Who Gets Paid More Finance Majors or Accounting Majors

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					Rethinking the Structure of
 Accounting and Auditing
           Shyam Sunder
          Yale University
 Sixth International Conference of
IAARF, Kolkata, January 11, 2003
    Corporate Governance and the
          Agency Problem
• The Dutch and the British East India Companies
  chartered as joint stock companies four centuries
  ago to gather large amounts of capital for trade
  with the East
• The agency problem: money of some people
  managed by others risks shirking and malfeasance
• Recent major corporate failures highlight the
  imperfections of our governance system
• Rethink our system of corporate governance—
  especially accounting, and auditing
11/21/2010      Rethinking Accounting and Auditing    2
 Accounting and Audit Elements
 of the US Corporate Governance
• Accounting rules
• Organization to set accounting rules
• Audit requirement with oversight of audit
  quality
• Involvement of the board of directors in
  audit and financial reporting
• A fifth related element: executive
  compensation
11/21/2010    Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   3
             Accounting Rules
• The law requires publicly held corporations
  to prepare and publish financial reports
• Much of content of format is voluntary
• Law requires internal controls and
  accounting system
• Minimum standards of disclosure, detail,
  definitions, and measurement—collectively
  referred to as accounting rules
11/21/2010     Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   4
   Organization to Set Accounting
               Rules
• The statutory authority lies with the Securities and
  Exchange Commission (SEC)
• The SEC delegates the task to privately finance
  Financial Accounting Standards Board, retaining
  the right to overrule the Board
• All public corporations are required to comply
  with these accounting rules
• International Accounting Standards Board is
  knocking at the door—kept out so far

11/21/2010       Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   5
             The Audit Requirement
• SEC requires the publicly-held corporations to
  obtain a certificate from a CPA on fair
  representation of their financial performance and
  status
• Auditors held liable to shareholders and third
  parties for negligence in certification
• American Institute of CPAs‘ audit standards
• July 2002 law to set up a new oversight board

11/21/2010        Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   6
             Directors and Executive
                 Compensation
• New York Stock Exchange requires its listed
  companies to have a majority of the members of
  the board to be independent
• Audit and compensation committees must consist
  of independent directors
• Significant parts of executive compensation are
  made to be contingent on financial performance as
  measured by accounting and stock prices,
  especially stock options
11/21/2010        Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   7
             Accounting as a Natural
                   Language
• Generally accepted accounting principles as
  dominant paradigm in accounting till 1972
     –   Accounting as natural language
     –   Evolution by usage and consensus over time
     –   Multiplicity of meaning and words
     –   Flexibility and limitless variability
     –   Authority derives from acceptance not power
     –   No known natural language designed by man

11/21/2010          Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   8
 Accounting as Designed Artifact
• Designing rules through deliberation
• Replacement of suggestive nature of research
  bulletins and opinions by standards and the power
  to punish any deviations
• FASB: large budget, staff; no greater wisdom, less
  modesty in ability to devise better rules
• Multiple criteria without aggregation function
• Cost of capital missing as a criterion for rules
• Consultative process but monopoly deprived it of
  natural selection necessary for evolution
11/21/2010       Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   9
    Standards Become the Targets
• FASB and its standards became the excuse for
  auditors to abandon their judgment, CEOs to
  demand to see the rule, and for both to demand
  additional clarifications
• Bankers and managers, often with the help from
  auditors, devised transactions to go around the
  rules to frustrate their intent
• Given time and money, IASB rules will catch up
  with the FASB rules in their detail
11/21/2010      Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   10
The World Improvises on the US
            Model
• US model has been widely adopted, with
  adjustments, in various parts of the world
• IASB is the most important imitation
• A thick rulebook has come to be seen as a sign of
  advanced financial reporting system
• Standard setters have a difficult task
      – No obvious criteria, trade offs among criteria, and
         assessment of consequences of a given rule
      – Receive mostly self-serving advice
      – Monopoly makes it difficult to gather evidence from
         the field
11/21/2010             Rethinking Accounting and Auditing     11
         Standard Setting Approach
• Advantage: Like a fire brigade, the board stands
  ready to deploy its expert resources to promptly
  address any reporting abuses
• Disadvantages: cannot know the consequences of
  its proposed ―solutions‖
     – Difficult to anticipate the action-reaction sequence and
       the ultimate result
     – Poor correspondence between the intent and the
       consequences
     – Game theoretic analyses of motives, options and
       strategies is precluded by its public unacceptability
11/21/2010           Rethinking Accounting and Auditing       12
             Permanent Rule Making
                 Establishments
• Encourage managers and auditors to demand more
  clarifications, instead of exercising their best
  judgment
• No rational basis for denying clarifications
• A permanent establishment needs demands for
  clarifications, or go out of business
• Judgment about the overall fairness gets buried under
  the weight of compliance with the letter of detailed
  rules
• No permanent establishment can promote rules over
  principles
11/21/2010        Rethinking Accounting and Auditing      13
      GAAP Regime is Hard Work
• Developing and sustaining GAAP requires
  judgment and discipline from managers,
  accountants, bankers, lawyers, analysts, etc.
• It requires creativity, living with uncertainty
• Respect for judgment and expertise, not authority
• Natural languages are unmatched as means of
  communication
• Comparison with common law vs. statutory law

11/21/2010       Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   14
             Common Law Approach
• Development in England through custom,
  acceptance and judicial precedent
• From people, not experts
• Their force arises from usage
• Progressive replacement of common law by
  statutory thinking in financial reporting
• Time to reconsider the merits of common
  elements
• Would introduction of limited competition among
  alternative sets of accounting rules help?
11/21/2010        Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   15
             Audit Requirement
• Legal requirement to get the financial
  reports certified by an independent auditor
• The audit franchise granted exclusively to
  the members of AICPA
• Many corporations furnished audited
  financial reports before audit was required
• Does the legal requirement create a better
  informed market, or better managed firm?
11/21/2010      Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   16
               Voluntary Audit
• Benefits: convincing the shareholders, creditors and
  tax collector of the reliability of representations made
  in financial reports
• Costs: auditor fee, managerial cooperation, potential
  modifications in reports, even embarrassment,
  constraints of behavior
• Managers and directors commissioned audits when
  advantages outweighed the costs
• Voluntary audit is a valuable signal to outsiders
• Contrary to its intent, statutory requirement shuts this
  signal off, thus leaving the outsiders less informed
11/21/2010         Rethinking Accounting and Auditing    17
             Auditor Independence
• Recent attention on the infringement of consulting on
  audit independence
• Major audit firms have been forced to divest
  themselves of their consulting operations
• But audit revenues also raise similar questions about
  auditor independence
• Alternatives: audits by federal or state governments or
  stock exchanges, competition among states or
  exchanges
• Firms choose to be incorporated/listed as an audited or
  unaudited corporation, letting shareholders discount
11/21/2010        Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   18
Independence and Competition in
       the Audit Industry
• 1970s: intense scrutiny of competition
• Insufficient appreciation of links between
  competition and independence responsible for at
  least some of the recent problems
• Two levels of analysis of their relationship
• At one level, a mechanical relationship
     – A small number of larger firms are more independent
       and less competitive
     – A larger number of small firms are more competitive
       but less independent of their clients
11/21/2010          Rethinking Accounting and Auditing       19
             On Way to Pursuit of
                Competition
• After a quarter century long pursuit of
  competition, the US audit industry is down
  to only four major firms and weaker
  competition, and questionable independence
• How did this come about?



11/21/2010       Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   20
         A Thumbnail Sketch of the
                Collapse
• Ninety years of antitrust laws and
  enforcement
• These laws were not applied to the
  professions—including doctors, lawyers,
  accountants, and dentists
• They kept anticompetitive clauses in the
  ―Code of Ethics‖ of their respective
  professions

11/21/2010      Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   21
       Professional Codes of Ethics
• No advertising
• No solicitation of competitors‘ clients or
  customers
• No solicitation of employees of competitors
• Most professions justified such clauses in
  their rules of membership on the basis that
  they are necessary for ―professional‖
  behavior
11/21/2010     Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   22
    Economics of Restrictions on
     Professional Competition
• There were substantive economic arguments to
  justify restrictions of professional competition
      – Quality of professional services difficult to see
      – Customer/client depends on seller‘s recommendation
         about what he/she should buy
      – Professional must incur time/effort to find out what the
         customer/client needs, must charge for it
      – Markets for professional services are prone to failure
         under free competition
      – Market for lemons (Ackerlof)—results would be even
         worse than the consequences of insufficient
         competition Rethinking Accounting and Auditing
11/21/2010                                                      23
        Theory Makes a Difference
• Economic arguments for deregulation
• Stigler: robustness of competition paper
• Answer to the ―market for lemons‖: the
  reputation effect as a counter to the lemons
  phenomenon
• Focus on economic efficiency of the system


11/21/2010     Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   24
             Status Quo Till 1977
• This was the status quo of competition in markets
  for various kinds of professional services in U.S.
  until the mid-seventies
• Then came a decision from the U.S. Supreme
  Court
• In 1977: U.S. Supreme Court ruling on Bates v.
  State Bar of Arizona, held that the restrictions on
  lawyer advertising violated the protections given
  free speech under the First Amendment to the US
  Constitution
11/21/2010       Rethinking Accounting and Auditing     25
             Change in US Policy
• The Supreme Court decision led to a change in the
  U.S. government policy on professional
  competition
• Under pressure from the Department of Justice
  and the Federal Trade Commission, most
  professional associations, including the American
  Institute of CPAs deleted the anticompetitive
  provisions from their codes of ethics by the end of
  the seventies
11/21/2010       Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   26
  Good Intentions, Bad Decisions
• The intent behind this change in the government policy (and the
  Supreme Court decision) had been to obtain for the public the
  presumed benefits of competition among professions
• The Court accepted the argument that, the risks of failure in the
  market for professional services are adequately counterbalanced
  by the tendency of the professionals to develop a reputation for
  the quality of services they provide
• Over time, customer and clients learn about the reputation of the
  professionals, as the basis of those they choose to patronize
• Reputation prevents market failure


11/21/2010            Rethinking Accounting and Auditing         27
             Does Reputation Work?
• In the case of doctors, at least the patient (or his
  family) know, after the treatment, whether the patient
  got better (even survived)
• In the case of lawyers, at least the client knows, after
  the trial, whether the case was won or lost
• These ex post observations are reasonably prompt and
  have at least a proximate correlation with performance
  They enable the doctors/lawyers to develop a more or
  less precise reputation with their patients/clients that
  serve as the basis of their own (and their
  acquaintances‘ future decisions)
11/21/2010         Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   28
      Generalizability to Auditors?
• Unfortunately, this argument, applicable to
  lawyers and doctors and many other professionals,
  does not work for the auditors
• The auditors‘ customers—the shareholders and
  other third parties—cannot tell, even after the fact,
  if the auditor provided quality services for three
  reasons:
     – The rate of audit failure is less than 1 percent
     – The customers never see the auditor do their work
     – Firm‘s decisions on hiring the auditor are made by
       managers who are the subject of the audit
11/21/2010           Rethinking Accounting and Auditing     29
              The Fatal Flaw
• Application of the reputation argument as the
  justification for competition in the market for
  auditing was fatally flawed
• With very low failure rate, and absence of direct
  contact and observability by the customers, it is
  not possible for auditors to develop meaningful,
  and accurate reputation with the shareholders in
  any reasonable length of time
• Under the pressure of free competition, the market
  for auditing broke down—a market for lemons
11/21/2010       Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   30
             Audit Market Breakdown
• Clients actively played audit firms against one
  another to lower their audit fees
• The amount and quality of the work done by
  the auditors was not observable to the clients
• Competition for audit services would not
  sustain a price to make auditing self-
  supporting
• Auditors responded by a new business model
  to survive in this cut rate environment
11/21/2010        Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   31
Revised Business Model of Audit
             Firms
• Aggressive pricing of audit services
• Cut labor intensive substantive testing, and replace
  it by cheaper analytical reviews
• Use audit service as ―foot in the clients‘ door,‖ to
  sell consulting services
• Share consulting revenue with audit partners
• Use consulting revenue to pay for any additional
  audit liability coverage arising from reduced
  substantive testing
• Reduce the pay for fresh graduates
11/21/2010       Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   32
11/21/2010   Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   33
11/21/2010   Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   34
 Consulting: A Consequence, Not
      the Cause of Failure
• In the debate on consulting services over the
  past decade, they have often been portrayed
  as the cause of failure of audit market by
  depriving auditors of their independence
• Instead, auditors turned to consulting
  services to earn a living when they found
  that they could not do so from audit services

11/21/2010     Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   35
              Large Liabilities
• The strategy of de-emphasizing substantive testing
  led to some spectacular audit failures, especially in
  the savings and loan banking industry in the mid-
  eighties
• Audit firms paid large court judgments or out-of-
  court settlements
• Drop in number and quality of students going into
  accounting majors
• Mid-course correction was needed to restore
  profitability
11/21/2010        Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   36
Number of Settlements of Claims
      Against Auditors
                                   Frequency by Time Period
             300

             250
             200

             150

             100
              50

               0
                   1960-1964 1965-1969   1970-1974   1975-1979   1980-1984   1985-1989   1990-1995   Unknown

                                                     Time Period




11/21/2010                           Rethinking Accounting and Auditing                                        37
 Amounts of Settlements Against
           Auditors
                                                   Total Amount of Settlements
             Amount of Settlements




                                     500,000,000
                                     400,000,000
                                     300,000,000
                                                                                        Total
                                     200,000,000
                                     100,000,000
                                              0
                                               67

                                               72

                                               75

                                               78

                                               81

                                               84

                                               87

                                               90

                                               93

                                               96
                                            19

                                            19

                                            19

                                            19

                                            19

                                            19

                                            19

                                            19

                                            19

                                            19
                                                                       Year



11/21/2010                                         Rethinking Accounting and Auditing           38
             Joint and Several versus
              Proportional Liability
• The auditor liability had been joint and several; if
  other defendants could not pay, auditors had to
  pay their share
• A political strategy to change the law to
  proportional liability
• Financing of elections as the lawyers and doctors
  had done for many years to advance their interests
• Payoff: Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,
  1995

11/21/2010         Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   39
     Accountants‘ Contributions to
         Political Campaigns




11/21/2010   Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   40
     Accountants‘ Contributions to
         Political Campaigns




11/21/2010   Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   41
           Accountants‘ Contributions to
               Political Campaigns
                           Contributi                   Soft           Donatio   Donation   %
Electi          Total                   Contributi                                               % to
         Ran                ons from                   Money            ns to      s to     to
 on            Contribut                ons from                                                 Rep
          k†               Individual                 Contributi       Democr    Republic   De
Cycle            ions                    PACs                                                     ub
2002                           s                        ons              ats       ans      m
                                                                                            27
         27                                                                                      72%
  *                 $7,8        $2,2          $3,3           $2,2         $2,1       $5,6   %
                                                                                            39
2000     28                                                                          $8,9        61%
                   $14,8        $7,0          $5,1           $2,6         $5,7              %
                                                                                            39
1998     26                     $3,4                                                             61%
                    $9,4                      $4,5           $1,4         $3,6       $5,7   %
                                                                                            41
1996     21                                                                          $6,5        59%
                   $11,2        $5,0          $4,7           $1,5         $4,6              %
                                                                                            50
1994     23         $6,9                                     $0.6                                49%
                                $2,6          $3,6                        $3,4       $3,4   %
                                                                                            54
1992     29                                                               $3,3       $2,9        46%
                    $6,3        $3,2          $2,4           $0.5                           %
                                                                                            50
1990     27                                   $1,7            N/A         $1,5       $1,5        50%
                    $3,1        $1,3                                                        %
                                                                                            41
        27
Total 11/21/2010                             $25,6
                                  Rethinking Accounting and Auditing                        42   58%
                   $59,7       $24,9                         $9,0        $24,5      $34,8   %
                1995 Legislation
• For auditors: switch from joint and several to
  proportional liability
     – Reduced and less uncertain liability
• For corporate management: forward looking
  statements under safe harbor rule
     – Freedom to issue unverified (unverifiable) information
       in financial statements as long as it was marked forward
       looking
• The only instance during Clinton‘s eight year
  presidency when his veto was overturned by the
  Congress (election financing)
11/21/2010           Rethinking Accounting and Auditing      43
              New Business Model
• The 1995 legislation, with a 1994 Court ruling exempting
  advisors from liability for aiding and abetting securities
  fraud, implemented the new business model of auditors
     – Key elements: intense competition, low audit fees to get in, fast
       growing high margin consulting business for profits
• Audits discarded in favor of ―assurance services‖
• Audit partners pressured to sell consulting services
     – Many old time auditors quit, instead of selling consulting
• Internal reorganization of power and responsibilities
     – E.g., Arthur Andersen transferred the final authority on accounting
       matters from headquarters specialists to the local partners

11/21/2010               Rethinking Accounting and Auditing                44
                 The Happy Days
• In 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission saw the
  adverse consequences, but wrongly identified consulting
  services as the culprit, and tried to stop consulting
• Audit industry beat back the effort with political help from
  the Congress (settled for disclosure of consulting fees)
• Extensive failures of corporate audits are the results of this
  25-year chain of events
• Auditors had become the perpetrators, the short term
  beneficiaries and ultimately the victims of the dotcom
  bubble
• The well meaning government policy to encourage
                   the industry pushed
    competition in Rethinking Accounting and Auditing it to collapse 45
11/21/2010
             Executive Compensation
• Aligning the interests of managers with the interests of
  shareholders is a fundamental challenge of corporate
  governance
• Since managerial contributions to the firm cannot be
  observed, and managers control the resources and
  information of the firm, there is ever-present moral hazard
• Accounting reports were designed to measure corporate
  performance to evaluate managers—contingent rewards
• But accounting measures have well-known weaknesses
• Solution: use market-based measures
11/21/2010          Rethinking Accounting and Auditing      46
      Assumptions Behind Market-
         Based Compensation
• Markets are efficient (not subject to manipulation
  by managers)
     – In spite of the support it enjoys in accounting academia,
       the assumption is false
• Financial reports are hard, based on unique
  accounting standards and incorruptible auditing
     – Again, a false assumption
• Governance mechanism to grant equity-based
  compensation is beyond manipulation
     – Yet another false assumption
11/21/2010           Rethinking Accounting and Auditing       47
           How Did Executive
           Compensation Soar?
• Director‘s compensation committees controlled by
    executives
• Annual survey techniques of executive
    compensation consulting firms
• Flexible accounting standards (not bad with
    vigilant analysts and investors)
• Auditor under pressure, controlled by managers
• Highly leveraged options, one-sided
• Skewed accounting for stock options
• Result: top to bottomAccounting changed from 40 to 500
11/21/2010          Rethinking
                               ratio and Auditing      48
             Incentives to Manipulate
• With increased compensation, and increased
  dependence of compensation on accounting and
  market measures, incentives to manipulate
  accounting and stock prices rose
• If the governance, accounting and auditing were
  rock solid links, it would not matter
• But they are not beyond manipulation
• Attempts to better align manager and shareholder
  interests also resulted in more manipulation by
  managers
11/21/2010         Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   49
             Accounting Standards
• Uniformity and comparability of accounting
  standards has become sacred
• Monopoly of standards in U.S. and many other
  jurisdictions
• Elimination of signaling function of accounting in
  a world of flexible standards
• Standardized financial reports give more
  information in one sense, but less information in
  another

11/21/2010       Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   50
    Perspective on Events of 2002
• We can choose to view the events of 2002 as bad
  behavior by some individual managers, auditors,
  directors, lawyers, investment bankers, bankers,
  politicians, etc.
• Alternatively, we can see them as a chain a related
  events, arising from bad policy
• We pushed competition into a market that is not
  able to sustain competition because of ex ante or
  ex post unobservability of the quality of service
  provided
11/21/2010       Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   51
             What Are We Doing?
• Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002:
     – Creates a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
       (there is little reason to think that this regulatory body
       would not, over time, be captured by the industry it is
       supposed to regulate)
     – Prohibits auditors from providing certain non-audit
       services to their audit clients (the Act incorrectly
       assumes that such services were the cause, not the
       consequence, of audit market failure)
     – Requires audit partner rotation every five years (will
       rotated partners be more or less vigilant? Collusive?)

11/21/2010            Rethinking Accounting and Auditing       52
             Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002
• Auditor reports to the audit committee
• Audit committee of independent directors
  with at least one expert
• Corporate responsibility for financial
  reports
• Forfeiture of bonuses/profits
• Disclosures of adjustments, OBSF, SPE
• Personal loans to executives
11/21/2010         Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   53
                The New Act
• Disclosure of trades within 2 days (why not
  advance notice of one week?)
• Conflict of interest rules for financial analysts
• Increased appropriations for SEC
• Minimum standards for attorneys
• Audit work papers for 5 years
• Whistle blower protection
• White collar crime penalty enhancements
• SEC: annual and quarterly reports in 60-45 days
11/21/2010       Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   54
   Effectiveness of New Measures
• It is doubtful if any of these measures, aside
  from the promise of adequate staffing of
  SEC and enforcement of existing laws, will
  have any significant impact on the auditing
  and accounting problems
• These ‗fixes‖ do not deal with the root
  causes
• What are the root causes?

11/21/2010     Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   55
             Areas of Concern
• Financial reporting standards: monopoly versus
  competition
• Market for audit services: breakdown under
  pressure of competition
• Insurance approach to audit market
• Corporate governance and qualifications of
  directors
• Control principle: choose rules to bring expected
  behavior in line with self interest

11/21/2010       Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   56
    Financial Reporting Standards
• U.S. monopoly of FASB, spreading to
  Europe and elsewhere
• Difficulty of assessing what is a good rule
• Cost of capital criterion
• Use market competition among standards to
  determine which rules lower the cost of
  capital of the firm empirically

11/21/2010    Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   57
         Regulatory Competition in
            Accounting Rules
• Each jurisdiction permits two or three sets of
  accounting standards
• Each firm chooses one set of standards
• Pays a fee to the standard-setting body
• Standard setting bodies compete like the stock
  exchanges, university accreditation, and appliance
  certification bodies do
• Will result in better standards which will lower the
  cost of capital

11/21/2010       Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   58
             Market for Audit Services
• Cannot bear the burden of full competition
• Choose one of two solutions
     – Allow auditors relief from antitrust laws (no
       advertising, solicitation, etc.; politically
       difficult
     – Combine audit and insurance into one packet



11/21/2010         Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   59
             An Insurance Solution
• Each public firm is free to buy (or not buy) any
  amount of financial misrepresentation insurance,
  and indicate the amount of coverage bought in its
  report
• The insurer examines the financial reports and
  charges a premium
• The firm adjusts how much insurance to buy
• Investors adjust how they process the information
  based on how much insurance is provided

11/21/2010        Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   60
   Pros and Cons of the Insurance
             Solution
• Quality of audit services internalized by the
  insurance firm
• No external regulation necessary to monitor audit
  quality which is difficult anyway
• Will need an accounting court to settle insurance
  claims—whether the financial reports made a fair
  representation
• Audit will be driven by economic, not regulatory
  considerations

11/21/2010       Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   61
         Corporate Governance and
                 Directors
• Recent emphasis on independence
• Also need competence, industry knowledge,
  contacts, and management‘s trust
• Criteria are often in conflict with one
  another
• How do we find directors who will have all
  these qualifications
• College professors? Unfortunately not
11/21/2010     Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   62
             Minority Directors
• Instead of framing it as a problem of
  independence, frame it as directors to represent the
  minority shareholders
• Have separate slate selected only by the minority
  holders
• More nominations than slots to make it a real
  election
• Better information to shareholders about the
  behavior of directors when they serve on the board

11/21/2010       Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   63
             Executive Compensation
• Giving incentives to corporate managers to work
  hard, and aligning their incentives with
  shareholders does not come for free
• It has its own cost
• Agency theory: we can only get a second best
  solution, not the first best solutions
• Scale back on incentives towards more fixed pay
• Fire those who do not measure up

11/21/2010        Rethinking Accounting and Auditing   64
                        Summary
• The recent collapse of accounting and auditing requires careful
  analysis of root causes
• Bad people or bad policies?
• Need to think of alternative solutions, e.g.,
   – Competition for accounting standards
   – Reduce competition in audit market or bundle with insurance
   – Minority directors with real elections and better information
     for shareholders about directors
   – Scale back on performance-contingent managerial
     compensation
• Think of even better alternative approaches

11/21/2010           Rethinking Accounting and Auditing         65
          Thank You

http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/sun
          der/research.html
       Shyam.sunder@yale.edu

				
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Description: Who Gets Paid More Finance Majors or Accounting Majors document sample