Russian and East European politics

Russian and East European politics 17. Dissent and dissidence I: definitions and origins Katya McDonagh fedoreae@tcd.ie Political context: 1960s-1970s Brezhnev’s rule: Everything was ‘done’ in the name of developed socialism Domination by a single party which monopolised institutional and ideological life Favouritism and nepotism Corruption: ‘everyone wants to live well’ Sad realities of the Soviet life over which Brezhnev and his generation steadily lost the capacity to CONTROL what went on in the country  1966 – Sinyavsky and Daniel trial       A highly significant trend in quite a different direction Two writers, Sinyavsky and Daniel, published abroad under false names and were put on trial for anti-Soviet agitation in February 1966 For the first time writers were put on trial for their writings International criticism Nevertheless, two and half years later (1968) the USSR invaded Czechoslovakia Protests in Moscow Emergence of dissent and dissidence The most significant political development in the late 1960s in Soviet politics (and it spread to EE)  ‘Dissent’ and ‘dissidence’ - different meanings: Dissent – a general sense of disagreement Especially in EE: ‘they pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work’ Indicated reduced legitimacy for the regime BUT: politically, did not include ACTION or DIRECT CHALLENGE OF THE REGIME Was CONTAINED by the authorities  Dissidence: ‘other-thinker’ – ‘inakomyslyashchii’      Dissent of a different order Not simply expression of dissatisfaction with the regime but a deliberate REJECTION of the regime The very opposite of joining the Communist Party Dissidence as OPTING OUT Involved concrete ACTION even if there were clear dangers How could dissidence arise: some explanations Regime had total control: Schools Mass media Civic organizations  Totalitarianism as a closed system: only one set of ideas could circulate in society  Processes of socialization and education  Apparatus of terror (especially under Stalin, Ceausescu, Hoxha)  Hadn’t regime become LESS REPRESSIVE?  Hadn’t society become richer so there was LESS TO COMPLAIN ABOUT?  How could dissidence arise?     More dissidents among best-educated younger citizens Essentially political development – the only REAL politics in the communist system Various sources of dissidence and dissent (Hill 1990): religion, ethnic identity, contacts with the West, the family, changes and contradictions ‘above’ BUT: still doesn’t explain why DISSENT turned into DISSIDENCE in the late 1960s Strands of resistance (Sakwa 1998) 1. Idea of genuine Marxism-Leninism – the system had the capacity to be regenerated Roy Medvedev’s ‘reformism’ – theoretical limitations 2. Religion as a counter-ideology Soviet Muslims (especially in Central Asia) Lithuania and Poland – Catholic Church Baptists in Ukraine Russian Orthodox Church – a revival in the 1970s Often Soviet religion was a mixture of belief and nationalism Solzhenitsyn – a fusion of Orthodox belief and Russian patriotism Strands of resistance 3. National dissent (linguistic, cultural and other sub-groups) Caucasus (especially in Armenia) Crimean Tatars Islam in Central Asia Jews Volga Germans Russian national consciousness including moderate Russian nationalism Strands of resistance 4. Liberal ideology Belief in the values of liberal democracy Transition to a Western-style democracy Ideas of social justice, individual liberty and economic development Andrei Sakharov: one of the successors to the 19th century Westernisers Some explanations Context of broad changes in communist societies and longer-term political developments  Reason 1: Great success story of communism = education + rising wealth Society became more urban, more complex, more sophisticated, wealthier, more educated How to stop people thinking differently? Dissidence as a product of the regime’s success  Some explanations Reason 2: The risks of challenging the system were less severe than earlier Less risks by the mid-1960s: terror has been abandoned as everyday political weapon Compare: regime under Stalin, Ceausescu Less likely to be tortured and then shot More likely to be arrested and imprisoned Not pleasant, but perhaps worth the risk In the post-Stalin era, the calculus of risk had changed  Some explanations Reason 3: The calculus of opportunity had also changed From Khrushchev onwards, regime became more pragmatic It wanted RESULTS It was prepared to listen to advice and to discuss issues Perception that the regime might listen to alternative approaches to problems  Some explanations Reason 4: International political climate had also changed Technological developments (‘Comrade Transistor’) Relaxation of tension (Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence; Brezhnev’s détente) More contact with the outside world Foreign correspondents were allowed ‘in’ and had ‘protection’: ‘If you hear that I have died, you will know I have been killed by the secret police’ The regime was sensitive to world opinions  Next lecture: dissidents, ideas and impacts       The politics of opposition in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union The Politics of Anti-Politics: Adam Michnik and Czeslow Milosz Vaclav Havel: The power of the powerless Opposition issues The dilemmas of dissidence Impacts and significance of the dissident movements