Three Images of International Relations

Three Images of International Relations Three Images Kenneth Waltz. 1954. Man, the State, and War. What are the causes of war? Third Image: The International System Second Image: The State First Image: Human nature 1st Image: Human Nature Optimists • People are basically good • Reform, education • Crime and war are deviant behaviors • Progress is possible, perhaps inevitable But... Does knowledge lead to peace? Does knowledge imply same preferences? Pessimists • Human nature is flawed • Passion and egoism are fundamental • Crime and war are normal • Utopian ideals are not achievable But... Incomplete explanation 1st Image • Original Sin—Genesis (950-550 B.C.), Paul (-64 A.D.), Augustine (354-430) – Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971). Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932) • Thucydides (460-400 B.C.) – Fear, Power, Honor • Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) – Subconscious, repression • Robert Jervis (1976). Perception and Misperception 2nd Image: The State Institutions Despotic states Internal strife The State Liberalism  Reason and progress make the eventual elimination of war possible Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) On Perpetual Peace • Historical evolution •Technology leads to more brutal wars •States will be compelled to become peaceful • Republics will be inclined towards peace • Commerce creates incentives to pursue peace • Voluntary association in legal federation of peaceful states Alternative view of democracy: Machiavelli The State Marxism-Leninism • The mode of production determines social relations • Government represents dominant class interests • Under capitalism – Expanding production leads to diminishing returns – Search for profits leads to demand for new markets and investment opportunities Conflict among capitalist states Harmony among socialist states The State Explaining Soviet behavior • J. F. Dulles—expansionist ideology Soviet policy was driven by Marxist-Leninist ideology, which foresaw an inevitable struggle with capitalist powers and the final victory of world revolution • G. F. Kennan—internal weakness Soviet policy was driven by the need to justify internal repression in terms of external threat 3rd Image: International anarchy Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Leviathan (1651) • Human beings are animals that seek pleasure and survival • In the state of nature, others are threats, so all are at war • Life is ―nasty, brutish and short‖ • To transcend anarchy, we surrender our natural rights to an absolute sovereign International anarchy State of Nature State of War Rousseau and the rd 3 Image Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) -- Swiss-French romantic philosopher -- The Social Contract, Discourse on the Origins of Inequality • The ―noble savage‖ is born good but corrupted by society • Social contract • General will • International society can be civilized Rousseau’s image of the Stag Hunt • Several primitives try to cooperate to catch a stag • Each can catch a rabbit alone • If any goes after a rabbit, the stag escapes S S 4 4 1 1 R 3 R 2 3 2 Implications of the Stag Hunt a) The environment can force us to act selfishly, even when we have common interests and we recognize that selfishness is self-defeating b) Cooperation is risky, but possible By 1914, the major powers of Europe had found themselves divided into two security alliances: Triple Entente • France • Great Britain • Russia World War I Triple Alliance • Austria-Hungary • Germany • Italy The decline of the Ottoman Empire led to the establishment of national states in the Balkans: World War I • Serbia • Montenegro • Rumania • Bulgaria • Albania • Greece Both Austria-Hungary and Russia wanted to increase their role in the Balkan region. Austria-Hungary World War I avoid decline as major power Russia gain control of Constantinople Germany and France both wanted to play a larger role in continental politics: Germany World War I gain status as world power France regain control of Alsace-Lorraine World War I Great Britain wanted to maintain the balance of power World War I The Summer of 1914 June 28: Archduke Franz Ferdinand, crown prince of Austria-Hungary, is assassinated by Serbian terrorist in Sarajevo Serbia, a Slavic country, is allied with Russia. Franz Ferdinand July 5: Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany tells AustriaHungary that it can count on Germany’s ―faithful support‖ in its attempt to punish Serbia, even if it leads to war with Russia. Kaiser Wilhelm II World War I The Summer of 1914 July 21: President Poincare of France visits Russia. Austria decides to wait until he leaves before taking any action against Serbia. President Poincare July 23: Austria-Hungary gives ultimatum to Serbia that threatens Serbia’s sovereignty. Franz Joseph (Austrian Emperor) July 25: Serbia does not accept all conditions of the ultimatum, so Austria-Hungary severs diplomatic relations with Serbia. World War I The Summer of 1914 July 25: Czar Nicholas II of Russia approves partial mobilization. July 28: Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia. July 29: Austria learns of Russian mobilization. July 30: Czar Nicholas II approves general mobilization in Russia. July 31: Emperor Franz Joseph orders general mobilization in Austria-Hungary. Czar Nicholas II World War I Militarism & Mobilization • Nations maintained large standing armies. • ―Cult of the offensive‖: Many nations -- but especially German military bureaucracy -believed that offensive military tactics were best – e.g., use surprise, mobilize quickly to gain upper hand, and win war quickly. • Military mobilization plans constrained the actions of leaders. Germany’s Schlieffen Plan required it to invade France in the event of war with Russia. • Two front war: Germany believed it necessarily had to involve France in any war with Russia. There was an incentive to strike France quickly, because Russia would mobilize slowly. Margin of victory: 14 days. World War I The Summer of 1914 July 31: Germany gives ultimatum to both France and Russia. To France: be neutral To Russia: suspend mobilization August 1: France rejects German ultimatum and orders mobilization. Germany follows and mobilizes. Russia rejects German ultimatum. Germany declares war on Russia. August 2: Germany invades Luxembourg and demands that Belgium, a neutral country, allow Germany to march through its territory. World War I The Summer of 1914 August 3: Belgium rejects German ultimatum. Germany declares war on France. August 4: Germany invades Belgium. Great Britain demands that Germany cease its attack on neutral Belgium. Germany rejects the British ultimatum. Great Britain declares war on Germany. Sir Edward Grey (British Foreign Secretary) World War I And so began the war to end all wars… The troops were expected home by Christmas World War I The war raged on much longer than anyone had expected. By March 1918, Russia had pulled out of the war after the Bolshevik Revolution, and Italy had joined the Allies (1915). Both sides found themselves stalemated in trench warfare on the Western Front. In 1917, the United States entered the war on the side of the British and French. An armistice was signed on November 11, 1918. World War I Military deaths Germany: 1,773,700 Austria-Hungary: 1,200,000 Turkey: 325,000 Bulgaria: 87,500 3,386,200 Russia: 1,700,000 France: 1,357,800 Great Britain: 908,371 Italy: 650,000 Rumania: 335,706 United States: 116,516 5,068,393 Civilian deaths: ~13 million Question Which image best accounts for World War I? Which Image Explains World War I? First Image • Character flaws of individual leaders • ―Cult of the offensive‖: Incorrect beliefs in the potency of surprise, offensive operations, and speed • Misperception • Mistakes Why was it so hard to end a war that no one wanted? •Nationalism •Animal passions •Irrational exuberance Which Image Explains World War I? Second Image • Regime type: •Authoritarian countries start wars •Democratizing countries start wars • Economic system: •Capitalism leads to conflict over resources, markets and investment venues Why was it so hard to end a war that no one wanted? •―Gambling for resurrection‖ (Downs & Rocke; Goemans) •Democratic fundamentalism •Narrow social base of authoritarian elites Which Image Explains World War I? Third Image • Defensive variant: •Entangling alliances & fear of abandonment •Uncertainty of commitments • Offensive variant: •German drive to dominate the continent Why was it so hard to end a war that no one wanted? •Hegemonic war is total (Gilpin) •Entangling alliances •Commitment problems •Relative gains Levels of analysis Each image has limitations • 1st image cannot easily explain variation • 2nd image cannot easily explain common responses by different states • 3rd image cannot easily explain different responses under the same circumstances Critique of levels of analysis Reification of levels – Isolation of subfields (IR from comparative politics) – Neglect of cross influences • Domestic influences on international politics • International influences on domestic politics Game theoretic approach Treat each ―image‖ as a feature of a more general model • Individual – Assume rationality – Preferences, beliefs, information may vary • The State – Unitary actor? Model of the state? • The System – Strategic interaction among states Intellectual history of realism in international relations Origins of Realism • Thucydides (460-400 B.C.) • The Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) • Leads to the destruction of Athens and the decline of Greek civilization • ―The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon [Sparta], made war inevitable‖ Thrace Macedonia Aegean Sea Epidamnus Thessaly Thebes Athens Corinth Sparta Ionian Sea Crete Asia Minor Corcyra Balance of Power Athens Epidamnus Sparta Corcyra Corinth Scene One: Corinth vs. Corcyra • Epidamnus rebels, expels nobles, seeks aid from Corcyra, Corinth • Corinth intervenes • Corcyra intervenes on behalf of the nobles Scene Two: Athens vs. Corinth • Corcyraean arguments: – We have the second strongest navy – Corinth will punish us if we defect – War is inevitable • Corinthian arguments: – Justice – We have precedents for good relations – War is not inevitable—yet The Athenians believed war with Sparta was inevitable Scene Three: Athens vs. Sparta • Corinthian arguments: – Athens broke the treaty – Your credibility is in question – Do we need to seek other allies? • Athenian arguments: – – – – Remember our role in defeating Persia Naval superiority Our empire does not prove threatening intentions Obtained by accident; we refused to give it up because we are insecure Sparta feared the growth of Athenian power. Ultimatum Scene Four: Pericles in Athens • Submission to Sparta’s demands is slavery • Athens has the military advantage • We should have limited goals • The Peloponnesian League has a collective action problem • War is inevitable because we cannot commit to refrain from increasing our power in the future Features of Thucydides’ Realism • Low estimate of human nature – ―The strong do as they may, the weak suffer what they must‖—Melian dialogue • Prominence of reputation and prestige • Richness of unit-level analysis – Epidamnus civil unrest – Athens and Sparta impose their forms of government on their allies – National power is a function of form of government Features of Thucydides’ Realism • Consequences of anarchy – Commitments are not enforceable – Self-defense is the primary motivation – Security dilemma-no one can lose Corcyra • • • • Pivotal role of small allies Power transition hypothesis Defensive balancing Interests are defined in terms of power