddams.com
                                  Blitz operating philosophy
  Key point
  •      Each level from simple to complex (platoon to theater) has their own observation-orientation-decision-action
         time cycle that increases as we try to control more levels and details of command at the higher levels. Put
         simply, as the number of events we must consider increase, the longer it takes to observe-orient-decide-act.
  Idea
  •      This brings out the idea that faster tempo, or rhythm, at lower levels should work within the slower rhythm but
         larger pattern at higher levels so that overall system does not lose its cohesion or coherency.
  Raises question
  •      How do blitzers harmonize these differing tempos/rhythms so that they can exploit the faster rhythm/smaller
         pattern (of the lower-level units) yet maintain the coherency of the rhythm/pattern for the larger effort?
  Response
  •      Give lower-level commanders wide freedom, within an overall mind-time-space scheme, to shape/direct
         their own activities so that they can exploit faster tempo/rhythm at tactical levels yet be in harmony with the
         larger pattern/slower rhythm associated with the more general aim and larger effort at the strategic level.
  Shaping agents
  •      Shape overall scheme by using mission concept or sense of mission to fix responsibility and shape
         commitment at all levels and through all parts of the organism. Likewise, use Schwerpunkt concept through
         all levels to link differing rhythms/patterns so that each part or level of the organic whole can operate at its own
         natural rhythm—without pulling organism apart—instead of the slower pace associated with a rigid centralized
These, inside a shared value system, permit
         control.
implicit guidance and control.


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                   Overall mind-time-space scheme
  Message
  •    According to General Gunther Blumentritt, such a scheme presupposes a
       common outlook based upon ―a body of professional officers who have received
       exactly the same training during the long years of peace and with the same
       tactical education, the same way of thinking, identical speech, hence a body of
       officers to whom all tactical conceptions were fully clear.‖
  •    Furthermore, a la General Blumentritt, it presupposes ―an officers training
       institution which allows the subordinate a very great measure of freedom of
       action and freedom in the manner of executing orders and which primarily calls
       for independent daring, initiative and sense of responsibility.‖
  Point
                                                     Boyd also used the German word,
  •                                                  ―Einheit,‖ to describe this common
       Without a common outlook superiors cannot give subordinates freedom-of-
       action and maintain coherency of ongoing action.             outlook.
  Implication
  •    A common outlook possessed by ―a body of officers‖ represents a unifying
       theme that can be used to simultaneously encourage subordinate initiative
       yet realize superior intent.


July 2006                           http://www.jaddams.com                                74
                                                      Schwerpunkt
                                                (focus of main effort)
Message
•       Schwerpunkt acts as a center or axis or harmonizing agent that is used to help shape commitment and
        convey or carry-out intent, at all levels from theater to platoon, hence an image around which:
          –     Maneuver of all arms and supporting elements are focused to exploit opportunities and maintain tempo
                of operations,
                                                                 and
          –     Initiative of many subordinates is harmonized with superior intent.
•       In this sense Schwerpunkt can be thought of as:
          –     A focusing agent that naturally produces an unequal distribution of effort as a basis to generate
                superiority in some sectors by thinning-out others,
                                                             as well as
          –     A medium to realize superior intent without impeding initiative of many subordinates, hence a medium
                through which subordinate initiative is implicitly connected to superior intent.


Implication
–       Schwerpunkt represents a unifying concept that provides a way to rapidly shape focus and direction of effort
        as well as harmonize support activities with combat operations, thereby permit a true decentralization of
        tactical command within centralized strategic guidance—without losing cohesion of overall effort.
                                                     or put another way
–       Schwerpunkt represents a unifying medium that provides a directed way to tie initiative of many subordinate
        actions with superior intent as a basis to diminish friction and compress time in order to generate a favorable
        mismatch in time/ability to shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances.

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                  Auftragstaktik—missions and
                  contracts instead of directives

The concept of mission can be thought of as a contract, hence an
agreement, between superior and subordinate.

       – The subordinate agrees to make his or her actions serve
         superior's intent in terms of what is to be accomplished,
       – The superior agrees to give the subordinate wide freedom to
         exercise his or her imagination and initiative in terms of
         how intent is to be realized.




July 2006                    http://www.jaddams.com
                Auftragstaktik—what ―commitment‖
                              means
As part of this concept, the subordinate is given the right to
challenge or question the feasibility of the mission if:

       – he feels his superior's ideas on what can be achieved are
         not in accord with the existing situation or
       – he feels his superior has not given him adequate resources
         to carry it out.



            Likewise, the superior has every right to expect his
            subordinate to carry out the mission contract when
            agreement is reached on what can be achieved consistent
            with the existing situation and resources provided.

                                                        J. R. Boyd, Patterns of Conflict, 76

July 2006                      http://www.jaddams.com
                                        Auftragstaktik

  •    But once the attack is underway and the situation begins changing rapidly, the
       subordinate will again be expected to adjust his actions to the changes on his
       own initiative, with appropriate references to his superior‘s intent. Lind,
       Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 13-14
  •    Advantages of Auftragstaktik:
            – Leaders at all echelons are forced to analyze their own situations as well as
              that of the next highest command
            – Transmission of orders from one command level to another is expedited
            – Measures taken at the scene of action are in harmony with actual conditions
                                                  General W. von Lessow, Bundeswehr, 1977
                                                             (in van Creveld, Fighting Power)
  •    It provides for the degree of cooperation necessary to achieve harmony of effort
       yet gives commanders at all levels the latitude to act with initiative and boldness
       … It is not more command and control that we are after. Instead, we seek to
       decrease the amount of command and control that we need. MCDP 6,
       Command and Control, Ch. 3

July 2006                               http://www.jaddams.com
                         Before you rush in …

 • Mission command and control demands mutual trust among
   all commanders, staffs, and Marines—confidence in the
   abilities and judgment of subordinates, peers, and seniors.
                                                right
        In other words, you must earn the MCDP 6, p. 10
                   to use Auftragstaktik.
 • Such a system, of course, presupposes uniformity of thinking
       and reliability of action only to be attained by thorough
       training and long experience. More importantly still, complete
       confidence of superiors and their subordinates and vice versa
       is absolutely indispensable.
                                   van Creveld, Fighting Power, p. 36.




                                                                            Version 1.2
                                                                         10 March 2005
July 2006                     http://www.jaddams.com
                             Idealized schematic
                                    The FESA climate
                                                       Common outlook

                                                               II. Einheit
               I. (Individual)
            Fingerspitzengefühl




      III. Schwerpunkt




                                                            IV. Auftrag
July 2006                         http://www.jaddams.com
                                            What OODA ―loop‖ speed
                                                  really means
                                                                           Shared values;
                Quickly                                                       common
                                             Know what to do
              understand                                                    experiences;
             what‘s going on                                                commander’s         And be able to
                                                                             intent, etc.           do it
                   Observe                    Orient                           Decide                      Act
                              Implicit                                               Implicit
     Unfolding               Guidance                                               Guidance
   Circumstances             & Control                                              & Control




                   Observations    Feed                        Feed              Decision         Feed     Action
                                  Forward                                                        Forward
                                                              Forward          (Hypothesis)                (Test)
                              Key Points:
       Outside                                                                                                Unfolding
• When you‘re doing OODA ―loops‖ right,
     Information                                                                                              Interaction
  accuracy and speed improve together; they don‘t
                 Unfolding
                                                                                                                 With
                                                                                                             Environment
  trade off.     Interaction      Feedback
                    With
               Environment                        Feedback
• The main function of management is to build an                  While learning
  organization that gets better and better at these                 from the
  things.                                                          experience
       July 2006                                  http://www.jaddams.com
                                                    Agenda

•    Conflict                                           •    Moral isolation and interaction
       –    Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg                          –    Theme for disintegration and
       –    Attrition warfare & maneuver conflict                   collapse

•    OODA Loops                                         •    Grand strategy

       –    What they are not (and are)                        –    Theme for vitality and growth

       –    How to accelerate OODA loops                       –    Ends and means

•    Moral conflict & the prism of conflict                    –    Moral leverage

•    Guerrilla warfare                                         –    What Lind, van Creveld, Hammes,
                                                                    Barnett, and Scheuer say about
       –    Blitz & guerrilla: common strategy                      grand strategy
•    Generations of war                                 •    Summary
•    Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert,                       –    Tables
     reorient, reharmonize
                                                               –    Issues among the authors
•    4GW according to Lind, van Creveld,
     Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer                              –    Neither Shall the Sword
                                                        •    If I were emperor …




July 2006                                  http://www.jaddams.com
                               Categories of conflict

 Now looking back and reflecting upon the panorama of military history we
 can imagine three kinds of human conflict:
            – Attrition warfare—as practiced by the Emperor Napoleon, by all
              sides during the 19th century and during World War I, by the Allies
              during World War II, and by present-day nuclear planners.
            – Maneuver conflict—as practiced by the Mongols, General
              Bonaparte, Confederate General Stonewall Jackson, Union
              General Ulysses S. Grant, Hitler‘s Generals (in particular Manstein,
              Guderian, Balck, Rommel) and the Americans under Generals
              Patton and MacArthur.
            – Moral conflict—as practiced by the Mongols, most guerrilla
              leaders, a very few counter-guerrillas (such as Magsaysay) and
              certain others from Sun Tzu to the present.

 With these comments in mind let‘s look into the essentials of each.

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                 Observations related to moral conflict
                                          Gen. Hermann Balck
  Theme
  •    No fixed recipes for organization, communications, tactics, leadership, etc.
  •    Wide freedom for subordinates to exercise imagination and initiative—yet harmonize within intent of
       superior commanders.
  •    Heavy reliance upon moral (human values) instead of material superiority as basis for cohesion and
       ultimate success.
  •    Commanders must create a bond and breadth of experience based upon trust—not mistrust—for
       cohesion.
  How is this atmosphere achieved?
  •    By example leaders (at all levels) must demonstrate requisite physical energy, mental agility, and
       moral authority, to inspire subordinates to enthusiastically cooperate and take initiatives within
       superiors intent.
  What is the price?
  •    Courage to share danger and discomfort at the front.
  •    Willingness to support and promote (unconventional or difficult) subordinates that accept danger,
       demonstrate initiative, take risks, and come-up with new ways toward mission accomplishment.
  •    Dedication and resolve to face-up to and master uncomfortable circumstances that fly in the face of the
       traditional solution.
  Benefit
  •    Internal simplicity that permits rapid adaptability.

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                              Essence of moral conflict

  Create, exploit, and magnify                            Idea
  •    Menace:                                            •       Surface, fear, anxiety, and
            Impressions of danger to one‘s well                   alienation in order to generate
            being and survival.                                   many non-cooperative centers of
                                                                  gravity, as well as subvert those that
  •    Uncertainty:                                               adversary depends upon, thereby
            Impressions, or atmosphere,                           magnify internal friction.
            generated by events that appear
            ambiguous, erratic, centers of                                               payoff
            gravity, as well as subvert
            contradictory, unfamiliar, chaotic,
            etc.                                                   In order to breed these
                                                                                Aim
  •    Mistrust:
                                             In other words, pump up these
            Atmosphere of doubt and suspicion           Destroy moral bonds
            that loosens human bonds among              that permit an organic
            members of an organic whole or              whole to exist
            between organic wholes.


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                                   Essence of moral conflict
      Negative factors                                          Counterweights
      •    Menace:                                              •    Initiative:

              Impressions of danger to one‘s well being                  Internal drive to think and take action
              and survival                                               without being urged
      •    Uncertainty:                                         •    Adaptability:

              Impressions, or atmosphere, generated by                   Power to adjust or change in order to cope
              events that appear ambiguous, erratic,              with a variety of circumstances
                                                             May use new or unforeseentools:
              contradictory, unfamiliar, chaotic, etc.
      •    Mistrust:                                         • physical – movement or firepower
                                                               •  Harmony:
              Atmosphere of doubt and suspicion that
              loosens human bonds among members of           • mental – or entities in a connected way
                                                                   Interaction of apparently disconnected
                                                                    events
                                                                           e.g., ambiguity via more
              an organic whole or between organic
              wholes
                                                               rapid OODA loops
Aim                                                       • or moral – propaganda,
                                                              and alienation in & covert action, etc.
Pump-up friction via negative factors to breed fear, anxiety, subversion order to generate many non-
cooperative centers of gravity, as well as subvert those that adversary depends upon, thereby sever moral
bonds that permit adversary to exist as an organic whole.
                                                  Simultaneously,
build-up and play counterweights against negative factors to diminish internal friction, as well as surface
courage, confidence, and esprit, thereby make possible the human interactions needed to create moral bonds
that permit us, as an organic whole, to shape and adapt to change.


  July 2006                                     http://www.jaddams.com                                                125
                      Prism of Conflict

                                                             Attrition
                                                             Maneuver
                                                             Moral




Any actual conflict

                                      Note: This is my interpretation - as far as I
                                                      know, Boyd never used it.
July 2006              http://www.jaddams.com
                                                    Agenda

•    Conflict                                           •    Moral isolation and interaction
       –    Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg                          –    Theme for disintegration and
       –    Attrition warfare & maneuver conflict                   collapse

•    OODA Loops                                         •    Grand strategy

       –    What they are not (and are)                        –    Theme for vitality and growth

       –    How to accelerate OODA loops                       –    Ends and means

•    Moral conflict & the prism of conflict                    –    Moral leverage

•    Guerrilla warfare                                         –    What Lind, van Creveld, Hammes,
                                                                    Barnett, and Scheuer say about
       –    Blitz & guerrilla: common                               grand strategy
            strategy
                                                        •    Summary
•    Generations of war
                                                               –    Tables
•    Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert,
     reorient, reharmonize                                     –    Issues among the authors

•    4GW according to Lind, van Creveld,                       –    Neither Shall the Sword
     Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer                       •    If I were emperor …




July 2006                                  http://www.jaddams.com
                     World War I Guerrilla Warfare
                                (a la T.E. Lawrence)
  Action
  •    Gain support of population. Must ―arrange the minds‖ of friend, foe and
       neutral alike. Must ―get inside their minds‖.
  •    Must ―be an idea or thing invulnerable, without front or back, drifting
       about like a gas‖ (inconspicuousness and fluidity-of action). Must
       be an ―attack-in-depth‖.
  •    Tactics ―should be tip-and-run, not pushes but strokes‖ with ―use of the
       smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest place‖.
  •    Should be a war of detachment (avoiding contact and presenting a
       threat everywhere) using mobility/fluidity-of-action and
       environmental background (vast unknown desert) as basis for ―never
       affording a target‖ and ―never on the defensive except by accident and
       in error‖.

  Idea
  •    Disintegrate existing regime‘s ability to govern.
July 2006                         http://www.jaddams.com                          64
                    Impression

       •    Infiltration tactics a la Ludendorff
            seem to be similar in nature to
            irregular or guerrilla tactics a la
            Lawrence.
       •    Why? Both stress clouded/distorted
            signatures, mobility and cohesion of
            small units as basis to insert an
            amorphous yet focused effort into
            or thru adversary weaknesses.




July 2006                         http://www.jaddams.com   65
                                      Major advances between
                                               World Wars I and II
  Soviet revolutionary strategy
  •    Lenin, and after him Stalin, exploited the idea of crises and vanguards—that arise out of Marxian
       contradictions within capitalism—to lay-out Soviet revolutionary strategy.
  •    Result:
            –   A scheme that emphasizes moral/psychological factors as basis to destroy a regime from within.
  Lightning war (blitzkrieg)
  •    Infiltration tactics of 1918 were mated with:
            –   Tank
            –   Motorized Artillery                                       – J.F.C. Fuller
            –   Tactical Aircraft                      by
            –   Motor Transport                                           – Heinz Guderian
            –   Better Communications
  •    Result:
            –   Blitzkrieg to generate a breakthrough by piercing a region with multiple narrow thrusts using armor,
                motorized infantry, and follow-up infantry divisions supported by tactical aircraft.
  Guerrilla war
  •    Mao Tse-Tung synthesized Sun Tzu‘s ideas, classic guerrilla strategy and tactics, and Napoleonic style
       mobile operations under an umbrella of Soviet revolutionary ideas to create a powerful way for waging
       modern (guerrilla) war.
  •    Result:
            –   Modern guerrilla warfare has become an overall political, economic, social and military framework for
                ―total war‖.
July 2006                                        http://www.jaddams.com                                                 66
                           Blitzkrieg and guerrilla strategy
  Infiltration and isolation          Note
  •    Blitz and guerrillas infiltrate a nation or regime at all levels to soften and shatter the moral
       fiber of the political, economic and social structure. Simultaneously, via diplomatic,
       psychological, and various sub-rosa or other activities, they strip-away potential allies thereby
       isolate intended victim(s) for forthcoming blows. To carry out this program, a la Sun Tzu,
       blitz, and guerrillas:
            –   Probe and test adversary, and any allies that may rally to his side, in order to unmask
                strengths, weaknesses, maneuvers, and intentions.
            –   Exploit critical differences of opinion, internal contradictions, frictions, obsessions, etc.,
                in order to foment mistrust, sow discord and shape both adversary‘s and allies‘
                perception of the world thereby:
                  • Create atmosphere of ―mental confusion, contradiction of feeling, indecisiveness,
                    panic‖...
                  • Manipulate or undermine adversary‘s plans and actions.
                  • Make it difficult, if not impossible, for allies to aid adversary during his time of trial.

  Purpose
  •    Force capitulation when combined with external political, economic, and military pressures
                                                           or
  •    Weaken foe to minimize his resistance against military blows that will follow.

July 2006                                      http://www.jaddams.com                                             69
                               Modern guerrilla campaign
Essence
•   Capitalize on corruption, injustice, incompetence, etc., (or their appearances) as basis to generate
    atmosphere of mistrust and discord in order to sever moral bonds that bind people to existing regime.
                                              Simultaneously,
•   Share existing burdens with people and work with them to root out and punish corruption, remove
    injustice, eliminate grievances, etc., as basis to form moral bonds between people and guerrillas in
    order to bind people to guerrilla philosophy and ideals.


Intent                                         Question:
•   Shape and exploit crises environment that permits guerrilla vanguards or cadres to pure-up guerrilla
                 Are al-Qa‘ida or the Iraqi insurgents accomplishing
    resolve, attract the uncommitted, and drain-away adversary resolve as foundation to replace existing
    regime withor even trying to accomplish these?
                 guerrilla regime.
Implication
•   Guerrillas, by being able to penetrate the very essence of their adversary‘s moral-mental-physical
    being, generate many moral-mental-physical non-cooperative (or isolated) centers of gravity, as well as
    subvert or seize those centers of gravity that adversary regime must depend upon, in order to magnify
    friction, produce paralysis, and bring about collapse.
                                                      Yet,
•   Guerrillas shape or influence moral-mental-physical atmosphere so that potential adversaries, as well as
    the uncommitted, are drawn toward guerrilla philosophy and are empathetic toward guerrilla success.

    July 2006                                http://www.jaddams.com                                           91
                                              Guerrilla results

                           Successful
                             Successful                                            Unsuccessful
                    •   American Colonies         1775-81
                                                  1775-81                     Philippines
                                                                         • • Philippines            1899-1902
                    •   Spain                     1808-14
                                                  1808-14                     South Africa
                                                                         • • South Africa           1900-02
                    •   Russia                    1812
                                                  1812                        Greece
                                                                         • • Greece                 1944-49
                    •   German East Africa        1914-18
                                                  1914-18                • • Philippines*
                                                                              Philippines*          1946-54
                    •   Arabia                    1916-18
                                                  1916-18                • • Malaya*
                                                                              Malaya*               1948-60
                    •   China                     1927-49
                                                  1927-49
                    •   Russia                    1941-45
                                                  1941-45
                    •   Yugoslavia                1941-45
                                                  1941-45
                    •   Indochina                 1945-54
                                                  1945-54
                    •   Algeria                   1954-62
                                                  1954-62
                    •   Cuba                      1956-59
                                                  1956-59
                    •   South Vietnam             1958-75
Guerrilla war is the war of the broad masses of an
                                                  1958-75
economically backward country standing up against a
powerfully equipped and well trained army of aggression.                 * Regime exercised particular care not to
                                                                           inflict casualties and to protect
                                           Vo Nguyen Giap
                                                                           population.
                                 People’s War People’s Army

 July 2006                                      http://www.jaddams.com                                               97
                         Blitz and guerrilla theme
  Essence
  •    Avoid battles—instead penetrate adversary to subvert, disrupt, or
       seize those connections, centers, and activities that provide cohesion
       (e.g., psychological/moral bonds, communications, lines of
       communication, command and supply centers ...)
  •    Exploit ambiguity, deception, superior mobility, and sudden violence to
       generate initial surprise and shock followed by surprise and shock
       again, again, again ...
  •    Roll-up/wipe-out the isolated units or remnants created by the
       subversion, surprise, shock, disruption, and seizure.

  Intent
  •    Exploit subversion, surprise, shock, disruption, and seizure to generate
       confusion, disorder, panic, etc., thereby shatter cohesion, paralyze
       effort, and bring about adversary collapse.


July 2006                        http://www.jaddams.com                           98
                               Counter-guerrilla campaign
Action
•      Undermine guerrilla cause and destroy their cohesion by demonstrating integrity and competence of government to
       represent and serve needs of people—rather than exploit and impoverish them for the benefit of a greedy elite.*
•      Take political initiative to root out and visibly punish corruption. Select new leaders with recognized competence as well as
       popular appeal. Ensure that they deliver justice, eliminate grievances and connect government with grass roots.*
•      Infiltrate guerrilla movement as well as employ population for intelligence about guerrilla plans, operations, and
       organization.
•      Seal-off guerrilla regions from outside world by diplomatic, psychological, and various other activities that strip-away
       potential allies as well as by disrupting or straddling communications that connect these regions with outside world.
•      Deploy administrative talent, police, and counter-guerrilla teams into affected localities and regions to: inhibit guerrilla
       communication, coordination and movement; minimize guerrilla contact with local inhabitants; isolate their ruling cadres;
       and destroy their infrastructure.
•      Exploit presence of above teams to build-up local government as well as recruit militia for local and regional security in
       order to protect people from the persuasion and coercion efforts of the guerrilla cadres and their fighting units.
•      Use special teams in a complementary effort to penetrate guerrilla controlled regions. Employ (guerrillas‘ own) tactics of
       reconnaissance, infiltration, surprise hit-and-run, and sudden ambush to: keep roving bands off-balance, make base areas
       untenable, and disrupt communication with outside world.
•      Expand these complementary security/penetration efforts into affected region after affected region in order to undermine,
       collapse, and replace guerrilla influence with government influence and control.
•      Visibly link these efforts with local political/economic/social reform in order to connect central government with hopes and
       needs of people, thereby gain their support and confirm government legitimacy.
Idea
•      Break guerrillas‘ moral-mental-physical hold over the population, destroy their cohesion, and bring about their collapse via political
       initiative that demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize
       stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of overall effort.
___________
* If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider changing sides!
    July 2006                                           http://www.jaddams.com                                                                  108
                                                    Agenda

•    Conflict                                           •    Moral isolation and interaction
       –    Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg                          –    Theme for disintegration and
       –    Attrition warfare & maneuver conflict                   collapse

•    OODA Loops                                         •    Grand strategy

       –    What they are not (and are)                        –    Theme for vitality and growth

       –    How to accelerate OODA loops                       –    Ends and means

•    Moral conflict & the prism of conflict                    –    Moral leverage

•    Guerrilla warfare                                         –    What Lind, van Creveld, Hammes,
                                                                    Barnett, and Scheuer say about
       –    Blitz & guerrilla: common strategy                      grand strategy
•    Generations of war                                 •    Summary
•    Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert,                       –    Tables
     reorient, reharmonize
                                                               –    Issues among the authors
•    4GW according to Lind, van Creveld,
     Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer                              –    Neither Shall the Sword
                                                        •    If I were emperor …




July 2006                                  http://www.jaddams.com
                       Another scheme –
                     the generations of war

 • 1GW: short-range, smoothbore weapons; line and column; rigid
   discipline with top down control. Training & élan could often
   close with and defeat enemy before absorbing debilitating
   casualties

 • 2GW: rifled weapons, automatic weapons, indirect fire artillery;
   tactics still basically linear (esp. on defense), but firepower
   replaced manpower as predominant element. Attempts to use
   ―élan‖ to overcome firepower were now suicidal

 • 3GW: same weapons; but: non-linear tactics (infiltration/pull;
   surfaces & gaps); time rather than place as basis of operational
   art; emphasis on collapsing enemy rather than closing with and
   destroying him (AKA blitzkrieg, maneuver warfare, modern
   system)

July 2006                  http://www.jaddams.com
                             1 & 2 GW




 Battle of Antietam
 September 17, 1862




July 2006             http://www.jaddams.com
                                                    Agenda

•    Conflict                                          •    Moral isolation and interaction
       –    Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg                         –    Theme for disintegration and
       –    Attrition warfare & maneuver conflict                  collapse

•    OODA Loops                                        •    Grand strategy

       –    What they are not (and are)                       –    Theme for vitality and growth

       –    How to accelerate OODA loops                      –    Ends and means

•    Moral conflict & the prism of conflict                   –    Moral leverage

•    Guerrilla warfare                                        –    What Lind, van Creveld, Hammes,
                                                                   Barnett, and Scheuer say about
       –    Blitz & guerrilla: common strategy                     grand strategy
•    Generations of war                                •    Summary
•    Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert,                      –    Tables
     reorient, reharmonize
                                                              –    Issues among the authors
•    4GW according to Lind, van Creveld,
     Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer                             –    Neither Shall the Sword
                                                       •    If I were emperor …




July 2006                                 http://www.jaddams.com
                                   Blitz vs. guerrilla
  •      Same basic themes (PISRR), collapse rather than overpower enemy
  •      Same emphasis on cheng/ch’i
  •      Differences include:

                                              Blitz/3GW                          Guerrilla

      Penetrate                 Enemy forces                       Target society


      Isolate                   Non-cooperative CoGs (e.g.,        Government from people
                                penetrated units, fighting units
                                from logistics, etc.)
      Subdue/Subvert            Isolated remnants                  Elements of society, geographic
                                                                   entities (villages, provinces, etc.)

      Reorient                  Ourselves for next objective       Subverted elements


      Reharmonize               Our forces (e.g., shift            Elements of society under our
                                Schwerpunkt)                       control

      Content                   High mental                        High moral




July 2006                             http://www.jaddams.com
                       Clausewitz’s Trinity*:
                                State vs. State

                                                          Other state

                                                         1, 2,
                                                      3GW/Blitz/MW

                                 Government



                                     The
                                    State



              People                               Army


*simplified
 July 2006                http://www.jaddams.com
                               Clausewitz’s Trinity:
                                                Insurgency
Allies
  of
 The
State



                         penetrate &
                           isolate
                                              Government




             Guerrilla                           The
                                                State


                                              penetrate &
                                                isolate

              People                                            Army



 July 2006                             http://www.jaddams.com
                  3GW restores maneuver


                                               Attrition
                                               Maneuver
                                               Moral
   1GW




            2GW
                               3GW
                                                           Guerrilla
July 2006             http://www.jaddams.com
            Now, come with me into the fourth
            generation!




July 2006                http://www.jaddams.com
                       4GW, according to Lind

  What defines 4GW:
  • ―Crisis in legitimacy of the state‖: The loss of the state's
    monopoly on war and on the first loyalty of its citizens and the
    rise of non-state entities that command people‘s primary loyalty
    and that wage war. These entities may be gangs, religions,
    races and ethnic groups within races, localities, tribes, business
    enterprises, ideologies—the variety is almost limitless.
  • A return to a world of cultures, not, merely states, in conflict; and
  • The manifestation of both developments—the decline of the
    state and the rise of alternate, often cultural, primary loyalties—
    not only ―over there,‖ but in America itself.




July 2006                     http://www.jaddams.com
                             4GW, according to Lind

  The goal of 4GW is largely moral:
            Fourth Generation war focuses on the moral level, where it
            works to convince all parties, neutrals as well as belligerents,
            that the cause for which a Fourth Generation entity is fighting is
            morally superior. It turns its state enemies inward against
            themselves on the moral level, making the political calculations
            of the mental level irrelevant.
  ―What if we combined terrorism, high technology, and the following
  additional elements?
             • A non-national or transnational base, such as an ideology or
               religion
             • A direct attack on the enemy‘s culture …
             • Highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially
               through manipulation of the media, particularly television
               news …
                       ―The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,‖ Lind, et. al., 1989
July 2006                             http://www.jaddams.com
                        ―collapse a state morally‖

  – Moral strength: Mental capacity to overcome menace, uncertainty, and
    mistrust.
  – Moral victory: Triumph of courage, confidence, and esprit (de corps)
    over fear, anxiety, and alienation when confronted by menace,
    uncertainty, and mistrust.
  – Moral defeat: Triumph of fear, anxiety, and alienation over courage,
    confidence, and esprit when confronted by menace, uncertainty, and
    mistrust.
  – Moral values: Human values that permit one to carry on in the face of
    menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.
  – Moral authority: Person or body that can give one the courage,
    confidence, and esprit to overcome menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.


                                                           When this happens, you just
                                                               give up and quit.


July 2006                         http://www.jaddams.com                                 121
                                                  ―Fighting‖ 4GW
                                                                  Lind
      •     You can use either the de-escalation model or the ―Hama‖*
            (annihilation) model. If you fall in between, you‘re doomed.
      •     The de-escalation model: stresses the moral level, understands the
            power of weakness, integrates troops with the local population,
            draws on that integration for good cultural intelligence.
      •     In fighting 4GW, ―less is more.‖ Try to keep your physical presence
            small, if possible so small that you are invisible. If you can‘t do that,
            then keep your footprint small in time – get in and get out, fast.
      •     Finally, if you have to take the least desirable route, invading and
            occupying another state, you must do everything you can to
            preserve that state at the same time you are defeating it. As we
            see in Iraq, if you destroy the state itself, there is a good chance
            nobody will be able to recreate it.
*Syrian dictator Hafez al-Assad quelled an insurrection in                   From ―FMFM 1-A,‖ On War # 101,
 the city of Hama by leveling part of it with an artillery
 barrage on January 30, 1982. Estimates of the death toll                                 January 25, 2005
 run from 10,000 to 40,000.
     July 2006                                      http://www.jaddams.com
                               Still ―fighting‖ 4GW
                                                 Lind

 • Other important pieces:
            – 4GW is often light infantry/Jaeger (hunter) warfare
            – ―Out G-ing the G‖ – get better at guerrilla warfare than the
              guerrilla (quoting COL David Hackworth, USA, Ret.)
            – Most important supporting weapon is cash
            – ―Force protection‖ is the enemy of ―force integration‖ (with
              the local population)
            – HUMINT is the only ―int‖ worth discussing

                                                 From ―FMFM 1-A,‖ On War # 101,
                                                              January 25, 2005




July 2006                          http://www.jaddams.com
                       Can 4GW be avoided?

• Even had American forces understood that they were likely to
  face a growing insurgency after the war, it is doubtful that they
  could have elaborated an effective strategy for defeating it
  quickly, if at all …
• A different conclusion would be to devise a national security
  strategy in which there is no imperative to fight the kind of war
  that the United States has fought in Iraq. Rather than ―do it
  better next time,‖ the contrary lesson would be on the order of
  ―don‘t do it at all.‖
            ―Revisions In Need Of Revising: What Went Wrong In The Iraq War,‖
                                   David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker,
                               Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College
                                                                 December 2005




July 2006                     http://www.jaddams.com
                          Fourth generation warfare
                                            Hammes

 • It uses all available networks – political, economic, social and
   military – to convince the enemy‘s political decision makers that
   their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the
   perceived benefit.
 • Note: Neither Lind nor van Creveld totally agree with the
   objective
            – Lind – focus is on moral level, so calculation of benefit is not
              dominant or sometimes even relevant
            – van Creveld – ―interests‖ or ―policies‖ are not the primary
              cause of war




July 2006                          http://www.jaddams.com
                            Fourth generation warfare
                                               Hammes

 •     It is an evolved form of insurgency (208)
            – practical people solving specific problems in order to defeat more
              powerful enemies (3)
            – But, Lind: ―Contrary to what a number of writers on 4GW have said,
              Fourth Generation war is not merely a new name for insurgency or
              guerrilla warfare.‖
 •     (Social) networks will be employed to carry specific messages to our
       policy makers and to those who can influence the policy makers (208)
            – Networks are exceptionally resilient and difficult to destroy. (183)
 •     Clausewitzian ―decisive battles‖ and even 3GW maneuver campaigns
       are irrelevant (208) at least until Mao‘s Phase III against a state
       government
 •     Too much central control can destroy the effectiveness of a 4GW force
       (209)

July 2006                             http://www.jaddams.com
                         Fourth generation warfare
                                           Hammes

 • A state will not give up its right to exist as a result of 4GW
   techniques
            – a final (Mao Phase III) conventional campaign will be
              required (211)
            – can achieve less drastic goals with 4GW
 • Successful 4GW organizations focus on the movement‘s long
   term political viability, rather than near-term tactical
   effectiveness. (222)
            – see themselves not as military organizations but as webs
            – unified by ideas
 • Must bring to bear full set of economic, social, intelligence &
   military capabilities of western states

July 2006                         http://www.jaddams.com
                       4GW – non-trinitarian warfare
                                        van Creveld
 Martin van Creveld doesn‘t use the term ―4GW‖ but has stated that
 the concept is basically the same as ―non-trinitarian‖ warfare, as
 described in The Transformation of War (1991.) What changes in
 4GW is who fights and what they‘re fighting for.
            – The state as we know it (government separate from ruler)
              became the dominant form of political organization in Europe
              only in 1648
            – In many parts of the world, states were only established in
              the 19th & 20th centuries through colonization/
              decolonization and some parts of the world never developed
              functioning states at all
            – Even where states were established, other organizations are
              coming to the fore and beginning to wage war not involving
              governments, people, and armies.

July 2006                         http://www.jaddams.com
                               Why societies go to war
                                              van Creveld
 •     States
            – interests; policy (Politik): cost/benefit calculations, often disguised,
              implied, or backfilled
 •     Non-States (and sometimes states)
            – grievances, objectives, glory of individuals/status in tribe
            – obtaining the spoils of war: booty, slaves, territory, women, which
              override and complicate any pursuit of tribal/community ―policy‖
            – obtaining prisoners for religious or culinary reasons (150)
            – doctrinal differences
            – other ―will of God‖ reasons
            – justice: avenge perceived wrongs; community honor (e.g., Trojan War)
            – assist an ally (WW I and to some extent WWII)
 •     Everybody
            – existence, either as a group (insurgency) or as a state

July 2006                               http://www.jaddams.com
                                       Predictions
                                         van Creveld

  • The side with the more rational interests will lose (149)
  •     Wars will be waged by groups we today call ―terrorists‖
            – tribes, religious groups, commercial groups, criminal groups,
              insurgencies, etc.
            – their home territories will not be continuous, impenetrable, or
              very large; no clear line on a map
            – leadership will be along personal & charismatic lines
  • Role of women in non-trinitarian warfare (4GW, but not 2/3GW!)
    will approach that of men, as it historically has in guerrilla
    warfare (180)




July 2006                          http://www.jaddams.com
                           Predictions (II)
                                 van Creveld
 • Distinctions between war and crime will break down (204) as will
   the difference between armed forces and civilians (194)
 • Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres
 • Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the civilian
   population, and extreme dispersion have become the norm
   (208) The problem of subversion is likely to be serious (211)
 • Much of the task of defending society against non-trinitarian
   warfare/4GW will fall to private security companies, with a
   corresponding decrease in the utility, size, and technological
   complexity (cost) of military forces
 • Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be replaced by
   police-like security forces on the one hand and armed gangs on
   the other (not that the difference is always clear, even today)
   (225)

July 2006                  http://www.jaddams.com
War through the ages
van Creveld

―It is not true that war is simply a means to an end, nor do
people necessarily fight
in order to attain this objective
or that. In fact, the opposite is
often true: people very often
take up one objective or another
precisely in order that
they may fight.‖ (226)




July 2006                   http://www.jaddams.com
                                                4GW
                                              Barnett

 • Guerrilla or insurgency-based warfare
            – Defeat enemy politically
            – Not on battlefield but through years of LIC
 • Incorporates notion of ―war within the context of everything else‖
            – Military tactics subordinated to economic, political, and social
              pain inflicted upon opponent
            – Focus is enemy‘s ―societal will to wage war‖ (Blueprint, 20)
 • Could be precluded by a sufficiently large Sys Admin force
   (Blueprint, 17)
 • Essentially a war against individuals; inside Core states,
   reduces to a law enforcement problem (Blueprint, 122, 123)


July 2006                          http://www.jaddams.com
                                                4GW
                                              Barnett

 • Problems with 4GW:
            – Suggests a world in perpetual war with an ―unredeemable
              and inexhaustible‖ supply of savages (Blueprint, 21 – citing
              Robert D. Kaplan)
            – Envisions long, drawn out conflict with al-Qa‘ida or its
              successor (Blueprint, 88 – citing Kaplan)
            – ―Addicted to notion of declining state‖ (on his blog 1/22/06)
 • 4GW techniques possible in conflict between Core states, but
   hard to see the payoff (Blueprint, 126-129) Discounts religion as
   a strong cause of the 9/11 attacks (Map, 285; Blueprint, 87 -
   citing Olivier Roy)
 • ―We seek to do unto al-Qa‘ida what they did unto us: trigger a
   System Perturbation …‖ (Map, 285)

July 2006                          http://www.jaddams.com
                                               4GW
                                             Barnett

 • But, system perturbation is risky
            – Outcome of perturbation, itself
            – Effect on rest of region (and by implication, the Gap as a
              whole) (Map, 290)
            – ―Rule-Set Reset‖ can be a dangerous time because ―the
              cure may be worse than the disease‖ (Blueprint, xviii)
 • Toppling Saddam was a real System Perturbation, but working
   the insurgency is a serious, long-term horizontal scenario,
   requiring people who can see across time. A PhD in history has
   to help on that score. Doesn't mean you're not still killing bad
   guys, it just means you do it with more care and discretion,
   making sure you don't simply create more enemies in the
   process.In the end, you get to leave when their economy is
   working. Jobs kill insurgencies, not soldiers. (Blog 17 Feb 06)
July 2006                         http://www.jaddams.com
                                                 4GW
                                              Scheuer

 • Doesn‘t really consider the subject – for reasons we‘ll cover
   under Grand Strategy.
 • Follows Lind and Hafez al-Assad, should military force become
   necessary.
 • Because we are so bad at grand strategy, we are only left with
   one military option:
            – ―The piles of dead will include as many or more civilians as
              combatants because our enemies wear no uniforms. Killing
              in large numbers is not enough to defeat our Muslim foes.
              With killing must come a Sherman-like razing of
              infrastructure. Roads and irrigation systems; bridges, power
              plants, and crops in the field; fertilizer plants and grain mills
              … As noted, such actions will yield large civilian casualties,
              displaced populations, and refugee flows.‖ (241-242)
July 2006                           http://www.jaddams.com
                                 John Robb
                          Open source warfare

• Open source warfare: ―relies on networks of peers rather than
  the hierarchies of command and control we see in conventional
  militaries. This structure provides an open source movement
  with levels of innovation and resilience that rigid hierarchies
  can't match.‖
• Multiple, smaller attacks against ―systempunkts‖ (disruptive
  leverage points) like power & telecom nodes, water, ports, etc.
• Iraq appears to be developing a cooperative community among
  diverse groups that operates like the open source software
  industry
• Locally successful tactics are quickly replicated; ineffective ones
  quickly abandoned – has evolutionary overtones
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/

July 2006                   http://www.jaddams.com
                Robb: open source warfare

• On the tactical level the objective is to undermine and
  collapse the state by driving people to primary loyalties
  to meet their needs. On the strategic level it is used
  to undermine the sentiment of the global financial/trade
  markets in relation to the target state to cause capital
  outflows, inflation, spiraling debt, and potentially
  economic depression.
• Note: compressing the distance between ―tactical‖ and
  ―strategic‖ is a feature of (counter-)guerrilla warfare and
  4GW. The Marine Corps uses the term ―strategic
  corporeal‖ to indicate that the actions of low-ranking
  people may have strategic or grand strategic impact
  (e.g., Abu Ghraib)



July 2006                http://www.jaddams.com
                         Other thoughts on 4GW

•    Al-Qa‘ida or whatever it is now, is having no problem developing future
     leaders and developing its ―franchise‖ model (Sherifa Zuhur, SSI)
•    The centre will reinforce successful cells with funds, skills and weapons,
     seeking to establish a sanctuary from which to develop. It will allow cells
     considerable latitude in the method they adopt to suit the local
     circumstances – provided that security is not breached and that the cell is
     both successful and in its actions no more corrupt than condoned by the
     movement. Gen Sir Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force

•    Organized crime will sometimes cooperate with ―terrorist‖ groups; can
     create dysfunctional governments (Phil Williams; Max Manwaring)
•    Demographic youth bulge will continue to provide fertile recruiting grounds
     for ―terrorist‖ vanguards—Nepal, for example
•    There are some 30-40 ―irregular‖ conflicts in any given year (Frank
     Hoffman)



July 2006                        http://www.jaddams.com
                  Echevarria’s critique of 4GW
                   Dr. Echevarria is the Director of Research at SSI


• Uses a version of Hammes‘ interpretation (1)
• Defines 4GW as: ―future terrorists would first seek to infiltrate a
  society and then attempt to collapse it from within by means of
  an ill-defined psychocultural ‗judo throw‘ of sorts‖ (2-3)
• ―the types of high-technology that 4GW‘s proponents envisioned
  terrorists using includes such Wunderwaffe as directed energy
  weapons and robotics …‖ (3)
• Critiques 4GW as claiming that US forces are: ―designed to
  operate within a nation-state framework‖ and then gives WW II
  as a counter example (!) (5)
• ― … by comparing what essentially amounts to military means or
  techniques – such as ‗massed manpower,‘ ‗firepower,‘ and
  ‗maneuver‘ – on the one hand, to what is arguably a form of
  warfare – such as insurgency – on the other… ― (15)
July 2006                     http://www.jaddams.com
                    Comments on Echevarria

• Confuses 4GW with a technological approach to warfare (2)
• Assumes that to be effective, guerrilla warfare must support
  state-vs-state warfare (echoing Clausewitz) (12-13)
• Confuses ―maneuver‖ with ―movement‖ (15) This is a major
  error. And ―insurgency‖ is simply a rebellion, not a form of
  warfare.
• Asserts that the epitome of warfare is violence and that
  Napoleon (who lost decisively to Wellington) was its master (16)
• Does not appreciate that in 4GW, the ―insurgents‖ are primarily
  targeting the outside state power - the local ―state‖ has already
  failed. If the local state has not failed, then he has a good point:
  what‘s happening is classic insurgency, not 4GW.


July 2006                    http://www.jaddams.com
                          4GW: One pattern, a la Clausewitz
Failed states

                  4GW


LIC                                                                          Supporting
                                                                              country
       Coup
                                                                Government


      G           2/3GW
                                                                 The
                                                                State
                   A
  P


     Target
 (failing state)              People                                           Army



      July 2006                        http://www.jaddams.com
                       4GW: One pattern, a la Clausewitz
Failed states

                 4GW


                                                                          Supporting
                                                                           country
                                                             Government


     G
                                                              The
     4GW
                                                             State
                  A
 P


  Failed state
                           People                                           Army



     July 2006                      http://www.jaddams.com
                            Blitz vs. guerrilla vs. 4GW

                              Blitz/3GW                            Guerrilla                       4GW???
   Penetrate        Enemy forces                     Own society                     Society of supporting country



   Isolate          Non-cooperative CoGs (e.g.,      Government from people          Non-cooperative centers of gravity
                    penetrated units)                                                (e.g., institutions, organizations)

   Subdue/Subvert   Isolated remnants                Elements of society             Enough NCoGs to cause
                                                                                     supporting country moral collapse
                                                                                     & withdrawal
   Reorient         Ourselves for next objective     Subverted elements              Ourselves: for example, expand
                                                                                     guerrilla or convert to 3GW in
                                                                                     target country
   Reharmonize      Our forces (e.g., shift          Elements of society under our   Ourselves: for example to continue
                    Schwerpunkt)                     control                         fight in target country


   Content          High mental                      High moral                      Moral vs. supporting country;
                                                                                     All vs. target country




July 2006                                     http://www.jaddams.com
                                        The ―generations of war‖ model
                                  From the viewpoint of Core states and nuclear powers
                                                                                                        Nuclear
                                 Peace of                                                             Weapons       Fall of
                                Westphalia                                                            Proliferate   USSR


                                                                                                                               state vs. state




 Precursor activities – going                                                           2 GW
back to Alexander & Sun Tzu
        (and before)

                                              1                                                                               3 GW
                                             GW
        States &                                                                               maneuver
       non-states                                             State-vs-state—                  concepts
       wage war                                               only ―legal‖ form                                                          New commo &
                                                                                                                                         trans networks
                                                                   of war

                                                                                                                                        4 GW

                                                                                                                                   States & non-
                                                          Highly irregular / partisan                                               states wage
                                                         warfare; terrorism; criminal                                                   war
                                                             organizations, etc.



                  1600                            1700               1800               1900                          2000


     July 2006                                                 http://www.jaddams.com
                                                    Agenda

•    Conflict                                           •    Moral isolation and interaction
       –    Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg                          –    Theme for disintegration and
       –    Attrition warfare & maneuver conflict                   collapse

•    OODA Loops                                         •    Grand strategy

       –    What they are not (and are)                        –    Theme for vitality and growth

       –    How to accelerate OODA loops                       –    Ends and means

•    Moral conflict & the prism of conflict                    –    Moral leverage

•    Guerrilla warfare                                         –    What Lind, van Creveld, Hammes,
                                                                    Barnett, and Scheuer say about
       –    Blitz & guerrilla: common strategy                      grand strategy
•    Generations of war                                 •    Summary
•    Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert,                       –    Tables
     reorient, reharmonize
                                                               –    Issues among the authors
•    4GW according to Lind, van Creveld,
     Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer                              –    Neither Shall the Sword
                                                        •    If I were emperor …




July 2006                                  http://www.jaddams.com
July 2006   http://www.jaddams.com
                           !    Simply stated           !
            As human beings, we cannot exist without an external or
            surrounding environment from which we can draw
            sustenance, nourishment, or support.


                                  In other words

            Interaction permits vitality and growth while isolation leads
            to decay and disintegration.




July 2006                      http://www.jaddams.com                   SG 29
                                     Illuminating example
                                                   (continued)
                                                 Overall Message
    •     The ability to operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than an adversary enables one to fold adversary
          back inside himself so that he can neither appreciate nor keep up with what's going on. He will
          become disoriented or confused;

                                                which suggests that

    •     Unless such menacing pressure is relieved, adversary will experience various combinations of
          uncertainty, doubt, confusion, self-deception, indecision, fear, panic, discouragement, despair,
          etc., which will further:

                      Disorient or twist his mental images/impressions of what's happening;

                                                       thereby

                     Disrupt his mental/physical maneuvers for dealing with such a menace;

                                                       thereby

                            Overload his mental/physical capacity to adapt or endure;
Key point: only at the level                           thereby
   of strategy & below
                                          Collapse his ability to carry on.

   July 2006                                http://www.jaddams.com                                     SG 44
             ?    What’s the point of all this              ?

 • We can‘t just look at our own personal experiences or use the
   same mental recipes over and over again; we've got to look at
   other disciplines and activities and relate or connect them to
   what we know from our experiences and the strategic world we
   live in.

                         If we can do this

 • We will be able to surface new repertoires and (hopefully)
   develop a Fingerspitzengefühl for folding our adversaries
   back inside themselves, morally-mentally-physically—so
   that they can neither appreciate nor cope with what's
   happening—without suffering the same fate ourselves.



July 2006                 http://www.jaddams.com                    SG 45
                     Which carries us to the
                            ?       question        ?

 • How do we fold adversaries back inside themselves, morally-
   mentally-physically … without suffering the same fate
   ourselves?

                         or put another way

 • How do we physically isolate our adversaries yet interact with
   others outside ourselves?
 • How do we mentally isolate our adversaries yet keep in touch
   hence interact, with unfolding events?
 • How do we morally isolate our adversaries yet maintain the
   trust/confidence of others and thereby interact with them?



July 2006                  http://www.jaddams.com                   SG 46
                                     Illumination

 •     Physically we can isolate adversaries by severing their communications
       with outside world as well as by severing their internal communications
       to one another. We can accomplish this by cutting them off from their
       allies and the uncommitted via diplomatic, psychological, and other
       efforts. To cut them off from one another we should penetrate their
       system by being unpredictable, otherwise they can counter our efforts.
 •     Mentally we can isolate our adversaries by presenting them with
       ambiguous, deceptive, or novel situations, as well as by operating at a
       tempo or rhythm they can neither make out nor keep up with. Operating
       inside their O-O-D-A loops will accomplish just this by disorienting or
       twisting their mental images so that they can neither appreciate nor cope
       with what's really going on.
 •     Morally our adversaries isolate themselves when they visibly improve
       their well being to the detriment of others (i.e. their allies, the
       uncommitted, etc.) by violating codes of conduct or behavior
       patterns that they profess to uphold or others expect them to
       uphold.
July 2006                        http://www.jaddams.com                       SG 47
                           Expected payoff

            Disintegration and collapse, unless adversaries change
            their behavior patterns to conform to what is deemed
            acceptable by others outside themselves.




July 2006                   http://www.jaddams.com                   SG 48
                               Illumination
                                  (continued)

 • Physically we interact by opening-up and maintaining many
   channels of communication with the outside world, hence with
   others out there, that we depend upon for sustenance,
   nourishment, or support.
 • Mentally we interact by selecting information from a variety of
   sources or channels in order to generate mental images or
   impressions that match-up with the world of events or
   happenings that we are trying to understand and cope with.
 • Morally we interact with others by avoiding mismatches
   between what we say we are, what we are, and the world we
   have to deal with, as well as by abiding by those other cultural
   codes or standards that we are expected to uphold.



July 2006                   http://www.jaddams.com                    SG 49
                         Expected payoff

            Vitality and growth, with the opportunity to shape
            and adapt to unfolding events thereby influence
            the ideas and actions of others.




July 2006                 http://www.jaddams.com                 SG 50
                                 Theme for disintegration
                                     and collapse
  Synthesize                                            Idea
  •    Lethal effort:                                   •     Destroy adversary‘s moral-mental-
            Tie-up, divert, or drain-away                     physical harmony, produce paralysis,
            adversary attention and strength as               and collapse his will to resist.
            well as (or thereby) overload critical
            vulnerabilities and generate
            weaknesses.
  •    Maneuver:                                                             Aim
            Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload,
            or seize those vulnerable yet critical
                                                                    Render adversary
            connections, centers, and activities                    powerless by denying
            as basis to penetrate, splinter, and                    him the opportunity to
            isolate remnants of adversary
            organism for mop-up or absorption.
                                                                    cope with unfolding
                                                                    circumstances.
  •    Moral:
            Create an atmosphere of fear,
            anxiety, and alienation to sever
            human bonds that permit an organic
            whole to exist.
July 2006                                  http://www.jaddams.com                                    136
                                                    Agenda

•    Conflict                                           •    Moral isolation and interaction
       –    Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg                          –    Theme for disintegration and
       –    Attrition warfare & maneuver conflict                   collapse

•    OODA Loops                                         •    Grand strategy

       –    What they are not (and are)                        –    Theme for vitality and growth

       –    How to accelerate OODA loops                       –    Ends and means

•    Moral conflict & the prism of conflict                    –    Moral leverage

•    Guerrilla warfare                                         –    What Lind, van Creveld, Hammes,
                                                                    Barnett, and Scheuer say about
       –    Blitz & guerrilla: common strategy                      grand strategy
•    Generations of war                                 •    Summary
•    Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert,                       –    Tables
     reorient, reharmonize
                                                               –    Issues among the authors
•    4GW according to Lind, van Creveld,
     Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer                              –    Neither Shall the Sword
                                                        •    If I were emperor …




July 2006                                  http://www.jaddams.com
                      ?    Raises question         ?

            How do we connect the tactical and strategic
            notions, or the theme for disintegration and
            collapse, with the national goal?




July 2006                 http://www.jaddams.com           138
            Via a sensible grand strategy that will:
            • Support national goal.

            • Pump-up our resolve, drain-away adversary resolve,
              and attract the uncommitted.

            • End conflict on favorable terms.

            • Ensure that conflict and peace terms do not provide
              seeds for (unfavorable) future conflict.




July 2006                     http://www.jaddams.com                139
                           Grand strategy

 Essence
 • Shape pursuit of national goal so that we not only amplify our
   spirit and strength (while undermining and isolating our
   adversaries) but also influence the uncommitted or potential
   adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy
   and are empathetic toward our success.




July 2006                  http://www.jaddams.com                   140
                                          Insight

  On one hand … the national goal and grand strategy tend to be
  constructive in nature. On the other hand, the strategic aim, strategy,
  grand tactics, and tactics are destructive in nature and operate over a
  shorter time frame.
  In this sense, the upper two and the latter four notions, as expressed,
  appear to be in disharmony with one another. Yet, application of these
  latter four strategic and tactical notions permit real leadership to
  avoid high attrition, avoid widespread destruction, and gain a quick
  victory. This combined with shattered cohesion, paralysis, and rapid
  collapse demonstrated by the existing adversary regime, makes it appear
  corrupt, incompetent, and unfit to govern.
  Under these circumstances, leaders and statesmen offering generous
  terms can form the basis for a viable peace. In this sense, the first two and
  the latter four notions can be in harmony with one another.

            Roughly, the principles of maneuver (warfare)

July 2006                       http://www.jaddams.com                            142
                               Further elaboration
Up to this point—by repeatedly adding, stripping-away, and recombining many different,
yet similar, ideas and thoughts—we have examined the nature of conflict, survival, and
conquest in many different ways.
A review and further manipulation of the ideas and thoughts that make-up these
different ways suggests that, for success over the long haul and under the most difficult
conditions, one needs some unifying vision that can be used to attract the
uncommitted as well as pump-up friendly resolve and drive and drain-away or subvert
adversary resolve and drive. In other words, what is needed is a vision rooted in human
nature so noble, so attractive that it not only attracts the uncommitted and magnifies the
spirit and strength of its adherents, but also undermines the dedication and
determination of any competitors or adversaries.
Moreover, such a unifying notion should be so compelling that it acts as a catalyst or
beacon around which to evolve those qualities that permit a collective entity or organic
whole to improve its stature in the scheme of things. Put another way, we are
suggesting a need for a supra-orientation or center-of-gravity that permits leaders, and
other authorities, to inspire their followers and members to enthusiastically take action
toward confronting and conquering all obstacles that stand in the way.
Such a scheme can be portrayed as follows:
  July 2006                        http://www.jaddams.com                              143
                          Unifying vision

Side by side, unaided except by their kith and kin in the great
Dominions and by the wide empires which rest beneath their
shield—side by side, the British and French peoples have
advanced to rescue not only Europe but mankind from the foulest
and most soul-destroying tyranny which has ever darkened and
stained the pages of history. Behind them—behind us—behind the
Armies and Fleets of Britain and France—gather a group of
shattered States and bludgeoned races: the Czechs, the Poles, the
Norwegians, the Danes, the Dutch, the Belgians—upon all of whom
the long night of barbarism will descend, unbroken even by a star
of hope, unless we conquer, as conquer we must; as conquer we
shall. Winston Churchill, ―First Broadcast as Prime Minister,‖ May
19, 1940



July 2006                  http://www.jaddams.com
                             Theme for vitality and growth
 Unifying vision                               Ingredients needed to pursue vision
 • A grand ideal, overarching theme, or        •     Insight:
   noble philosophy that represents a                  Ability to peer into and discern the inner nature or
   coherent paradigm within which                      workings of things.
   individuals as well as societies can
   shape and adapt to unfolding                •     Orientation
   circumstances—yet of
(Positive) essenceoffers a way to                      Ability to harmonize our images, views, or
   expose flaws – chart
moral conflictof competing or                          impressions of the world in order to comprehend
   adversary systems.                                  changes in the world
                 125
                                               •     Harmony:
                                                       Power to perceive or create interaction of apparently
                                                       disconnected events or entities in a connected way.
                       Aim
                                               •     Agility:
     Improve fitness as an                             Ability to transition from one OODA state – or
     organic whole to shape                            equivalently one orientation state – to another more
                                                       rapidly than any opponent
     and expand influence or
                                               •     Initiative:
     power over the course of
                                                       Internal drive to think and take action without being
     events in the world.                              urged.


     July 2006                            http://www.jaddams.com                                              144
                             Boyd’s pattern

    Unifying
    Vision



    Grand Strategy


                     Domain of the OODA ―Loop‖
    Strategy


                                                        Observe                               Orient                              Decide                     Act

                                                                      Implicit                                                          Implicit
                                          Unfolding                  Guidance                  Cultural
                                                                                                                                       Guidance

    Grand Tactics                       Circumstances                & Control                Traditions                               & Control


                                                                                   Genetic
                                                                                   Heritage                Analyses &
                                                        Observations      Feed
                                                                                                           Synthesis     Feed       Decision        Feed     Action
                                                                         Forward                                        Forward                    Forward
                                                                                                                                  (Hypothesis)               (Test)
                                                                                        New
                                                                                    Information         Previous
                                                                                                       Experience
                                          Outside                                                                                                               Unfolding
                                        Information                                                                                                             Interaction
                                                                                                                                                                   With
                                                       Unfolding
                                                                                                                                                               Environment
                                                       Interaction                         Feedback
                                                          With
                                                                                                     Feedback

    Tactics                                           Environment




July 2006                    http://www.jaddams.com                                                                                                          v 1.4 5/17/2005
                             Boyd’s pattern

    Unifying
    Vision
                              A ―Code of Moral Values‖—what van Creveld calls the ―war
                              convention‖ —that determines what actions (―transients‖) are
    Grand Strategy   Basis    and are not acceptable.
                              If you violate these, or are tricked into violating them, you
                              isolate yourself morally and demoralize your own forces.


    Strategy
                                         Key point: The attractiveness of the
                                         unifying vision is not what determines
                                         which actions are acceptable.
    Grand Tactics
                                         That would be ―ends justifying means‖
                                         – creative writing, in other words.

    Tactics


July 2006                    http://www.jaddams.com                                   v 1.4 5/17/2005
            With these thoughts in mind, let’s look
            at what our authors have to say about
            grand strategy




July 2006               http://www.jaddams.com
                                  Grand strategy
                                             Bill Lind
 • ―Col John Boyd, USAF, America‘s greatest military theorist,
   defined grand strategy as the art of connecting to—while
   isolating the enemy from—as many independent power centers
   as possible. The grand strategic question facing the US is how
   to do that in a 21st century that will increasingly be dominated
   by non-state, Fourth Generation forces.‖
 • Lind‘s grand strategy: minimize contact with sources of disorder,
   while making every effort to connect with sources of order:
            – Control entry and immigration from sources of disorder
            – Learn to live (well) without their products and resources
            – If necessary, retaliate as a ―spasm‖: massively and
              immediately
            – ―strategic (military) defensive combined with annihilating
              strategic and tactical counteroffensive‖
July 2006                          http://www.jaddams.com
                                  Grand strategy
                                                Lind
 • Sources of order:
            – States
            – Some religions and ideologies
            – Some businesses and other commercial enterprises
            – Mercenary armies
 • Sources of disorder
            – Failed states, including Afghanistan and Iraq
            – Islam
 • Idea is to ―fold sources of disorder back inside themselves,‖ as
   in Boyd‘s military strategy of Interaction and Isolation (Strategic
   Game)


July 2006                         http://www.jaddams.com
                             Lind’s grand strategy –
                                  Assessment
 • Idea of ―sources of disorder‖ is similar to Barnett‘s ―non-
   integrating gap‖ (which includes all states with a Muslim
   majority.)
 • But Lind does not propose trying to integrate the sources of
   disorder back into the sources of order by means of active
   involvement
 • Sees two major drawbacks to a (military) offensive in the ―War
   on Terror‖:
            – Will be widely viewed as aggression
            – Will involve ―sources of order‖ directly in the midst of
              ―sources of disorder,‖ breaking their isolation

                                         i.e., violation of universal moral code


July 2006                          http://www.jaddams.com
                            Grand strategy
                          in insurgency/4GW
                                   van Creveld
  • An armed force that keeps beating down on a weaker opponent
    will be seen as committing a series of crimes; therefore it will
    end up by losing the support of its allies, its own people, and its
    own troops …
  • In other words, he who fights against the weak—and the rag-tag
    Iraqi militias are very weak indeed—and loses, loses. He who
    fights against the weak and wins also loses. To kill an opponent
    who is much weaker than yourself is unnecessary and therefore
    cruel; to let that opponent kill you is unnecessary and therefore
    foolish. – ―Why Iraq Will End as Vietnam Did‖
                             i.e., violation of universal moral code,
                             the ―war convention‖ - why in an
                             Internet Age, states have difficulty
                             waging attrition warfare against
                             guerrillas.
July 2006                    http://www.jaddams.com
                 Problems with military force
                                  van Creveld

 • … the original goals for which the US went to war included
   stopping communism and preserving democracy in South
   Vietnam (147)
 • From the Americans in Vietnam to the Soviets in Afghanistan,
   the number of those who found their calculations upset and their
   plans confounded by the enemy‘s determination to suffer and
   endure is legion (148)




                         Replace ―communism‖ with the bad ideology du jour
                        (Islamic Fundamentalism or some such) and you get
                       goals similar to those used to justify the invasion of Iraq.




July 2006                   http://www.jaddams.com
                          Core vs. Gap
                                   Barnett

• Agreeing on a written, common rule set builds unity
  among Core nations (Blueprint 126)
• ―Disconnectedness defines danger‖ (xvi)
• No safety until ―everyone is invited in‖ with justice
  (208)
• Ends can justify means (140, 205)
• Preemptive war still the best tool (121)




July 2006               http://www.jaddams.com
                        Barnett’s grand strategy
                  ―Disconnectedness defines danger”

Core
• Highly connected
• Codified rule sets on security                                                   Gap
• High degree of sharing these rule
  sets                                                      • Lack of codified rule sets on
                                                              security
• 4GW is a law-enforcement issue
                                                    • Varying degrees of disconnectivity,
• Agreement on how to handle                          oppression
  ―terrorists‖
                                             • Local governments incapable of or
• Share in burden of                           unwilling to fight ―terrorism‖
  interventions into the Gap
                                     • Core states have right to violate Gap
• 6 step A-Z rule                      ―sovereignty‖
  set for processing
  failed stated                • Interventions must have support of main Core
                                 states and results must be seen as fair & just
July 2006                          http://www.jaddams.com
                          Barnett’s grand tactics:
                             the ―Six Steps‖
1.       UNSC ―indicts‖
2.       ―Functioning executive body‖ (e.g., Group of 8) sanctions
         military action
3.       US-led force invades, arrests old regime
4.       Core SysAdmin force restores stability
5.       International organization (TBD) reconstructs
6.       Bad guys are tried before the International Criminal Court
         (Blueprint 51-52)




 July 2006                      http://www.jaddams.com
                      Blueprint’s grand tactics:
                              kinetics
• Leviathan:
       – Special Ops for 4GW
       – Network-Centric Warfare - primarily airpower - as enabler for
         Sys Admin & reconstruction
• Systems Administrator
       – Most of Army
       – All of USMC (except special operations)
       – 50% uniformed military; 25% uniformed police; 25%
         government civilians
       – Highly multinational




July 2006                       http://www.jaddams.com
                                 Barnett’s Pattern

   Unifying Vision
      Shrink the Gap. A connected world – ―disconnectedness‖ is the enemy.
   Grand Strategy
      Utilize networks in Functioning Core, primarily private sector investment, as
      ―pull‖ mechanism; use Core military to ―export‖ security, ―proactively shape a
      better tomorrow‖.


   Strategy
       System perturbation: put system into play & integrate into the core.

   Grand Tactics
      Six Point A-to-Z rule set for processing failed states. ―Leviathan‖ against
      rogue states & to take out ―bad actors.‖ Sys Admin to integrate. Special ops
      against ―terrorists.‖

   Tactics
      Airpower, NCW for access, regime change. Rapid reconstruct to pre-empt 4GW


July 2006                          http://www.jaddams.com
                 Making rollback work –
                  (Gordon & Trainor)




                 Know your enemy and
                 know yourself and you
                   will not fear in 100
                         battles.



     Enabling           Establishing security &
    occupation            rehabilitating Iraq
                                                  Cobra II, p. 503
July 2006               http://www.jaddams.com
                       What we did instead
                       (Gordon & Trainor)




                                    Other coalition members?
                                     Allies?
                                      Arabs?
              Our                       The Iraqis themselves?
            Emphasis

            WAR                            Stability Operations

                                                           Cobra II, p. 503
July 2006                http://www.jaddams.com
                      The grand strategy of al-Qa’ida
                                             Scheuer

 • Osama bin Laden is playing defense (a la Bill Lind.)
 • His grand strategy consists of three parts, one directed towards
   Muslims, one directed towards the uncommitted, and one
   directed towards the United States.
 • His intent is to remove US & Western influence from the lands
   that are traditionally Muslim (including Spain!) and institute a
   ―pure‖ (Salafist) form of Islam in these areas
 • Scheuer echoes Boyd in deconstructing grand strategy into
   three messages:
            – To our (bin Laden‘s) side / allies (in this case, the Muslim
              world)
            – To the uncommitted
            – To opponents (primarily the United States)
July 2006                          http://www.jaddams.com
                          Grand strategy of al-Qa’ida
                                                 Scheuer
 Message to Muslims:
 •      Islam is under attack from non-Islamic forces
 •      As evidence, he preaches a consistent message:
              1. Support for Israel that allows her to oppress the Palestinians
              2. Western troops on the Arabian Peninsula
              3. US invasion and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan; statements that our
                 goal is to make them ―secular democracies‖
              4. Support for other regimes hostile to Muslims: Russia, India, China,
                 Uzbekistan, etc.
              5. US pressure on Arab energy producers to keep prices low, thereby robbing
                 Muslims of their future
              6. US & Western support for apostate, corrupt, unjust, and tyrannical Muslim
                 governments (Saudi Arabia, Syria, Gulf States, and until recently, Iraq.)
 •      Bin Laden stays on message: It is your duty as Muslims to oppose this attack. You
        will either succeed or become martyrs
                           ―If bin Laden‘s argument is accepted, (each Muslim) must take up
                           arms or otherwise support the mujahideen, or face eternal
                           damnation for not performing a duty mandated by God.‖ IH, 8.
July 2006                              http://www.jaddams.com
                         Grand strategy of al-Qa’ida
                                               Scheuer
   Message to the uncommitted:
   • We have no quarrel with you, so long as you do not
     oppress Muslims or assist the US in the six activities
     mentioned above.
   • If you do, we are capable of striking you and striking
     hard
              –   Madrid railway attack, 4 April 2004
              –   London transit attack, 7 July 2005

… and not to target whoever wanted to be neutral, but whoever insisted on fighting
along with the Crusaders against Muslims should be killed, regardless of their sect or
tribe.
… [but] southern Iraqis cannot participate with the United States and its allies in
invading al-Fallujah, al-Ramadi, Baqubah, Mosul, Samarra, al-Qaim and other towns and
villages while their areas remain safe from reprisal and harm.
                                 Osama bin Laden, speeches of June 30 and July 1, 2006

  July 2006                          http://www.jaddams.com
                  Grand strategy of al-Qa’ida
                                       Scheuer
 Message to the United States and its allies:
 • We hate you for what you do, as noted above.
 • We do not hate ―democracy‖ or ―freedom.‖
 • We are not going to start a jihad to destroy your theaters,
   beaches, or taverns (although these are clearly signs that your
   civilization is depraved.)
 • I (bin Laden) invite Mr. Bush and the American People to
   embrace Islam; I will be your guide.
 • If you do not, and if you continue in the six practices noted
   above, we will strike you with ever more massive attacks until
   you finally leave.
                  Comment: We do not want to connect with corruption and
                  vice. [It is the duty of a Muslim ruler to encourage that which
                  is good and forbid that which is evil. – e.g., Qu‘ran 3:104-114,
                  9:67; 16:90]

July 2006                    http://www.jaddams.com
                Why Grand Strategy in 4GW?

• In truth, such a condition of democracy is militarily difficult to
  achieve when occupation is involved, as Israel has discovered
  in the occupied territories and as the imperial powers discovered
  after the Second World War, when the colonies sought
  independence … The initiative moves to the occupied, who can
  choose to cooperate with the occupiers or not.

• The dangers and costs of coercing the people have already
  been discussed, and if, as history keeps showing, they are
  used, then the coercive measures must be maintained, or the
  spirit of freedom and independence will break out.

                                                     Gen Sir Rupert Smith,
                                                       The Utility of Force



July 2006                   http://www.jaddams.com
                     Conflict in the Muslim World
                         Michael Vlahos (Johns Hopkins)

• US has indeed unleashed a system perturbation on the Muslim
  World
• Unfortunately it is one we do not understand and can only partially
  control
       – Rooted in ancient Muslim traditions - freedom from outside
       – Aggravated by 25 years of US support for repressive regimes
• Possibilities include:
       – Failed state: 27 million person version of Somalia
       – We leave, but the insurgency doesn‘t
       – ―Iraqoslavia‖ - partition, then civil war, then regional war
• In all cases, we‘ve trained the next generation of Jihadists
• Prescription - connect to groups we can live with

July 2006                       http://www.jaddams.com
                         Grand Strategy in Iraq?

If there was a simple formula by which a coherent political strategy
may be expressed, it was to
       – communicate to the Shia that they would, as the majority
         group, quickly gain power through free elections;
       – to reassure the Sunni that, despite losing their historic
         dominance over Iraq, they would not be subject to
         persecution;
       – and to persuade the Kurds to cooperate in the maintenance
         of the Iraqi state and to rest content with an autonomous
         status short of independence.
In fact, the American occupiers did not consistently pursue any
such logic.
                                       Hendrickson & Tucker, ―Revisions‖

July 2006                      http://www.jaddams.com
                    Grand Strategy in Iraq?




―People who were on the fence or supported us" in the past "have
in fact decided to strike out against us."
                           LTG Peter Chiraelli, USA, Commander,
                                         Multinational Corps, Iraq




                                    Quoted in Andrew Bacevich, ―What Is An Iraqi Life Worth?‖
                                                         The Washington Post, July 9, 2006


July 2006                 http://www.jaddams.com
                                                    Agenda

•    Conflict                                           •    Moral isolation and interaction
       –    Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg                          –    Theme for disintegration and
       –    Attrition warfare & maneuver conflict                   collapse

•    OODA Loops                                         •    Grand strategy

       –    What they are not (and are)                        –    Theme for vitality and growth

       –    How to accelerate OODA loops                       –    Ends and means

•    Moral conflict & the prism of conflict                    –    Moral leverage

•    Guerrilla warfare                                         –    What Lind, van Creveld, Hammes,
                                                                    Barnett, and Scheuer say about
       –    Blitz & guerrilla: common strategy                      grand strategy
•    Generations of war                                 •    Summary
•    Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert,                       –    Tables
     reorient, reharmonize
                                                               –    Issues among the authors
•    4GW according to Lind, van Creveld,
     Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer                              –    Neither Shall the Sword
                                                        •    If I were emperor …




July 2006                                  http://www.jaddams.com
      Now, let’s collect up the
      bits and pieces.

             Role & utility of military
             force
             Involvement in the Gap
             Fourth Generation
             Warfare
             Grand Strategy
             What ―Winning‖ means



July 2006                      http://www.jaddams.com
                                                                Summary


            Issue               Lind                 Hammes                  Barnett              van Creveld                 Scheuer

   Military force       Massive retaliatory      Modernized counter –   3GW: Access &            Conventional armies      Annihilating attacks in
                        spasm                    insurgency             regime change            will rot in this         defense of national
                        Occasional 4GW           Project homeland       New ―force‖ to           environment              interest; collateral
                        efforts on a defensive   security               rebuild, play global     Armies will bifurcate    damage be damned
                        basis                                           cop-on-the-beat          into gangs & private     Otherwise, stay out
                                                                        US to play lead role     services

   Involvement in Gap   No – retaliation only    Vital interest only    Yes – integrate Gap      No choice – it‘s         No – vital interest
                                                                                                 coming our way           only




   4GW                  • Non-state              • Evolved form of      Included in substate     • Non-trinitarian        • Al-Qa‘ida is main
                        • Focus is moral           insurgency           violence by              • Agrees with Lind,        threat
                          defeat of state        • (Social) netwar      individuals – province     vis-à-vis Israel –     • Change policies in
                                                                        of special ops.            Palestinians (wall       ME or follow LInd
                        • Large dose of          • Persuade decision-
                          insurgency               makers                                          so high a bird can‘t
                                                                                                   fly over it)




July 2006                                              http://www.jaddams.com
                                                            Summary


            Issue            Lind                 Hammes                    Barnett             van Creveld                Scheuer

    Grand Strategic   Breakdown of state       Evolution of            Eliminate a few bad     Breakdown of state      Life in Muslim ME
    Orientation       system                   insurgency into         actors, suppressing     system                  focused on religion,
                      Isolate sources of       netwar                  universal longing for   Many motivations for    honor, survival, kin
                      disorder; Islam          Involves current        connectedness.          non-state actors,       obligations;

                      Connect with sources     situation in ME, but    Main tool: cause &      including:              See themselves as
                      of order (state & non-   also criminal & narco   manage system             –   War is fun        under attack
                      state)                   networks                perturbations                                   Al-Qaida is catalyzing
                                                                                               Clausewitz can be
                                               Neo-Clausewitzian       Use economic, social    fatal (rational actor   body for some
                                               view of causes of war   tools to re-integrate   loses)                  fraction
                                               on state side           Gap

    Winning           Can‘t be done –          Interagency approach    Gap is shrunk to        Can‘t be done –         Fix US ME policy;
                      isolate and hope for     can contain – project   manageable level        isolate and hope for    crush residual threats
                      best                     ―Homeland Security‖                             best                    if they cause
                                               Be patient                                                              problems; beacon –
                                                                                                                       not arsenal – of
                                                                                                                       democracy




July 2006                                           http://www.jaddams.com
              Main issue: role of military force

 • Is ancient wisdom now obsolete: Whoever relies on the Tao in
   governing men doesn‘t try to force issues or defeat enemies by
   force of arms. For every force there is a counterforce. Violence,
   even well intentioned always rebounds upon oneself. Tao Te
   Ching, 30
 • Is Iraq really experiencing 4GW, or just classical insurgency? In
   particular, what is the objective of the transnational element?
 • What about large-scale conventional conflict, i.e., with China,
   Russia, or India?




July 2006                   http://www.jaddams.com
                               Conclusions
• We‘re not going to fight Russia, China, or India (at least not with
  conventional weapons).




July 2006                   http://www.jaddams.com
                                   China



                             China                       USA
Potentially hostile       13,700 mi.                       0
border

Restive minorities    Tibetans, Uygurs,                    0
                      Mongolians, etc.

Breakaway provinces         Taiwan                   0 (since 1865)


Strat nuc weapons            25-50                      10,000
Recent invasions           Vietnam               Grenada, Panama, Iraq
                      (29 day incursion, 1979)


Defense budget            $70 billion                 $500 billion

July 2006              http://www.jaddams.com
                               Conclusions

• We‘re not going to fight Russia, China, or India (at least not with
  conventional weapons).

• Therefore we can eliminate most of the non-nuclear forces we
  now have.
• What we will face is ―evolved insurgency,‖ for which we have, at
  the moment, no good solution. The environment will be the failed
  states of the Gap.
• Our best strategy is military containment combined with active,
  non-military measures.
• Eventually, we should privatize our residual conventional combat
  forces.


July 2006                   http://www.jaddams.com
                              So, what is 4GW?

• It‘s any way that non-state entities confront the organized power
  of a state
       – Inside a Core state, it is a law enforcement problem
       – If it is just inside a non-Core state, it is insurgency
• If it does not fit into either of these categories and if it is severe
  enough to be considered ―war,‖ then it may be 4GW
       – Transnational - gangs, tribes, corporations, nationalities
         without states, etc.
       – Sometimes based around religion or ideology
       – May use the methods of guerrilla warfare
       – Focus is on collapsing the will of local states to survive or
         oppose and of supporting states to interfere
       – May or may not have any grand plans for the future
July 2006                       http://www.jaddams.com
                                 Predictions
                                   van Creveld

 • Distinctions between war and crime will break down (204) as will
   the difference between armed forces and civilians (194)
 • Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres
 • Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the civilian
   population, and extreme dispersion have become the norm
   (208) The problem of subversion is likely to be serious (211)
 • Much of the task of defending society against non-trinitarian
   warfare/4GW will fall to private security companies, with a
   corresponding decrease in the utility, size, and technological
   complexity (cost) of military forces
 • Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be replaced by
   police-like security forces on the one hand and armed gangs on
   the other (not that the difference is always clear, even today)
   (225)                                       Ref: Transformation of War, 1991
July 2006                    http://www.jaddams.com
                               Predictions
                                 van Creveld

 • Distinctions between war and crime will break down (204) as will
   the difference between armed forces and civilians (194)
 • Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres
 • Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the civilian
   population, and extreme dispersion have become the norm
   (208) The problem of subversion is likely to be serious (211)
 • Much of the task of defending society against non-trinitarian
   warfare/4GW will fall to private security companies, with a
   corresponding decrease in the utility, size, and technological
   complexity (cost) of military forces
 • Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be replaced by
   police-like security forces on the one hand and armed gangs on
   the other (not that the difference is always clear, even today)
   (225)
July 2006                  http://www.jaddams.com
                As a first step, we need to privatize
                    much of our military force
• Bankrupt organizations can go out of business
• Markets unleash competition                             Also, consider that
      – variety, rapidity, initiative                     our opponents in
                                                          4GW are already
      – creativity
                                                          privatized.
• Privatization has a long military history
      – mercenary organizations, including criminal
      – British East India Company
        (1600-1858) and privateers
      – US PMCs today
      – van Creveld‘s gloomy tomorrow
• Nothing less will force the amount
  of change that we need
July 2006                        http://www.jaddams.com
            Why not rollback as recommended
                       by Barnett?

                        • Don‘t know how to do it




July 2006           http://www.jaddams.com
                              Rollback, in the heart
                                    of NATO
                                                                              NATO
―In Albania and much of ex-Yugoslavia, the forces ranged against the
 state—crime syndicates and armed nationalists—are often more
 than a match for legitimate business and politics. Government, in so
 far as its writ runs at all, is frequently worse than useless: customs
 barriers and regulations simply obstruct legal business, offer bribe
 opportunities for bureaucrats and abet crime.
―… Albanian gangs spirit people into Britain and Germany; guns are
 reaching Britain from Croatia and points south; the stolen-vehicle
 trade in the Netherlands is dominated by Serbs; and Chinese
 syndicates based in ex-Yugoslavia send illegal migrants to Finland.
 It was once said of the Balkans that they produce more history than
                  New York Times Map

 can be consumed locally; it is even more true that the region is a
 big net exporter of crime.‖
                                                                ―Europe's banlieue,‖ The Economist,
                                                                                     Nov 24th 2005

 July 2006                             http://www.jaddams.com
            Why not rollback?

                 • Don‘t know how to do it
                  • Occupations are unpredictable in
                    result, but always expensive
                         – nationalism, tribalism,
                           sectarianism, etc.
                         – insurgency / guerrilla warfare
                           almost inevitable
                  • We never fund the reconstructing
                    phase adequately
                  • And then there‘s corruption



July 2006    http://www.jaddams.com
Epilogue




               If II Were Emperor …
               If were




   July 2006        http://www.jaddams.com
                           Are there alternatives?
                          appropriate bits and pieces
• play for shih (position/force/configuration/advantage/energy –
  title of Chapter 5 in Sun Tzu.)

       1. Employ cheng/ch’i
       2. Employ timing and force together
       3. Develop favorable situations with great potential
       4. Take and maintain the initiative
                                          David Lai, ―Learning From the Stones,‖ p. 2


•    pump up the elements on the right side of the ―Theme for Vitality and
     Growth‖ [Patterns #144; chart 124 of this presentation]
•    work on improving connections with as many ―sources of order‖/Core
     states as possible
•    continually improve our understanding of how Gap countries actually
     work – ethnic/tribal, religious, legal, criminal, etc.
                                                                                          Version4.01
                                                                                        February 2006
July 2006                           http://www.jaddams.com
                          Are there alternatives?
                              appropriate bits and pieces

• recall the ancient wisdom of the Tao te Ching: Violence, even
  well intentioned always rebounds upon oneself. This represents
  the distilled wisdom of practical people over thousands of years.
• if you‘re going to do it anyway, exploit Sun Tzu and those
  thousands of years of experience:
       – best to attack his plans                        Where we should have started

       – next best attack his alliances
       – third best alternative, attack his army
       – fourth on the list – attack cities              Where we in fact did start in Iraq


                                  Taking a state whole is superior;
                                     Destroying it is inferior to this.
                                          Sun Tzu (Denma Trans.) Chapter 3


July 2006                       http://www.jaddams.com
                       Are there alternatives?
                         appropriate bits and pieces

• take nothing off the table, so if we feel the need to help things
  along (e.g., to prevent misuse of nuclear material), use PISRR:
       – Penetrate              for populations suffering under ―big men,‖ this
                                shouldn‘t be that difficult
       – Isolate
                                idea is to preserve existing system, but co-opt it
       – Subvert                (perhaps minus the ―big man‖) and steer it into the
                                world economy.
       – Reorient
                                also, consider the ―Theme for Disintegration &
       – Reharmonize            Collapse,‖ Patterns chart 136.


• under this approach, there will often be no need for a large and
  visible Sys Admin, since most of the people who know how to
  rebuild and run the system are already there.
• and there will be no need for an all-American ―Leviathan‖ - the
  USMC and SOF we have will do just fine (detailed
  recommendations in A Swift, Elusive Sword).
July 2006                   http://www.jaddams.com
                     Army                    Navy                        Air Force          USMC
                                 Special                                        Special
            Heavy forces        operations                        Tactical     operations
                                  forces     Tactical              airlift       forces
                                               air                                          All
                             Special                     Tactical air
                            operations
               Reserve        forces
              Component


                                                  SES
                                              Strike Force                                  Political, financial,
                                                                                            law enforcement,
                                                                                             engineering, etc.
                                                                For Rollback
                                  For
                              Containment                   Developed world must combine
                                                            military containment with police,
                                                                       Counterinsurgency
                                                                           and strong preemptive
                                                            intelligence,reconstructing
                                                         3GW forces
                                                                        /
                                                                            forces
              Evolved SES                                   incentives:
                                                                                   System
              Strike Force                               •              FinancialAdministrator
                                                      SES
                                                   ―Leviathan‖
                                                         • Commercial
                     Potentially                                • Political
                                                               •
                                                          Private Diplomatic
                                                          military
                                                        companies

July 2006                                      http://www.jaddams.com
                                             Could it work?



   If we spent half as much time studying this approach as we now do
   preparing to fight 2GW (and some 3GW) against Core states and
   vanished empires, we might get somewhere.




    The shih of battle do not exceed cheng & ch’i, yet their variations cannot be exhausted. Sun Tzu, Chapter 5


July 2006                                    http://www.jaddams.com
                                Could it work?


We integrated:
       – The entire Soviet Union
         (except Belarus?) and
       – The entire Warsaw Pact
into the global system without invading anybody.
    (In fact, a proximate cause of the fall of the Soviet system
    was its successful attempt to invade and remove a ―big man,‖
    Hafizullah Amin, in Afghanistan.)

                       10 are now members of NATO

                                         and 8 also belong to the EU




July 2006                      http://www.jaddams.com
      To flourish and grow in the
            • many-sided
            • uncertain, and
            • ever-changing world
      that surrounds us suggests that we must make
      intuitive within ourselves those many practices
      we need to meet the exigencies of that world.
      —John R. Boyd, A Discourse on Winning & Losing




July 2006                  http://www.jaddams.com

				
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