“U
nlike in mainland Tanzania, the struggle for political power in the islands of Zanzibar has largely been shaped by the politics of identity based on race. Despite a common language (Swahili), religion (Islam), and a high rate of intermarriage among the islands’ multi-racial communities, racial labels of “Africans” vs. “Arabs” are widely used during election season, and interethnic conflicts often culminate in political stand-offs and violence. Why do Zanzibar’s elites politicize racial identities, particularly at election time? Why have competitive multiparty elections in 1995, 2000, and 2005 resulted not in strengthening democracy, but rather in derailing it? At issue in Zanzibar is not merely the quest for political power by leaders seeking the legitimacy to rule, but also their need to reconstruct state identity along racial lines and to re-negotiate state sovereignty vis-à-vis the Union with Tanzania. Unlike in the mainland, the challenge to Zanzibar is not just to hold free and fair elections, but also to design a political system that ensures broad-based representation of all relevant groups and provides incentives for coalition-building, moderation, and compromise. There is also a need to bring ethno-racial considerations and their implications to the negotiation table. —Bernadeta Killian, June 28, 2007
”
Identity Politics in Zanzibar and Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in Tanzania
Dr. Bernadeta Killian Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow June 28, 2007
Please note that the views expressed in this presentation represent the opinions and analysis of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Endowment of Democracy.
United Republic of Tanzania
One unitary republic, two governments Composed of two formerly sovereign states: Tanganyika and Zanzibar 1961: Tanganyika gains independence from the British 1963: Zanzibar gains independence 1964: Revolution in Zanzibar April 26, 1964: Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar Zanzibar enjoys semi-autonomous status, exercises its sovereignty over all domestic and non-union matters Zanzibar non-union matters: setting up national and budgetary policies on such sectors as agriculture, tourism, health, education, water, communication, industry, etc. Union Matters: Foreign affairs, defense and security, police, emergency powers, citizenship, external borrowing and trade, mineral oil resources, higher education, court of appeal, registration of political parties, etc.
Basic Data
Tanzania:945,087sq. km Tanzania: per-capita income: US$340 (2006) Zanzibar: per-capita US$327 (2005) Tanzania (total pop.): 34,443,603 Zanzibar: 981,754 people Unguja Island (60%) & Pemba Island (40%)
I. Introduction Tanzania: Unity in Diversity
Tanzania is renowned for its long-established civic peace & unity among its diverse ethnic, religion & racial groups
It has been a peace-broker & model of national cohesion in E. Africa The use of Swahili language has been a binding thread In the case of Zanzibar, a common religion (Islam) and a high rate of intermarriage have unified the state‟s diverse ethno-racial groups
Why is Zanzibar Different?
Struggle for the control of the state has been intense, deadly & zero-sum Unlike in mainland Tanzania, the struggle for political power in Zanzibar has largely been shaped by the politics of identity on the basis of race. Racial labels of „Africans‟ vs. „Arabs‟ are widely used in the context of political contestation for power. This presentation seeks to understand why.
Why do political elites in Zanzibar politicize racial identities, particularly at election time?
Politicized Racial Identity Explained
Control of the State
Identity of the State (Arab vs. African)
Sovereignty of the State
(Zanzibar vs. Union)
II: Historical Context The Shaping of Political Identities
Over the centuries, Zanzibar attracted several immigrant groups, including:
Mainland Africans Persians Arabs Europeans Comorians Indians
(3rd-4th century) (10th century) (11th century) (16th century) (18th Century) (19th century)
Intermarriage between Persians & Africans led to the emergence of Shirazi Africans
The Shaping of Political Identities
Shirazi Africans Africans
Mainland Africans
Shirazi Africans = the Hadimu, Tumbatu and Pemba Shirazi Mainland Africans = Africans of recent arrival from the African hinterland (slaves, freed slaves and their descendants, and migrant laborers) (latecomers)
1948 census: the Shirazi (55.8%), Mainland African (19.8%), Arabs(16.9%), Indians(6.2%), Comorians (1.1%),Europeans (0.1%),Other (0.1%)
Colonial Economy and the Shaping of Political Identities
British
Arabs
Indians
Africans
Shaping of Political Identities (cont’d)
Politics deeply divided along ethno-racial lines African Association, Shirazi Association, Arab Association, Indian Association Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP): Arab-led
• Formed in 1955 • Support base: Arabs, Pemba & Tumbatu Shirazi
Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP):
• Formed 1957 • Support base: Mainland Africans & Unguja Shirazi (Hadimu)
Zanzibar and Pemba People‘s Party (ZPPP):
• Formed in 1959 • Support base: Pemba Shirazi
State Succession & State Identity in Zanzibar
Shirazi chieftainships until 16th century
Arab Rule 1744-1963 (219 years) British Rule 1890-1963 (73 years)
ZNP/ZPPP government
Dec 10, 1963–Jan 12, 1964 (33 days)
Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar
Jan 12, 1964–April 26, 1964 (3 ½ months)
E. African Federation?
As the state has changed hands, so too has the identity of the state changed.
III: Democratization and & Political Identities
Third wave of democratization brings to the fore suppressed competing diversities Resurgence of identity politics: Recurrent feature of new democracies in Latin America, Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and former USSR Group/ethnic identities: determining criterion for inclusion or exclusion in the polity in deeply divided societies. „Who belongs here?‟ has become a buzz word in democratic competition in what Horowitz calls „severely divided societies‟ (Horowitz, 1985)
Democratization & Political Identities
As opposed to cultural and market-based identities, political identities are those that are legally enforced and institutionally reproduced in the process of state formation (Mahmood Mamdani, 2001) Plural identities emerge from situations of stress, in which identity is threatened, and when consequences of domination by another group are perceived to be enormous (Horowitz,1985,1999; Rothchild,1997) Political identities: instrumental rather than primordial due to their dynamics, situational and pragmatic nature.
„Election-centric conception‟ of „consolidation‟ phase as Harbeson (1999) calls it, is problematic Even after three consecutive elections, democracy cannot be regarded as having been consolidated in Zanzibar. Democratic consolidation should go beyond the „democratic process,‟ which focuses largely on the holding of multi-party competitive elections and focuses on what Dankwart Rustow (1970) calls “habituation” Guillermo O‟Donnell (1996) refers to “a close fit between formal rules and behaviour.”
IV: Multi-Party Democracy & Resurgence of Identity Politics (1992–present)
Old political divisions and memories come to the fore. Two major political parties emerge—CUF and CCM CCM (or Chama cha Mapinduzi)
• is a merger of ASP and Mainland party Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) • fully represents the interests of the old ASP • Electoral support: the same as in pre-independence elections • CCM stronghold: Unguja and Africans
Civic United Front (CUF)
• appears to replicate the previous ZNP-ZPPP alliance • Electoral support: the same as in pre-independence elections • CUF stronghold: Pemba and among non-Africans
CCM versus CUF
Votes earned by CCM and CUF presidential candidates in Unguja and Pemba (1995–2005)
100 80
1995 2005 1995 2005
60
1995
2005
40 20 0
1995 2005
1995 2005
CCM votes in Unguja
CCM votes CUF votes in CUF votes in in Pemba Unguja Pemba
Politicization of Racial Identities
The return of multiparty politics has revived unresolved questions concerning control of the state in Zanzibar, its identity, and its sovereignty. Politicized racial identities during campaigns: ‗Africans‘ vs. ‗Arabs‘
For the regime in power, democratization can as well lead to losing control of the state, its African identity, and the possibility of being ruled by what they find as being the remnants of the Sultanate oligarchy. The state sovereignty is also at stake given the fact that the policy of the major opposition party is to revisit the Union question (form and content).
Politicization of Racial Identities CUF Campaign Speeches
Elections would lead to “the end of a blackman‟s rule.”—CUF leader, campaign rally at Kibandamaiti, 21 October, 1995
“The African-led Revolutionary government has been far more brutal than the Arab aristocracy…and that people‟s living standards were better off before the Revolution than it is today.”—CUF presidential candidate, campaign rally at Makunduchi, September 17, 2005
CUF Campaign Issues (cont‘d)
Question legitimacy of the 1964 Revolution Cherish Zanzibar‘s 1963 independence Pay reparations or return confiscated property to pre-revolution owners Convict those engaged in arbitrary killings and torture during and after the revolution Advocate for a federal system, 3-government structure Suspend and review additional Union matters Promote ―equal rights for all,‘ including equality in development
Politicization of Racial Identities CCM Campaign Issues
―The Zanzibar population is predominantly black; the colour of indigeneous Africans…There is a need to ensure that the great 1964 Revolution remains for ever and that Zanzibar remains African. That is the only way Africans as the majority Zanzibaris can determine their own fate and the destiny of Zanzibar‖ ―CUF is a party representing Arab interests and voting for it would lead to the restoration of the Sultanate, and the subsequent break-up of the Union.‖ CUF is portrayed to be a Muslim party ―with an intent of establishing an Islamic state.‖ —Omar Mapuri (former CCM deputy chief minister, minister of education in Zanzibar, and former Union minister), Zanzibar Revolution: Achievements and Prospects, 1997
CCM Campaign Issues
Praise & protect the 1964 Revolution ‗Revolution forever‘ Support the Union and two-government structure (formal CCM policy) Bring about development Maintain peace and unity
Consequences of the Politicization of Racial Identities
Political conflicts, political stand-offs, violence, lack of social and civic peace. Three rounds of elections (in 1995, 2000, and 2005) do not deepen democracy, but rather, derail it. 1995 and 2000 elections deemed not free and fair, due to voter intimidation, voter fraud, rigging and partisanship of the electoral body. 2005 elections: anomalies in vote counting
Consequences of the Politicization of Racial Identities
Sporadic violence during election season (2000). Mass demonstrations lead to death of at least 30 people Freedom of speech constrained by the government Two Reconciliation Accords between CCM and CUF (1999 & 2001) breached „Ethnicization of state apparatus‟
V: Implications of Competing Political Identities on Democratic Consolidation
I: Elections become an instrument to maintain state power • Voters are excluded based on their appearance, area of origin, party affiliation (‗Wapemba‘ versus ‗Wabara‘) • Security forces as voters—‗voter importation‘
Registration of Security Forces
Turnout in Registration Centers in Central District with Military Camps Nearby
Registration center Ubago School Military Camp Ubago TPDF Estimated Voters 441 Registered voters 1402 % of registered voters 317.91
Machui School
Posta Kaepwani Tunguu School Marumbi School Dungabweni School
Machui JKU & FFU
Unguja Ukuu Navy (KMKM) Tunguu Brigades Marumbi KMKM Dunga JKU & TPDF Fire
696
1268 520 561 1520
1060
2076 556 876 2106
152.3
163.72 106.92 156.15 138.55
Jendele School
Cheju School Bambi School Sec.
Jendele JKU
Cheju Prison Bambi JKU
907
971 1336
1366
1163 2125
152.81
119.77 159.06
Source: TEMCO (2006) The 2005 Presidential and General Elections in Zanzibar, p. 216
Implications of Competing Political Identities
(cont’d)
II: CUF‘s status as the leading opposition party in Tanzania is at risk Unlike other opposition parties in Tanzania, CUF has a strong social base in Zanzibar, owing to a perceived common history and a collective sense of exclusion However, politicization of CUF as a ―Pemba‖ party, ―Islamic‖ party, and ―Arab‖ party, makes it difficult for CUF to expand its social base to the mainland. All other opposition parties are in decline in terms of electoral support.
CUF versus Other Parties:
Union Parliamentary Seats
CCM versus Opposition
Parliamentary Elections in Tanzania (1995–2005)
Paliamentary Seats (%)
90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1995 2000 Election Year 2005 CCM Opposition
Implications of Competing Political Identities
(cont’d)
III: Ambivalent popular support for institutions of democracy
• ―Unquestionable embrace of democratic procedures‖ by a significant segment of the citizenry is a crucial element of consolidation (Diamond et al., 1997) • Unlike in mainland Tanzania, citizens‘ support for multi-party democracy in Zanzibar is comparatively low.
Popular Support for Democracy in Mainland Tanzania vs. Zanzibar (March 1999)
PARTY SYSTEM TANZANIA MAINLAND ZANZIBAR
51.5%
Multi-party system (299)
54.4%
(247)
40.9%
(52)
40.4%
Single-party system
37.4% (170)
8.1%
51.2% (65)
7.9%
(235)
8.1%
No difference
(47)
100%
(37)
100%
(10)
100%
TOTAL
(581)
(454)
(127)
Popular Support for Democracy Mainland Tanzania vs. Zanzibar
Tanzanians’ Support for Party Systems
(March 2006)
PARTY SYSTEM
TANZANIA
63.3% (857) 27.9% (369)
MAINLAND
65.5%
ZANZIBAR
55.3%
Multi-party system Single-party system
(690)
25.4% (267) 9.1% (96) 100%
(166)
34% (102) 10.7% (32) 100%
9.4%
No difference
(127) 100%
TOTAL
(1353)
(1053)
(300)
Implications of Competing Political Identities
Questions Would Agree Somewhat Agree
2.4 (3)
(cont’d)
TOTAL
Racial Tolerance Among Zanzibaris (1999 Survey)
Would Disagree
21.3 (27)
Depends on his/her decision
16.5 (21)
Son marry from different racial group
59.8 (76)
100 (127)
Daughter marry from different racial group
Son marry from different political party Daughter marry from different political party
56.7 (72)
4.7 (6)
22.8 (29)
15.8 (20)
100 (127)
51.2 (65)
4.7 (6)
27.6 (35)
16.6 (21)
100 (127)
59.1 (75)
4.7 (6)
25.2 (32)
11 (14)
100 (127)
Son marry from another religion
If your MP is of different race/color
11.8 (15)
4.7 (6)
68.5 (87)
15 (19)
100 (127)
Don’t mind
14.2 (18) 17.3
Somewhat mind
7.1 (9) 8.7
Would mind
77.2 (98) 71.7
Don’t know
1.6 (2) 2.4
TOTAL
100 (127) 100
If your MP is of different religion
(22)
(11)
(91)
(3)
(127)
Implications of Competing Political Identities
(cont’d)
Respondents’ Support for Democratic Institutions & Processes
QUESTIONS All political parties be allowed to hold public meetings Agree 58.3% (74) Somewhat Agree 7.1 (9) Disagree 24.4 (31) Other 10.3 (13) Total 100 (127)
Government critics should not contest for national leadership
Private-owned media should be restricted Only CCM should be allowed to rule
28.3 (36)
3.1 (4)
59.8 (76)
8.7 (11)
100 (127)
18.9 (24) 55.9 (71)
11.8 (15) 0.8 (1)
57.5 (73) 39.4 (50)
11.8 (15) 4 (6)
100 (127) 100 (127)
Implications of Competing Political Identities
(cont’d)
IV: Rigidity of Zanzibari Voters
As a result of politicized ethno-racial identities, it has been difficult for a third party or mainland-based parties to gain electoral support Electoral campaigns are avenues largely for enhancing party loyalty among members, rather than recruiting new members, e.g. role of party youth wings is to guard the meetings against ‗intruders‘ (non-members)
Community/group pressure to make people attend only those meetings that are organized by their parties
Implications of Competing Political Identities
(cont’d)
V: The State of the Union
Increased assertiveness on the part of Zanzibar government for more political space and autonomy from the Union government.
As political competition gets tougher, the need for strong control over coercive instruments of the state becomes necessary. In May 2004, the Revolutionary government of Zanzibar outlined 15 Union matters to be removed from the Union list, including oil and natural gas, international relations, intelligence, police, etc.
VI: Conclusions & Recommendations
Consensus, negotiations, accommodation, and compromise become difficult. Rule of law and good governance become jeopardized Recognizing variations and contrasts between these two partner states is critically important Bring ethno-racial issues and their implications to the negotiation table Building and nurturing incentive mechanisms of dialogue and reconciliations should be made a high priority.
Sunrise in Zanzibar