E voting

E-voting Kim Lawson-Jenkins Computer Science Department The George Washington University Washington D.C. email - jinx55@gwu.edu Help America Vote Act (HAVA)   Passed October 29, 2002 Gives funds to states that replace punch card and lever voting machines by the 2006 elections   Amount of funds – $3.8 Billion Touch screen voting systems and optically scanned machines can be used as replacements Optical scan Direct-Recording Electronic SOURCE: SHOUP VOTING SOLUTIONS Voting equipment type Equipment Type No. of Counties % of registered voters DREs Optical Scan Punch card Lever 623 1429 327 264 29.35% 34.93% 12.37% 13.98% Source – Election Data Services (www.electiondataservices.com) Transparency in Voting Systems      Why it is needed Registration Source code for DREs Testing voting systems Election day procedures Why transparency is needed  Confidence and trust in the system  Voter verification  Ability to find and address problems earlier in the process   John Hopkins report Florida registration problems  Even the best most comprehensive tests won’t find all problems with computer systems Registration  Is there a right to privacy regarding voter registration information?  HAVA supports statewide computerized voter registration databases  Benefits of public access to voter registration information   Less surprises on election day Reduces the need for provisional ballots Source code of DREs    Five DRE makers have agreed to submit their software to the National Reference Software Library under NIST Private for-profit companies supply the software. Not all mission critical systems support open source software. Testing Voting Systems  The Federal Voting System Standard  Provides precious few procedures for the laboratories to follow in testing voting systems   Labs are not obligated to disclose all results No observations of the system in practice Testing Voting Systems  Half dozen major labs    Ciber Inc Wyle Laboratories SysTest Labs  All labs say that DRE companies mandate secrecy of testing results for competitive reasons Voting process   Voter Registration Vote Casting  Use of DREs primarily affects this area    Multiple languages Better for physically-impared voters Better for highlighting voter errors   Vote Counting Vote Recount Election Day Activities Maryland  Voters are given Voter Authority Cards which include  Voter Name, Election Judge’s initials, DRE machine number  On each machine a manual tally is kept of how many voters cast votes using a particular DRE Election Day Activities     Several times during the day election judges log the total VAC counts for each machine and deliver the VACs to the chief election judge. At the beginning of the election day, a Zero Totals Report for each DRE is printed and posted for interested parties At the end of the election day a Result Totals Report for each DRE is printed and posted on the outside door of the polling place The Result Total Report, the manual tally for each DRE, and the tally information for the VACs should match. Election Day Activities   Election day audit procedures will find discrepancies regarding the total number of ballots cast. Recounts are a different matter…  Assurance that the ballot cast is included in the ballot count may or may not be better than the situation in 2000. Even paper audit trails would not insure this. Threats to voting integrity   Influencing an election for a particular national or state candidate – small Raising doubts about the integrity of the election outcome on a national level – not so small November 3, 2004 and later     The threats for problems with voting systems increase as more time passes if limited progress is made Congress should fully fund the initiatives outlined in HAVA Developers of cryptographic solutions should work with existing DRE manufacturers to implement these solutions in DRE machines Citizens should contact their congressional representatives and the President to make their feelings known on the subject Conclusions  Recommendations from the TGDC to EAC in early 2005.    Computer Security and Transparency Core Requirements & Testing Usability & Privacy Conclusions   As with all security issues, administration and implementation of security procedures are critical for voting systems. E-voting situation is analogous to Y2K.