Political leadership in Australia: One of a Kind? Lecture for Australian Democracy course, ANU, April 2008 Paul ‘t Hart Today’s key Q: Is there such a thing as ‘vintage Australian political leadership’? Is there something specific about the way in which politicians become party/government leaders, perform their leadership roles, and step down from the leadership? Or do Australian leadership practices simply fit the mould of all established democracies? Underneath today’s Q is a second Q: if Australia’s mode of political leadership is in some way distinctive, how can we study it, and how has it been studied? I will try to say a bit about both issues. But before we get there, we should begin to ask: why bother studying political leaders? Isn’t it enough to study institutions, parties, elections, and governments? Does it really matter ‘who (as in: which individual) governs’? What do you think? [discussion] Political scientists provide a few answers to this issue of relevance: 1. We should not overestimate how much leaders matter for electoral outcomes, but neither can we underestimate it. 2. Political leaders matter more in some polities than in others: authoritarian vs democratic regimes; constitutional powers of key offices within democracies vary 3. Political leaders matter more in some issue areas and situations than in others: in US for example president has much more potential grip on foreign/security policy than on domestic policy. Also, in times of crisis as opposed to ‘ordinary’ situations, people look to their leaders more (and leaders may invoke special legal prerogatives to centralize power temporarily), for ‘meaning-making’, management of collective stress and policy initiative. 4. In the contemporary era of partisan de-alignment and mediatised politics, politics is becoming an increasingly ‘personalised’ affair. Hence: personalist parties; strengthening of leaders position in classical mass or cadre parties; celebrity politics etc. So in today’s democracies, leaders may matter more than ever before. Now to the main question. I have 2 observations to offer and discuss. Observation 1. Australian politics is ‘rough and tumble’ compared to many other established democracies (though milder than Taiwan, Korea). This goes for the nature of parliamentary debate, and therefore the ‘prize fighter qualities’ that every leadership aspirant must (be seen to) possess. Keating’s catalogue of invective was legendary; so was Menzies’ use of condescending haughtiness. But
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it also goes for the kinds of pressures put upon leaders, and the way in which leadership in Australian political parties is gained and lost. Example 1: politics as dogfight. PtH’s own experience with Keating vs Hawke in 1991. Compared to Holland/Sweden, the sheer nakedness of the power struggle and the nature of the invective used was extraordinary. And no exception: Liberal democrats’ ugly record. Fraser’s guerrilla against Gorton and later Snedden; the Peacock-Howard struggle in the Liberals in the 80s. and many example of ugly leadership brawls Example 2: leadership as a dangerous possession. Comparative crossnational research shows up an unusually quick succession rate of Australian political leaders that are perceived not to be doing their job well. Cite data from Bynander/’t Hart 2007. (On the other hand, extreme longevity of and concentration of personal power in leaders who keep tight control of dominant factions and/or keep winning elections, even at the detriment of the party’s longterm viability as a whole, see e.g. Evatt, later Calwell in Labor, and Howard in Libs) Why? a. Ad-hoc cultural explanation: anti-elitism, larrikinism, mateship. No time for deference. Tradition of calling a spade a spade. ‘Robust debate’ in Oz terms may be seen as a shouting match in other cultures. b. Systematic cultural explanation: Hofstede’s scores for Australia: high individuality, low power distance, high masculinity => a recipe for a down to earth, confrontational, masculine style of management/leadership – and critical studies of leadership cultures in Australia by business scholars such as Amanda Sinclair (MBS) bear out this broad brush image. c. Structural explanations Majoritarian vs Westminister democracy: ‘Winner takes all’ vs ‘ Condemned to Compromise’; ‘Opposition as alternative government’ vs ‘Mixed-motive game between governing and non-governing parties’; and ‘Whips system’ vs ‘Multi-party rainbows’ . => in Westminster crucial role of vote maximisation, therefore of polls, therefore of leaders who do well in polls/elections. In Westminster democracies, prize on charisma, not on ‘policy content’, ideological purity etc. AND above all: prize on polarization, fighting etc. When you win, you become PM of most often a single-party government (you will have to contend with intraparty factions, but Rudd is showing that really tough and electorally successful leader can tame them by imposition rather than pandering), disciplined by Whips and with little need to negotiate. [Although in federal Australia and strong-Senate Australia as opposed to unitary and effectively unicameral UK this power of PMs/cabinets is potentially offset by state premiers/governments and Senate controlled by non-governing parties (Senate is NOT chosen on
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majoritarian rulers, hence potentially more parties in it and stringer need for ‘getting along’) . In contrast, in pure PR, multiparty, consensual democracies, there is no direct link between election wins and prime-ministerial power. Everything is mediated by the – sometimes protracted – coalition negotiations that follow elections. You can ‘lose’ the election, yet ‘win’ the coalition negotiations – and vice versa. To get, and keep, multiparty coalitions going requires entirely different leadership skills than those which are prized in Westminster democracies: - against polarization vis a vis the competing party stands obfuscation of interparty differences (at least in non-election periods); - against politicization of issues stand de-politicising them via corporatist or technocratic routes; - against ‘taking as much as my last win allows’ stands ‘ making sure we keep the current coalition together, yet options for a future coalition with different parties open as well; - against rhetorical grandstanding on the front stage stands pragmatic deal-making at the backstage. Therefore, people like Paul Keating, Bob Menzies, John Hawke, Henry Bolte and Joh Bjelke Petersen would be very unsuccessful political leaders in consensual countries. But the less confrontational, less warrior-like, more consensus-oriented styles of people like Hawke, Bracks and Rudd might work. Vice-versa, most Dutch prime ministers would be daunted, dizzied, appalled and quite quickly emasculated by the ‘bear pits’ of Australian politics. Leader (de)selection rules. Australia has a very low leader removal threshold of all established democracies. One hastily assembled party room vote is enough. Australian leaders serve at the pleasure of their parliamentary colleagues alone. They cannot claim a ‘contract with the people’ that comes from direct election by ordinary members; they do not have the relative protection that comes from the hassle of having to call a full-scale leadership convention; they have no option to build decisive support among the leadership voting block of trade unions, as some European social-democratic labours do. Hence: the near-continuous leadership speculation is/around parties that do not do well in polls (suddenly the party room is a dangerous place full of ambitious competitors and potential henchmen). Hence also: the need for Australian prime ministers to keep consulting their colleagues – they can at best be ‘first among equals’, not ‘presidents’, according to Pat Weller.
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[For an alternative view see Walter and Strangio, 2007 who argue that prime-ministerial power resources have grown exponentially, and prime-ministerial role conceptions have become more domineering ever since Whitlam, regardless of which party was in power; their view sits with the strand of scholars who argue that in many parliamentary democracies there has been a creeping ‘ presidentialization’ of the prime ministership (and by implication the role of opposition leader), see e.g. Poguntke and Webb 2005]
4. Observation 2: There is an obsession with leaders in Australian political journalism, commentary, and perhaps in politics itself too. [Pat Weller quote]. Interestingly, this is not matched by any serious, sustained, systematic analytical attention to patterns of political leadership in Australian political science. There are lots of case studies, many bios (of sharply differing qualities), some ‘collective bios’ of prime ministers and premiers, but few systematic analysis of leadership styles, careers, successes/failures etc. that we can find in for example the United States. There has been general reluctance (or simply lack of knowledge of / interest in) utilising internationally wellestablished tools of leadership analysis in subfields such as political psychology (e.g. operational code analysis, traits and skills analyses, leadership style typologies such as those of JD Barber, and so on). Fortunately, there are some pivotal exceptions that confirm this general rule. Let me name just three here (to be elaborated verbally): a. Graham Little , psycho-social approach of Davies elaborated and developed into 3-part typology of leadership ‘ensembles’: group, inspiring, strong leadership b. Jim Walter , psycho-biography of Whitlam c. Judith Brett , rhetorical analysis of Menzies. And see her Little-inspired analysis of Howard’s leadership, and his demise (on your Reading list for today). [Other scholars working usefully on rhetorical styles of Australian leaders include John Uhr and James Curran]. d. Patrick Weller , empirical study of Malcolm Fraser at work If you are interested in getting at what political leadership in Australia is all about, these are very good places to start. There is a mountain of work to be done on Australian party leaders, premiers and prime ministers using these tools, and so accounting for: their attitudes and decisions in critical historical cases; their successes and failures in holding their parties together, consolidating their authority, pushing their policy preferences, winning elections; their moral rectitude/looseness; their flexibility/rigidity in the face of changing political and economic circumstances; their relations with advisers and colleagues. Most Australian political scientists have contented themselves with either historical/journalistic description or more or less intelligent but essentially inductive/normative speculation and commentary instead of grounded, systematic, comparative, robust analysis. Basically the
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kind of stuff that the most insightful, and far better connected and sourced, political journalists like Paul Kelly excel at. It is hard to establish one’s added value as an academic student of politics if one goes down that route. I should hope that some of you will do better than that when you get the chance.
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