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					                          IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                  JUVENILE DIVISION
                            ______________ COUNTY, OHIO


IN RE: __________________________ :
       [YOUR NAME]                :                Case No.
                                  :
                                  :                County of Adjudication:_____________
                                  :
                                  :                HEARING REQUESTED


                      PETITION TO CONTEST RECLASSIFICATION


       Petitioner,   [NAME]__________________________________,        petitions this Court

for a hearing to contest reclassification pursuant to R.C. 2950.031(E) or R.C.

2950.032(E).

       1.      Petitioner was adjudicated delinquent of_



in a judgment entered on __                                in

County.

       2.      Petitioner resides in                            County and registers with

the sheriff of that county pursuant to R.C. chapter 2950.

       3.      Petitioner received a Notice of New Classification and Registration Duties

from the Office of the Ohio Attorney General on                                    .    A

copy of the Notice is attached to this petition.

       4.      Pursuant to R.C. 2950.031(E) and R.C. 2950.032(E), Petitioner requests,

as a matter of right, a hearing to contest the application of the new registration

requirements to Petitioner.
       5.     Petitioner submits that the State’s reclassification is improper and

unconstitutional for the following reasons, which are explained in greater detail in the

attached memorandum in support:

              a. The retroactive application of Senate Bill 10 violates the prohibition on

                  ex post facto laws in Article I, Section 10 of the United States

                  Constitution.

              b. The retroactive application of Senate Bill 10 violates the prohibition on

                  retroactive laws in Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution.

              c. Reclassification of Petitioner constitutes a violation of the Separation of

                  Powers’ Doctrine.

              d. Reclassification     of     Petitioner   constitutes   impermissible   multiple

                  punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States

                  and Ohio Constitutions.

       WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that this petition be granted, and

that the court grant the following relief:

      Enjoin the Sheriff of this County, or any other State official from taking any action

       based on the attempted reclassification;

      Issue an order pursuant to R.C. 2950.031(E) or R.C. 2950.032(E) that Petitioner

       cannot be reclassified under the Senate Bill 10, that the new registration and

       notification requirements do not apply to Petitioner;

      Provide that a copy of all orders be served on the Sheriff of this County, upon the

       Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, and upon the office of the

       Attorney General of the State of Ohio.




                                                 2
                                           Respectfully submitted,


                                           [SIGNATURE]
                                           ___________________, PETITIONER, pro se
                                           [PRINTED NAME]
                                           _____________________________________
                                           [ADDRESS]
                                           _____________________________________
                                           [CITY, STATE, ZIP]



                             MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

A.     Introduction

       On or about    [date]____________________,        Petitioner received a letter from the

Attorney General which informed him that he was going to be reclassified under a newly

enacted law, Senate Bill 10 (Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act) as a “Tier ___ Juvenile Sex

Offender.” (A copy of petitioner’s letter is attached). Enacted on June 30, 2007, Senate

Bill 10 fundamentally transforms Ohio’s sex offender classification process and offender

registration requirements, notification requirements, and residency restrictions. Unlike

sex offender classifications under Ohio’s Megan’s Law, which were based on an

offender’s likelihood of committing future sex offenses, Senate Bill 10 assigns sex

offenders to one of three tiers based solely on the offense of adjudication with no

consideration of the offenders’ risk to the community or likelihood of reoffending. By

tying sex offender classification decisions and obligations directly and solely to the

crime of adjudication, Senate Bill 10 has created a sex offender classification law that is

punitive.

       Under his pre-Senate Bill 10 classification, Petitioner was required to register

___________________________________________ [registration requirements before receipt of   letter].


Senate Bill 10 potentially imposes more onerous obligations and responsibilities on



                                              3
Petitioner because he has been reclassified as a Tier ___ registrant. Beginning on

January 1, 2008, Petitioner is required to register with the local sheriff’s office every

_____________________________________________________ [registration              requirements after


receipt of letter].   (See attached.)

B.         Law and Argument

           This petition presents several arguments that the State’s attempt to reclassify

Petitioner under Senate Bill 10 is both improper and unconstitutional. For the sake of

clarity, each argument is presented as a separate “count.”

           Count One: Reclassification of Petitioner under Senate Bill 10 is
           prohibited because the attorney general failed to properly serve Petitioner
           in accordance with R.C. 2950.031(A)(2).

           Revised Code 2950.031(A)(2) required the attorney general to send Petitioner

his “reclassification” letter by registered mail, no later than December 1, 2007.

Specifically, R.C. 2950.031(A)(2) states that,

           [a]t any time on or after July 1, 2007, and not later than December 1,
           2007, the attorney general shall send to each offender or deli nquent child
           who prior to December 1, 2007, has registered a residence [* * *], a
           registered letter that contains the information described in this division.
           The registered letter shall be sent return receipt requested to the last
           reported address of the person and, if the person is a delinquent child, the
           last reported address of the parents of the delinquent child. ***

           But the attorney general failed to properly serve Petitioner because Petitioner

was not served by registered mail. Instead, the attorney general served Petitioner by

certified mail.            Because the attorney general did not comply with the service

requirements enumerated in R.C. 2950.031, Petitioner cannot be reclassified under

Senate Bill 10.




                                                 4
       Count Two: Provisions of Senate Bill 10 violate a juvenile’s right to due process,
       right to equal protection, and right to trial by jury by treating juvenile offenders
       differently based on the type of offense and age at the time of committing that
       offense, and by placing juveniles in the same tier structure as adults.

       The juvenile justice system is grounded in the legal doctrine of parens patriae,

meaning that the state has the power to act as a provider of protection to those unable

to care for themselves. State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 88, 2000-Ohio-436 citing In

re T.R. (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 6, 15; Black’s Law Dictionary (7 Ed. 1999) 1137. Since its

origin, the juvenile justice system has emphasized individual assessment, the best

interest of the child, treatment, and rehabilitation, with a goal of reintegrating juveniles

back into society.    Id. citing D’Ambra, A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why

Waiver of Juvenile Offenders is Not a Panacea (1997), 2 Roger Williams U.L.Rev. 277,

280.

       The United States Supreme Court has provided juveniles many of the same

procedural protections as adults, including rights to notice of charges, to counsel, to

confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, to privilege against self-incrimination,

and to proof beyond a reasonable doubt . In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1; In re Winship

(1970), 397 U.S. 358.

       In 1971, the United States Supreme Court held that a trial by jury is not

constitutionally required in the adjudicative phase of a state juvenile court delinquency

proceeding. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971), 403 U.S. 528. In addition, in juvenile

court proceedings there is no right to grand jury determination of probable cause, no

right to an open and speedy trial, and no right to bail.

       The right to an impartial jury “in all criminal prosecutions” under federal law is

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 540. That requirement



                                              5
has been imposed upon the states, through the Fourteenth Amendment, “in all criminal

cases which—were they to be tried in federal court—would come within the Sixth

Amendment’s guarantee.” Id. This is because the Court has said “that trial by jury in

criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice.” Id. (citing Duncan v.

Louisiana (1968), 391 U.S. 145, 149; Bloom v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 194, 210-211).

       With respect to trial by jury, accepting “the proposition that the Due Process

Clause has a role to play,” the task “is to ascertain the precise impact of the due

process requirement.” McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541, (citing Application of Gault (1967),

387 U.S. 1, 13-14 ). The applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings, as

developed by Gault and Winship, is fundamental fairness. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543.

       While there are instances in Ohio where a juvenile may be punis hed as an adult,

including after a transfer proceeding or serious youthful offender proceeding, those

juveniles are provided the same constitutional rights and procedural safeguards as adult

defendants. See, Kent v. United States (1966), 383 U.S. 541. (Prior to a juvenile court

waiving its jurisdiction, as a condition to a valid waiver order, the juvenile is entitled to a

hearing that must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment,

including access by his counsel to the social records and probation or similar reports

which presumably were considered by the court, and to a statement of reasons for the

juvenile court’s decision.) The effect of Senate Bill 10 is that juveniles, aged 14 years of

age or older at the time of their offense, are placed in the same three-tier structure as

adult offenders, without having gone through the procedure or ceremony of a serious

youthful offender proceeding or without having been bound over to the adult criminal

court. Receiving this adult consequence, having not been bound over or otherwise




                                               6
transferred to the adult criminal system, violates the juvenile’s right to due process and

trial by jury.

        The guarantee of equal protection of the laws means that no person or class of

persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other

persons or classes in the same place and under like circumstances.              Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution; Ohio Constitution Article I, Section 2.

The Ohio Constitution provides, “all political power is inherent in the people.

Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit…” Ohio Const., Art. I,

Sec. 2. In order to be constitutional, a law must be applicable to all persons under like

circumstances and must not subject individuals to an arbitrary exercise of power.

Conley v. Shearer (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 288-289.           In other words, the equal

protection clause prevents the state from treating differently or arbitrarily, persons who

are in all relevant respects alike. Park Corp. v. Brook Park (2004), 1002 Ohio St.3d

166.

        Under a traditional equal protection analysis, class distinctions in
        legislation are permissible if they bear some rational relationship to a
        legitimate governmental objective. Departures from traditional equal
        protection principals are permitted only when burdens upon suspect
        classifications or abridgments of fundamental rights are involved. State v.
        Thompkins (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 558, 664 N.E.2d 926 quoting State ex
        rel. Vana v. Maple Hts. City Council (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 91, 92, 561
        N.E.2d 909.

        Under the provisions of Senate Bill 10, juvenile sex offenders will receive an adult

consequence by being placed in the tier structure, while another class of adjudicated

juveniles, non-sex offenders, will be treated another way, with no adult consequence.

And, juvenile sex offenders aged 14 or older at the time of their offense are placed in a

tier, but juvenile sex offenders aged 13 or younger at the time of their offense are not



                                              7
subject to any tier classification or registration requirements. There is no rational basis

for this radical difference in sentencing based solely upon a child’s slightly different

chronological age.

         There is no rational justification for juveniles to be placed in the same tier

structure as adults. The punitive nature of sex offender classification is not rationally

related to the government’s objective in providing for community safety because,

according to the Ohio Association of County Behavioral Health Authority, the recidivism

rate for juveniles who commit a sexual offense is only 4%-10%, compared to a 30%

recidivism rate for juvenile non-sex offenders. 1 Furthermore, adult punishments are an

ineffective deterrent for juveniles. In Roper v. Simmons (2005), 543 U.S. 551, the Court

noted that “the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults

suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.” Roper, 543 U.S. at

571.

         A juvenile court proceeding has not been held to be a “criminal prosecution,”

within the meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment, but also has not been regarded

as devoid of criminal aspects merely because it usually has been labeled civil.

McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541 (citing Kent v. U.S. (1966), 383 U.S. 541, 554; In re Gault,

387 U.S. at 17; In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-66). Senate Bill 10, however, places a

juvenile offender who was adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court in the same three-tier

structure as an adult criminal defendant who was convicted in criminal court. But in

doing so, the Ohio legislature failed to provide full procedural safeguards to juveniles, by

failing to mandate that juvenile courts afford to juveniles all of the rights afforded to a



1
    http://www.oacbha.org/includes/downloads/volume3issue1.pdf


                                             8
person who is prosecuted for committing a crime. Given that a juvenile offender is

placed in the same tier structure as an adult offender, it violates fundamental fairness to

deny a juvenile accused of a sexual offense the constitutional safeguards—including full

due process, equal protection, and jury trial rights—that adult criminal defendants enjoy.

       Count Three: The Retroactive Application of Senate Bill 10 Violates the
       Prohibition on Ex Post Facto Laws in Article I, Section 10 of the United States
       Constitution.

       The retroactive application of Senate Bill 10 to Petitioner constitutes an ex post

facto law as proscribed by Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution.

       The Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, Section 10 of the United States

Constitution prohibits, among other things, any legislation that “changes the

punishment, and inflicts greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when

committed.” Miller v. Florida (1987), 482 U.S. 423, 429, quoting Calder v. Bull (1798), 3

Dall. 386, 390). The purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to ensure that legislative

acts “give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until

explicitly changed.” Weaver v. Graham (1981), 450 U.S. 24, 28-29.

       In analyzing whether a challenged statute imposes retroactive punishment in

violation of the federal prohibition on ex post facto laws, this Court must apply the

intents-effect test. State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St. 3d 404, 415. If the express or

implied intent of the General Assembly was to create criminal punishment rather than a

civil penalty, that “ends the inquiry” and the retroactive application of the statute is

unconstitutional. Smith v. Doe (2003), 538 U.S. 84, 92. If, however, the intention of the

General Assembly was to enact a regulatory scheme that was civil and non-punitive,

this Court must further consider whether the statutory scheme is “so punitive in effect as




                                              9
to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.” Id. (Citations and internal quotations

omitted.)

       1.      Intent of Legislation

       In determining the General Assembly’s objective, this Court must examine the

statute’s text and structure. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. To do so, courts must first “ask

whether the legislature, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either

expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other.” Hudson v. United States

(1997), 522 U.S. 93, 99. In concluding that Ohio’s Megan’s law, as originally enacted in

1997, was not intended to be criminal punishment, the Ohio Supreme Court

emphasized the statutory scheme’s “narrowly tailored attack on th[e] problem” of

protecting the community for sex offenders. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 417. Under the

original Megan’s Law, an individual’s classification and registration requirements was

tied directly to an ongoing threat to the community. That is no longer the case. Under

Senate Bill 10, an individual’s classification and obligations under the statute flow

directly from the offense of adjudication.           Thus, the statutory scheme has been

transformed from a narrowly tailored attempt to address a problem to a categorical one

indicative of punitive statutory scheme. 2

       The formal attributes of a legislative enactment, such as the manner of its

codification and the enforcement procedures it establishes are also probative of

legislative intent. Smith, 538 U.S. at 94. In this case, the legislature elected to place


2
  The punitive intent of the General Assembly is also evidenced by certain changes made to the
statute in 2003 (e.g. residency restrictions and removal of ability to reconsider classification) by
Senate Bill 5 and retained by the AWA. Cf. Mikaloff v. Walsh (N.D. Ohio 2007), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 65076, *13-23 (finding that “the Ohio General Assembly intended the residency
restriction to be penal.”)



                                                10
Senate Bill 10 squarely within Title 29, Ohio’s Criminal Code.           Furthermore, the

enforcement mechanisms established by the statute are criminal in nature. The failure

of an individual to comply with the registration, verification, or notification requirements

of the statute subjects him or her to criminal prosecution and criminal penalties. See

generally, R.C. 2950.99

       Considering Chapter 2950 as amended by SB 5 in 2003 and SB10 in 2007, it is

now apparent that the General Assembly’s intent with regard to Chapter 2950 is

punitive, not civil.

       2.      Effect of Legislation

       Even if this Court were to determine that the General Assembly intended Senate

Bill 10 to operate as a remedial statute, it has a “punitive effect so as to negate a

declared remedial intention.” Allen v. Illinois (1985), 478 U.S. 364, 369. In assessing

the punitive effects of a particular statute, this Court should consider whether the

obligations imposed by Chapter 2950 were historically regarded as punishment;

whether they operate as a disability or restraint; whether they further traditional notions

of punishment, bear a rational connection to non-punitive purpose, and/or are excessive

in relation to the alternative purposes assigned. Smith v. Doe (2003), 538 U.S. 84, 97,

citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963), 373 U.S. 144, 168-69.

       Senate Bill 10 imposes burdens on defendants that are historically regarded as

punishment and which operate as affirmative disabilities or restraints. While registration

may cause adverse consequences on the defendant “running from mild personal

embarrassment to social ostracism,” the further limitation on where on an offender can

live causes Chapter 2950 to resemble colonial punishments of “public shaming,




                                            11
humiliation, and banishment.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 98. Unlike the law considered by the

United States Supreme Court in Smith, Senate Bill 10 does more than disseminate

truthful information; it subjects offenders to significant restraints on their liberty not

shared by the general citizenry akin to parole and probation. Moreover, because the

restraints are direct consequences of criminal conduct they further the traditional

notions of punishment and deterrence and are no longer “narrowly tailored to comport

with the respective danger and recidivism levels of the different classifications of sex

offenders.” Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 421-22. The imposition of obligations or burdens

regardless of whether they are necessary in a particular case is clearly excessive, smacks

of punishment, and is retribution for past conduct.

       Count Four: The Retroactive Application of Senate Bill 10 Violates the
       Prohibition on Retroactive Laws in Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution.

       Even if this Court concludes that Senate Bill 10 does not constitute an ex post

facto law as applied to Petitioner, Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution prohibits

the retroactive application of Senate Bill 10 to Petitioner.

       Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution expressly forbids the enactment of

retroactive laws. 3 Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 106.

With this guarantee, the Ohio Constitution affords its citizens greater protection against

retroactive laws than does the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.

Id. at 105. This constitutional bar on retroactive laws has been interpreted to apply to

laws affecting substantive rights but not to procedural or remedial aspects of such la ws.

Kunkler v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 135, 137. A statute is


3
   Article II, Section 28 provides: “The general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive
laws….”


                                               12
substantive if it “impairs or takes away vested rights, affects an accrued substantive

right, imposes new or additional burdens, duties, obligation or liabilities as to a past

transaction, or creates a new right.” Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 411.

       Senate Bill 10 is a substantive law which, among other things, eliminates the pre-

existing right of citizens to reside where they wish and imposes new obligations and

burdens which did not exist at the time Petitioner committed his offense. See Nasal v.

Dover, Miami App. No. 2006-CA-9, 2006-Ohio-5584, ¶23, (concluding that R.C.

2950.031 constitutes an unconstitutional retroactive law as applied to an individual who

owned and occupied real estate prior to the enactment of the statute and whose

predicate offense occurred prior to the enactment of the statute). Thus, it cannot be

retroactively applied.

       Count Five:    Reclassification of Petitioner Constitutes a Violation of the
       Separation of Powers Doctrine.

       The legislative and executive branches’ attempt to reclassify Petitioner under

Senate Bill 10 violates the separation of powers doctrine by interfering with a prior

judicial adjudication regarding Petitioner’s sex offender status .

       A statute that violates the doctrine of separation of powers is unconstitutional.

State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451,

475. This doctrine is embedded in the very framework of the Ohio Constitution which

defines “the nature of scope of powers designated to the three branches of

government.” Id., quoting State v. Hochhausler (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 455, 463. As a

part of this doctrine, courts “possess all powers necessary to secure and safeguard the

free and untrammeled exercise of their judicial functions and cannot be directed,

controlled or impeded therein by other branches of the government.” Zangerle v. Court



                                             13
of Common Pleas (1943), 141 Ohio St. 70, at paragraph two of the syllabus. Courts

must “jealously guard the judicial power against encroachment from the other two

branches of government” in order “to avoid the evils that would flow from legislative

encroachments on our independence.” City of Norwood v. Horney (2006), 110 Ohio

St.3d 353, 387.

       Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 10, the determination of whether and how

an offender had to register as a sexual offender was specifically reserved to the

judiciary. Cf. State v. Eppinger (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 158, 166. Indeed, the trial court

had the responsibility to determine whether an individual was a sexual predator and/or

habitual sex offender or simply a sexually oriented offender. See R.C. 2950.09 (pre-

Senate Bill 10).   As such, the trial court makes a judicial determination regarding

classification which the General Assembly seeks to unsettle with the retroactive

application of Senate Bill 10. Such interference with previous judicial adjudications

impermissibly encroaches on judicial authority and violates the separation of powers

doctrine.

       Count Six: Reclassification of Petitioner Constitutes Impermissible Multiple
       Punishment Under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Ohio
       Constitutions.

       Reclassification of Petitioner under Senate Bill 10 constitutes successive

punishment and therefore a double jeopardy violation under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio

Constitution. These constitutional provisions forbid the imposition of multiple criminal

punishments for the same offense in successive proceedings. Hudson v. United States

(1997), 522 U.S. 93, 98-99; State v. Martello (2002), 97 Ohio St.3d 398, 399-400.




                                          14
       As explained in Count One, the obligations and burdens imposed by Senate Bill

10 are punitive in both intent and effect and therefore constitute additional punishment.

If the State is permitted to reclassify Petitioner under Senate Bill 10, Petitioner will have

been punished twice in successive proceedings in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio

Constitution. Petitioner was first punished when he was adjudicated delinquent for his

conduct and classified under Ohio’s prior juvenile sex offender law. Now, several years

later, the State seeks to enhance his punishment by subjecting him to the new juvenile

sex offender’s law more onerous requirements. Because Petitioner’s reclassification

under Senate Bill 10 adds punishment at a successive proceeding, it is unconstituti onal

and therefore impermissible.

       Further, the following special circumstances about Petitioner and/or Petitioner’s

case further support the Petitioner’s claims: [ENTER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, IF ANY]




   C. Conclusion


       For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner prays that this Court grant him a

hearing on the merits of this petition and hold that the State’s attempt to reclassify

Petitioner under Senate Bill 10 is unconstitutional.



                                              15
                                            Respectfully submitted,


                                            [SIGNATURE]
                                            ___________________, PETITIONER, pro se
                                            [PRINTED NAME]



                                CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

       I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing PETITION TO CONTEST

RECLASSIFICATION was forwarded by regular U.S. mail to the office of


[YOUR COUNTY’S PROSECUTOR’S NAME]


[YOUR COUNTY’S PROSECUTOR’S FULL ADDRESS]


                                                                      on this            day
                                                                                [DATE]
of January, 2008.
                                            [SIGNATURE]
                                            ___________________, PETITIONER, pro se
                                            [PRINTED NAME]




                                              16
                           IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                   JUVENILE DIVISION
                                _________ COUNTY, OHIO


IN RE: _______________________           :
                                         :       Case No.
                                         :


                              AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCY

      I, ____________________________, do hereby solemnly swear that I have

presently this ______ day of __________________, 20____, no means of financial

support and no assets of any value and, therefore, cannot afford to pay for any legal

services, fees, or costs in the above-styled case.



                                         DEFENDANT-PETITIONER, pro se


                                         ADDRESS



                                         CITY, STATE & ZIP CODE




      Sworn     to   and    subscribed    in   my    presence     this   ______   day   of

______________________, 20 ____.



                                         NOTARY PUBLIC
                         IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                 JUVENILE DIVISION
                            ____________ COUNTY, OHIO


IN RE:      ______________________, :
                                    :             Case No.
                                    :


                     MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

         Petitioner moves this Court for an order appointing counsel to represent

Petitioner on the Petition to Contest Reclassification. A memorandum in support is

attached.

                                          Respectfully submitted,




                                          PETITIONER, pro se


                                          ADDRESS



                                          CITY, STATE & ZIP CODE


                             MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

         Petitioner lacks the skill or knowledge to adequately pursue and protect

Petitioner’s rights without the assistance of counsel. Counsel is essential to ensure that

Petitioner’s rights are fully protected and all issues reviewed.     As attested by the

Affidavit of Indigency filed with the petition, Petitioner is without funds to hire an

attorney. Because the instant challenged reclassification has a punitive impact, the

Petitioner is entitled to counsel at state expense.




                                             1
        Further, R.C. 2151.352 grants a statutory right to counsel to all parties “at all

stages of the proceedings” in juvenile court. Counsel must be appointed unless that

right is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived in accordance with the Rules of

Juvenile Procedure and In re C.S. 115 Ohio St. 3d 267; 2007-Ohio-4919; 874 N.E.2d

1177.

        WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated above, Petitioner respectfully requests that

counsel be appointed in this matter.

                                            Respectfully submitted,




                                            PETITIONER, pro se


                                    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

        I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL was forwarded by regular U.S. mail to the office of


[YOUR COUNTY’S PROSECUTOR’S NAME]


[YOUR COUNTY’S PROSECUTOR’S FULL ADDRESS]


                                                                      on this            day
                                                                                [DATE]
of January, 2008.
                                            [SIGNATURE]
                                            ___________________, PETITIONER, pro se
                                            [PRINTED NAME]




                                               2
                          IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                  JUVENILE DIVISION
                              ____________COUNTY, OHIO


IN RE:      _______________________ :
                                    :            Case No.
                                    :



                                         ENTRY

         For good cause shown, the Court hereby finds the Petitioner to be an indigent

and      entitled   to   appointed   counsel.       The     Court    appoints    attorney

________________________________________ to represent Petitioner relating to the

Petition to Contest Reclassification. Counsel is directed to obtain from the Petitioner an

OPD-206R financial disclosure form and file it with the Court.



                                         IT IS SO ORDERED.




                                         Judge

				
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