China’s Triple Warfare And Cross-Strait Economic Interactions
David W.F. Huang Mainland Affairs Council Taiwan
2005 U.S. Report on China’s Military Power
The US expressed concerns over China’s non-military strategies and capabilities against Taiwan. In particular, China has “combined diplomatic, economic, legal, psychological, and military measures to convince Taipei that the price of declaring independence is too high.”
This new trend of threat can be summed up as China’s triple warfare against Taiwan.
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Definition China’s Triple Warfare
• In the PLA’s Regulation on the Political Work, China stipulates “a reinforcement of political work in terms of media warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.” (Dec. 2003). • This was further illustrated in its 100 Case Studies for each type of the triple warfare published by the PLA in January 2005.
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Legal Warfare
• The law is used to provide justification for one’s own military actions, or to deny the legitimacy of the enemy’s resistance.
• Based on legal justifications, the state can seek international supports while mobilizing its own troop to fight war for justice.
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Media Warfare
• Fully utilize media and information resources to raise the fighting spirit while breaking the enemy’s will to fight.
• Develop a favorable media environment to set up agenda and achieve propaganda victory.
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Psychological Warfare
• Threat: Threatening information is constantly released to affect the enemy’s understanding, feeling, and assessment of the strategic environment, so that the enemy is refrained from pursuing alternative courses. • Deception: Schemes and techniques of disguise are used to mislead and surprise the enemy. Subsequently, the enemy will make wrong decisions and take wrong actions.
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Psychological Warfare
• Division: Schemes are used to create division among enemy leaders, between leaders and subordinates, and among organizations.
• Defense: Measures are applied to safeguard possible psychological warfare by the enemy.
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Mechanism Underlying the Triple Warfare
• Control over the access to information is the key to operate the triple warfare. • Media warfare provides an environment favorable to psychological and legal warfare.
• Legal warfare provides legal foundation for psychological and media warfare.
• Three types of warfares mutually support each other in actual operation.
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Operational Diagram of the Triple Warfare
Media Warfare
Winning the war without fighting.
Psychological Warfare
Legal Warfare
Derail enemy’s morale; give up resistance.
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Five Stages of China’s Triple Warfare against Taiwan
Setting agenda and repeating messages (media)
Creating pressures on the government (psychological) Undermining the government’s public authority (legal) Generating the “chilling effect” by rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors (psychological)
Denying Taiwan’s sovereign status by isolating it (legal)
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Examples of China’s triple warfare against Taiwan
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Example 1: “Anti-separation (-secession) Law”
Announcing the title without detailing the wording of antisecession law (ASL) on 17 Dec. 2004. (legal+media) Thus, inviting media speculations on the ASL’s punishment clauses, which impose psychological pressures on Taiwanese businessmen and people. (media+psych.)
To alleviate international pressure against the ASL, China proceed to negotiate a deal with Taiwan for the 2005 new year charter flight, so as to create an impression that the ASL was meant to maintain status quo and peace in the Taiwan Strait.
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Example 1: “Anti-separation Law”
• After the enactment of the ASL on 14 March 2005, the law defined Taiwan and mainland are both inalienatable parts of China. Further, it unilaterally impose a duty on Taiwanese people to facilitate unification. (legal) • The ASL stipulates a usage of non-peaceful means against Taiwan (legal+psych. threat), while appearing to offer flexible stances to negotiate deals with Taiwan on issues of trade, economic and cultural exchanges. (media+psych)
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Applications of the ASL
• Since the ASL legalizes China’s “one China principle,” China continues to deny Taiwan’s bids for membership in int’l organization (e.g. UN, WHO), obstruct Taiwanese participation in int’l activities (e.g. post-tsunami reconstruction conferences), refuse bilateral talks in the WTO forum.
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Applications of the ASL
• Since the ASL legalizes non-peaceful means against Taiwan, China intends to maximize its military threat on Taiwan (e.g. speed up missile deployment, joint military exercise with Russia, survey ships transgressing into Taiwan water, etc.)
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Applications of the ASL
• Inviting Taiwan’s opposition leaders to visit China, hence creating internal divisions. • Setting up various agenda, such as offering panda and Chinese tourists to Taiwan, applying zero tariff to Taiwanese fruits, reduction of tuition fee for Taiwanese students in China, providing loan for specific Taiwanese businessmen, etc., in which only Taiwanese opposition parties can play a part, hence bypassing Taiwan government’s authority.
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Example 2: Export of Taiwanese Fruits to China
• The issue can be traced back as early as the TAO’s “ May 17 Statement” in 2004. But it was materialized only recently, on 1 August 2005, again by China’s unilateral announcement. • After the enactment of the ASL, China’s premiere Wen ChiaBao announced that China would import agriculture products from southern Taiwan, with an eye to deprive DPP supporters there. • Based on “Lien-Hu” consensus in May 2005, China unilaterally assigned its negotiating partner in Taiwan, namely, Taiwan Provincial Farmers Association (TPFA).
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Example 2: Export of Taiwanese Fruits to China
• China kept inviting TPFA representatives and Taiwan’s opposition politicians to discuss the issue in Beijing, while hiding its intention of dumping its 800 items of agriculture products to Taiwan. • Since the related issues of fruit quarantine, certificate of product origin, and tariff reduction (both TW and CN are WTO members) involved public authority, the Taiwanese government delegated its authority to Taipei External Trade Association (TaiTra) to negotiate with China. • Because China did not confirm its intention to negotiate with TaiTra, no progress since then, except China’s unilateral announcement of zero tariff treatment for 15 items of Taiwanese fruits.
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Case 3: Chinese Tourist Visits to Taiwan
‧December 17, 1991: China promulgates the Measures for the Control of Chinese Citizens Travelling to or from the Region of Taiwan as the legal standard for Chinese tourist visits to Taiwan. The measures define cross-strait travel as domestic travel. ‧ China blames the issue of Chinese tourists absconding in Taiwan on the unreasonable policies of the Taiwanese authorities. ‧May 2, 2005: Taiwan Affairs Office Director Chen Yunlin announces that China will soon allow its citizens to make tourism trips to Taiwan. (This is reportedly one of the three gifts granted by Beijing during Lien Chan's visit to China.)
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Case 3: Chinese Tourist Visits to Taiwan (Cont.)
‧May 20, 2005: China's National Tourism Administration holds a press conference but does not announce details on cross-strait tourism policies. According to a China News Agencies report, some government agencies have not finalized the details of the opening policies, suggesting that more time will be required before the policies are implemented ‧Aug. 2, 2005: MAC officially commissions the Travel Agent Association of R. O. C., Taiwan (TATT)to negotiate all matters concerning cross-strait tourism.
‧ Oct. 20, 2005: China's Taiwan Affairs Office and the KMT hold discussions on direct cross-strait passenger and cargo transportation links and Chinese tourist visits to Taiwan. After the meeting, a statement is issued.
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Case 3: Chinese Tourist Visits to Taiwan (Cont.)
• China has made all the necessary arrangements and commissioned a private travel industry organization in China to conduct communications and negotiations with a private travel organization in Taiwan. • Oct. 28, 2005: China's National Tourism Administration Director Shao Qiwei makes a ten-day inspection tour of Taiwan's tourism resources. • China avoids the issue of not listing Taiwan as a permitted tourism destination for its citizens and delays the announcement of related measures.
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Case 3: Chinese Tourist Visits to Taiwan (Cont.)
• China welcomes Taiwan’s private travel industry to conduct negotiations with China under the name of the "Cross-Strait Tourism Exchange Association," but it refuses to accept the organization authorized by Taiwan. • The Chinese authorities attempt to fabricate public opinion, using opposition party members in Taiwan to blame the Taiwanese government for unwillingness to hold negotiations on tourist visits.
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• Consistently advocating direct cross-strait transportation links • Demanding that links be "[treated as] the internal affairs of one country, direct two-way, and mutual benefit" • Insisting that consultations be held under the principle of a "private sector to private sector, industry to industry, and company to company". • May 2005: A consensus was reached during Lien-Hu and Lien-Soong meetings on facilitating direct cross-strait transportation links. • June 13, 2005: Premier Frank Hsieh announces that the Taipei Airline Association would be commissioned to assist in negotiation matters
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Case 4: Cross-Strait Passenger and Cargo Charter Flights
Case 4: Cross-Strait Passenger and Cargo Charter Flights (Cont.)
• Aug. 16, 2005: Chen Yunlin meets with the KMT "CrossStrait Passenger and Cargo Charter Flight Promotion Mission." After the meeting, the KMT announces that China has agreed to jointly discuss, arrange and implement passenger and cargo charter flights. However, this sidesteps Taiwan’s demand for the implementation of cargo charter flights, and is aimed at creating a situation in which Taiwan must agree to public pressure to first implement passenger flights. • Aug. 2005: China responds negatively to the Taiwanese government's announcement that the Taipei Airline Association has been commissioned to assist in arranging of cargo charter flights and to simultaneously hold discussions on passenger flights.
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Case 4: Cross-Strait Passenger and Cargo Charter Flights (Cont.)
• China externally advocates that negotiations on cross-strait passenger and cargo charter flights be arranged between private industry organizations across the Strait, according to the Macao model adopted for 2005 Lunar New Year charter flights. In fact, Beijing is only interested in implementing passenger flights and is unwilling to lift restrictions on cargo flights.
• China uses the media to propagate the impression that the Taiwanese authorities are obstructing consultations on direct cross-strait transport links and attempting to shirk responsibility for the impasse on passenger and cargo charter flight talks. Opposition political parties in Taiwan have cooperated with this effort through attempted revisions to stipulations in the “Acting Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area” that pertain to direct transport links. Such moves seek to turn the government into a figurehead and “de-governmentalize” the air traffic rights negotiations that involve the government’s exercise of authority.
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Conclusion
• China’s triple warfare is already a war against Taiwan, albeit not a physical warfare. • The aim of China’s triple warfare is to substantiate its “one China principle” by offering Taiwanese people its citizen treatments. • The strategy of China’s triple warfare is to explore Taiwan’s internal divisions, hence undermining the public authority of the Taiwanese government.
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Conclusion
• The potential impact of China’s triple warfare against Taiwan is to weaken Taiwanese people’s will to defend, hence further undermining Taiwan’s link to the USA. • To counter China’s triple warfare, Taiwan needs a comprehensive and robust strategy, taking into account of both defense and economic alliance between USA, Japan, and Taiwan.
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