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					  Electoral Intimidation & Violence
       in Ghana and Newark:
Can we define, measure, and explain
 patterns across different systems?

                     Megan Reif

Charles & Kathleen Manatt Democracy Studies Fellow, IFES
          Ph.D. Candidate, University of Michigan
                 Thursday, September 29
                                          Acknowledgements

      For rich resources, ideas, information,
  institutional and individual expertise, support,
         conversation, networking, advice,
    collaboration,… friendship… THANK YOU!
                              With special thanks
                                        to
                             Charles & Kathleen Manatt
(All errors are mine and in no way reflect on the excellent work of IFES. To ensure accuracy and protect respondents in
                                           Newark, please cite only with permission.)
                  Presentation Objectives


•   Test a critical assumption of the proposed long-term
    dissertation research with available data
•   Identify practical issues of definition and measurement
    necessary to refine theory and implement research
    design
•   Solicit feedback on the validity of cross-
    cultural/contextual, cross-level comparison (local versus
    national election) and what we might learn from it
•   Compare legal contexts to begin to explore possible
    effects of institutional environment on violence
                Methodology and Limitations

Methodology
   – Developed tentative propositions and assumptions from (limited)
     secondary and case study literatures and election observation in
     Indonesia (03-04)
   – Coded incidents from Newark interviews and media; coding of
     media incidents in Ghana; entry of IFES monitor incidents in Ghana
     (interpreting and seeing how other interpreted events) (IFES)
   – Informal interviews with victims and perpetrators of electoral
     intimidation in Newark, NJ
   – Exploration of Newark, Ghana, and Iraq incidents
Limitations
   - Case selection not designed to test theory
   - Deductive inferences
   - Incident data limited in time and space; cannot test potential
     explanations involving institutional change
   - Data not recoded for intensity scale and index creation
                             Critical Assumption


Election Violence is STRATEGIC, aimed at:
(1) Winning (gaining or retaining power and/or
    resources)
(2) Protesting or signaling unfairness / seeking
    reform of unfair systems
    “It is when an electoral process is perceived as unfair, unresponsive, or corrupt, that
    its political legitimacy is compromised and stakeholders are motivated to go outside
    the established norms to achieve their objectives” (Fischer 2002, 2).

(3) Discrediting or ending democracy as a system
    of government (insurgency)
(4) Reciprocal / Escalatory (tit-for-tat or defensive
    response to coercive tactics by opponent)
                                Non-Strategic Conceptions of
                                     Election Violence

  Possible Explanation                   Empirical Expectation              Implied Intervention
Symptomatic: Manifestation of          Occurs where there is regular    Resolve ethnic, cleavage conflict
   „primordial‟ or personal            conflict around social            Law enforcement
   conflicts, played out during        cleavages                         Create a political, economic, and
   critical events like elections     Actors involved same as those       electoral system that addresses
                                       in underlying conflict              underlying grievances
                                      Elections foment conflict
Expressive: Spontaneous,              Violence random with respect        Civic education
   epiphenomenal manifestation         location in space and time          Law Enforcement
   of passionately held                                                    Public service announcements
   attachments                                                             Party control of supporters/
                                                                            codes of conduct
Criminality/Greed: Criminal           Actors are criminals              Law enforcement
   acts taking advantage of           Occurs in high crime areas or
   chaos of an election and             areas of wealth, irrespective
   diversion of security resources      of electoral competitiveness

Epiphenomenal: Violence in            Violence random with respect      Law enforcement
   queues, frustration associated       location in space and time       Restrictions on alcohol
   with crowds, celebrations,         Violence in poor or high
   drunkenness (e.g. Ghana              population areas
   crowds, insufficient police)
                Assumption of Strategic Motives
                          Politicians...
• Seek to obtain or retain power and resources
• Have a menu of electoral strategies at their disposal
• View coercion as a costly substitute for non-violent electoral
  strategies because it risks:
       - Reputational costs/loss of legitimate supporters
       (even dictators seek legitimacy)
       - Prosecution and punishment
       - Higher probability of detection than fraud (DOJ)
       - Lower certainty of achieving desired outcomes
• Yet Fischer (2002) and IFES experience demonstrates that
  electoral violence is important, even when rare.
    “People don‟t think they sit
around a conference room table
 and plan these things [electoral
intimidation and violence]. They
  do. They know exactly what
         they are doing.”

 - 2004 Candidate for Newark Board of
              Elections
                   Motivating Questions


Given the costs of coercion, under what
 circumstances do politicians choose
 coercive electoral strategies when and
 where they do?
 Different answers imply different strategies for
 measurement and interpretation of violence, as well as
 intervention, and conflict resolution.


 Are the answers the same across contexts?
 Tentative Empirical Expectations of Strategic Conception of Violence
             Variables                       Illustrative Expectation               Implied Intervention

High Stakes: (a) “Office that            Election violence likely where      Impose reputational costs
    Matters”; (b) Resources/levers        office control of policy and        Reduce personal stakes of
    of power; (c) Probability of          resources high (legal & illegal)     office
    Win/Loss (Competitiveness),          Violence likely in close            Term limits
    (d) Sudden appearance of              districts/races                     Reduce patronage, limit
    viable challengers (e) Partisan      Violence increases with viable       state/city employment
    public goods                          challengers
    provision/patronage
Institutions:                            Change in fraud, suffrage, or       Electoral system change
(a)    Means:                             ballot secrecy enforcement may      Enforce institutional laws
       Administrative/enforcement         increase violence                    against violence
       quality (opportunity for fraud    Election day violence occurs in     Monitor entire process
       & nonviolence);                    FPTP systems                        Improve clarity of complaint
(b)    Selection:                        Pre-Election violence occurs in      procedure
       Location of SELECTION vs.          PR systems                          Assess how intimidation
       ELECTION (suggests time           PR, Party List, Coalition            affects outcomes and create
       in process to monitor)             systems more prone to                electoral remedies for
(c)    Information & Uncertainty          candidate-on-candidate               intimidation
       (1) Pr(violence)=desired           violence than voter violence
       outcome                           SNTV, non-partisan, weak
       (2) Party ideology offers          party systems more likely to
       clear choice to voters             be personalistic, vindictive
Exclusion/Fairness: Parties                Banned parties victims or         Improve inclusion, suffrage,
    excluded or wronged by unfair           perpetrators of violence           voter registration
    practices use violence
        Challenge of Defining and Mitigating
          Election Violence: Coercion and
         Fraud involve Creative Innovation

• If politicians substitute and combine
  tactics, will addressing one type of
  electoral manipulation or changing
  aspects of the electoral process lead to
  substitution with another tactic?

     [Examples: Costa Rica, Indonesia, Newark]
“Having been thwarted by increasingly
  sophisticated and better organized
  election machinery, they could turn
   to violence to achieve their ends.”

- Danville Walker, Director of Elections, Jamaica,
     November 10, 2002 (quoted in Jamaica
                     Observer)
  Substituting Means of Electoral Manipulation in Costa Rica
                         (1901 – 46)

                                                                                                              Modern
                                                                                                              Electoral
                                                                                                              Code
                                                                                      Nonviolent methods
                                                                      Secret          Coercive methods
                                                                      Ballot

                                                                                               Mandatory
                                                                                               Turnout
                                                                                               Laws




 Similar patterns in Egypt, 19th-century Kentucky, Kansas City, U.S. South
Molina, Iván and Fabrice Edouard Lehoucq. 1999. "Political Competition and Electoral Fraud: A Latin American Case Study."
Journal of Interdisciplinary History 30: 228.
    The Sultan’s Curse




Face Buying:
             United States

• Anonymous welfare and debt
  mailings to voters; newly covered
  under mail fraud laws
• Fake police officers in Hispanic
  areas in the Southwest
                        Newark


Even violence that appear spontaneous may
 be orchestrated:
• Newark Booker Campaign Incident Log:
      “District 48: Sharpe had 15-20 people
      outside; -- Send Visibility”
• Incitement / Provocation and Response
      [2005 Incident at Pennington Court
      designed to show candidate‟s toughness]
      Defining Coercion, continued

• Where does nonviolence end and violence
  begin?
       [Newark code enforcers (film clip)]
• How proximate to the election does an event
  have to be to “count” as election-related?
       Newark Mayor vetoed committed             funds for
  social service group as punishment for support of
  opposition 1 month after election;birthday party fundraising
  occurs annually. Wilkinson (2004) argues that parties are
  always campaigning in India and use ethnic violence to
  play on fears.
      Exploratory Assessment of
        Preliminary Hunches:
Data, Qualitative Interviews, Glance at
          Legal Frameworks
       Exploratory Research: Newark

• Identified incidents from any Star Ledger
  article pertaining to elections from date of
  Booker‟s candidacy to inauguration date
• Identified 50+ potential respondents
• Interviewed ~25 people, including former
  James employees and “intimidators” who have
  defected to the other side
• Identified 38 incidents of coercion, combining
  media reports and campaign legal notes
       Exploratory Research: Newark
• High Stakes for Incumbent Sharpe James
  - “Resource Curse” of Port Authority revenue and
  opportunities for patronage (Newark collects only 83%
  of taxes; most city residents are employed by City
  Hall)
  - Highest paid official in New Jersey, paid more than
  any Governor and the VP
  - “Double Dipping” and shaping rules of the game as
  State Senator
  - Highest murder rate, one of poorest cities in the most
  affluent U.S. State
• Faced first viable challenger in 2002
• Employees/dependents faced job loss, campaign
  reform under Booker
            Sharpe’s Bundle of Strategies Prior
                        to 2002

• City employees compelled to finance incumbent campaign
  (b-day tix)
• Transfer or termination of anyone who supports opposition
  council members or mayoral challengers (Dana Rone
  family members)
• Delivers votes to county, state, and national Democrats in
  return for favorable laws, lax enforcement in return (sign
  ordinances)
• Reputation for having “eyes and ears everywhere” deters
  criticism and competition (Healey Invitation)
• Coopts enemies with lucrative contracts or city jobs
• Pendergast-style largess (Turkeys and Patronage)
  cultivates loyalty (voters like Sharpe‟s goodies better)
        Sharpe’s Nonviolent Levers


•   City Code enforcement
•   Union contract negotiation
•   Developer contracts
•   City employees (police, etc.)
•   Housing Authority
•   Authorization of Federal Block Grants
•   Large sums of unregulated revenue
•   Year-round campaigning & fundraising getting or
    delivering votes up the chain (“Campaigning is a
    year-round job around here”)
             Sharpe’s Desperation in 2002:
           Employing Election Violence can be
             a POSITIVE Sign of Increasing
                 Electoral Competition
• Presence of viable, well-funded opponent leads to more
  open criticism and opposition, whereas 1998 Challenger
  Mildred Crump told reporters people were “terrified” to
  support her.
• Polls show James losing support in South Ward
• James hires consultants, conducts polls, and uses media
  advertising for the first time
• Using uniformed and off-duty police to intimidate, vandalize,
  and restrict opponents‟ movement
• Hiring out-of-town street power
• Alleged employment of gangs
• Race-baiting, incitement and hate speech
• Escalation of economic coercion
           Data Exploration of Non-Strategic
                     Explanations


H: Violence is Merely Symptomatic of Ethnic Cleavages:
• Booker Lawyers emphasized civil rights threat
  against Hispanics to invite Federal oversight, but
  the data pattern suggests James conceded
  Hispanic areas and intimidated in his stronghold.
• Interviews suggest people believe it is easy for
  leaders to abuse their own and get away with it
• A hotly-contested election turned a non-partisan,
  all-African American race into a racial conflict, not
  the other way around (See also Wilkinson 2004 on
  India).
              Data Exploration of Non-Strategic
                  Explanations, continued


H: Intimidation/Violence is Expressive of Passionate Supporters
• Strategic presence of mobs/crowds hired from Philadelphia
• Interviews suggesting crowd presence deters voting
  because race has been won; compels voting because
  voters assume their choice will be found out; or convinces
  voters to vote for the side that will win
• Cluster of incidents is non-random
• Incidents cluster around GOTV operations & high turnout
  “Newark is Gangs of New York…Tammany Hall”
       -- leader of Union punished for backing Booker
              Data Exploration of Non-Strategic
                  Explanations, continued


H: Violence is Associated with Crime
• Some evidence to support gang involvement on election
  day, but strategic not criminal involvement (“When you
  have the same drug dealers & criminals who instill fear in
  the housing projects suddenly wearing James shirts at the
  polls, you can imagine what people will do” – Booker
  lawyer)
• Interviewees suggest that low education and income level
  makes people vulnerable to manipulation and willing to
  commit or ignore crime
• DOJ: Election crimes as indicators of other corrupt activity
  – Corrupt leaders‟ fear of losing office
        Data Exploration of Strategic
                Exploration

• Timing of Intimidation Seems Strategic
  1. Shift from pre-election deterrence of financial
  and volunteer support to opponent to…
  2. GOTV operations on Election Day (seem to be
  associated with increasing support for James
  from 1998-2002)
  3. Retribution against opponents‟ supporters
  when levers of punishment become available.

      (NCC; Major McGreevey Donor)
                                       Post-Election: Directed toward INSTITUTIONS/Don




                                             Pre-Election Directed to Deterring
                                             Opposing Candidate & Supporters



Election Day: Directed toward VOTERS
      Data Exploration of Strategic
              Exploration


• Location Seems Strategic
  1. Clusters
 2. East Ward was considered up for
 grabs, but any new turnout would go to
 Booker
 3. Polls showed James weakest in South
 and East in 9/2001, yet he won them
                 Practical Considerations for
             Definition, Measurement, Inference

• Number and location of incidents do not reflect level of intimidation
  because of combination of polling stations in key locations (higher
  number of districts affected than map indicates);
• How would we know if intimidation influences the outcome? (Booker
  interviewees mixed on whether election was stolen or not;
  unprecedented 4,000 votes in S. Ward)
• How do we characterize:
  - electricity outages in polling stations
  - rumors of Election Board machine tampering,
  - Union contract negotiation delays
  - Arena threat,
  - Strip club incident
  - legal harassment (parking tickets, 22 sign injunctions ($1000 ea)
• Rumored verses verifiable incidents? (researcher versus
  practitioner)
              Methodological Considerations

• Choice of Sources:
   – Allegations (Lehoucq and Molina 2002)
   – Legal investigation (DOJ reported receiving over 100 incidents,
      with other organizations receiving more calls) (motives?)
   – Media Reports (Media & Culture in U.S. versus Ghana)
      * Acceptability of “rough and tumble” politics
        “Politics is war and I‟m ready to fight….I‟ve got a Ph.D.
        too, a Ph.D. in street politics....I rule the street operations.”
                 -- Newark ward operations strongman
      * American complacency about what does and does not happen
      in U.S.
      * American tendency to report same incident with every new
      story and to summarize general trends (not conducive to the
      “who did what to whom where” data collection format typical of
      political science
   - Different legality for incidents (lack of a sense of outrage)
“The factual truth of the allegations
[of intimidation and violence] is not
 what matters, but the perception
that they are widespread and could
           happen to you.”
  - Interview with professor forced to resign a major
university position because of his criticism of Newark’s
              City Hall economic policies
                    Ghana

• Coded narratives and forms of IFES
  monitors in Ghana’s 2004 General Election
  (54 Incidents, ~6 of questionable relation
  to election and/or insufficient information)
• Supplemented with Daily Media Monitoring
  of paper known for lack of bias, Ghanaian
  Chronicle, from Registration Date to
  Inauguration Date (additional 16 incidents,
  though general reports of intimidation
  could not be included)
   Methodological Issues Raised by
          Ghana Incidents

• Rolling primaries
• Accusations and statements
  against violence
• Coup Hoax
• General Reports
• Photography, surveillance
       Rationale for Comparison

• Approximately 20% unemployment in each
  case (leaving out Port Authority
  employment in Newark)
• Newark Poverty Rate of 26%
• Incumbent with 20-36 Years in Power
• Centralized control of state apparatus and
  security forces
• Although local, Electoral Systems are
  uniform only at the city level for municipal
  and county for state/federal elections in
  New Jersey
                Ghana Incident Exploration

Cross Tabulation of Timing and Nature of Incidents of Election Violence
                     Ghana 2004 General Election
                            (Row Percentages)

                Intraparty    Interparty      Other           Total

Pre-Election
                 17 (47%)     20 (43%)       9 (20%)           46
   Incidents

Election Day     3 (15%)       7 (35%)       10 (50%)          20


Post-Election    1 (16%)       3 (50%)       2 (33%)            6


    Total           21           30             21             72
   Perpetrators and Victims of Electoral Coercion in
                    Newark & Ghana
 (Column Percentages: Multiple Perpetrator Categories Mean Total Exceeds Total Incidents,
     Column Percentage indicates Percentage of Incidents Involving Type of Actor or Event)


                                           Newark                         Ghana

Perpetrators                          N             Col %             N           Col %

Mutual Perpetrators                   0             0.00             17                0.18

Leader Perpetrator                    6             0.11              8                0.08

Party Agent Perpetrator               6             0.11             12                0.13

Party Supporter                      20             0.36             48                0.51

Agent of State                       14             0.25              3                0.03

Criminal Element                      3             0.05              0                0.00

Indeterminant                         6             0.11              7                0.07

                                     55                              95

Victims

Leader Victim                         9             0.16             18                0.22

Party Agent Victim                    4             0.07              7                0.09

Party Supporter                      13             0.24             34                0.42

Voter                                16             0.29              6                0.07

Election Persons/Material            13             0.24             16                0.20

                                     55                              81
Severity of Tactics
Impact Severity
      What Future Comparative Analysis
                Might Tell Us

• Willingness of wrong persons to file
  complaints
• System effects on type of perpetrators and
  victims
• Social/cultural and legal/institutional
  explanations for severity of violence used
• What is election violence an indicator of? Do
  shifts in the nature of violence (from one-
  sided to mutual, or two-party, suggest an
  important change)?
• Motives of victims and perpetrators
• Number and nature of parties (ideology,
  party discipline)
Do Institutions and Laws Matter?


  A deductive look at the legal
          framework
        Legal Framework for Coercion


1. Right to vote
2. Legal definitions of election offences
3. Penalties and remedies for election offences
4. Enforcement (areas in need of further research)
    • Clarity and transparency of election authority
    • Independence of election authority
    • Detection and prosecution of violations
    • Statute of Limitations
           Ghana Current Electoral Provisions


•      1992 Constitution, Ch. 7: Representation of the People
•      Registration of Voters Regulations, 1968 (L.I. 587)
• Representation of the People Law, 1992 (PNDCL 284) (“RPL”)
• Presidential Elections Laws, 1992 (PNDCL 285)
• Electoral Commission Act, 1993 (Act 451)
• Public Elections (District Assembly) Regulations, 1993 (C.I. 4)
    (repeals District Assembly Election Regulations, 1988 (L.I.1396) by applying to
           assemblies all provisions of the Public Elections Regulations (Parliamentary))

•      Public Elections Regulations, 1996 (C.I. 15)
    (repeals Public Elections (Parliamentary) Regulations, 1992 (L.I.1537 and Amendment
           L.I.1544)

•      Political Parties Act, 2000 (Act 574)
    (repeals Political Parties Law, 1992 PNDCL 281))
            Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: Ghana



Right to Vote: Constitutionally guaranteed
Defining Physical Coercion: “Undue Influence” and
  “Interference in Electioneering” include threat or use of
  force, abusive language, disruption of public tranquility,
  creating fear of spiritual or temporal injury or loss, including
  fear of divine displeasure in order to induce a voter to vote
  or not vote or a candidate to withdrawal.
Criminal Penalties: (a) Cedi 1 million ($833, or 87% of
  average household income); (b) up to two years in prison
  for coercion, destruction of election materials, bribery, vote
  buying, etc. (c) 5 years disqualification as voter or party
           Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: Ghana



Remedies
 (1) Immediate: (a) If violence or natural disaster interrupts
 polling, polling can be postponed to following day; (b)
 Disorderly persons or those committing offences defined
 above removed from polling stations and charged.
 (2) Electoral: Petition and 20,000 Cedi (~$8.50) can be
 filed by voter or candidate within 21 days of the election to
 the High Court.
            Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: Ghana



Electoral Remedy: If the High Court rules on the basis of a
  petition that election offences occurred, it can:
  1. Call for count or rejection of specific votes affected by
  offences toward possible victory for a different candidate;
  2. Disqualify candidates or punish offenders if guilty of
  offences but affirm election result;
  3. Call for fresh election “general bribery, treating,
  intimidation or other misconduct…have so extensively
  prevailed that they may be reasonably supposed to have
  affected the result of an election”
Enforcement: Independent Election Commission
      Ghana Electoral System

• First-Past-The-Post, Plurality
  system with single member
  constituencies
• Two-party dominant system
• President must receive 50%
                     U.S. Current Federal Electoral
                     Provisions Related to Coercion


•     U.S. Constitution: 15th, 19th and 26th Amendments; States retain
    broad jurisdiction over the election process
•     Federal Statutes: Apply to elections in which the ballot includes one or
    more candidates running for federal office if there is intimidation of voters
    (18 U.S.C. § 594 and 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-10(1). 18 USC may apply in
    narrow circumstances to nonfederal elections involving physical threats or
    reprisals against candidates, voters, poll watchers, or election officials (§§
    245(b)(1)(A) ; §§); the presence of armed men at polls (592); coercion of
    military or federal employee voting (609-610). See U.S. Department of
    Justice, Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses, Sixth ed., January 1995
    for elaboration of complex statutes and jurisdiction. Federal authority
    warranted only to “redress long-standing patterns of election abuse.”
•     State Election Law
                   Laws Governing Electoral Coercion: U.S.



Right to Vote: Constitution provides explicitly for non-discrimination in voting
   on the basis of race, sex, and age, but Bush v. Gore and other courts see no
   federally guaranteed right to vote in the constitution. (qualified citizens are
   eligible to vote)

Some Federal Definitions of Coercion:                             18 U.S.C. §241 and 242:
   241: State or federal authority cannot willfully deprive a person of any right, privilege, or
   immunity secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States; 242: Ten-
   year penalty for conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate to deprive (…).
   Applied to cases in which voters prevented from reaching polls.
   Voter intimidation: threats, duress, economic coercion, or some other aggravating factor
   which tends to improperly induce conduct on the part of the victim.
   18 U.S.C. § 594: Requires proof that the actor intended to force voters to act against their
   will by placing them in fear of losing something of value…money or economic
   benefits…liberty or safety.
   Speech: “Federal criminal laws are for the most part inapplicable to the tactics and
   rhetoric of the candidates and their agents…[to apply them] would tend to chill the free
   exercise of speech in the rough-and-tumble context of political campaigns.”
                       Laws Governing Electoral Coercion:
                                 New Jersey


Coercion (illlustrative):
N.J. Stat. § 19:34-27 / 34-30: Employers cannot threaten injury, damage, harm, or
   loss against any person in his or her employ to induce or compel him to vote or
   refrain from voting….(includes enclosing political information in pay envelopes
   or posting it at the workplace)
N.J. Stat. § 19:34-28: “No person shall, directly or indirectly, by himself or by any
   other person in his behalf, make use of, or threaten to make use of, any force,
   violence or restraint, inflict or threaten the infliction…of any injury, damage,
   harm or loss, or in any manner to practice intimidation upon or against any
   person, in order to induce or compel…”
N.J. Stat. § 19:34-29: “No person shall by abduction or duress or any forcible or
   fraudulent device or contrivance whatever, impede, prevent, or otherwise
   interfere with the free exercise of the elective franchise by any voter…”
              Laws Governing Electoral Coercion:
                        New Jersey


Penalties:
• A person is guilty of a misdemeanor and will be
  punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars
  ($500.00) or by imprisonment not exceeding one year,
  or both, if on Election Day they do any of the following:
  (i) tamper, deface or interfere with any polling booth;
  (ii) obstruct the entrance to any polling place, or
  obstruct or interfere with any voter; or
  (iii) loiter, or do any electioneering within any polling
  place or within 100 feet thereof. § 19:34-6

• Disenfranchisement in some cases; harsher penalties
  for second offenses
              Laws Governing Electoral Coercion:
                        New Jersey


Penalties:

  Most violations (impeding voters on election day,
  interfering with canvassing, etc.) are punishable as
  “disorderly persons” offenses (misdemeanors)

  An election official is guilty of a crime [felony] in the
  second degree for committing:
      (i) knowingly and willfully intimidating, threatening
      or coercing or attempting to intimidate, threaten or
      coerce any person for registering to vote or
      attempting to vote
                Laws Governing Electoral Coercion:
                          New Jersey


Remedies:
Immediate: Any individual who believes there has been, or
  will be, a violation of any provisions of this title may file a
  complaint with the Division of Elections seeking relief or, as
  an alternative, file a complaint with the Superior Court. The
  complaint will be resolved expeditiously. [§§ 19:61-6(a);
  19:61-6(g)] (Judges are available on election day)
Electoral: Irregularities Complaint Log Form:
• Instructions of where to send it; what authority?
• If acts were trivial or unimportant, accidental, or did not
  arise from any want of good faith, the election of the
  candidate should not “by reason of such offense
  complained not be void” § 19:3-9
• Unclear statute of limitations
                              Electoral Authorities:
                                   New Jersey



State Law divides election responsibilities among the Elected, Partisan:
• The Board of Elections is responsible for staffing and managing the
   polling locations.
• The Superintendent of Elections/commissioner of Registration is
   responsible for establishing a 100- foot barrier around polling places to
   prevent electioneering. The office also manages the voting machines
   until Election Day.
• The City Clerk's office is responsible for counting the votes and
   certifying them.
Dispute Resolution:
• Four Superior Court judges assigned to hear election appeals on
   election day pertaining to challenges, registration, etc.
Prevention/Security: Routine deployment of 15 state troopers and
   UNPRECEDENTED deployment of U.S. Attorneys Officer observers
            Electoral System: New Jersey



• Non-Partisan System: In 1953, discontent with the city's five-
member commission form of government, led to a city Charter
Commission and adoption of a strong nonpartisan mayor system
with a nine-member council. Voters approved the measure on Nov.
3, 1953.
• Mayoral and council candidates must obtain 50 percent of the
votes cast - plus one vote - to win, or a runoff is held one month
later.
• Violence has marred Newark elections in the 19th century, 1930s-
40s, and the 1970 election.
          Institutional Reforms:
      What Newark Could Learn from
     Ghana and its Sister City, Kumasi:

• Independent election authority
• Bipartisan election authority
• Clear instructions for filing complaints
• Extending laws to include campaigning,
  donations
• Longer statute of limitations for complaints
• Specific penalties and electoral remedies
• Future research should address assessment
  of when a finding can be made that
  intimidation and violence have affected the
  results
                               Future Directions


1. Large-N, Multiple Regression & Interaction Effects
   (substitutability across tactics, effects of electoral system when
   stakes are high vs. low, exclusion is high vs. low)
2. Additional Variables (resources, statute of limitations)
3. Change over time (endogeneity between violence and
   institutional change)

Election Violence

Evioltime 1= f(Institutions -> Means, Stakes, Exclusion; Quality of
   enforcement/admin; ΔInstitutionst, t-1; Control variables)

Endogeneity

Institutionstime 1 = f(Eviolt-1; Institutionst-1; Control variables)
           Election Violence and Electoral
                       Reform
                                                                  Comprehensive
                                                                  Reform


                                    Major Reform 3
                                    (e.g. system, registration,
                                     admin quality)
              Major Reform 2
              (e.g. suffrage)


Major Reform 1
(e.g. secret ballot)



                                                Pre-peak: reform demands
                                                Post-peak: politician substitution
                                                + enforcement demands



                                Time (Election Years)
       Preliminary Evidence

• Bipartisan municipal election
  authorities in the U.S. are in
  areas that experienced violence
  (Cook Co, MO; NYC; Chicago)
Thank you!


Discussion

				
DOCUMENT INFO
Description: Statute of Limitations Illinois document sample