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					Legislative Professionalism and Republican Gains in Southern State Legislatures

William E. Cassie Appalachian State University A. J. Barghothi University of South Carolina

Prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana.

Legislative Professionalism and Republican Gains in Southern State Legislatures

Over the past quarter century or so political scientists have spent a great deal of time investigating both the causes and effects of divided government in the United States. This attention can easily be attributed to the regularity of divided control in the post-war era. “Divided government is not new in the United States, but it became so common in the last half of the twentieth century that researchers began to focus for the first time on its causal basis” (Niemi and Weisberg, 2001: 271). Since 1947 (the 80th Congress) 17 of 29 (58.6%) Presidential and mid-term elections have produced divided government1 at the national level. In spite of this attention we appear no closer to an explanation of either the causes (for varying explanations of the causes of divided government see Jacobson 1990; Fiorina 1992; Petrocik and Doherty 1996, and many more) or effects (for varying explanations of is consequences see Mayhew 1991; Coleman 1999, and others) of divided government. One important component of divided government is the regular pattern with which it is manifested. With the exception of Truman’s experience with divided government at the beginning of the post-war period, and the recent experience under Bill Clinton, divided government has been characterized by Republican presidents and a Democratically controlled Congress—or at least one congressional chamber.2 Although much of the scholarly attention has concentrated on divided government at the national level (see Fiorina 1994 and 1996; and Squire 1997 for investigations of divided government at the state level), the phenomenon has also been clearly evident at
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Divided government is defined throughout this paper as when at least one legislative chamber is controlled by the opposite party from the executive (either the president or a governor). 2 76.5% of divided government at the national level since 1947 has been characterized with Republican presidents and at least one Democratically controlled chamber of Congress.

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the state level. Between 1947 and 2000, state governments have been divided 40% of the time. In addition to the regular occurrence of divided government in the states, it is important to note that divided government at the state level has followed the same pattern as in the national government. From 1947 through 2000, fifty-four percent of divided government at the state level has involved a Republican governor and at least one Democratically controlled legislative chamber.3 While the consequences of divided government are an important field of study, the purpose of this research is to add to the literature that deals with the causes of the phenomenon. Identifying the causes of divided government is important because understanding why we have divided government potentially gives us leverage on the effects of divided government. For example, if we could take as an article of faith that voters intentionally divided government in order to balance policy alternatives (Fiorina, 1992) that would go a long way in helping to explain why we see different policy outcomes (Cameron et al 1997) or different levels of policy making (Binder 1999) periods of divided government. In other words, if we knew voter policy balancing caused divided government then “gridlock” under divided government makes sense. If, on the other hand, we knew that divided government is the product of some kind of institutional factor, such as gerrymandering, the incumbent’s advantage, or professionalism, which have potentially less ideological repercussions (although clearly still partisan repercussions), then we might expect divided government to have less of an effect on policy outcomes (Mayhew 1991).

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In Southern and border states 94% of divided governments have had Republican Governors and at least one Democratically controlled legislative chamber. In fact there are only five instances of divided government in these states where a Democratic Governor faced at least one Republicanily controlled legislative chamber, and none before the 1995-96 term: FL and NC 1995-96 and 1997-89; SC 1999-2000.

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One important explanation for divided government at the state level is advanced by Morris P. Fiorina (1994 and 1999). Using an opportunity cost model, Fiorina finds that the professionalism of state legislatures makes legislative service more attractive to potential Democratic candidates and less attractive to their Republican counterparts. This is the case because of the time commitment required to serve in a professional legislature. Fiorina says that “because full-time legislative service is incompatible with another career, and Democrats, on average, have less lucrative career opportunities than do Republicans” (1994; 305), Democrats, on average find legislative service more rewarding (both from an economic and a prestige perspective). This relates to divided government because the opportunity-cost decision calculus is likely only to impact one’s decision to run for the legislature. The prestige and salary accompanying a governorship is likely to be equally attractive to both Democrats and Republicans. Fiorina’s explanation not only explains why we have divided government, but also the typical pattern of divided government—Republican executives and Democratic legislatures. Fiorina (1994) tests his model on 31 non-southern states4 justifying the omission of southern and border states by saying “the Republicans have never won control of a southern or border legislative chamber in the post-war period” (305, emphasis in the original). Although at the time of his writing the exclusion of the South, on the basis of one-party electoral dominance made sense; the years that have followed have seen Republican electoral fortunes in Southern and border states5 greatly improved. Given the

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Fiorina omitted from his analysis AK, HI, MN, and NE in addition to the following southern and border states: AL, AR, FL. GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, and WV. 5 For the purpose of this analysis the South is defined as AL, AR FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, and VA. KY, MD, OK, and WV are defined as border states.

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gains that Republicans have made in southern legislative contests6, it is now appropriate to apply Fiorina’s research design to the South. Squire (1997) tests Fiorina’s explanation that divided government at the state level is a product of legislative professionalism, by dividing states into four categories based on their level of professionalism7. While not a direct test of Fiorina’s “partisan advantage” thesis, Squire’s analysis supports Fiorina’s divided government hypothesis. He finds a “positive, but not terribly impressive, relationship between increasing levels of professionalism and incidences of divided government” (428-9). The purpose of this paper is to test Fiorina’s hypothesis “that the professionalization of state legislatures makes legislative service more attractive to Democratic candidates and less attractive to Republican candidates” (1994; 304) in southern and border state legislatures. Before doing so it is important to review the relevant literature on state legislative professionalism and its electoral effects. First we must develop a working conception of legislative professionalism. The concept of legislative professionalism was developed in the 1960’s and 1970s with an effort to reform state legislative politics. Moncrief and Thompson (1996) assert that these “reforms were designed to induce capable, qualified persons to serve in the
6 In 1980 all fifteen Southern and border states had sizable Democratic majorities, the largest being in AL where 135 of 139 legislators (both chambers) were Democrats, the smallest being in TN where 77 of 128 legislators were Democrats. By 2000 Republicans held control of both chambers in FL, SC, and VA, and one chamber in KY while the largest Democratic advantage was in WV where 103 of 134 legislators (both chambers) were Democrats. In 1998 Republican’s enjoyed a majority in one chamber in KY, SC, TX, and VA, while enjoying control of both chambers in FL. In 1996 Republican’s enjoyed a majority in one chamber in NC, SC, TX, and VA, while enjoying control of both chambers in FL.. In 1994 Republican’s enjoyed a majority in one chamber in FL, NC, SC, and TN. 7 Squire divides states into the following categories based on their level of legislative professionalism. His typology is as follows: 1) Professionalized (including: NY, MI, Ca, and MA); 2) Substantially Professionalized (including: PA, OH, AK, IL, CO, MD, HA, WI, FL, NJ, AZ, OK, CT, WA, and IA); 3) Marginally Professionalized (including: TX, MD, NC, MN, DE, LA, OR, SC, VA, ME, SM, NV, AL, KS, RI, VT, IN, TN, GA, WV, and ID) and 4; Not Professionalized (including: MT, AR, KY, NM, SD, UT, ND, WY, and NH)

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legislative institution. These changes included larger salaries and better benefit packages for legislatures, the establishment of personal staff, and upgraded facilities and resources” (1). As a part of this reform movement, the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures (CCSL) was formed in 1965, “to help transform state legislatures into 20th century institutions of government” (CCSL, 4). The CCSL developed a measure of legislative capability asserting that legislatures should be functional, accountable, informed, independent, and representative. Building on the CCSL’s work, Grumm (1971), defines professionalism based on legislative compensation, length of session, expenditures for legislative services and operation, the CCSL “legislative service score” and the number of bills introduced. Other measures or descriptions of legislative professionalism include: Bowman and Kearney (1988) who define legislative professionalism (or capacity) on the institution’s “ability to respond effectively to change, make decisions efficiently, effectively and responsively, and manage conflict” (346). Squire (1993) uses the level of member remuneration, staff support and facilities, and time demands placed on the legislators to define professionalism. Finally King (2000), uses a measure of professionalism that is based on Squire’s index, looking at member compensation (which includes both salary and living expenses), the number of days the legislature is actually in session, and expenditures for legislative services and operations (minus legislator compensation) per legislator. It is important to note that there are other measures of legislative professionalism used in the literature, such as Black (1970) who defines professionalism as widely held beliefs by those in the profession. However, most of the literature defines professionalism based on a set of core concepts that tap into the relationship between

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professionalization and a Democratic bias being addressed here—most specifically session length and member compensation. In this way Mooney (1994) provides a useful definition, stating that legislative professionalism turns on the degree to which the legislature can “command the full attention of its members, provide them with adequate resources to do their jobs in a manner comparable to other full-time actors, and set up organizations and procedures that facilitate lawmaking” (48-49). Commonly this definition has referred to 1) member compensation, 2) time available for legislative business (as measured by days in session), and 3) staff resources available to legislatures. In the end, the most obvious definition of legislative professionalism turns on our conception of the United States Congress as the prototypical “professional” legislative body. Squire (1997) makes this point well saying, “legislatures deemed professional operate similarly to the U.S. Congress; they meet in unlimited sessions, pay their members well, and provide superior staff resources and facilities” (418). And so, for our purposes here, Monney’s definition of professionalism meets well with the opportunity cost model being tested here. Following Fiorina we drop staff size because although this is an important measure of professionalism, once in office—we do not expect staff size to be a determining factor when deciding to run for office or not, as would be compensation and session length. A second important goal is to understand the effects of professionalism on the political make-up of legislatures. In other words, does professionalization of a legislature affect the kind of people who choose to serve in office? And if so is there a partisan bias to that affect? Although not a direct test of partisan implications of professionalism, Ehrenhalt (1992), demonstrates that professionalization has an impact on the composition

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of elective institutions8, and the type of individuals who serve in them. Ehrenhalt compares today’s professional political institutions with their less professional predecessors saying: “The 1990s finds American government increasingly dominated by a modern class of professional politicians, people who work full-time at getting and holding office” (xviii). This is contrasted with the earlier era when: State legislatures…were “citizen” institutions nearly everywhere in America up through the 1960s, with most of them in session no more than three months a year. The legislatures were farmers, lawyers, Main Street merchants, and others willing to take time off from private pursuits to devote themselves to the responsibility of writing laws and making policies. For this they were paid a modest stipend as a supplement to their regular income (xix). Though not tested empirically, Ehrenhalt links professionalization to increasing democratic majorities in elected institutions. Going as far as saying that the pool of Democratic candidates for professional legislature was so much larger than their Republican counterparts that they could win even if incongruent with the electorate on important issues (23). This statement is congruent with Fiorina’s hypotheses that there is an inherent Democratic bias to professionalism. Explaining why some states (particularly Southern and border states elect Republican governors while maintaining Democratic legislatures. Ehrenhalt’s finding that professionalization is tied to careerism is echoed by Moncrief, Thompson, and Kurtz (1996) who surveyed sitting state legislators and found that “as state legislatures have improved their decision making capabilities through procedural changes, longer sessions, increased staff, and better resources, they also have created the conditions for a different breed of

8

Ehrenhalt’s work does not concentrate exclusively on state legislatures, but rather the impact of professionalization on office seekers in both local government and state legislatures.

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legislature, that is legislatures who find the new, professional institution an attractive place in which to build a career” (1996; 57). As stated earlier Fiorina (1994) not only empirically tests the link between legislative professionalism and divided government, but also the partisan impacts of professionalism, and finds a significant relationship between one measure of professionalism: legislative salaries. Fiorina shows that as legislative salaries increase (controlling for an array of other factors to be discussed in the data and methods section) so do the percentage of Democrats in the legislature in the non-South. This Democratic advantage is based on Fiorina’s assertion that, in the aggregate, Democrats and Republicans confront different opportunity costs based on their non-political careers. It is important to note that Fiorina’s assertions are not without critics. Stonecash and Agathangelou (1997) argue that Fiorina’s claims about the partisan effect of professionalism are both theoretically and methodologically flawed. From the theoretical perspective they claim that the partisan advantage that Democrats enjoy in the non-South is the product of a political realignment rather than factors tied to professionalism (increases in legislative salary and legislative session). They also question his exclusion of southern states, stating “by choosing to exclude the South, Fiorina eliminates cases which contradict his argument” (149). In a rejoinder Fiorina (1997) attempts to clear up “a series of misconceptions and misunderstandings—about measures, methods, arguments, and findings” (156) held by his critics. More important than clearing up measurement issues he attempts to demonstrate “no evidence that a long-term partisan realignment to the Democrats is occurring” (156).

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Another criticism of Fiorina’s work is that he failed to account for the potential impact of term limits on the decision calculus of legislative candidates. Meinke and Hasecke (2003), expand Fiorina’s work to include the effect of term limits, finding that term limits reduce the incentives for Democratic candidates because they work counter to professionalization. Methods and Analysis: Our approach in this study is to replicate, as closely as possible, the methods used by Fiorina (1994) in his original article on this subject.9 It is not our intention to join the larger debates about the strengths of Fiorina’s theory. We simply wish to test the merits of the theory with regard to the southern legislatures excluded from his original analysis. In order to examine the effects of professionalism on Republican fortunes in southern legislatures we use data that covers the period from 1978 through 2002. There is nothing particularly special about the year 1978, it simply gives us enough data to see the advances made by Republicans as well as changes in professionalism. Our measures are generally those used by Fiorina (1994). Since our focus is on the Republican gains in the South we use Republican seat share in the state houses as our dependent variable.10 We measure professionalism by calculating the length of the legislative sessions, and the compensation for legislatures (salaries and per diem). Other independent variables include a lagged dependent variable, presidential and gubernatorial election results (Republican percentage of the vote), whether it is a presidential off year or gubernatorial year, and a time variable to capture any trends unaccounted for by other
We would like to thank Morris Fiorina for his responses to questions concerning his measurements and methods. He obviously is not responsible for any conclusion that we draw here. 10 Fiorina used Democrat seat share as the dependent variable. This change does not alter anything other than in our analysis something that hurts Republicans will have a negative sign while in the previous research it would have had a positive sign.
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variables. We do not include a measure of GNP growth because the rationale does not seem to apply here. Appendix One displays graphs for each of the fifteen states showing the Republican seat share in the state houses for the period included in this study. It is evident that the Republican party has enjoyed gains throughout the South during this time period. It is also evident that the growth has been very different from state to state.11 West Virginia has seen very little advances by Republicans while states such as Texas have experienced growth during this period from nearly no Republican legislators to a current Republican majority. Our quest is to surmise the extent to which legislative professionalism relates to these various patterns of Republican gains. The results for our first regression analysis are presented in Table One. Our analysis uses Fiorina’s (1994) model as a general guide. We utilized a dummy variable regression with each state represented by a dummy variable (coefficients not reported). The findings suggest that professionalism may be a hindrance to Republicans. Both the length of session variable (days) and the compensation variable are negative indicating that Republicans would fare better in legislatures with shorter sessions and less pay. However, neither variable reaches an acceptable level of significance. The only variables that are significant are the lagged dependent variable, the trend variable (year) and the Republican vote for governor. Table One about here The tolerance numbers displayed in Table One suggest that there may well be a multi-collinearity problem with the data. In order to address this problem we took out the
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Readers should note that the scales for the graphs differ from state to state. These are the scales generated by SPSS to best display the data for each state. Thus some states (ie Alabama) may show a very steady growth rate but still be under 40%.

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lagged dependent variable and recalculated the results. These figures are in Table Two. Several interesting observations can be made from this table. It is important to note that very little explanatory power was lost by dropping the lagged dependent variable. Typically a lagged variable is a good way to boost explanatory power but in this case multi-collinearity was a problem as suggested. With the lagged variable out of the model the measures of professionalism show up as significant and in the hypothesized direction. It would seem that Fiorina’s (1994) theory does help to explain Republican gains that have occurred since his original analyses which excluded these southern and border states for good reasons. It would appear that Republicans are hindered by advances in professionalism. In real terms, every one month increase in session length costs the Republican’s nearly one percent of the house seats. Even though the compensation variable is in the hypothesized direction and significant it does not have a very large impact in real terms. This is not surprising. The theory never suggested Republican’s did not want higher salaries, only that larger salaries might attract more Democratic candidates. The South, traditionally, has not had a problem finding Democrats. Table Two about here Conclusions: Our findings indicate that Republican gains in the South have been hindered by rising professionalism in some cases and of course benefiting from lower levels of professionalism in others. These findings support the theory introduced by Morris Fiorina in 1994 and debated ever since. While Fiorina was criticized for excluded the South then, the results now suggest something very different.

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Southern politics have been a topic of interest for quite some time and continue to be due to the changes that occur and the continuing differences that exist. While our results confirm the relationship between professionalism and Republican legislative success, there is one finding that is very different from those seen in the original research. In our research the trend variable was very noticeable and quite significant. This suggests that there may well be other variables that have not been identified that may help to explain the results in the South. It was also interesting that the presidential vote was not important, while the gubernatorial elections were. This may indicate that southern voters view state politics separately from national politics. It may also indicate that southern voters actually view the parties differently at the two levels. This research adds to the literature on two fronts. First, it adds to our knowledge about the impact of professionalism on partisan success in state legislatures, which ultimately relates back to the often investigated phenomenon of divided government. It also adds to our understanding of what is happening in the South. Scholars and interested observers seek confirmation of a realignment which may have occurred, may be occurring, or may occur in the near future. In most of the southern states the Democrats continue to control the state legislatures and this runs contrary to the idea of new alliances among voters. Our findings indicate that Democratic dominance may be aided by growing professionalism, along with other systemic variables which can not be ignored such as incumbency. Future research should continue to examine the changes in the South, as well as the changes in state legislatures and the impact these have on legislative behavior, partisan competition, and other factors. Survey research should consider asking southern

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voters about their attitudes at the state level rather than the national level or just in general. We need to understand not only how the voters perceive their partisanship but also why. We also need to continue to examine professionalism since it is likely that changes will continue to occur as more states expand their legislative sessions and thus set in motion the overall expansion of professionalism.

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References Black, Gordon. 1970. “A Theory of Professionalization in Politics.” American Political Science Review 64: 865-78. Binder, Sarah. 1999. “The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96.” American Political Science Review 93: 519-533. Bowman, Ann O’M. and Richard C. Kearney. 1998. “Dimensions of States Government Capability.” Western Political Quarterly 41:341-62. Colman, John J. 1999. “Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness.” American Political Science Review 93: 821-35. Cameron et al. Site the article contradicting Mayhew 1991 Citizens Conference on State Legislatures. 1971. The Sometimes Government: A Critical Study of the 50 American Legislatures. Kansas City, MO: Citizens Conference on State Legislatures. Council of State Governments. Various Years. The Book of the States. Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments. Ehrenhalt, Alan. 1992. The United States of Ambition: Politicians, Power and the Pursuit of Office. New York: Random House. Fiorina, Morris P. 1992. “An Era of Divided Government.” Political Science Quarterly 107: 378-410. __________. 1994. “Divided Government in the American States: A Byproduct of Legislative Professionalism?” American Political Science Review 88: 304-16. __________. 1996. Divided Government, 2nd ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. __________. 1997. “Professionalism, Realignment, and Representation.” The American Political Science Review 91: 156-62. __________. 1999. “Further Evidence of the Partisan Consequence of Legislative Professionalism.” American Journal of Political Science 43: 974-77. Grumm, John G. 1971. “The Effects of Legislative Structure on Legislative Performance.” In State and Urban Politics: Readings in Comparative Public Policy ed. Richard I Hofferbert and Ira Sharkansky. Boston: Little Brown. Jacobson, Gary C. 1990. The Electoral Origins of Divided Government. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

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King, James D. 2000. “Changes in the Professionalism of U.S. State Legislatures.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 25: 327-43. Mayhew, David. 1991. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990. New Haven: Yale University Press. Meinke, Scott R. and Edward B. Hasecke. 2003. “Term Limits, Professionalization, and Partisan Control in U.S. State Legislatures.” Journal of Politics 65: 898-908. Moncrief, Gary F. and Joel A. Thompson eds. 1996. Changing Patterns in State Legislative Careers. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. Moncrief, Gary F., Joel A. Thompson, and Karl Kurtz. 1996. “The Old State Statehouse, It Ain’t What it Used to Be.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 21: 57-72. Mooney, Christopher Z. 1994. “Measuring U.S. State Legislative Professionalism: An Evaluation of Five Indices.” State and Local Government Review 26: 70-78. Niemi, Richard G. and Herbert F. Weisberg eds. 2001. Controversies in Voting Behavior 4th ed. Washington D.C.: CQ Press. Petrocik, John R. and Joseph Doherty. 1996. “The Road to Divided Government: Paved Without Intention.” In Divided Government: Changes, Uncertainty, and the Constitutional Order, ed. Peter F. Galderisi. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. Squire, Peverill. 1993. “Professionalism and Public Opinion of State Legislatures.” Journal of Politics 55: 479-91. __________. 1997. “Another Look at Legislative Professionalism and Divided Government in the States.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 22: 417-32. Stonecash, Jeffrey M. and Anna M. Agathangelou. 1997. “Trends in the Partisan Composition of State Legislatures: A Response to Fiorina.” American Political Science Review 91: 148-61.

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Table One: Republican Seat Share in 15 Southern and Border State Houses, 1978-2002

model

Unstandardized Coefficients B Std. Error .860 .011 .000 .043 .868 .049 .093 .059

Standardized Coefficients Beta -.025 -.088 -.065 .078 .044 -.005 .287 .529

t

Sig. Tolerance -.847 .398 .113 .260 .012 .150 .854 .000 .000 .654 .193 .179 .624 .642 .787 .247 .178

off year days compensation governor vote governor year presidential vote year lagged dep. var.

-.729 -.017 -5.459E-05 .110 1.256 -.009 .550 .547

-1.592 -1.130 2.551 1.447 -.185 5.889 9.202

Dependent Variable: republican seat share 2 2 R .90 Adjusted R .89

Table Two: Regression Results Without Lagged Dependent Variable

model

Unstandardized Coefficients B -.547 -.028 -.00015 .133 1.021 -.023 Std. Error 1.048 .013 .000 .052 1.057 .060 .074

Standardized Coefficients Beta -.019 -.140 -.183 .095 .036 -.013 .629

t

Sig. Tolerance .655 .195 .189 .626 .642 .788 .589

off year days compensation governor vote governor year presidential vote

-.522 -2.091 -2.686 2.533 .966 -.390 16.356

.602 .038 .008 .012 .335 .697 .000

1.204 year Dependent Variable: republican seat share 2 2 R .85 Adjusted R .83

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Appendix One

Alabama
50

40

30

Republican Seat Share

20

10

0 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

YEAR

Arkansas
40

30

Republican Seat Share

20

10

0 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

YEAR

18

Florida
70

60

50

Republican Seat Share

40

30

20 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

YEAR

Georgia
50

40

Republican Seat Share

30

20

10 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

YEAR

19

Kentucky
40 38 36 34 32

Republican Seat Share

30 28 26 24 22 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

YEAR

Louisiana
50

40

30

Republican Seat Share

20

10

0 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

YEAR

20

Maryland
40

30

Republican Seat Share

20

10

0 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

YEAR

Mississippi
40

30

Republican Seat Share

20

10

0 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

YEAR

21

North Carolina
60

50

40

Republican Seat Share

30

20

10 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

YEAR

Oklahoma
50

40

Republican Seat Share

30

20 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

YEAR

22

South Carolina
70

60

50

Republican Seat Share

40

30

20

10 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

YEAR

Tennessee
46

44

42

Republican Seat Share

40

38

36

34 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

YEAR

23

Texas
70

60

50

Republican Seat Share

40

30

20

10 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

YEAR

Virginia
70

60

50

Republican Seat Share

40

30

20 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

YEAR

24

West Virginia
40

30

Republican Seat Share

20

10 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

YEAR

25


				
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