Three Images of International Relations
Three Images
Kenneth Waltz. 1954. Man, the State, and War. What
are the causes of war?
Third Image: The International System Second Image: The State First Image: Human nature
1st Image: Human Nature
Optimists
• People are basically good • Reform, education • Crime and war are deviant behaviors • Progress is possible, perhaps inevitable
But...
Does knowledge lead to peace? Does knowledge imply same preferences?
Pessimists
• Human nature is flawed • Passion and egoism are fundamental • Crime and war are normal • Utopian ideals are not achievable
But... Incomplete explanation
1st Image
• Original Sin—Genesis (950-550 B.C.), Paul (-64 A.D.), Augustine (354-430)
– Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971). Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932)
• Thucydides (460-400 B.C.)
– Fear, Power, Honor
• Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)
– Subconscious, repression
• Robert Jervis (1976). Perception and Misperception
2nd Image: The State
Institutions
Despotic states
Internal strife
The State
Liberalism Reason and progress make the eventual elimination of war possible
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) On Perpetual Peace
• Historical evolution •Technology leads to more brutal wars •States will be compelled to become peaceful • Republics will be inclined towards peace • Commerce creates incentives to pursue peace • Voluntary association in legal federation of peaceful states
Alternative view of democracy: Machiavelli
The State
Marxism-Leninism
• The mode of production determines social relations • Government represents dominant class interests • Under capitalism – Expanding production leads to diminishing returns – Search for profits leads to demand for new markets and investment opportunities
Conflict among capitalist states Harmony among socialist states
The State
Explaining Soviet behavior
• J. F. Dulles—expansionist ideology
Soviet policy was driven by Marxist-Leninist ideology, which foresaw an inevitable struggle with capitalist powers and the final victory of world revolution
• G. F. Kennan—internal weakness
Soviet policy was driven by the need to justify internal repression in terms of external threat
3rd Image: International anarchy Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Leviathan (1651) • Human beings are animals that seek pleasure and survival • In the state of nature, others are threats, so all are at war • Life is ―nasty, brutish and short‖ • To transcend anarchy, we surrender our natural rights to an absolute sovereign
International anarchy
State of Nature
State of War
Rousseau and the
rd 3
Image
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)
-- Swiss-French romantic philosopher -- The Social Contract, Discourse on the Origins of Inequality
• The ―noble savage‖ is born good but corrupted by society • Social contract
• General will • International society can be civilized
Rousseau’s image of the Stag Hunt
• Several primitives try to cooperate to catch a stag • Each can catch a rabbit alone • If any goes after a rabbit, the stag escapes
S S 4 4 1 1
R 3
R
2
3
2
Implications of the Stag Hunt
a) The environment can force us to act selfishly, even when we have common interests and we recognize that selfishness is self-defeating
b) Cooperation is risky, but possible
By 1914, the major powers of Europe had found themselves divided into two security alliances: Triple Entente
• France • Great Britain • Russia
World War I
Triple Alliance
• Austria-Hungary • Germany • Italy
The decline of the Ottoman Empire led to the establishment of national states in the Balkans:
World War I
• Serbia • Montenegro • Rumania • Bulgaria • Albania • Greece
Both Austria-Hungary and Russia wanted to increase their role in the Balkan region. Austria-Hungary
World War I
avoid decline as major power
Russia
gain control of Constantinople
Germany and France both wanted to play a larger role in continental politics: Germany
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gain status as world power
France
regain control of Alsace-Lorraine
World War I
Great Britain wanted to maintain the balance of power
World War I
The Summer of 1914
June 28: Archduke Franz Ferdinand, crown prince of Austria-Hungary, is assassinated by Serbian terrorist in Sarajevo Serbia, a Slavic country, is allied with Russia.
Franz Ferdinand
July 5: Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany tells AustriaHungary that it can count on Germany’s ―faithful support‖ in its attempt to punish Serbia, even if it leads to war with Russia.
Kaiser Wilhelm II
World War I
The Summer of 1914
July 21: President Poincare of France visits Russia. Austria decides to wait until he leaves before taking any action against Serbia.
President Poincare
July 23: Austria-Hungary gives ultimatum to Serbia that threatens Serbia’s sovereignty.
Franz Joseph (Austrian Emperor)
July 25: Serbia does not accept all conditions of the ultimatum, so Austria-Hungary severs diplomatic relations with Serbia.
World War I
The Summer of 1914
July 25: Czar Nicholas II of Russia approves partial mobilization. July 28: Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia. July 29: Austria learns of Russian mobilization. July 30: Czar Nicholas II approves general mobilization in Russia. July 31: Emperor Franz Joseph orders general mobilization in Austria-Hungary.
Czar Nicholas II
World War I
Militarism & Mobilization
• Nations maintained large standing armies. • ―Cult of the offensive‖: Many nations -- but especially German military bureaucracy -believed that offensive military tactics were best – e.g., use surprise, mobilize quickly to gain upper hand, and win war quickly. • Military mobilization plans constrained the actions of leaders. Germany’s Schlieffen Plan required it to invade France in the event of war with Russia. • Two front war: Germany believed it necessarily had to involve France in any war with Russia. There was an incentive to strike France quickly, because Russia would mobilize slowly. Margin of victory: 14 days.
World War I
The Summer of 1914
July 31: Germany gives ultimatum to both France and Russia. To France: be neutral To Russia: suspend mobilization
August 1: France rejects German ultimatum and orders mobilization. Germany follows and mobilizes. Russia rejects German ultimatum. Germany declares war on Russia.
August 2: Germany invades Luxembourg and demands that Belgium, a neutral country, allow Germany to march through its territory.
World War I
The Summer of 1914
August 3: Belgium rejects German ultimatum. Germany declares war on France. August 4: Germany invades Belgium. Great Britain demands that Germany cease its attack on neutral Belgium. Germany rejects the British ultimatum. Great Britain declares war on Germany.
Sir Edward Grey
(British Foreign Secretary)
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And so began the war to end all wars…
The troops were expected home by Christmas
World War I
The war raged on much longer than anyone had expected. By March 1918, Russia had pulled out of the war after the Bolshevik Revolution, and Italy had joined the Allies (1915). Both sides found themselves stalemated in trench warfare on the Western Front.
In 1917, the United States entered the war on the side of the British and French. An armistice was signed on November 11, 1918.
World War I
Military deaths
Germany: 1,773,700 Austria-Hungary: 1,200,000 Turkey: 325,000 Bulgaria: 87,500 3,386,200
Russia: 1,700,000 France: 1,357,800 Great Britain: 908,371 Italy: 650,000 Rumania: 335,706 United States: 116,516 5,068,393
Civilian deaths: ~13 million
Question
Which image best accounts for World War I?
Which Image Explains World War I?
First Image
• Character flaws of individual leaders • ―Cult of the offensive‖: Incorrect beliefs in the potency of surprise, offensive operations, and speed • Misperception
• Mistakes
Why was it so hard to end a war that no one wanted? •Nationalism •Animal passions •Irrational exuberance
Which Image Explains World War I?
Second Image
• Regime type: •Authoritarian countries start wars •Democratizing countries start wars • Economic system:
•Capitalism leads to conflict over resources, markets and investment venues
Why was it so hard to end a war that no one wanted? •―Gambling for resurrection‖ (Downs & Rocke; Goemans) •Democratic fundamentalism •Narrow social base of authoritarian elites
Which Image Explains World War I?
Third Image
• Defensive variant: •Entangling alliances & fear of abandonment •Uncertainty of commitments • Offensive variant: •German drive to dominate the continent Why was it so hard to end a war that no one wanted? •Hegemonic war is total (Gilpin)
•Entangling alliances
•Commitment problems •Relative gains
Levels of analysis
Each image has limitations • 1st image cannot easily explain variation • 2nd image cannot easily explain common responses by different states • 3rd image cannot easily explain different responses under the same circumstances
Critique of levels of analysis
Reification of levels
– Isolation of subfields (IR from comparative politics) – Neglect of cross influences
• Domestic influences on international politics • International influences on domestic politics
Game theoretic approach
Treat each ―image‖ as a feature of a more general model • Individual
– Assume rationality – Preferences, beliefs, information may vary
• The State
– Unitary actor? Model of the state?
• The System
– Strategic interaction among states
Intellectual history of realism in international relations
Origins of Realism
• Thucydides (460-400 B.C.) • The Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) • Leads to the destruction of Athens and the decline of Greek civilization • ―The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon [Sparta], made war inevitable‖
Thrace Macedonia Aegean Sea Epidamnus Thessaly Thebes Athens Corinth Sparta Ionian Sea Crete Asia Minor
Corcyra
Balance of Power
Athens
Epidamnus
Sparta
Corcyra
Corinth
Scene One: Corinth vs. Corcyra
• Epidamnus rebels, expels nobles, seeks aid from Corcyra, Corinth • Corinth intervenes • Corcyra intervenes on behalf of the nobles
Scene Two: Athens vs. Corinth
• Corcyraean arguments:
– We have the second strongest navy – Corinth will punish us if we defect – War is inevitable
• Corinthian arguments:
– Justice – We have precedents for good relations – War is not inevitable—yet
The Athenians believed war with Sparta was inevitable
Scene Three: Athens vs. Sparta
• Corinthian arguments:
– Athens broke the treaty – Your credibility is in question – Do we need to seek other allies?
• Athenian arguments:
– – – – Remember our role in defeating Persia Naval superiority Our empire does not prove threatening intentions Obtained by accident; we refused to give it up because we are insecure
Sparta feared the growth of Athenian power. Ultimatum
Scene Four: Pericles in Athens
• Submission to Sparta’s demands is slavery • Athens has the military advantage • We should have limited goals • The Peloponnesian League has a collective action problem • War is inevitable because we cannot commit to refrain from increasing our power in the future
Features of Thucydides’ Realism
• Low estimate of human nature
– ―The strong do as they may, the weak suffer what they must‖—Melian dialogue
• Prominence of reputation and prestige • Richness of unit-level analysis
– Epidamnus civil unrest – Athens and Sparta impose their forms of government on their allies – National power is a function of form of government
Features of Thucydides’ Realism
• Consequences of anarchy
– Commitments are not enforceable – Self-defense is the primary motivation – Security dilemma-no one can lose Corcyra
• • • •
Pivotal role of small allies Power transition hypothesis Defensive balancing Interests are defined in terms of power