United States Law on Illigal Immigrants by tou16202


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									Saskia Sassen at the The World is at Home conferance in Reykjavík 12-13th of
October 2000 - transcript of her speech from a tape.

Hello. It is an enourmous pleasure for me to be here. I appologise that I don’t even
know one word in Icelandic. I think Reykjavík is about the only word I know. I am
Dutch actually, and I am told that my name, Saskia, is actually more connected to the
language old norse, I guess that Iceland speaks, than Holland, and I don’t know. You
probably have the story .. you understand much better the connection between … and
the Netherland and Iceland. I mean, I never lived really in the Netherlands, that’s why
I don’t know the story very well. It’s a pleasure for me really to be here. It’s my first
time, and I hope it won’t be my last.
I’ve been asked to project the question of migration, past and present, and I do as I am
told. But I will also, I would very much like to address the questions of policy and the
debate that raged today all over the world really. Let’s remember that half of the
migrant, the immigrants in the world are not in our highly developed countries, they
are in the south, as we’ve now have come to call it. They are in Africa. They are in the
South, in India, in Bangladesh, …, etc. So when we use the term immigrant, migrant,
refugee, we are using an incredibly general term to capture enourmous diversity and
specificity. And secondly, I think even within the highly developed world, there is
enourmous variation. Yesterday when my driver picked me up, my plane was late, it
was about one in the morning and I think he was as tired as I was, I have?? to get up
every morning at five or something, I began to ask him questions about Iceland and
immigration, so that was my first introduction. You know, drivers have a way of
always being available to inform you of what’s going on. So I began to be very
interested in what’s happening here with migration and I hope I will learn today.
Now let me then begin to talk about what I think are two or three very important
issues when we think about immigration. And to look at the past, for me, is
instrumental. It is not necessarily because I am so interested in the past. I am truly not
a historian. And I appologise for … for all the historians in this room and in any other
room. My question in looking at the past when it comes to migration, and this is
particularly in Western Europe, by the way, in the eighteen hundred and the seventeen
hundred, is in the hope that we can understand something about what are some of the
imperical characteristics of migration from past to present. It is to illuminate, the
question of patterning Eurasian, the limited number of people who …, when all is said
and done, actually are migrants; tiny, tiny little minority. Look at the (???-
vantar/past??) case of Europe. Once in Europe, it is particularly interesting because
you have already so many nations formation. Many more than you have today,
actually. There were all these divisions. You have enourmous levels of inequality,
between regions, between localities. And you did not have the types of border
controls that supposedly we have today, even with Europeanisation. I’m talking very
much about the European Union and I recognize that Iceland is a totally different
story, but again, I have to confine myself to what I know and you will interpret how
that applies or does not apply to the case of Iceland. Anyhow, in this context of
Western Europe in the past where you have inequality, you have migrant, you have
differences, that you did not have the tight border control that you have today. It is
interesting to raise the question; who migrated. Did everybody from poorer areas go
to the richer areas in Western Europe? There were barely border controls.
Furthermore, the questions of racism, racialization, discrimination, under conditions
where you have considerable equality in terms of certain issues, such as culture,
religion and superficial racial indicator, in a way that today, when you think about the

French debate about Islam and France, or the question of Turkish people in Germany,
or the question of racialized minorities in the UK. You know, today it’s different, so
the question then, the third question, one could say, for western Europe is, at the time
when the immigrant was phenotypically very similar to the resident community, when
the question of regligion played differently, with either a fanatic destinction, or it was
more or less the same overall religious, you know, range of religious, if you want.
What that immigrant racialized, you know what I mean by racialized; it is the
construction of somebody who is different, the other, etc. And the answer is frankly
yes, which to me is enourmously significant. Because in the context of current debate
the notion is where we don’t want too many immigrants, because they are of a
different culture, they are of a different religion. The distance questions if you are
constructed in terms of different religion, different culture. Never name the question
of race, racialization etc. But when you look at the past, you see these people, they
looked more or less the same, they had more or less the same overarching culture,
simply from a perspective of today, a European culture, and they had more or less the
same religion. They were still constructed as a foreigner, the outsider etc. So I think
that is a very important lesson from the past. Now, to the question of who comes, who
leaves their towns, their villages, their country etc. The past tells us some very
interesting stories. Number one, most people who were in disadvantaged locations
within western Europe, who were at reasonable distances, and remember that walking
is the main mode of transport still in the seventeen hundred and much of the eighteen
hundred, most people, I repeat, were in disadvantaged and poorer locations at
reasonable distance from locations of prosperity, which were more over well known
locations of prosperity did not move. Even though one could say they would have
enhanced their income if they would have moved. Secondly, in looking at the
literature, there is enourmously rich literature, that really is a literature, that is known
by migration, by the way, that is a research literature that tries to understand the
development of industrialization, up and up the level of villages and towns and
regions, and you have enourmously detailed material. When I was doing this book,
Guests and aliens, I really got lost in some of that. Wonderful research literature. And
what it shows us, I mean I sort of analytically have pulled out elements from that
literature, I’m sure I have done violence in doing that to the integrity of the historians
who count, but you know, that’s what happens. In looking at it I began to see that it
was also certain very objective condition, the kinds of crop they planted, what kind of
weavers they were, etc. etc., which created conditions for a household, to actually free
up a bunch of members of a household to go into a migrant labour stream. Finally, the
question of recruitment. Recruitment was enourmously important. The vinyards in
France counted on seasonal migrants coming. It began in seventeen hundred, already
probably earlier, it went throughout the eighteen hundred no matter wars, no matter
what was happening. And that often was innoceeded?? by recruitment, but there were
very, very specific conditions, that transformed, if you want, a condition of poverty,
unemployment, insufficient work, into a migration push fact(or). Even at a time, as I
said, when the distances were fairly resonable, when border control was not what it is
today, most people who could have migrated, if we just thought of it in poverty terms,
unemployment and underemployment terms, did not migrate. Why do I make so much
out of these conditions of the past and what they tell us? Because in looking at the
literature, the emourmous literature, today, on migrations today, and that means
literature by different social science disipline covering different immigrant
comunities, in different countries and locals within countries. There must be
thousands, and thousands, and thousands of people who right now, as we are sitting

here, are working on one or another aspect of one or another community in one or
another city, town, inside Germany, inside France, inside Italy. We have an
enourmous amount of research, some of it excellent, some of it very bad, some of it
objective, or at least it needs aspiration, some of it patently political and analogical,
no matter. We have an enourmous amount of data. I can not claim that I have read all
of that, but since I speak six languages I have read a lot. And I have read a lot of
material that comes, from what I would like to think of as a decentered perspective. It
is not coming from the center. It is coming from a multiplicity of often very, very
obscure, if you want, scholarly surface. Not just from the main research centers, the
main universities, a lot, a lot of stuff. It strikes me that with so much information, with
so much material we today know a lot about international migration. Secondly, what
that literature tells us, tells me, is that a lot of the politics, the politics of fear, the
politics of crises, within which the question of immigration is often located, situated,
is inaquate, it is incorrect, and let me sort of spell out what I mean by this. I think that
like was the case in the past, today international migration flows involve a minority of
people, a tiny little minority of all the people in all these countries, in all of towns, in
all of villages that could in principle be migrant if we just understood it in the terms in
which it is usually understood, which is if you’re poor, if you’re underemployed, if
you’re unemployed and there are locations where you could get a job, make more
money, look at the foreign exchange rate etc, etc, why not move. It turns out that we
humans simply cannot be reduced to that enourmously rational economic conduct that
is so persuasive. Because the truth of the matter is that when you think logically about
these things you would say why would they not move. Even if they just moved for
two years they would be better off in principle. But they don’t. And I think that we
need to introduce, in a way not narrow dynamic variable to understand that. Now
again, the main point for talking about it, the main point for making a big issue about
it, for me and for others like myself, is that it should feed, it should help us with the
policy question. Thinking about immigration in the rich countries of the world today,
thinking mostly the North Atlantic, Western Europe, North America, but it also in fact
includes countries like Japan and other countries. Thinking, lets just stick with the
North Atlantic, this is were we are, I realize that … the North Atlantic, probably she
thinks Iceland is really in the middle of the North Atlantic. Most people think Western
Europe and North America, sort of, and you’re rising between. But let’s just think
about this broader region. I think that the way the policy around immigration is being
handled is not very enlightened and is not sustainable. Doing policy when you think
that you are going to be invaded by the three billion poor who are in the world would
certainly be a terrifying task to address. It is much better to try to be very sober about
what is really happening, and it is in that spirit that I emphasize and repeat over and
over these issues about patterning, limited numbers etc. So let me just develop it a bit
in terms of what is it that we know from the literature. Who is coming, from where
are they coming, the durations, the numbers, the levels. Secondly, earth globalization,
with all the growth in interdependencies that it brings alters that picture, and I think it
does a bit, but in terms of what we know from the literature, there is enourmous
patterning in migration flows, and this I cannot repeat enough, how important an issue
this is when we are thinking about doing policy. The patterning shows us, number one
that the numbers are always minorities. For most countries, emmigration flows are a
minority of the population. For most receiving countries immigration is a minority of
the population. Now, there are exceptions, Luxemburg has a very high incidents,
some of the rich Arab oil exporting countries have very high incidences. Those are
very unusual cases. They are very extreme conditions. If you look at the big, big

countries, the United States, 13% are immigrants and we have a lot of history, we
were build through immigration and colonization etc. So, I do think they are
enourmously important, to consider the fact as serious fact. Secondly, that is not
simply the result of effective state control. This is not the case, because there is pent
up demand and those people who are determined to immigrate tend to come in no
matter how militarized the border. We in the United States with Mexico have the most
militarized border in the world. The Berlin wall was kindergarten stuff compared with
what we have in the Mexico … We have helicopters with infrared equiptment, we
have hundreds of helicopters. We have an enourmous apparel, militarized apparel that
controls our border. And yet, guess what, they can’t control the populous. So there we
are then , by god, if a person, if a group is determined to cross the border they will,
often at high cost. There are dead, there are dead every day in the crossing of that
border. Now I remember when the Berlin wall was up, boy did we document every
single death. The world press, because this was partly called war etc, documented
every wall crossing and the tragic death that came with that. In the United States it
would be impossible to document all the death. Every day and some of them die, of
course, of exposure in crossing through very rough terrain. This is serious stuff, but
anyhow the main point I wanted to pull out is that we cannot interpret the outcome
that I referred to, which is that it is always the minority, no matter how poor the
neighboring country and no matter that it be a neighboring country, who actually
become immegrants. And that cannot be interpreted as being the consequence of
effective state controls. When you look at the policy in the United States, this fact is
an enourmously important fact. It is a fact that is also enourmously important to make
work for us in terms of policy design. The obsession is still effective state control.
Now, state control makes a difference. It makes a difference in two ways. It does raise
the … . It is a costlier operation of into your own body, of course. To immigrate is
state controlled and your only restort is an undocumented path into the country.
Secondly, it criminalizes the undoucmented immigrant, that has its own significant
consequences for the receiving economy, you know, good for certain types of
employers, bad in some broader sense, etc. etc. So, the fact of state attempts to control
a border is not an innocent event. It is a charge event and it does have an impact on
shaping immigration. There is no doubt about it. But that is still different from saying
that state control is a mechanism, an effective mechanism to shape the immigration
history of a country. I think that is far more problematic than …. . A second feature
that the literature shows us about migration if you want the imperical regularity that
you see in migration after migration, the fact of the duration of immigration flows.
We tend to be submerged in the notion that, my god, once “they” start coming, they
won’t stop coming, when, in fact, all the time you can look at many different
migration flows. There are durations for these. These are highly structured complex
social proceedings, and they last for a given period of time. It seems that in that realm
of the social science study unlike perhaps theologian, nothing is forever. Nothing. No
matter what power is amassed by a given system, eventually it will become undone.
Often under the most untypically, I would argue, under the most unexpected
conditions, sort of find it never predicts discontinuity. Look at what happened now in
Jugoslavia, look what happened in the Soviet Union. What happened with the Latin
America military dictatorship that sort of exploded in the case after waiting … civil
war, it was not a civil war that brought the dictatorship down, it was other elements. I
grew up in Latin America. So, there is something about this question of duration that
is understudied and underutilized and recognized, I think, among policy makers and
policy analysts. Look at Western Europe, I mean, it is such an interesting story.

Italians, Spaniards, significant migrants for the Northern European countries. They
came at a time when there were border controls. 1973 most of these countries began
to close up and sent a lot of them back. Look at the 1990s, they can go where ever
they want, because they are members of the European Union. I mean Italians,
Spaniards, Portugeese, etc. They are not. Those migrations have come to an end.
There is still migration, but it is not what it was in the sixties and in the early
seventies. A time when, of course, they were often inniciated to recruitment. So that is
a very clear examble where now that there is the offer of enourmous mobility these
people are not necessarily moving. So again, there was a duration attached to that post
world war two migration flow. In the same way that there were durations attached to
the migrations of Northern Italians to various parts of Europe to build tunnels, build
railroads, you know, build the palaces in Stockholm, etc.etc..When …and Sweden
decided to become a kingdom, they wanted palaces and they brought in Italian
stoneworkers. So, this question of the duration of migrations, I think that in many of
the current migrations, let say, in the Unitied States, we see that same sort of curve, if
you want. They begin, they grow, at a certain state they stabilize and then they
decline. And one of the interesting questions is why. And I think that the answer lies
in the broader system within which these migrations are imbedded. And you can see
that labour migrations, I mean refugee flows are a bit of a different story, that labour
migrations are very much shaved and partly produced by broader social economic
conditions. They are in that sense, if you want, what we social scientists would say, a
dependent variable, even though there is agency in the innitiating of these flows. I
mean, one of the interesting questions is: if there is a tradition of emigration in a given
region, in a given town, you know, who is it that migrates? Once you have a tradition
of emigration like you have in whole number of areas, say, in Mexico today, why is it
that not everybody migrates. When you have already the subjective bridges, if you
want, and the objective bridges, that connect areas, why is it that some people migrate
and not others. Because those are extreme test cases, if you follow what I’m trying to
say. And I have now had a couple of students doing doctoral dissertations on this,
because you really need the passion and the length of commitment of a doctoral
dissertation to do the research on some of these issues, so I think that the younger
generations who are doing these doctoral research work on these subjects, are making
an enourmous contribution. And one of the things they found was that the person who
migrates under conditions where you have a tradition of emigration is a person who
believes that his or her work will really make a difference. So that they can go from a
Mexican village to the United States city, work hard, and it will pay off. Secondly, the
one who migrates is the one that the household allocates, that’s a different story. But
in the first case, you can see a very specific social psychological patterning in the one
who wants to become the emigrant. That also tells us, and we know that in the United
States very very clearly, that overall the immigrant population has an enourmous
amount of self-election. Boy, are they willing to work hard. Boy, do they believe in
the American dream. If you work hard, you do make it. Most Americans no longer
believe in that dream, but the immigrants do. Do they believe that unions can make a
difference? Yes they do. They are the ones who are far more likely to join unions
today, than third, fourth, fifth generation Americans. So there is a social psychology, I
don’t want to make too much out of this, I always feel very uncomfortable with social
psychology, because you don’t really know enough what happens in the minds of
people, certainly people we who don’t know very well. But evidence signals that the
person who emigrates has a certain kind of social psychological configuration. There
is the other group and those are the dependant, or the people that are allocated by the

household to migrate. But anyhow, also this case again we see that it is sort of a
minority of people who really are the ones who are going to migrate. Finalizing on the
question of duration, one aspect that is very underrepresented in the research literature
of immigration, which I think again is crucial for policy making, is the fact agree
term. We have known that in the case of the United States all these large migrations
of Italians that came in the early nineteen hundreds. Sixty percent of these people
went back to Italy. In the United States we don’t even keep statistics on return
migration. In fact, if everybody wants to come, that’s the basic mind set, and I see the
same thing in the Western European countries, everybody wants to come here. And
once they are here they are so happy that they all want to stay. It is simply not true. It
is simply not the case. And so, if it is indeed the fact that … vary from one group to
another, a very significant group of migrants actually do go back. Well, that should
also alter the question of policy, and not this notion of invasion, this notion of
practical control… . Furthermore, we also know that once people are given the tool to
organize their return or to organize their situation, … want to cross borders, they use
those tools. We know for instance when amnesty was given to a very large number,
over a million, Mexicans in the United States who were here adopted. This was the
first big amnesty program, that we had in nineteen eighty-six. So we have a lot of
history in this …, I mean I’m clearly not a historian when I say a lot of history. We
have a lot of years, and a lot of, if you want, evidence, even though it’s fragmentary
evidence. And what happened was that as soon as many of these Mexicans who were
undocumented in the United States got legalized, they went back to Mexico. Because
now they had the option to come back into the United States for six months, for three
months, or in two years or in five years or whatever. So that the policy that we have
and this is the case also in European countries, is one where in the obsession of
controlling, they prevent significant numbers of migrants. who would like to spend
less time in Germany or in France or in the United States, to have a more circulatory
pattern. Now, big footnote. There are all kind of problems with circulating migrants,
no doubt about it. But still, I think that we can, and again this holds very much for
rich countries to think that they are highly desirable, for about anybody in the world.
We cannot use the preference of immigrants. As an indicator of all of those who want
to be in the country, the millions of immigrants in the United States were there
including the undocumented, we cannot simply assume, aha, if they are here, they are
here because they want to be here. Because, again now we have launched research on
this to try to understand; do all the undocumented who are here, we did this in New
York, do they really want to be here? Or are they captive of their situation. Either they
haven’t make enough money to pay back their …, you know, their dept of honour to
their relatives or friends back home etc, or because if they leave they will have
difficulty in getting back in. The risks of undocumented entry etc. etc. And we know,
and these… stories became spectacular stories, you know, front page coverage, that
some of these people are captive, and so the money was raised to facilitate their return
back home. Because they really wanted to go back home. So, there is an enourmous
amount, to create a summary image here, of patterning, both in terms of numbers,
both in terms of the duration of migration, and also in terms of, and I have not really
talked about this very much, from where people are coming and to where they go.
And this I just want to address now very quickly. This third aspect of patterning really
has to do with the fact that it is certain locations within countries that tend to produce
most of the emigrants, and this is difficult research to do, by the way, and also it’s a
question of research that only surfaced, I would say, in the last decade or so. So, we
don’t have enough analyse that tells us from where most of the emigrants of a certain

nationality actually came, inside the countries. We know, for instance, with the case
of the Turkish migration to Germany, that it was, certainly in its initial stage, a certain
kind of region within Turky that produced most of the emigrants. We know that at
the beginning of the Dominican migration to the United States it was a certain kind of
location within the Dominican Republic that produced most of the migrants.
Secondly, we know that they tend to go to certain locations. Again, in the case of the
United States it is interesting because it is such an enourmous country. It is so big. But
this notion that the migrants go to those places where most of the new jobs are etc, but
no, they go where there are other immigrant communities already etc. There are, if
you want, real bridges that connect specific locations and regions, within the sending
countries with specific locations in the receiving countries. Again, this is an incredible
amount of patterning. We know of seasonal migration flows which go on and on for
decades that bring migrants from particular parts of Mexico to particular parts in
Illinois, which is a state in the middle of the United States. Things like that. Now,
does the issue of globalization, does the issue of the new technology alter this level of
patterning. Does it free us, this embellishment of migration flows, which gives
migration, which has not given migration historically for both the eighteen hundred
and most of the nineteen hundred, shape, you know, contour, bordering, limited
orders of magnitude, limited termporal frame, all of these things I’ve been talking
about. Do the current conditions alter that patterning? Yes and no. But you know it,
we always are prudent here. No, because we are dealing ultimately with millions of
people world wide. The estimate worldwide, you know, these figures are enourmously
problematic, in fact, there are about a hundred and twenty immigrants that we can
count because they are officially throughout the world, which you realize how little
that is in a population of six billion. You know the sixth billionth baby was just born
in Sarajevo, right? Photographed around the world. I don’t know how they counted
the six billion, no matter, those are other issues. Of those that I repeated less than half
are in the rich countries, in the highly developed countries. So we are dealing with a
population of legal recognized immigrants, you know whatever the truth is, we tend to
speak about permanent immigrants in about sixty million. So even though it is a very
tiny minority of people, and if you add the undoucmented it goes up to about two
hundred million. Most of the undocumented are not yet in the highly developed
countries. They are mostly in, you know, the sub-Sahara migrations. The Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Afganistan etc. areas of the world. So, though it is a minority, it is a
minority of minorities, bla bla bla. It still is millions. To a very large extent, these
flows are embedded in existing patterning, often already immigrant communities, etc.
So there is only so much that new technology, new cross border dynamics, you know,
everything that we can summerize under the image of globalization, can do to those
flows. Those flows have their own way of existing as dynamics that will continue, and
there is some point again, their duration will come to an end. But there are ways, I
think, in which globalization does alter the migration picture. And they also relate to
questions of policy. I need to know, am I right in thinking that I’m running out of
time, or not. Moderator? Yes, ok. So, very quickly, one big difference, and I just
finished a little research project on this, and I would be happy to share the paper with
whoever is interested. It is a fact, now this is my way of looking at it, alright. This is
not necessarily everybody’s way of looking at it. But I think that civilization has
created an infrastructure for cross border flows, whether that is money, goods, or
people. That while (it aims) at questions of capital, and certain types of economic
aspects; money, information, specialized service professionals, etc, (it sets up) a set of
new bridges, a new enabling environment for other kinds of flows, which were not

meant to travel that cross border infrastructure, to take place as well. The clearest
issue is money laundrying. I’m just giving this as an example. So you set up global
markets in finance. You set up an environment that facilitates the cross border flow of
money. Well, dirty money is also, no I don’t know, I think that all money is a bit dirty
anyhow. You know, what we usually call dirty money, is also going to be flowing to
that. Now, how does that affect immigrants? Well, here is what I think how it affects,
and how it affects the patterning that I was talking about, and that is illigal trafficing
in people. Now, that has grown enourmously over the last decade. It coincides with
the end of the socalled, of the cold war, which was not all that cold, mind you, that is
way I always like to say socalled cold war. There were a lot of death off shore or in
shore of the main countries involved. That political little statement aside, I will
proceed. In the last ten years both globalization, the end of the cold war, I think, half
created conditions for illigal trafficing that had the power to alter those existing
patterns. Trafficing for women in the sex industry has exploded on the scene, etc, etc.
Now, the actual numbers involved are not large, but they are growing. Secondly, the
infrastructure is there, to expand illigal trafficing. Thirdly, very, very varnishious fact,
is that the trafficers are in business. Their business depends on people being willing to
believe that they can be trafficed and that it will work for them. I mean, most of these
are not kidnapped, most of these… negotions at some point. Now, often at negotions
is the household deciding they can relinguish one of their daughters, to whatever they
think is going to happen. I don’t know much they understand or not. But, to a very
large extent there is the propaganda, if you want, of the illigal trafficers that persuade
people to subject to, you know, to be subjected to the trafficing. So, this does alter the
pattern, because this is active propaganda. Illigal trafficers are in the business of
trafficing people. The same as McDonalds try to get you all to eat McDonald
hamburgers. By god, those trafficers are trying to persuade as many people as they
can to be trafficed. This is very disturbing. Besides the issues of exploitation, you
know etc, etc, there is a question of really going out there recruiting trafficese, so to
speak. So, that does alter the issue of policy. Finally, I think, and I will conclude with
this, the question of globalization creates, I think, unsustainable controdictions in our
policy regimes, that are going to have to be worked out. And I think the only way to
work them out is not laterally, even though multi lateralism indictates …, it is
something that should be of a highly specialized and regional sort, not another parallel
United Nations for migration. That is not what I had in mind when I say multi
lateralism. Now, the question of globalization produces these unsustainable tensions,
because on the one hand the new regimes were setting up regimes that alter the
functioning of the border. They try to nutralize the border. The border is really an
institution, it is an institutional encasing of the geographic condition. Regarding
capital information and specialized professionals, the border is thinned out
institutionally. It is still there, but it is thinned out. The institutions around it are not
given towards control, they are given towards enabling the cross border flow. That
means a radical reorienting of state apperatuses towards facilitating cross border
flows. That is what most of the new policies that states are engaged in, whether it is
regarding finance, telecommunications, trade questions, is rethinking their roles, not
as controlling borders, but as making borders, sort of bell that moves things, that
facilitates. That is a far more radical transformation, I think that seems to be
understood by a lot of the general commentery, in the press, for instance. They see
that the immigration it is towards control. Is it sustainable within the same state
apperatus to have these two orientations? I think, in the long run, it is not sustainable.
There is a lot of disagreement, certainly in the United States, with that decision of

mine. They say, why the hell, why not, of course we can do it. Every now and then
you see the contradiction at work. When the migration police and the drug police
wanted to institute control on trucks, trucks being related to trade, right, cross border
trade. Because the notion is that the drugs are coming in the trucks and so are the
undocumented immigrants, which means stopping all trucks for inspection. Guess
who protested? Anybody related to trade on both sides of the border. So, the tr … the
most elementary of fight in our complex economic system became one of the sides
where the contradictions in these two types of policies become evident. That slow
down of trade was not easily accomodated by the system. So, at that point somehing
had to give. You’ll have many other instances where you see this contradiction.
Finally, I think it is not sustainable because it brings about an emphasize on policing.
The sight for enforcement of regulatory issues concerning immigration becomes the
body of the immigrant. And in the end, in our society under the rule of law, imperfect
as that rule of law is, all rules of law are reflected by power systems and inequalities,
but still, at least it is a set of rules of the game that you can count on. But is our
country so attached to the notion that we are presided under the rule of law, excepted
policing of the other, the undocumented, eventually is going to enter the sphere of
civil society. And it is like a little cancer in the inside of the system. The fifty-nine
migrants who died in that truck in Dover, they died short of the UK, on the territory of
the UK. That is happening inside a society, under the rule of law. That is not just
because they are undocumented immigrants, happening outside. We have multiple
such incidents. Can we accommodate this in the long run? With our rule of law? I
believe we cannot. Thank you very much.


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