Politics, Society and Models of Democracy
Alistair Cole
Politics and Society in Europe
European politics are the politics of liberal democracy? In a formal sense, it is difficult to contest…. The EU itself acts as a legal order that embeds democratic institutions in its member-states The new accession states of 2004 and 2007 countries had each to meet strict criteria – the Copenhagen criteria – to be able to join in the European Union. European liberal democracies are constitutional political regimes: i.e. that political processes are regularised by reference to respect for duly established rules and constitutional norms.
Politics and Society
The nations considered in this lecture are, by and large, the nations comprising the EU These countries are „most similar‟ in that they belong to broadly the same family of political regimes and have intense interaction with each other. Their fundamental similarity, in many respects, allow us to compare the importance of different institutional structures, or to weigh the causal force of specific cleavages. These countries operate under very similar constraints, notably their membership of the European Union, which weighs in an increasingly important manner on each of them. Comparative Politics: middle level analysis. Not really metanarratives of power or domination Middle level research objects: institutions, elites, parties, leadership, electorates, policy sectors…. Generic, cross cutting themes such as Europeanisation. Operationalising new forms of comparative analysis less based on country as unit of analysis, more on variables.
Politics and Society
In all European Union countries, the ability of national governments to control policy-making has diminished, as a result of the growing influence of the EU over economic and financial policy, and – especially, as a result of globalisation of international economic and financial exchanges. The countries of continental Europe each have their own political cultures/state traditions, which mediate the impact of globalised exchanges and norms. The country unit of analysis retains pertinence. Debates about convergence and national policy styles remain vitally important.
Regime Typologies The ‘loss of clusters’
Traditional comparativists sought to distinguish between different types of regime: that is clusters of regimes which share sufficient characteristics to enable them to be considered as belonging to a group of similar regimes. Comparative politics traditionally operated a tripartite division of the world into: liberal democracies, Communist regimes, „third world‟ states (this last being the most unsatisfactory of the three). None of these categories is satisfactory. The traditional tryptic has been challenged by the evolution of history, not least the collapse of communism in 1989-1991. Unit of analysis less likely to be single country, more identifying explanatory variables across countries
Liberal Democracy aka Gordon Smith, 1986
political competition for the highest offices of state, as expressed by competing political parties, the free interplay of interests, and an acceptance of political and economic pluralism alternation in power ( or at least the theoretical possibility of it). recognition of a boundary between the state and civil society, implying freedom of the media. (liberal democracy) recognition of the rights of legal opposition. a recognition of constitutionalism: i.e. that political processes are regularised by reference to respect for duly established rules and constitutional norms. This might take the form of a written constitution, or an unwritten form; but of greater importance than this is the extent to which each branch of government theoretically operates within the strict parameters of legal rules, safeguard against arbitrary government.
Limitations and criticism
This classic definition of liberal democracy is rather a formalistic one; it does not consider, by itself, whether democracies are capable of providing effective government, of delivering the goods. It is one based on a model of competitive elitism: alternative elites stand by ready to conduct the affairs of government. It is one that requires a minimal democratic participation. Too much participation can be destabilising; in one version of this (Lipset and Bendix) democratic stability requires limited participation. The claim sustained by the liberal democracies to allow for the free interplay of democratic forces has in most cases proved accurate: this can be measured by the fact that most of the core 20 liberal democracies have at some time managed an alternation in power. Moreover, it has been rare for any one government to remain in power for more than ten years
Limitations and criticism 2
that the liberties safeguarded by liberal democracy are excessively negative and formalistic, designed primarily to safeguard existing property relations that liberal democracy has proved intolerant of genuine attempts at revolutionary change: any attempt fundamentally to challenge the norms of capitalism, e.g, has invited a reversion away from democracy towards dictatorship- such as in Chile with the overthrow of Allende's Marxist government in 1973. Reverse: attempts to impose democracy through arms, as in Irak. Huntingdon: crisis of civilizations and imposing democracy through the barrel of a gun. S. Huntingdon, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 1991
that the notion of pluralism - i.e. a dispersal of power throughout the political, social and economic systems - is a myth; that the pluralist idea of fair interaction between competing interests is erroneous, with the odds heavily stacked in favour of those possessing capital; and that the idea of democracy itself is a misnomer, since power is exercised by a small procapitalist elite.
Six Models of European Democracy
D. Held, Models of democracy,1987, 1996, 2005 Held 1: Athenian Democracy Small communities, direct participation & sovereignty (polis) over all public affairs Office short term, by election, lot & rotation Women & slaves excluded Low participation Domination by demagogues & factions as/ more likely than „deliberation‟; instability
Held 2: Competitive elitist democracy (Majoritarian Model)
Theoretical roots in Weber & Schumpeter Influenced by the protective model of democracy; dominant 1945-70s – rather similar to the model outlined above Key feature: competition between alternative elites Governments are strong within parliaments, but subordinate to elections, and hence parliaments, over time. This is particularly apposite to describe British democracy. Participation limited and intermittent. Too much particpipation destabilising (Lipset and Bendix)
Held 3: Legal Democracy (Consensual model)
Majoritarianism strongly constrained by the law/the „rule of law‟ Separation (sharing) of powers emphasised Minimum role for state in society Markets and free trade should be given fullest possible scope Epitomised by l.C20th „neo-liberal‟ trend
Held 4: Participatory Democracy
Inspired by developmental democracy & in C20th by Macpherson & Carole Pateman A knowledgeable, participating citizenry is essential Participation in regulating the state, local community/ies and the workplace Party elites directly accountable to members Need for consistency between power structures in public and private spheres. Democracy can not thrive of structures of civil society remain authoritarian.
Beyond Held: Social Democracy
Dahrendorf: 1945-1980 welfare states added a substantive (material) basis to the largely procedural basis of liberal democracy. Democracy consists in a set of rights and duties, including expectations of welfare rights. Democracy is a form of social citizenship. Bobbio: „Rolling back‟ the welfare state implies rolling back/undermining democracy itself R. Dahrendorf, After Social Democracy, 1980 N. Bobbio, „Liberalism old and new‟ in: idem. The Future of Democracy, 1987
C. Crouch, Postdemocracy, 2004
Early C21st world-historical peak for democracy, in terms of its geographical range But there are many problems in established democracies. Everywhere there is increasing abstention, dissatisfaction with performance of democratic regimes, a challenge to the effectiveness of democratic regimes There is also, specifically, a problem with American democracy, which is bound to impact upon European countries. US leadership of democratic world established in the 1930s, on the basis of the Roosevelt Welfare state, when most of Europe turned Right. But since the 1980s, USA has changed fundamentally: it no longer represents value-based, or normative leadership. For Crouch, post-Democracy is NOT non-democratic, nor antidemocratic, but it is satisfied with residual democratic and welfare rights. Individual market-based economic rights have the primacy over social or political rights In post-democracy, social movements are less vibrant, especially those of Labour,,, and the trade unions are marginal actors
Post-Democracy (suite)
unions are marginalised State as policeman → more prominent role for the state in regulating everyday lives, a more instrusive state Wealth gap grows; taxation less redistributive with moves to the global economy The poor return to pre-democratic condition of nonparticipation: in the US, this is flagrant, but is also evidence in western European democracies, where electoral registration has declined. Poor do not register; either because they do not have a home, or because they fear the State (for taxation purposes, e.g.). The nature of political communication is changed in an age of mediatisation and soundbites. Genuine discussion in the public space fades away.
Lijphart‟s Majoritarian and Consensual Democracies Lijphart, A. (1984). Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in twenty-one countries, Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries.
Lijphart‟s Majoritarian and Consensual Democracies
Executive-parties cluster Concentration of executive power in a single party majority cabinet/broad coalitions Domination of Executive-Legislative relations by the Executive/ an active legislature influencing policy The prevalence of a two-party system/ a multi-party system A majoritarian electoral system(first past the post or two ballot)/ a proportional electoral system A pluralist interest group system, with „free-for –all‟ bargaining/ a corporatist style pattern of interest mediation
Federal-Unitary cluster
Unitary and centralised government / devolved or federal government Unicameral concentration of legislative power/powerful second chamber representing societal interests Flexible constitutions/written constitutions Legislative sovereignty re the constitution/constitutional arbitration in a system of shared and separated powers Executive-dependent Central Banks/independent monetary authorities.
Lijphart’s 1999
study increased also addressed the issue of substantive outcomes. He considered which, of majoritarian or consensual democracies, performed better in relation to: A) Economic performance and B) Democratic quality. Lijphart‟s main conclusion was that consensus/negotiation democracy pole is far superior to the majoritarian, „winner-takes all‟ one. AL found that there was little difference between Consensual and Majoritarian democracies in relation to economic performance. But that consensual, nonmajoritarian democracies ensured a much higher democratic quality.
Summary
European democracies, for Lijphart, could be divided according to these two poles. In practice, individual democracies would lie somewhere between the two extremes. Britain, for example, as the archetype of the Westminster model, was clearly the representative of the first camp; more divided countries, such as the Netherlands, of the second camp. This model has long been very influential, as a basic way of differentiating between European democracies. There are variants on this. Lijphart‟s concept of consociationalism was also very influential for many years. According to the consociational model, divided societies – such as the Netherlands or Belgium – could nonetheless support effective and consensual political systems, as a result of elite-level compromises between the main pillars represented in a society. In a society divided by issues of religious identity, for example, elite level accommodation ensured broad support for the system. The consensus model ensures a positive logic of negotiation and compromise; whereas the Winner takes all system is inherently conflictual and negative sum. The Lijphart model was a critique of the pretensions of the Westminster model of democracy and celebrated the fact that negotiation, compromise and coalition produced not only fairer, but also better politics.
A CRITIQUE OF LIJPHART
One such critique was that of Paul Penning. The first criticism: that this model betrayed the empirical reality, as much in Majoritarian systems, as in Consensual ones. TheMajoritarian model did not necessarily produce a winner takes all mentality, because regular alternations in power meant that governments exercised power with caution. Likewise, the negotiated consensual and consociational mechanisms of divided societies did not always succeed in producing a fairer, or more effective politics. The role of institutional incentives could be overstressed in these accounts. In the consociational model, as in Belgium, this has clearly broken down, with territorial elites „repillarising‟ Belgian society.
P. Pennings, „Parliamentary control of the executive in 47 countries‟, paper prepared for the ECPR, April 2000 @: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/cop enhagen/ws10/pennings.PDF
Penning 2
for Penning, Lijphart‟s distinction between Consensus democracy and majoritarian democracy offers a poor statistical explanation of variations in parliamentary control. Lijphart‟s assumption that Westminster systems are characterized by strong governments and weak parliaments, whereas Consensual countries are characterized by strong parliaments & weak governments. But for Penning this is not confirmed by the data analysis. Statistical and case study analysis has shown that the parliamentary control of the government in Consensual democracies is seriously weakened by the majority's duty to support the coalition government.
Penning 3
Penning argued that the Lijphart model exaggerated differences – and explained these overly in relation to institutional, rather than societal arguments. The dichotomous view of there being two types of democracy is highly misleading. Contrary to Lijphart‟s assumptions, strong executives do not automatically imply weak legislatures: this is far too mechanical and assumption, one that relies too much on structure and not enough on agency explanations.
Role of electoral system and coalitions
There have also been criticisms about the role of the electoral system. PR systems can create stalemate and instability, just as easily as they can create compromise and flexibility. On the other hand, „… majoritarian electoral systems and moderate multiparty systems, in particular, tend to generate slightly higher levels of institutional confidence than alternative arrangements' (p.234).” Institutional confidence is maintained because Majoritarian democracy can contribute to rapidly forming and maintaining stable governments”
Novak, 1997
Novak (1997) suggests that in certain circumstances, actionefficiency is essential & will lead to outcome-effectiveness. Political and economic reforms in C-E Europe, esp. in „homogenous‟ countries, leading to „comparative advantage‟ for them Furthermore, major changes of power occur more frequently in Majoritarian democracies … These can be more conducive to political innovation and allow for genuine democratic choice. Majoritarian democracy sees the advantage lying in ability to take decisions and provide firm government. M Novak (1997), „Is There One Best “Model of Democracy”? Efficiency and Representativeness: “Theoretical Revolution” or Democratic Dilemma?‟, Czech Sociological Review, 5,2: 131-157
End of consociationalism?
The original basis of L‟s consensual model of democracy, consociational theory, which stressed elite cooperation in divided societies preventing civil disorder (& even war) has been largely disproved.