The Class of 1974

Document Sample
The Class of 1974 Powered By Docstoc
					The Class of 1974: Where Have All the Members Gone?

Melanie J. Blumberg California University of Pennsylvania blumberg@cup.edu John C. Green The University of Akron green@akron.edu William C. Binning Youngstown State University wcbinning@ysu.edu

Paper presented at the 2004 Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Hotel InterContinental, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 7-10, 2004.

Abstract

The 1974 midterm congressional election is considered to be a watershed event in American politics, as the Class of 1974 fundamentally reshaped the U. S. House of Representatives (Loomis 1988; Smith 1988; Schneider 1989). Not only was it successful in instituting a number of internal reforms, but it also was responsible for honing a new type of politics: Technical competence became as important, if not more important, than political ideology. The cohort mastered the art of incumbency, which helped a large number of “careerists” retain their seats nearly twice as long as the average House member. Their style of politics has since become the norm for others who are interested in making careers of serving their congressional districts. The paper examines the art of incumbency, as practiced by the Watergate Babies, and tracks the post-congressional careers of those who served at least eight terms.

The 1974 midterm congressional election is considered to be a watershed event in American politics, as the Class of 1974 fundamentally reshaped the U. S. House of Representatives (Loomis 1988; Smith 1988; Schneider 1989). Not only was it successful in instituting a number of internal reforms, but it also was responsible for honing a new type of politics: Technical competence became as important, if not more important, than political ideology. Smith (1988) credits former Congressman Wayne Hays (D-OH) with rewriting the House administrative rules in order to protect new members’ seats. Hays, Chair of the House Administration Committee, increased office allowances, which allowed members to expand their personal staffs thereby making it possible to handle more constituency casework. He also credits Hays with expanding traveling and mailing privileges so members could make more frequent trips to their districts and stay in touch with voters when they were not there in person. Some scholars (Robinson, 1981; Loomis 1988) tend to believe the classmates’ political skills are unmatched by others, with the exception of legendary figures such as Speaker Joe Cannon. Loomis (1988) explains: . . . [T]he Watergate babies have survived impressively, in both their [initial] reelection bids . . . and their subsequent electoral challenges. For all their reformist origins, the 1974 entrants have acted pragmatically in shoring up their local political bases. In fact, they discovered that their office resources serve them both as policy activists and sensitive representatives of their districts. To this end, many 1974 newcomers found that developing sophisticated local enterprises could give them a great deal of flexibility in pursuing their policy goals on Capitol Hill. (8-9) Congressman George Miller (D-CA) noted that reelection was a central goal for the Democratic cohorts. Approximately 80 percent of them attended a weekend retreat one month after taking office. Issue workshops dotted the agenda, but the sessions that

2 attracted the most participants involved strategies to enhance incumbents’ reelection chances (Schneider 1989). According to Schneider (1989), class members recognized the reputation for being problem-solvers would not create as strong an attachment between themselves and their constituents as would reputations for being ideologues. If they delivered on their promises, they would be in little electoral jeopardy while failure to keep their word could result in electoral defeat. In an effort to lessen the possibility of voter defection, the freshman “perfected the skills of incumbency protection and constituency service” (Schneider 1989: 57). The contention that reelection is the primary goal of most members is not new and certainly not particular to any one cohort (Mayhew 1974b). Rather than argue the Class of 1974 was single-minded in its pursuit of electoral success, perhaps it is as important to recognize it also marked the beginning of a new era in Congress, one marked by greater individualism, more activism, brief apprenticeships, sophisticated technology, and media relations. In addition to running permanent campaigns—a hallmark of contemporary politics— the freshman class was set on reforming the institution. One former Watergate Baby recalls how the classmates started their freshman year: As we came together just after Thanksgiving Day 1974 in Washington, there seemed to be an almost ‘oneness of mind’ about making changes in procedures of the House as we interpreted the voter reaction to the problems of Watergate which had helped to propel many of us through the election. Even before we had our first meeting with the Democratic [C]aucus, we had met several times as a group . . . and decided that we needed to work out some strategy to follow if we were going to ‘make our voice[s] be heard.’ Two areas that gained

3 initial support were to challenge certain sitting committee chairman through our insistence that the [C]aucus should formally vote on the election of committee chairman, not just award the seat to the senior Democrat, alive and breathing, even barely. The other reform we thought was important was a change in some rules in committees such as keeping all committee meetings, including mark-ups, open to the public unless they were closed by a majority vote.1 (Blumberg 1995: 43) According to this former member, the group met fairly regularly because they believed it was possible to reform Congress if they were armed with sufficient information and mounted an organized effort. The Watergate Babies mark an important transition in congressional politics: They were both policy-oriented and media-savvy (Robinson 1981; Loomis 1988; Schneider 1989) and, in Schneider’s words, “committed to a new kind of politics—a politics of ideas” (39). To what degree did the Class of 1974 perfect the art of incumbency? Where have all the members gone thirty years after the watershed election? It is difficult to dispute the cohort’s success at the polls: Thirty of the original 92member class served at least eight terms, which is almost twice as long as the average tenure, with ten of them making the twenty-year mark and four still showing no signs of retiring. Many of the “careerists” have continued their policy advocacy in their postcongressional careers, whether in an appointive office or with a nonprofit organization or as political consultants. The paper examines the art of incumbency, as practiced by the Watergate Babies, and tracks the post-congressional careers of those who were responsible for making a new style the politics the norm in Congress. Literature Review A review of the literature on both victory and defeat suggests that incumbent electoral outcomes rest on fourteen variables. It appears incumbents have a significant degree of

4 control over their own electoral fortunes, but nonetheless there are small number who do everything “right” and still lose. This seems to indicate variables may be grouped at the very least into two categories: factors over which incumbents have full control and factors over which incumbents have no control. However, a detailed examination of the findings suggest that a much more complex relationship among the variables exists. It is more accurate to cluster variables into four groups: (1) direct factors or factors over which incumbents have full control, (2) indirect factors or factors over which incumbents have semi-control, (3) outside factors or factors over which incumbents have no control, and (4) challenger strength.2 Direct Factors Those factors over which incumbents have full control include: personal conduct, district attentiveness, self-controlled visibility, policy leadership, ideological compatibility, and campaign spending. Personal Conduct A number of scholars suggest that charges of ethical misconduct may have the most deleterious consequences for incumbents who seek reelection. Peters and Welch (1980) find a significant number of candidates accused of wrongdoing, particularly charges related to moral issues, are either defeated in their reelection bids or resign rather than risk losing. Ragsdale and Cook (1987) conclude that ethical problems tend to increase challenger political action committee (PAC) contributions, which is a sure sign of incumbent vulnerability. Other earlier research is mostly descriptive. There is a time lag between the Peters and Welch (1980) and Ragsdale and Cook (1987)

5 studies and other quantitative work. The House bank scandal provided an opportunity for researchers to objectively evaluate the impact of scandal on congressional careers. Groseclose and Krehbiel (1994) and Jacobson and Dimock (1994) suggest bank overdrafts provide one explanation for the high number of retirements, primary election defeats, and general election defeats in 1992. According to Jacobson and Dimock (1994), although the check-writers were not defeated systematically, their abuses were “far more damaging when exploited by an experienced, well-financed challenger” (601). Groseclose and Krehbiel (1994) suggest the “golden parachute” prompted many members to cut their losses: Incumbents who took office prior to January 8, 1980 had to retire before the One Hundred Third Congress if they wished to convert their campaign funds into personal use. Kiewiet and Langche (1993) are cautious about attributing the exceptionally high number of retirements solely to the scandal; rather, they conclude the turnover rate may be explained by a combination of redistricting and the “golden parachute.” District Attentiveness It is generally believed that opinion leaders and a small number of voters pay attention to their representatives’ voting records, while the majority of the electorate view members as ombudsman or mediators between the people and bureaucracy. Although it is difficult to convince congresspeople otherwise, some scholars suggest there is not a significant correlation between the direct use of constituency service and vote choice (Mann & Wolfinger 1980; Johannes & McAdams 1981; Johannes 1984). According to Mann and Wolfinger (1980), the “reputation for service” (628) is more important than the provision of service. District constituents, even if they have personally requested their

6 representative’s assistance, know they may contact his or her office for help with a variety of services, such as resolving a problem with a government agency, securing tickets for a White House tour, or obtaining a flag that flew over the Capitol. The perception of service is as important, if not more important, than the performance of service. Fiorina (1977) suggests that it is entirely rational to vote for the incumbent; after all, “[e]xperience in Washington and congressional seniority count when dealing with the bureaucracy” [italics omitted] (51). Most members maintain a balance between their “Washington careers” and “constituency careers” (Fenno 1978) in pursuit of influence and reelection, respectively. Those in the “expansionist” stage of their constituency careers devote a disproportionate amount of their resources to their districts in an effort to cultivate images of being caring, responsible representatives (Fenno 1978: 215). Fenno (1978) attributes incumbent popularity to “home style” or the allocation of resources—time and staff—to the district, the building of constituency trust, and the extent of constituency service. Members from marginal districts, especially, must appeal to partisans of the opposition party and independents in order to succeed. One way is to place a greater emphasis on constituency service rather than on policy positions. When congresspeople engage in practices such as advertising, credit claiming, and position taking (Mayhew 1974b), they emphasize both personal qualities and individual accomplishments. Fowler and McClure (1989) hold that “[i]cumbents wage permanent reelection campaigns by creating a constant personal presence in their districts” (5). Hibbing

7 (1991), however, suggests there is little relationship between electoral success and trips home. There are those who argue that constituency casework has a significant impact on voters’ perceptions of members. Yiannakis (1981) explains that citizens must be satisfied with the service they receive in order for representatives to benefit from handling personal problems. Serra and Cover (1992) indicate that the performance of casework should carry electoral benefits with it, while Moon and Serra (1994) suggest “service responsiveness has an electoral payoff for incumbents regardless of issue positions or other factors “ (205). Moreover, Jones (1992) argues that contact between either members and constituents or personal staff and constituents “works despite partisan predispositions against the incumbent” (23). According to Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987), “when it comes to evaluating their representatives, policy considerations decline sharply, and constituency assistance and district service considerations” (51) become more important than policy making. Schiff and Smith (1983) detect two trends in their study of personal staffing allocations and duties: an increase in the size of district staffs and a modest increase in the amount of casework processed in district offices. Epstein and Frankovic (1982) suggest that staffing makes a difference in how members are perceived by their constituents, but Johannes (1984) maintains that it is “a dubious measure of casework or even constituency orientation” (266).3 Fiorina (1981) holds that tangible district benefits, which are a different type of constituency service, account for a modest degree of voter support. Stein and Bickers

8 (1994) find that vulnerable incumbents are more likely to place an important emphasis on securing rewards for their districts than do safe incumbents. As important, average district voters are either oblivious to their own member’s efforts or simply do not care. On the other hand, the attentive public, aware of the projects, tend to evaluate their own representative favorably. Anagnoson (1982) adds that it is the timing of the announcement, not the actual project, which affects vote choice. Self-controlled visibility Cook (1988, 1989) writes extensively on the importance of press secretaries: They assist members in mastering media techniques, act as liaisons between the representatives and the media, and help members develop images as issue authorities. While they perform important functions, neither they nor the legislators fully control media coverage of the members. There is one important way in which incumbents are able to promote themselves, the franking privilege. Frantzich (1982) writes that mailings, which are sent at taxpayers’ expense, allow members to communicate with their constituents on a regular basis. According to Frantzich (1982), “[t]he possibilities are almost endless” (172): Questionnaires, survey results, newsletters, issue updates, town hall meeting notices, government publications, congratulatory messages, calendars, and certificates are only a few of the creative types of communication between congressional offices and district residents. Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987) explain how members “bombard constituents with missives containing a predominance of favorable material” (10). It is little wonder these

9 contacts increase incumbents’ recognition and approval ratings (Cover & Brumberg 1987). Although there is a plethora of information on the franking privilege, there are only a few systematic studies of the practice (National Taxpayers Union 1990, 1992; Blumberg 1995; Blumberg, Green, & Best 1996). According to National Taxpayers Union (NTU) officials, descriptive statistics indicate members from marginal districts spend more on mailing than do those from safe districts, which implies that representatives who are in jeopardy of losing their seats attempt to bolster their images as hard-working and caring legislators by advertising and claiming credit for what they have done for their districts. In addition to promoting their accomplishments, they are “buying” greater name recognition, as well as an informational advantage, over potential challengers. More important, they are increasing their vote totals (Blumberg 1995; Blumberg, Green, & Best 1996). Policy Leadership Many newer members are recognized for their issue activism (Robinson 1981; Loomis 1988). A number of them adopt issue positions in attempts to develop strong followings among their constituents and become experts in given fields. As part of their policy leadership, they sponsor or co-sponsor legislation that is important to their districts. Ragsdale and Cook (1987) restate Mayhew’s (1974b) classic argument: “[T]he introduction of such bills presents ripe opportunities for credit claiming, position taking, and advertising—all of which are perceived to pay off at the polls” (50). Not only does it add to the advantage incumbents have over challengers, but it may help members in their Washington careers by setting them apart from their colleagues as experts on particular

10 issues thus expediting their acquisition of coveted committee assignments or committee leadership posts. Ideological Compatibility Converse (1964), in his seminal article, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” suggests that most individuals, with the exception of political elites, opinion leaders, and a small number of voters, have unconstrained belief systems. Their inability to think consistently across similar issues leaves them without means to structure an otherwise complex political world along ideological lines. Erickson, Luttbeg, and Tedin (1980), in an analysis of presidential voting, argue that “[p]eople whose votes are shaped by the policy views of the candidates undoubtedly come largely from the ranks of ‘ideologues’” (215). Others base their decisions on criteria such as partisanship, candidates image, particular issues, recent events, or group associations. Most voters, by inference, may reward or punish House incumbents based on criteria other than the extent to which voting records coincide with their own policy concerns or worldviews. Many other scholars however, take issue with the portrayal of the American voter as a nonideological and ill-informed citizen. Johannes and McAdams (1981) and Bond, Covington, and Fleisher (1985) are among the first political scientists to recognize enough voters make their choices on the basis of policy compatibility with their member of Congress to affect election outcomes. It does not appear that an errant vote automatically signals defeat, especially if the legislation is not particularly salient to their district; rather, the member’s ideological voting pattern, which is developed over time, is the key to electoral success or failure.

11 Parker and Parker (1993) suggest representatives have numerous opportunities to vote their own conscience, as information costs are relatively high. However, the possibility of voter defection is reduced if the members are not risk-takers namely, if they refrain from shirking. Shirking, the practice of a legislator voting his or her own conscience when it is odds with the district ideology, is studied by many economists (Kau & Rubin 1979, 1982; Peltzman 1984; Kalt & Zupan 1990). Each reaches a slightly different conclusion. According to Kau and Rubin (1979), there appears “to be something that is significantly and systematically associated with voting which correlates with the ratings given to congressmen by ideological groups” (384): It may be a combination of demographic characteristics, economic factors, and members’ ideology. They later suggest that “a representative’s ideology will be the same as the prevailing ideology of his or her district” (Kau & Rubin 1982: 33). If a congressperson deviates too far from the district ideology, for whatever reason, he or she may suffer the electoral consequences. Peltzman (1984) suggests that “voters do not vote randomly” (184). In general, “liberals and conservatives tend to appeal to voters with systematically different incomes, education, and occupations” (210). Peltzman (1984) claims that ideology plays a “prominent role” (210), especially with respect to salient social issues such as abortion rights. According to Kalt and Zupan (1990), members from time to time vote their own conscience as opposed to their constituents’

12 interests; nonetheless, district demographics and ideological preferences relate to the type of legislators voters choose to support. Jackson and Kingdon (1992) question the body of literature on ideological shirking, maintaining that legislative voting is driven by a number of factors, among them: reelection considerations, partisanship, careerism, and institutional power. Carson and Oppenheimer (1984) argue it is more important to examine the distance between legislators and their constituents on demographic characteristics, economic factors, and voter preferences rather than focus on interest group ratings that are based on carefully selected recorded votes. Campaign Spending Jacobson and Kernell (1981) suggest that campaign spending by House incumbents has little effect on election outcomes, but the opposite is true for challengers who must compensate for generally not having name recognition, high visibility, and reputations for service. Jacobson (1980, 1990a, 1990b) explains that “[c]hallengers have a fighting chance only if they are able to use the campaign period to neutralize the incumbent’s informational advantage” (31), which can only be accomplished by having adequate funding. Incumbents normally spend between 60 and 80 percent more than their opponents and, once incumbents perceive their seats are threatened, they tend to increase campaign expenditures substantially (Jacobson 1983). At some point there is an inverse relationship between incumbent spending and the votes it buys (Jacobson 1980, 1983, 1990a, 1990b). Voters tend to perceive the increased spending as a statement of incumbent

13 concerns about the electoral outcome. Thomas (1989) disagrees with the theory of diminishing returns. He writes that “an incumbent can usually increase his [or her] vote by increasing his [or her] campaign expenditures” (973) and centers his argument on the assumption that voter support of incumbents is based on factors such as partisanship, constituency service, and name recognition. He considers this an effective means by which incumbents protect their support bases. Green and Krasno (1988, 1990) also disagree with Jacobson. They discount his argument that spending means more for the challenger than it does for the incumbent: It is important to both contestants. Krasno, Green, and Cowden (1994) discuss the advantage incumbents have in raising campaign contributions throughout the election cycle. Opponents “start out behind, and incumbents are able to mobilize the resources to make sure they stay out there” (473). Goldberg and Traugett (1984) suggest that incumbents do not always outspend opponents: Most incumbents are Sure Winners whose spending appears much more modest once the relatively few high spending Vulnerables are considered separately . . . . Most challengers are Hopefuls, and their spending appears more robust once the low-spending Sure Losers are treated separately. Hopefuls spend more than confident incumbents. (84) Jacobson (1990b) offers a different perspective by attributing the low level of competition in House races to the inability of challengers to raise enough money to wage serious campaigns. The inability of opponents to attract contributors is due in large

14 measure to their less than stellar credentials. Abramowitz (1991) tends to agree with this portrayal, arguing that campaign spending in the “most important determinant of the level of competition in a House election” (53). Alexander and Bauer (1991) describe “token” challengers as those candidates who are merely “a name on the ballot” (54) and have inadequate resources to buy media time. They only opportunity a “token” challenger has a good chance of defeating an incumbent is if the sitting member becomes embroiled in a scandal during the campaign. No matter how the inability of challengers to raise adequate funds is explained, the truth is inescapable: Most challengers are at a sever disadvantage in their efforts to raise campaign contributions and thus wage increasingly expensive battles. Indirect Factors Those factors over which incumbents have semi-control include: campaign contributions, legislative leadership, and media visibility. Campaign Contributions Closely tied to campaign spending, which is under the direct control of incumbents, are campaign contributions. Although fundraising is time consuming, it presents few problems for incumbents as opposed to challengers. Perceived incumbent vulnerability, however, serves to help challengers raise money (Jacobson 1980, 1983, 1990a, 1990b; Jacobson & Kernell 1981; Ragsdale & Cook 1987; Alexander & Bauer 1991). Alexander and Bauer (1991) indicate that challengers have more success in attracting contributions if incumbents are accused of ethical misconduct. If it appears that a challenger has good chance of unseating the incumbent, the

15 challenger’s party contributes more money to the campaign and may send a professional campaign coordinator to the district. Many PACs and individual contributors may give money to both candidates in an effort to maintain a line of communication in Congress in the event the incumbent is defeated. When incumbent and challenger campaign contributions are relatively close, the electoral margin barrows. When a challenger raises more money than the incumbent, the likelihood of incumbent defeat increases significantly (Blumberg 1995; Blumberg, Green, & Best 1996). Legislative Leadership Much has been written about the significance of institutional leadership positions, such as Speaker of the House, majority and minority leaders, and majority and minority whips, and the prestige of committee chairmanships and assignments to congressional careers (Ray 1982; Ragsdale & Cook 1987; Groseclose 1994). Loomis (1988) explains that even members who hold subcommittee chairmanships are able to capitalize on their positions. Many issue-oriented men and women who “through good fortune and substantial political skills—chair subcommittees and thus enter the increasingly important ‘middle management’ that is central to running the contemporary Congress” (Loomis 1988: 6) use the positions of power to build their Washington careers. These members are able to translate their leadership abilities into votes by projecting images of being well respected by their colleagues, a strategy which was employed by the Class of 1974 Democrats. Moreover, both committee and subcommittee chairs have opportunities to influence legislation that may benefit their constituencies and, in turn, translate into additional votes.

16 Media Visibility Incumbents, in general, are more visible than are their opponents. Mann and Wolfinger (1980) suggest that House members “are almost universally recognized by voters in their districts” (622). This may be due, in part, to the “informational advantage” (Fiorina 1977) incumbents have over challengers. Fiorina explains that information about incumbents is normally less controversial than is information about opponents. The media play a critical role with respect to the visibility of some House members. Robinson (1981) suggests there is “a symbiotic [italics omitted] relationship” (76) between House members and the local media because reporters are extremely reliant on the information provided by the offices. According to Robinson (1981),“[t]he result is safer incumbency” (90). Larson (1990), in her study of a single congressional district, concludes that very few individuals react negatively to their representative when his or her roll call vote is not I n agreement with their own personal preferences. In a pretest-posttest experiment, she gauged readers’ reactions to articles in a daily community paper about a member’s voting record. The key to voter tolerance of an errant vote may be objective reporting by the newspaper rather than a skewed analysis. Cook (1989) explains that representatives are inclined to favor local media coverage and making news is easier if there are regional correspondents in Washington. The amount of coverage, however, varies across congressional districts (Cook 1989; Salmore & Salmore 1989) due in large measure to the nature of media markets. Cook (1989)

17 explains that “the boundaries of many districts do not coincide either with circulation areas for major newspapers or with television markets” (40). As the size of the metropolitan area increases, the likelihood of regular coverage decreases. There also is the question of what is newsworthy. Graber (1989) discusses the action versus process dichotomy: In general, the executive branch and, more specifically the president, receives more coverage than does the legislative branch because the former concentrates on what is being accomplished (action) and the latter focuses on how it is being accomplished (process). Action is more interesting than process, especially given the proclivity of the media to cover events with visual impact. Cook (1988) explains how legislators optimize their opportunities to make the news. He writes that almost all members employ press secretaries who generally perform one of two functions, depending on the way they perceive their jobs: They either act as liaisons between the congressional offices and the local media or they help members with their legislative agendas. Cook (1988) suggests that the behavior of some members id similar to what Kernell (1986) describes in Going Public when presidents attempt to sell their policy preferences to the citizenry; in this instance, legislators sell themselves to the public as issue spokespeople. Members of Congress appear to benefit from increased visibility regardless of how their press secretaries are utilized. Visibility, to be sure, usually helps incumbents. The question remains whether it works for the challenger as well. Stokes and Miller (1966) argued, nearly four decades ago, that “recognition carries a positive valance; to be perceived at all is to be perceived favorably” (205). The authors suggested that anytime the public has information about

18 the challenger, the possibility for significant voter defection increased. More recent work takes the scholars to task. In some instances, such as coverage of ethical problems, this may not be true. Adverse publicity relating to ethical misconduct may have serious ramification for incumbents (Peters & Welch 1980; Ragsdale & Cook 1987; Alexander & Bauer 1991). Robinson (19810, however, emphasizes that the local media are generally softer on changes of scandal and corruption than are the national media. This aside, press secretaries believe “the media have become harder, tougher, and more cynical” (Robinson 1981: 55) than in the past. Press secretaries and legislators alike indicate that “Watergate was the watershed” (Robinson 1981: 51) event, which marked the close of an era of friendly media coverage. Other types of media coverage also may affect incumbent electoral chances. Ragsdale and Cook (1987) suggest that exposure on national broadcasts often has a negative impact on incumbents, as “it may create the impression that members pay insufficient attention to district concerns” (51). According to Clarke and Evans (1983), newspapers tend to run stories about incumbents during the course of elections that “carry the mantel of objective reporting” (84). They are not sure whether newspaper endorsements affect election outcomes to a significant degree because there are an insufficient number of challenger endorsements to study. MacKuen and Coombs (1981), in a twenty-eight state study of senatorial and gubernatorial newspaper endorsements, explain that the backing of candidates, whether incumbents or challengers, carry significant weight with respect to electoral outcomes.’

19 However, editorial boards are more likely to support incumbents as opposed to challengers. The impact visibility has on electoral outcomes cannot be disputed, as it gives incumbents decided advantages over opponents. When challengers gain name recognition among voters and are able to command their attention, support for incumbents is likely to erode somewhat. Outside Factors Those factors over which incumbents have no control include: district partisanship, presidential approval (incumbent the same party as the president), the national economy, and the district economy. District Partisanship Few would dispute Erikson (1976) and Payne’s (1980) early contentions that safe one-party districts virtually ensure incumbent electoral success. Moreover, Hinckley (1971) argues that once elected, a House member is returned to Congress even if opposition party identifiers outnumber those of the incumbent’s party. According to Mann (1978), “[s]ome incumbents have made safe seats of what by the balance of partisan identifiers ought to be competitive or opposition party seats (94). Hinckley (1981), among others, suggests that incumbency has become a low-cost voting cue. Or, as Mayhew (1974a) argues in his study of vanishing marginals, it may the result of the “weakening of the particular links that party has supplied between the electorate and government” (314). Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987), however, continue to recognize the importance of party loyalty. According to the authors, party

20 identification is “the single most important variable affecting” (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina 1987: 9) congressional election outcomes. In general, “[p]artisan attachments lend stability to electoral results, although the level of loyalty and its impact on the vote have declined in recent years” (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina 1987: 9). Other scholars seem to take similar positions, albeit from a slightly different perspective. Cover (1977) holds that the partisan leanings of some opposition party voters prevent “them from supporting the incumbent as overwhelmingly as do those belonging to the incumbent’s party” (536). Bond, Covington, and Fleisher (1985) write: “Many . . . partisan misfits are able to survive reelection. Nonetheless, such incumbents are more vulnerable than those with partisan ties to the majority of the electorate in their districts” (516). Presidential Approval and the National Economy Tufte (1975) maintains that “the vote cast in midterm congressional elections is a referendum on the performance of the President and his administration’s management of the economy” (824). There is, however, a lack of consensus concerning the relationship between national economic conditions and presidential job performance ratings and their impact on vote choice in congressional elections. Hibbing and Alford (1981) confirm Tufte’s (1975) findings at the individual level, but others are more skeptical. For example, Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) find little evidence to support the notion that individuals “punish the incumbent party for their misfortunes” (521); instead, “voters make collective economic judgments based on their partisan predispositions and from their appraisal of changes in national economic conditions” (495). This is referred to as

21 “sociotropic voting.” Kiewiet (1981), in his analysis of policy-oriented voting, suggests that voters most concerned with unemployment, which is an important economic indicator, tend to support Democratic candidates. In fact, Lipset and Schneider (1983) explain that a one percent increases in the unemployment rate, with no change in the rate of inflation, reduces confidence in Congress by 4.1 percent. A number of scholars maintain that voters judge a president on criteria other than how they perceive the administration is handling the economy. MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992), for example, credit voters with basing their opinions of presidential job performance on rational expectations or prospective evaluations of how the economy will behave. They do not, however, examine the impact of these expectations on voting behavior. This perspective is not without its critics. Clarke and Stewart (1994) consider the measure to be flawed and suggest that retrospective evaluations remain a significant indicator of presidential approval. They acknowledge the “banker” model (prospective evaluations) does have important implications for presidential approval ratings, but it does not have the explanatory power that the authors claim it has. Yantek (1982) is among the growing number of political scientists and economists who question the impact that economic conditions are reported to have on presidential job performance ratings; he argues, instead, that significant domestic and foreign events play a more important part in how most citizens evaluate the way presidents handle their jobs. He does not address the impact of presidential approval ratings on congressional election outcomes as do Marra and Ostrom (1989). They suggest that presidential job performance “mediates the direct impact of the economy on congressional election outcomes”

22 (Marra & Ostrom 1989: 567) due, in no small measure, to the relationship between events and presidential evaluations. They find this to be true for on-year as well as off-year elections. Feldman (1982) offers a different explanation based on classical liberalism: Due to the American ethic of self-reliance, “personal economic grievances are not connected to political activity and have little effect on voting decisions” (464). The District Economy Owens (1984) appears to be one of a small number of researchers who has studied the effect of district economic conditions on House elections. He explains that “disaggregating national economic indicators . . . better approximates the immediate economic environment of the individual voter, inasmuch as economic conditions vary greatly across the nation (Owens 1984: 130). The data for three elections (1976, 1978, and 1980) indicate little correlation between the district economy and vote choice, although he admits that other factors (e.g., district partisanship and district socioeconomic composition) may confound the findings. Blumberg (1995) and Blumberg, Green, and Best (1996), however, suggest that when the district economy, as measured by the local unemployment rate, are worse than national economy, as measured by the national unemployment rate, voters tend to support the incumbent. Fishel, Gopoian, and Stacey (1987), on the other hand, maintain “that the state unemployment trend from the year preceding the election significantly affects the fate of incumbent senators, regardless of their party. Incumbents representing states with declining economies can expect to pay the price a election time” (27-28).

23 Challenger Strength Given the electoral success of incumbents, challengers appear to be nothing more than “sacrificial lambs” (Canon 1993). The very perception of incumbent strength discourages those who could provide the most serious challenge from entering the race (Jacobson 1981, 1989, 1990b; Jacobson & Kernell 1983; Kazee 1983). Strong opponents are loath to waste their personal and political capital in what may well be no-win situations. Banks, Kiewiet, and Roderick (1989) suggest that a weak challenger, in an effort to increase his or her probability of success, runs against an incumbent rather than wait for an open seat to become available. Opportune times to contest elections (e.g., open seats or incumbent retirements) are not the same for weak challengers as they are for strong opponents. Weak challengers often choose to run against incumbents to avoid facing strong challengers from the same party in the primaries, elections they are likely to lose. Mack (1992) and Jacobson (1981, 1989, 1990b) are two of a small group of researchers who address the issue of repeat challengers. Repeat challengers generally do better in subsequent elections, having gained campaign experience and name recognition; but, they “only have an impact on the very closest of races” (Mack 1992: 9). Mack (1992) indicates that their success rate is nit very impressive, as less than 20 percent of them defeat incumbents who are tainted by scandal. Canon (1993) makes a distinction between ambitious amateurs and experienceseeking amateurs. Similar to experienced candidates, ambitious amateurs tend to contest elections when district and national conditions are favorable. According to Canon

24 (1993), ambitious amateurs are four times as successful as are their experience-seeking counterparts in defeating incumbents. Berkman (1994) contends that many amateur politicians will be replaced by state legislators as long as term limits exist at the state level. Fowler and McClure (1989) identify another problem for weak challengers. “Washington money men” (175) are apt to dismiss candidates unceremoniously if their chances of success appear minimal. Once the district is written off, a “self-fulfilling prophecy” (Fowler & McClure 1989: 175) takes hold: Predicted loss becomes actual loss. Herrnson (2000) cautions that incumbency is not a guarantee of success, as a small number of challengers actually “have realistic chances of winning” (226) under certain conditions: First-term House members and incumbents who are implicated in a scandal, have a series of roll-call votes that are out of sync with constituents, or possess other liabilities” (226) may draw stiff competition. “Political experience and campaign professionalism” (Herrnson 2000: 233) are key to mounting strong challenges, including the ability to build hefty campaign war chests. Although there are exceptions to the rule, “incumbents tend to win because they frequently face weak challengers” (Maisel, Irvy, Ling, & Pennix 1996). Once an incumbent is perceived as being vulnerable, a strong opponent is likely to surface. The Art of Incumbency The literature review, which includes numerous studies conducted after the significant institutional reforms and changes in congressional behavior, suggests that incumbents

25 may control their own electoral fates. The Class of 1974 perfected the art of incumbency as no other cohort had previously. At the ten-year mark, 38 of the original 92-member class had retained their seats and only 24 had been defeated in their reelection bids with four of the them holding on until 1984 when Ronald Reagan won reelection in a proverbial landslide, as shown in the Appendix A.5 It was another eight years before five more class members would lose their reelection bids, some of whom were chastised by voters for their involvement in the House Bank scandal and other improprieties: Three were defeated in the primary election and the others lost in November.6 After serving in the House for two decades, nine class members remained: George Miller (D-CA), Norman Mineta (D-CA), Henry Waxman (D-CA), Henry Hyde (R-IL), Jim Oberstar (DMN), John LaFalce (D-NY), Bill Hefner (D-NC), Bill Goodling ((R-PA), and Harold Ford (D-TN). Thirty years after the Watergate Babies redefined the House, three Democrats and one Republican show no signs of stepping aside: George Miller, Henry Waxman, Jim Oberstar, and Henry Hyde. There is little doubt the “incumbency effect” gives House members a decided edge over their opponents, but it seems reasonable to assume that not all variables mentioned in the literature have a significant impact on electoral outcomes when analyzed together. It is our contention that incumbents have almost total control over their electoral fortunes and other factors over which they have either little or no control may only serve to exacerbate problems the officeholders bring upon themselves.

26 The sample is a subset of the 92-member class and consists of 53 of the original members or a pooled sample of 278, accounting for the attrition rate. Members who either left the House to pursue other career paths, such as contesting a gubernatorial election, or who were defeated in the primary election are not included in the sample.7 Assuming the late Speaker of the House Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill was correct in saying “all politics is local” (O’Neill & Hymel 1994), it is instructive to focus on the effect of district-level phenomena on congressional election outcomes rather than to rely on aggregate data.8 Much of the detailed discussion centers on the members whose congressional careers were cut short, as there are important lessons to be learned from their behavior. Data Analysis It is argued that direct factors over which incumbents have full control determine House election results, as shown in Table 1. Indirect factors have little or no bearing on election outcomes and outside factors serve to compound problems incumbents make for themselves.9 In rare circumstances when incumbents appear to do everything “right,” outside factors, such as the partisan imbalance in the district or low presidential approval ratings in an off-year election, may lead to electoral defeat.10

27 Table 1 Logistic Regression Analysis of Election Outcomes in the U. S. House of Representatives 1976 through 1984: The Class of 1974 Election Outcomes Variable cspend ethics party wh ideo print constant Goodness of fit Percent of cases Predicted correctly Beta 9.312* 4.813* 1.281* 2.711* .301** -4.214** 4.310* 210.15* r .28 .21 .20 .18 .08 -.06 --

96.37% N = 278

* Significant at .05 level or better ** Significant at .01 level or better Source: The data are compiled from multiple sources, which may be found in Appendix B. Direct Factors Incumbents have full control over six factors: personal conduct, district attentiveness, self-controlled visibility, policy leadership, ideological compatibility, and campaign spending. Personal Conduct. Personal conduct refers to charges and convictions of ethical wrongdoing, including: campaign finance violations, conflict of interest, bribery, abuse of congressional prerogatives, and morals charges (Peters & Welch 1980). Ethical

28 misconduct is a slippery variable to quantify, as there is no way to be certain whether all charges or abuses are detected.11 As important, some charges of misbehavior are questionable. For example, Mark Hannaford (D-CA), Jim Lloyd (D-CA), and Marty Russo (D-IL) were accused by their opponents of supporting Wayne Hays in his effort to retain his committee chairmanship. Their challengers attempted to link them to the scandal, but the charges were unfounded and did not affect their 1976 reelection bids.12 Peters and Welch (1980) find that some instances of ethical misconduct are more important than others in ending incumbents’ careers: morals charges, bribery charges, and campaign violations. This was the case in the defeats of Allan Howe (D-UT), John Jenrette (D-SC), and George Hansen (R-ID). Following his conviction on sex solicitation charges, Howe received a suspended sentence and small fine. Local Democratic leaders urged him to withdraw from the race, but he maintained his innocence (Southwick with Speights 1976) and was defeated after having served only one term. Jenrette and Hansen withstood challenges longer than expected given the seriousness of their legal problems. Jenrette overcame charges of adultery and drunkenness stemming from his high profile divorce (Congressional Quarterly Special Report 1976), but had more serious problems: He reached an out-of-court settlement with a business partner who accused him of converting profits for personal use and was investigated by federal authorities for illegal land deals and using his influence to help drug dealers access air strips in South Carolina (Jones 1980). In 1980, voters finally ousted him from office after his involvement in Abscam—a government undercover sting operation—was made public (Congressional Quarterly Special Report Supplement 1980).

29 Hansen served five terms before being defeated. He weathered a federal conviction on campaign finance law violations, but came under severe criticism when his wife started a direct-mail campaign to raise money to pay their personal debts (Congressional Quarterly Special Report 1976, 1978). In 1982, he was investigated for violating the Federal Ethics in Government Act for not disclosing a loan made to his wife by Nelson Bunker Hunt and the $87,000 profit she made in the silver future’s market under Hunt’s guidance (Congressional Quarterly Special Report Supplement 1982). He was convicted of filing false financial disclosure statements and sentenced to a five- to fifteen-month jail term and fined $40,000. Six weeks after his conviction, the House voted 354 to 52 to reprimand him (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report Supplement 1984). Voters may not always be so forgiving. Ed Pattison (D-NY), for example, admitted in a Playboy interview that he had smoked marijuana (Congressional Quarterly Special Report 1978). Although this may seem trivial by current standards, it contributed to his defeat after serving only two terms. However, this case may be an anomaly, as voters seem willing to give most members many opportunities to change their behavior before replacing them. As important, strong challengers are not overly eager to run against incumbents who are experiencing legal problems until they are fairly certain they are are not wasting their political capital. Jacobson and Dimock (1994) argue that incumbents who abused their check-writing privileges at the House Bank were more likely to be defeated if they were challenged by experienced rather than amateur opponents. Five members in the sample were unaffected by the scandal: Henry Waxman (D-CA) with 434 overdrafts, Bill Goodling (R-PA) with

30 430 overdrafts, Harold Ford (D-TN) with 388 overdrafts, Phil Sharp (D-IN) with 120 overdrafts, and George Miller (D-CA) with 99 overdrafts (“A Checklist,” April 17, 1992: A12). Four of the five did not have experienced opposition. Joseph Early (D-MA) and Tom Downey (D-NY) who lost in 1992 had other problems: Early, who wrote 140 bad checks, accepted scholarships from the head of an aerospace political action committee for his two daughters and intervened in a criminal case by protesting a one-year jail sentence given to a local bookie (Almanac of American Politics 1994). Downey’s wife was listed as an auditor at the House Bank during the time he wrote 151 overdrafts. Moreover, ABC’s Prime Time Live reported Downey was among a group of members who vacationed in Barbados, although they were supposed to be on a fact-finding trip to Latin America. He also was accused of misusing congressional perquisites such as having parking tickets fixed and flagrantly using the franking privilege (“Media in Campaigns” January 4, 1992). In general, voters seem willing to give members ample time to reinvent themselves. Harold Ford (D-TN) provides a good example: His legal problems dated to 1987 when he was indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of tax and bank fraud. His first trial ended in a hung jury and he forestalled a retrial until 1993; meanwhile, he was named as one of the 22 worst check-writing abusers, having overdrawn his House Bank account 31 of the 39 months under investigation (Krauss March 16, 1992). He won in 1988 with 82 percent of the vote and, although his margin of victory fell to 16 points in 1990, it more than doubled two years later.

31 Al Baldus (D-WI) offers a succinct bit of advice to those who wish to be careerists: “Keep your noses[s] clean.” It is better than living on the edge, waiting for voters to lose patience. District Attentiveness. Although there is divided opinion as to what constitutes district attentiveness, two variables are cited with some regularity: trips to the district and assignment of personal staff. Fenno (1978), in his seminal study of congressional careers, found no correlation between electoral safety and trips home nor did he find a statistically significant relationship between trips home and tenure in office. Hibbing (1991), however, found evidence to suggest that modern representatives are better at keeping contact with constituents than were older cohorts, although little is mentioned about the impact on election outcomes. Our findings are consistent with Fenno’s (1978): “Home style” as measured by trips to the district and assignment of personal staff has little bearing on congressional careers.13 The data indicate that members who return to their districts with great frequency do not stand a better chance of winning their reelection bids than do those who prefer to remain in Washington. The pattern, however, is interesting. A close examination of the data suggests that incumbents from safe districts—those who received 55 percent or more of the vote in the previous election—were more apt to return to their districts on a regular basis than those from marginal districts. House members from safe districts may have done so as insurance against defeat. The pattern is the same for both Incumbent Winners and Incumbent Winners. Jim Lloyd (D-CA) said it best: “Out of sight—out of mind.”

32 Although there is no statistical evidence to support the claim that allocation of personal staff makes a significant impact on electoral outcomes, 19 of the 24 Incumbent Losers assigned the majority of their personal staffs to their Washington offices. There is no way to know whether the former members placed greater priorities on their Washington careers than on their district careers or whether they simply did not perceive the need for well-staffed district offices. This may be moot point, as explained by Jim Lloyd (D-CA): “Washington space is limited severely” and “ because of modern technology . . . much can be done equally well in either office.” Self-controlled Visibility. Use of the congressional franking privilege is one means by which members stay in touch with their constituents, as it provides a forum for them to advertise and claim credit for what they have done to benefit the district without having to rely on intermediaries as interpreters. The data indicate the practice is costly: From 1975 to 1984, which was the end of the first decade in office, the median amount spent on constituency mailings was more than $24,000 (in 1982 dollars).14 Incumbents who spent below the median and lost their reelection bids reported printing costs that ranged from $84 to $19,527. Incumbents who spent above the media and lost their reelection bids reported printing expenditures from a low of $23, 344 to a high of $85,372. The National Taxpayers Union (1990, 1992) and other critics of the franking privilege argue that incumbents have an unfair advantage over their challengers because of the sheer amount of positive exposure they receive. The eight former members who responded to the survey believe mass mailings are an effective way to stay in touch with constituents. Tim Hall (D-IL) went beyond the obvious by suggesting that town hall

33 meeting notices have the most impact because members who return to their districts and speak with their constituents have opportunities “to have a good exchange of ideas about problems and needs.” Policy Leadership. Hibbing (1991) uses five measures of legislative activity in his study of congressional patterns: floor speaking, amendments offered during floor debate, the number of bills sponsored by a member, legislative specialization, and legislative efficiency. Other who study the effect of legislative activity on challengers’ campaigns (Ragsdale & Cook 1987) settle on the number of bills sponsored and cosponsored by members. Some concern over including cosponsored legislation is expressed, as members frequently add their names to bills for purposes of advertising, credit claiming, and position taking (Hibbing 1991). It is for this very reason the cosponsored bills are included in this analysis.15 There is no evidence to suggest that electoral fortunes hinge on how active members are on the legislative arena. Six of the eight former members who responded to the questionnaire indicate it is either “not too important” or “fairly important” that House members are thought of as policy experts. Jerry Patterson (D-CA) articulated what many political scientists have recognized for quite some time: “They want you to represent them generally across the board. Foreign affairs or banking issues, for example, are limited to a small universe.” Another class member put it rather bluntly: “People don’t expect expertise, just an effort to vote their best interests.”

34 Four of the eight former members who responded to the survey believe how representatives vote is more germane to electoral success than is legislative activism, while three of the eight believe the two behaviors are equally important. Ideological Compatibility. In broad terms, ideological compatibility refers to the extent to which members’ voting records coincide with district policy preferences or ideologies. A modified version of the Johannes and McAdams (1981) measure of policy compatibility is used to classify members as either “compatible” or “discrepant.”16 Many political scientists and economists have come to recognize that enough voters evaluate how well their personal views coincide with their representative’s voting record to affect the outcome of an election (Kau & Rubin 1979, 1982; Johannes & McAdams 1981; Peltzman 1984; Bond, Covington, & Fleisher 1985; Kalt & Zupan 1990). Slightly more than 58 percent of the incumbents who lost their contests differed enough from their respective district’s ideology to become victims of their own voting behavior: George Hansen (R-ID), Martha Keys (D-KS), Bob Carr (D-MI), Tom Hagedorn (R-MN), Helen Meyner (D-NJ), Andrew Maquire (D-NJ), Leo Zeferetti (D-NY), and Joseph Fisher (DVA). The average discrepancy score is 20.49 and each of them scored 30 points or higher. This was particularly true for Hagedorn who was defeated following redistricting: His discrepancy score was 64.58.17 Slightly more than 24 percent of the Incumbent Winners, five of whom were Republicans, had discrepancy scores over 30 points. Henry Hyde (R-IL), Virginia Smith (R-NE), Bill Gradison (R-OH), Richard Schulze (R-PA), Bill Goodling (R-PA), Tom Downey (R-NY), and Matt McHugh (D-NY). Smith and Goodling had high discrepancy

35 scores, in 1976, but adjusted their voting behavior to mesh with their districts’ concerns. The data indicate that some members are able to overcome the ideological differences between themselves and their constituents, yet it would be unwise to give voters any reason to vote for the opposition, as shirking contributes to incumbent defeat. Class members who answered the questionnaire were requested to select the statement that best explained how they voted in Congress. Six of the eight chose the statement, “I always tried to base my decisions on what I believed to be in the best interest of my constituents.” Three of the six who tended to vote their own conscience had discrepancy scores sufficient enough to contribute to their defeats. The two remaining members who agreed with the statement, “Sometimes I voted my own conscience even if I differed with the voters and other times I voted their wishes even if I thought they were wrong,” had discrepancy scores in the mid-teens. None of the former members selected the statement, “I usually voted how my constituents wanted me to vote even if their wishes conflicted with my best judgment.” This may give some hope to critics who believe House members will go to any length to get reelected. Campaign Spending. Campaign spending, as measured by the total campaign expenditures made by incumbents and challengers on their respective races, significantly impacts election results.18 Jacobson and Kernell (1981) and Jacobson (1980, 1983, 1990a, 1990b) argue that challengers are the ones who need to match or exceed incumbent spending if they hope level the playing field. Thomas (1989) does not dismiss the importance of incumbent campaign spending, especially if officeholders have to neutralize

36 negative advertising and Green and Krasno (1988, 1990) acknowledge the significance of spending by both contestants. The class members spent an average of $190,268 on their campaigns as compared to challengers who spent an average of $138,303 on their races. The data indicate the contenders broke even at $7,625 then for every $1.00 spent by the incumbent, the challenger only spent $0.67. Challenger Winners spent an average of $369,839 on their campaigns as compared to Incumbent Losers who spent an average of $269, 927 on their reelection bids. Of those who failed to retain their House seats, 19 spent less than their opponents did. George Hansen (R-ID) and John Hightower (D-TX) had slight edges over their challengers, but Hansen had been convicted of filing false financial disclosure statements, which helped to negate any advantage he may have had over his opponent. Mark Hannaford (D-CA), Tom Hagedorn (R-MN), and Leo Zeferetti (D-NY) significantly outspent the competition and still lost. Other factors, such as high ideological discrepancy scores and, in Zeferetti’s case, running against a fellow incumbent, helped contribute to their defeats. All of the former members who returned the survey agreed the amount of money incumbents spend on their reelection campaigns is important, as all were outspent by their opponents. Four agreed with the statement, “Challengers must outspend House incumbents in order to have a ‘fighting’ chance.” Six agreed with the premise, “Challengers need to ‘buy’ name recognition.” All but one think incumbents are able to “neutralize negative campaign advertising by spending a lot of money.”

37 Indirect Factors Incumbents have semi-control over three factors: campaign contributions, legislative leadership, and media visibility. Campaign Contributions. Campaign contributions and campaign spending are linked inextricably: Unless candidates are able to independently finance their election contests, they must depend on outside sources for funding. Contributions generally favor incumbents thus putting challengers at a great disadvantage in their quest to purchase name recognition. Once a challenger is able to outspend the incumbent, the chance of upset increases significantly. Among the incumbents who were at a spending disadvantage, over 63 percent received fewer PAC contributions than their opponents; more than 71 percent lagged behind their challengers in individual donations; and, 19 Democratic incumbents received less party money than their GOP colleagues. The Republican Party and various PACs invested heavily in the opposition when incumbents were perceived as being extremely vulnerable. Allan Howe (D-UT) and John Jenrette (D-SC), for example, received less than one-half as much as their challengers in PAC money and were given only minimal support by the Democratic Party. Howe and Jenrette, who were both involved in scandals, received $2,500 and $1,000 in party money as compared to their opponents who received $12, 850 and $13,407, respectively. The Republican Party invested heavily in almost all of its candidates. All GOP candidates, with the exception of George Hansen (R-ID) who had been convicted of filing

38 false financial disclosure statements, received more money than the Democratic candidates. Some of the greatest disparities were in 1980 when the Democratic Party could not match the GOP in raising money. All Democratic incumbents, with the exception of Al Baldus (D-WI), who was not perceived as being exceptionally vulnerable, received significantly less help from the party than did those on the other side of the aisle. The GOP contributed approximately four times as much to all of its candidates’ campaigns as did the Democratic Party, with some Republican challengers receiving up to five or six times as much as the Democratic incumbents. More than 64 percent of all Republican challengers at least doubled what Democratic incumbents received from individual contributors and 84 percent bettered the Democrats in contributions of $500 or more. These contributions can help bridge any gaps that exist between incumbent and challenger PAC money. Bob Dornan, for example, lagged behind Jerry Patterson (D-CA) almost 3:1 in PAC money, but was able to raise $839,727 in individual contributions as compared to Patterson who raised only $252,602. Elliott Levitas (D-GA) had a 2:1 advantage over Pat Swindall in PAC contributions, but individual donations helped to level the playing field because Swindall received $324,867 as compared to Levitas who reported $166,479. The reported expenditures account for only a portion of the money raised for and spent on congressional campaigns. Federal Election Commission (FEC) filing reports indicate that in the 1984 Patterson-Dornan race, Dornan out-raised and outspent Patterson by more than $300,000.19 Patterson explained the “real” difference: “Bob Dornan spent $1.1 million—and as the darling of the far right, two ‘uncontrolled’ (independent)

39

committees spent another $400,000+ in his behalf. He had $1.5 million effectively [and] I had $600,000.” Of the former members who returned the questionnaire, six of the eight indicated that campaign contributions are key to incumbents’ reelection chances. Three made particularly interesting observations: If you are always outspent 2, 3, 4 to 1 by your opponent—they are important. They buy access to voters to tell your story. Anonymous Money, I’m sorry to say, is the name of the game. Perhaps we should think seriously of public financing of congressional elections. Either way, the people always end up paying for elections. Former Congressman Tim Hall (D-IL) As my personal friend Jess Unruh said: “Money is the mother’s milk of politics.” I believe this is not only to be true but even more true today than day it was uttered. Former Congressman Jerry Patterson (D-CA) Legislative Leadership. Legislative leadership equates with what Hibbing (1991) refers to as the “internal House career” (413) or formal leadership positions.20 Common wisdom holds that the wave of House reforms, which led to the proliferation of subcommittees, allowed the Watergate Babies to chair panels early in their careers. Holding an institutional leadership position often establishes a member as a policy expert. Because committee and subcommittee chairs are regarded as authorities in their issue areas, the media often single them out for their knowledge and opinions (Cook 1989). This, in turn, gives them greater visibility and added opportunities to advertise, claim credit, and take positions on a host of policies (Mayhew 1974b; Ragsdale & Cook 1987). However, according to Ragsdale and Cook (1987), the attention may not work to their advantage, as too much exposure, especially by the national media, could lead

40 constituents to think their representative’s Washington career is more important than serving the district’s needs. The data fail to support either claim. Seven of the members who lost their reelection bids were subcommittee chairs; one headed a select panel; and, two were subcommittee ranking minority members. Jim Lloyd (D-CA), former Chair of the House Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, remains unconvinced that holding a leadership position is important to district voters: “Most constituents are interested in [their] problems and [have] very little awareness as to the ‘inside the Beltway’ mentality of Washington insiders.” The others who responded to the questionnaire disagree with Lloyd. They believe “prestige” and “respect” are two benefits of institutional leadership, although one qualified his endorsement: “It usually should work that way if you are in touch with your constituents and are using that leadership role to better serve them.” In any case, holding an institutional leadership position may have its rewards, but reelection is not one of them. Media Visibility. Incumbents, with very few exceptions, enjoy more media attention than do their challengers. The amount of coverage varies widely, depending on the media market, which makes this variable extremely difficult to quantify.21 We use the absence or presence of a press secretary or communications director as a surrogate measure for media visibility, assuming a member would have more media exposure if someone on staff had the specific of task of keeping his or her name in public view. More than four decades ago, Cater (1959) wrote than congresspeople were “unique creator[s] and creature[s] of publicity” (47) and, in their quest to gain media coverage,

41 they used their “highest paid assistant[s] to diagnose and fil prescriptive needs of the press” (47). Not much had changed since then. Cook (1988, 1989) explains that most House members employ press secretaries to act as either links to the media or liaisons who promote them as issue experts. Either way, press secretaries attempt to keep members in public view and frame them in the best possible light. Although press secretaries may be good at image making, it appears their services are not crucial to members’ electoral fortunes. There are at least four explanations for this conclusion: First, there is no way to be certain whether House members who have press secretaries on staff get more extensive or more media exposure than those who do not unless a detailed study of press and television coverage is done. Most incumbents already have an advantaged over potential challengers both in terms of name recognition and media visibility; moreover, local reporting is generally positive (Robinson 1981). Most anyone on staff could write a press release to announce money for a new federal courthouse or a grant to lengthen an airport runway. Second, incumbents who represent districts in major metropolitan media markets do not receive much media coverage, as there is competition for scare newspaper space and television airtime (Cook 1989; Salmore & Salmore 1989). Jerry Patterson (D-CA) noted the importance of television exposure, but explained that 20 members must compete for attention in the Los Angeles media market. Having press secretaries may be helpful to members who do not have to vie with one another for valuable space or airtime, but they are not as important to those who are unable to get coverage at any cost.

42 Third, Ragsdale and Cook (1987) raise a question about voter attitudes toward members who receive extensive national media exposure and whether it is beneficial for press secretaries to promote their “bosses” as issue experts, as they run the risk of distancing members from area voters. This may seems like a nonsequitur argument given the national visibility of members such as Henry Waxman (D-CA) who is an expert on health issues or Henry Hyde (R-IL) who is a pro-life advocate, as both consistently win their reelection bids with well over 60 percent of the vote. Fourth, although the local news media are generally soft on incumbents (Robinson 1981), features about ethical misconduct many have deleterious ramifications over the long term (Ragsdale & Cook 1987; Alexander & Bauer 1991). Two members whose electoral fates were affected by scandal had press secretaries on staff, which suggests there may be limits to the “spin” that can be put on stories. Seven of the former members who responded to the questionnaire agreed that press secretaries perform necessary duties. A former congresswoman suggested: “The business of a representative is serving the interest of constituents. It takes a professional PR staff to engage the media into telling the story of government business that affects their lives.” There are times when even a professional press secretary cannot help. Tim Hall (D-IL), who had one on staff, wrote that the Republican Party had held the Fifth Congressional District for nearly 100 years and it was tantamount to an exercise in futility to get good press. He said that “some editors could never find time to talk to me.”

43 Outside Factors Incumbents have no control over four factors: district partisanship, presidential approval, the national economy, and the district economy. District Partisanship. District partisanship, similar to ideological compatibility, cannot be measured directly, as only 38 states require party registration or a public statement of party preference. Scammon favors using the district vote in presidential elections that are not personality-driven as a surrogate measure for district partisanship. (personal communication, January 23, 1992).22 Based on his advice, the Carter vote is used for three elections (1976, 1978, and 1980) and the Dukakis vote, which accounts for redistricting, is used for four elections (1982, 1984, 1986, and 1988). The relationship between district partisanship and electoral safety engenders an ongoing debate among political scientists. One side holds that in many instances incumbency has supplanted party loyalty as a low-cost voting cue (Hinckley 1981a; Mann 1978), while the other side suggests party identification remains an important determinant of voting behavior and that votes tend to be siphoned from “partisan misfits” (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina 1987: 516) over time. It is difficult, at best, to determine which side is more accurate, as there is little agreement about how to measure the variable. However, if Scammon is correct in saying district partisanship is a reflection of the presidential vote in elections that are not personality-driven, then it is a significant determinant of electoral outcomes in congressional elections. Over 77 percent of all unsuccessful Democratic incumbents ran in districts in which either Carter I (1976) or Dukakis (1988) received less than 50 percent of the vote.

44 Moreover, the Democratic ticket polled less than 40 percent in five of the districts. Only two districts, one of which was traditionally Republican, showed strong support for Carter I. Voters in the Illinois Fifth Congressional District gave Jimmy Carter a 3:2 electoral victory over Gerald Ford and rejected Tim Hall (D-IL) after just one term in office. It is generally assumed that candidates for other offices receive a “bump” from a presidential candidate of the same party. It is curious, therefore, that the vast majority of Democratic incumbents who ran and won in on-year elections exceeded the vote cast for the presidential hopefuls from their party by at least 10 percentage points. This appears to strengthen the argument that politically savvy incumbents often transcend district partisanship thereby creating fairly safe havens for themselves. On the other hand, the majority of those who ran and lost also bettered the presidential vote by at least 10 percentage points thus suggesting that “partisan misfits” (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina 1987: 516) cannot always overcome the odds. A word about the GOP incumbents is in order. The majority who ran and won in onyear elections bested their party’s presidential candidates by more than 10 percentage points. Tom Hagedorn (R-MN) was the sole Republican whose defeat could partially be attributed to the district partisanship imbalance. Hagedorn represented Minnesota’s Second Congressional District prior to redistricting and ran well ahead of the ReaganBush ticket in 1980, receiving 61 percent of the vote as compared to 51 percent for the top of the ticket. Although he consistently outpolled his opponents by a minimum of 20

45 points, he was narrowly defeated, in 1982, by Tim Penny. Voters in Minnesota’s First Congressional District—Hagedorn’s new district—had given the Carter-Mondale ticket an 8-point edge over the Reagan-Bush ticket two years earlier. George Hansen (R-ID), who had ongoing legal problems, came within 133 votes of keeping his seat in 1984. His district was solidly Republican, having given Ford (1976), Reagan I (1980), and Reagan II (1984) overwhelming victories. Former members who answered the questionnaire recognized what most scholars maintain: Party identification as a voting cue is not dead. Four of the five who believe that district partisanship is central to congressional electoral outcomes represented districts in which the presidential candidates of their party received less than 40 percent of the vote. Of those who thought partisan imbalance is somewhat important, all came from districts in which their party’s presidential nominee did poorly. Presidential Approval and the National Economy. Tufte (1975) began a debate, which has lasted nearly three decades, by asserting that the vote cast in midterm elections could be considered as a referendum on presidential performance and the president’s ability to manage the economy. There tends to be more agreement concerning the effect of presidential approval ratings on congressional elections than there is on the relationship between the national economy and presidential approval, which in turn is said to affect the races. Yantek (1982) and Marra and Ostrom (1989) are among those in the scholarly community who suggest that events are more critical to the public’s perception of presidential job performance than is the economy.

46 The debate aside, national trends as measured by control of the White House, have a significant effect on incumbents’ reelection chances (incumbent and president of same party). According to Marra and Ostrom (1989), three indicators of presidential approval impact both on-year and off-year congressional elections: the president’s current approval rating, the change in level of presidential support, and significant events. These factors, taken together, help to explain the Watergate Baby’s losses in 1980. President Carter had a low job approval rating, which was down 15 points from his six-month high (the highest approval rating from the six-month period following the most recent election) of 52 percent. The authors suggest that large shifts in presidential job performance ratings indicate “how satisfied voters are likely to be in the future” (Marra & Ostrom 1989: 548). There is little doubt that the Iranian hostage situation affected public opinion about his ability to lead the nation. The impact of the economy on his job approval ratings and, hence, congressional elections is more difficult to assess. Marra and Ostrom (1989) find no direct link between the change in real disposable income and the level of presidential support. However, Democratic losses were more than double the party’s average turnover in on-year elections. It does not seem too farfetched to suggest that the economy contributed in some small measure to President Carter’s downward spiral and, as a consequence, contributed to the above average losses for Democratic House members. However, it is important to recognize that Democrats had more seats to lose and many represented districts that heavily favored the opposition party. The party’s losses two years earlier

47 did not seem to be out of the ordinary, although President Carter’s job approval ratings were mediocre. Democratic incumbent losses were six seats shy of the party’s average for midterm elections. In the 1982 midterm election, Republicans lost 22 seats or three seats above their average for the seven off-year elections since 1952. President Reagan’s job approval rating was lower than President Carter’s at the same point in his administration, but this did not appear to have an inordinately negative impact on the congressional election results. Although one class member lost his seat, Reagan’s support in his new district had been soft. President Reagan’s strong approval ratings, in 1984, played a twofold role with respect to congressional races: His popularity helped defeat three Democratic class members and it almost resuscitated the campaign of a Republican who was mired in scandal. District Economy. Few scholars study the effect of local economic conditions on congressional races (Owens 1984; Blumberg 1995; Blumberg, Green, & Best 1996). Although Owens (1984) finds little evidence voters punish or reward incumbents for their personal economic conditions, Blumberg (1995) argues that incumbents benefit from poor local economies because voters do not wish to change course in bad times and recognize that expertise is a valued attribute in dealing with the bureaucracy. When the local economy, as measured by the difference between the national and district unemployment rates, is considered in conjunction with other variables (Blumberg, Green, & Best 1996) the relationship is no longer significant.

48 Challenger Strength Many scholars suggest that strong challengers calculate their chances of unseating incumbents before deciding to risk their political futures on what is ordinarily perceived to be an exercise in futility. “Strategic politicians” (Jacobson 1989) wait for a window of opportunity before making their decisions to run against incumbents. In addition to assessing the potential impact of economic conditions (Jacobson 1989) on their chances of success, they evaluate other factors such as district marginality (Mayhew 1974a; Jacobson 1987; Ansolabehere, Brady, & Fiorina 1988) and charges or convictions of ethical misconduct (Alexander & Bauer 1991). The most successful challengers generally hold public office, have held public office, or have run for elective office previously. Although there is not a statistically significant relationship between challenger strength and incumbent electoral outcomes when considered with the other variables, nearly 67 percent of defeated class members ran against elected officials or former candidates: Five were state legislators and three were former House members, perhaps the most formidable opponents. The former members who responded to the questionnaire, when asked to explain what constituents a “strong” challenger, cited many of same attributes found in the literature. All but one agreed that money is the most significant challenger asset. Tim Hall (D-IL) did not mince words, noting that the number one advantage challengers have over incumbents is “[p]ure and simple—money!” Other factors included: public office,

49 district partisanship, and presidential popularity (president and challenger of same party). The former classmates speak from experience. Of those who replied to the survey, seven were significantly outspent by their opponents; three were challenged by experienced opponents; five represented districts in which the partisan balance favored the other party; and, four were affected by public perception of the president’s job performance. Two former members raised the possibility that voters may be tired of institutional behavior and thus be willing to give someone else—no matter how experienced or inexperienced—a chance to represent them. A former congresswoman explained that there is a “general disaffection with [government]” among the electorate. Or, as Jim Lloyd (D-CA) said: Voters once had a pejorative image of Congress but loved their own member. Currently, it is: “Congress is terrible, but my member may be no better” (personal conversation, June 28, 1994). Discussion The data suggest that House incumbents have a significant degree of control over their own electoral fates, as shown in Table 1. Results of a logistic regression analysis indicate that three factors over which incumbents have direct or full control affect their reelection chances: personal conduct, ideological compatibility, and self-controlled visibility. It has been widely acknowledged that ethical misconduct is a sure means to seal the electoral fortunes of incumbents, even if there is a lag between committing or being charged with wrongdoing and when the electorate finally decides to vote them out of office. Ideological compatibility is difficult to gauge, especially when researchers must

50 account for redistricting. However, the modified Johannes and McAdams model (1981) works rather well in explaining the importance of voting constituency concerns if incumbents wish to be careerists. Finally, use of the franking privilege may not be popular with government reformers, such as the National Taxpayers Union, but keeping in contact with constituents is critical. Members of Congress would be wise to do everything within their power to learn the art of incumbency in order to compensate for factors over which they have no control: well-financed challengers, a district partisan imbalance, and presidential woes. Challenger spending appears to be more important than experience, although the literature suggests experienced opponents who generally surface when incumbents appear vulnerable are likely to raise more money than can amateurs. Incumbents representing districts in which the party balance favors the opposition party would do well to become partisan pretenders. In other words, they should downplay their party ties and stay ideologically in sync with district voters. Although incumbents cannot control trends upon which voters evaluate presidential performance, they should be prudent in their public support of one who is trouble. Loyalty is always an issue, but so is reelection. Many who become tired of playing the political game retire. Our model of House incumbent electoral outcomes explains 96.37 percent of the races. These generalizations apply specifically to the Class of 1974, but there is reason to believe that other House elections can be explained likewise. Subsequent cohorts are similar to the Watergate Babies in a number of respects, although the Class of 1994 is the

51 antithesis in one important area: The Class of 1974 is known for its technological competence and the Class of 1994 is known for its ideological fervor. Nonetheless, many of the same attributes that marked the Class of 1974 as a new breed of legislator apply to other who followed: Post-Watergate representatives are individualists who, for the most part, are prone to putting their own careers ahead of institutional loyalty. They serve shorter apprenticeships and are more legislatively active than earlier cohorts. They also are more adept at media relations, which is a necessity with the increasing demand for “expert” opinion. Where Have All the Members Gone? The Class of 1974 produced a number of the most recognized names in politics, many of whom ran successfully for higher office, were appointed to high-level offices, joined prestigious law firms and consulting firms, or secured positions on nonprofit boards. After serving just two terms in the House, Paul Tsongas (D-MA), Max Baucus (D-MT), and Larry Pressler (R-SD) won their Senate races and two years later, Chris Dodd (DCT), Charles Grassley (R-IA), and Bob Kasten (R-WI) won their Senate bids. In 1984, after serving ten years in the House, Paul Simon (D-IL) and Tom Harkin (D-IA) won their Senate seats. Tim Wirth (D-CO) and Jim Jeffords (R-VT) followed in 1986 and 1988, respectively. Eleven class members—seven Democrats and four Republicans— lost their Senate bids, among the more prominent names are: Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ), Tom Kindness (R-OH), and Dale Bonkers (D-WA).

52 Jim Blanchard (D-MI) and Jim Florio (D-NJ) won their gubernatorial races, although Florio served sixteen years before making the leap. Abner Mikva (D-IL) served two terms before being confirmed for a seat on the federal bench. Many of the “careerists” who left the House after serving at least eight terms added to their already impressive resumes by accepting distinguished appointments or receiving lucrative job offers, for example: Norman Mineta (D-CA) resigned from office, in 1995, to become a Vice President at Lockeed Martin Corporation and was appointed Chair of the National Civil Aviation Review Commission by President Clinton. He then served as Secretary of Commerce during the last six months of the Clinton administration and is currently Secretary of Transportation in the Bush administration (http://whitehouse.gov. government.mineta-bio.html). Bill Hughes (D-NJ) was named Ambassador to Panama upon leaving the House after 20 years of service (http://www.dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/ Bureaus/lat/1995/951025/HughesSwearingIn.html). Matt McHugh (D-NY), after serving nine terms, accepted a position as Counselor to the President of the World Bank. He also chairs the Board of Directors of Bread for the World, a nonprofit humanitarian organization (http://www.bread.org/whoweare/ President-board.html). Jim Scheuer (D-NY), after ending his 18-year congressional career, served as the United States Director of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development from 1994 to1996 (http://www.swarthmore.edu/Library/friends/ead/ 6r3001.htm). Stephen Solarz (D-NY), who was defeated in the 1992 primary after being cited as one of the most flagrant abusers of check-writing privileges at the House Bank, is a senior counselor at APCO Worldwide and he started his own international consulting

53 firm. Until 1998, he served as Chairman of the Board of the Central Asian-American Enterprise Fund and is a Distinguished Consultant at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (http://www.apcoworldwide.com/content/bios.solarz.cfm). Solarz, similar to Andy Jacobs (D-IN) and Phil Sharp (D-IN), both of whom represented their Indiana constituencies for 20 years, teaches at a university. Solarz, when he left office, became a visiting professor of international relations at George Washington University and Jacobs, who practices law, is an adjunct professor at Indiana UniversityPurdue University Indianapolis (http://www.iupui.edu/~polisci/jabobs.htm). Sharp is is a senior research fellow with the Environment and Natural Resource Program at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government and senior policy advisor at VanNess Feldman (http://www.vnf.com/content/AboutUs/Biographies/Phil_Sharp.htm). Butler Derrick (D-SC), after a 20-year career in Congress, became a partner in Powell Goldstein Frazer & Murphy (http://www.pgfm.com/bio.asp?key=3149). Glenn English (D-OK), after serving ten terms, became Vice President and General Manager of the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (http://www.energycommerce.house. gov/108/Hearings/03132003hearing818/English1354.htm). Bill Gradison (R-OH), who resigned midway through his tenth term in office, became President of the Health Insurance Corporation of America and is a member of the Public Accounting Company Oversight Board (http://www/hiaa.org/search/content.cfm?ContentID=308; http://www. complianceweek.com/pressreleases/072903.asp). Bill Goodling (R-PA), who retired after serving 26 years in the House, accepted a senior adviser’s position at Baker & Daniels (http://www.bakerdaniels.com/bios/

54 pdfbios/pdf_noAddress/goodling_bill385.pdf). Tom Downey (D-NY), after losing his 1992 primary election bid, is a partner in a Washington lobby firm, Downey & Chandler (http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/1998/01/silverstein-chart.html).23 There is little doubt that the four remaining class members—George Miller (D-CA), Henry Waxman (D-CA), Henry Hyde (R-IL), and Jim Oberstar (D-MN)—will be able to capitalized on their expertise and connections should they decide to retire. The Pragmatic “Generation” The Class of 1974 not only perfected the art of incumbency, but members distinguished themselves while in office and in their post-congressional careers. They began their legislative careers as reformists, changing the institution so younger members could make a difference without waiting to serve long apprenticeships. Most of the class members, the Democrats in particular, were policy wonks who had to work harder and smarter to deliver on their promises, least their constituents would lose patience with them. Many have stayed in government: most in higher office, four in the House, and one in a cabinet post. The “careerists” who retired after serving at least eight terms, which is nearly twice as long as the average representative serves, used their expertise and connections to continue working in policy fields. Only a small number are lobbyists, one of the more “natural” post-congressional career choices. It will be interesting to evaluate the Class of 1994’s staying power and career choices given that it is the largest cohort since the Watergate Babies took office three decades ago. Schneider (1989) is convinced ideologues have the optimal situation, as they can

55 speak of values thus deflecting criticism from either do-nothingism or “poor” policy choices. Our guess is that it will be difficult to match the Class of 1974’s record. Notes
1

The quotation is taken from a response to an open-ended question on a survey completed by defeated Class of 1974 members (Blumberg 1995). The former congressman wishes to remain anonymous. Observations made by other class members appear throughout the paper. 2 There are actually fifteen variables if redistricting is taken into account. As it takes place once in every five elections, it is mentioned in the analysis only when it affects particular races negatively. For studies regarding how redistricting impacts election results see, for example, Gopoian and West (1984) and Rush (1993). 3 Johannes (1984) questions the Epstein and Frankovic (1982) argument in To Serve the People: Congress and Constituency Service (Chapter 8, fn. 12). 5 J. Patterson (D-CA), E. Levitas (D-GA), G. Hansen (R-ID), and J. Hightower (D-TX) were defeated in the 1984 general election. B. Carr (D-MI) was elected in 1974, defeated in 1980, and elected to his old seat in 1982, which he retained until 1994 when he ran for a Senate seat and lost. 6 M. Russo (D-IL), C. Hubbard (D-KY), and S. Solarz (D-NY) were defeated in the 1992 primary election and J. Early (D-MA) and T. Downey (D-NY) were defeated in 1992 general election. 7 When the initial sample parameters were established, the following criteria were imposed: The sample would consist of members who appeared to be careerists or those who chose to remain in the House rather than run for different elective office or accept work in either the public sector or private sector. There is no sure way to determine whether those who lost their reelection bids would have been careerists, but the assumption was made that if they did not leave the House on their own accord then they may have made long-term commitments to remain in the lower chamber. Bullock (1977) defines a careerist as someone who serves at least ten years. By his definition, former B. Bedell (D-IA) and J.Weaver (D-OR) could have been included in the sample because they both retired after serving six terms. However, the natural break point in the sample is eight terms, which yields N = 53 or a pooled sample of N = 278. Three of the members who are included in the sample sought higher office, but not until later in their careers: J. Florio (D-NJ), after serving eight terms, won his race for governor, in 1990, and L. AuCoin (DOR), after serving nine terms, lost his Senate bid in 1992. B. Carr (D-MI) was defeated in 1980, which qualified him for the sample: He then regained his seat in 1982 and, in 1994, ran unsuccessfully for the Senate. M. Russo (D-IL), C. Hubbard (D-KY), and S. Solarz (D-NY) lost in the 1992 primaries, each after having served nine terms. N. Mineta (D-CA) and W. Gradison (R-OH) resigned prior to the end of their tenth terms. V. Smith (R-NE) retired after serving eight terms; H. Nowack (D-NY) and R. Schulze (R-PA) retired at the end of their ninth terms; P. Sharp (D-IN), W. Hughes (D-NJ), S. Neal (D-NC), G. English (DOK), B. Derrick (D-SC), and M. Lloyd (D-TN) retired after serving ten terms; A. Jacobs (D-IN) and H. Ford (D-TN) retired after serving eleven terms; W. Hefner (D-NC) retired after serving twelve terms; W. Goodling (R-PA) retired after serving thirteen terms; and, J. LaFalce (D-NY) was the last to retire, after serving the full fourteen terms. Members who were defeated in primary elections, with the exception of those who lost in 1992, are excluded from the analysis. Although primary contests are an important aspect of incumbent electoral outcomes, they are not within the scope of this study. 8 The 1994 midterm election may be the exception to the local “rule,” as the Republican nationalized the election by using the Contract with America as a campaign theme. 9 As campaign contributions co-vary with campaign spending, they are omitted from the equation.

56
10

Slightly more than 13 percent of incumbents were textbook examples of how legislators ought to behave if they wish to be careerists, but they lost nonetheless. Outsides factors, such as district partisan imbalance and/or low presidential approval ratings in off-year election (president and incumbent of same party) had negative effects on their races. 11 The problem of fugitive data became apparent during a conversation with political scientists from a small, private college. When asked to explain their representative’s loss, they indicated his infidelity was key to his defeat. It was never reported, but opinion leaders and many other voters were aware of his behavior and “punished” him by ending his political career. The data, however, suggest he would have been defeated without constituents having knowledge of his extra marital affairs. 12 Wayne Hays (D-OH), Chair of the House Administration Committee and Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, was charged with keeping his mistress on the government payroll as a House Administration Committee secretary (Diamond 1977). E. Levitas (D-GA), was accused of an unrelated incident, but most political observers considered the charges to be irrelevant. P. Swindall, Levitas’s opponent, taped a conversation in which the incumbent threatened to withhold support from a bill to refinance the Kennedy Center if a political appointee in the Department of Treasury attended a Swindall fundraiser (Barone & Ujifusa 1985). The Levitas charges were omitted from the analysis as were those made against M. Hannaford (D-CA), J. Lloyd (D-CA), and M. Russo (D-IL). There also was widespread publicity over M. Keys’s (D-KS) 1975 divorce and subsequent marriage to A. Jacobs (D-IN) in 1976, with the greatest being whether she was committed to her constituents, as her declared residence was a home owned by acquaintances (Congressional Quarterly Special Report 1978). Although this might have been a factor in her 1978 defeat, it is questionable whether it should be considered ethical misconduct. It is probably best explained as a case of poor judgment. 13 Trips home is measured as a continuous variable (Hibbing 1991; Ragsdale & Cook 1987). A number of scholars (Fenno 1978; Schiff & Smith 1983; Ragsdale & Cook 1987) weight trips to the district by region, assuming that members who live in close proximity to the Beltway will return home more frequently than those who live a greater distance from it. Whether members live in Virginia or whether they live in California, we assume constituents expect them to return to the district with some regularity rather than become semi-permanent residents of Washington. A second somewhat more questionable measure of district attentiveness is personal staff allocation, the proportion of district staff relative to Washington staff (Fenno 1978; Fox & Hammond 1977; Fiorina 1981; Schiff & Smith 1983; Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina 1987). It is assumed that members who attach importance to constituency service allocate the greatest proportion of their personal staffs to their district offices. 14 It is extremely difficult to compile these figures. David Keating, Executive Vice President of the National Taxpayers Union explained that it took the organization nearly an entire year to collect one year of data (personal communication, January 28, 1992). Numerous changes in the law allow a large proportion of the mailing costs to go undetected. According to Debbie Williams, Senior Adviser at the Franking Commission, no records on mail addressed to individuals are maintained. It only keeps track of expenditures on newsletters and postcards addressed to postal patron or items sent to 500 or more people (personal communication, January 28, 1992). We relied on the Clerk of the House Reports to construct our data base. Mailings and mailing-related costs include: newsletters, targeted letters, town meeting notices, questionnaires, survey tabulation, certificates, stationary and envelopes which exceed the office allowance, greeting cards, news release letterhead used for constituency mailings, franked envelopes, labels, typesetting, newsletter design, signature fonts, newsletter photography, brochures and catalogues sent to constituents, congressional calendars, and Congressional Record reprints used for constituency mailings. Data base purchases are omitted from the costs wherever possible as are purchases of other mailing lists; however, computer fees associated with printing and delivering labels are included. The only figures available for 1975 are those listed as “stationery.” Any expenditures above the normal stationery allowances are counted as printing costs. In 1976, some mailing costs are listed under the subheading “Constituent Communication Expenses,” but there are other printing costs as well. Beginning in 1978, printing and related costs are listed under the subheading “Official Expenses.”

57
15

Although Ragsdale commemorative events are excluded from the Ragsdale & Cook (1987) analysis, they are counted in our measure for much the same reason given for the inclusion of cosponsored legislation. Omitted from the analysis are: House resolutions, concurrent resolutions, and joint resolutions. 16 The researchers, in their study of the 1978 election, regress each incumbent’s 1976 Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) score on the percentage of the district’s 1972 McGovern vote as “an indicator of district liberalism” (517). They calculate each member’s ideological discrepancy with his or her district by taking the absolute value of the difference between his or her predicted ADA score and his or her actual ADA score. Those “whose ratings lay close to the regression line described by the equation [are] assumed to be ideologically compatible with their districts and those substantially above or below that line [are] defined as ‘discrepant’” (Johannes & McAdams 1981: 517). As this study covers additional elections, the indicators were modified. The McGovern vote was used for three elections (1976, 1978, and 1980); the Mondale vote was used for three elections (1982, 1984, and 1986) and the Dukakis vote was used for one election (1988). Rather than rely on the even-year ADA scores, members average ADA scores were used for each two- year period in the belief that their images are the result of a t least short-term cumulative behavior. Readers also may wish to consider Ardoin & Garand’s (2003) “top-down” simulation to predict ideological scores for House districts. 17 A second member who was affected by redistricting was Leo Zeferetti (N-NY). His discrepancy scores are unknown for the period prior to 1982, as records pertaining to the district’s presidential vote are not available. However, when he ran in 1982, he was pitted against Rep. Guy Molinari and, according to one report, had lost a large portion of his Democratic constituency, which helps to explain the schism between his ADA scires and district ideology (Barone & Ujifusa 1983). 18 Challengers with expenditures of less than $5,000, who did not file financial activity reports with the Federal Election Commission, are recorded as having spent nothing on their campaigns. Assigning $2,500 as an arbitrary mean for these cases serves little purpose because the reporting threshold is quite low in comparison to the monies spent by incumbents. 19 According to FEC reports (1983-1984), J. Patterson (D-CA) was out-raised by B. Dornan $713, 958 to $1,046,909 and outspent by him $699,747 to $1,023,001. 20 Legislative leadership is measured as holding an institutional leadership position: Speaker of the House, majority and minority leaders, majority and minority whips, committee chairs and ranking minority members, and subcommittee chairs and ranking minority members. 21 Case studies may provide the only detailed account of media visibility and its impact on congressional elections (see, for example, Blumberg & Best 1990). Local network affiliates did not archive news programs during the period studied and some still do not engage in the practice. Many small local dailies did not index the articles during the period studied, which means researchers would have to cull through the available copies to obtain an accurate count of the articles on incumbents and challengers. Added to the confusion, some districts are so expansive that multiple electronic and print news sources would have to be analyzed. The logistics are daunting. 22 There are a number of imperfect methods used to measure district party identification, for example: Johannes and McAdams (1981) average the results of congressional races in each district over a number of years. Hibbing (1991) suggests this is an imprecise measure given the high incumbent reelection rate. Bond, Covington, and Fleisher (1985) calculate “the average percentage of the vote cast for the incumbent party nominee[s] for governor, senator, and president” (522) in the preceding elections, as the average is less likely to reflect candidates’ personalities and national trends. Richard Scammon, however, believes the vote totals for statewide races are not too revealing, primarily due to the propensity of voters to support sure winners even if the candidates are of the opposition party. According to Scammon, presidential elections, which are not personality-driven, are adequate measures of district partisanship. He said no two races in modern history fill the criterion better than the 1976 and 1988 elections (personal communication, January 23, 1992). 23 W. Hefner (D-NC) is retired (http://www.salisburypost.com/newscopy/041599hefner.htm) and M. Lloyd who does charitable work for cancer research (http://www.chattanoogaraceforthecure.com/honorarychair. html). C. Hubbard (D-KY) lost his1992 primary bid amid reports of ethical misconduct. In 1994, he pled guilty to conspiring to defraud the FEC and theft of government property for which he received a three-year

58
prison sentence (http://www.politicalgraveyard.com/special/trouble-disgrace.html). Information on what other “careerists” are doing since leaving Congress could not be found: B. Carr (D-IL), V. Smith (R-NE), J. LaFalce (D-NY), H. Nowak (D-NY), S. Neal (D-NC), R. Schulze (R-PA), and H. Ford (D-TN).

References

Abramowitz, Alan I. 1991. “Incumbency, Campaign Spending, and the Decline of Competition in U. S. House Elections.” Journal of Politics 53: 34-56. Alexander, Herbert E. and Monica Bauer. 1991. Financing the 1988 Election. Boulder: Co: Westview Press. Anagnoson, Theodore. 1982. “Federal Grant Agencies and Congressional Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 26: 547-561. Ansolabehere, Stephen, David Brady and Morris Fiorina. 1988. “The Marginals Never Vanished?” rev. Working Paper No. P-88-1. Stanford, CA: The Hoover Institute. Ardoin, Philip J. and James C. Garand. 2003. “Measuring Constituency Ideology in U. S. House Districts: A top Down Simulation Approach.” Journal of Politics 65: 1165-1189. Banks, Jeffrey S. and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. “Explaining Patterns of Candidate Competition in Congressional Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 33: 997-1015. Blumberg, Melanie J. 1995. Incumbent Loss in the U.S. House of Representatives: An Empirical Analysis of the Class of 1974. Kent, OH: Kent State University. Dissertation. Blumberg, Melanie J., John C. Green and James J. Best. 1996. “Why Don’t They All Win? Incumbent Loss in the U. S. House of Representatives.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. Bond, Jon R. and Gary Covington and Richard Fleisher. 1985. “Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections.” Journal of Politics 47: 510-529. Bullock, Charles S. 1977. “House Careerists: Changing Patterns of Longevity and Attrition.” American Political Science Review 66: 1295-1300. Cain, Bruse, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina. 1987. The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Carson, Richard T. and Joe A. Oppenheimer. 1984. “A Method of Estimating the Personal Ideology of Political Representatives.” American Political Science Review 78: 163-178.

60 Cater, Douglass. 1959. The Fourth Branch of Government. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Clarke, Peter and Susan H. Evans. 1983. Covering Campaigns: Journalism in Congressional Elections. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Clarke, Harold and Marianne C. Stewart. 1994. “Prospections, Retrospections, and Rationality: The ‘Bankers’ Model of Presidential Approval Reconsidered.” American Journal of Political Science 38: 1104-1123. Converse, Philip E. 1964. “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics.” In Ideology And Discontents, ed. David E. Apter. New York: Free Press. Cook, Timothy E. 1988. “Press Secretaries and Media Strategies in the House of Representatives: Deciding Whom to Pursue.” American Journal of Political Science 32: 1047-1069. _________. 1989. Making Laws and Making News: Media Strategies in the U. S. House of Representatives. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Cover, Albert D. 1977. “One Good Turn Deserves Another: The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 21: 523-541. Cover, Albert D. and Brice S. Brumberg. 1987. “Baby Books and Ballots: The Impact of Mail on Constituent Opinion.” American Political Science Review 76: 347-359. Diamond, Robert A., ed. 1977. Congressional Ethics. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Epstein, Laurily K. and Kathleen A. Frankovic. 1982. “Case Work and Electoral Margins: Insurance Is Prudent.” Polity 14: 691-700. Erikson, Robert S. 1976. “Is There Such a Thing As a Safe Seat?” Polity 8: 623-632. Feldman, Stanley. 1982. “Economic Self-interest and Political Behavior.” American Journal of Political Science 26: 446-466. Fenno, Richard F. 1978. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. Boston: Little, Brown. Fiorina, Morris P. 1977. Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

61 _________. 1981. “Some Problems in Studying the Effects of Resource Allocation in Congressional Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 25: 543-568. Fishel, Murray, David Gopoian and J. Michael Stacey. 1987. On the Campaign Trial: The Ultimate Campaign Computer Simulation. Washington, DC: Campaigns & Elections. Fowler, Linda L. and Robert. D. McClure. 1989. Political Ambition: Who Decides to Run for Congress. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Fox, Harrison W., Jr. and Susan Webb Hammond. 1977. Congressional Staffs: The Invisible Force in American Lawmaking. New York: Free Press. Frantzich, Stephen E. 1982. Computers in Congress: The Politics of Information. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE. Goldenberg, Edie N. and Michael N. Traugott. 1984. Campaigning for Congress. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Gopoian, David J. and Darrell M. West. 1984. “Trading Security for Seats: Strategic Considerations in the Redistricting Process.” Journal of Politics 46: 1080-1096. Graber, Doris A. 1989. Mass Media and American Politics 3rd ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Green, Donald Philip and Jonathan S. Krasno. 1990. “Rebuttal to Jacobson’s New Evidence of Old Arguments.” American Journal of Political Science 34: 363-372. _________. 1988. “Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 32: 884-907. Groseclose, Tim. 1994. “Testing Committee Composition Hypothesis for the U. S. Congress.” Journal of Politics 56: 440-458. Groseclose, Timothy and Keith Krehbiel. 1994. “Golden Parachutes, Rubber Checks, and Strategic Retirements from the 102d House.” American Journal of Political Science 38: 75-99. Herrnson, Paul S. 2000. Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington 3rd ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

62 Hibbing, John R. 1991. “Contours of the Modern Congressional Career.” American Journal of Political Science 35: 405-428. Hibbing, John R. and John R. Alford. 1981. “The Electoral Impact of Economic Conditions: Who Is Held Responsible?” American Journal of Political Science 25: 423-439. Hinckley, Barbara. 1971. Stability and Change in Congress. New York: Harper & Row. _________. 1981. Congressional Elections. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Jackson, John E. and John W. Kingdon. 1992. “Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes.” American Journal of Political Science 36: 805-823. Jacobson, Gary. 1980. Money in Congressional Elections. New Haven CT: Yale University Press. _________. 1981. “Congressional Elections, 1978: The Case of the Vanishing Challengers.” In Congressional Elections, ed., Louis Sandy Maisel. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE. _________. 1983. The Politics of Congressional Elections. Boston: Little, Brown. _________. 1987. “The Marginals Never Vanished: Incumbency and Competition in Elections to the U. S. House of Representatives.” American Journal of Political Science 31: 126-141. _________. 1989. “Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U. S. House Elections, 1946-86.” American Political Science Review 773-793. _________. 1990a. “The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments.” American Journal of Political Science 34: 334-362. _________. 1990b. The Electoral Connections of Divided Government: Competition in U. S. House Elections, 1946-1988. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Jacobson, Gary C. and Michael A. Dimock. 1994. “Checking Out: The Effects of Bank Overdrafts in the 1992 House Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 38: 601-624. Jacobson, Gary C. and Samuel Kernell. 1981. Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

63 Johannes, John R. 1984. To Serve the People: Congress and Constituency Service. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Johannes, John R. and John C. McAdams. 1981. “The Congressional Incumbency Effect: Is It Casework, Policy Compatibility, or Something Else?” American Journal of Political Science 25: 512-542. Jones, Bradford S. 1992. “Things that Go Bump in the District: Partisanship, Contacting, and Electoral Payoffs, 1978-1990.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. Jones, DuPre, ed. 1980. Congressional Ethics 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Kalt, Joseph P. and Mark A. Zupan. 1990. “The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal Agent Slack in Political Institutions.” Journal of Law & Economics 33: 103-131. Kau, James B. and Paul H. Rubin. 1979. “Self-interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting.” Journal of Law & Economics 22: 365-384. _________. 1982. Congressman, Constituents, and Contributions: Determinants of Roll Call Voting in the House of Representatives. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing. Kazee, Thomas A. 1983. “The Deterrent Effect of Incumbency on Recruiting Challengers in U. S. House Elections.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 8: 469-480. Kernell, Samuel. 1986. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Kiewiet, D. Roderick. 1981. “Policy-oriented Voting in Response to Economic Issues.” American Political Science Review 75: 448-459. Kinder, Donald R. and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1979. “Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting.” American Political Science Review 73: 495-527. Krasno, Jonathan S., Donald Philip Green and Jonathan A. Cowdon. 1994. “The Dynamics of Campaign Fundraising in House Elections.” Journal of Politics 56: 459-474.

64 Lipset, Seymour Martin and William Schneider. 1983. The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind. New York: Free Press. Mack, W. R. 1992. “Repeat Challengers: Are They the Best Challengers Around?” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. MacKuen, Michael Bruce and Stephen Lane Coombs. 1981. More than News: Media Power in Public Affairs. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE.

MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson and James A. Stimson. 1992. “Peasants or Bankers? The American Electorate and the U. S. Economy.” American Political Science Review 86: 597-611. Maisel, L. Sandy, Elizabeth J. Irvy, Benjamin D. Ling and Stephanie G. Pennix. 1996. “Re-exploring the Weak Challenger Hypothesis: The 1994 Candidate Pools.” In Midterm: The Elections of 1994 in Context, ed. Philip A. Kinkner. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Mann, Thomas E. 1978. Unsafe at Any Margin: Interpreting Congressional Elections. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. Mann, Thomas E. and Raymond E. Wolfinger. 1980. “Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections.” American Political Science Review 74: 617-632. Marra, Robin F. and Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. 1989. “Explaining Seat Change in the U. S. House of Representatives, 195086.” American Journal of Political Science 33: 541-569. Mayhew, David R. 1974a. “Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals.” Polity 6: 295-317. _________. 1974b. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. “Media in Campaigns.” 1992, January 4. American University Campaign Management Institute, Center of Congressional and Presidential Studies, School of Public Affairs. Washington, DC: C-SPAN. [televised seminar] Moon, David and George Serra. 1994. “Casework, Issue Positions, and Voting in Congressional Elections.” Journal of Politics 56: 200-212.

65 National Taxpayers Union. 1990, September 20. “National taxpayers Union Reveals House Mailing Costs.” [photocopy] O’Neill, Tip with Gary Hymel. 1994. All Politics Is Local, and Other Rules of the Game. New York: Times Books. Owens, John R. 1984. “Economic Influences on Elections to the U.S. Congress.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 9: 123-150. Parker, Suzanne L. and Glenn R. 1993. “Why Do We Trust Our Congressmen?” Journal of Politics 55: 442-453. Payne, James L. 1980. “The Personal Electoral Advantage of House Incumbents, 1936-1976.” American Politics Quarterly 8: 465-482. Peltzman, Sam. 1984. “Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting.” Journal of Law & Economics 27: 181-210. Peters, John G. and Susan Welch. 1980. “The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections.” American Political Science Review 74: 697-708. Ray, Bruce A. 1982. “Committee Attractiveness in the U. S. House, 1963-1981.” American Journal of Political Science 26: 609-613. Ragsdale, Lyn and Timothy R. Cook. 1987. “Representatives’ Actions and Challengers’ Reactions: Limits to Candidate Connections in the House.” American Journal of Political Science 31: 45-81. Robinson, Michael J. 1981. “Three Faces of Congressional Media.” In The New Congress, eds. Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. Rush, Mark E. 1993. Does Redistricting Make A Difference? Partisan Representation and Electoral Behavior. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Salmore, Barbara and Stephen A. Salmore. 1989. Candidates, Parties, and Campaigns: Electoral Politics in America 2nd ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Schiff, Steven H. and Steven S. Smith. 1983. “Generational Change and the Allocation of Staff in the U. S. Congress.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 8: 457-467. Schneider, William. 1989. “JFK’s Children: The Class of ’74.” Atlantic Monthly, March, 35-58.

66 Serra, George and Albert D. Cover. 1992. “The Electoral Consequences of Perquisite Use: The Casework Case.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 17: 233-247. Smith, Hedrick. 1988. The Power Game: How Washington Works. New York: Ballantine Books. Stein, Robert M. and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1994. “Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel.” Journal of Politics 56: 377-399. Stokes, Donald E. and Warren E. Miller. 1966. “Party Government and the Saliency of Congress.” In Elections and the Political Order, eds. Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. New York: Wiley. Thomas, Scott J. 1989. “Do Incumbent Campaign Expenditures Matter?” Journal of Politics 51: 967-976. Tufte, Edward R. 1975. “Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections.” American Political Science Review 69: 812-826. Yantek, Thomas A. 1982. “Public Support for Presidential Performance: A Study of Macroeconomic Effects.” Polity 15: 268-278. Yiannakis, Dianne Evans. 1981. “The Grateful Electorate: Casework and Congressional Elections. American Journal of Political Science 25: 568-580.

Appendix A U. S. House of Representatives Class of 1974 Election District
*D-CA7 *D-CA13 *D-CA17 *D-CA24 *D-CA34 *D-CA35 *D-CA38 D-CO2 D-CT2 D-CT6 R-FL5 *D-GA4 D-GA7 *R-ID2 *D-IL3 *R-IL6 D-IL10 *D-IL15 D-IL24 D-IN2 D-IN6 D-IN8 *D-IN10 *D-IN11 *D-IA2 R-IA3 D-IA5 D-IA6 *D-KS2 *D-KY1 R-LA6 R-ME1 D-MD5 *D-MA3 D-MA5 *D-MI6 D-MI17 D-MI18

Name
Miller, G. Mineta, N. Krebs, J. Waxman, H. Hannaford, M. Lloyd, J. Patterson, J. Wirth, T. Dodd, C. Moffett, A. Kelly, R. Levitas, E. McDonald, L. Hansen, G. Russo, M. Hyde, H. Mikva, A. Hall. T. Simon, P. Fithian, F. Evans, D. Hayes, P. Sharp. P. Jacobs, A. Blouin, M. Grassely, C. Harkin, T. Bedell, B. Keys, M. Hubbard, C. Moore, W. Emery, D. Spellman, G. Early, J. Tsongas, P. Carr. B. Broadhead, W. Blanchard, J.

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W D W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W

W W D W D W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W DSP W W D W W W D W W W W W WS W W W

W W W D W W WS W DP W W W W W FJ W W W W W WS W W W W W W W D W W

W W W

W W W

W W W

W W W

W W W

W W W

W W WR W W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W W DS W W W W W

D W

WS

D DE D W W

W W

W W

W W

DP W

W

W

W

W

W

W DS DP W W

WS

W W

W W

W W

W W

W W

RET W RET

W W W W DS V W

WS W W W

RET W DS W W DP

W

W

W W

W W

D W DS

W W W W RET WG

U. S. House of Representatives Class of 1974 (continued) Election District
*R-MN2 D-MN6 *D-MN8 D-MT1 *R-NE3 D-NVAL D-NH1 *D-NJ1 *D-NJ2 R-NJ5 *D-NJ7 *D-NJ13 *D-NY2 *D-NY3 *D-NY11 *D-NY13 D-NY14 *D-NY15 D-NY24 *D-NY27 *D-NY29 *D-NY36 *D-NY37 *D-NC5 *D-NC8 *R-OH1 R-OH8 D-OH 23 D-OK2 *D-OK6 *D-OR1 D-OR3 D-OR4 *R-PA5 D-PA7 *R-PA19 R-PA25 *D-RI2 *D-SC3

Name
Hagedorn, T. Nolan, R. Oberstar, J. Baucus, M. Smith, V. Santini, J D’Amours, N. Florio, J. Hughes, W. Fenwick, M. Maguire, A. Meyner, H. Downey, T. Ambro, J. Scheuer, J. Solarz, S. Richmond, F. Zeferetti, L. Ottinger, R. McHugh, M. Pattison, E. LaFalce, J. Nowak, H. Neal, S. Hefner, W. Gradison, W. Kindness, T. Mottl, R. Risenhoover, T. English, G. AuCoin, L. Duncan, R. Weaver, J. Schulze, R. Edgar, R. Goodling, W. Myers, G. Beard, E. Derrick, B.

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W

W W W WS W W W W W W W D W W W W W W W W D W W W W W W W DP W W W W W W W RET W W

W D RET W W W W W W W W D W D W W RES W W W W W W W W W W W W DP W W W W D W W DSP W W W DS

W W DS W W

W W

W W

W RET

W

W

W

W

W

W

W W

W W

WG W W

RET

W W W D W W W W W W W W DP W W W W W W

W W W

W W W

W W W

W W W

D RET DP

RET W W W W W W W W W W W W W DS

W W W W W W

W W W W W W

RET W W W RET W RET W W W WR W W RET

RET

W W W W W W

W W

W W

W W

W DS

RET

RET W W DS W W

W W

RET W W W W RET

W

W

W

W

W

W

RET

68

U. S. House of Representatives Class of 1974 (continued)

Election District
D-SC5 *D-SC5 R-SD1 *D-TN3 *D-TN8 *D-TX13 D-TX21 *D-UT2 R-VTAL *D-VA8 *D-VA10 D-WA3 *D-WI3 *D-WI8 R-WI9

Name
Holland, K. Jenrette, J. Pressler, L. Lloyd, M. Ford, H. Hightower, J. Krueger, R. Howe, A. Jeffords, J. Harris, H. Fisher, J. Bonker, D. Baldus, A. Cornell, R. Kasten, R.

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

W W W W W W W D W W W W W W W

W W WS W W W DS W W W W W D W

W D W W W

RET

W W W

W W D

W W

W W

W W

W W

RET W RET

W D D W D WS

W

W

W

WS

W

W

W

DSP

Note: *Members of the Class of 1974 included in the sample. Andrew Jacobs (D-IN) is considered a member of the 1974 cohort, as he was defeated in 1972 then regained his seat in 1974 and served until he retired in 1996. Abbreviations: W (won reelection); D (defeated in general election); DP (defeated in primary); WS (won Senate seat); DS (defeated for Senate); (DSP (defeated in Senate primary); WG (won gubernatorial election); FJ (appointed federal judge); RET (retired); WR (won reelection and resigned prior to end of term); RES (resigned); DE (deceased); V (vacant due to illness). 1982 redistricting: Sharp (D-IN 2); Jacobs (D-IN10); Hagedorn (R-MN 1); Scheuer (DNY 8); Zeferetti (D-NY 14); McHugh (D-NY 28); LaFalce (D-NY 32); Nowack (D-NY 33); Gradison (R-OH 2); and, Ford (D-TN 8). 1992 redistricting: Mineta (D-CA 15); Waxman (D-CA 29); Solarz (D-NY 12); and, LaFalce (D-NY 29). 2002 redistricting: Waxman (D-CA 13). Sources: Almanac of American Politics, 1976-2004; USA Today (November 9, 1994: 10A).

69

Appendix B Data Sources

“A Checklist: Who Wrote Overdrafts at the House Bank and Who Did Not.” 1992. New York Times, April 17, A12. “Andy Jacobs: Adjunct Professor.” http://www.iupui.edu/~ploisci/jacobs.htm. [Retrieved December 23, 2003] Barone, Michael, Grant Ujifusa and Douglas Matthews. 1975. The Almanac of American Politics, 1976: The Senators, the Representatives, the Governors—Their Records, States, and Districts. New York: E. P. Dutton. _________. 1977. The Almanac of American Politics, 1978: The Senators, the Representatives, the Governors—Their Records, States, and Districts. New York: E. P. Dutton. _________. 1979. The Almanac of American Politics, 1980: The Senators, the Representatives, the Governors—Their Records, States, and Districts. New York: E. P. Dutton. Washington, DC: National Journal. Barone, Michael and Grant Ujifusa. 1981. The Almanac of American Politics, 1982: The President, the Senators, the Representatives, the Governors—Their Records and Election Results, Their States and Districts. Washington, DC: National Journal. _________. 1983. The Almanac of American Politics, 1984: The President, the Senators, the Representatives, the Governors—Their Records and Election Results, Their States and Districts. Washington, DC: National Journal. _________. 1985. The Almanac of American Politics, 1986: The President, the Senators, the Representatives, the Governors—Their Records and Election Results, Their States and Districts. Washington, DC: National Journal. __________. 1987. The Almanac of American Politics, 1988: The President, the Senators, the Representatives, the Governors—Their Records and Election Results, Their States and Districts. Washington, DC: National Journal. _________. 1989. The Almanac of American Politics, 1990: The President, the Senators, the Representatives, the Governors—Their Records and Election Results, Their States and Districts. Washington, DC: National Journal.

_________. 1991. The Almanac of American Politics, 1992: The President, the Senators, the Representatives, the Governors—Their Records and Election Results, Their States and Districts. Washington, DC: National Journal. _________. 1993. The Almanac of American Politics, 1994: The President, the Senators, the Representatives, the Governors—Their Records and Election Results, Their States and Districts. Washington, DC: National Journal. _________. 1995. The Almanac of American Politics, 1996: The President, the Senators, the Representatives, the Governors—Their Records and Election Results, Their States and Districts. Washington, DC: National Journal. _________. 1997. The Almanac of American Politics, 1998: The Senators, the Representatives, the Governors—Their Records and Election Results, Their States and Districts. Washington, DC: National Journal. _________. 1999. The Almanac of American Politics, 2000: The Senators, the Representatives, the Governors—Their Records and Election Results, Their States and Districts. Washington, DC: National Journal. Barone, Michael with Richard E. Cohen and Grant Ujifusa. 2001. The Almanac of American Politics, 2002: The Almanac of American Politics, 2000: The Senators, the Representatives, the Governors—Their Records and Election Results, Their States and Districts. Washington, DC: National Journal. _________. 2003. The Almanac of American Politics, 2004: The Senators, the Representatives, the Governors—Their Records and Election Results, Their States and Districts. Washington, DC: National Journal. Beneson, Bob. 1992, February 29. “Illinois.” Congressional Quarterly Special Report: 1992 Congressional Elections Supplement 50: 42-49. _________. 1992, March 21. “Incumbent Tremors in Illinois: Democrat Dixon “Dumped.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 50: 739-743. “Bill Goodling.” http://www.bakerdaniels.com/bios/pdfbios/pdf_noAddress/Goodling_ bill385.pdf. {Retrieved December 23, 2003] “Biographies: Philip R. Sharp.” http://www.vnf.com/content/AboutUs/Biographies/ Philip_Sharp.htm. [Retrieved December 23, 2003]

71

“Blowing the Lid on Kiters, Inc.: Voters Will Settle Accounts for the House This Fall.” 1992. U. S. World & News Report, March 23, 36-37. Brownson, Charles B., ed. 1975-1988. Congressional Staff Directory. Alexandria, VA: Congressional Staff Directory. [Data from the Congressional Staff Directory 1975 through 1988.] Brownson, Anna L., ed. 1989-1992. Congressional Staff Directory. Alexandria, VA: Congressional Staff Directory. [Data from the Congressional Staff Directory 1989 through 1992.] Bureau of the Census. 1973. Congressional District Data Book: 93rd Congress: A Statistical Abstract. Washington, DC: U. S. Department of Commerce. _________. 1983. 1980 Census of Population and Housing: Congressional Districts of the 98th Congress. Washington, DC: U. S. Department of Commerce. _________. 1993. 1990 Census of Population and Housing: Congressional Districts of the 98th Congress. Washington, DC: U. S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis, United States Department of Commerce. 1989, December. Business Statistics, 1961-88: A Supplement to the Survey of Current Business 26th ed. Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office. _________. 1990, April. “Current Business Statistics: General Business Indicators.” Survey of Current Business 70: S-1. _________. 1991, April. “Current Business Statistics: General Business Indicators.” Survey of Current Business 71: S-1. _________. 1992, January. “Current Business Statistics: General Business Indicators.” Survey of Current Business 72: S-1. _________. 1993, July. “Current Business Statistics: General Business Indicators.” Survey of Current Business 73: S-1. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 1976, September. CPI Detailed Report. Washington, DC: U. S. Department of Labor. _________. 1978, September. CPI Detailed Report. Washington, DC: U. S. Department of Labor.

72

_________. 1983, October. “Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment Estimates Areas, 1976. [microfiche, BLS/LAUS/AR-83/07] Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor for the States, Labor Market Areas, and Counties.” Unemployment in States and Local Statistics. _________. 1984, July. “Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment Estimates for the States, Labor Market Areas, and Counties.” Unemployment in States and Local Areas, 1980. [microfiche, BLS/LAUS/AR-84/04] Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics. _________. 1984, July. “Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment Estimates for the States, Labor Market Areas, and Counties.” Supplement to Unemployment in States and Local Areas, 1982. Supplement No. 2. [microfiche, BLS/LAUS/AR-84/02] Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics. _________. 1984, August. “Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment Estimates for the States, Labor Market Areas, and Counties.” Unemployment in States and Local Areas, 1978. [microfiche, BLS/LAUS/ AR-84/06] Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics. _________. 1984, September. “Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment Estimates for the States, Labor Market Areas, and Counties.” Unemployment in States and Local Areas, 1977. [microfiche, BLS/LAUS/ AR-84/07] Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics. _________. 1985, August. “Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment Estimates for the States, Labor Market Areas, and Counties.” Supplement to Unemployment in States and Local Areas, 1984. Supplement No. 3. [microfiche, BLS/LAUS/ AR-85/01] Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics. _________. 1988, May. “Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment Estimates for the States, Labor Market Areas, and Counties.” Supplement to Unemployment in States and Local Areas, 1986. [microfiche, BLS/LAUS/ AR-88/02] Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics. _________. 1990, June. “Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment Estimates for the States, Labor Market Areas, and Counties.” Supplement to Unemployment in States and Local Areas, 1988. [microfiche, BLS/LAUS/ AR-91/03] Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

73

_________. 1992, June. “Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment Estimates for the States, Labor Market Areas, and Counties.” Supplement to Unemployment in States and Local Areas, 1990. [microfiche, BLS/LAUS/ AR-92/02] Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor. 1977, February. Monthly Labor Review 100: 102. _________. 1979, February. Monthly Labor Review 102: 78. _________. 1981, February. Monthly Labor Review 104: 90. _________. 1983, February. Monthly Labor Review 106: 62. _________. 1985, February. Monthly Labor Review 108: 70. _________. 1987, February. Monthly Labor Review 110: 61. _________. 1989, February. Monthly Labor Review 112: 72. _________. 1991, February. Monthly Labor Review 114: 62. _________. 1993, February. Monthly Labor Review 116: 11. Bureau of National Affairs. 1993. B & A Policy Practice Series. Washington, DC: Bureau of National Affairs. [reference insert service] Burger, Timothy J. 1993. “Ford Gets Bank Probe Clearance Letter.” Roll Call, November 8, 1, 23. _________. 1994,. “Three-year Sentence Sought for Hubbard.” Roll Call, June 23, 3, 26. _________. 1994. “Hubbard Sentence Postponed: Wife Gets Probation.” Roll Call, July 4, 3, 12. _________. 1994. “Hubbard Lawyers Say Serious Medical Woes should Keep Ex-congressman out of Prison.” Roll Call, August 8, 10. “Bush Job Performance—Trend.” 1993. The Gallup Poll Monthly, January, 14-17. “Butler Derrick.” http://www.pgfm.com/bio.asp?key=3149. [Retrieved December 23, 2003.] 74

“Candidates for Governor, Senate, House.” 1992, October 24. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report: Special Report Supplement 50: 3415-3430. “Caught in the Act.” 1992. Newsweek, March 23, 24-31. Clymer, Adam. 1992. “Public Believes Worst on Bank Scandal.” New York Times, April 2, A13. _________. 1992. “The Scandal Is a Sword, but how It Cuts Is Unclear.” New York Times, April 20, A1, A13. Congressional Districts in the 1980s. 1983. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc. “Congressional Quarterly Election Report.” 1984, October 13. Congressional Quarterly Special Report Supplement 42: 2503-2609. “Criminal Actions against House Members.” 1994. Washington Post, June 1, A17. Curran, Tim and Glenn R. Simpson. 1993. “Hubbard Is Sent Undercover in Wake of House Bank Woes.” Roll Call, December 16, 1, 15. Early, Joseph D. 1992, April 1. “Three Votes for Fairness; Three Votes for Fear.” [news release] “Economic Report of the President.” 1987, January. Implicit Price Deflator: Final Sales from President’s Council of Economic Advisers. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. “Election ’94: U. S. House.” 1994. USA Today, November 9, 10A. Ellis, David. 1992. “Nobody Here but Us Chickens: Who Kited Checks at the House Bank?” Time, March 23, 30. Federal Election Commission. 1977, April. FEC Disclosure Series, No. 9. 1976 House of Representatives Campaigns, Receipts and Expenditures. Washington, DC: Federal Election Commission. _________. 1979, June. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1977-1978: U. S. Senate and House Campaigns. Interim Report No. 5. Washington, DC: Federal Election Commission.

75

_________. 1982, January. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1979-1980: U. S. Senate and House Campaigns. Final Report. Washington, DC: Federal Election Commission. _________. 1983, October. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1981-1982: U. S. Senate and House Campaigns. Final Report. Washington, DC: Federal Election Commission. _________. 1985, November. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1983-1984: U. S. Senate and House Campaigns. Final Report. Washington, DC: Federal Election Commission. _________. 1988, March. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1985-1986: U. S. Senate and House Campaigns. Final Report. Washington, DC: Federal Election Commission.

_________. 1989, March. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1987-1988: U. S. Senate and House Campaigns. Final Report. Washington, DC: Federal Election Commission. _________. 1991, October. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1989-1990: U. S. Senate and House Campaigns. Final Report. Washington, DC: Federal Election Commission. _________. 1993, March. FEC Reports on Financial Activity, 1991-1992: U. S. Senate and House Campaigns. Final Report. Washington, DC: Federal Election Commission. Fritz, Sarah and Dwight Morris. 1992. Handbook of Campaign Spending. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Glasser, Susan B. 1992. “Six Years after Indictment, Trial Set for Ford on Bank Fraud Charges: Feb. 1, 1993.” Roll Call, October 10, 5. _________. 1993. “GOP Asks Probe of Justice Dept. over Ford Trial.” Roll Call, January 1, 1, 14. _________. 1993. “Six Years after Indictment, Rep. Ford’s Second Trial on Fraud Charges Begins.” Roll Call February 4, 5. _________. 1993. “Ford Asks Justice Probe, Claiming Fraud Trial ‘Poisoned.’” Roll Call, February 8, 12. 76

_________. 1993. “With Jury Selection Complete in Ford Trial, 11 Whites, One Black to Judge Congressman.” Roll Call, February 11, 16. _________. 1993. “Ford, on Trial,” Asks Leadership for Help: May Challenge Prosecution for Making Preemptory Jury Strikes on the Basis of Race.” Roll Call, February 15, 7. _________. 1993. “Ford’s Second Trial Finally Begins: Prosecutors Claim Congressman Sold Office for Sham Loans.” Roll Call, March 8, 12, 39. _________. 1993. “GOP Reaches Dead End in Efforts to Force Probe of Justice Dept. Action on Ford.” Roll Call, March 11, 7. _________. 1993. “After Six-year Wait, Harold Ford Takes Stand in His Own Defense in Fraud Trial.” Roll Call, March 29, 3. _________. 1993. “Ford Fraud Case Goes to the Jury.” Roll Call, April 8, 1, 56. _________. 1993. “”Rep. Ford Found Innocent of Bank Fraud, Set to Take Reins of Ways & Means Panel.” Roll Call, April 12, 10. _________. 1993. “Acquitted, Rep. Ford Moves to Settle Some Scores, Wants U. S. to Pay His Legal Bill.” Roll Call, April 15, 3. _________. 1993. “House Admin. Set to Act on Old Request by Ford to Be Reimbursed for Legal Bills.” Roll Call, April 19, 14. Gruson, Lindsey. 1992. “A Worried Solarz Tries to Explain Overdrafts.” New York Times, March 16, A1, A10. “Heard on the Hill.” 1994. Roll Call, May 12, 1, 50. Hook, Janet. 1992, March 28. “Paralysis Grips Congress as Scandals Spread.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 50: 775-776. “House Bank Overdrafts Send a Chill through Campaigns of Incumbents.” 1992, October 24. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 50: 3328-3329. “House Institution Calling It Quits.” 1994. USA Today, April 6, 4A. Katz, Jeffrey. 1992, February 29. “Tennessee.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report: 1992 Congressional Elections Supplement 50: 99.

77

Katz, Jeffrey and Ines Pinto Alicea. 1992, March 21. “Profiles of 24 Biggest Offenders: Outlooks on Possible Effects.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 50: 701-704, 706-710. Krauss, Clifford. 1992. “House Panel Proposes Short List of Offenders in Banking Scandal.” New York Times, March 6, A7. _________. 1992. “Foley, in Defeat, Agrees to Naming of Check Abusers.” New York Times, March 13, A1, A12. _________. 1992. “Foley Proposes Using Outsider to Run House Services.” New York Time, March 16, A10. Kuntz, Phil. 1992, February 29. “Check-kiting at the House Bank: How It Worked, How It Didn’t.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 50: 446-450. _________. 1992, March 21. “Overdrafts Sometimes Funded Campaigns, Investments.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 50: 697-699. _________. 1992, April 4. “Angry Members’ Protests Grow as Bank Scandal Festers.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 50: 858, 860. “Legal Analyses Conference ’PARCA’ Provisions Threatening Millions with High Premiums, Fewer Choices.” http://www.hiaa.org/search/contnet.cfm?contentID=308. [Retrieved December 23, 2003] “List of Politicians Who Got into Trouble or Disgrace.” http://www.politicalgraveyard. com/special/trouble-disgrace.html. [Retrieved December 23, 2003] “Media in Campaigns.” 1992, January 4. American University Campaign Management Institute, Center of Congressional and Presidential Studies, School of Public Affairs. Washington, DC: C-SPAN. [televised seminar] Moxley, Warden with Wayne Walker and Robert Healy, eds. 1973. Congressional Districts in the 1970s. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc. National Taxpayers Union. 1992, January 16. “House Postage Costs Soar 69 Percent: Republicans Outspend Democrats on ‘Free Postage.’” [photocopy] _________. 1990, September 20. “National Taxpayers Union Reveals Mailing Costs.” [photocopy]

78

“1986 Candidates for Senate and House.” 1986, October 11. Congressional Quarterly Special Report Supplement 44: 2502-2513. “1988 Candidates for Senate and House.” 1988, October 15. Congressional Quarterly Special Report Supplement 46: 2955-2966. “1990 Candidates for Senate and House.” 1990, October 13. Congressional Quarterly Special Report Supplement 48: 5359-5371. “1994 Election Results.” 1994. Roll Call Election Services Supplement, November 14. Ornstein, Norman J., Thomas E. Mann and Michael J. Malbin with Kimberly Coursen. 1992. Vital Statistics on Congress, 1993-1994. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Silverstein, Ken. 1988, January/February. “Microsoft’s 1995-1997 Lobbyists and Their Power Ties.” http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/1998/01/silverstein_ chart.html. {Retrieved December 23,2003] “The Outlook: Senate, House and Governors.” 1976, October 9. Congressional Quarterly Special Report 34: 2771-2869. “The Outlook: Senate, House and Governors.” 1978, October 14. Congressional Quarterly Special Report 36: 2797-2914. “The Outlook: Senate, House and Governors.” 1980, October 11. Congressional Quarterly Special Report 38: 2986-3089. “The Outlook: Senate, House and Governors.” 1982, October 9. Congressional Quarterly Special Report 40: 2481-2610. “PCAOB Board Member Bill Gradison to Address Compliance Week’s ‘Compliance Solutions’ Conference.” http://www.complianceweek.com/pressreleases/072903. asp. [Retrieved December 23, 2003. Pear, Robert. 1992. “House Names Top 22 Check Abusers.” New York Times, April 2, A13 “Prepared Witness Testimony: Comprehensive National Energy Policy.” http:// www.energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/03132003hearing818/English 1354.htm. [Retrieved December 23, 2003] “Race for the Cure: Local Honorary Chair Marilyn Lloyd.” http://www. chattanoogaraceforthecure.com/honorarychair.html. [Retrieved December 23, 2003] 79

“Remarks by U. S. Ambassador William J. Hughes, October 25, 1995.” http:// www.dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bureaus/lat/195/951025/HughesSwearingIn.html. [Retrieved December 23, 2003.] Schmalz, Jeffrey. 1992. “House and Bank Overdrafts Add to Voters’ Outrage.” New York Times, March 16, A10. “Secretary of Transportation Norman Y. Mineta.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/ government/Mineta-bio.html. [Retrieved December 23, 2003.] Simpson, Glenn R. 1993. “Ex-Rep. Solarz Is Cleared in House Banking Probe: At Least 2 Current Members Still under Scrutiny.” Roll Call, April 26, 14 _________. 1994. “Hubbard(s) Guilty in a Complex Plot Tied to Bank Flap: Exmember Faces up to 20 Years.” Roll Call, April 7, 1, 12. _________. 1994. “Hyde Knew S & L Woes, Report Says.” Roll Call, June 13, 10. “Stephen J. Solarz.” http://www.apcoworldwide.com/content/bios.solarz.cfm. [Retrieved December 23, 2003] “Swarthmore College Archives: James H. Scheuer Papers, 1957-1995” RG6/R3/001. http://www/swarthmore.edu/Library/friends/ead/6r3001.htm. [Retrieved December 23, 2003] United State House of Representatives. 1975. Report of the Clerk of the House from January 1, 1975 to June 30, 1975: 94th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office. [Data from Report of the Clerk of the House from January 1, 1975 to June 30, 1975: 94th Congress, 1st Session to Report of the Clerk of the House from October 1, 1992 tthrough December 31, 1992: 103rd Congress, 1st Session.] Wineka, Mark. “VA Facility to Be Renamed for Rep. Hefner.” http://www. salisburypost.com/newscopy/041599hefner.htm. [Retrieved December 23, 2003] “Who We Are: Bread for the World President and Board of Directors.” http:/www. bread.org./whoweare/president-board.html. [Retrieved December 23, 2003.]

80


				
DOCUMENT INFO
Shared By:
Categories:
Tags:
Stats:
views:779
posted:5/30/2009
language:English
pages:82