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European Commission
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs
Unit C2
NATIONAL FISCAL RULES - A QUESTIONNAIRE
I. General description of the rule
1. Please specify the nature of the rule:
Revenue rule
Expenditure rule
Budget Balance rule (this includes balanced budget rules, golden rules and rules in relation to the budget balance)
Debt rule
Other rule, please specify:
2. Please provide a general description of the rule:
3. Please indicate the main reasons / motivations for the introduction of a new fiscal rule or for the reform of an
existing fiscal rule already in force in 2005. In particular, please indicate whether the introduction or the reform
of the rule was related to particular events, such as a broad institutional reform, changes in legislation to adapt
the budgetary policy making to the requirements established by EMU (e.g. the Stability and Growth Pact) etc.
4. Please indicate the relevant general government sub-sector to which the rule applies.
- The whole of the general government sector
- Central government (The State and other central government entities)
- The State / Federal Government
- Regional governments (autonomous regions of the federated states)
- Local governments
- Social security
- Additional information:
6. Please indicate the relevant dates for the rule considered:
- When it was first approved and when it entered into force. In case of a reform of an existing fiscal rule, please specify
when the changes were approved and when entered into force.
- In case of a new fiscal rule, please indicate whether the rule has already undergone any change after its approval or it is
expected to be amended in the next future. Please, provide, if possible, information about these possible changes:
II. Design: time frame, coverage, exclusions and target definition
a) Time frame
6. Please indicate the time span covered by the rule. Notably, does the rule extend the time horizon beyond the
yearly budgetary cycle? For instance, in case of a multi-annual expenditure rule, please indicate the time horizon
covered by the rule:
Coverage
7. Please specify whether the aggregate targeted by the rule (expenditure, revenues, balance budget etc) is
defined in terms of ESA95 accounting or in terms of another accounting system (cash/budgetary accounting). If
you consider that some relevant information on this aspect should be pointed out, please use the box below:
- ESA95 accounting
- Other cash/budgetary accounting basis, please specify:
- Additional information:
8. In case of expenditure or revenue rules , please specify the following:
8a. Which categories of expenditure (resp. revenue components) are covered by the rule (e.g. health care
expenditure, all expenditure items, total taxes, only direct taxes etc):
8b. What is the estimated value of the expenditure items (resp. revenue components) covered by this rule as a
percentage of total general government expenditure (resp. revenue):
- less than 5% 5-10% 10- 15% 15-20% 20-25% 25-30% 30-40%
- 40-50% 50-60% 60-70% 70-80% 80-90% 90-100%
9. In case of a budget balance or debt rules applied to a general government sub-sector(s), what is the
expenditure share of this (these) sub‑sector(s) over total general government expenditure.
- less than 5% 5-10% 10- 15% 15-20% 20-25% 25-30% 30-40%
- 40-50% 50-60% 60-70% 70-80% 80-90% 90-100%
II.c) Exclusions from the coverage of the rule
10. Please indicate what elements (if any) are excluded from the rule coverage in each of the following cases:
10.a- In case of expenditure rules , please indicate if some expenditure items are excluded from the rule coverage
and please estimate their share in total general government expenditure:
- Interest expenditure:
- Cyclically-sensitive items (such as unemployment related expenditure) – please specify:
- Public investment. Please specify the relevant definition of public investment applied (e.g. gross or net public
investment, including only some specific items etc.):
- Other items, please specify, including their share in general government expenditure:
10.b- In case of revenue rules , please indicate if some categories of receipts (e.g. some particular taxes) are
excluded from the rule coverage and please estimate their share in total general government revenue:
- No specific revenue item is excluded
- Yes, some specific revenue item(s) are excluded, please specify:
10.c- In case of budget balance rules , please indicate if some budgetary elements are explicitly excluded from
the rule coverage and please estimate their share in total general government expenditure:
- Interest expenditure. If relevant, please specify their share in general government expenditure:
- Public investment. Please specify the relevant definition of public investment applied (e.g. gross or net public
investment, including only some specific items etc.):
- Others, please specify:
10.d- In case of debt rules , please indicate the following:
- Some types of government liabilities are excluded from the rule. Please, specify and give the percentage of debt
excluded as a percentage of total general government gross debt:
- Other exclusions. Please specify and give the amount of debt excluded as a percentage of total general government
gross debt:
II.d) Target definition / specifications
11. Please provide details on the definition of the rule.
11.a- In case of expenditure rules :
- The rule targets a nominal expenditure ceiling (level)
- The rule targets a real expenditure ceiling (level)
- The rule targets a nominal expenditure growth rate
- The rule targets a real expenditure growth rate
- The rule targets a specific expenditure to GDP ratio
- Others, please describe:
11.b- In case of revenue rules :
- The rule imposes constraints on the allocation of higher-than-expected revenues in good times. Please describe:
- The rule imposes constraints on the developments in the tax-to-GDP ratio. Please specify:
- Other, please describe:
11.c- In case of budget balance rules :
- The rule targets a specific budget balance in nominal terms
- The rule targets a specific budget balance as a percentage of GDP
- The rule targets a specific budget balance as percentage of GDP in cyclically-adjusted or structural terms.
- The rule targets a specific budget balance as a percentage of GDP within a range of possible values depending on
growth developments.
- The rule targets a given improvement of the budget balance (as a % of GDP).
- The rule targets a given improvement of the structural or cyclically-adjusted budget balance (as a % of GDP).
- Other, please describe:
11.d- In case of debt rules :
- The rule targets a specific amount of debt in nominal terms
- The rule targets a specific debt-to-GDP ratio
- The rule targets a given reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio
- The rule establishes a ceiling for the government (or a specific sub-sector) debt in level or as a % of GDP
- Other, please describe:
12. Among the following options, which is the closest to the actual results stemming from the respect of the
rule:
12.a - In case of expenditure rules
- Respect of the rule implies a stabilisation in nominal expenditure.
- Respect of the rule implies a stabilisation in real expenditure.
- Respect of the rule implies an increase in real expenditure lower than the potential real GDP growth rate of economy.
- Respect of the rule implies an increase in real expenditure in line with the potential real GDP growth rate of economy.
- Respect of the rule implies an increase in real expenditure higher than the potential real GDP growth rate of economy.
- Other. Please specify:
12.b- In case of revenue rules:
- Respect of the rule implies a stabilization of the tax burden (tax-to-GDP ratio).
- Respect of the rule implies a decrease in the tax burden (tax-to-GDP ratio).
- The rule limits the increase in the tax burden.
- Other. Please specify:
12.c- In case of budget balance rules:
- Respect of the rule implies a stabilization of the nominal budget balance at a given level.
- Respect of the rule implies a stabilization of the budget balance in % of GDP at a given level.
- Respect of the rule implies a stabilization of the structural budget balance in % of GDP at a given level.
- Respect of the rule implies a given improvement of the budget balance as a % of GDP.
- Respect of the rule implies a given improvement of the structural budget balance as a % of GDP.
- The rule allows for a worsening of the budget balance as a % of GDP under certain circumstances and/or up to a pre-
established threshold.
- The rule allows for a worsening of the structural budget balance under certain circumstances and/or up to a pre-
established threshold.
- Others. Please, specify:
12. d- In case of debt rules:
- Respect of the rule implies a stabilisation of the debt level (nominal terms).
- Respect of the rule implies a decrease in the debt level (nominal terms).
- Respect of the rule implies a stabilization of the debt ratio.
- Respect of the rule implies a decrease in the debt ratio.
- Others. Please, specify:
13. Does the rule limit or prevent the implementation of pro-cyclical fiscal policies, notably in good times?
- No.
- Yes. Please specify:
- In case the answers given in this questionnaire refer to a reformed fiscal rule, and the changes introduced are linked to
one or more elements related to questions 6-13, please explain the main motivation of these changes.
III Statutory base of the rule
14. Please, indicate which of the following best describes the statutory base of the rule:
Medium term arrangement:
- Coalition agreement.
- Political agreement or commitment made by the relevant authority (e.g. commitment made by the government, the
Minister of Finances or the President of a regional government) other than a coalition agreement.
- Other, please describe:
Long term arrangement:
- Provisions related to the rule are enshrined in a legal act (e.g. rule incorporated in Public Finance Act, in a Fiscal
Responsibility Law or in any other similar statutory act).
- Pact or agreement reached by different general government tiers not necessarily enshrined in any legal act but which
makes up a domestic stability commitment.
- Provisions related to the rule are enshrined in the Constitution.
- Other, please describe:
In case the answers given in this questionnaire refer to a reformed fiscal rule, and the changes introduced are related to
question 14, please explain the main motivations of these changes.
IV Monitoring of compliance with the rule
15. Who is responsible for monitoring respect of the rule?
- No body in charge of monitoring.
- The Ministry of Finance.
- Governmental structure (politically dependant) other than the Ministry of Finance. Please specify:
- National Parliament
- Independent authority (e.g. Fiscal Council, Court of Auditors). If yes, please specify:
- Other, please specify:
- Is there a real time monitoring?
- No
- Yes. Please specify:
- In case the answers given in this questionnaire refer to a reformed fiscal rule, and the changes introduced are related to
question 15, please explain the main motivations of these changes:
V Enforcement
16. In case of non-compliance with the rule, could you please indicate which of the following options best
describes who / which body enforces the rule observance:
- No body in charge of enforcement.
- Internal enforcer - Ministry of Finance.
- Governmental structure (politically dependant) other than the Ministry of Finance. Please specify:
- National Parliament
- Independent enforcer, e.g. judiciary branch or an independent fiscal body / review panel created to ensure the rule
enforcement. Please specify:
- Other, please specify:
17. Please indicate which of the following best characterises the rule in terms of escape clauses:
- There are no predefined escape clauses
- Derogations to the rule are possible if budgetary problems arise in sensitive areas (e.g. healthcare)
- Derogations to the rule are possible in case of adverse events outside governmental control (e.g. natural disasters,
exceptional slowdown in economic growth)
- There is a list of events automatically granting a derogation from the rule, and if so please specify them:
18. Could you please specify what option best describes the actions taken in case of non-compliance or risks
of non-compliance with the targets implied by the rule (more than one option is possible).
- There are no ex-ante defined actions.
- The government or the relevant authority is obliged to prepare a proposal to the Parliament or to the body which
enforces the rule observance with corrective measures.
- The ministry/official body/government or relevant authority responsible for the overrun is obliged to correct it by taking
appropriate actions. Please specify:
- There is an automatic correction mechanism (e.g. a link between non‑compliance in the current year and the resource
allocation in the budget of the following year). If so, please describe the mechanism:
- There is a possibility of imposing sanctions. If so, please describe the mechanism (who imposes what sanctions on
whom and whether their imposition seems credible):
- There is an automatic mechanism for sanction imposition in case of non-compliance. If so please describe the
mechanism (who imposes what sanctions on whom):
- Other, please specify:
In case the answers given in this questionnaire refer to a reformed fiscal rule, and the changes introduced are linked to
one or more elements related to questions 16-18, please explain the main motivation of these changes:
19. Please indicate which of the following options best describes the average level of media / public opinion
reaction in case of rule non-compliance:
- No reaction
- Modest interest of media and public opinion
- High level of media activity, but not likely to invoke public debate
- High level of media activity, resulting in public debate on the subject, likely to induce government to publicly justify the
non-compliance
20. Did the rule significantly affect the composition of revenue and expenditure?
- No
- Yes. Please specify:
VI Compliance and circumventing
21. Since the new rule entered into force or the changes applied to an existing fiscal rule were implemented, the
rule has been respected...
- Never
- Rarely
- Around 50% of cases
- Always
22. Could you please summarize the main reasons for non-compliance?
23. Could you please indicate your view on whether the new or the reformed rule is significantly contributing to
budgetary discipline?
- The rule is not significantly contributing to fiscal discipline
- There is hardly contributing to fiscal discipline
- There is a perception that the new or the reformed rule is significantly contributing to fiscal discipline
- The new or the reformed rule is definitely contributing to fiscal discipline
- Additional comments:
End of questionnaire
c European Commission
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs
Unit C2
Non-compliance actions
Accounting system
Time frame (years)
Enforcement body
Target/constraint
Monitoring body
Statutory base
Description
Exclusions
Rule no.
Country
Sector
Type
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
1011 AT BBR CG, Budget Deficit targets for the CG, RG (Länder), and ESA 2 . . . . N
RG, balance as LG contained in a National Stability Pact
LG % of GDP within a multiannual budgetary setting.
1012 AT BBR CG, Budget Deficit targets for the CG, RG (Länder), and ESA 4 . . . . N
RG, balance as LG contained in a National Stability Pact
LG % of GDP within a multiannual budgetary setting.
1013 AT BBR CG, Budget Deficit targets for the CG, RG (Länder), and ESA 4 L GS GS Possibility of N
RG, balance as LG contained in a National Stability Pact sanctions
LG % of GDP within a multiannual budgetary setting.
2011 BE ER CG Real Real growth of primary expenditure for CG BA 4 CA IND, NP GS No pre- Y
expenditure ought to be equal or lower than 0%. defined action
growth rate
2021 BE RR CG Growth of Growth of fiscal revenues has to be in line BA 4 CA No body MF, GS No pre- Y
revenues in with GDP growth (both in nominal terms). defined action
relation to
GDP growth
2031 BE BBR LG Budget Balanced budget rule for LG: mandatory BA A L IND, RG GS (RG) GS (RG) N
balance in balance of budgetary accounts. corrects
nominal possible
terms slippages by
appropriate
actions
2041 BE BBR RG Budget Regional governments must register a ESA 5 PA IND GS Possibility of Y
balance in surplus or, at least, a balanced budget by (CG, sanctions
nominal 2010 at latest. RG) [i]
terms
2051 BE BBR SS Budget Balanced budget rule for SS sector. BA 4 CA GS GS No pre- N
balance in defined action
nominal
terms
2061 BE ER SS Real Real growth of health care expenditure BA 4 L IND, NP GOV, Automatic Y
expenditure must be equal or lower than a pre- possibly mechanism
growth rate established figure. social of sanction
partners
3011 BG DR GG Debt/GDP Outstanding portion of the consolidated ESA M L MF MF Automatic Y
ratio change government debt at the end of each year correction
may not exceed the previous year, as a mechanism
ratio to the projected GDP. with possible
sanctions
3021 BG ER GG Expenditure Ceiling on the size of the government ESA M PA MF MF No pre- Y
ceiling as % sector: 40% of GDP. defined
of GDP actions
5011 CZ ER CG Nominal Inserted in a medium term expenditure BA 3 L MF GOV No pre- Y
expenditure framework (MTEF), covers 2 years beyond defined
ceiling the budget year. Expenditure limits are set action;
to achieve a pre-defined deficit target. government
provides
explanations
in case of
non-
compliance
5021 CZ DR RG, Debt ceiling Debt service ratio (debt service/debt basis) BA A PA . . . N
LG in terms of should not exceed 30%.
debt service
ratio
5022 CZ DR RG, Debt ceiling Debt service ratio (debt service/debt basis) BA A PA MF MF Corrective N
LG in terms of should not exceed 30%. measures
debt service are proposed
ratio - possibility
of sanctions
6011 DE BBR CG Budget Golden rule: public borrowing is only BA A C, L MF, NP No body No pre- Y
balance in allowed if it does not exceed public defined action
nominal investment. Exceptions allowed for
terms stabilisation purposes only.
6021 DE ER CG, Nominal Maximum expenditure growth of annually BA 5 PA GS Financial No pre- N
RG expenditure 1% on average for federal government and (CG, Planning defined action
growth rate Lander. RG) Council.
6022 DE ER CG, Nominal Until a balanced structural budget is BA 5 PA GS Financial No pre- N
RG expenditure reached, the growth rate of expenditures (CG, Planning defined action
growth rate must be lower than the growth rate of RG) Council.
overall revenues
6031 DE BBR LG Budget Balanced budget rule for LG BA A L GS GS Clear actions N
balance in ('administrative' and capital accounts). foreseen
nominal
terms
6041 DE DR LG Debt ceiling Raising credits by the communes requires BA A L GS GS Permission Y
in nominal authorisation by the supervisory agencies for credits
terms and must only be used to finance refused
investments. Numerical limits and ceilings.
6051 DE BBR RG Budget Golden rule: the credit volume must not BA A C Länder MF No body No pre- Y
balance in exceed the investment volume, except for and Länder defined action
nominal dealing with adverse macroeconomic Parliaments
terms developments.
7011 DK BBR GG Budget Structural budget surpluses in the interval ESA M CA MF MF No pred- Y
balance as 0.5 - 1.5% of GDP. defined action
% of GDP
in structural
terms
7012 DK BBR GG Budget Structural budget surpluses in the interval ESA M CA MF MF No pre- Y
balance as 0.75 - 1.75% of GDP in the years towards defined action
% of GDP 2010, surpluses or at least balance up to
in structural 2011-2015.
terms
7021 DK ER GG Public Real public consumption on a national ESA M PA MF MF No pre- N
consumption account basis must not increase by more defined action
growth rate than 0.5% p.a.
in real terms
7022 DK ER GG Public Real public consumption on a national ESA M PA MF MF No pre- N
consumption account basis must not increase by more defined action
growth rate than certain amounts per year. Besides,
in real total ceiling of 26.5% of cyclically adjusted
terms. GDP in 2015.
7031 DK RR GG Limits on Direct and indirect taxes cannot be raised. n/a n/a PA MF MF No pre- 0
direct or defined action
indirect tax
rates
8011 EE BBR GG Budget Balanced budget rule for GG. BA M CA MF MF, NP No pre- N
balance in defined
nominal action;
terms possibility of
cuts in
expenditure if
revenue
shortfall
8021 EE DR LG Debt ceiling Limited issuance of new debt: (1) From BA A L MF MF Proposition Y
as % of 1997: new debt must not exceed 75% of of corrective
budgeted budgeted revenues. And from 2004 the debt measures
revenues ceiling is 60%. (2) From 1994: annual (possible
repayment must not exceed 20% of reduction in
budgeted revenues (1994). transfers)
10011 ES BBR GG Budget In "normal" economic conditions, GG and its ESA 3 L MF, GS, NP MF, GS MF presents N
balance as sub-sector must show a balanced budget or corrective
% of GDP a surplus. This is embedded in a medium- plan with
term fiscal framework (3 years) consistent appropriate
with the Stability Programme. actions
10012 ES BBR GG Budget The budgetary objectives take into account ESA M L MF, NP MF,GS, NP possibility of N
balance as the economy's cyclical position, allowing sanctions
% of GDP budget deficits in periods of slow growth but
requiring surpluses in periods of high
growth. The overall deficit during downturns
must not exceed 1% of GDP. In addition, a
deficit of up to 0,5% of GDP is allowed to
finance public investment under certain
conditions.
10021 ES DR LG Debt ceiling LG must register a balanced budget or a BA A L MF, RG MF LG designs N
as % of surplus. Total LG debt cannot exceed 110% financial plan
current of current revenues and must register to be met in
revenue positive savings. 3 years
10031 ES DR RG Debt ceiling Restrictions on possible loans. BA A L MF MF No pre- N
# defined action
10041 ES DR RG Debt ceiling For each RG, indebtedness must be the ESA A Agreem MF MF, CM Possibility of N
in nominal same (nominal terms) at the begining and at ent sanctions
terms the end of each year (including 2003). (CG,
RG)
11011 FI BBR CG Budget Balanced CG finances to be secured under ESA M PA MF GS No pre- N
balance as normal conditions of economic growth at defined
% of GDP the end of the electoral period. Cyclical or action;
in structural other short-term deviations allowed, if they political
terms do not jeopardize the reduction of the CG pressure to
debt ratio. CG deficit must not exceed ensure
2,75% of total output. compliance
11012 FI BBR CG Budget Target of structural surplus of 1% by the ESA M PA MF GS No pre- N
balance as end of the parliamentary term. Cyclical or defined
% of GDP other short-term deviations allowed, if they action;
do not jeopardise the reduction of the CG political
debt ratio. CG deficit must not exceed 2,5% pressure to
of total output. ensure
compliance
11021 FI DR CG Debt/GDP CG debt must be reduced over the BA 5 PA MF GS No pre- N
ratio change legislative period. defined
action;
political
pressure to
ensure
compliance
11031 FI ER CG Real At the beginning of the electoral period, CG BA M PA MF GS GS proposes Y
expenditure sets a ceiling for expenditure over this corrective
ceiling period. measures
11032 FI ER CG Real At the beginning of the electoral period, CG BA 5 PA MF GS GS proposes Y
expenditure sets a ceiling for expenditure over this corrective
ceiling period. measures
11041 FI BBR LG Budget Balanced budget rule for LG: in the case of BA 4 L IND, GS IND, GS Preparation N
balance in a deficit, the budget should be balanced in of plans to
nominal the next 4 years; measures to cover the cover
terms deficit to be proposed. eventual
deficits,
possible
personal
admonitions
11042 FI BBR LG . Local Government Act. Regulates BA M . . . . N
municipalities in bringing their budgets in
balance. Contains provisions on budget and
financial plans, financial statements,
reporting on operations, and financial
supervision.
11051 FI RR SS Allocation of Counter-cyclical regulation of ESA BC L GS IND No pre- N
revenue unemployment security contributions and defined action
surpluses earnings-related pension contributions using
so-called EMU-buffer funds that exist in the
unemployment insurance fund in the private
sector pension scheme.
12011 FR ER CG Real Targeted increase of CG expenditure in real BA A PA IND, NP no body No pre- N
expenditure terms. defined action
growth rate
12012 FR ER CG Real Targeted increase of CG expenditure in real BA A PA NP, Ind no body no pre- N
expenditure terms. defined action
growth rate
12021 FR RR CG Allocation of CG to define the allocation of higher than BA A L IND, NP NP No pre- N
higher than expected tax revenues ex ante. defined action
expected
revenues
12031 FR BBR LG Budget Golden rule: voted budgets must be in BA A L IND National Obligation to Y
balance balance; ex post deficits cannot exceed 5% level: GS; propose
of current revenues (10% for small regional corrective
municipalities). level: prefet measures
12041 FR DR SS Contain SS Each increase in the SS debt has to be ESA A L L NP . N
debt matched by an increase in revenues. Thus,
the repayment of the SS debt should not be
prolonged.
12051 FR ER SS Ceiling in Annual vote of the Parliament on the ESA A PA . . . N
volume for national ceiling for health expenditure.
expenditure
growth rate
12052 FR ER SS Ceiling in Annual vote of the NP on the national ESA M PA IND IND, GOV IND N
volume for ceiling for health expenditure in terms of proposes
expenditure volume. corrective
growth rate measures
13011 HU BBR GG Budget GOV presents a budget bill to the NP that ESA A L MF no body No pre- Y
balance ensures the primary balance, in the defined action
Maastricht sense, being in sufficit.
13021 HU DR LG Debt ceiling The annual ceiling of the debt-creating BA A L No official No body No pre- Y
related to commitments of LG (borrowing and related body defined action
repayment charges, bond issues, etc.) is set in
capacity proportion to the capacity to repay debt.
14011 IE ER CG Allocation of 1% of GNP is set aside from GOV BA A L MF MF No pre- N
expenditure expenditure and automatically paid into the defined action
National Pension Reserve Fund for
investment on behalf of the State.
Borderline case.
14021 IE ER CG Nominal Rolling 5-year multi-annual capital BA 5 L GS, MF MF No pre- N
expenditure envelopes set out capital investment defined action
ceiling (Exchequer and PPP funded) by Ministerial
Group for each year in the 5 year period.
The envelopes are based on a commitment
to keep capital investment around 5% of
GNP. Borderline case.
14031 IE BBR LG Budget From 2004 onwards, for any given year, LG ESA A PA MF, GS MF, GS Limits N
balance in must have a net total deficit (in EDP terms) imposed on
nominal of no more than a fixed nominal amount borrowing of
terms (€160m in 2004 and 2005, €200m in 2006). local
In addition, the Health Boards (also part of authorities
the LG sector) could have a net total deficit
of no more than €40m in 2004. (These latter
bodies were abolished on 1 January 2005,
replaced by the Health Service Executive,
which is part of CG and is prohibited from
borrowing or running a deficit.)
15011 IT ER CG, Nominal Expenditure ceiling for pharmaceutical ESA A L, pact MF, GS GS Corrective N
RG expenditure products: 16% of the financing level for the (CG, actions
ceiling National Health Service contributed by the RG)
State.
15012 IT ER CG, Nominal Expenditure ceiling for pharmaceutical ESA A L MF, GS GS Corrective N
RG expenditure products: 16.4% (14% territorial, 2.4% actions
ceiling hospital) of the financing level for the
National Health Service contributed by the
State.
15021 IT ER RG, Nominal Internal Stability Pact provides LG with ESA 3 L MF IND Automatic Y
LG expenditure measures to limit expenditure. Expenditure sanction
growth rate evolution depends on kind of entities mechanism
(regions, municipalities, provicnes) and year
to which it refers to.
15022 IT BBR, RG, Budget Internal Stability Pact provides LG with ESA M L MF GOV Automatic Y
ER LG balance measures to limit expenditure. Expenditure sanction
(LG); evolution depends on kind of entities mechanism
Nominal (regions, municipalities, provicnes) and year
expenditure to which it refers to.
growth rate
(RG)
15031 IT BBR RG, Budget According to artivle no. 119 of Italian BA M C IND, MF MF No pre- Y
LG balance in constitution, Local and Regional bodies are defined action
nominal allowed to carry on deficit only for financing
terms investments
15041 IT BBR RG Budget Healthcare pact; Agreement to regulate ESA 3 L Board of GOV Automatic N
balance in transfers from GOV to regions to finance Performance correction
nominal the National Health Care System. The level Assessors mechanism
terms of the transfers is subject to the fulfilment of (with CG and and
certain conditions. RG members) possibility of
financial
sanctions
15042 IT BBR RG Budget Healtcare pact; Agreement to regulate ESA M L Board of GS Appointment N
balance in transfers from GOV to regions to finance Performance of a
nominal the National Health Care System. The level Assessors commission
terms of the transfers is subject to the fulfilment of (with CG and to reduce
certain conditions. RG members) deficits
16011 LT DR CG Ceiling on Limits set on CG net borrowing. BA A L IND MF No pre- Y
net defined action
borrowing
16021 LT ER CG Expenditure If the GG budgets showed a deficit on ESA M L MF, IND MF, NP Possibility of N
growth rate average over the past 5 calendar years, sanctions
then the annual growth rate of the planned and non-
State budget appropriations may not exceed approval of
0,5% of the average growth rate of the the budget
State budget revenue of those 5 years.
16031 LT RR CG Allocation of The deficit of the approved State budget ESA M L MF, IND, NP MF, NP Possibility of N
higher than shall be reduced by excess revenue of the sanctions
than current year. and non-
expected approval of
revenues to the budget
deficit
reduction
16041 LT BBR LG Budget LG must approve balanced budgets. BA A L GS GOV, NP Possibility of Y
balance in sanctions
nominal and of claim
terms to the Court
16042 LT BBR LG Budget LG must approve balanced budgets. BA A L GS GOV, NP Possibility of Y
balance in sanctions
nominal and of claim
terms to the Court[i]
17011 LU DR CG Debt ceiling CG maintains public debt at a low level. BA, including M CA No body No body No pre- Y
in terms of New public debt can be issued to finance capital defined action
debt/GDP rail infrastructure projects. No formal expenditures
ratio quantified target, but implicit. (investment).
17021 LU ER CG Nominal In the course of the legislative period, BA, including M CA No body No body No pre- N
expenditure public expenditure growth is maintained at a capital defined action
growt rate rate compatible with the medium term expenditures
economic growth prospects (no formal (investment).
quantified target, but implicit).
17031 LU BBR SS Budget Annual budget balance rule with constitution BA, compatible M PA + L CG CG Obligation to N
balance in of reserve funds for healthcare with ESSPROS take effective
nominal and ESA 95 measures
terms (questionnaire)
17032 LU BBR SS Budget Annula budget balance rule with constitution BA, compatible A PA+L CG CG Automatic N
balance in of reserve funds for long-term helathcare. with ESSPROS corrections
nominal and ESA 95
terms (questionnaire)
17033 LU BBR SS Budget Annula budget balance rule with constitution BA, compatible A PA+L GOV GS Obligation to N
balance in of reserve funds for healtcare, long-term with ESSPROS take effective
nominal helathcare and pension private sector and ESA 95 measures
terms schemes. (questionnaire)
18011 LV RR CG, Actual The CG and SS budgets are divided into BA A L MF, GS GS No pre- N
SS revenues base and special budgets. The latter must defined action
must cover be fully financed by earmarked revenues.
special Special budgets are devoted to social
budgets needs, mainly pension payments. Borderline
case.
18021 LV DR LG Debt ceiling LG can only increase borrowing and loan BA A PA IND MF No pre- N
in nominal guaranties up to certain limits set by CG. defined action
terms
20011 NL ER GG Real Any setbacks against the expenditure ESA 4 CA MF MF MF proposes Y
expenditure ceilings must be compensated within the corrective
ceiling sector; windfalls have first to be used to measures
compensate for setbacks within that sector.
Windfalls cann be used for new expenditure
as long as total expenditure is below the
ceiling.
20021 NL RR GG Allocation of At the beginning of the electoral period, ESA 4 CA MF MF MF proposes N
higher-than- coalition agrees on the desired corrective
expected development of the tax base. This multi- measures
revenues year path is adhered to during the period.
Additional tax increases are compensated
through tax relief and vice versa. Only
changes in statutory tariffs are taken into
account. Increases in the tax income due to
economic developments are not
considered. The rule obliges the
government to preallocate higher than
expected revenues.
21011 PL BBR CG Budget Anchor of budget. BA M PA MF, IND, NP GS, NP, IND GOV N
balance in proposes
nominal corrective
terms measures
21021 PL DR GG Debt ceiling Public debt must not exceed 60% of GDP. BA A C, L IND GOV, IND GOV Y
in terms of (Supreme (Supreme proposes
debt/GDP Audit Office), Audit Office), corrective
ratio NP NP measures
22011 PT BBR CG Budget Budgets of services with financial and BA A L MF MF No pre- N
balance in administrative autonomy must be in balance defined action
nominal or positive.
terms
22021 PT BBR LG Ceiling on Aims at stabilizing the nominal budget ESA A L MF, GS MF No N
net balance by capping LG net debt growth at predefined
borrowing 0%. actions
22022 PT BBR LG Budget The target is a nominal budget balance. Net ESA A L MF, GS MF No pre- Y
balance in indebtedness for LG capped at 125% of (Directorate defined
nominal previous year's revenues, a ceiling for General for action and
terms medium and long term loans (100%) and LG) possibility of
short-term loans (10%). Net debt growth imposing
ceiling for LG capped at 0%. actions
22031 PT BBR RG Debt ceiling Net indebtedness ceilings for autonomous ESA A L MF MF Automatic N
# RG are defined annually in the State budget. sanction
mechanism
23011 RO BBR LG Budget LG BA A L MF MF Corrective Y
balance ## measures
23021 RO DR LG Debt ceiling LG cannot contract or guarantee loans if BA A L MF MF Corrective Y
as % of their annual public debt service (principal measures
current payment, interest, commissions) including
revenue the loan they want to contract, is higher
than 30% of their own revenue.
24011 SE BBR LG Budget Local Government Act: LG are obliged to BA A L CoA No body Corrective N
balance ## balance their budgets. measures
24021 SE ER CG, Nominal Nominal expenditure ceiling for CG and BA 3 L IND (CoA), GOV Obligation to Y
SS expenditure extra-budgetary old-age pension system GOV, NP, MF correct by
ceiling targeted. appropriate
actions
24022 SE ER CG, Nominal Nominal expenditure ceiling for CG and BA M Parliam IND (CoA), GOV Obligation to Y
SS expenditure extra-budgetary old-age pension system entary GOV, NP, MF correct by
ceiling targeted. decision appropriate
actions
24031 SE BBR GG Budget A surplus for the GG in terms of 2% of GDP ESA BC GOV IND (CoA), GOV No pre- N
balance as over the cycle targeted. commit GOV, NP, MF defined action
% of GDP ment,
in structural endorse
terms d by NP
24032 SE BBR GG Budget A surplus for the GG in terms of 1% of GDP ESA M GOV IND (CoA), IND No pre- N
balance as over the cycle targeted. commit NP, MF defined action
% of GDP ment,
in structural endorse
terms d by NP
25011 SI DR GG Debt ceiling The debt/GDP ratio of GG and non-financial BA 4 CA MF MF No pre- Y
in terms of public entities (classified outside GG) defined action
debt/GDP cannot exceed 40% of GDP.
ratio
25021 SI DR LG Debt The total payment of principal and interest BA A L IND (CoA), MF MF No pre- Y
ceiling; limit in each year must not exceed 8% of defined action
on revenues of the previous year. LG cannot
repayment borrow abroad,. Any LG borrowing needs
as % of approval of MF.
revenue in
previous
budget year.
26011 SK ER CG Nominal Expenditure not considered in the State BA A PA IND, GOV, NP IND, NP Obligation to N
expenditure budget law can only be executed if its total take effective
ceiling amount does not exceed 1% of total measures
expenditure approved in the budget law and
the deficit is not increased. Allows
increasing expenditure in good times.
Initially, the rule set a limit of 15%.
26021 SK DR RG, Debt ceiling Borrowing limits for RG and LG: 1) total BA A L IND, MF GOV Possibility of N
LG and limit on debt cannot exceed 60% of current revenue sanctions
repayment in the previous budget year in nominal
as % terms (i.e. capital revenues and revenues
current of from financial transactions are excluded); 2)
revenue in annual instalments to reimburse debt
previous cannot exceed 25 % of revenue in the
budget year previous budget year in nimonal terms.
in nominal
terms
27011 UK BBR GG Budget Golden rule: GG borrowing only allowed for ESA BC L IND, MF, GS, MF Appropriate Y
balance as investment, not to fund current spending. NP actions have
% of GDP Performance against the rule is measured to be taken[iii]
by the average surplus on the current
budget as % of GDP over the economic
cycle.
27021 UK DR GG Debt ceiling Sustainable investment rule: public sector ESA BC L IND, MF, GS, MF Appropriate Y
as % of net debt as a proportion of GDP will be held NP actions have
GDP at a stable and prudent level over the to be taken
economic cycle. Other things equal, net
debt will be maintained below 40% of GDP
over the economic cycle.
Data description
Column 1.1 Identifier of the rule. The identifier is built up as follows: the first or first two digits indicate the country. Then, in the second or third place a "0" separates the coun
Thus, the third or fourth digit provides for a consecutive numbering of rules in that country, and the last digit stands for the version, 1 being the earliest (e.g. 2702
Columns 1.2 to 1.16 Description of the rule based on the surveys 2006 and 2008.
Column 1.14 Since the dataset is truncated, the start date 1990 does not distinguish between rules that came into force in that year and those in force already before. In some
force, but such information is incomplete.
Column 2 Fiscal rule coverage index (FRCI). Source: Commission services (DG Ecfin). See separate note on the construction of the FRCI.
Columns 3.1 to 3.8 Sub-criteria used to construct the fiscal rule strength index (FRSI). Categorisation of the survey results by the Commission services (DG Ecfin). See separate pd
Columns AB to AT Average value of the Fiscal Rule index over the period 1990-2008 (i.e. the index takes both the institutional coverage and the strength of fiscal rules into account
( i.e. from 1990 to 2008)
(for 3,1 to 3,8 see reference of data description below)
C4a - Non-compliance actions
Coverage of GG finances
C1b - Adjustment margin
C3 - Enforcement body
C2b - Alert mechanism
Additional information
C2a - Monitoring body
C4b - Escape clauses
C1a - Statutory base
C5 - Media visibility
In force since
In force until
In force
Fiscal Rule Index value over time (i.e. index taking into account both the coverage and the stren
1.14
1.15
1.16
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
2
4
1999 2000 (1.15) Replaced by the 0.75 3 3 2 0 2 2 1 1 R
NSP 2001.
2001 2004 (1.15) Replaced by the 0.75 3 3 2 0 2 4 1 1 R
NSP 2005.
2005 2008+ (1.9) Statutory base based 0.75 3 2 2 0 2 4 1 1 Y
on C. (1.10) GS body:
committee with CG, RG,
LG representatives.
1993 1998 (1.6) Rule in the process 0.23 2 2 3 1 2 1 0 3 N 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
leading to EMU
qualification. (1.10) IND
body: CoA, High Council of
Finance.
1992 1999 (1.6) Rule in the process 0.23 2 2 1 0 2 1 0 1 N 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
leading to EMU
qualification.
1990 2008+ (1.10) IND body: High 0.13 3 3 3 0 2 3 0 1 Y 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Council of Finance. (1.14)
Rule in force since 1982;
enforcement since 26
December.
Applied since 1990. 2008+ (1.10) IND body: High 0.30 2 2 3 1 3 3 0 1 Y 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
Formerly approved Council of Finance.
from 1995
1992 2008+ (1.10)(1.11) GS MIN: 0.35 2 3 2 1 2 2 0 1 Y 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Budget, Social Affairs.
1995 2008+ (1.6) Maximal growth rate 0.13 3 2 2 1 2 4 0 3 Y 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
of health expenditure:
1.5% (1995-1999); 2.5%
(2000-2003); 4.5% (2004-
2011). (1.7) consistent with
ESA. (1.10) IND body:
CoA, High Council on
Finance. (1.11) GOV body:
MIN of Health
2003 2008+ 1.00 3 2 2 0 2 3 1 3 Y
2006 2008+ 1.00 1 3 2 1 2 1 0 3 Y
2005 2008+ (1.16) Gov has to explain 0.75 4 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 Y
the reason why it exceeds
its expenditure ceilings.
1998 2001 (1.15) Replaced by a 0.38 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 R 2.4
similar rule 2004.
2004 2008 This rule was abolished by 0.38 1 2 2 1 2 4 1 2 N
end 2008 and replaced by
a new system of local
government monitoring.
1990 2008+ (1.11) Possibility of 0.30 4 1 3 0 1 1 1 3 Y 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
challenge at the
Constitutional Court. (1.14)
Introduced with an
amendment of the
constitution 1969.
1990 2007 (1.10) GS body: Financial 0.55 2 2 2 0 2 1 0 3 N 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
Planning Council with CG,
RG, LG members. (1.14)
In force since the early
1980s.
2008 2008+ (1.10) GS body: Financial 0.55 2 2 2 0 2 1 0 3 Y
Planning Council with CG,
RG, LG members. (1.14)
In force since the early
1980s.
. 2008+ (1.6) Financial 0.13 3 1 2 0 2 4 0 3 Y 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
sustainability for LG by
nominal budget balance.
Sanctions in case of
violation imposed by the
communal supervisory
agency: possibly refuse to
authorise the budget;
impose consolidation
programmes; take over the
administration of the
commune. To achieve a
balanced budget,
communes can either rise
or reduce expenditures.
(1.10) GS body:
Communal Supervisory
Agencies of the Länder.
(1.14) Rule was in force
already before 1990.
1990 2008+ (1.10) GS body: 0.13 3 2 2 1 2 3 0 3 Y 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Communal Supervisory
Agencies of the Länder.
(1.12) Ceilings to be
measured in terms of the
financial capacity of the
commune or the
investment volume. Any
credit above ceilings is
refused. (1.14) The rule
was in force already before
1990.
1990 2008+ Reform in the early 1970s. 0.35 4 1 2 0 1 1 1 3 Y 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
(1.11) Possibility of
challenge at the
Constitutional Court.
1992 2006 (1.15) Since 2007, a 1.00 2 2 2 1 2 1 0 2 R 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7
reformed rule has been in
force, see separate row.
2007 2008+ The rule is part of the 2010- 1.00 2 2 2 1 2 1 0 2 Y
plan, target
published/revised in 2015-
plan, August 2007.
1994 2006 Gradual implementation 0.45 1 2 2 1 2 4 0 2 R 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
since 1994.
2007 2008+ The rule is part of the 2010 0.55 1 2 2 1 2 4 0 3 Y
plan, target revised in 2015
plan (August 2007). Real
public consumption on a
national account basis
must not increase by more
than 1.75% in 2008, 1.2%
in 2009-2012 and 0.75% in
2013-2015.
2001 2008+ Introduced in November 0.90 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 3 Y
2001.
1993 2008+ If a proposal decreases 1.00 4 2 2 1 3 4 0 3 Y 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8
revenues or increases
expenditures, it has to be
compensated so that the
budget is balanced.
Amendments: 1993-1999:
revenue to equal
expenditures. 2002:
introduction of financial
transactions into the state
budget.
1997 2008+ (1.6) approved in 1994, 0.22 3 2 2 1 2 4 0 2 Y 1.6 1.6
amended since then with
minor changes to cover all
kinds of credit facilities. If a
LG exceeds the allowed
debt level, it must not
increase its expenditures.
2002 2005 (1.4). The rule applies 1.00 3 2 2 1 2 4 0 2 R
individually to each
subsector of the oublic
administration therefore
covering the whole general
government.
2006 2008+ 1.00 3 2 3 1 3 2 0 2 Y
1990 2008+ (1.14) In force since 1988; 0.13 3 3 2 1 2 3 0 1 Y 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
adopted again in 2004.
1990 2008+ (1.6) (1.14) In force since 0.35 4 3 2 1 2 3 0 1 Y 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
1980.
2003 2008+ 0.35 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 1 Y
1999 2002 0.55 1 3 2 1 2 1 0 1 N
2003 2008+ (1.6) If the deficit is to 0.55 1 2 2 1 2 1 0 1 Y
exceed 2.5% of GDP even
in a weak economy, it
should be reined in.
1995 2007 . 0.55 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 N 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
1999 2006 0.30 1 1 2 1 2 2 0 1 N
2007 2008+ 0.35 1 1 2 1 2 2 0 1 Y
1995 2001 (1.10) IND body: auditing 0.35 3 2 3 0 3 2 1 1 N 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
committees. GS: MIN of
Interior. (1.11) Same as
(1.10). (1.14) Issued in
March 1995. Reforms of
the rule 2001 and 2006: a
target has to be formulated
on the quality and
financing of services in the
beginning of the council
period; a balanced or
surplus budget has to be
reached in the next 4 years.
2001 2008+ 0.35 3 2 3 0 3 3 1 1 Y
1999 2008+ (1.10) GS body: MIN of 0.13 3 2 2 1 3 1 0 2 Y
Social Affairs and Health.
1998 2005 Amendments in 2004: (1) 0.40 1 2 3 0 1 1 0 2 R 1.9
expenditure growth rate
limited at 0% (2000-2002:
1% allowed); (2) change
of the reference period for
the growth rate from three
years to one year. (1.10)
IND body: CoA.
2006 2008+ Higher media visibility in 0.40 1 2 3 0 1 1 0 3 Y
the period 2006-2008.
2006 2008+ (1.10) IND body: CoA. 0.40 4 1 3 0 3 1 0 3 Y
1983 2008+ The rule has been in force 0.23 3 3 3 0 2 2 0 1 Y 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
since 1983 for communes
and departements, and
since 1988 for the regions.
(1.10) IND body: regional
CoA.
Approved in 2005. 2008+ Article 20 of the legal act 0.13 3 1 3 0 1 1 0 3 Y
Introduced in 2008 LOLFSS of August 2005
1997 2005 0.18 1 1 3 0 2 2 0 2 R 1.0 1.0
2006 2008+ (1.10) IND bodies: Alert 0.18 1 1 3 1 3 2 0 2 Y
Committee, CoA. (1.11)
IND body: Alert
Committee. (1.12) IND
body: Alert Committee.
2007 2008+ 1.00 3 2 3 0 1 1 0 1 Y
1996 2008+ (1.6) Ceiling debt limit is 0.30 4 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 Y 1.3 1.3 1.3
proportional to GDP.
2000 2008+ 0.05 3 3 2 1 2 2 1 3 Y
2004 2008+ 0.13 3 2 2 1 2 1 0 3 Y
2004 2008+ 0.20 2 2 2 0 2 4 0 1 Y
2001 2007 (1.10) GS body: Italian 0.05 3 2 2 1 2 3 0 1 R
Pharmaceutical Agency
(AIFA); MIN of Health.
(1.12) Absorption of deficit:
AIFA: 60%; regions: 40%.
2008 2008+ (1.10): GS: Agenzia 0.05 3 2 2 1 2 3 0 1 Y
Italiana del Farmaco, AIFA.
(1.11) GS: regions; AIFA.
(1.12): Corrective action
undertaken by regions and
Aifa. Otherwise, MIN of
Economics imposes
sanctions. When the 14%
ceiling is exceeded,
regions charged for 30% of
the excess, AIFA of 70%.
2.4% ceiling: regions must
fully finance excess
expenditures. These
changes did not affect the
index value.
1999 2006 ESA applies to targets, BA 0.30 3 2 2 0 2 4 0 2 R
to monitoring. Pact
changed every year; major
amendments in 2007.
(1.11) In case of non
compliance, the
independent committee of
auditors nominated by the
local entitites informs MF
and MIN of Interior so that
automatic sanctions apply
promptly.
2007 2008+ 0.35 3 2 3 1 2 4 0 1 Y
2001 2008+ (1.10) IND body: CoA. 0.35 3 1 3 0 2 1 1 2 Y
2001 2006 ESA applies to targets. 0.07 3 2 2 1 2 4 0 2 R
Agreement in March 2005,
amended September 2006.
2007 2008+ 0.13 3 2 2 1 2 2 0 2 Y
1997 2008+ Changes: 1997: limit on 0.35 3 2 3 1 2 1 0 1 Y 2.0 2.0
total foreign nominal
borrowing; 1999: limit on
state spending; 2004:
change in methodology;
limit on net GOV borrowing.
2008 2008+ (1.10) IND: National Audit 0.55 3 2 3 1 3 2 1 3 Y
Office.
2008 2008+ (1.10) IND: National Audit 0.55 3 2 3 1 3 2 1 3 Y
Office.
1990 2005 (1.10) GS body: Council of 0.35 3 2 2 1 3 4 0 1 R 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Municipality.(1.12)
Administrative
responsibility: the
supervisor authorised by
GOV has right to submit a
claim to the Court in the
case of infringement of a
legal act.
2006 2008+ (1.10) GS body: Council of 0.35 3 2 2 1 3 3 0 1 Y
Municipality.
Although this 2008+ 0.90 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 Y 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9
specific rule was
introduced in 2004,
similar rules were in
force in the previous
period 1990-2003.
1999 2008+ 1999 It is the starting date 0.90 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 Y
of the previous gov
prgoramme (1999-2004)
1992 2008+ (1,14) The rule came in 0.10 3 2 2 1 2 4 0 2 Y 0.7 0.7 0.7
force in 2 steps: a first one
in 1993, a second one in
1995. From 1993 onwards
this rule is contained in the
next one (17032).
1993 2008+ From 1998 onwards this 0.20 3 2 2 1 2 4 0 2 Y 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
rule and the previous one
(17031) are included in the
next one (17033).
1999 (this rule 2008+ (1.10) GOV body: MIN of 0.28 3 2 2 1 2 4 0 2 Y
contains the two Social Security. (1.11) GS:
previous ones). MIN Social Security;
General Inspectorate of
Social Security.
1994 2008+ (1.10), (1.11) GS body: 0.35 3 2 2 0 2 1 0 1 Y 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
State Treasury.
1994 2008+ (1.10) IND: Board 0.35 2 2 3 1 2 1 0 1 Y 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
monitoring and supervising
municipal loans and loans
guaranties.
1994 2008+ 1.00 2 2 2 1 2 3 0 2 Y 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
1994 2008+ (1.6) In addition to the 1.00 2 2 2 1 2 3 0 2 Y 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
allocation of extra
revenues, the rule also
defines tax burdens as %
of GDP.
2006 2007 (1.6) 4-year nominal 0.55 1 2 3 1 3 4 1 1 N
anchor of 30 billion PLN
(or 3% of GDP) for the CG
budget.
1997 2008+ (1.6) If the debt is between 1.00 4 2 3 1 3 4 1 1 Y 8.3 8.3
55% and 60% of GDP, the
draft central budget must
not increase the ratio of
central government debt to
GDP in the following year
and for local draft budgets
a formula based on the
restriction of the deficit-to-
revenue ratio is applied. If
the debt exceeds 60% of
GDP, despite the previous
safeguards, any
government borrowing is
forbidden in the
subsequent year, which
means that public
accounts should be in
balance or surplus.
2002 2008+ 0.13 3 1 2 0 2 1 0 1 Y
2003 2006 0.13 3 2 2 0 2 1 1 1 R
2007 2008+ 0.13 3 2 2 1 2 4 0 1 Y
2007 2008+ (1.6) Targets the 0.05 3 2 2 1 2 4 0 1 Y
stabilization of a nominal
budget balance. the rule is
described as a BBR and
not a DR because it refers
to ceilings to the net and
not gross debt.
1990 2008+ 0.23 3 2 2 0 2 2 0 3 Y 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
1999 2008+ Debt ceiling prior to 2006: 0.23 3 2 2 0 2 2 0 3 Y
20%.
2000 2008+ (1.10) Local and national 0.45 3 2 3 0 1 1 0 1 Y
CoA.
1996 2006 0.65 3 2 3 1 2 4 0 3 R 5.4 5.4 5.4
2007 2008+ 0.65 2 2 3 1 2 4 0 3 Y
2000 2006 1.00 2 2 3 1 1 1 0 3 R
2007 2008+ (1.11) IND: Fiscal Policy 1.00 2 2 3 1 1 1 0 2 Y
Council.
2000 2008+ (1.8) From 2000 to 2004. 1.00 2 2 2 1 2 1 0 1 Y
(1.13) Municipalities may
borrow for certain
purposes (to finance
housing construction,
water supplies, disposal
and treatment of waste
water) if the total level of
existing and anticipated
new debt exceeds 10% of
the revenues of the
previous year, provided
that the total payment of
principal and interest in an
individual year does not
exceed 3% of the
revenues.
1990 2008+ Already in force before 0.08 3 3 3 1 2 1 0 3 Y 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
1990. Amendments 1990,
1995, 1999, 2005, 2008.
Description refers to
present version. No info
about amendments.
2002 2008+ (1.6) Expenditure limits: 0.45 1 2 3 1 3 3 0 1 Y
15% (2002), 5% (2004),
1% (2005). (1.10), (1.11)
IND body: Supreme Audit
Office.
2002 2008+ (1.10) IND body: Supreme 0.13 3 2 3 1 2 1 0 1 Y
Audit Office.
1997 2008+ (1.10) IND body: National 1.00 3 2 3 0 2 3 1 3 Y 7.9 7.9
Audit Office. GS body:
Treasury. (1.12)
1997 2008+ (1.10) IND body: National 1.00 3 2 3 1 2 3 1 3 Y 8.4 8.4
Audit Office. GS body:
Treasury. (1.12) According
to the Code for Fiscal
Stability, GOV may depart
from its fiscal objectives
and operating rules
temporarily, provided that it
specifies: (a) reasons for
departing from previous
objectives and operating
rules; (b) approach and
period of time that GOV
intends to take to return to
the previous objectives
and rules; (c) objectives
and rules to apply over the
respective period.
ry. Then, in the second or third place a "0" separates the country identifier from the next figures providing additional information.
last digit stands for the version, 1 being the earliest (e.g. 27021 indicates: a) 27= UK; b) 2= second rule; c) 1= version one of this second rule).
to force in that year and those in force already before. In some cases, column 1.16 indicates earlier entry into
n the construction of the FRCI.
sults by the Commission services (DG Ecfin). See separate pdf note on the construction of the FRSI.
titutional coverage and the strength of fiscal rules into account)
er time (i.e. index taking into account both the coverage and the strength of the rule)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
4.5 4.5
5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1
4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8
0.9
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4
6.5 6.5 6.5
5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4
2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
3.2
0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7
5.7 5.7
5.737 5.737 5.737 5.737 5.737
3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
3.6 3.6
6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2
8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8
1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2
7.6 7.6 7.6
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
1.7 1.7
2.6 2.6
2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
2.2 2.2 2.2
2.9 2.9 2.9
1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
0.7
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
1.2 1.2 1.2
4.7 4.7
1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
0.3
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2.5 2.5
2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.8 0.8
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
4.7
4.7
2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
2.4 2.4 2.4
4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9
4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
4.2 4.2
8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
0.8 0.8
0.3 0.3
1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4
5.3 5.3
6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2
5.6 5.6
5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
3.050 3.050 3.050 3.050 3.050 3.050 3.050
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9
8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4
5.737 5.737 5.737 5.737 5.737 5.737 5.737 5.737 5.737
5.737
Standardised fiscal rules index
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
BE -0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.4
BG -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
CZ -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -1.0
DK -1.0 -1.0 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.8
DE 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
EE -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
IE -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.9 -0.9
EL -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
ES -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
FR -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
IT -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 -0.5 0.3
CY -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
LV -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LT -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
LU -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.5 1.5
HU -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
MT -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
NL -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
AT -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.2 0.2 0.3
PL -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
PT -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
RO -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
SI -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 0.4 0.4
SK -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
FI -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.2 1.2 1.2
SE -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.6 1.6
UK -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
-1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.8 1.8 1.8
-1.0 -1.0 -0.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
-0.9 -0.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
-1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
1.0 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.8
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5
-1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.7
1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
-0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.4 0.4
-1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.7 1.7 1.2
-0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5
-0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 0.9
1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4
2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
European Commission
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs
Unit C2
Abbreviations
EU Member States A Annual
AT Austria BA Budgetary accounting system
BE Belgium BBR Budget balance rule
BG Bulgaria BC Business cycle (multiannual)
CY Cyprus C Constitution
CZ Czech Republic CA Coalition agreement
DE Germany CC Coordination committee
DK Denmark CG Central government
EE Estonia CM Council of Ministers
EL Greece CO Council Opinion
ES Spain CoA Court of auditors
FI Finland DR Debt rule
FR France ER Expenditure rule
HU Hungary ESA ESA95 system of accounts
IE Ireland FC Fiscal Council
IT Italy FCRI Fiscal rule coverage index
LT Lithuania FRSI Fiscal rule strength index
LU Luxembourg GG General government (includes CG, RG,
LV Latvia LG, SS)
MT Malta GOV Government
NL Netherlands GS Governmental structure
PL Poland IND Independent
PT Portugal L Legal act
RO Romania LG Local government
SE Sweden M Multiannual
SI Slovenia MF Ministry of finance
SK Slovakia MIN Ministry/ministries
UK United Kingdom MTBF Medium-term budgetary framework
n/a Not applicable
NP National parliament
O Other
p.a. Per annum
PA Political agreement
PF Public finances
R Replaced
RG Regional government
RR Revenue rule
SCP Stability and Convergence Programme
SS Social security
. Answer missing
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