Internet Voting from the Internet Policy Institute

Internet Voting Digital Government Research Conference May 21, 2001 David Cheney - Internet Policy Institute David Jefferson - Compaq Systems Research Center Paul Herrnson - University of Maryland Jane Fountain - Kennedy School, Harvard David Elliott - Division of Elections, Washington State Goals of Panel • Present findings and recommendations of project • Refine the research agenda • Discuss and get feedback • Stimulate research ideas About the Project • President Clinton (12/99) asked NSF to study the feasibility of online voting • NSF (7/00) awarded grant to IPI conduct workshop • Workshop held with computer security experts, election officials, social scientists (10/00) • (11/2000 election) • Report released 3/01 • www.internetpolicy.org or www.netvoting.org Executive Committee • • • • • • • • • • C.D. Mote, Jr., University of Maryland (Chair) Erich Bloch, Washington Advisory Group Lorrie Faith Cranor, AT&T Research Labs Jane Fountain, Harvard University Paul Herrnson, University of Maryland David Jefferson, Compaq Systems Research Center Thomas Mann, The Brookings Institution Raymond Miller, University of Maryland Adam C. Powell, III, The Freedom Forum Frederic Solop, Northern Arizona University Panelists Michael Alvarez, Caltech Penelope Bonsall, FEC David Brady, Stanford Polli Brunelli, U.S. Federal Voter Assistance Project Paul Craft, Florida Division of Elections Craig Donsanto, Dept. of Justice David Elliot, Washington State Elections Division, Michael Fischer, Yale Dan Geer, @Stake, Inc. Lance Hoffman, George Washington University Patricia Hollarn, Okaloosa County, Florida Carl Landwehr, Mitretek Richard Niemi, Univ. Rochester Ronald Rivest, MIT Technology Aviel Rubin, AT&T Research Roy Saltman, Consultant Barbara Simons, Association for Computing Machinery Sandra Steinbach, Iowa Elections Division Mike Traugott, Univ. of Michigan Raymond Wolfinger, UC Berkeley Why Internet Voting? • If one can shop, pay taxes over Internet, why not vote? • Increase voter participation rate, especially among young, disabled, travelers • Make voting more convenient • More participatory democracy • Vendor push • Fast and accurate counting, better user interfaces Internet voting experiments • • • • Arizona Democratic primary Federal voting assistance project Other demos (California, Arizona) Experiments going on in Europe – Cybervote project -- Sweden, France, Poland – Geneva – Estonia – Europe-wide student union vote • Eligibility and Authentication—only authorized voters should be able to vote; • Uniqueness—no voter should be able to vote more than once; • Accuracy—system should record the votes correctly; • Integrity—votes should not be able to be modified, forged, or deleted without detection; • Verifiability and Auditability—verify that all votes have been correctly accounted for; reliable and authentic election records Criteria for Election Systems Criteria for Elections Systems, con’t • • Reliability—work without loss of any votes, in the face of many possible failures; Secrecy and Non-Coercibility—no one should be able to determine how any individual voted; voters should not be able to prove how they voted; Flexibility—allow a variety of ballot formats (e.g., write-in candidates, multiple languages); be accessible to people with disabilities; Convenience—require minimal voter equipment or skill; Certifiability—testable so that election officials have confidence that they meet the necessary criteria; Transparency—voters should be able to possess a general understanding of the voting process; and Cost-effectiveness • • • • • Other Considerations • Participation and access by demographic groups; • Election logistics, administration, and costs; • Effects on deliberative and representative democracy; • Effect on the sense of community and character of America elections; • Federal, state, and local government roles; and • Election laws. Findings – Remote Voting • Remote Internet voting systems pose significant risk to the integrity of the voting process, and should not be fielded for use in public elections until substantial technical and social science issues are addressed. • Numerous and pervasive security issues: – – – – viruses Trojan horses denial of service attacks creation of spoof websites Findings – Remote Voting II • Privacy/secrecy • Platform compatibility/certification issues • Many social science issues: – digital divide – differences in access to Internet among demographic groups – effect on campaigns and electioneering laws – effect on civic participation – effect on direct versus representative democracy • Need to educate public officials about risks/challenges Findings – Poll Site Internet Voting • Poll site Internet voting systems offer some benefits and could be responsibly fielded within the next several election cycles. – voting clients, environment are under control of election officials – votes can be stored at the voting machine – can use existing registration and authentication • Key issues: software errors, reliability, audit trail, transparency, cost • Experimentation appropriate • Expandable to allow voting from many places. Findings – Kiosk Voting • If poll site successful, next step is voting terminals in libraries, schools, malls, etc. • Key issues (+ all poll site issues) : – standards for electronically authenticating voters, e.g. digital signatures – monitoring kiosks Findings – Voter Registration • Internet-based voter registration poses significant risk to the integrity of the voting process, and should not be implemented until an adequate authentication infrastructure is available and adopted. – high risk for automated fraud (i.e., registration of large numbers of fraudulent voters) – voter registration is already weak link in electoral process – need unique biometric (e.g., fingerprint or retinal scan) data and an existing database with which to verify the data • May use Internet to update info (e.g., addresses) Research Recommendations • Large, critical research agenda – public officials need better knowledge to make informed decisions on new election systems – likely public and political pressures to adopt remote Internet voting in the near future • Needed research: – mix of short-term and long-term research – technical, social science, and election systems topics. – interdisciplinary; involve election officials Next Steps Advance Research Agenda • Prioritize • Add • Refine • Modify • Link to e-commerce, e-government research • What is NSF’s role? Key Questions • Which research is most critical and in what time frame? • Who (firms, universities, FEC, states, NSF) should do what? Critical Research Areas I • Approaches to security, secrecy & scalability – secure voting platforms – secure network architectures – methods to reduce the risk of insider fraud • Reliable poll site and kiosk Internet voting systems • Testing and certification procedures • Effects of open architecture and open source code on innovation, profitability, and public confidence • Authentication for kiosk and remote voting Critical Research Areas II • Human interfaces and electronic ballots, access for disabled • Protocols for preventing vote selling and reducing coercion • Economics of voting systems • Effects of Internet voting on – – – – voter participation, by demographic group the public confidence in the electoral process deliberative and representative democracy political campaigns Critical Research Areas III • Federal/state/local roles in elections • Legal issues: – vote fraud – liability for system failures – international law enforcement – electioneering laws Conclusion • Voting at the heart of democracy • Internet voting promises significant benefits, but poses great technical and social challenges • Rich research agenda with relevance to other e-govt, e-commerce Poll site Multiple pollsite Timing (years) Critical Issue Development of secure voting platforms Secure network architectures Insider fraud Reliable poll site and kiosk Internet voting systems Procedures for continuous testing and certification of election systems, Test methods for election systems Open architecture and open source code requirements Human factors design -- human interfaces, electronic ballots, needs of the disabled; Protocols for preventing vote selling and reducing coercion The economics of voting systems The effects of Internet voting on participation in elections, by demographic group Effects on elections, public confidence in the electoral process, and deliberative and representative democracy Internet voting for political campaigns Federal/state roles Legal issues--jurisdiction, vote fraud, liability for system failures, international law enforcement, and electioneering Electronic authentication for kiosk and remote voting; and Experimentation, modeling, and simulation of election systems 1 X XX X X XX XX XX X X X X X X 2-4 ? 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