BCRA and the

BCRA and the 2004 Presidential and Senate Races in Florida Robert Crew, Florida State University Terri Susan Fine, University of Central Florida Susan MacManus, University of South Florida Paper prepared for presentation at the Southern Political Science Association, January 6-8, 2005. Hotel Intercontinental, New Orleans, LA. BCRA and the 2004 Presidential and Senate Races in Florida Robert Crew, Florida State University1 Terri Susan Fine, University of Central Florida2 Susan MacManus, University of South Florida3 The 2004 Presidential and Senate races in Florida were both highly contentious, but for different reasons. They shared in common heavy spending by political parties and interest groups because of the very real expectation that the outcome of both contests might determine national party balance of power. At the presidential level, George W. Bush was the first Republican president since his father, George H.W. Bush, to seek re-election. Further, the outcome of the 2000 election in Florida turned out to be so narrow (537 votes out of 5.9 million cast) that it was impossible to predict the likely winner of Florida’s 27 electoral votes before election day. The Senate race was a contest for an open seat and the number of open seat Senate races nationally (8) far exceeded the net difference between the Republican majority (51) and the Democratic minority in the Senate (48). Whoever won the Senate race in Florida would impact the balance of power in the Senate in some fashion. A small net gain in the number of Democratic Senators might give the Senate a Democratic majority, while a small net gain in Republican victors would more fully cement Republican dominance at the national level. The relationship between the two races was that, should President Bush be re-elected, the way that he used his second term to shape his legacy would be affected by the makeup of the Senate. The Senate’s constitutional privilege to confirm cabinet officials, U.S. Supreme Court justices (three replacements are anticipated in the next four years) and ratify treaties are all arenas that presidents who are granted a second term use as a means to shape their legacy. Both races were also affected by public concerns about morality and terrorism although Floridians did not view these issues in the same way as others living outside of Florida. Put another way, the Florida contests exhibited national characteristics, while in other respects the Florida contests were unique in that they reflected Florida’s own political landscape. Political parties, interest groups and candidates, all keenly aware of the high stakes of both contests, spent heavily in Florida. Floridians were deluged with radio and television advertising, direct mail, recorded telephone calls from political celebrities and those from the entertainment field, as well as live contacts from door-to-door and telephone canvassers. The purpose of this paper is to analyze campaign spending by political parties, interest groups and candidates in the air and ground wars in the 2004 Presidential and Senate races in 1 2 3 With the assistance of Rebecca Young and Elise Heffner, Florida State University. With the assistance of Adrienne Mathews and Erica Thomas, University of Central Florida With the assistance of Amber Davis, University of South Florida 2 Florida. The paper will first look at the political conditions relevant to both contests. From there, we will turn our attention to the role of money in each campaign. This discussion will be followed by a look at the effects of money, giving specific attention to the air war (television and radio advertising) and the ground war (direct mail advertising). The results exhibit meaningful differences in party and interest group strategy. The results also suggest that Republicans relied more on party financial resources while the Democrats depended more on interest groups and 527s to get out their message and deliver the votes. Circumstances unique to each election are also discussed. The paper concludes with a discussion of the role and impact of campaign money in the Presidential and Senate races in Florida. The Political Environment in Florida Florida is a large battleground state—more of a purple state than a red or blue state. To look at the composition of Florida’s officeholders, it appears that Florida is a solidly red (Republican) state. But looks are deceiving. It was true that as of the 2004 election, Republicans controlled the Governor’s office, all three of the state’s elected executive offices,4 two-thirds of the state House of Representatives, 65% of the state Senate and nearly three-fourths of the congressional delegation. But both U.S. Senators, Bill Nelson and Bob Graham, were Democrats—proof that Democrats can and do win statewide races. Only the U.S. Senate seats remained in Democratic hands in 2004, although one of these was contested in 2004. Florida is the southern state that has made the clearest transformation from a solidly Democratic to a Republican stronghold. Despite this Republican legislative and executive dominance, the state’s electorate remains closely divided. Registration figures understate the real level of party competition. Final registration figures for the November 2 election showed the breakdown to be: 41% Democrat, 38% Republican, 18% no party affiliation, and 3% minor parties. Democrats outnumbered Republican registrants by a mere 368,757 out of 10,381,246 registered voters. When the Republican-leaning conservative Democratic registrants in rural and North Florida are “counted” Republican, the parties are more nearly equal. Registration aside, more Floridians identify themselves as independents (32%) than as Democrats (31%) or Republicans (29%)5. Independents are the fastest growing group of voters. The Democratic Party’s greatest strength is in the “Gold Coast” areas of southeastern Florida including Broward, Miami/Dade and Palm Beach counties and in the northern university communities in Leon and Alachua counties and their surrounding rural counterparts, Jefferson, Jackson, Gadsden and Dixie counties (These rural counties have sizable African American populations). 4 A 2000 Florida Constitutional amendment transformed the Secretaries of Education and State into appointed offices. 5 The 2003-2004 Florida Annual Policy Survey, Social Science Survey Research Laboratory, Florida State University. 3 Florida’s Democrats are essentially two parties-in-one. The Broward/Miami/Dade/Palm Beach, Alachua, and Leon counties faction (the urbanites) is the more liberal wing of the party. The conservative wing is made up of Old South Democrats in the small, more agriculturallybased counties in the panhandle (the ruralites). It is the latter faction that has often voted Republican, especially in presidential elections. The conservative, rural Democrats were the target of both Republicans and Democrats in 2004. Suburbia and rural Florida hold the keys to Republican success. The fast-growing affluent southwest counties of Charlotte, Lee and Collier (called the “Treasure Coast”), the western Everglades, and the far western portions of the panhandle near Pensacola (Escambia County) contain the greatest concentration of Republican support. The Florida panhandle has a strong military presence, as seven of the state’s 21 active military installations are located there.6 Like the Democrats, the Republicans are also ideologically split. One segment is composed of pro-business conservatives who are moderate on many social issues. The other is made up of moral and religious conservatives—the family values voters—and defense hawks—the promilitary, pro-gun voters. The family values group was the target of especially aggressive “get out the vote” (GOTV) efforts on the part of the Bush campaign and was listed as a primary constituency in the party’s Seventy Two Hour Plan. The party estimated that nearly one million religious conservatives sympathetic to Bush did not vote in 2000. Republicans aimed their GOTV efforts directly at this group, particularly the infrequent married religious conservative female voters. The GOP, with its volunteer-based GOTV army, won the turnout battle. Matthew Dowd, Bush’s campaign strategist, said that the Bush campaign had 100,000+ volunteers in Florida— “the largest operation, volunteer operation, that anybody’s had on a political campaign.”7 It paid off: “Despite polls showing a neck-and-neck race and an unprecedented voter mobilization campaign by Democrats, the Bush-Cheney campaign turned its 537-vote margin in 2000 into a nearly 370,000 vote advantage this year. How? Republicans blew the doors off on turnout.”8 Post-election analyses showed: “Democrats failed to turn out their base of supporters, while Republicans rolled over them with a massive campaign to get out the vote. The percentage of voters who turned out in critical, heavily Democratic South Florida counties [Miami-Dade, Broward, Palm Beach County] fell from four years ago…At the same time, turnout was high in James Witt (2004) in Florida's Politics : Ten Media Markets, One Powerful State, Kevin A. Hill, Susan A. MacManus, and Dario Moreno, editors, p. 104. 7 Ken Thomas, Associated Press, “Bush Defeats Kerry in Florida,” Palm Beach Post, November 3, 2004. 8 Adam Smith, “Has Florida Become a GOP Stronghold?” St. Petersburg Times, November 4, 2004. 4 6 Republican strongholds and swing counties upstate…Bush won pivotal counties in central Florida that Gore carried in 2000, and carried them by larger margins. Turnout was even greater along the Gulf Coast and in the Florida panhandle, which vote solidly Republican.”9 “Democrats hoped to carry Palm Beach and Broward Counties by at least 400,000 votes to offset Bush’s expected lead in the rest of the state. Kerry ended up 324,207 votes ahead in the two counties. Even if he had hit the 400,000 target, it wouldn’t have offset higher-than-expected Bush turnout statewide.”10 “Bush’s campaign minimized losses in Democratic-leaning areas, won the swing parts of the state, and did ‘better in what we call the fortress areas of the Republican-lean areas of the state.’”11 “In the end, though, while Democrats bragged about their Florida ‘ground game,’ President Bush’s Republicans quietly went out and won it.”12 The GOP plan of targeting infrequent religious conservative voters paid off. Exit polls show Bush got about six in 10 votes from Florida’s Protestants and Catholics; about 8 in 10 Floridians are of one of those two faiths. Many of Florida’s panhandle residents are conservative Protestants. And in those small, rural counties stretching from Escambia (Pensacola) east to Jacksonville (Duval), Bush gained more than 193,000 votes more than he did just four years earlier. Bush also made gains among Catholic Hispanics in South and Central Florida (the allimportant swing part of the state). He also did better among women voters than in 2000. The bottom line is that Bush and the Republicans were able to craft a campaign message that had broad appeal in Florida. “He did a good job of tying moral values to the security issues: ‘I’m standing up not only for moral values, but also for your family and your security.’ And that was very effective.”13 President Bush was also “helped by triumphs in key counties in Central Florida, the flexing of Republican power in rural counties and by pulling even with U.S. Senator John Kerry among women.”14 Laura Parker, “Democrats Fail to Get More Of Their Voters Out,” USA Today, November 4, 2004, p. 13A. 10 George Bennett, “Bush Campaign Deserves Credit For Drawing Out GOP Voters Here,” Palm Beach Post, November 8, 2004. 11 Ken Thomas, Associated Press, “Bush Defeats Kerry in Florida,” Palm Beach Post, November 3, 2004. 12 S.V. Date, “President Won Florida with Better Ground Game,” Palm Beach Post, November 4, 2004. 13 Jeff Kunerth, “Morality, Security Key in Re-Election,” Orlando Sentinel, November 4, 2004. 14 Ken Thomas and John Pain, Associated Press, “Election 2004: Central Florida, Rural Voters Key to Bush Victory,” Naples Daily News, November 4, 2004. Former U.S. Rep. Tillie Fowler, R-Jacksonville, attributed the president’s gains among women voters to his message on terrorism 5 9 Independents hold the balance of power in the state. Independent voters tend to be young (under age 40, both single and married) and newcomers to Florida who have been drawn to the state by employment opportunities due to the area’s explosive growth. The state’s “swing” vote is concentrated along the I-4 Corridor (Interstate Highway 4 runs from Daytona Beach southwest to the Tampa area). The 10-county Tampa Bay media market—the state’s largest—holds the highest share of the state’s independent voters. This explains why candidates for both races from both parties frequently held rallies in, and visited, the area. Florida’s diverse racial/ethnic mix mirrors that of the U.S. better than any other large battleground state. African Americans, who are overwhelmingly Democratic, comprise 15% of the state’s population and 12% of registered voters; Hispanics, who are of many races, make up 17% of the population and about 11% of registered voters. In 2004, for the first time, exit polls showed that Hispanic voters made up a larger share of the Florida electorate than African Americans (15% v. 12%). Hispanics as a group are more heterogeneous in partisan attachment than are African Americans. Cubans, who constitute 8% of voters, are solidly Republican and provide that party both financial and electoral support. Political analysts divide the state’s Hispanic population into two groups of voters: Cubans and non-Cubans. Cubans, who constitute 8% of voters, are staunch anti-communists who provide financial and electoral support to the Republican party. Non-Cuban Hispanics, especially Puerto Ricans and Mexicans living in the Orlando area, are slightly more likely to be Democrats. However, Republicans have made major inroads into the non-Cuban Hispanic communities beginning with Jeb Bush’s re-election as governor in 2002. In 2004, non-Cuban Hispanics, especially the large Puerto Rican community in the Orlando-Kissimmee area along the I-4 Corridor, were considered another key group of “swing voters.” They were heavily targeted by both parties. The Presidential Contest The 2000 presidential election in Florida was arguably the most dramatic in American history. It was decided by only 537 votes out of 5.9 million cast and this total was not declared official until a U.S. Supreme Court ruling three weeks after election day.15 The results of the 2000 election created a highly charged context for the 2004 contest. The partisan divide continued to narrow and Florida gained 2 more seats in the Electoral College (from 25 to 27) due to the 2000 census. All of this meant that both the Democrats and the Republicans saw Florida as winnable in 2004—and a “must have” state. Each party also had something to prove by carrying the state in 2004—that it really won Florida in 2000. and national security and to the growing number of women who own small businesses and liked his lower tax stance. 15 The reason why the electoral vote in Florida mattered was that the electoral college tally in other states resulted in neither candidate winning the necessary 270 votes without Florida. 6 In many ways, the 2004 presidential campaign in Florida began almost immediately after George Bush was declared the winner in 2000. The president made at least 23 trips to the state during his first term. His brother, Governor Jeb Bush, took every opportunity to bolster the president’s candidacy. Democrats cringed, knowing full well the power of incumbents—pork and personal visits. These incumbency effects were magnified when four Category 3 and higher hurricanes ravaged the state between August 13 and September 26, in some places more than once. Although these storms afforded Bush additional opportunities to visit the state and to look presidential, they also knocked the campaigns off stride and deflated Floridians’ interest in the race for over a month. Polls released after the hurricanes showed that Bush’s hurricane-related visits may have had an effect, boosting him from a 6% point deficit in August to an 8% point lead in the third week of September. From the start, multiple lawsuits both before and after the election were expected. Both parties recruited top notch legal teams early in the campaign. As had occurred in 2000, the list of persons ineligible to vote because of their felony status, a large percentage of which was AfricanAmerican, was at the center of controversy. As in 2000, the state Division of Elections hired a private firm to compile a list of felons whose civil rights had not been restored by the state’s Clemency Board. This list was to be used by county elections supervisors in purging ineligible voters from their registration rolls. The 2004 list was eventually abandoned, but not until Secretary of State Glenda Hood,16 Governor Bush, and Republican state legislators, were vehemently attacked in the press by Democrats and civil rights advocacy groups for refusing to pass a law automatically restoring voting rights to felons who had completed their sentences. One key element of John Kerry’s campaign strategy was to mobilize African-Americans by regularly reminding African-Americans of what happened during the 2000 election. Blacks in Florida were the most likely to have had their votes disqualified or kept from voting by an errorridden felon purge. Candidates on both sides knew that they had to secure support from most Florida voters as a crucial piece in winning the election. On the Republican side, the general strategy adopted by the Bush/Cheney campaign for the nation as a whole – to capitalize on fears regarding terrorism – was perfect for Florida for a number of reasons: 1) Florida’s tourism economy suffered directly and substantially when visitors became afraid to fly into the state after the attacks on the World Trade Center; 2) an anthrax death occurred in South Florida immediately after the World Trade Center attacks; 3) several of the 9/11 terrorists received their flight training in Florida; and 4) the state’s infrastructure is quite vulnerable because of 21 military installations, 14 deep water ports, 20 commercial airports and more than 700 private airports. 16 Secretary of State Glenda Hood succeeded Katherine Harris. While Harris was elected statewide, Hood was appointed by the Governor. In 2000, Florida voters amended the state constitution to make the position appointive rather than elective. 7 As happened in other parts of the nation and the South, the more diffuse Kerry/Edwards message failed to resonate with Florida voters, particularly with the more conservative Democrats in North Florida who are essential to a Democratic victory. Exit polls showed that Kerry got a smaller percentage of votes in this region than in any other in the state.17 Indeed, the Democratic Senate candidate, Betty Castor, outpolled Kerry in Florida and has reported that his poor performance in this region hurt her own chances for victory.18 In the end, Kerry was not able to provide a suitable rationale for unseating George W. Bush. Nearly 70% of those Floridians who reported voting for Kerry claimed that their reason for doing so was their opposition to President Bush (CNN Exit Poll). Although Kerry was able to win the majority of independent voters, he had a net loss of 8% in crossover votes, losing 15% of Democrats and picking up only 7% among Republicans. The Senate Contest The 2004 U.S. Senate race was a fiercely fought contest from start to finish. It generated a crowded field of candidates from both parties. The seat became open when U.S. Senator Bob Graham, a Florida political icon, decided to retire from the Senate when his term finished in 2004. Florida Democrats were determined not to lose the seat while Florida Republicans wanted nothing more than to swing it over to the GOP column. This was a race filled with possible “firsts.” Had she won, Democrat nominee Betty Castor would have been the first Democratic woman from Florida to win a U.S. Senate seat. Castor was a former state legislator, former Florida Education Commissioner (an elected cabinet post at that time) and former president of the University of South Florida. Castor banked on her previous experience running statewide, her gender (well over half of Florida’s voters are females—an even higher percentage among Democratic primary voters), and her appeal outside of South Florida, especially in the critical I-4 Corridor and in the more conservative North Florida. Republican nominee Mel Martinez made much of the fact that he would be the first Cuban American in history to be elected to the U.S. Senate if he won. Prior to running for the Senate seat, Martinez had served as the U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (2001-2003) and Chairman of Orange County (which includes Orlando), Florida (1999-2001). The fact that Republican U.S. Senate candidate Mel Martinez is from the Orlando area and speaks Spanish was not lost on anyone trying to understand the White House’s “interest” in his candidacy. The race was one of only two U.S. Senate contests in the nation not featuring a white male (Illinois was the other; two African American males competed for that seat.). CNN Exit Poll, Florida, 11/8/2004. www.cnn.com/Election/2004. This was also the region where the Gore-Lieberman ticket did the worst in 2000. 18 Interview with U.S. Senate Candidate Betty Castor, conducted by Susan MacManus, December 10, 2004. 8 17 The stakes were high, the competition was fierce, and the outcome was close. This race turned out to be a more competitive race than the Bush v. Kerry presidential contest. Early predictions that it would be the nation’s costliest U.S. Senate contest did not pan out.19 But it was costly nonetheless—the eighth most expensive. As the race progressed, the advertising and personal attacks became more venomous. The terrorism issue dominated both the primary and general election phases of the election campaign. It ended up being the number one issue in Florida, according to exit polls. The issues dominating both the presidential and senatorial campaigns were virtually the same inside and outside the state, but ranked differently. National exit polls showed that concern about moral issues was the most often cited reason voters chose Bush over Kerry. But in Florida, it was terrorism over moral issues (24% v. 20%). Castor understood that, in order to win the election, she would have to shift voters’ attention from terrorism and homeland security to domestic issues. While in the early part of the campaign this strategy may have worked (Caster enjoyed a 6% lead over Martinez among registered and likely voters in September), national coverage regarding missing explosives and the Osama bin Laden tape released in October re-focused voters’ attention on terrorism and homeland security issues. Media attention inside and outside Florida was heavily focused on the presidential race. It was understandable in light of the events surrounding the 2000 presidential contest. Polls showing the strong possibility of another close election thrust Florida right back into the spotlight as a crucial battleground state. Frequent visits by the presidential and vice presidential candidates, their spouses, children, and other surrogates drew bigger crowds than appearances by the U.S. Senate candidates alone. In a sense, they were overshadowed by the top-of-the-ticket race. The Role of Money Given the size of Florida and its importance to the national electoral outcome, the amount of money raised and spent by the two campaigns was expected to be staggering. There is, of course, no way to determine the full amount, since federal campaign finance rules do not require presidential campaigns to maintain and report expenditures by state. Political Money Line reports that Bush collected $271 million from individual donors throughout the nation and that Kerry raised $224 million from individual donors. In addition, non-party political groups, the 527s, raised and spent another $544 million nationally between the two campaigns. The two campaigns raised substantial sums in Florida. Bush, in particular, profited from fund raising in the state, where he raised over $16 million in individual contributions, about 6% 19 That “honor” went to South Dakota’s contest between incumbent Democrat Tom Daschle and Republican John Thune. 9 of his national total. Kerry raised $7.2 million in Florida, 3.2% of his total.20 Florida has long been a big donor state, with its plethora of wealthy retired executives and union leaders. On the Senate side, raising money both outside and inside Florida was made easier by the fact that the seat was a key to which party would hold the balance of power in the Senate. Twenty-eight percent of individual contributions to Martinez’s campaign came from persons living outside of Florida while 30% of individual contributions to Castor came from out of state.21 The Candidates The Federal Election Commission reports that Democrat Castor raised a total of $11.1 million while Republican Martinez raised a total of $12.5 million. Martinez received more support from PACs and his own party while Castor’s largest source of financial support came from individuals (see Table 1). Table 1 About Here Both Senate candidates spent heavily on broadcast advertising including broadcast and cable television, and radio. The Castor campaign spent over $700,000 on broadcast advertising. Of this, $122,710 was spent on radio advertising. The remainder was spent on television. The Martinez campaign far outspent the Castor campaign. They spent $1,132,638 on broadcast advertising, of which all but $7,608 was spent on television. The Castor campaign spent 82% of its broadcast advertising dollars on television. In contrast, the Martinez campaign spent 99% of all of its broadcast dollars on television advertising. The Parties Both the Democratic and the Republican national parties were heavily involved in supporting the activities of their respective presidential and Senate candidates. The Democratic National Committee (DNC) outspent the Republican National Committee (RNC) by about $5 million dollars, nearly matching Kerry’s own campaign activities. The bulk of both the Democratic Party and the Kerry dollars went to buy television, rather than radio, time. In contrast, the Bush/Cheney organization spent heavily on radio while the RNC did not. The Republican and Democratic Senate Campaign Committees put the Florida U.S. Senate race near the top of their funding priority lists. They spent nearly equal amounts on their 20 21 Political Money Line. www.politicalmoneyline.com, 8 December, 2004. EMILY’s List utilizes the “bundling” loophole. This loophole allows interest groups to direct individual contributions to their favored candidates. Castor’s advantage in out-of-state contributions may partially be explained by EMILY’s List strong national support for Castor’s campaign. 10 respective candidates’ races. The National Republican Senate Committee (NRSC) spent $1,672,810 on television and radio advertising supporting Martinez. The Democratic Senate Campaign Committee (DSCC) spent nearly as much on Castor’s behalf ($1,622,963)—a difference of only about $50,000-- but for broadcast advertising alone. The NRSC heavily supported Martinez because they perceived he had a strong chance of winning with his almost “rock star”-like qualities.22 He was also seen as the key to winning the state’s Hispanic vote. In the primary, Martinez won 90% of the vote in the heavily Hispanic precincts in South Florida. This strong primary support from Hispanics was repeated in the general election. In fact, Martinez was seen as helping President Bush among Hispanics more than vice versa. He was, in effect, a “reverse coattail” candidate. Interest Groups The presidential race attracted many interest groups, although most interest group money was spent by two of them. Those interest groups concerned with the presidential race spent approximately $8.1 million dollars on radio and television advertising in Florida. Nearly 40% of this total was spent by two groups, the Media Fund on John Kerry’s behalf and Swift Boat Veterans for Truth on behalf of George W. Bush. Overall, nearly two thirds of all interest group money was spent on behalf of Kerry/Edwards. A coalition of 527 groups including the Media Fund, the AFL-CIO, MoveOn, the League of Conservation Voters and others, focused their resources on attacking George Bush’s record. These groups attacked Bush on a variety of issues: his association with the Saudi royal family, his position on women’s issues, the environment, and the plight of working men and women. The Media Fund was particularly helpful to Democrats in using the airwaves to attack the president during March/April 2003 before the Democrats had a nominee. The Media Fund also made major local cable and radio ad-buys targeting 18-to-35 year old African Americans urging them to register to vote. The Swift Boat Veterans for Truth used most of its resources to attack John Kerry’s Vietnam War record. These ads were very effective in Florida, a state that has large numbers of military bases and veterans. Unlike the presidential race, where each candidate benefited from at least one dominant interest group or 527, interest group money spent on the Senate race was of greater benefit to one candidate and not the other. Betty Castor’s interest group support base was dominated by EMILY’s List and the AFL-CIO. These two groups outspent all other pro-Castor interest groups on broadcast advertising. EMILY’s List spent just over $316,000 on broadcast advertising on Castor’s behalf while the AFL-CIO spent $350,000 on broadcast advertising, all of which was spent on television. Castor also benefited from spending by groups like Communities for Quality Education, Florida Women Vote, the Human Rights Campaign, and the People for the American Way who ran sympathetic television and/or radio ads on Castor’s behalf. 22 Patrick Davis, National Republican Senatorial Committee, interview on November 11, 2004. 11 Martinez benefited from advertising from traditional Republican-leaning groups like the National Rifle Association and the National Right to Life Committee and from advocacy groups such as Progress for America and the United Seniors Association. However, interest group spending levels for Martinez did not match those spending for Castor. Two interest groups/527s spent at least $100,000 in Florida on Martinez’ behalf while seven interest groups/527s spent at least $100,000 in Florida for Castor. Interest group and party activity clearly demonstrated Florida’s importance in the presidential and Senate campaigns. Large sums of money, from multiple interest group and party resources, were expected because of the nature of both campaigns and because of the political landscape at the national and state levels. The Ground War Both the Democratic and Republican national committees mounted aggressive and even unprecedented efforts to mobilize their base voters. The presidential race in Florida was a substantial targeting and GOTV effort. Both campaigns expended enormous amounts of energy and money to identify potential supporters, get them registered, and make sure they voted. In meeting their voter support goals, the campaigns combined party and interest group resources. Democratic Party efforts were heavily reinforced by a loosely coordinated coalition of external groups who directed aggressive outreach activities to a wide range of potential voters. Indeed, such was their visibility that outside observers might easily conclude that it was these groups who were conducting the party’s GOTV campaign. The Republican Party, on the other hand, clearly took the lead in voter contact and was supported by allied groups that focused on their own constituencies. In some cases, the parties’ targets were the same while in others they were different. Both parties sought the support of senior citizens, veterans, and non-Cuban Hispanics. Democrats focused on young voters, African Americans, working women, and environmentalists. Republicans looked to sportsmen, social conservatives and Cuban-Americans for high levels of support. Republicans also made a special appeal to the Jewish community in seeking support from staunchly pro-Israel hawkish Jews. The Republican National Committee led the ground war for the Bush campaign in Florida. It developed a Seventy Two Hour Plan that outlined volunteer recruitment, voter registration and coalition building goals for each county in the state. These goals were then pursued through the on-the-ground efforts of the Republican Party of Florida’s Victory 2004 program. This program used volunteers for door-to-door canvassing, e-mails, direct mail, and telephones in order to reach targeted voters. The Republican Party of Florida (RPOF) claims that 109,000 volunteers were engaged in the Florida effort. This program exceeded all expectations and is credited by many as the most important factor in the Republican victory. Their efforts vastly surpassed party efforts in the 12 2000 election. In that campaign, the RPOF made 77,000 personal contacts between the Republican National Convention and Election Day. In the four days before the 2004 election, the RPOF made three million personal contacts. Over one million of these were made through telephone or face-to-face contacts, with the remainder coming in the form of direct mail.23 The party’s stated turnout goal of 3,465,177 votes for the President was exceeded by nearly 500,000 votes. The Democratic Party developed a similar plan with county-level targets and goals. It recruited over 120,000 volunteers in Florida. They were managed through a computer system titled Bottled Lightning into which their names were entered and through which their activities were tracked daily. To augment these volunteers in the last two weeks of the campaign, the Party also hired 1500 canvassers, some of whom were recruited from out-of-state.24 These canvassers were the subject of some criticism. Comments from the field suggested that they did not understand the Florida electoral system, were not sensitive to the diverse social and demographic constituencies in the state and were overly aggressive and somewhat hostile in their contacts.25 The DNC and the Florida Democratic Party also sent 22 separate e-mails, 44 unique pieces of direct mail and 2 separate phone messages to its supporters. The Republican and Democratic mobilization campaigns were successful. Both parties enjoyed a successful ground war as they exceeded their stated voter registration goals. Total voter registration in Florida increased from 8,752,717 in 2000 to 10,301,290 in 2004. Democratic registration moved from 3,803,081 to 4,261,249 and Republican registration from 3,430,238 to 3,892,492. Robert Crew interview with Joseph Augustini, Communications Director, Republican Party of Florida, December 12, 2004. Chris Petley, Political Director, Democratic Party of Florida, telephone interview by Robert Crew, December 15, 2004. 25 See article by Victor Hull, “Turning Out Voters Locked Up a Victory,” Sarasota Herald Tribune, November 4, 2004. “…the Democrats’ strategy of relying on loosely organized, paid recruits, many of them brought in from outside Florida by liberal special interest groups…failed miserably.” Hull mentions Orange County Democratic Party Chairman Doug Head as “scathing in his assessment of the so-called 527 groups.” Head complained that the 527 groups and Kerry’s national organization “sucked up” volunteers from the local Democratic Party: “An awful lot of bodies got sucked into being paid volunteers. We couldn’t persuade people to stay home and work the precincts. The Kerry organization was saying, ‘We need poll greeters, poll watchers.’ They were all redundant and poorly assigned. It was disconnected and obviously ineffective.” The article also mentioned that the Democrats’ strategy of making reminders of Election 2000’s controversial outcome a theme, “it apparently didn’t motivate voters as much as expected.” An editorial in The Tampa Tribune also chided some 527s for not bothering to turn in registrations, failing to collect correct information or intentionally misleading new voters to believe that they were registered with they were not. See “New Lessons Emerge As Florida Voters Triumph At Polls,” The Tampa Tribune, November 6, 2004. 13 24 23 Like the Republicans, Democratic mobilization goals were exceeded. Democrats set a goal of turning out 150,000 more voters than the number who voted for Al Gore in 2000. Actual Democratic turnout in 2004 was in excess of 500,000 over the 2000 numbers. Exit polls in Florida indicate that about 1% more voters were contacted by the Kerry campaign than by the Bush campaign. In addition, Kerry contacts in the state appeared to be slightly more persuasive than Bush contacts. Sixty five percent of those who were contacted by the Kerry campaign claimed to have voted for him while 63% of those contacted by the Bush campaign voted for the president. Yet GOP turnout was higher and Bush prevailed. Both parties were relatively successful with the demographic constituencies they targeted. Exit polls showed that Kerry won among Florida voters age 18-29 (58%) whose share of the electorate actually increased by 2% over 2000 (17% v. 15%). Kerry also won an overwhelming majority of the African American vote (86%) and the Jewish vote (80%). While Kerry won only 49% of the women’s vote (well below the 53% Gore got in 2000), his vote share amount non-white women was 64%. Kerry also narrowly lost the 65 years of age and over vote (49% to Bush’s 50%).26 The Bush campaign was also successful in reaching its targeted demographic constituencies. Those who attend church weekly voted overwhelmingly for the president (64%). A majority of Latino voters (56%), including Cuban-Americans, white women (56%), and middle-age adults (45-59 year olds--57%; 30-44 year olds--53%), voted for President Bush.27 Bush also made slight inroads into the Jewish and African American vote.28 Overall turnout also increased, from 70.1% in 2000 to 74.2% in 2004. The key difference was that the Republicans set and achieved higher turnout goals than did the Democrats. Early voting affected the dynamics of the campaign. The ad campaign was a bifurcated, two-stage effort. It focused first on the early voters, then on the traditional Election Day voter. Prior to October 18 (the first day of early voting), election communications informed voters of early voting opportunities and stressed its advantages--ease of access and convenience. Subsequently, campaign messages shifted to more traditional “get to the polls” themes. In both periods, the groups utilized similar tactics: e-mail to their membership lists, door-to-door canvassing, direct mail, and telephone campaigns. Environmentalists undoubtedly supported him as did pro-choice women but exit polls do not provide such breakdowns. 27 It is a good bet that Florida’s NRA members heavily supported the president. 28 In 2004, Bush won 13% of the Black vote (up from 7% in 2000) and 20% of the Jewish vote (no data from 2000 available). 14 26 The Presidential Ground War Candidate committees in both parties utilized the full range of personal contact mechanisms available in modern political campaigning: e-mail, direct mail, personal contacts through canvassing and telephone, and appearances at highly publicized campaign rallies. In Florida, Democrats relied more heavily on outside groups for their voter mobilization efforts whereas Republicans used traditional party vehicles. Consequently, our data show that Bush-supporting Republican party organizations sent a larger number of unique e-mails and direct mail pieces, and made more personal contacts and phone calls on his behalf than did Democratic party organizations on behalf of the Kerry/Edwards campaign (see Table 2). Table 2 About Here Interest groups involved in the Republican ground war played a secondary role to the activities of the Republican Party. Those that were involved, the NRA, the Chamber of Commerce, social conservatives (evangelical churches, school choice/home school groups and pro-life groups), and Cuban-Americans were utilized to prod their own constituents. Nevertheless, the NRA tried to integrate their GOTV training into Bush/Cheney activities. Interest group activity on behalf of the two presidential candidates was heavily skewed toward the Kerry campaign. A loose coalition of groups including Planned Parenthood, the League of Conservation Voters, the AFL-CIO, America Coming Together (ACT), MoveOn, the Sierra Club, EMILY’s List and others combined to mount massive door-to-door voter registration and GOTV programs on behalf of the Kerry campaign and some other Democratic candidates, most notably Betty Castor, the party’s nominee for the U.S. Senate. This coalition met almost weekly to discuss their targets and progress. The primary focus of the 527-group coalition was on Dade County in South Florida and on the I-4 Corridor, especially in the Orlando and Tampa areas. Their targets were the environmentally concerned, young voters, African American and Hispanic voters and undecided or infrequent voters, especially working women. ACT alone had 7 offices in Florida--in Tampa, Orlando, Jacksonville, Miami and Palm Beach. ACT’s Director of Communications in Florida claimed that his organization alone registered more than 50,000 new voters in the state.29 Groups that were officially non-partisan, but perceived to be Democratic-leaning, used entertainment luminaries to encourage young persons to vote. Examples include the Citizen Change organization, created by rap star Sean “P. Diddy” Combs, which conducted a three day GOTV campaign called “Vote or Die,” in the Miami area. This program was geared toward minority voters. ACT sponsored “Vote for Change” concerts featuring Bruce Springsteen, the Robert Crew interview with Tait Sye, Florida Communications Director, ACT. November 5, 2004. 15 29 Dave Mathews Band, REM and Pearl Jam also represented strong GOTV efforts. Exit polls conducted on a national sample suggested that these efforts were successful, especially with first time voters. Compared to repeat voters, these first-timers were more likely to attribute their participation to the efforts of “so many celebrities encouraging people to vote.”30 Celebrity phone calls were commonplace and still popular with the voting public. Bushsupporting celebrities making recorded phone calls included California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, many members of the Bush family (former First Lady Barbara, First Lady Laura, Florida Governor Jeb, and his son George P. Bush), former New York City Mayors Rudy Giuliani and Ed Koch, conservative political commentator Sean Hannity, Arizona U.S. Senator John McCain, Reverand Franklin Graham, and President Bush himself. Celebrities calling for Kerry included former Vice-President Al Gore, celebrities Barbara Streisand, Jack Nicholson, Sean “P. Diddy” Combs, Michael J. Fox, Mary J. Blige, Vanessa Williams, Martina Navratilova and Spike Lee, U.S. Senator and former First Lady Hillary Clinton, Caroline Kennedy, former President Bill Clinton and former presidential candidate Jesse Jackson. Their primary purpose was GOTV. The wide range of advertising content and placement reflects Florida’s incredible diversity—and the precision of targeting in Election 2004. The Presidential Air War The Bush air war campaign outspent that of John Kerry by about $3 million. Kerry spent approximately $7.6 on television and radio advertising while Bush spent about $10.5 million. In Florida, Bush spent more on radio, about three times the amount spent by Kerry. This is consistent with what Bush strategists learned after the 2000 campaign, namely, that Democrats watch more television than Republicans. Consequently, Republicans revamped their media strategy in 2004. “They cut the proportion of money they put into broadcast television and diverted more to niche cable channels and radio, where it could more precisely reach its target audience.”31 Consistent with this approach, much of the Bush radio activity was targeted to listeners in key rural parts of the state. The content of those ads focused almost exclusively on either the war in Iraq, the war on terrorism, Kerry’s liberal Senate record,32 or Kerry’s inconsistent voting record and policy positions (see Table 3). Table 3 About Here 30 Shorenstein Center, Harvard University, Vanishing Voter Survey, November 10, 2004. www.vanishingvoter@ksg.harvard.edu. Katharine Seelye, “U.S. Political Parties re-Evaluate Their Media Campaigns,” New York Times News Service, Washington, D.C.. Thursday, December 9, 2004, p. 9. Robert Crew telephone interview with Joseph Agostini, Communications Director, RPOF, December 14, 2004. 16 32 31 While the Bush ads focused on portraying Kerry as a flip flopper, and a weak-kneed northeastern liberal who could not be trusted to defend the nation against terrorism, Kerry’s ads lacked a central theme. Kerry’s advertisements touched on a variety of domestic issues such as the economic plight of middle class Americans, the high cost of prescription medicines, the vice president’s ties to Haliburton, the Bush threat to Medicare and the condition of the nation’s economy. He also utilized air time to defend himself against the Bush attacks on his commitment to defending the nation. Interspersed with issue-specific ads, Kerry ran autobiographical spots that focused on his efforts to define himself as the polls continued to show that the public did not know or understand him well. Since the 2002 gubernatorial election in Florida, some Democrats have questioned the degree to which their party and candidates utilize broadcast television, as opposed to cable, radio, and direct mail (In the 2002 governor’s race, losing Democratic candidate Bill McBride’s campaign was criticized for this decision.). Ironically, the same criticisms have been launched at the Kerry and Castor campaigns post-November 2, 2004—too much reliance on broadcast television and not enough on cable or radio (these are media aimed at narrower audiences). The Senate Ground War The Senate race was overshadowed by the presidential ground war although it was expected (though not necessarily realized on both sides) that coattails, whether working down or up the ticket (“reverse coattails”) would benefit each party’s candidates. In the Senate race, Castor had a tougher time holding on to Democratic voters (85%) than Martinez had in keeping Republican voters (90%) in the fold although Castor did receive a majority of the votes from independents (59%).33 Each Senate candidate hoped to secure support from their “niche” constituencies: women for Castor; Hispanics for Martinez. They did. Exit polls show that Castor received a majority of women’s votes (53%), but more from non-white women (61%) than from white women (49%). Martinez won the Latino vote, receiving 60% compared to Castor’s 39%. Both Senate candidates staged an extensive ground war through direct mail. The Martinez campaign focused less attention on door-to-door canvassing while emphasizing telephone canvassing. The Castor campaign employed extensive door-to-door canvassing efforts. The Castor campaign’s printed materials (direct mail and brochures left with potential supporters by canvassers) reflected her emphasis on domestic issues of great interest to women voters. The Castor campaign mailed out five unique advertisements, all of which focused on Data are from the 2004 U.S. Senate Exit Poll conducted by Edison Media Research/Mitofsky International. 17 33 Castor’s domestic policy record. Several of the mailers, as well as the canvassing materials, featured a bulleted list of four or five of Castor’s issue positions. On every list, national security was listed last (see Table 4).34 Table 4 About Here All of the campaign materials collected for the study were printed in English. Castor’s campaign, like that of Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry, has been criticized for not using more Spanish language campaign advertising. Critics say it hurt her campaign. The exit poll figures for the Hispanic vote confirm it. The Martinez ground war stressed his personal biography—from his arrival in the U.S. as a young immigrant from Cuba to his service as a member of the President’s Cabinet. The four unique mailings generated by the Martinez campaign and made available to our study showed Martinez and President Bush together—a strong visual endorsement from the President. One striking ad highlighted a quote from Bush endorsing Martinez and a powerful photograph showing the two sharing a podium Interest groups and political parties were also active in the direct mail ground war. Twelve different interest groups supported Castor’s campaign while nine interest groups supported Martinez. Castor got more of her help from advocacy groups than from the Florida Democratic Party. The reverse was true for Martinez who was heavily supported by the RPOF and by the NRSC. Martinez benefited greatly from Florida’s “three-pack” law that permits the party to advertise on behalf of a candidate if at least two other candidates are also mentioned in the advertisement. The ground war mailings reflected each candidate’s strongest assets as seen by the group being targeted by the mailer. For example, EMILY’s List featured Castor’s record on health care, specifically her role in creating Florida’s “Healthy Kids” program. These ads claimed that it was “Betty’s fault” that Florida’s children were healthier thanks to Castor’s “Healthy Kids” program. While EMILY’s List is a strong supporter of reproductive choice, this issue was not mentioned in the mailings. The Castor campaign also benefited from advertising by a national 527 group called “Women’s Voices, Women Vote” which was formed to increase turnout among registered women voters. The Florida-based “Florida Women Vote,” with the same goal, also supported Castor in its advertising. NRSC-financed advertising for Mel Martinez flooded voters’ mailboxes. Several of these mailings focused on how Castor handled the Sami Al-Arian situation when she was president of 34 In the national security text bullet, terrorism was listed last, and the focus was on supporting veterans (a large population in Florida) and the military, as well as protecting communities from terrorism at home. There was no mention of international terrorism in these advertisements. 18 the University of South Florida.35 Statements quoted from prominent Florida newspapers were featured in these mailings. Statements such as “Two men who were professors under Castor at USF now face charges of helping Islamic Jihad terrorists kill civilians in Israel” dominated these mailers. That same print ad featured a photograph of apparent Islamic militants burning an American flag. The caption, a quote from an October 4, 2004 Washington Times editorial, read: “Alleged terrorists found safe harbor at the university on Mrs. Castor’s watch.” Quotes and photographs taken from one of Castor’s competitors for the Senate nomination, Congressman Peter Deutsch, were also included in this mailing. Deutch did not campaign against Castor once she was nominated; rather, the NRSC used some of Deutch’s primary election materials in their own advertisements. This approach was designed to undermine Castor’s support among Democrats, independents and some moderate Republicans by showing that even “one of her own” was against her on the terrorism issue. The content of the ground war materials merely reflected each candidate’s overall campaign strategy. The Castor campaign, her party and allied interests, emphasized domestic issues and strong efforts to exploit the gender gap. The Martinez campaign, his party and allied interests, focused on Martinez’s ties to President Bush (including his pledge to support for confirmation the president’s nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court). The advertising also touted Martinez’s Cuban immigrant background, reminded voters he would be the first CubanAmerican in the U.S. Senate, and attacked Castor for her handling of the Al-Arian situation. The Senate Air War The air war mimicked the ground war in terms of which organizations provided the strongest support for each candidate even though radio advertising by the candidates and their allies was far less prevalent than television advertising. The candidates themselves aired the greatest number of unique ads (see Table 5). Martinez’s television advertisements featured his humble background while Castor’s advertisements emphasized her support for bread and butter domestic issues such as health care and education. However, it was Castor, not Martinez, who ran the first post-primary ad mentioning Al-Arian. The Castor campaign undoubtedly thought running the ad would allow her to move on to domestic issues. In retrospect, the decision to run that ad may have been the costliest of her campaign. Rather than changing the subject, it legitimized hard-hitting Republican response ads on the subject—and they were unending. Table 5 About Here 35 The professor, Sami Al-Arian, was later indicted by the U.S. government but that was well after Castor left the USF presidency to take another position. Castor repeatedly said she could not have fired Al-Arian with the evidence available at the time. Al-Arian’s indictment came after passage of the Patriot Act, which allowed government records to be matched. But that Act was passed by Congress long after Castor had left USF. As of December, 2004, Al-Arian is in federal prison awaiting trial. 19 The air war was limited to fewer players. Many organizations that participated in the ground war sat out the air war. The greater expense of the air war, when compared with the ground war, likely discouraged many groups from participating. Nine candidate organizations or their allies sponsored television advertisements while 22 organizations or their allies utilized direct mail. Of course, direct mail is easier to target with precision than either broadcast or cable television because it is only sent to narrow groups of registered voters. Castor ran more unique television ads than Martinez (9 versus 5 respectively), while the Florida Democratic and Republican Parties aired two advertisements each. The Republican National Committee played a more active role in the air war than did the Democratic National Committee; the RNC aired four different advertisements while the DNC aired two. Conclusion The 2004 election was the first presidential election to be conducted under election reforms put in place by the Florida Legislature and Congress via the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). Reforms were necessary following the 2000 debacle that revealed the many shortcomings of the state’s election system, ranging from equipment-related problems (chads), ballot design flaws (the butterfly ballot), to inconsistent recount rules across the state’s 67 counties. The state outlawed punch card voting machines, mandated better poll worker training and voter education, provided for provisional ballots, and expanded early voting. The 2004 election was also the first presidential and Senate election in which Floridians could vote early.36 These early voting sites were required to be open for at least four hours each day, including weekends, in the two weeks before Election Day. Early voters voted in record numbers (around 18%).37 Of those who voted early, 43% were Republicans, 39% Democrats, and 15% Independents. In spite of long lines to vote early in many areas, 36% said their voting experience was better than in 2000; just 10% said it was worse, while 52% said it was about the same. Both political parties and the county supervisors were heavily promoting pre-election day voting via absentee ballot or early voting. Higher-than-expected turnout in the first couple of days at early voting sites meant voters standing in long lines for hours. The number of sites supervisors could use for early voting was limited by state law to government offices and libraries. Consequently, there simply were too few sites, too few machines available, and too few poll workers in some heavy traffic places. This problem undoubtedly will be tackled by the 36 37 Early voting was first used in Florida in the 2002 gubernatorial election. Source: Telephone survey of a random sample of 800 Floridians who voted in Election 2004, conducted November 2-3 for The Collins Center for Public Policy, Inc. by Barcelo & Company and Hamilton Beattie and Staff. The survey’s margin of error is +/- 3.5% at the 95% confidence level. 20 legislature before the 2006 election cycle because early voting has proved to be very popular. In spite of the problems, it actually ended up being very helpful.38 The four Category 3 and higher hurricanes that hit the state over a five week period several weeks before the election exacted a psychological and financial toll on Floridians. Governor Bush’s response to the hurricanes got high marks from Floridians for his responsiveness, presence at heavily-damaged sites, and ability to secure help from the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA). (Jeb Bush even opted out of attending the Republican National Convention, where his brother was being nominated for the second and last time.) Polls suggest that Republican candidates, including Martinez, may have benefited slightly from the governor’s (and the president’s) response to the hurricanes. Initially, Republicans feared the hurricanes would make it harder for them to win since Republican counties were generally the hardest hit. Post-election analyses of turnout show that turnout in these hard hit areas was not as greatly affected as initially feared. Early voting clearly impacted the air and ground wars because it affected spending decisions. Many voters received recorded telephone messages from current and former politicians and other celebrities, received direct mailings, and were also approached by canvassers at their homes days, if not weeks, after they had voted. This also meant that organizations that saved their money in order to spend it during the last days and weeks of the campaign found that their efforts may have been for naught as many of their targeted constituencies had already voted. Early voting clearly affected television advertising strategies. Before early voting began on October 18, many of the ads featured older voters and their issues—Social Security, Medicare, health care, terrorism, and national security. Once early voting began, the ads featured young and female voters and their concerns. Both groups are renowned for being late deciders in whether to vote at all, and if so, for whom. Heading into Election Day, the polls consistently showed that both Florida races were expected to be statistical dead heats. As it turned out, the Senate race was much closer than the presidential contest. George Bush won Florida by a 5% margin (52% to 47%). There was no hair breadth margin, no long wait for an outcome and no voting irregularity scandal. Indeed, there were media accounts of disappointed foreign journalists dejectedly returning to their homes without a “big story.” Martinez won by a mere plurality of the vote (49% to Castor’s 48% and Bradley’s 2%39). Many Floridians went to bed still not knowing who had won, although Martinez was slightly ahead by midnight. Castor did not concede on election night because there were still a sizable number of provisional ballots that had yet to be counted, leaving her a glimmer of hope. Upon a closer examination the next morning, Castor conceded the election to Martinez, giving Republicans a clean sweep of the five open U.S. Senate seats in the South. 38 Susan A. MacManus, “Implementing HAVA’s Voter Education Requirement in Florida’s Decentralized Election System,” Publius (forthcoming 2005). 39 Dennis Bradley, a former Republican, ran with the newly formed Veterans Party. 21 Despite fears among some Democrats, the state’s electoral machinery performed well. The early voting period allowed election supervisors to smooth out early wrinkles in the voting process (poll worker shortages, inoperable equipment, etc.) preventing voters from being disenfranchised should problems have occurred on Election Day, too late for resolution. In spite of intense critiques of the electronic touch screen voting machines used in the state’s 15 largest counties, the new equipment (which had been used in the 2002 gubernatorial election) functioned properly in the vast majority of cases. Nonetheless, pre-election lawsuits challenging the absence of a paper trail for electronic touch screen voting machines, the counting of provisional ballots cast in the precinct in which the voter was registered and nowhere else, and other attributes of the election system led Florida voters to expect another meltdown on Election Day. Fortunately, lawsuits filed prior to the election40 were resolved before Election Day, bringing more clarity to the election administration process, thereby reducing controversy. Both parties sent hoards of lawyers into precincts as poll watchers to make sure that poll workers and election officials did their jobs in a nonpartisan manner. Few complaints were filed by these observers. In fact, more poll workers complained about the observers than vice versa. In general, the outcome of political campaigns was determined by three things-- money, message, and mechanics. In the Florida presidential campaign of 2004, the Bush/Cheney campaign was superior in all of these. His focus on the war on terrorism turned out to be the single most important issue for Floridians and these voters broke 87% to 12% for Bush. The president’s campaign gave Floridians a clear reason for re-electing him. Bush had the financial resources to get his carefully crafted message out to his precisely targeted voters and the GOP’s highly successful 72 Hour Task Force campaign won the turnout war. Kerry’s loss was not for lack of resources. Furthermore, his campaign operated very efficiently and he enjoyed success in getting his supporters to the polls. The central factor in Kerry’s loss was that he never gave Florida voters a coherent rationale for discarding an incumbent and voting for him instead. And, he was never able to make domestic issues the primary focus of his campaign. In the future it will not suffice for Democrats to attempt to win elections in Florida simply by mobilizing their base. They will also need to persuade weaker identifiers from both parties, and independents, to win. The 2004 Senate election in Florida created a stronger Republican majority in the U.S. Senate while at the same time electing the first Cuban-American ever to the prestigious post. It also affirmed what national party leaders had predicted, namely that support for Martinez among Lawsuits challenging the absence of a paper trail for electronic touch screen machines were tossed out. The courts also ruled valid the state’s requirement that provisional ballots had to be cast in the precinct in which a voter is registered to be counted. Plaintiffs had sued to have them counted regardless of where cast. 22 40 Hispanics, especially Cubans in South Florida, would help re-elect President Bush. The closeness of the U.S. Senate race likely portends a tough re-election campaign in 2006 for Bill Nelson, Florida’s lone Democrat in the U.S. Senate. The way that candidates, political parties, interest groups and 527s raised and spent money also shows key strategic differences between the parties. These strategy differences likely impacted the election outcome, as the methods used for getting the message out to voters, coupled with the messengers communicating those messages, greatly differed among the four campaigns. 23 Table 1 Candidate Receipts and Expenditures, Florida Senate Race, 2003-04 Source PACs Individuals Party Candidate Other contributions Total receipts Total expenditures Cash on hand (as of 11/22/04) Betty Castor (D) $880,326 $10,162,049 $6703 $214,480 $250,012 $11,513,570 $11,138,992 $372,331 Mel Martinez (R) $2,179,228 $9,794,320 $50,117 $0 $753,213 $12,776,878 $12,584,298 $193,581 Source: Federal Election Commission, “2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info,” November 22, 2004 (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [December 20, 2004]). 24 TABLE 2 Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organizations, Florida Presidential Race, 2004a Type and Organizationb Democratic alliesc Candidates Kerry-Edwards 2004, Inc. Political parties DNC Florida Democratic Party Interest Groups America Coming Together NARAL Pro-Choice America AFL-CIO League of Conservation Voters Environment 2004 The Media Fund MoveOn.org Sierra Club Emily’s List AFSCME People for the American Way Planned Parenthood Action Fund Florida Education Association Defenders of Wildlife Action Fund Human Rights Campaign Working America American Family Voices American Federation of Teachers National Jewish Democratic Council Wake Up! Young Voter Alliance Central Florida Jewish Community 16 27 16 15 10 … 3 8 7 … 5 … … … 1 … … … … … 1 … 26 4 12 6 6 4 … 4 … 6 … 4 4 3 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 … 1 … … … … … 4 … … … … … … … … … … … 1 1 … 1 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 1 … … … … … … … … … … … 2 … … … … … … … … … … … 8 1 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 1 … 3 4 … … … … 1 … … … … … … … … … … 43 31 28 23 16 15 12 12 7 6 5 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 16 6 10 34 1 … … … 1 1 5 3 29 … 62 44 67 3 1 1 4 5 24 105 Email Mail Newspaper/ Magazine Personal Contact Phone Call Radio T V Total Unique Ads 25 Committee for an Informed Electorate Democracy for America Democratic Coalition Mothers Opposing Bush PunkVoter.com The Unity Campaign TruthAboutWar.com United Automobile Workers Union You Decide Republican allies Candidates Bush/Cheney 04 Bush/Cheney 04 / RNC Political parties RNC Republican Party of Florida Interest Groups National Rifle Association Republican Jewish Coalition Swift Boat Veterans for Truth Progress for America National Right to Life All Children Matter Club for Growth Americans for Job Security Vote Your Sport Billionaires for Bush New Republican Majority Fund US Chamber of Commerce Nonpartisan Interest Groups Women’s Voices. Women Vote. Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration c … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 1 1 … … … 1 1 … 1 … … … … … … … … … … … 1 … … … … … … … … … … … … … 1 … … … … 1 1 … … … … … 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 97 … 7 10 7 … … 2 … … 3 … … … … 1 9 … 48 42 2 4 2 3 2 5 … 3 … … 1 … … … … 1 … 5 … … … … … … 2 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 9 1 2 3 … … … … … … … … … … … … 18 2 9 2 … … 1 4 … … … … 1 … … 36 6 9 2 1 … 6 2 … … 1 … … … … … 169 9 75 60 10 9 9 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 1 … … 3 2 … … … … … … … … … … 3 2 26 League of Women Voters Rock the Vote Voices for Working Families … 1 … … … 1 … … … … … … … … … … … … 1 … … 1 1 1 Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, Kelly D. Patterson, J. Quin Monson, and the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, 2004 Soft Money and Issue Advocacy Database (Brigham Young University, 2004). a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with Table 3. b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization’s activity. For instance, National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action and National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund data have been included in the National Rifle Association totals and Progress for America Voter Fund data have been included in the Progress for America totals. c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “…” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium. 27 TABLE 3 The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures, Florida Presidential Race, 2004a Type and Organizationb Democratic alliesc Candidates Kerry-Edwards 2004, Inc. John Kerry / DNC Political parties DNC Interest Groups The Media Fund AFL-CIO Emily’s List MoveOn.org Communities for Quality Education Florida Women Vote New Democrat Network Coalition to Defend the American Dream Human Rights Campaign League of Conservation Voters Service Employees International Union Save Our Environment This Vote Counts People for the American Way American Family Voices Sierra Club The Nature Conservancy Natural Resource Defense Council Communication Workers of America $1,925,393 $350,010 $275,780 $249,052 $247,970 $192,225 $179,640 … … $92,075 $29,720 … $10,155 … $1,300 … … … … $187,000 … $40,800 $14,475 … $13,800 … $103,236 $100,000 … $53,353 $18,700 … $2,340 … … … … … $2,112,393 $350,010 $316,580 $263,527 $247,970 $206,025 $179,640 $103,236 $100,000 $92,075 $83,073 $18,700 $10,155 $2,340 $1,300 … … … … $6,007,579 $754,032 $1,224,338 $3,693,450 $48,398 … $1,045,294 … … $2,290,042 $403,843 … … $2,351 … $204,641 $95,737 $42,845 $6,553 $5,837,155 $255,680 $6,092,835 $17,453,686 $6,716,721 $762,720 $135,398 $58,576 $6,852,119 $821,296 $26,112,559 $5,148,887 TV Radio Total $ Spent CMAG TV 28 National Right to Work Committee Stronger America Now Republican allies Candidates Bush/Cheney 04 Bush/Cheney 04 / RNC Political parties RNC Florida Republican Party Interest Groups Swift Boat Veterans for Truth Progress for America United Seniors Association National Rifle Association All Children Matter National Right to Life US Chamber of Commerce Nonpartisan Interest Groups AARP Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration Families for a Secure America The Latino Coalition American Civil Liberties Union Citizens for Public Integrity League of Women Voters c … … … … … … $6,428 $6,406 $5,818,895 $4,566,214 $1,063,490 … $1,101,255 $443,445 $178,700 $17,850 $84,140 … … $356,606 $133,858 $900 … … $25,260 $11,500 $66,303 … $21,900 … $6,175,501 $4,700,072 $1,064,390 … $1,101,255 $468,705 $190,200 $84,153 $84,140 $21,900 … $18,560,233 $18,233,588 $2,987,319 $330,708 $1,841,741 $2,585,767 $812,871 … … … $335,585 $70,575 … … … … … … $14,400 $53,030 $29,700 $17,800 $8,400 $5,883 … $84,975 $53,030 $29,700 $17,800 $8,400 $5,883 … $768,560 … … … … … $5,568 Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, Kelly D. Patterson, J. Quin Monson, and the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, 2004 Soft Money and Issue Advocacy Database (Brigham Young University, 2004); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data. a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senatorial, or Presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study’s sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study’s relevant House, Senate, or Presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the shear volume of television and radio 29 stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. Television ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table X-X. b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization’s activity. For instance, National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action and National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund data have been included in the National Rifle Associationtotals and Progress for America Voter Fund have been included in the Progress for America totals. c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “…” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium. 30 TABLE 4 Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organizations Florida Senate Race, 2004a Total Unique Ads Type and Organizationb Democratic alliesc Candidates Betty Castor for US Senate Political parties Florida Democratic Party DNC DSCC Interest Groups Emily’s List Florida Women Vote AFL-CIO American Federation of Teachers Florida Education Association Human Rights Campaign Environment 2004 People for the American Way Sierra Club Republican alliesc Candidates Mel Martinez for Senate Political parties Republican Party of Florida NRSC RNC Interest Groups US Chamber of Commerce National Rifle Association American Democracy Project Email Mail Newspaper / Magazine Phone Call Radio TV 27 1 1 … 8 … 1 … … 1 1 1 1 5 4 … … 3 3 1 2 2 1 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 4 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 9 2 1 1 … … … … … … … … … 45 7 2 1 11 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 15 … … … … … … 4 10 6 1 7 4 3 … … … … … … … 2 1 … … … … … 2 1 … … … … … 5 2 2 4 … … … 28 14 8 5 7 4 3 31 Hispanos Unidos All Children Matter Club for Growth Florida Leadership Council National Federation of Independent Business National Right to Life Nonpartisan Interest Groups Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration AARP League of Women Voters Rock the Vote Voices for Working Families … … 1 … … … 3 1 … … 1 1 … … … 1 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 3 1 1 1 1 1 … … … 1 … 2 1 … … 1 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 1 … … 2 1 1 1 1 Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, Kelly D. Patterson, J. Quin Monson, and the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, 2004 Soft Money and Issue Advocacy Database (Brigham Young University, 2004). a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table X-X. b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization’s activity. For instance, National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action and National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund data have been included in the National Rifle Association totals. c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “…” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium. 32 TABLE 5 The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures, Florida Senate Race, 2004a Type and Organizationb Democratic allies Candidates Betty Castor for US Senate Political parties DSCC Interest Groups The Media Fund AFL-CIO Emily’s List Communities for Quality Education Florida Women Vote New Democrat Network Coalition to Defend the American Dream Human Rights Campaign Service Employees International Union Save Our Environment This Vote Counts People for the American Way American Family Voices Sierra Club The Nature Conservancy Natural Resource Defense Council Communication Workers of America National Right to Work Committee Stronger America Now Republican allies Candidates Mel Martinez for Senate Political parties $1,125,030 $7,608 $1,132,638 $9,077,985 c c TV Radio Total $ Spent CMAG TV $584,281 $1,622,963 $1,925,393 $350,010 $275,780 $247,970 $192,225 $179,640 … … $29,720 … $10,155 … $1,300 … … … … … … $122,710 … $187,000 … $40,800 … $13,800 … $103,236 $100,000 $53,353 $18,700 … $2,340 … … … … … … … $706,991 $1,622,963 $2,112,393 $350,010 $316,580 $247,970 $206,025 $179,640 $103,236 $100,000 $83,073 $18,700 $10,155 $2,340 $1,300 … … … … … … $7,816,123 $5,362,595 $6,007,579 $754,032 $1,224,338 $48,398 … $1,045,294 … … $403,843 … … $2,351 … $204,641 $95,737 $42,845 $6,553 $6,428 $6,406 33 NRSC Florida Republican Party Interest Groups Progress for America United Seniors Association National Rifle Association All Children Matter National Right to Life US Chamber of Commerce Nonpartisan Interest Groups AARP Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration Families for a Secure America The Latino Coalition American Civil Liberties Union Citizens for Public Integrity League of Women Voters $1,594,475 … $443,445 $178,700 $17,850 $84,140 … … $78,335 … $25,260 $11,500 $66,303 … $21,900 … $1,672,810 … $468,705 $190,200 $84,153 $84,140 $21,900 … $5,799,822 $330,708 $2,585,767 $812,871 … … … $335,585 $70,575 … … … … … … $14,400 $53,030 $29,700 $17,800 $8,400 $5,883 … $84,975 $53,030 $29,700 $17,800 $8,400 $5,883 … $768,560 … … … … … $5,568 Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, Kelly D. Patterson, J. Quin Monson, and the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, 2004 Soft Money and Issue Advocacy Database (Brigham Young University, 2004); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data. a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senatorial, or Presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study’s sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study’s relevant House, Senate, or Presidential battleground races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the shear volume of television and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This data does not include every station in the state. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. Television ads purchased from national cable stations that aired in this state are not reflected in this table. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table X-X. b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization’s activity. For instance, National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action and National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund data have been included in the National Rifle Association totals and Progress for America Voter Fund have been included in the Progress for America totals. Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. c In blank cells, “…” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium. 34