The Foundation of an Anti-Hegemonic Coalition

Document Sample
The Foundation of an Anti-Hegemonic Coalition Powered By Docstoc
					The Foundation of an Anti-Hegemonic Coalition? The Geopolitics of Russo-Chinese Relations

Thomas Ambrosio North Dakota State University

Paper Presented at the Southern Political Science Association 2004

International relations scholars are divided on the issue of whether and how the great powers will actively challenge America’s global preeminence.1 As seeming evidence for those who argued that the post-Cold War unipolar international system is transitory, the newfound Russo-Chinese partnership appeared to be the cornerstone of a nascent anti-hegemonic coalition. An alliance between two of the largest countries in Eurasia, especially if bolstered with others dissatisfied with American hegemony, has the potential of balancing American power and influence. Certainly the rhetoric emanating from Moscow and Beijing indicated that balancing the world’s superpower was the ultimate goal of their partnership: both states repeatedly called for the establishment of a global multipolarity, designed to prevent any one great power from unilaterally affecting the interests of any other great power; in this way, global hierarchy (as represented by unipolarity) would give rise to a global balance. After the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, however, Russia seemingly abandoned its anti-U.S. stance and shifted closer to the United States -- much to the dismay of China. Rather than challenging the United States, Russia actively supported America’s war in Afghanistan and acquiesced to America’s long-term presence and influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Moreover, Russia temporarily dropped its public rhetoric of multipolarity and was guarded in its vocal criticisms of the United States. America’s invasion of Iraq, however, illustrated to both Beijing and Moscow the potential problems of global unipolarity from the perspective of two ‘middle powers’.2 This paper will examine the relationship between Russia and China after the collapse of the Soviet Union in terms of the possible and desired polar structures of the international system. It aims to answer the following questions: • What are the bases of the Russo-Chinese partnership/alliance evident after the mid-

1990s? • • • • Was this partnership designed as an anti-hegemonic coalition? How was the partnership affected by September 11th? How has the war in Iraq affected the logic of the Russo-Chinese partnership? What are the systemic implications for the relationship between the United States, China, and Russia?

It is posited that the nature of the Russo-Chinese partnership can be best understood in the context of Russo-American relations and the systemic environment which Moscow aims to establish. In other words, the degree to which Russia is willing to establish a relationship with China that goes beyond simply good-neighborly and trading relations is directly related to Moscow’s support for a multipolar international system. This, in turn, is dependant upon its strategic relationship with the United States. This does not mean that Russia seeks to replace one relationship with another: non-conflictual relations is the ultimate aim of both relationships, but the systemic considerations qualitatively affect the nature and scope of these relationships. On the one hand, an alliance with China is necessary if Russia wishes to establish a multipolar international system. On the other, opposing American unipolarity may be both costly and, quite possibly, futile. As a result, accepting American unipolarity and working within it may be the best way for Russia to maintain its great power status and global autonomy. In the final analysis, the anti-hegemonic coalition is not an end it itself, but rather a means to address Russia’s weakness vis-à-vis the United States. This paper is divided into several sections. The first will provide a brief overview of the late-Soviet and initial post-Soviet relationship between Moscow and China. The second section

will focus on the qualitative changes which occurred in the relationship after 1996. The third section will examine attempts to establish multipolarity, focusing on the expansion of the antihegemonic alliance and the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. September 11th altered the political landscape in the United States and had significant consequences on the international system and the Russo-Chinese relationship. These changes, and Chinese perspectives of Russia’s newfound affinity for the United States, will constitute the fourth section. Lastly, the international controversy over the American-led invasion of Iraq is still being felt. This section will examine the reemergence of Russian support for multipolarity and the need to balance American power. The conclusion of this paper will posit the future of the Russo-Chinese relationship and its implications for Beijing, Moscow, and Washington, as well as identify impediments to the formation of a Russo-Chinese alliance. A New Beginning During the Soviet period, relations between China and the USSR fluctuated quite dramatically. In the first half of the 1950s, immediately following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the two states formed an important strategic bloc which shook the geopolitical landscape. Seeing themselves as the bastions of communism arrayed ideologically and militarily against the United States, the partnership between the two states was a direct challenge to the United States and served as a cornerstone of the bipolar global structure. During the second half of the 1950s, however, relations took a significant downturn: ideological differences which emerged following the rise of Nikita Khrushchev as the leader of the USSR feed differing perspectives over national interests and the leadership of the communist bloc. By the late 1960s, the PRC and the USSR engaged in a series of border clashes and open warfare, most likely in the form of a preventive first strike against China’s embryonic nuclear program,

became a real possibility. Tensions between the PRC and the USSR continued throughout the 1970s as a de facto Sino-American alliance weakened the Soviets’ geopolitical standing. Nevertheless, during the 1980s, the USSR and the PRC began the process of reevaluating their relationship, culminating in the May 1989 state visit to Beijing by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. This resulted in the normalization of relations and opened a new chapter their relationship in which both sides committed themselves to “peaceful co-existence” after decades of conflict. Moreover, a treaty ending their historic territorial dispute was signed. Within a week of the Soviet Union’s collapse in December 1991, the Chinese and Russian deputy foreign ministers signed a protocol in which both sides committed themselves to developing “good-neighborly” relations and “peaceful co-existence.” A year later, the first of a series of summit meetings was held in China and a Joint Statement on the Foundation of Mutual Relations was signed. This was followed by a second summit in September 1994 in Russia at which Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a joint statement which defined the relationship between their countries as a “constructive partnership.” Eight months later, Jiang traveled to Moscow to attend the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II. During this meeting, both sides showed support for issues important to the other party: Russia confirmed its support for the ‘one China’ principle, while China confirmed its support for the Russian approach on Chechnya. Thus, by mid-1995, China and Russia had committed themselves to peaceful relations and had reversed decades of conflict between the PRC and the USSR. While lingering doubts remained about the stability of the Sino-Russian relationship, it was clear that a sea change had occurred. Commitment to Multipolarity

From 1996 to 1997 the Sino-Russian relationship fundamentally changed. Up to this point, the Sino-Russian rapprochement had been primarily a bilateral warming of relations. Afterwards, however, this relationship began to focus on geopolitics. Both states bristled under the unipolar structure of the international system and perceptions of American hegemonic tendencies. In order to blunt America’s global power, both states committed themselves to the promotion of a multipolar international system, taking the lead as a nascent anti-hegemonic bloc. The paths taken by both states to come to this position was quite different, however. Chinese rejection of American hegemony is long standing and appeared immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although there is some debate as to whether China is a status quo or a revisionist power,3 what is certain is that the rhetoric of the desirability of multipolarity and a rejection of unipolarity has been a consistent theme in Chinese foreign policy statements. On the other hand, Russian support for multipolarity did not begin until the mid1990s. The initial (1992-3) pro-West, pro-U.S. foreign policy of Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev came under sharp criticism from a broad range of the political and foreign policy spectrum. Even those who supported democratic reforms and a transition to a market economy attacked Kozyev’s ‘Atlanticist’ foreign policy for subordinating Russian interests to those of the United States and for acquiescing to (what were perceived as) a series of unilateral concessions to the Americans. This resulted in a shift in Russian foreign policy toward the development of a more ‘independent’ stance, commensurate with Russia’s great power aspirations. Leading this charge was Yevgeny Primakov, who served as head of Russia’s intelligence agency until he replaced Andrei Kozyrev after the 1996 presidential elections. The ‘Primakov Doctrine’, as it has been dubbed, called for a fundamental transformation of the international system from a unipolar structure to multipolarity. Multipolarity, in this sense, is

not directly confrontational. Primakov was not calling for a new Cold War or for Russian domination of the international system. Instead, Primakov’s conception of multipolarity was inherently defensive in nature: the ultimate aims of the Primakov Doctrine were resisting American domination of the international system, blocking American influence in the former Soviet Union, and increasing the autonomy of Russia on the world stage. This foreign policy concept did not necessitate conflict with the United States, but rather hoped to build a new relationship with Washington -- one based upon ‘equality’, in which Russia would not be neither a junior partner nor would the United States be able to dictate unilateral outcomes which affect Russian security interests.4 To achieve this, Moscow sought help from other states opposed to American hegemony and shifted its orientation away from the West and toward Asia. In April 1996, the third official Sino-Russian summit was held in Beijing. At this meeting the two leaders signed a joint statement declaring that the relationship between their two states had reached the level of a “strategic partnership.”5 This partnership, in addition to other goals, was formed on the basis of a common world view: that is, the transition of the international system after the Cold War was seen well under way and that the promotion of multipolarity was necessary to ensure international peace and the security interests of their respective states. However, this conception of the international system was being challenged by those forces, namely the unnamed United States, which was committed to promoting “[h]egemonism, power politics, and repeated imposition of pressures on other countries.” In a not-so veiled reference to NATO expansion, the statement also cited the revitalization of “bloc politics” as a threat to international peace. Morever, both states called upon the “peace-loving countries and peoples” of the world to “work together to establish a just and equitable international political and economic order.” The words ‘just’ and ‘equitable’ are crucial for

understanding the nature of the multipolar international structure supported by China and Russia: because of the relative power imbalances between the United States and the other great powers, the United States can create a more hierarchal relationship between itself and other states; a ‘just’ and ‘equitable’ international order would level these relationships and prevent the U.S. from imposing its will upon the other great powers. In this context, ‘equality’, refers more to a consensus-based approach to international politics than any sort of Western concept which links equality with personal freedoms and human rights.6 It is important to understand the context of this communique. NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, a contentious issue amongst the Russian public and policy elite,7 had been announced and American criticism of Russia’s war in Chechnya was increasing. In the previous year, the United States launched air strikes against Serbs in Bosnia over Russian objections. Moreover, a Sino-American crisis over Taiwan, in which American warships were sent into the Straits of Taiwan in response of Chinese missile tests, had just occurred. Both Russia and China had recently confronted what they perceived to be an increasingly hegemonic United States. Thus, the partnership proclaimed at the April 1996 summit should be understood within the context of growing opposition to American-led unipolarity. This opposition was codified a year later at the April 1997 Russo-Chinese summit at which the two states signed the “Joint Russian-Chinese Declaration About a Multipolar World and the Formation of a New World Order.” One Chinese diplomat referred to the document as an expression of “common opposition to any country’s taking tyrannical actions in the international arena.”8 In this declaration, the parties committed themselves as partners to the establishment of a multipolar world. The shape of this world is implied in the second paragraph: no state should “claim a hegemony for itself or pursue a policy from the position of strength and

monopolize international affairs.”9 A “new, universally significant security concept” should be developed in which all states agree to use peaceful means and dialogue to deal with security problems. A close examination of this document provides a number of important insights. First and foremost, it is a rejection of what the parties see as an increasingly hegemonic United States. In addition to its reference to hegemony and the need for multipolarity, the document makes reference to the continuing “Cold War mentality” evident in the international system and “attempts at expanding and strengthening military blocs.” Although never mentioned by name, it is clear that these statements refer to the Clinton administration’s continued promotion of NATO expansion. In addition, the document appeared to be concerned with resisting American interference into what the parties regard as “domestic” concerns. For example, the document emphasized state sovereignty and non-intervention into domestic affairs, as well as implied a rejection of universal human rights standards10 -- standards which the United States champions and which both China and Russia see as important sources of American pressure.11 Second, it is a statement of weakness vis-à-vis the United States. The emphasis on formal equality between states and a rhetorical rejection of power politics is hypocritical: China and Russia have not been above using pressure, including military pressure, to assert their interests. However, neither state can effectively compete with the United States. Thus, the concept of formal equality helps to level the playing-field amongst the great powers and to lessen the importance of relative power imbalances. Moreover, the emphasis on the United Nations Security Council, as well as statements such as “mutual respect, equality, and mutual benefit,” and “the establishment of mutual understanding,” imply the desire for both states to have a veto over U.S. unilateralism -- something which would be unnecessary if power was more

evenly distributed in the international system. In fact, the entire concept of multipolarity implies a virtual veto over the unilateralist impulses of any great power: other powers align against any aggressive power in an effort to preserve the status quo and to ensure that any major changes in the international system require consensus. Finally, the document is an international call-to-action: the two parties identified the important role that the “developing countries and the non-alignment movement” could play in “assisting in the formation of a multipolar world and a new international order.” Implied here is that those states which are not part of the hegemomic coalition have a common cause and a common interest in the promotion of multipolarity and in resisting American unipolarity. While the two sides denied that they were creating an alliance or that their policies were directed at any specific state or states, it was rather clear that they sought to separate themselves in terms of their identity from “the hegemonists” -- code for the Untied States and its allies.12 Furthermore, although they two sides rejected ‘bloc politics’, the document implies that the world is divided between those who which to preserve unipolarity and those who reject it. However, rejection of bloc politics and support for multipolarity are not contradictions: aligning together to end unipolarity is a temporary corrective to a systemic problem. Multipolarity, as a concept, requires a flexible power structure without formal alliances. The breakdown of multipolarity has been, in fact, due to the formation of more static blocs. Thus, the two powers called upon the other states of the international system to help affect systemic change. Constructing Multipolarity From the mid-1990s, Beijing and Moscow actively promoted cooperation between their two states and began to build a global infrastructure of multipolarity. This did not mean that they sought confrontation with the United States: both states saw positive relations with the

United States as important for promoting economic development. Rather, there was an active push, especially by Russian policymakers, to developing a system of resistence to American hegemony. This quest for multipolarity assumed a number of forms, only some of which will be examined in depth here.13 This section will focus on the joint Russo-Chinese policies, the possibility of bringing other states into the anti-hegemonic coalition, and the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. During the mid-1990s, Russo-Chinese military cooperation reached record levels with Russia becoming China’s primary supplier of modern weapons and military technology: some seventy percent of Russian foreign arms sales went to China and the defense industries of both countries have formed closer relationships with each other.14 Some of these systems include “attack aircraft, missile systems, destroyers, diesel submarines, and helicopters.”15 While many of these sales do not include the latest generation of Russian equipment, they are quite significant. Moreover, these sales are directly related to Beijing’s desire to increase its ability to project power in the eastern Pacific and are largely designed to counter American military advantages. Despite the open wishes of both sides to increase trade between the two countries, economic cooperation laged far behind military transfers. The reasons for this include: Russian products are often inferior to those of other countries (e.g., the United States, South Korea, and Japan) which are competing for the Chinese market; problems of ownership, taxation, and currency exchange; and the policies of local Russian leaders (especially along the RussoChinese border) who often use anti-Chinese fears to retain local control.16 Nevertheless, the intent of both sides was for increased trade to be part of the foundation for their “partnership with strategic coordination.”17 Meaning, in short, that increased trade would help to bring about

a closer relationship between the two states which would, in turn, solidify their joint commitment to multipolarity. Given the vast power differential between the United States, on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other, the construction of multipolarity would require more than just these two states. Russia was the most active on this front: Moscow actively sought to build or restore relations between itself and potential members of an anti-hegemonic coalition. These included non-Western states which have traditionally seen themselves as part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). During the Cold War, the NAM was generally anti-West and Soviet-leaning (Cuba, for example, though claiming to be non-aligned, was a prominent member of the NAM). A post-Cold War NAM was initially a contradiction in terms, given the end of the clash of Eastern and Western blocs with which to align. However, in the context of a potentially hegemonic United States, it could be seen as inherently pro-multipolarity: resisting external pressure was a particularly important foreign policy aim of these relatively weak states. India, in particular, was seen as crucial in this regard. With the second largest population in the world and an outspoken opponent of colonialism and neo-colonialism, an anti-hegemonic triumvirate of New Delhi, Beijing, and Moscow would set the major powers of Eurasia against American hegemony. The focus on a tripartite anti-hegemonic coalition as the foundation of multipolarity played a large role in Russian foreign policy thinking after the 1997 summit.18 When India tested nuclear weapons during the summer of 1997, Russia’s official response was muted: except for a formal rebuke, Moscow resisted the imposition of sanctions or any real punishment for New Delhi’s violation of the nonproliferation regime. Several Russian commentators viewed this as an important step in the development of a multipolar world, for good or ill.19 In

preparations for the late 1998 Russo-Indian summit, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin emphasized that the visit by Yeltsin to New Delhi was “new evidence of both countries' readiness to develop close interaction in the conditions of the modern multipolar world.”20 Coming on the heels of U.S. missile and air attacks against Iraq, which Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi strongly protested, the summit itself focused its attention on what the parties perceived as an increasingly unilateral and hegemonic United States and on the need to intensify cooperation between those opposed to American actions.21 Prime Minister Primakov claimed that the basis of the talks centered around “the understanding that it was necessary to create a multipolar world”22 and that the “shared interests” of the Russia, China, and India were geopolitical in nature.23 He also suggested that a "strategic Moscow-Beijing-Delhi triangle” was necessary in order to promote peace in the international system.24 While such a triangle is fraught with difficulties (which will be dealt with in the conclusion), such an alignment, at least in theory, could tip the global balance by bringing together some 2.5 billion people committed to resisting unipolarity. Possibly the most significant indication of a Russo-Chinese anti-hegemonic alliance was the development of the Shanghai Security Organization. Russia, China, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan established a working group in 1996, called the ‘Shanghai Five’, to coordinate policies and promote cooperation.25 During a summit meeting of the group in August 1999, which came as the dispute over NATO expansion was heating up, Yeltsin declared that he was “ready to fight, especially with Westerners.”26 While Foreign Minister Ivanov tried soften Yeltsin’s statement, he noted that it needed to be understood "in the context of countermeasures against building up unipolar world.”27 Nevertheless, Yeltsin reiterated these themes in his address to the group: he denounced "attempts by some States to build a world order that is only

suitable to themselves....They take no account of the objective gravitation to a multipolar world.”28 This was seconded by Chinese President Jiang Zemin who proclaimed that "hegemony and the politics of force are on the rise, with new forms of so-called neo-interventionism being revived.”29 The Bishkek Declaration, which the Shanghai Five signed at the conclusion of the 1999 summit, identified the need for a transition to multipolarity in order to bring about long-term stability in the international system.30 In a separate joint statement, Yeltsin and Jiang produced a sharp attack upon the (again, unnamed) United States: The two sides point out that in international relations there is increasingly clear evidence of the development of negative tendencies such as the attempt to force a unipolar world order and a uniformity of culture, values and ideology; attempts to weaken the role of the United Nations and its Security Council; the seeking of excuses to give irresponsible interpretations of the substance and principles of the UN Charter; the reinforcing and expanding of military blocs; the replacing of international law with power politics or even resorting to force; and the jeopardizing of the sovereignty of independent states using the concepts of "human rights are superior to sovereignty" and "humanitarian intervention.”

The two sides agree to work together with the rest of the world to oppose the tendencies currently preventing the establishment of a just multi-polar structure for international relations.31 Thus, the notion of Russia (along with its Eurasian allies) as the “standard-bearer” against American-led unipolarity, as a Russian ambassador put it,32 was firmed placed at the center of

the summit. This should not be surprising: the fallout from the American-led war in Kosovo, which was strongly opposed by Beijing and Russia and strained relations between the U.S. and both states, was still being felt. (This is particularly relevant given the use of the phrase ‘humanitarian intervention’, which the U.S. used to justify its campaign against Serbia.) The connection between a United States more willing to use military force without prior Security Council approval and the need for multipolarity was, without question, an important impetus for what seemed to be a return to some version of bloc politics. Although this was expressly denied by the parties themselves, it is clear by the statements made at the conference that Kosovo and an increasingly hegemonic United States was on everyone’s mind. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established in June 2001 in order to cement relations between Russia and China, secure Beijing’s and Moscow’s security interests in Central Asia through the establishment of a de facto condominium over the region (it was also signed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), and help to bring about the development of multipolarity by creating a Eurasian bloc.33 According to the organization’s founding charter, the SCO was established, among other reasons, in order to “[build] a democratic, just, and rational international political and economic new order’ and ‘[maintain] a global strategic balance and stability.”34 In reality this meant, according to Chinese President Jiang Zemin, fostering “world multi-polarization.”35 Signed just prior to the Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship, which was also designed to counter American hegemony, the SCO appeared to be a significant step toward multipolarity and, according to Jiang, “[the opening of] a new page in the development of Russian-Chinese relations in the new century."36 Thus, during the summer of 2001, China and Russia had committed themselves in word and deed to resisting American domination of the international system and to the establishment of a multipolar international

system. The Aftermath of September 11th The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 where the most devastating acts of modern terrorism. In an effort to punish al-Qaeda, prevent future attacks, and restore its shaken confidence, the United States embarked on an open-ended, global ‘war on terrorism’. As President George W. Bush stated in his 20 September address to the nation, the coming conflict would be a “lengthy campaign” which called upon all states to make a choice: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” Instead of shirking from its place on the world stage, America appeared to be reasserting its dominance within the international system. Support for a unilateralist foreign policy has increased both in the administration and amongst the American public. Moreover, the Bush Doctrine, outlined in the president’s June 2002 West Point commencement speech and officially presented in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, disavowed containment and deterrence in the war on terrorism and instead embraced a strategy of preventive military action.37 In short, the United States has appeared more, rather than less, hegemonic since September 11th. If the pattern of past Russo-Chinese relations was any guide, a more aggressive United States should have yielded a negative response from Moscow and Beijing: the strengthening of the relationship between Russia and China usually came about as a result of U.S. policies. Thus, it seemed likely that the Bush administration’s ‘war on terrorism’ would further unite the two powers against the United States. This should have been especially true since just days before September 11th, yet another Russo-Chinese summit was held which featured with the standard criticisms of unipolarity and sharp opposition to the Bush administration’s moves to terminate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.38 This was not the case however. In fact, Russia openly sided

with the United States and seemingly defected from the nascent anti-hegemonic coalition. After September 11th, the rhetoric emanating from Moscow decisively shifted away from an anti-American line. If one uses the language of the in-group versus out-group to characterize Russian rhetoric and strategic thinking prior to September 11th, Moscow increasingly perceived the members of the hegemonic coalition as something akin to an out-group. After September 11th, however, a new out-group emerged: international terrorism. As a victim of mass terrorism itself, particularly at the hands of Chechen and Dagestani rebels, Russia showed its comprehension of the threat that terrorism posed, both to itself and to the international community. As asserted in the Russian newspaper Izvestia, “Russia will have urgently to rethink its international stance” in light of the terrorist attacks.39 Very soon afterward, evidence of such a rethinking emerged. Foreign Minister Ivanov declared that the attacks’ implications go “far beyond the borders of the United States....The international terrorism has caused a blatant challenge to all civilized humanity, to all the civilized world.”40 In response, Ivanov called for the US and Russia “to join efforts in order to create a global system of countering threats and challenges, including international terrorism.”41 Putin called international terrorism “‘the plague of the twenty-first century” which stand as “a challenge to the whole of humanity.”42 By labeling terrorists as pariahs fundamentally adrift from the civilized world, Russia reaffirmed first, that the fundamental divide in the world was not between unipolar and multipolar visions of the international system, but rather between ‘civilized’ and ‘non-civilized’ forces, and second, that Russia was part of the civilized or status quo world. How one defines the ‘civilized world’ is certainly a matter of dispute. But the use of the phrases “barbaric” and “inhuman,’ as expressed by Putin, seem to indicate that the world was, once again, fundamentally divided.43 On the one hand, we have the revisionist states and non-

state actors aiming to overthrow the international order. In the case of al-Qaeda, they desire to remake the world in the image of radical, fundamentalist Islam. On the other hand, we have the conservative, status quo, or satisfied powers, led most prominently by the United States. Russian policymakers might take exception to American unipolarity and the strength of the hegemonic coalition, but after September 11th there was nowhere else to go. Thus, Dmitri Rogozin, chairman of the international affairs committee in the Russian Duma, suggested that ‘what happened in New York and Washington this week ended once and for all the Cold War. Just as [sixty] years ago, Russia and the US have a common enemy again. Now we have the moral and ethical and political conditions for a fundamental rapprochement between the United States and Russia.”44 This notion seemed to be confirmed by Ivanov on the eve of Bush’s speech effectively declaring war against international terrorism: “Russia is firmly set to go down the road of forming new strategic frames of relations between our countries.”45 Russian cooperation with the United States’ war on terrorism was not limited to passive support. Sergei Markov, director of the Political Studies Institute, characterized it as a ‘military alliance” against “a common military enemy.”46 This entailed the sharing of information about the Taliban’s military capabilities and al-Qaeda activities, providing military and logistical assistance to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, making available corridors in its air space to US armed forces, and providing diplomatic and political support for US actions. Russia acquiesced to a long-term basing of American troops in Central Asia and the introduction to military advisors into Georgia.47 Furthermore, Russian objections to NATO expansion were mollified through the creation of a NATO-Russia Council, which involved a limited Russian role in decision-making within the alliance.48 Moreover, the official Russian response to the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty was quite muted, with both

President Putin and Foreign Minister Ivanov merely called it a “mistake” and Putin declaring that it “does not create a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation.”49 Most significant was the sea change in the Russian foreign policy establishment. The influential Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, which released a report in early October 2001 entitled “Russia and the Processes of Globalization,” in which the Council stated that “...’multipolarity’ games, especially rhetorical ones, which are understood by most of the world as resistance to the US and indeed to the West, are too expensive and unpragmatic.”50 The report went on to suggest that Russia should accept a NATO-based security system in Europe since Russia will find it increasingly more difficult, and ultimately futile, to resist NATO expansion. Russia fundamentally had two choices: join the hegemonic coalition or oppose it. While neither option is perfect, the negative consequences of the latter are too high to accept: ...it is necessary to make a choice in favor of participation in a great militarypolitical coalition of responsible states against any forms of international terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear and other types of mass-destruction weapons. Participation in such a coalition will cost Russia dearly. But attempts to sit on the sidelines will cost even more. We will objectively slide downhill, especially in public opinion, into the camp of the backward and dissatisfied, with no future, supporting radicalism and terrorism.51 By siding with the US and the west, Moscow could demand concessions such as debt relief, a more active Russian role in NATO, some limits on NATO expansion, or a free hand in Chechnya. By opposing the United States, Russia would miss out on a host of opportunities and likely have to carry an unacceptable burden for a grand strategy that very well might not succeed.

What is so significant about this report is the fact that it was signed by over one hundred members of the Council, including the key architects of Russia’s post-Kozyrev foreign policy such as Alexi Arbatov, Vladimir Lukin, Dmitriy Rogozin, and Yevgeniy Primakov. Thus, it may have signaled a definitive end to Russia’s quest for multipolarity. More important, however, is the fact that this shift was fundamentally based upon geopolitical concerns rather than what appeared to be an ideological approach to international politics represented by Kozyrev’s EuroAtlanticist foreign policy concept. While it is certainly true that Kozyrev’s foreign policy began to shift in accordance with international realities (an increasingly unilateralist United States during the early-to-mid 1990s) and Russia’s domestic political scene (opposition to Russian bandwagoning with the US),52 the post-September 11th rapprochement was inherently pragmatic in nature. Russia’s absolute and relative weakness vis-à-vis the United States, and the lack of prospects for the formation of an anti-hegemonic coalition, left Russia with little choice but to look toward the West and attempt to get the best deal possible. This idea was summarized by another Council report which noted that: “It is possible that the development of recent setbacks for Russia were partly due to an inaccurate understanding of the external world, by an inadequate determination of priorities, by the overestimation of resources. It is very probably that, by fighting for the retention of some past, frequently ephemeral, positions, Russia missed available opportunities.”53 Chinese commentators, who had long pushed for multipolarity, took great interest in the Russian foreign policy shift. There appeared to be an understanding of Russian motives for turning toward the west: “Given that Russia’s strength is inadequate, it must improve its relations with the United States in order to preserve its own interests and play the role of a great power in the international arena.”54 However, it was also noted that a US-Russian alliance

would likely run into problems.55 Whether or not this is wishful thinking on the part of Chinese observers remains to be seen. It appeared, however, that they feared a US-Russian rapprochement would negatively impact China’s geopolitical position by, in part, allowing American influence into China’s western frontier and further strengthening the hegemonic coalition. This was especially true in regard to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. After September 11th and the resulting foreign policy shift by Moscow, the SCO appeared far less relevant. One report called it “stillborn.”56 The London Times, quoting a Western diplomat, said of the SCO: “China saw itself as building a regional bloc that could stand up to the Americans and deal with them collectively,” adding, “it is hard to see how they can still think so now.’57 With Russia acquiescing to an American military presence in Central Asia, the fact that Central Asian leaders are increasingly looking toward the United States for trade, aid, and security, and Putin refusing to rule out American membership in SCO,58 the Chinese appeared concerned about Russia’s commitment to multipolarity.59 Indeed, the SCO’s primary focus has shifted along with Russian priorities: terrorism, rather than confronting American hegemony, dominated discussions amongst the SCO’s members.60 The importance of multipolarity was included in the June 2002 SCO summit declaration, but it was downplayed and appeared to be pro forma, especially in comparison to previous Russo-Chinese documents. Moreover, no mention of American hegemony or hegemonic tendencies was included in the document.61 While all sides praised the work that was done at the summit, the SCO’s possible geopolitical role has been stymied by the improving relationship between Washington and Moscow. It is perhaps telling that even after the crisis over Iraq, SCO Secretary-General Nikolay Bordyuzha, in an extensive June 2003 interview, mentioned neither American power nor the need to promote multipolarity.62 Instead, the fight against international terrorism was

emphasized. Thus, the Russo-Chinese alliance against American unipolarity seemingly faltered in the face of the September 11th terrorist attacks. In the aftermath of September 11th, it initially appeared as if Russia had made a strategic choice against pursuing multipolarity on the basis of the calculation that siding with the United States was better than opposing it. In fact, public appeals to the need for multipolarity by highlevel Russian policymakers seemingly disappeared as an acceptance of the reality of America’s domination of the international system began to infuse Russian geopolitical thinking. This was short-lived, however. The controversy over American plans to invade Iraq and effect ‘regime change’ placed the threat posed by a hegemonic U.S. firmly on the political agenda. The rhetoric of Russia and China aligning against the global hegemony resurfaced, but with key European countries such as France and Germany joining in their opposition to unipolarity. Dispute Over Iraq The dispute over Gulf War II, between the United States and Great Britain, on the one hand, and the other great powers, on the other, was probably the most serious clash of the great powers in the post-Cold War period. Although four years earlier the United States initiated an air war and led an occupying force into Kosovo without United Nations Security Council approval, the decision to invade Iraq had far-reaching geopolitical repercussions and therefore the relative desirability of the unipolar international system was placed center-stage in foreign policy circles throughout the globe. In Moscow, it raised questions of whether the postSeptember 11th rapprochement with the United States was merely temporary and whether the other great powers (minus Great Britain) would actively support multipolarity. The rhetoric of multipolarity, which had not been seen in Putin’s public speeches since September 11th,63 reemerged in a joint Russo-Chinese statement during his visit to China in

December 2002.64 The two sides recommitted themselves to ensuring that the SCO remain “an important factor in maintaining regional peace, security and stability, as well as one of the pillars in the structure of the future multipolar world.”65 This language was repeated throughout the lead-up to Gulf War II. Moreover, Putin took his message to Western Europe where he found a receptive audience. For example, in an interview on French television, Putin asserted that “[the] main thing is that France and Russia have common approaches to constructing the future edifice of international security. As we believe here in Russia, and as the French President Chirac believes, the future edifice of world security must be based on a multipolar world. This is the main thing that unites us. I am absolutely confident that the world will be predictable and stable only if it is multipolar.”66 In the first half of February 2003, the leaders of Russia, Germany, and France issued a joint declaration outlining their strong opposition to the war. Afterwards, Putin declared that he believed “we can consider that as a first step toward a multipolar world.’67 When matched with attempts to reinvigorate the SCO,68 the basis of an anti-hegemonic coalition, consisting of continental European and the Eurasian powers, appeared to be gaining traction. Preliminary Conclusions The implications of the row over the Iraq invasion have yet to be fully felt. There is some evidence which should mitigate some of the negative, long-term effects of the US invasion of Iraq. First, the continental alliance on Iraq, though symbolically important, was never conceived of as a formal alliance. There are no indications of high-level discussions of France and Germany leaving NATO, nor is there any evidence that the three powers wished to set up a counter alliance of their own or to actively support Saddam Hussein’s regime. Instead, opposition to US policy remained in the realm of rhetoric and, one could argue, had as much of a domestic political component to it as a geopolitical one.69 Moreover, neither country proposed a

meaningful way by which to block US actions in Iraq. Furthermore, immediately after the United States emerged victorious, there were a series of ‘kiss-and-make-up’ sessions between the US and its opponents. The most important of which were the series of meetings surrounding the celebrations of St. Petersburg’s three-hundredth anniversary in early June 2003.70 Repairing the US-Russian relationship was of particular importance to the Bush administration. It was reported that Bush’s National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice proposed the following formula for dealing with the Euro-Atlantic rifts: “Punish France, ignore Germany and forgive Russia.” During a meeting with Secretary of State Colin Powell, Putin told reporters that “[of] course, we have had a lot of argument recently concerning the Iraq problem, but we have successfully overcome those differences.”71 As a consequence of this policy, US-Russian relations, though considerably cooler, do not seem to have been fundamentally altered by the Iraq crisis. Nevertheless, the logic of the anti-hegemonic coalition -- balancing American power and influence in an attempt to increase the relative autonomy of the great powers -- remains. It is quite possible that, post-Gulf War II, a sea change has occurred through which the United States is no longer seen as a benign power, but rather a serious threat to the interests of other great powers. As is evidenced through an examination of the post-Cold War Russo-Chinese relationship, the link between Russian support, or at the very least, acquiescence to the unipolar system appears to be a driving force in the quality of this relationship: as the United States appeared increasingly hegemonic (via NATO expansion, unilateral uses of force, etc.), Russia sought an alliance with China in support of multipolarity. As support for the U.S. increased -either during the Kozyrev period or immediately following September 11th -- support for an anti-hegemonic waned. If a more negative perception of the United States becomes ingrained in

the Kremlin, it is likely that the construction of multipolarity will take center stage in Russia’s relations with the other great powers. In other words, Russia’s systemic aims (i.e., international system objective) will increasingly be the focus of its great power diplomacy. Although the logic of the Russo-Chinese relationship seems to have survived the postSeptember 11th U.S.-Russian rapprochement, there are a number of factors which will likely hamper the development of this relationship. First, it is clear that the relationship is not one of equals. Certainly Russia has an abundance of nuclear weapons, but it is a declining power both militarily and economically, whereas China is a rising power. These power differentials could lead to a situation in which Russia finds itself as the junior partner in the relationship. Unless Russia is able to drastically change the past decade of its socio-economic trends, Moscow will be forced eventually to make a fundamental choice: exist as a junior partner to the Americans or to the Chinese. If Beijing begins treating Russia like a junior partner, it could find that Moscow will defect from any anti-hegemonic coalition in search of a better modus vivendi with the United States. Second, and related to the first, there is the problem of Chinese immigration into the Russian Far East. The combination of an influx of Chinese immigrants and a declining Russian population may yield a demographic problem which is already being felt on the local level. Fears of Chinese irredentism, despite the formal settling of their border dispute, may also help to negatively affect relations between the two states. Thirdly, any effective anti-hegemonic coalition will require the support of India. Although Russo-Indian relations are quite good, the relationship between China and India has historically been poor: border skirmishes in the 1960s, the close relationship between China and India’s longtime enemy Pakistan, and the presence of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees in India have hampered the development of goodwill between Beijing and New Delhi.72 In addition, one of the reasons India chose to openly test

nuclear weapons was to increase its status in relation to China.73 Although Russia has an interest in acting as a mediator between its two potential allies,74 its growing military ties to China have caused some concern in New Delhi.75 Furthermore, neither China nor India seem enthusiastic about fully putting aside their differences despite some recent positive steps toward better relations.76 Finally, there is the problem of relations with the United States. Although both Beijing and Moscow wish to transition the international system to multipolarity, neither is willing to risk upsetting relations with the United States: both states see good relations with the U.S. as crucial for their economic reforms and direct conflict with the U.S. will likely hamper economic development. Moreover, the United States potentially has a lot to offer both states in terms of trade, admission to international organizations, and technological assistance. Thus, the anti-hegemonic coalition will likely only go as far as not to call into question Beijing’s and Moscow’s relations with the United States. Furthermore, both states have used their joint relationship as leverage over the United States: Moscow uses the threat of an alliance with China to put pressure on the United States on a variety of issues; Beijing does the same thing vis-à-vis Russia. Consequently, the Russo-Chinese alliance, although not without its logic, is inherently instrumental in nature: it is not based upon shared values or interests (except keeping the United States at bay). Thus, it is not without some irony that what appears at first glance to be an anti-American alliance could, in fact, be undermined by the necessities of having positive relations with the unipole. In the final analysis, the potential for the creation of an anti-hegemonic coalition rests in the three capitals, Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. For the first two, overcoming the problems inherent in their relationship and their dependence upon support from the West in general and the United States in particular, will be necessary if they are to have any chance of

effectively balancing the United States. For Washington, perceptions of its policies, and the way in which they are carried out, may be the decisive factor in determining whether, when, and how its dominance within the international system is seriously called into question. Unipolarity is an extremely rare event. Given the very real power differentials between the hegemon and the other states, it is even rarer for the other great powers to effectively alter the nature of the international system. All three states are marching into uncharted territory and the final result of the push for multipolarity and of America’s attempts to retain unipolarity has yet to be seen.

1.For some of the more recent literature on the current unipolar international system and systemic change within it, see A Multipolar Peace?, Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, (eds) (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994); International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, (eds.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); America’s Strategic Choices, Michael E. Brown, et al., (eds.) (Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press, 1997); The Rise of a Multipolar World, Werner Kaltefleiter and Ulrike Schumacher, (eds.) (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lange, 1997); Unipolar Politics, Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, (eds.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 2.Laura Neack, “Middle Powers Once Removed: The Diminished Global Role of Middle Powers and American Grand Strategy,” paper presented at International Studies Association Annual Convention, Los Angeles, CA, 2001. <http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/nal01/> 3.Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?,” International Security vol.27, no.4 (2003): 5-56. 4.Moreover, a pro-Western foreign policy was seen as hampering Russian economic and political reforms: criticisms of Kozyrev’s foreign policy fueled anti-democratic forces throughout the country. A foreign policy concept based upon Russia’s great power status could blunt these criticisms and help build a domestic constiuency for desperately needed reforms. 5.”China, Russia Issues Joint Statement,” Xinhua News Agency, 25 April 1996. 6.In fact, this joint statement is extremely undemocratic in tone: both states express their resistance to any outside interference with their domestic political or social structures. Thus, discussions of human rights, according to this dociment, are effectively off the table. 7.J.L. Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms? (Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). 8.qtd. in Chandler Rossenberger, “Moscow’s Multipolar Mission.” 9.”Russian-Chinese Join Declaration -- Full Text,” TASS, 23 April 1997. 10.”Each and every state has the right -- proceeding from its specific conditions -- to independently choose on its own a way of development without intervention on the part of other states. The existing differences between their social systems, ideologies, and systems of values must not become an impediment of th development of normal inter-state relations.” 11.China is amongst the world’s greatest human rights abusers and Russia scoffed at criticisms for its war in Chechnya. 12.Cited in Stephen Blank, “Which Way for Sino-Russian Relations?,” Orbis vol.42, no.3 (Fall 1998): 345-61. 13.For Russian actions, see: "Russia's Quest for Multipolarity: A Response to U.S. Hegemony," European Security vol.1, no.1, 2001.

14.Michael J. Barron, “China’s Strategic Modernization: The Russian Connection,” Parameters (Winter 2001-02): 72-86. 15.Elizabeth Wishnick, “Russia and China: Brothers Again?.” 16.Blank, “Which Way for Sino-Russian Relations?” 17.Xinhua News Agency, 1538gmt, 18 November 1996, reproduced as ”China and Russia Agree to Build Strategic Partnership,” in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 November 1996, SU/D2775/B. 18.Dmitry Gornostayev and Alexander Reutov, “In A Joint Declaration, Moscow And Beijing Come Out Against Unipolar World,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 24 April 1997, p.1, reproduced in Russian Press Digest; Dmitry Zaks, “Moscow, Beijing Stand Up to West,” Moscow Times, 24 April 1997. 19.Vladimir Kucherenko, “Why Did India Violate 'Atomic Proprieties'? Because It's Cheaper,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 15 May 1998, p.5, reproduced by Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press v.50, no.19 (10 June 1998): 10; Pavel Felgenhauer, “Flip Side of Multipolar Coin,” Moscow Times, 14 May1998. 20.ITAR-TASS, 0603 gmt, 3 November 1998, “Russian-Indian Consultations Pave the Way for Yeltsin Visit in December,” reproduced by BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 21.K.K. Katyal, “India, Russia to Strive for Multipolar World,” The Hindu, 23 December 1998; Martin Sieff, “Primakov Puts Russia in a Strategic Spot,” Washington Times, 27 December 1998, A10. 22.Katyal, “India, Russia to Strive for Multipolar World.” 23.Alexander Timofeyev and Alexei Bausin, “Primakov Forging Military Partnership,” Moscow News, 24 December 1998. 24. Timofeyev and Bausin, “Primakov Forging Military Partnership.” 25.”’Shanghai Five’ Useful in Regional Cooperation,” Interfax Russian News, 4 July 2000. 26.Michael Binyon, “Moscow and China Cement Anti-Nato Pact,” The Times (London), 25 August 1999, overseas news. 27.Sergei Blagov, “Muted Response to Russia's Call for Multipolar World,” InterPress Service, 26 August 1999. 28.”'Shanghai Five' Call For Multipolar World,” The Hindu, 26 August 1999. 29.”Shanghai Five' Call For Multipolar World.” 30.“Bishkek Declaration Praises Steps to Strengthen Security,” TASS, 25 August 1999.

31.ITAR-TASS, 0450gmt, 10 December 1999, “Text of Russian-Cinese Joint Statement on Summit,” reproduced in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 December 1999, SU/D3716/B. 32.Anatoly Adamishin, “How to Become a Standard-Bearer,” Vremya MN, 27 August 1999, p.6, reproduced in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press vol.51, no.34 (22 December 1999): 15. 33.Ching-Ching Ni, ‘China, Russia Bolster Central Asia Alliance’, Los Angeles Times, 15 June 2001, A1; John Pomfret and Peter Baker, ‘China’s Leader in Moscow to Sign Pact’, Washington Post, 16 July 2001, A9. 34.Xinhua News Agency (Beijing), 05:48 GMT, 15 June 2001, reproduced as ‘Full Text of Shanghai Cooperation Organization Declaration -- Xinhua’, in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 15 June 2001. 35.Martin Fackler, ‘New Asian Forum Criticizes Washington’, Associated Press, 15 June 2001. 36.John Pomfret and Peter Baker, “China's Leader in Moscow to Sign Pact,” Washington Post, 16 July 2001, A9. 37.White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf 38.‘“Full Text” of Joint Communique on 6th Regular Meeting of Sino-Russian Premiers’, World News Connection, FBIS-CHI-2001-0911. 39.Georgy Bovt, ‘An American Tragedy’, Izvestia, 12 September 2001, p. 2, reproduced as Russian Press Digest, 12 September 2001. 40.Anne Usher, ‘Foreign Minister Pledges Russian Cooperation Against Terrorism’, Associated Press, 19 September 2001. 41.It should be noted that a centralized, coherent effort against terrorism has not been established. However, it is important to note Ivanov’s sentiment as a general perception of the global threat of terrorism. Dina Pyanykh, ‘RD, US Should Draw Lessons from NYC, Washington Tragedy -- FM’, TASS, 12 September 2001. 42.‘Putin Says World must Unite to Combat “Plague of 21st Century”’, Agence France Presse, 11 September 2001. 43.Putin was quoted as characterizing September 11th as a series of ‘barbaric terrorist acts’ and ‘inhuman acts’. ‘Putin Outraged by ‘Barbaric Terrorist Attacks’ in US’, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11 September 2001. 44.Susan B. Glasser, ‘Russia Rejects Joint Military Action with United States’, Washington Post, 15 September 2001, p. A6. 45.‘Putin-Bush Contacts Develop Bilateral Relations -- Ivanov’, TASS, 20 September 2001.

46.‘Press Conference with Political Studies Institute Director Sergei Markov on RF-US Relations’, Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 6 February 2002. 47.Maksim Ysin, ‘America Task Force Goes to Georgia’, Izvestia, 28 February 2002, p. 1, reproduced in What the Papers Say, 28 February 2002. 48.‘Blair Says NATO-Russia Council Marks End of Cold War’, TASS, 28 May 2002. 49.‘Moscow Still Regards US Withdrawal from ABM Treaty a Mistake’, Diplomatic Panorama (Interfax News Agency), 1 August 2002; Svetlana Bebayeva, et al., ‘Washington Quits ABM Treaty’, Izvestia, 14 December 2001, 1, reproduced in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 53, no. 50, 9 January 2002. 50.It is certain that drafts of this report were developed prior to September 11th. However, the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington gave greater impetus to the need to fundamentally reevaluate Russia’s grand strategy. ‘Council on Foreign and Defense Policy Working Group on Russia and Globalization’, 8 October 2001, World News Connection, FBIS-SOV-2001-1113. 51.Ibid. 52.Lynch, ‘The Realism of Russia’s Foreign Policy’. 53.‘Russia Before the Start of the Twenty-First Century’, at http://www.svop.ru/yuka/831.shtml. 54.Huang Huizhu, ‘How Long with the Russian-US ‘Honeymoon’ Last’, Liaowang (Beijing), 22 October 2001, reproduced in World News Connection, FBIS-NES-2001-1101; ‘China’s International Environment after the War Against Terrorism’, Xinhua (Hong Kong Service), 10 January 2002, reproduced in World News Connection, FBIS-CHI-2002-0110. 55.See Gong Yaowen, ‘Can Russia and the United States Become Equal Partners?’ in Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), 18 November 2001, reproduced in World News Connection, FBIS-CHI-20011119. 56.Oliver August, ‘‘Stillborn’ Charter is Signed in Russia’, The Times (London), 8 June 2002, overseas news. 57.Ibid. 58.‘Putin Does Not Rule Out SCO Enlargement’, Diplomatic Panorama (Interfax News Agency), 10 June 2002. 59.Vladimir Skosyrev, ‘How to Hew a Window to Asia’, Vremya MN, 7 June 2002, p. 1, reproduced in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 54, no. 23, 3 July 2002. 60.Vladimir Isachenkov, ‘Asian Security Group Led by Russia and China Boosts Status, Anti-Terrorism Cooperation’, Associated Press, 7 June 2002.

61.Xinhua News Agency (Beijing), 7 June 2002, 15:52 GMT, ‘Chinese Agency Publishes “Full” Text of Shanghai Six Declaration in Russia’, in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 9 June 2002. 62.Radio Mayak (Moscow), 08:15 GMT, 14 June 2003, reproduced as ‘Collective Security Treaty Purely Defensive, Head Tells Russian Radio’, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 14 June 2003. 63.‘Is the World Becoming Multipolar Again?’, St. Petersburg Times, 6 December 2002. See also Xinhua News Agency Domestic Service (Beijing), 15:36 GMT, 2 December 2002, reproduced as ‘Xinhua Carries “Full Text” of 2 December Sino-Russian Joint Declaration’, in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 3 December 2002. 64.Steve Gutterman, ‘Russia, China Express Solidarity in Foreign Affairs, Vow to Deepen Cooperation’, Associated Press, 3 December 2002. 65.”Xinhua Carries ‘Full Text’ of 2 December Sino-Russian Joint Declaration,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 3 December 2002. 66.‘Interview Granted by President Vladimir Putin to France-3 Television’, Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 10 February 2003. 67.‘Putin: Iraq Declaration “Step Toward a Multipolar World”’, Agence France Presse, 12 February 2003. Also see several articles under the title ‘Have Russia, “Old Europe” Formed “Antiwar Entente”?’, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 55, no. 6 (12 March 2003), p. 2. 68.According to Igor Ivanov, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization could "play the role of one of the key supports in a multipolar world order.” “Shanghai CO National Coordinators Meet in Beijing,” TASS, 28 February 2003. 69.Schroeder certainly used anti-Americanism to help win his most recent election, which he was expected to either lose or barely hold on to power. He emerged victorious largely due to his opposition to the American invasion in Iraq. Chirac, too, witnessed a boost in his popularity amongst his constituents with this anti-American stance. 70.Vladimir Putin was mayor of the city before assuming the post of prime minister and later president. Bush’s attendance at the celebrations honoring Putin’s city were seen as symbolically important. Grigory Yavlinsky, ‘Patching Things Up at Putin's Northern Picnic’, St. Petersburg Times, 10 June 2003. 71.Tom Raum, ‘Bush is More Forgiving of Some War Critics than Others’, Associated Press, 16 May 2003. 72.C. V. Ranganathan, ‘India-China Relations: Problems and Prospects’, World Affairs, Vol. 2, no. 2 (April-June 1998); Sangeeta Thapliyal, ‘Indo-Pak Conflict and the Role of External Powers’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 22, no. 7 (October 1998) pp. 1067-1081.

73.M.V. Rappai, ‘India-China Relations and the Nuclear Realpolitik’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 23, no. 1 (April 1999) pp. 15-26. 74.Jyotsna Bakshi, ‘Russian Policy Towards South Asia’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 23, no. 8 (November 1999) pp. 1367-1398. 75.Jyotsna Bakshi, ‘Russia-China Military-Technical Cooperation: Implications For India’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 23, no. 4 (July 2000) pp. 633-667. 76.‘Modesty and Grand Strategy’, The Hindu, 28 September 2000.


				
DOCUMENT INFO
Shared By:
Categories:
Tags:
Stats:
views:30
posted:5/30/2009
language:Malay
pages:33