Home Lending Capital by olg16391

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									Aligning Incentives in Securitization

Adam B. Ashcraft
Federal Reserve Bank of New York




                                        for internal use only
The seven deadly frictions


                                Warehouse
                                 Lender
                                               3. adverse
                                               selection


                               Credit Rating                 Arranger
                                 Agency
                                                            2. mortgage
       Servicer                                                 fraud


            5. moral              Asset
                                 Manager                    Originator
            hazard

                       6. principal-                        1. predatory
                           agent                               lending
                                                7. model
                                  Investor        error
                                                            Mortgagor



                                                            4. moral hazardinternal use only
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                 Friction #1: Predatory Lending
   Defined as the welfare-reducing provision of credit
   Results in “too much” lending
   Borrowers, especially those with bad credit, can be financially
    unsophisticated
   Some borrowers don't know best price, or can't make the right
    given the best prices
   Lenders (or brokers as their agents) can take advantage of this
   % of subprime mortgage with strong optionality*:
         2000 (2007): 0.1% (36.8%)


Resolution: state and federal anti-predatory lending laws,
 consumer protection regulation

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       Steering Prime Borrowers to Subprime Loans
   Ernst, Bocian, and Li (2008): "Steered Wrong: Brokers,
    Borrowers, and Subprime Loans"
   Study 1.7 million mortgages produced between 2004 to 2006
   Use matched sample methods, comparing brokered and retail
    originations
   Note between 63 and 81 percent were brokered in 2006
   Conclude that brokered loans cost more (130 bps), and that the
    effect larger for subprime
   Recommend: ban YSP and prepayment penalties for subprime
    loans, hold lenders and investors accountable for broker
    behavior, establish clear broker duties to clients
   Caveat: YSP can be used to fund closing costs


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        Prepayment Penalties Benefit Borrowers
Mayer et al (2007): "The Inefficiency of Refinancing: Why
 Prepayment Penalties are Good for Risky Borrowers"
Borrowers with prepayment penalties obtain rates that are as much
 as 0.8% lower than similar borrowers with fully prepayable
 mortgages, with the largest reductions going to the riskiest
 borrowers.
Controlling for ex-ante risk, borrowers with prepayment penalties
 default at a much lower rate.
Risky borrowers without prepayment penalties are much more
  likely to repay their mortgage in response to a positive shock to
  house prices than other borrowers, explaining why lenders
  charge a premium for these borrowers.




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                The Case of Payday Lending
   CRL (2006): Financial Quicksand: Payday lending sinks
    borrowers in debt...
Ninety percent (90%) of payday lending revenues are based on
  fees stripped from trapped borrowers, virtually unchanged from
  our 2003 findings. The typical payday borrower pays back $793
  for a $325 loan.
   Morse (2007): "Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villians?"
Communities with payday lenders show greater resilience to
 natural disasters: foreclosues, births, deaths, alcohol and drug
 treatment
   Morgan (2006): "Defining and Detecting Predatory Lending"
Borrowers in states that permit more payday lending are less likely
 to be denied credit generally and have lower delinquencies

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   ...but current problems are larger than predation
Subprime loan performance remains horrific and is not
 improving despite massive rate cuts (which offset hybrid
 ARM resets)
"the percentage of loans facing reset in the 3rd Quarter of 2009
  that are currently delinquent jumped from 21.4% to 28.5%. While
  delinquency rates increase during the early life of a loan pool, this
  worsening trend confirms our initial assessment that very weak
  underwriting and mortgage origination fraud, and not simply
  payment resets, has been the primary cause for elevated
  subprime loan delinquencies for loans originated through at least
  the middle of 2007."
State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group, April 2008




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                Friction #2: Predatory Borrowing
   The originator has an informational advantage over the arranger
    with regard to the quality of the borrower
   Originator and borrower can collaborate to overstate income,
    misrepresent occupancy, hide other details
   Fast home price appreciation (HPA) increases returns to
    speculation, criminal activity, reduces the cost of fraud to lenders
Resolution: due diligence of arranger, representation & warranties
 of originator, capital and other business lines of originator




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          Evidence from Early Payment Defaults
   Fitch (2007): "The Impact of Poor Underwriting Practices and
    Fraud in Subprime RMBS Performance"
Identified 45 early payment defaults from 2006 and studied the loan
  files, finding evidence of widespread:
occupancy misrepresentation
suspicious items on credit reports
incorrect calculation of debt-to-income ratios
poor underwriting of stated income for reasonability
first-time homebuyers with questionable credit and income




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                       Cash-back Financing
   Ben-David (2008): "Manipulation of Collateral Values by
    Borrowers and Intermediaries"
Document that highly leveraged borrowers more likely to
•        buy a property which signals willingness of seller to give
         cash back
•        pay full listing price or more
•        to default
but pay the same interest rate, implying investors did not price this
 behavior




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                         Lax Screening
   Seru et al. (2008): "Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening?
    Evidence from Subprime Loans?"
The authors document that securitized loans with FICO scores
 above 620 default more frequently than securitized loans with
 scores just below 620, but only for low documentation loans




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           Final Thoughts on Predatory Borrowing
   Investors need to ensure that someone is monitoring originator
    underwriting practices
   It is costly (and subject to free-rider problems) for investors to do
    this themselves
   It would be natural for the rating agencies to formally rate
    originators in the same fashion they do for servicers,
    acknowledging the impact that the originator risk factor has on
    the mortgage pool loss distribution
   This rating presumably would not only involve audits of loan
    pools, but would impose capital requirements on originators so
    reps and warranties have value
   However, this could be done by any credible third party



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                 Friction #3: Adverse selection
   Arranger has an informational advantage with regard to the
    quality of the mortgage loans vis-a-vis the warehouse lender and
    the investor
   This friction makes secured funding costly and fragile, and can
    severely limit the ability of the arranger to warehouse and
    securitize the loans in times of stress
   Resolution: due diligence of investor and lender; arranger
    reputation; credit spreads; funded o/c; ratings of RMBS; short-
    term funding; collateral (i.e. repo transactions)




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                       Warehouse Lending
   The demands of warehouse lenders crippled hundreds of
    originators in the first half of 2007. For example, New Century
    (#2 subprime originator and MBS issuer in 2006) defaulted in
    April as lenders refused to extend further credit




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              Asset-backed Commercial Paper
   ABCP funding disappeared in August 2007 as investors became
    nervous about (nonprime) mortgage exposure




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                                                                   Secured Lending
   Repo credit evaporated for investment banks in March 2008,
    leading to the run on and rescue of Bear Stearns
                                                                 Various RP Spreads from Credit Suisse, weekly


                             1.60
                                    Average AGY CMO - TSY Spread 1/07-7/07 = 13 bp
                                    Average AGY PT - TSY Spread 1/07-7/07 = 12 bp
                                    Average Non-AGY RMBS - TSY Spread 1/07-7/07 = 18 bp



                             1.20
         Percentage Points




                             0.80




                             0.40




                             0.00
                                1/7/08   1/14/08   1/21/08   1/28/08    2/4/08   2/11/08   2/18/08   2/25/08   3/3/08   3/10/08   3/17/08   3/24/08   3/31/08   4/7/08
                                                                                                 date

                                                                       AGY CMO-TSY         AGY PT-TSY          NON-AGY RMBS-TSY




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                  Insider Trading in RMBS
   Drucker and Mayer (2007): "Inside Information and Market
    Making in Secondary Mortgage Markets"
The authors document that underwriters of prime RMBS exploit
 inside information when trading in the secondary market.
 Underwriters bid on a majority of their own tranches, but the ones
 on which they do not bid perform worse ex post.




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              The Adverse Effect of Hedging
   Ashcraft and Santos (2007): "Has the CDS Market Lowered
    the Cost of Corporate Debt?"
The authors document that the onset of CDS trading is followed by
 an increase in the cost of syndicated loans and bonds, especially
 for risky and opaque firms where retained loan share is important
 for resolving information problems between the lead bank and
 other members of the syndicate.




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             Final Thoughts on Adverse Selection
   Adverse selection could be minimized through the resolution of
    other informational frictions
   In addition, investors could demand that arrangers disclose their
    hedges of retained tranches
   The central bank has responded aggressively to the liquidity
    problems created by adverse selection with a number of new
    liquidity facilities (term discount window, term auction facility, term
    securities lending facility, primary dealer credit facility)




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            Friction#4: Moral Hazard of Borrower
   Occurs generally in the presence of unobserved effort and limited
    liability
   With significant declines in home prices, many homeowners will
    find the value of their homes to be smaller than the amount they
    owe on their mortgages
   Underwater but performing borrowers are unable to sell their
    homes without bringing cash to closing.
   Some borrowers who can afford their mortgage payments could
    find it in their interest to exercise their option to walk away
Resolution: limits on leverage, principal modifications




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            Evidence of Borrower Moral Hazard
   Performing borrowers asking for loan modifications
   Changes to pecking order of payments
A 2007 report by Experian documented some evidence that
  consumers are more likely to pay their credit cards and auto
  loans than their mortgages




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             The Impact of Bankruptcy Reform
   Morgan et. al. (2008): "Bankruptcy Reform and Subprime
    Foreclosures"
In Chapter 7, households with credit card and mortgage debt have
  unsecured debts (like credit cards) expunged, and keep assets
  with value below the exemption, which typically included equity in
  their home
However recent bankruptcy reform has made it more difficult for a
 borrower to file Chapter 7 through a means test, which has
 shifted the balance of power between mortgage lenders and
 unsecured lenders
The authors document that there has been a larger increase in
 subprime foreclosures in states with higher bankruptcy
 exemptions



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       Final Thoughts on Moral Hazard of Borrower
   There is growing concern that significant price declines will leave
    millions of homeowners underwater, which will be followed by a
    widespread walking away from homes. This would obviously
    severely amplify the current downturn in housing.
   Solutions to this potential problem generally involve the write-
    down of principal by lenders
   Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 prevents the IRS
    from collecting taxes on mortgage principal write-downs, making
    this friction worse by giving households more bargaining power




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            Friction #5: Moral Hazard of Servicer
   Servicer effort and quality has important impact on losses
   Servicer compensated on basis of loans under management and
    not borrower performance
   Potential tension between servicer and investors in the decision
    to modify/foreclose
   Servicer has an incentive to inflate reimbursable expenses
   Servicer not fully compensated for the labor costs of loan
    modifications
   When the demand for modifications is high, servicer might be
    slow to add costly resources
Resolution: pooling & servicing agreement; reputation/value of
 servicing rights; servicer quality ratings (rating agencies); master
 servicer

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              Servicers and the Equity Tranche
   Mayer et al (2007): "Agency Conflicts, Asset Substitution,
    and Securitization"
Using data on 357 commercial mortgage-backed securities deals,
 the authors show that when holding the first-loss position, special
 servicers appear to behave more efficiently, making fewer costly
 transfers of delinquent loans to special servicing, but liquidating a
 higher percentage of loans that are referred to special servicing




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              The Limits of Loan Modifications
True sale (SFAS 140) requires that the servicer go bank to the
  bond holders to approve modifications else control has not shifted
However, the bondholders are widely-dispersed and have
 conflicting interests
It is in the interest of junior tranche holders to delay loss in order to
   avoid the writedown of bond principal.
The use of modifications instead of liquidations can trigger the
 release of o/c to equity tranche investors.
Limits on modifications are in place to protect senior investors from
  excessive "modification"
The November 2007 Treasury streamlined loan modification plan
 was an attempt to give servicers a "safe harbor" for delaying
 interest rate resets on hybrid subprime ARMs

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          Final Thoughts on Servicer Moral Hazard
   It might be difficult for a servicer to write down principal, even
    when it might result in a higher recovery value than foreclosure
    given constraints inspired by this friction in the pooling and
    servicing agreement.




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                     What about cramdowns?
   It might be difficult for a servicer to write down principal, even
    when it might result in a higher recovery value than foreclosure
    given constraints in the pooling and servicing agreement.
   For most secured loans, when the market value of the asset is
    less than the amount of the loan, the bankruptcy court can "cram
    down" the secured claim to the assets market value and leave the
    rest as an unsecured claim.
   First-lien mortgages generally cannot be crammed down in this
    fashion "in order to encourage the flow of capital into the home
    lending market]
   There have been recent proposals by Congress for cramdowns to
    help the borrower and servicer reach the "efficient" outcome
   Problems with this proposal include:
     67 percent of all Chapter 13 bankruptcy plans fail
     Bankruptcy affects all credit, not just the mortgage
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                        Other recent actions
   Hope Now/GSEs: owner-occupied, 90+ non-bankruptcy, 38%
    housing ratio, rate reduction, term extension, defer principal
   Citibank: current, 40% housing ratio, rate reduction, term
    extension, principal foregiveness
   Boa/Countrywide: owner-occupied, 60+ or reset,34%/42% ratios
    with escrow; documentation required; 5-year fixed rate to 2.5%;
    teaser freezer
   IndyMac: Owner-occupied, 60+, 38% housing ratio, full
    documentation. 5-year fixed down to 3%, climbs 1%/year to
    Freddie survey rate. Reduce 2nd rate to 2%.
   Chase: 60+, flexibility and affordability standard, rate reductions,
    principal forbearance, modification of option ARMs
   FDIC proposal: owner-occupied, 60+, 31% housing ratio, full
    documentation, rate reduction, term extension, principal
    forbearance
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LTV and re-default rates
                           Haughwout and Tracey (2008)




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Performance-based principal reductions

   Concept
    Write down principal by X% for each Y payments made as follows:
                                X% = (CLTVupdated - CLTVtarget)*α
     Where:
      α is adjustment speed from CLTVupdated to CLTVtarget per year (e.g., 25%)
      CLTVtarget set so that borrowers choose to stay in the home (e.g., 120%)
      CLTVupdated reflects initial CLTV and subsequent HPA, under assumption home is in
       excellent condition, providing incentives for maintenance

   Why?
      Default is largely unexplained beyond HPA and CLTV
      Improves fairness--provides HPA insurance to good borrowers as well as delinquent
       ones
      Aligns incentives--doesn't encourage good borrowers to go delinquent
      Adjusts for externalities from delinquencies and foreclosures not included in NPV
       calculation
        Bails out Main Street not Wall Street --helps homeowners



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                  Friction #6: Principal-agent
   Asset managers (agent) act on behalf of investors (principal) who
    may not be financially sophisticated
   Asset managers develop investment strategies, conduct due
    diligence, find the best price
Resolution: investment mandates, evaluation relative to peer or
 benchmark, credit ratings, external consultants




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                   The ABS CDO problem
   Adelson and Jacob (2008): "The Subprime Problem: Causes
    and Lessons"
Until 1997 the vast majority of subprime RMBS used bond
 insurance as credit enhancement.
From 1997 to 2002, about half of deals used bond insurance and
  the other half used subordination as credit enhancement.
In 2004 ABS CDOs and CDO investors became the dominant class
  of agents pricing credit risk on subprime RMBS, displacing bond
  insurers and other sophisticated investors
CDOs were willing to accept loans that traditional investors would
 not have accepted, and originators began originating riskier and
 riskier loans.
Evidence: Compare monoline direct exposures to RMBS vs ABS
 CDO exposures
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S&P Loss Projections for Ambac (25 Feb 2008)


    Direct Subprime RMBS Loss Projections (% Expousure)
  Vintage     AAA       AA       A        BBB       BB
    2005       0.00    0.13     0.80      2.19      N/A
    2006       0.59    5.34     8.86      11.66     N/A
    2007       0.08    2.45     5.45      8.56      N/A
    Indirect Subprime RMBS Loss Projections (% Exposure)
  Vintage     AAA       AA       A        BBB       BB
    2005       0.00    2.50    22.22      45.86    60.34
    2006       1.38    50.22   82.25      88.70    92.19
    2007       0.25    27.82   68.09      79.70    95.73




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               Final Thoughts on Principal-Agent
   Most exposure from ABS CDOs was either retained by issuers or
    hedged with monoline insurers
   Key risk management failure was by relatively sophisticated
    investors who did not look to the underlying collateral and likely
    relied too much on the underlying credit ratings
   Re-securitization of RMBS likely obscured the presence of these
    frictions to the ultimate investors
   Investors who use credit ratings as an input to risk management
    should have an independent view on the efficacy of the ratings
    criteria
   As this exposure remained in the trading books of supervised
    institutions, this highlights an important failure in the supervision
    of risk management


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Friction #7: Model Error by the Rating Agencies
   Some investors lack the ability (or willingness) to evaluate the
    efficacy of rating agency models, which makes them susceptible
    to both honest and dishonest errors by the rating agencies
   Credit rating agencies are paid directly by issuers (but indirectly
    by investors), which could potentially create a race to the bottom
    with standards
Resolution: reputation




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                       Historical Downgrade Actions


                                            Negative rating action
                  Subprime 1st lein               Subprime 2nd lein                   Subprime all Lein
 Vintage        $    # tranche # deals          $      # tranche # deals         $       # tranche        # deals
  2002       2.90%     13.80%      48.80%    1.50%        4.00%      9.10%    2.90%       13.20%          46.40%
  2003       1.70%     10.10%      38.50%    0.70%        2.90%     11.10%   10.60%        9.60%          36.50%
  2004       0.90%      6.20%      34.30%    1.70%        5.90%     44.00%    0.90%        6.20%          35.00%
  2005       0.60%      3.60%      20.90%    3.30%       18.50%     85.40%    0.70%        4.90%          28.00%
  2006      13.40%     48.00%      92.10%   60.00%       84.50%     91.80%   16.70%       52.30%          92.00%
                                             Positive rating action
                  Subprime 1st lein               Subprime 2nd lein                   Subprime all Lein
 Vintage       $      # tranche # deals         $      # tranche # deals        $        # tranche        # deals
   2002     2.10%       6.40%      20.80%    6.70%       17.30%     63.60%   2.30%         7.00%          23.50%
   2003     2.80%       8.60%      26.40%    9.20%       30.10%     83.30%   2.90%        10.00%          30.50%
   2004     1.20%       3.30%      15.00%    7.20%       22.30%     56.00%   1.40%         4.30%          17.90%
   2005     0.00%       0.00%       0.00%    5.30%        9.60%     39.60%   0.20%         0.90%           4.40%
   2006     0.00%       0.00%       0.00%    0.00%        0.00%      0.00%   0.00%         0.00%           0.00%
Source: Moodys (26 October 2007)




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                        The Key Mistakes
   Underestimated the severity of the housing downturn
Housing markets were historically local, but securitization created
 correlation which did not previously exist
   Used limited historical data
Could not accurately estimate the response of borrowers to
 significant price declines
   Ignored the originator risk factor
Did not respond to the arbitrage of rating criteria by weak
  originators
   Ignored the refinancing stress risk factor
Never anticipated the complete evaporation of refinancing
 opportunities

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What about ratings shopping?
   Jerry Fons (April 2008)
       "The recent failure of rating agencies to signal in a timely and
        accurate fashion the condition of many securities backed by subprime
        housing loans can be traced to weaknesses (or outright failures) in
        the protections against conflicts of interest cited above."
   CGFS (January 2005)
       "In general, investors appear to be satisfied with the services provided
        by the rating agencies. While sophisticated investors claim to have
        better models, the transparency of rating agencies is highly
        appreciated and their ability to improve models is seen as impressive.
        conflicts of interest are seen to be less of a concern now than they
        used to be in the past."
   SEC Report (July 2008)
       “[N]o evidence that decisions about rating methodology or models
        were based on attracting or losing market share.” In other words,
        credit-ratings analysts are exposed to pressure but do not succumb."

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Number of ratings for sub-prime deals
                        Number of Ratings - Subprime
  1
 .8
 .6
 .4
 .2
  0




       2000   2001     2002     2003      2004    2005     2006     2007      2008
                                          Year

               Fraction of Deals with 1 Ratings     Fraction of Deals with 2 Ratings
               Fraction of Deals with 3 Ratings




      Decline in average number of rating agencies per deal raises the question of
      whether or not ratings shopping became a problem for most recent vintages!

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Subprime MBS unexpected AAA credit enhancement
                                                               Subprime
400




                                 .2
300




                                 .1
                     Residuals
200




                                       0
100




                                 -.1
                                 -.2
      0




                                           19 7
                                           19 8
                                           20 9
                                           20 0
                                           20 1
                                           20 2
                                           20 3
                                           20 4
                                           20 5
                                           20 6
                                           20 7
                                              08
      19 6
      19 7
      19 8
      20 9
      20 0
      20 1
      20 2
      20 3
      20 4
      20 5
      20 6
      20 7
         08




                                              9
                                              9
                                              9
                                              0
                                              0
                                              0
                                              0
                                              0
                                              0
                                              0
                                              0
         9
         9
         9
         9
         0
         0
         0
         0
         0
         0
         0
         0




                                           19
      19




             Year                          excludes outside values




Subprime credit enhancement was larger than a simple model would have
predicted over the years of the worst vintages, 2005-2008.
Variance of residual enhancement declined significantly.
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       Residual AAA enhancement by number of ratings
                           Residual over time, by rating number
       .1
 .05
         0
-.05
   -.1
-.15




             2000   2001     2002     2003        2004   2005   2006       2007   2008
                                                  Year

                                    Two Ratings            Three Ratings



        No significant relationship between the number of credit rating agencies per
        deal and residual credit enhancement, suggesting decline in number affected
        amount of enhancement in the deal.

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                 Final Thoughts on Model Error
   Credit ratings play a crucial role in securitization, and despite the
    horrific performance of RMBS and ABS CDOs, that will not
    change
   Rating agency errors could have been honest, but there is a
    perception in the marketplace that they were not, and that needs
    to be changed
   What needs to be done:
Better disclosure to investors of macro assumptions and the macro
 scenarios which break a tranche
More conservatism in asset classes with limited historical data
Formally rate originators for underwriting practices
Incorporate refinancing stress risk factor into rating analysis


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Final thoughts
   Resolving these seven frictions in the least costly fashion is
    crucial to repairing securitization and moving forward
   As the credit rating agencies play a crucial role in securitization
    and re-securitization, they are an important part of the solution
   Significant changes need to take place in the approach of
    investors to risk management and in the approach of regulators
    to supervision of this risk management
   Principal-based approach to loan modifications.




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