The Politics of Transition in Central and Eastern Europe

The Politics of Transition in Central and Eastern Europe Lecture 3: ‘Exit’, ‘Voice’, and Democratic Consolidation Dr Gwendolyn Sasse Gwendolyn.Sasse@nuffield.ox.ac.uk Albert O. Hirschmann (1970) original concern is with ‘repairable lapses of economic actors’ (i.e. drop in performance/quality)  ‘exit’: customers stop buying a product or members leave a firm/organisation  ‘voice’: direct expression of dissatisfaction to management, articulated by customers or members of an organisation (signalling mechanism)  ‘loyalty’: an underlying attachment/commitment to the product or organisation; trade-off between certainty of exit and the uncertainty about future improvement; loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice ==> what are the equivalents in the political/societal sphere?   H. argues that there is a complicated relationship between ‘exit’ and ‘voice’: ‘voice’ is a residual of exit where demand is elastic (i.e. easy exit inhibits voice), but an alternative where demand is inelastic (i.e. difficult exit encourages voice), but not mutually exclusive since there are occasions where the possibility of exit aids voice How transferable to political/ societal dynamics?    H. argued explicitly that the voice and exit strategies could be applied to political organisations and systems review of these applications by Dowding et al.(2000) suggests that while H.’s model mostly used as suggestive labels rather than systematic empirical test + conceptual weaknesses (esp. ‘loyalty’ which Barry (1974) called ‘an ad hoc equation filler’; lack of distinction between individual & collective voice & exit) but: frames complicated relation between stability and change and the role of action and inaction in this+ widening the analysis of participation beyond elites and linking up with debates on ‘civil society’, ‘social capital’, ‘mass mobilisation’ and ‘trust’ in transition/consolidation Extension by Hirschman (1993)  H. himself extended categories to describe/analyse the collapse of the GDR, comparing/linking the private, individual strategies of the ‘Ausreiser’ (‘exiters’) with the more public, active reactions of the ‘Bleiber’ (‘stayers’) of the huge demonstrations in Leipzig, Dresden, etc. ==> how good a case? too exceptional; mass exit became an option and exit was not ‘corrective’ in H.’s original sense Application to CEE:  1) 2) 3) 4) 5) Greskovits (1998): explanation of lower level in CEE of mass protest compared to Latin America (‘political patience’): socio-economic differences between the regions (+ social costs of transition) legacy of socialism: lack of organisational capacity for mass protest and the population’s lack of experience of violent challenges to the social order continued role of the state in preserving essential welfare and important subsidies expanded role of ‘exit’ as an alternative to voice in the resort to ‘informalism’ especially in economic behaviour channelling of ‘voice’ into institutional political channels (‘protest voting’ for esp. nationalist-populist parties and in referenda rather than strikes or demonstrations) ==> But: 1) Greskovits does not evaluate the impact of the CEE types of exit and voice on the ‘re-equilibration’ (G.Ekiert’s term) of the system, which was Hirschman’s preoccupation 2) ‘political opportunity structure’ not sufficiently highlighted as a crucial variable explaining types of exit and voice (Szabo 1996) 3) need for differentiation in time and place 4) question clear-cut distinction between LA/SE and CEE/FSU Cycles of (De-)Mobilisation ?    Karl & Schmitter (1996) argue (LA/SE) that mass ‘demobilisation’ after a ‘mobilised’ period of revolutionary activity involving regime change is an ‘almost universal fact’ ‘masses’ were involved in strikes or demonstrations in most CEE countries in 1988-90 (transition), but scale and frequency of such politically motivated activity have declined in most areas since (consolidation); instead: partial re-channelling into institutional participation periods of ‘re-mobilisation’ (largely non-violent) : in response to economic crisis, tough government measures, electoral fraud etc. ‘Repertoire of contention’ (C.Tilly) in CEE: Voice: - strikes - demonstrations - campaigns - protest voting (link to populism)  Exit: - permanent emigration - temporary or internal migration - ‘informalism’ in economic and political activity: 1) tax evasion, street trading, illegal employment, asset stripping, capital flight, criminal activity, corruption, mafia gangs, drugs, etc. 2) abstention from voting (or is this voice?), political apathy, etc. ==> Which of these means are corrective, or simply destabilising? ==> relationship to voting behaviour/party system unclear  The Broader Context: The ‘Civil Society’ Debate    intellectual origins of the concept: resistance to the State became widespread in the ‘Enlightenment’ (18th century) as a sphere of autonomy limiting the scope of absolute monarchy (intellectuals, entrepreneurs); check on power revived in Eastern Europe (+ to some extent LA) in 1970s as an autonomous sphere of moral/intellectual resistance to the ‘totalitarian’ state (Michnik, Havel, etc.); not necessarily conducive to democratic politics Defining ‘civil society’:  ‘networks of formal and informal associations that mediate between individual actors and the state; these networks may function for good or for evil’ (Bermeo) (literature of the 1970s: discussion of ‘interest groups’, ‘popular organisations’ included discussion of overly active society harming democracy’; Hirschman et al.: ‘a mixture of alert and inert citizens, or even an alternative of involvement and withdrawal, may actually serve democracy better than total, permanent activism or total apathy’ (1970); dense organisational network can facilitate extremist mobilisation/collapse of democracy (Weimar Germany, fascist Italy)) ==> is economic activity included? ==> distinction from politics/state not always clear (e.g. development into parties or members moving into parties) ==> more than NGOs, but where to stop? ==> measured against ideal-type when pointing to ‘lack’ in CEE/FSU? Footnote: related debate about ‘social capital’: Stiglitz’s Critique of ‘Washington Consensus’ good analysis of shortcomings in the Russian case (esp. privatisation schemes)  emphasis on: 1) social and organisational capital as the ‘glue’ for market economy; trust: has to be created over time and from below’ 2) decentralisation not centralisation ensures more transparency and accountability ==>BUT: How realistic are these suggestions? Where to go from here? ==>BUT: problematic comparison of China and Russia  Transition vs. Consolidation  - -   basic def.: consolidation is the transformation of democratic rules and institutions into regular, accepted and predictable patterns ‘two-turnover-test’ (electoral alternation) as a baseline for transition or consolidation (Huntington) process by which democracy becomes ‘the only game in town’ (Przeworski) ‘habituation phase’ (Rustow): growing confidence in and practice of democratic rules and norms & development of political parties linking elites & masses blurred distinction between transition and consolidation despite attempt for more precision end point unclear: when is democratisation complete? What makes for democratic consolidation?      electoral turnover? agreement on state/nation (‘national unity’) lasting elite pact or elite turnover? mass mobilisation at the outset of transition (Bunce) or continuous mass involvement? consolidation of party system? Linz and Stepan (1996)  - Three dimensions for assessing democratic consolidation: Behavioural Attitudinal Constitutional Five Conditions of Consolidation: - civil society - political society - rule of law - functioning state bureaucracy - institutionalised economic society  Alternative definition (Schedler, 1998)      preventing democratic breakdown (key!) preventing erosion completing democracy deepening democracy organising democracy Political Parties:  1) 2) 3) 4) Typology of parties: mass parties: arising from a mass movement and/or dependent on a large mass membership, many of whom are not active, and having regional & local organisations cadre parties: often arising out of parliamentary fractions, relying on small activist membership catch-all parties : large parties aiming at broadening their natural constituency to capture the centre by minimising divisive ideology cartel parties (Katz & Mair): elite-dominated parties which collude as a group to manage government, parliament and elections in their interest Role of Parties in the Democratic Process: mediate between state (government, parliament) and society (voters);  articulate interests of particular groups and aggregate them into a programme to be presented to the electorate  ultimate objective is government (to form it, take part in a coalition, or influence it in debate and legislation); hence: leadership recruitment function  informational and mobilising roles (increasing public awareness of political issues, setting the agenda, stimulating activism)  when forming part of a stable system they can ensure greater predictability and discipline (‘lock-in effect’) ==> how important are political parties in transition/ consolidation? ==> how effective? ==> how stable? ==> how representative?  How different are post-communist parties? (Mair) distinct post-communist democratisation (near-absence of civil society; more complex reform process; delayed emergence of party systems)  different type of electorate (more open, volatile and uncertain; no clear cleavage structures, top-down parties/’sofa parties’)  different context of competition (short-term interests of elites, ‘institutional incentives towards instability’, openness of competition)  different pattern of competition (adversarial elites, majoritarian rather than consensual style of politics; ‘catch-allparties’/populism) ==> exaggeration of difference? measured against ideal-type (e.g. Lipset/Rokkan, 1967)?  Attempts at explaining variation:  - Prior regime type: Kitschelt et al.: 3 types of communist system: 1) national-accommodative (Pol. Hung.); 2) bureaucratic-authoritarian (GDR, Cz.); 3) patrimonial (Bulg., Rom.) producing different conditions for development of parties i.e. where the Communist Party was ready to negotiate early and/or seen as pronational, it retained more popularity and was able to transform itself into a social-democratic party (Pol.: SLD; Hung.: MSZP; Lith.: LDDP; Slovenia: SLSD) where the CP was seen as anti-national and authoritarian communism was more decisively rejected (Est., Lat., Cz.) (NB: pre-comm. trad. shapes expectations, organisation) where CP was seen as pro-national but was deeply embedded in corrupt authoritarian networks it managed to retain initial control of transition, reforming slowly and with difficulty (Bulg.: BSP; Rom.: NSF > PDSR; Alb.: ASP; Serbia: SPS) - - - ==> But: tricky distinctions of prior regime types ==> But: overemphasis on CP contd.       Pre-Socialist Political Traditions Stateness issues (ethnic parties: stabilising or destabilising?) Party-formation strategies and resources Institutional factors (parliamentary system, electoral system) Party laws and funding Proximity to Western party families and external support