In Search of Alpha October 2000 Hedge Funds - The Basics Revisited Defining Hedge Funds "During the French Revolution such speculators were known as agitateurs, and they were beheaded. Michel Sapin There are nearly as many definitions of hedge funds as there are hedge funds. We think the following is the best description: Definition Hedge funds are private partnerships wherein the manager or general partner has a significant personal stake in the fund and is free to operate in a variety of markets and to utilise investments and strategies with variable long/short exposures and degrees of leverage. 2 Beyond the basic characteristics embodied in this definition, hedge funds commonly share a variety of other structural traits. They are typically organised as limited partnerships or limited liability companies. They are often domiciled off shore, for tax and regulatory reasons. And, unlike traditional funds, they are not burdened by regulation. Alternative Investm ent AIS comprise an asset class that seeks to generate absolute positive returns by Strategies (AIS) exploiting market inefficiencies while minimising exposure and correlation to traditional stock and bond investments. Normally, private equity as well as hedge fund investing are referred to as AIS. Skill-based strategies As we elaborate later in this report, the reputation of hedge funds is not particularly versus strategies capturing good. The term 'hedge fund' suffers from a similar fate as 'derivatives' due to a an asset class mixture of myth, misrepresentation, negative press and high-profile casualties. Hedge fund strategies are occasionally also referred to as skill-based strategies or absolute return strategies which, from a marketing perspective, avoids the negative bias attached to the misleading term 'hedge fund'. Skill-based strategies differ from traditional strategies. The former yields a particular return associated to the skill of a manager whereas the latter primarily captures the asset class premium. Skill-based strategies involve, from an investors perspective, the following three attributes: • High expected risk-adjusted returns; • Low correlation with traditional asset classes; • A source of return not explained by the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Michel Sapin, form er French Finance Minister, on speculative attacks on the Franc (from Bekier 1996) from Crerend 1995 In Search of Alpha October 2000 Main Characteristics of the Hedge Fund Industry Industry Size and Grow th US$1tr assets under Estimates of the size of the hedge fund industry are scarce and deviate substantially. m anagem ent as of 1998 The estimates for the number of funds ranges between 2,500 and 6,000 and assets under management between US$200bn and US$1tr. The President's Working Group estimates that the hedge funds universe as of mid-1998 was between 2,500 and 3,500 funds, managing between US$200bn and US$300bn in capital, with approximately US$800bn to US$ 1tr in total assets.' Still a niche industry Compared with other US financial institutions, the estimated US$1tr in assets under management remains relatively small. At the end of 1998, commercial banks had US$4.1tr in total assets, mutual funds had assets of approximately US$5tr, private pension funds had US$4.3tr, state and local retirement funds had US$2.3tr, and insurance companies had assets of US$3.7tr. 2 The CalPERS bom bshell - The California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) dropped a legitim ising hedge fund bombshell on the hedge fund industry on 31 August 1999, when it released a investing statement saying it would invest as much as US$1 1bn into 'hybrid investments', including hedge funds. While many other large and sophisticated institutional investors have been investing in the AIS sectors for years, the announcement by CalPERS further legitimised AIS investments for the broad base of institutions seeking viable alternatives to their reliance on ever-increasing stock prices. One year after the LTCM collapse, when it was nothing more than a fading memory, new hedge funds were hatching at the quickest pace ever seen. Net capital flows into the industry were picking up from 1998's retrenchment, placing the industry on the threshold of a long-term boom. Som e of the m ost While sophisticated individual investors (up to 75% of hedge fund assets, according conservative and to some estimates)3 have historically targeted hedge funds, in recent years the sophisticated investors participation of institutional investors has risen. In the US, for example, institutional invest in hedge funds investors accounted for nearly 30% of new money flowing into hedge funds in the past few years. University foundations and endowments are among the most aggressive institutional investors. It is commonly known that the 'Ivy League' schools such as Harvard and Princeton have large allocations to hedge funds. On the corporate side, large conservative firms such as IBM or RJR Reynolds have been investing in hedge funds for years. Pension funds, under pressure to constantly look for new ways to diversify their holdings, are also starting to allocate capital to hedge funds. In addition, over-funded pension funds seek to preserve wealth by lowering risk . I Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management - The Report of The President's Working Group on Financial Markets, April 1999. 2 From Board of Gov ernors of the Federal Reserv e Sy stem, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United Sta tes, Fourth Quarter 1998. 3 See Hopkins (2000) In Search of Alpha October 2000 Supply driven expansion in Increased institutional participation portends a fundamental shift in the quality of the past versus…. hedge fund programmes. In the past, the establishment of hedge funds has been largely supply-driven. Successful investors, often the heads of proprietary trading desks, decided to forego their lucrative seven and eight figure Wall Street remuneration packages to establish boutique organizations as the primary vehicle for managing their own personal assets. Earning a return on their own assets (versus the collection of fees from outside investors) was the primary motivator for early hedge fund entrants. Entry costs were high as the dealer community set lofty standards for those to which it would lend money/stock and establish trading lines. …today's demand driven Increasing participation from institutions is beginning to shift the expansion from growth being supply driven to demand driven. This motivates a vast group of aspirants to enter the competition for these new US dollars and euros. At the same time, the barriers to entry have been tom down. There have been hedge funds launched by 20-year olds with little to no resources or investment experience. Growth in funds-of-funds As a result, the differentiation between quality and sub-standard managers is industry becoming more pronounced. Quality hedge fund managers should benefit from a proliferation of ill-managed funds, while investors need to stay alert to this potential degradation in the quality of hedge fund management. This proliferation and the high costs associated with actively selecting hedge funds are among the main reasons for accelerated growth in the funds -of-funds-industry. We will take a closer look at funds-of-funds on p94. The following two sections examine the distribution of dollars invested in hedge funds, by fund size and by fund investment style. Source: Van Hedge Fund Advisors In Search of Alpha October 2000 Average fund size is falling Chart 1 shows the distribution of hedge funds by size. As of 1999, around 83% of all funds under management were allocated to funds below US$100m and around 52% to funds smaller than US$25m. The average size of hedge funds is decreasing. Based on the 1,305 hedge funds in the MAR/Hedge database (not shown in graph), the average fund size in October 1999 was US$93m compared with US$135m a year earlier. Distribution by Style Table 1: Number of Funds and Assets Under Management by Style as of 1998 (%) Funds Assets under management Long/short equity 30.6 29.8 Managed futures 18.6 15.9 Funds-of-funds 14.1 NA* Event-driven 11.9 16.6 Emerging markets 5.6 3.5 Fixed income arbitrage 5.1 7.7 Global macro 4.0 14.9 Equity market neutral 3.8 3.9 Convertible arbitrage 3.5 4.4 Equity trading 1.1 2.4 Dedicated short bias 0.5 0.4 Other 1.2 0.5 Source: Tremont (1999) * As funds of funds invest in other funds the percentage of all hedge funds assets under management has not been given to avo id double counting Equity long/short largest Long/short equity is the largest style with a market share of around 30%, based on investment style the number of funds as well as assets under management. The funds of funds industry was around 12-14% of the total number of funds. We expect this percentage to increase, as for most investors a diversified exposure to hedge funds is more appropriate than carrying single-fund risk and picking single hedge funds is time consuming and costly. We will address the costs of picking hedge funds later in the document (p94) Fewer macro funds Note that only around 4% of funds are macro funds but they represent around 15% of the industry. The percentage of macro funds fell to around 22% by 1997 (Table 2) and 15% by 1998 (Table 1). We expect these percentages to be even lower today after large losses (Tiger) and retreats (Quantum). The following table compares allocation differences between 1990 and 1997. In Search of Alpha October 2000 In Table 2: Assets Under Management Comparison Between 1990 and 1997 (%) 1990 1997 Change Macro 50.6 22.4 -28.2 Equity Non-Hedge 14.1 15.8 1.7 Equity Hedge 9.8 14.8 5.0 Em erging m arkets 2.8 12.7 9.9 Event-Driven 4.5 7.9 3.4 Equity m arket-neutral 1.0 4.7 3.7 Sector 0.5 3.5 3.0 Distressed securities 1.7 2.5 0.8 Fixed incom e arbitrage 0.6 2.0 1.4 Convertible arbitrage 1.9 1.8 -0.1 Risk arbitrage 0.2 0.9 0.7 Short selling 2.7 0.2 -2.5 Other 9.6 10.8 1.2 Source: Nicholas (1999) Note that Equity Non-Hedge and Equity Hedge is roughly what others define as long/short equity. The market share of long/short equity, therefore, is around 30%. This is consistent with data from Tremont (1999). Use of Leverage Different hedge fund Leverage is an important issue to most investors when investing in hedge funds. strategies require different Institutionally, leverage is defined in balance sheet terms as the ratio of total assets degrees of leverage to equity capital (net worth). Alternatively, leverage can be defined in terms of risk, in which case it is a measure of economic risk relative to capital. Vulnerable to liquidity Hedge funds vary greatly in their use of leverage. Nevertheless, compared with shocks other trading institutions, hedge funds' use of leverage, combined with any structured or illiquid positions whose full value cannot be realised in a quick sale, can potentially make them somewhat fragile institutions that are vulnerable to liquidity shocks. While trading desks of investment banks may take positions similar to hedge funds, these organisations and their parent firms often have both liquidity sources and independent streams of income from other activities that can offset the riskiness of their positions. The following table shows our own estimates of how different hedge fund managers are typically leveraged. In Search of Alpha October 2000 Table 3: Estim ated Use of Balance Shee t Leverage (%) Balance-sheet leverage Fixed incom e arbitrage 20-30 Convertible arbitrage 2-10 Risk arbitrage 2-5 Equity m arket-neutral 1-5 Equity Long/Short 1-2 Distressed securities 1-2 Em erging m arkets 1-1.5 Short selling 1-1.5 Source: UBS Warburg estimates Around 72% of hedge funds Based on a report from Van Money Manager Research around 72% of hedge funds use leverage used leverage as of December 1999. However, only around 20% have balance-sheet leverage ratios of more than 2:1. Fixed income arbitrageurs operate with the smallest margins and therefore gear up heavily to meet their return target. Hedge funds that operate in emerging markets, for example, use little leverage primarily because derivatives markets and securities lending is not developed. Using leverage and using derivatives are often regarded as synonymous. This is a misconception, which we address later in the document (p88). Table 4 shows the use of derivatives by investment style. Table 4: Use of Derivatives of Global Hedge Funds in 1995 (%) No derivatives Use of derivatives _____________________________________________________________ Total Hedging Yield enhancem ent Both Total only only Total Sam ple 28.1 48.8 1.4 21.7 71.9 Fund of Funds 6.3 53.4 0.0 40.2 93.7 Market Tim ing 13.8 55.2 6.9 24.1 86.2 Macro 20.5 38.6 0.0 40.9 79.5 Em erging Markets 21.6 64.9 0.0 13.5 78.4 Short Selling 23.3 46.7 0.0 30.0 76.7 Market Neutral - Arbitrage 23.5 55.1 1.0 21.4 76.5 Opportunistic 23.9 36.6 5.6 33.8 76.1 Special Situations 25.0 63.2 0.0 11.8 75.0 Market Neutral - Securities Hedging 33.3 43.3 0.0 23.3 66.7 Incom e 35.1 43.2 0.0 21.6 64.9 Value 37.6 50.5 2.6 9.3 62.4 Distressed Securities 42.9 37.1 0.0 20.0 57.1 Several Strategies 46.3 41.5 0.0 12.2 53.7 Aggressive Grow th 47.4 40.9 0.6 11.1 52.6 Source: Van Money Manager Research In Search of Alpha October 2000 Incentive to hedge Around 72% of hedge funds use derivatives primarily for hedging purposes. Unlike other money managers, the hedge fund manager's use of derivatives is not constrained by regulatory barriers. Furthermore, many hedge fund managers co me from a risk management (as opposed to a fund management) background which implies knowledge of risk management instruments and experience in its markets. A further reason for the extensive use of derivatives is the fact that the hedge fund managers' own capital is at stake. Capital depreciation of the fund, therefore, has a greater impact on the managers' wealth. Hence, a hedge fund manager has a large incentive to hedge (ie, preserve wealth). Some long-established macro funds find the fees on complex derivatives prohibitive. They find it cheaper to use conventional forwards and futures to take positions ahead of the market moves they foresee. Some newer macro funds pursue more specialised trading strategies using complex derivative securities. Relative-value funds are also inclined to use derivatives because the mis-priced securities they are seeking can be hidden within complex derivatives that combine several underlying assets. High leverage is the Hedge funds leverage the capital they invest by buying securities on margin and exception rather than the engaging in collateralised borrowing. Better known funds can buy structured rule derivative products without first putting up capital, but must make a succession of premium payments when the market in those securities trades up or down. In addition, some hedge funds negotiate secured credit lines with their banks, and some relative value funds may even obtain unsecured credit lines. Credit lines are expensive, however, and most managers use them mainly to finance calls for additional margin when the market moves against them. These practices may allow a few hedge funds to achieve very high leverage ratios. Characteristics of the 'Average' Hedge Fund The hedge fund industry is There is no typical hedge fund. One of the industry's main characteristics is heterogeneous heterogeneity and not homogeneity. However, Table 5 lists some averages from the Van Hedge hedge fund universe. Table 6 on p 13 lists some further characteristics. In Search of Alpha October 2000 Table 5: Global Hedge Fund Descriptive Statistics, as of Q4 99 Mean Median Mode Fund size (US$m ) 87 22 10 Fund age (years) 5,9 5.3 5.0 Minim um investm ent (US$) 695,000 250,000 250,000 Num ber of entry dates 34 12 12 Num ber of exit dates 28 4 4 Lockup period* 84 days 0 day NA Advance notice* 35 days 30 days NA Managem ent fee (%) 1.7 1.0 1.0 Perform ance related fee (%) 15.9 20.0 20.0 Manager's experience (years) in securities industry 17 15 10 in portfolio m anagem ent 11 10 10 Source: Van Money Manager Research; Liang (1999). * From Liang (1999) and as of July 1997 The mean measures the arithmetical average. The median measures the point on either side of w hich lies 50% of the distributio n. A median is often preferred over the mean as a measure of central tendency because the arithmetic average can be misleading if extreme values are present. The mode is the number, w hich occurs most frequently Table 6: Trends in Descriptive Statistics betw een 1995 and 1999 Characteristics Yes 1995 Yes 1999 (%) (%) Manager is a US registered investm ent advisor 54 45 Fund has hurdle rate 1 17 17 Fund has high w ater m ark 2 64 75 Fund has audited financial statem ents or audited perform ance 97 98 Manager has US$500,000 of ow n m oney in fund 78 75 Fund can handle 'hot issues' 3 25 53 Fund is diversified 57 57 Fund can short sell 76 84 Fund can use leverage 72 72 Fund uses derivatives for hedging only, or none 77 71 Source: Van Money Manager Research We will highlight some of the characteristics in Table 6 when we compare hedge funds with mutual funds on p51. In the following section we discuss the _________________________________ 1 Hurdle rate: The return above w hich a hedge fund manager begins taking incentive fees. For example, if a fund has a hurdle rate of 10%, and the fund returns 25% for the year, the fund w ill only take incentive fees on the 15% return above the hurdle rate. 2 High w ater mark: The assurance that a fund only takes fees on profits unique to an individual investment. For example, a US$1,000,000 investment is made in year one and the fund declines by 50%, leaving US$500,000 in the fund. In year tw o, the fund returns 100%, bringing the investment value back to US$1,000,000. If a fund has a high w ater mark, it w ill not take incentive fees on the return in year tw o, since the investment has never grow n. The fund w ill only take incentive fees if the investment grow s above the initial level of US$1,000,000. 3 A new ly issued stock that is in great demand and rises quickly in price. Special rules apply to the distribution of hot issues. developments in Europe which many regard as a growth area for raising capitol for absolute returns strategies. The Situation in Europe 56% of institutions either Ludgate1 conducted a survey on the hedge fund industry in Europe from an currently invest (17%) or investor’s perspective. The sample size was 100 major European institutional plan to invest (39%) investors domiciled in UK, Germany, France, Switzerland, Italy, Netherlands, and institutional m oney in Scandinavia. The number of sample institutions for each market was based on hedge funds in the future relative weighting of total assets under management in each market. All respondents were senior personnel involved in investment management, including 39 CIOs. Total assets of sample institutions represented over 60% of total assets under management by European institutions. The major findings summarized as: - 56% of institutions surveyed either currently invest (17%) or plan to invest (39%) institutional money into hedge funds in the foreseeable future; - Current investment money in hedge funds was greatest in France (33% of investors) and Switzerland (30%) and lowest in Germany (7%) and Italy (0%); - Biggest hedge fund growth markets were Scandinavia (67% of current non - Investors) and the Netherlands (62%); - 65% of all institutions surveyed thought that hedge funds would become an asset class in themselves Sw itzerland w ill have the Adding current institutional money in hedge funds to the funds which plan to enter largest and Germ any the the industry would result in Switzerland (87%) having the largest allocation of sm allest institutional institutional money, followed by the Netherlands (82%) and Scandinavia (77%). allocation to hedge funds 1The Future Role of Hedge Funds in European Institutional Asset Management , by Ludgate Communications, March 2000. In Search of Alpha October 2000 The smallest allocation would be held by German (24%) and Italian investors (60%). "We are not a casino!" - an Based on this survey, investing in hedge funds is not something widely considered investor by German investors. One investor was quoted as saying: "No, we don't (currently invest in hedge funds)! It is completely obvious that hedge funds don't work. We are not a casino. Note that the survey was conducted at the CIO level. Another investor was quoted arguing that investing in hedge funds is against their philosophy and that hedge funds still have a stigma attached to them. An Indocam/Watson Wyatt survey 1, which reveals similar results as the Ludgate survey, took a sample consisting of continental European pension funds across nine markets, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland. The survey contacted senior decision -makers at 284 continental European pension funds. Respondents were interviewed by telephone by experienced foreign language market researchers for an average time of about 25 minutes. The Indocam/Watson Wyatt survey addressed AIS in general, whereas the Ludgate survey focused particularly on investing in hedge funds. In Search of Alpha October 2000 European pension funds Of the Є886m in alternative investments analysed, private equity, hedge funds and have a sm all allocation to CTAs and international venture capital were found to be the most popular. AIS Nevertheless, within the context of the total investments made by all respondents, which totalled Є452bn, the alternative investment exposure is extremely small. Sw iss pension funds have Although 36 respondents invest in alternative asset classes, the predominant the largest allocation to AIS appetite accounting for over 90% of all mandates by value analysed was for Swiss respondents. Switzerland is believed to be one of the most important customer bases for non-traditional funds (Cottier 1996). Traditionally, many private banks in Geneva and Zurich have become spons ors and distributors of hedge funds through their vast private client base. Following a change in Swiss pension fund regulations, Swiss pension funds are allowed to take on more risk as long as they adhere to the 'Prudent Man Rule' 1 The European pension fund The generally low allocation to hedge funds by non-Swiss pension funds in Europe puzzle is puzzling. Relative performance and benchmarks may enable traditional managers to look at their competitive position relative to their peer group. But, consistent long-term returns - independent of market movements - make a compelling reason for embracing the world of absolute return for all investors, including pension funds. Concepts such as the core-satellite and/or the portable alpha approach 2 to investing large amounts of money strongly favour hedge fund investing for the active mandate in these approaches. A further interesting aspect of the Indocam/Watson Wyatt survey is the selection criteria for alternative investment managers. Table 9 shows the most important alternative investment manager selection criteria analysed geographically for those pension funds that are currently outsourcing these types of mandate. Table 9 only shows respondents from three countries for presentation purposes. __________________________ IIn the US, f or more than a century , the inv e6tment actions of f iduciaries hav e been subject to the test of the 'Prudent Man Rule' as interpreted by US courts. As enacted into legislation by most US states, the Prudent Man Rule holds that a f iduciary shall exercise the judgement and care, under the circumstances then prev ailing, which men of prudence, character and intelligence exercise in the management of their own af f airs, not in regard to speculation but in regard to the permanent disposition of their f unds, considering the probable income as well as the probable saf ety of their capital. 2 The core-satellite approach is an alternativ e to the 'all inclusiv e' balanced asset allocation approach. In a core-satellite strategy , a money manager will inv est ty pically 70-80% of its assets in an index tracking f und. Specialist f und managers are hired around this 'passiv e core' as 'satellites' to inv est in sectors where index -tracking techniques are dif f icult to apply , f or example AIS, smaller companies or emerging markets. With the portable alpha approach, the alpha of a manager or group of managers or strategy is transported to a target index. For example a pension f und allocates its f und to a bond manager who generates an alpha of 200bp y early without an increase in credit risk. In addition it swaps total returns of an equity index with the risk f ree rate. The end result is the total index return plus 200bp. This approach can be used quite broadly . Alpha can be generated in many dif f erent areas and transported into v irtually any index. The limiting f actor is the av ailability of deriv ativ es to carry out the alpha transf er. One of the disadv antages is the cost of the transf er. Howev er, if the target index is an index with a liquid f utures contract, the costs are usually less than 1 00bp per y ear. In Search of Alpha October2000 Mandate suitability is m ost Generally, the selection criteria do not differ substantially from those exhibited for im portant more conventional asset mandates. There is a considerable amount of u niformity relating to what respondents regarded as the most important of alternative investment manager selection criteria. These criteria generally relate to the mandate suitability, calibre of investment professionals and continuity, investment performance and client servicing. Fees do not seem to be an Once again, the least important of the alternative investment manager selection issue in selecting a criteria were remarkably similar when analysed geographically. Respondents m anager generally believed the 'softer' factors to be less important than selection criteria, namely brand comfort, culture of organisation, and prior knowledge of organisation. Additionally, fees were not deemed to be of particular importance for selection. Generally, the more operational of selection criteria, particularly quality of reporting and administration, were regarded as being of moderate importance by respondents. Low correlation is m ost When asked for their rationale for investing in AIS, the respondents collect ively attractive feature chose average low correlation as the most important aspect followed by outperformance against equity, outperformance against fixed income and hedge against inflation. According to Watson Wyatt and Indocam, of the 196 contin ental pension funds surveyed, some 30% outsourced to hedge funds or other alternative investment managers. Another 8% believe they will be doing so within three years. The following table shows future market appetite for AIS by 2003, based on the survey results. InSearchofAlpha October2OOO Table 10: Future Market Appetite for AIS to 2003 No. of funds % of fund invested in alternative asset classes by 2003 Belgium 2 2-10 Denmark 6 1-5 France 1 1 Germany 2 1 Ireland 1 3 Netherlands 10 2-10 Portugal 1 5 Sweden 6 5-9 Switzerland 14 2-9 Source: IndocamNatson Wyaft Allocations to AIS are Indocam/Watson Wyatt anticipate a rise of the allocation to alternative investments growing in Europe by respondents who already invest in AIS as well as those who are about to invest in these asset classes. The allocation from European pension funds could rise from less than Єlbn to in excess of Є12bn. As many Swiss respondents did not respond to the outlook for three years, this figure is probably understated. The most considerable growth is expected to come from the Dutch, Swedish and Swiss pension funds. Elsewhere, there is expected to be some appetite, at least, expressed, which is consistent with the findings from the Ludgate survey. No hedge funds, please, EuroHedge ran a story, examining why UK investors have a small allocation to growing in Europe hedge funds. It seems UK investors are following John Maynard Keynes' maxim that "worldly wisdom teaches us that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally." One of the deterrents is the fact that all investments, except UK equities an d bonds, are excluded from the government's minimum funding requirement. Another stumbling block is that, unlike their European counterparts, UK funds do not like pooled investment vehicles because of poor past experiences. And mid-sized pension funds appoint their managers as custodians, which hinders the adoption of specialist strategies. Allocating returns from pooled vehicles to individual clients is an obstacle. Fee structure is a concern While fees are of limited concern to pension fund managers on the continent (as in the UK surveys suggest), fees are a big stumbling block in the UK, according to EuroHedge. To the trustees of the average UK fund, which pays about 30bp for management, hedge fund charges of 1% or 2% management and 20% performance appear astronomical. Unless they are convinced that the value added is worth the charges, trustees are even less likely to pay an extra layer of fees for a fund of funds. Difficulties measuring total Another problem is that large UK pension funds aim for a target equity market exposure to equity market exposure, and will likely be either under or overweight their guidelines if their hedge fund manager's beta is constantly changing - as it will, especially if the ____________________ 1 EuroHedge, 31 July 2000. www.hedgeworld.com JnSearchofAlpha October2OOO manager uses leverage. This, in turn, makes it difficult for pension funds to track ‘active risk’ against their benchmark. In addition, the allocation by sector is becoming more important. British abstinence is However, the fact that these problems are being discussed is evidence of changing changing for the better attitudes. Pension consultants are warming to the concept of hedge funds - though with great caution, so as not to alienate clients. This concludes our brief round up of the hedge fund industry. In the following section, we describe the different hedge fund strategies. In Search of Alpha October2000 Hedge Fund Strategies Defining Hedge Fund Styles The beta of hedge funds We believe that one of the most important issues from an investor's perspective in can differ w idely terms of investing in hedge funds is the knowledge about the different investment styles in the hedge fund industry. Equity investors are typically familiar with the fact that the equity market has different sectors and styles to invest in and that the different styles have different return, risk and correlation characteristics. The same is true for hedge funds. There is a vast amount of different strategies available. The style differences of hedge funds differ widely in one respect with styles and sectors in the equity arena. In equities, all sector and style indices have a beta (exposure) to the market of around one. The beta of the different hedge fund styles varies from minus a multiple of one (short seller using leverage) to a multiple of plus one (long biased fund using leverage). Chart 4 segments some hedge fund strategies into styles and sub -styles. The classification is subjective. As with equities, there are different style classification systems in the market. For this report we focused on exposure (and therefore correlation) to the general market of the different strategies. Am biguous classification One of the main differences between hedge funds and other money managers is, as mentioned above, their heterogeneity and the fact that hedge funds are less regulated. This means categorising hedge funds is difficult and the above classification is therefore subjective, inconsistent with some hedge fund data vendors and incomplete. Any classification of hedge funds is an attempt at fitting something into a box. However, some hedge fund strategies do not fit into a box. There are many hedge funds, which do not fit into this classification and/or are hybrids of the above structure, ie, there are overlaps. However, for the purpose of In Search of Alpha October 2000 the description and performance analysis of the main styles (or skill-based strategies) the structure in Chart 4 is sufficient. Correlation w ith equity At the first level we distinguish between relative-value, event-driven and 'the rest' m arket as m ain classifier which we called 'opportunistic' in Chart 4. The main reason for this distinction is that relative-value had historically very little exposure/correlation to the overall market, whereas event-driven had little exposure/correlation and all other styles have variable degrees of exposure to the market. Being long or flat the We believe the main bone of contention in Chart 4 is probably the classification of m arket is a big differe nce long/short equity as opportunistic.' Long/short equity is the largest style in terms of number of managers pursuing the strategy. However, the managers in this group are not homogeneous. Some have long biases, others are market-neutral or short or vary over time. The managers in the long/short equity sub-style, who are close to market neutral are effectively pursuing a relative-value strategy and therefore are closer to the 'equity market neutral' camp. However, we justify the classification of eq uity long/short style as opportunistic because most managers have historically made the bulk of their gains on the long side, and, partly as a consequence, maintain net long exposure. In the following three chapters we highlight some of the main characteristics of the three styles and their sub-styles. A definition is given in the glossary on p173 for styles not covered here. ___________________ 1 For example, Schneew eis and Pescatore (1999) distinguish betw een five sectors (based on Evaluation Associates Capital Markets): relative value; event-driven; equity hedge; global asset allocators; and short selling. Long/short equity is a sub-sector of the relative value sector. It defines the equity hedge sector as long and short securities w ith varying degrees of exposure and leverage, such as domestic long equity (long undervalued US equities, short selling is used sparingly), domestic opportunistic equity (long and short US equities w ith ability to be net short overall), and global international (long undervalued global equities, short selling used opportunistically). We prefer our classification system because it allow s us to distinguish strategies w ith zero beta from the long-biased strategies. InSearchofAlpha October2OOO Relative-Value and Market Neutral Strategies This class of investment strategy seeks to profit by capitalising on the mispricings of related securities or financial instruments. Generally, relative-value and market neutral strategies avoid taking a directional bias with regards to the price movement of a specific stock or market. We believe this makes this style most appealing for investors who are looking for high and stable returns accompanied by low correlation to the equity market. Table 11: Sum m ary Risk/Return Characteristics Based on Historical Perform ance ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Sub-sector Returns Volatility Dow nside Sharpe Correlation Exposure Leverage Investm ent risk Ratio to equities to m arket Horizon Conv ertibles arbitrage Medium Low Low Medium Medium Low Medium Medium Fixed income arbitrage Low Low Medium Low Low Low High Medium Equity market-neutral Medium Low Low High Low Low Medium Medium Source: UBS Warburg Exploiting inefficiencies for Relative value and market-neutral strategies rely on identifying mispricings in a living financial markets. A spread is applied when an instrument (equity, convertible bond, equity market, etc.) deviates from its fair value and/or historical norm. Relative value strategies can be based on a formula, statistics or fundamental analysis. These strategies are engineered to profit if and when a particular instrument or spread returns to its theoretical or fair value. Hedged as in 'hedge funds' To concentrate on capturing these mispricings, these strategies often attempt to eliminate exposure to significant outside risks so that profits may be realised if and when the securities or instruments converge towards their theoretical or fair value. The ability to isolate a specific mispricing is possible because each strategy should typically include both long and short positions in related securities. In most cases, relative-value strategies will likely seek to hedge exposure to risks such as price movements of the underlying securities, market interest rates, foreign currencies and the movement of broad market indices. High risk-adjusted returns Disciples of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) argue that the con stant higher could be derived from faulty risk-adjusted returns of some hedge fund managers are derived from a faulty m ethodology of accounting methodology with respect to accounting for risk. Mean and variance do not fully for risk characterise the return distribution and understate true risk of skewed returns with fat tails. On pp98-150 we examine mean and variance characteristics as well as non-normality features of the return distribution of the various hedge fund strategies. We conclude that changing the methodology does not change the conclusion with respect to superior risk-adjusted returns. Convertible arbitrageurs Another argument brought against some relative value strategies is that m ade m oney in the 1929 opportunities are limited, ie, there is a capacity constraint. Hedge fund excess crash returns will diminish as soon as a discipline reaches a capacity limit. With respect to capacity constraints, we would like to quote a market comment from 193 1: "The last few years have been marked by steadily increasing arbitrage opportunities and arbitrage profits. Between 1927 and 1930 alone over In Search of Alpha October 2000 US$5bn worth of equivalent securities I were placed on the market. In the same years the profits to the arbitrageurs totalled many millions of dollars. The year 1929 was perhaps the most profitable year in arbitrage history, but each year has yielded its quota of profits. Even the year 1930, which was marked by steadily declining prices, yielded excellent profits.”2 “As long as there continue We believe this market comment highlights two aspects, or, conversely, two to be people like you, w e'll misconceptions of investing in hedge funds. These are: m ake m oney” 3 (1) Arbitrage is not a new concept. Mispriced derivatives and the exploitation of market inefficiencies by risk managers has been a feature of the industry for centuries; (2) Relative-value strategies can do well in falling markets too. One of the criticisms is that hedge fund investing is a child of the current bull market and therefore a bubble about to burst. This does not seem likely. The 1929/30 period was the worst in US stock market history and arbitrageurs made money. The reason is that panic results in market inefficiencies. When the majority of the market participants panic, alternative money managers, eventually, make money. We will quantify correlation in down-markets later in the document. In this report we analyse three relative-value strategies, namely convertible arbitrage, fixed income arbitrage and equity market neutral strategies. security is a predecessor term for conv ertibles I Equiv alent 2Frorn Weinstein (1931) 3Myron Scholes: "As long as there continue to be people like you, w e'll make money." See p66. In Search of Alpha October 2000 Convertibles Arbitrage Exploiting market Convertible arbitrage is the trading of related securities whose future relationship inefficiencies by hedging can be reasonable predicted. Convertible securities are usually either convertible equity, duration and credit bonds or convertible preferred shares, which are most often exchangeable into the risks common stock of the company issuing the convertible security. The managers in this category attempt to buy undervalued instruments that are convertible into equity and then hedge out the market risks. Fair value is based on the optionality in the convertible bond and the manager's assumption of the input variables, namely the future volatility of the stock. According to Tremont (1999), convertible arbitrage represents 3.5% of all funds and 4.4% of all assets under management. Nicholas (1999) estimates the assets under management in convertible arbitrage at only 1.8%. Buying cheap volatility Most managers view the discounted price of the convertible in terms of under- priced volatility, and use option-based models both to price the theoretical value of the instrument and to determine the appropriate delta hedge. The risk is that volatility will turn out lower-than-expected. Other managers analyse convertibles using cash flow-based models, seeking to establish positive carry positions designed to achieve a minimum level of return over their expected life. Although convertible arbitrage is technical (its basis for putting on a trade is a mathematical formula) it involves experience and the skill of its managers. In Search of AlPha October 2000 Interviewed in Mar/Hedge in February 1997, Gustaf Bradshaw, at the time director of resear ch of the BAH Funds, said: "The art of the convertible arbitrageur lies in the calculation of the amount of underlying equity that should be sold short against the local convertible position. This ratio can be adjusted depending on a manager's market view and so there is a large element of personal skill involved. This is an area where the skill and experience of the portfolio managers are vital because the computer systems are there to be overridden by the managers. Liquidity is one of the constraints in trading convertibles or warrants. You can often see great opportunities but no exit” 1 Running the delta high In theory, convertible arbitrage is a relative value strategy. The concept f the classic trade is to exploit a market inefficiency. However, convertible arbitrageurs can hedge imperfectly and be long delta to express a view on the underlying market or stock. To some, the high risk-adjusted returns of convertible arbitrage are partially attributable to most convertible arbitrages having a positive delta in the bull market of the 1990s. Leverage is betw een tw o-10:1 The degree of leverage used in convertible arbitrage varies significantly with the composition of the long positions and the portfolio objectives, but generally ranges between t wo and 10x equity. Interest rate risk can be hedged by selling government fond futures. Typical strategies include: - Long convertible bond and short the underlying stock; - Dispersion trade by being long volatility through the convertible bond positions and short index volatility through index options; - Convertible stripping to eliminate credit risk; - Arbitrating price inefficiencies of complicated convertible bonds and convertible preferred stocks with various callable, put-able, and conversion features (such as mandatory conversion, conversion factors based on future dividend payments, etc.); - Buying distressed convertible bonds and hedging by selling short the underlying equity by hedging duration risk. Cheap am azon.com An example of relative value disparity could be found in the capital structure of amazon.com. At the end of Q2 99, the Internet bookseller had, in addition to its equity capital, two tranches of long-term debt outstanding: a US$530m stepped-coupon senior debt isse of 2008 and a US$1.25bn convertible issue of 2009. After adjusting these securities’ prices to reflect market values at 30 June 1999, the following picture of the company’s capital structure emerged. ____________________ 1 From Chandler (1998), p49. In Search of Alpha October 2000 Buy low - sell high Despite no past earnings and no projected earnings for the fiscal year, equity holders believed the company to be extraordinarily valuable. The market capitalisation was US$20.2bn at 30 June 1999.1 The straight debt holders were somewhat less optimistic about amazon.com's prospects, as implied by the yield spread of these securities and their credit rating. The yield spread had averaged about 450bp over comparable Treasuries, implying a significant element of risk. With the junior (equity) security holders euphoric and the senior security holders suspicious about the prospects of the company, one might have expected the middle tranche of convertible security holders to be 'cautiously upbeat'. Surprisingly, they were the most pessimistic stakeholders of all. Assuming 100% implied volatility, the credit spread was over 1,5001bp portending Amazon's imminent demise. Viewed differently, with a normalised credit spread of 600bp, the convertible was trading at a very low level of implied stock volatility. Either the convertible was too cheap or equity too expensively valued by the market. To exploit this inefficiency, convertible arbitrageurs sold expensive equity and bought the comparably cheap convertible bond. If the stock falls sharply the Although the above example seemed to be a 'no-brainer' example of convertible price of the convertible arbitrage, investors who put on the trade without hedging the credit risk have lost bond can becom e a money to date (September 2000). The convertible bond fell more or less in line with function of the credit rating the stock. As Internet stocks fell in Q2 00, the markets' assessment of the credit rating of these stocks fell as well. The companies were said to be 'burning cash'. This resulted in the synthetic put of the convertible bond to lose value. In other words, the value of the convertible bond became more a function of the straight debt value (bond floor) and less a function of the conversion value. The recent path of the amazon.com arbitrage is therefore not only a good example of the mechanics of convertible arbitrage, it also highlights that convertibles can behave more as ________________________ 1 Which compares with US$12.8bn one year later. In Search of Alpha October 2000 straight bonds after a dramatic fall of the share price, when the convertible bond becomes a function of credit risk as opposed to equity risk. Exchangeables have low er A profitable example of convertible arbitrage is the purchase of the Siemens credit risk Exchangeable 2005 (exchangeable into Infineon stock) and the sale of Infineon stock. The attraction of exchangeables for spin-offs, such as Infineon by Siemens, is that the convertible bond carries the credit risk of the issuer (the blue-chip mother company), which in this case is Siemens, and allows the spin-off to finance itself more cheaply than if it issued a plain-vanilla convertible bond. We believe there will be an increase in issuance of exchangeable convertible bonds since it is an attractive financing instrument for companies unwinding cross -holdings or spinning off subsidiaries. In Search of Alpha October2OOO Fixed Income Arbitrage Exploiting m arket Fixed income arbitrage managers seek to exploit pricing anomalies within and inefficiencies in the fixed across global fixed income markets and their derivatives, using leverage to enhance incom e m arket returns. In most cases, fixed income arbitrageurs take offsetting long and short positions in similar fixed income securities that are mathematically, fundamentally or historically interrelated. The relationship can be temporarily distorted by market events, investor preferences, exogenous shocks to supply or demand, or structural features of the fixed income market. According to Tremont (1999), fixed income arbitrage represents 5.1 % of all funds and 7.7 % of all assets under management. Credit anom alies and Often, opportunities for these relative value strategies are the result of temporary advantageous financing credit anomalies, and the returns are derived from capturing the credit anomaly and obtaining advantageous financing. These strategies can include: • Arbitrage between physical securities and futures (basis trading); • Arbitrage between similar bonds in the same capital structure; • Arbitrage pricing inefficiencies of asset backed securities, swaptions, and other interest rate financial instruments; • Arbitrage between on-the-run and off-the-run bonds (issuance-driven trade); • Arbitrage between liquid mutual funds containing illiquid municipal bonds with treasury bonds; • Yield curve arbitrage and yield curve spread trading; • Stripping bonds with multiple callable features or swaps with complicated cash flows into their components in order to arbitrage these stripped components; I n Search of Alpha October 2000 - Exploitation of inter-market anomalies (buying 'TED' spread by being long Treasury bill futures and short Eurodollar futures under the assumption that the spread will widen). High degree of Because the prices of fixed income instruments are based on yield curves, volatility sophistication curves, expected cash flows , credit ratings, and special bond and option features, fixed income arbitrageurs must use sophisticated analytical models to identify pricing disparities and to manage their positions. Given the complexity of the instruments and the high degree of s ophistication of the arbitrageurs, the fixed income arbitrageurs rely on investors less sophisticated than themselves to over- and under-value securities by failing to value explicitly some feature on the instrument (for example, optionality) or the probability of a possible future occurrence (for example, political event) that will likely affect the valuation of the instrument. The alpha of a fixed income hedge fund, therefore, is primarily derived from the skill needed to model, structure, execute and manage fixed income instruments. Sm all m argin, high leverage The spreads available tend to be very small, of the order of three to 20bp. Therefore, managers need to lever the position and expect to make money out of carry on the position and the spread reverting to its normal level. In order to generate returns sufficient to exceed the transaction costs, leverage may range from 20 to 30x NAV employed. Despite the high leverage, the volatility of returns achieved by fixed income arbitrageurs is usually very low due to the market-neutral stance of most funds in this discipline. Not all fixed incom e In general, fixed income arbitrageurs aim to deliver steady returns with low arbitrage strategies are volatility, due to the fact that the directional risk is mitigated by hedging against m arket-neutral interest rate movements, or by the use of spread trades. Managers differ in terms of the diligence with which interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, inter-market spread risk, and credit risk is hedged.' Leverage depends on the types of positions in the portfolio. Simple, stable positions, such as basis trades, are leveraged much more highly than higher risk trades that have yield curve exposure. Some managers take directional credit spread risk, which results in a violation with our 'relative value' definition stated above. Some observers, due to large, unexpected losses in yield curve arbitrage in 1995, have also concluded that some trades with exposure to changes in the yield curve are not market-neutral (White 1996). Basis trading as an exam ple Basis trading is the most basic fixed income arbitrage strategy. A basis trade of fixed incom e arbitrage involves the purchase of a government bond and the simultaneous sale of futures contracts on that bond. Bond futures have a delivery option, which allows several different bonds to be delivered to satisfy the futures contract. Because it is not certain which bond is expected to become the cheapest to deliver at matu rity, this uncertainty, along with shifts in supply and demand for the underlying bonds, may create profit opportunities. 1 Pension & Endow ment Forum (2000), p23. In Search of Alpha October 2000 Attractive opportunities There were particularly attractive opportunities in this segment with the exodus of several Post-LTCM proprietary trading desks and the downscaling of activities by other market participants such as LTCM. One situation in Brazilian fixed income instruments provides an interesting example of the inefficiencies in this area. The Brazilian sovereign market consists of many related securities, two of which are New Money Bonds and the Eligible Interest Bonds. Because New Money Bonds are somewhat less liquid then Eligible Interest Bonds they tend to react more slowly to changes in Brazilian fundamentals. During a rally in bonds in March 1999, for example, it was possible to purchase the lagging New Money Bonds at 55 and sell the Eligible Interest Bonds at 65, taking the 10-point credit differential, while picking up 125bp in yield. In either a bullish or bearish scenario, the trade was compelling: a deteriorating market would tend to cause the prices of both bonds to converge as a restructuring scenario unfolded; while (as it turned out) in a bullish market the money flows bid up the price of the New Money Bonds. Profits were taken as the prices converged to more normal levels. In Search of Alpha October 2000 Equity Market-Neutral The goal is consistent Equity market-neutral is designed to produce consistent returns with very low returns w ith low volatility volatility and correlation in a variety of market environments. The investment and low correlation strategy is designed to exploit equity market inefficiencies and usually involves being simultaneously long and short matched equity portfolios of the same size within a country. Market neutral portfolios are designed to be either beta or currency-neutral or both. Equity market-neutral is best defined as either statistical arbitrage or equity long/short with zero exposure to the market. According to Tremont (1999), equity market neutral represents 3.8% of all funds and 3.9% of all assets under management. Num ber crunching can add Quantitative long/short funds apply statistical analysis to historical data (historical value asset prices as well as 'fundamental' or accounting data) to identify profitable trading opportunities. The traditional discipline entails hypothesising the existence of a particular type of systematic opportunity for unusual returns, and then 'backtesting' the hypothesis. Backtesting essentially entails gathering the historical data and performing the calculations on it necessary to determine whether the opportunity would have been profitable had it been pursued in the past. Simple hypotheses are preferred to complex hypotheses; the intricate trading rules favoured by technicians and chartists are generally avoided. Normally, analysts hope to bolster their empirical findings with intuitive explanations for why the hypothesised opportunity should exist. Once a successful strategy is identified, it is normally implemented relatively mechanically. That is, the strategy is traded according to a limited set of clearly defined rules (the rules that were backtested), which are only rarely overridden by the subjective judgement of the manager. 'Quant' fund strategies are often closely related to work published by finance academics in peer reviewed academic journals. In many cases, the fund managers come from academic backgrounds and, in some cases, created the academic research themselves. Quant fund managers are often very secretive, as their trading rules are potentially prone to theft. Mean reversion and earnings surprises have been the main drivers of this strategy. Risk control Is im portant Users of quantitative strategies expect to identify small but statistically significant return opportunities, often across large numbers of stocks. Quantitative managers typically balance their longs and shorts carefully to eliminate all sources of risk except those that they expect will create returns. Since they are often trading long portfolio lists, they are able to reduce dramatically not only broad market risk, but also industry risk, and aggregate stock-specific risk. They appear less likely than fundamental managers to adopt substantial long or short biases. equity market-neutral fund, however, can generate alpha by buying stock as well as Double alpha One of the great advantages of equity market-neutral strategies is the doubling of alpha. A long-only manager who is restricted from selling short only has the opportunity to generate alpha by buying or not buying stocks. A manager of an selling stock short. Some market observers argue that this 'double alpha' argument is faulty because an active long-only manager can over- and underweight securities, which means he is short relative to benchmark when underweight. We do not share this view because we believe there is a difference between selling short and being underweight against a benchmark. If a stock has a weight of 0.02% in the In Search of Alpha October 2000 benchmark index, the possible opportunity to underweight is limited to 0.02% of the portfolio. We would even go as far as portraying short selling as a risk management discipline of its own. We will address this issue on p76 where we attempt to de-mystify short selling. A pair trade involves the A typical example in this category would be a pair trade where one share category purchase of One share of the same economic entity is bought and the other is sold. One example of such a category and the sale of pair trade is the unification of shares of Zurich Financial Services of Switzerland, another on the same stock which announced a merger with the financial services arm of BAT Industries of the UK. This pair trade is typical for equity market-neutral managers because it does not involve market or sector risk. The two stocks are based on the same economic entity, which happen to deviate in price. Other typical pair trades involve trading voting rights, for example, buying TIN4 savings shares and selling the ordinary shares. The law of one price is the For legal reasons two share categories were listed, Allied Zurich in the UK and underlying theme of most Zurich Allied in Switzerland. Each Allied Zurich share was entitled to receive 0.023 equity market-neutral trades Zurich Allied shares. On 17 April, Zurich Financial Services announced the unification of their two shares that was sweetened with a 40p dividend for shareholders in Allied Zurich. The spread narrowed to zero by September 2000. The fact that Zurich Allied and Allied Zurich were not traded at the same price was a violation of the law of one price since both shares together made up Zurich Financial Services. This concludes our description of the three strategies in the relative value arena. In the following section, we discuss the characteristics of two event-driven strategies, risk arbitrage and distressed securities. In Search of Alpha October 2000 Event-Driven Strategies "We are ready for an unforeseen event that may or may not occur. " Dan Quayle Returns generated This investment strategy class focuses on-identifying and analysing securities that independently from m oves can benefit from the occurrence of extraordinary transactions. Event-driven in the stock m arket strategies concentrate on companies that are, or may be, subject to restructuring, takeovers, mergers, liquidations, bankruptcies, or other special situations. The securities prices of the companies involved in these events are typically influenced more by the dynamics of the particular event than by the general appreciation or depreciation of the debt and equity markets. For example, the result and timing of factors such as legal decisions, negotiating dynamics, collateralisation requirements, or indexing issues play a key element in the success of any event-driven strategy. According to Tremont (1999), event-driven strategies represent 11.9% of all funds and 16.6% of all assets under management. Table 14: Sum m ary Risk/Return Characteristics Based on Historical Perform ance __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Sub-sector Returns Volatility Dow nside Sharpe Correlation Exposure Leverage Investm ent risk ratio to equities to m arket horizon Risk arbitrage High Medium Medium High Medium Medium Medium Medium Distressed securitiesMedium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Low Long Source: UBS Warburg Research intensive Typically, these strategies rely on fundamental research that extends beyond the strategies evaluation of the issues affecting a single company to include an assessment of the legal and structural issues surrounding the extraordinary event or transaction. In some cases, such as corporate reorganisations, the investment manager may actually take an active role in determining the event's outcome. Opportunities for high risk - The goal of event-driven strategies is to profit when the price of a security changes adjusted returns even in flat to reflect more accurately the likelihood and potential impact of the occurrence, or or negative m arkets non-occurrence, of the extraordinary event. Because event-driven strategies are positioned to take advantage of the valuation disparities produced by corporate events, they are less dependent on overall s tock market gains than traditional equity investment approaches. Event-driven strategies In times of financial crisis, the correlation between event-driven strategies and have higher system atic risk market activity can increase to uncomfortable levels. During the stock market crash than relative value in October 1987, for example, merger arbitrage positions fell in step with the strategies general market, providing little protection in the short run against the dramatic market decline (Swensen 2000). As time passed, investors recognised that companies continued to meet contractual obligations, ultimately completing all merger deals previously announced. The return of confidence improved merger arbitrage results, providing handsome returns relative to the market. In Search of Alpha October 2000 Risk Arbitrage Bet on a deal being Risk arbitrage (also known as merger arbitrage) specialists invest simultaneously in accepted by regulators and long and short positions in both companies involved in a merger or acquisition. In shareholders stock swap mergers, risk arbitrageurs, are typically long the stock of the company being acquired and short the stock of the acquiring company. In the case of a cash tender offer, the risk arbitrageur is seeking to capture the difference between the tender price and the price at which the target company's stock is trading. Deal risk is usually During negotiations, the target company's stock can typically trade at a discount to uncorrelated w ith m arket its value after the merger is completed because all mergers involve some risk that risk the transaction will not occur. Profits are made by capturing the spread between the current market price of the target company's stock and the price to which it will appreciate when the deal is completed or the cash tender price. The risk to the arbitrageur is that the deal fails. Risk arbitrage positions are considered to be uncorrelated to overall market direction with the principal risk being 'deal risk'. We live in a probabilistic Former US secretary of the Treasury and Goldman Sachs partner, Robert Rubin w orld brought fame to the profession in the 1980s. Throughout the industry, Rubin was known as one of the best in the field (Endlich 1999). His careful research and unemotional trading style were legendary. A quote from Rubin emphasises what risk arbitrage is all about: "If a deal goes through, what do you win? If it doesn't go through, what do you lose? It was a high-risk business, but I'll tell you, it did teach you to think of life in terms of probabilities instead of absolutes. You couldn't be in that business and not internalise that probabilistic approach of life. It was what you were doing all the time. Regulatory risk is key Risk arbitrageurs differ according to the degree to which they are willing to take on deal risk. Where antitrust issues are involved, this risk is often related to regulatory decisions. In other cases, as was predominant in the late 1980s, financing risk was the major concern to arbitrageurs. Most managers only invest in announced transactions, whereas a few are likely to enter positions with higher deal risk and wider spreads based on rumour or speculation. Table 15: Key Risk Factors Risk Position Effect Legal Trust regulation Risk arbitrage is primarily a bet on a deal being accepted by regulators and shareholders. If a deal Is called off, the risk arbitrageur usually loses as the spread w idens. Equity Short delta, long liquidity One of the main performance v ariables is liquidity. Merger arbitrage returns depend on the ov erall and long volatility v olume of merger activ ity, w hich has historically been cyclical in nature. In general, strategy has exposure to deal risk and stock specific risk, w hereas market risk is often hedged by inv esting in 10-20 deals. Stock specific risk has a large cap bias since large caps are easier to soil short. Most trades are transacted on a ratio-basis as opposed to a cash-neutral basis assuming the spread conv erges. This leav es the arbitrageur w ith a small short delta position as the cash outlay for long stock position is smaller than the proceeds from the short position. Source: UBS Warburg _______________________ 1From Endlich (1999). p109. In Search of Alpha October2000 Sub-sector in itself is Most managers use some form of 'risk of loss' methodology to limit position size, heterogeneous but risk tolerance reflects each manager's own risk/return objectives.' Some managers simply maintain highly diversified portfolios containing a substantial Portion of the transaction universe, typically using leverage to enhance returns, whereas other managers maintain more concentrated portfolios (often unleveraged) and attempt to add value through the quality of their research and their ability to trade around the positions. Some managers are more rigorous than others at hedging market risk. Risk arbitrage is not sim ply Given the high profile of recent risk arbitrage deals and their profitability to the a binary event arbitrageur, many long-only managers joined this discipline. We believe that there is a certain risk of this herd behaviour backfiring. There is more to risk arbitrage than simply buying the stock of the company being acquired and selling the stock of the acquiring company. Risk arbitrage is not simply a binary event, will it work or fail? Risk arbitrage, as the name implies, is more the task of the risk manager than that of a portfolio manager. The deals are most often highly complex an d the management of unwanted risk requires knowledge, experience and skill in all financial engineering and risk management disciplines. Below we list just a selection of the tasks, which are carried out by risk arbitrageurs entering a spread: • Analysis of public information regarding the companies of the transaction and the markets in which they compete, including company documents, various industry and trade data sources, past Justice Department or Federal Trade Commission enforcement activities in the relevant product and geographic markets, and current antitrust agency enforcement policies; • Estimation of probabilities as to the likelihood of a government antitrust investigation and enforcement action, the likely outcome of such an action, and whether a remedial order can be negotiated eliminating the necessity for litigation; • Monitoring of litigation by the government and any private enforcement action and, in hostile transactions, analysis of the viability on antitrust and regulatory grounds of possible white knight candidates; analysis of the requirements and procedures of various federal and state regulatory approvals that may be required, depending upon the nature of the acquired company's business operations; • Control of deal risk with respect to the acquiror walking away, deal delay, possibility of material adverse conditions, shareholder approval, tax implications, and financing conditions; and • In hostile transactions, analysis of the viability of various anti-takeover devices created by the target corporation in anticipation of or in the course of the unwanted takeover attempt and litigation arising from these defences. ___________________ 1 Pension & Endow ment Forum (2000), p28. In Search of Alpha October2000 Risk arbitrage has a long Risk arbitrage is not new. As a matter of fact, risk arbitrage has a long tradition. tradition Two prominent arbitrageurs, Gus Levy and Cy Lewis, were instrumental in establishing Goldman Sachs and Bear Stems as prominent Wall Street firms. Gus Levy invented risk arbitrage in the 1940s and Ivan Boesky popularised it 40 years later (Endlich 1999). In fact, the senior post at Goldman Sachs has traditionally been filled by the head of the 'arb desk' including former US secretary of the Treasury Bob Rubin. Risk arbitrage was Goldman Sachs's second most profitable department after mergers and acquisitions, it was regarded as a jewel in the firm's crown. Risk arbitrage received negative press coverage in the late 1980s when some well known 'M&A specialists', such as Ivan Boesky and Martin Siegel, bought stock in companies before the merger announcements using inside informat ion and Robert Freeman, chief of risk arbitrage, head of international equities, and trusted partner of Goldman Sachs, was forced to step down in ignominy. Exam ple An illustrative and successful example of risk arbitrage activity is the completion of the acquisition of Mannesmann by Vodafone AirTouch. The deal was announced on Sunday 14 November 1999, when Vodafone AirTouch bid 53.7 of its own shares for each Mannesmann share. At the close of the following Monday, the bid premium was 22.5%. On 4 February, the Vodafone AirTouch board approved an increase bid of 58.9646 shares for each Mannesmann share. On 10 February, the deal was declared wholly unconditional. The bid premium eventually melted to zero, resulting in a large profit for hedge funds, which sold stock of the acquiror and simultaneously bought stock of the target company. In Search of Alpha October 2000 Distressed Securities Distressed securities is Distressed securities funds invest in the debt or equity of companies experiencing about being long low financial or operational difficulties or trade claims of companies that are in financial investm ent grade credit distress, typically in bankruptcy. These securities generally trade at substantial discounts to par value. Hedge fund managers can invest in a range of instruments from secured debt to common stock. The strategy exploits the fact that many investors are unable to hold below investment grade securities. origins go back to 1890s Distressed securities have a long tradition. The origins of these event -driven strategies probably go back to the 1890s when the main railways stocks were folding. Investors bought the cheap stock, participated in the restructuring and issuance of new shares and sold the shares with a profit. Distressed securities are Distressed securities often trade at large discounts since the sector is mainly a under-researched and buyer's market (Cottier 1996). Most private and institutional investors want to get distressed securities funds securities of distressed companies off their books because they are not prepared to have a strong long-bias bear the risks and because of other non-economic issues. Distressed companies are barely covered by analysts. Most banks do not get involved in the distressed securities business. Many distressed securities funds are long only. Fundam ental versus Distressed securities specialists make investment returns on two kinds of intrinsic value mispricings. First, fundamental or intrinsic value, which is the actual value of the company that the bond interest represents. Second, relative-value, which is the value of bonds relative to the value of other securities of the same company (Nicholas 1999). When the market price of a company's security is lower than its fundamental value due to temporary financial difficulties, distressed securities specialists will take core positions in these securities and hold them through the restructuring process. They believe that the security will approach its fair value after the restructuring is complete. Capital structure arbitrage While a company is restructuring, the prices of its different financial instruments can become mispriced relative to one another. This is an opportunity for what is referred to as intra-capitalisation or capital structure arbitrage. The distressed securities specialists purchase the undervalued security and take short trading positions in the overpriced security to extract an arbitrage profit. In Search of Alpha October 2000 Usually low leverage and The main risks of distressed securities investing lie in the correct valuation of low volatility securities, debt and collateral, as well as in the adequate assessment of the period during which the capital will be tied up (taking into account major lawsuits, etc.). Sometimes other asset classes are shorted in order to offset a part of the risks, and guarantees or collateral (such as brand names, receivables, inventories, real estate, equipment, patents, etc.) are used to hedge the risks. The diversification between securities, companies, and sectors is very important. Distressed funds have typically low leverage and low volatility. However, since positions are extremely difficult to value, investors have to bear mark-to-market risk. The volatility of the returns is therefore probably higher than published. The prices of distressed securities are particularly volatile during the bankruptcy process because useful information about the company becomes available during this period. Long term in nature Investments in distressed securities are most often illiquid. Long redemption periods, therefore, are the norm. Frequent liquidity windows of one year or more (for example quarterly) work against the nature of the strategy. A hedge fund manager will seek a long-term commitment from his investors. It is essential that the manager has a large pool of committed capital so that liquidity is not a problem. The length of any particular bankruptcy proceeding is notoriously hard to forecast and the outcome is always uncertain, both of which make the duration of distressed securities strategies unpredictable. In addition, managers who participate on creditor and equity committees must freeze their holdings until an arrangement is reached. Active versus passive There are basically two different approaches. Active distressed managers get approach involved in the restructuring and refinancing process through activ e participation in creditor committees. In some cases, an investor may even actively reorganise the company. The passive approach simply buys equity and debt of distressed companies at a discount and holds onto it until it appreciates. Both approaches a re very labour-intensive and require a lot of analytical work. The US bankruptcy law is very detailed. Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code provides relief from creditor claims for companies in financial distress. Large tax loss carry forwards, strict disclosure rules, and clear debt restructuring rules help in reorganising distressed companies. The objective is to save distressed companies from total liquidation (Chapter 7). In Europe, however, bankruptcy is intended to end and not prolong the life of a company. US distressed securities markets are therefore much more liquid than their European counterparts, which is why few distressed funds are active outside the US. Typical trades are: Typical trades • Entering into core positions in the debt and equity of a distressed company, accompanied by active participation in the creditor committees in order to influence the restructuring and refinancing process; • Passive long-term core positions in distressed equity and debt; • Short-term trading in anticipation of a specific event such as the outcome of a court rule or important negotiations; • Partial hedging of the stock market and interest rate exposure by shorting other stocks of the same industry or by shorting Treasury bonds. In Search of Alpha October 2000 -Arbiraging different issues of the same distressed company (eg, long mezzanine debt and short common stock); -Vulture investing (derogatory term applied when a venture capitalist or a distressed securities investor gets an unfairly large equity stake); -Providing buy-out capital: equity or debt for privatizations, spin-offs, acquisitions and takeovers (often by the firm’s own management). Buy-out capital may be leveraged. This concludes our description of event-driven strategies. In the following section we describe four strategies which we summarise as ‘opportunistic strategies’ namely macro funds, short sellers, long/short equity and emerging markets. In Search of Alpha October 2000 Opportunistic Strategies "I don't play the game by a particular set of rules; I look for changes in the rules o the game." George Soros1 Strategies which are not The main section of this report is a detailed analysis of hedge fund historical risk dependent on market and return characteristics (starting p98). Despite having some reservations returns are more easily regarding to the quality of the hedge fund index return data, we analysed time serie s forecasted to assess how these characteristics could be defined in the future. For this reason, we classified the hedge fund universe in three main groups - relative-value and non-relative-value plus a hybrid of the two. The key determinant for our classification is exposure to the market. In our opinion, an investor that understands where risk and returns in convertible arbitrage are generated should have the tools to extrapolate the return, risk and correlation characteristics into the future. The predictability of performance characteristics increases as market exposure decreases, ie, increases if we go from right to left in Chart 9. Other classification systems distinguish between directional and non -directional at the first level instead of relative-value, event-driven and opportunistic. With such a 1 From Nicholas (1999), p172. In Search of Alpha October 2000 classification, risk arbitrage would be defined as non-directional, whereas distressed securities as directional. Chart 9 would justify such a classification system as the dispersion of returns of risk arbitrage are much lower than for distressed securities which have a strong directional bias. Table 17: Sum m ary Risk/Return Characteristics Based on Historical Perform ance Sub-sector Returns Volatility Dow nside Sharpe Correlation Exposure Leverage Investment risk ratio to equities to market horizon Macro High High Medium Medium Medium High Medium Short Short sellers Low High High Low Negative High Low Medium Long/short equity High High High Low High High Low Short Emerging markets High High High Low High High Low Medium Source: UBS Warburg Higher volatility and low er The main difference between the four opportunistic strategies in Table 17 and the risk-adjusted returns previously discussed relative value and event-driven strategies is volatility and the exposure to the market. The high volatility is primarily a function of beta, ie, a high exposure to the underlying asset class. As a result of higher volatility, risk-adjusted returns (as measured for example with the Sharpe ratio) are lower then with relative value and event-driven strategies. In Search of Alpha October2OOO Macro Macro funds have the Macro hedge funds, also known as 'Global macro funds', enjoy extraordinary flexibility to m ove from flexibility regarding investment policy and investment strategies. They are (or were) opportunity to opportunity the big players of the hedge fund industry and the ones most often in the headlines. w ithout restriction They are (or have been) regarded as the new trading and investment gurus (Cottier 1996). Through their size and leverage, they are believed to influence and manipulate markets. Some macro hedge funds were accused of causing the fall in the pound sterling in 1992, resulting in its withdrawal from the European Monetary System. However, this allegation was brought into question by a study published by the, International Monetary Fund! Furthermore, it can be argued that since every move by one of the big macro players is amplified by many smaller copycats, they may not be entirely to blame for their large impact. For this reason, macro funds no longer disclose their positions, a move that has diminished the already low transparency of these funds. Opportunistic strategies Macro hedge funds pursue a base strategy such as equity long/short or futures trend following to which large scale and highly leveraged directional bets in other markets are added a few times each year. They move from opportunity to opportunity, from trend to trend, from strategy to strategy. According to Tremont (1999), in 1998 4.0% of all funds are in this category, representing 14.9% of all assets under management. The higher the m arket Most often macro funds operate in very liquid and efficient markets such as fixed efficiency the few er income, foreign exchange or equity index futures markets. We believe there is a opportunities exist trade-off between liquidity and opportunity. Liquidity is correlated with efficiency. The more efficient a market the higher the liquidity. High liquidity and high efficiency often means close to perfect information and competition. Perfect information and perfect competition means fewer opportunities to exploit inefficiencies. Macro funds, therefore, make their money by anticipating a price change early and not by exploiting market inefficiencies. Macro m anagers exploit far- Macro fund managers argue that most price fluctuations in financial markets fall from -equilibrium conditions within one standard deviation of the mean (Nicholas 1999). They consider this volatility to be the norm, which does not offer particularly good investment opportunities. However, when price fluctuations of particular instruments or markets push out more than two standard deviations from the mean into the tails of the bell curve, an extreme condition occurs that may only appear once every two or three decades. When market prices differ from the 'real' value of an asset, there exists an investment opportunity. The macro investor makes profits by exploiting such extreme price/value valuations and, occasionally, pushing them back to normal levels. __________________ 1 It is beyond doubt that macro hedge funds had a significant short position in sterling in 1992 that impacted the market. It is, however, difficult to determine whether this position 'caused' the sterling devaluation, because it coincided with net capital outflows from the UK . The prologue to the 1992 ERM crisis was the 'conversion' play, estimated to be aroundUS$300bn by the IMF. Altogether, European central bank interventions amounted to roughly US$100bn. The US$11.7bn in hedge fund positions coincided with at least another US$90bn of sales in European currencies. We e xplode the myth of hedge funds causing world-wide havoc on p78. In search of Alpha October2OOO Stock picking versus risk Tremont (1999) distinguished two kinds of macro managers, those who come from m anagem ent background a long/short equity background and those who come from a derivative trading background: (1) Macro funds run by companies like Tiger Investment Management and Soros Fund Management were originally invested primarily in US equities. The success of these managers at stock picking resulted over time in substantial increases in assets under management. As the funds increased in size, it became increasingly difficult to take meaningful positions in smaller-capitalisation stocks. Consequently, the funds started gravitating towards more liquid securities and markets in which bigger bets could be placed; (2) Funds run by Moore Capital, Caxton, and Tuder Investment developed from a futures trading discipline which, by its very nature, was both global and macroeconomic in scope. The freeing up of the global currency markets and the development of non-US financial futures markets in the 1980s provided an increasing number of investment and trading opportunities not previously available to investment managers. Mouse clicks and Anecdotal evidence suggests that the latter do better than the former in market m om entum stress situations as witnessed in March/April 2000. Julian Robertson wrote to investors in March 2000 to announce the closure of the Tiger funds. Investors are expected to get 75% back in cash and 5% in a basket of securities. The 20% balance will likely stay in five stocks, the returns on which should eventually be reimbursed to investors. In total he is returning US$6.5bn to investors. Robertson said that, since August 1999, investors had withdrawn US$7.7bn in funds. He blamed the irrational market for Tiger's poor performance, saying that "earnings and price considerations take a back seat to mouse clicks and momentum." Robertson described the strength of technology stocks as "a Ponzi pyramid destined for collapse." Robertson's spokesman said that he did not feel capable of figuring out investment in technology stocks and no longer wanted the burden of investing other people’s money. Ironically, his letter reached investors in the week that the NASDAQ plunged and his views were being proved right. The Tiger funds were up 6% in March and US Air, the biggest of Robertson's remaining five holdings, has seen a 30% gain within two weeks as old economy stocks came back into fashion. The death of the m acro Tiger Management's large losses and George Soros' retreat are potentially a sign fund? that the heyday of macro funds is over. At the end of April 2000, George Soros announced that he was cutting back on his Quantum fund. Quantum had US$8.5bn in assets when Soros made the announcement that Stanley Druckenmiller, the manager of the fund, and his colleague Nicholas Roditi, who ran the US$1.2bn Quota Fund, were leaving the group. The Quantum fund, which will be renamed Quantum Endowment Fund, plans to stop making large, so-called macro bets on the direction of currencies and interest rates and expects to target an annual return of 15% which is less than half of the annual average posted since the fund's start in 1969. One month later, the Quantum fund was said to have 90% in cash according to Bloomberg. In Search of Alpha October 2000 Trades of the magnitude of George Soros' sterling trade in 1992 might or might not Opportunistic funds have a belong in the past. However, we believe the opportunistic hed ge fund which has a future despite setbacks in mandate to invest in anything the general partners believe to yield a profit, will H1 00 continue to raise funds in the future. Whether an investor prefers the stable, highly predictable returns of relative-value strategies or the unpredictable, widely dispersed and erratic returns generated by opportunistic funds, is a matter of idiosyncratic preference. We believe that an over-funded pension fund would be inclined to favour the former over the latter. However, we believe opportunistic hedge funds such as global macro or global asset allocation funds are not as dead as some claim them to be. The next opportunistic investment style we discuss in this report is short selling. For a very brief moment in spring 2000, it looked like short sellers would experience a Renaissance. Jeffrey Vinik, who ran Fidelity Investments' flagship Magellan Fund before starting his own firm, returned 25% after fees in the March-April period through judicious use of short sales and stock-picking.' Although hedge funds with a pure short bias are rare, understanding the merits and dynamics of short selling is important with long/short equity funds, which are the largest category of the hedge fund universe. ________________________________________________ 1 Jef f rey Vinik's name became practically sy nony mous with bad stock market calls a f ew y ears ago. As a star manager of the largest mutual f und, Fidelity Magellan, Vinik reckoned that stocks had peaked in 1995. So he inv ested in bonds - and balef ully watched one of the strongest stock market rallies of the decade f rom the sidelines. The results were not pretty : Returns slumped, and inv estors withdrew money . To make matters worse, at the end of 1995 he came under SEC scrutiny f or say ing positiv e things about stocks he was selling. He was exonerated; but when he lef t Fidelity in June 1996, many believ e he departed with a cloud ov er his head. The hedge f und he started af ter he lef t Fidelity doubled 'inv estors' money in 1997. The US$800m he raised when he started reached some US$4bn f our y ears later. In Search of Alpha October 2000 Short Sellers Equity as w ell as fixed The short selling discipline has an equity as well as fixed income component. Short incom e elem ent sellers seek to profit from a decline in the value of stocks. In addition, the short seller earns interest on the cash proceeds from the short sale of stock. Tremont (1999) estimates that short sellers make up around 0.5% of all funds, representing 0.4% of all assets under management. . . . The current bull m arket has Given the extensive equity bull market, short selling strategies have not done nearly driven short sellers particularly well in the recent past. Their performance is nearly a mirror image of into extinction equities in general. Chart 10 compares annualised returns of short sellers with the MSCI World index. We will focus on risk and return characteristics in more det ail in the performance analysis section on p132. Table 18: Key Risk Factors Risk Position Effect Equity Short bias Most often short delta, otherwise long/short fund. Usually short in large capitalisation stocks since larger capitalized stocks can be borrowed to be sold short more efficiently. Given the experience of the 1990s, one of the lar gest risks is momentum where overvalued stocks continue to outperform. A further risk is that the borrowed stock is re-called. Credit Short default risk Collateral has usually little default risk. Short sellers are therefore short default risk since the strategy benefits if short equity positions default. Interest rates Short duration If interest rates fall, the proceeds from the fixed income portion used as collateral as well as the rebate on the proceeds from the short sell are reduced. Source: UBS Warburg The short seller borrow s the Short sellers borrow stock and sell it on the market with the intention of buying it stock and earns interest on back later at a lower price. By selling a stock short, the short seller creates a the proceeds from s elling restricted cash asset (the proceeds from the sale) and a liability since the short seller stock short must return the borrowed shares at some future date. Technically, a short sale does not require an investment, but it does require collateral. The proceeds from the short In Search of Alpha October 2000 sale are held as a restricted credit by the brokerage firm that holds the account and the short seller earns interest on it - the short interest rebate. Security selection is a key Security selection is the key driver of returns in the segment. A theme in 1999 that driver contributed to positive security selection on the short side was the exploitation of aggressive accounting by certain companies' management. These practices typically involve the acceleration of revenue recognition or the accounting of extraordinary items like mergers and acquisitions. Exam ple Tyco International, in its recording of large reserves on acquisitions in 1999, is an example of aggressive accounting practice. By taking large reserves, Tyco avoided future depreciation/amortisation charges against profits and thereby showed increasing growth in earnings. While the company theoretically complied with GAAP, it was this methodology of aggressive accounting that had p rovided a source of short ideas. Web of dysfunctional Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt broached the role of relationships Wall Street analysts in regards to the issue of aggressive accounting. In a speech in October 1999, he noted a "web of dysfunctional relationships" between Wall Street and corporate America that encourages analysts to rely too heavily on company guidance for earnings estimates and pushes companies to tailor results for the Street's consensus estimates. He continued to argue “…analysts all too often are falling off the tightrope on the side of protecting the business relationship at the cost of fair analysis." Many hedge funds managers argue that while Wall Street research is of limited value on the long side, it is of even less value on the short side due in large part to the conflicts mentioned by Mr. Levitt. This leaves hedge fund managers in the short discipline to uncover profitable short opportunities through their own research and security selection. In Search of Alpha October 2000 Emerging Markets Emerging market hedge Emerging market hedge funds focus on equity or fixed income investing in funds are not regarded as a emerging markets as opposed to developed markets. This style is usually more typical hedge fund strategy volatile not only because emerging markets are more volatile than developed markets, but because most emerging markets allow for only limited short selling and do not offer a viable futures contract to control risk. The lack of opportunities to control risk suggests that hedge funds in emerging markets have a strong long bias. According to Tremont (1999), emerging markets represent 5.6% of all funds and 3.5% of all assets under management. Table 19: Key Risk Factors _________________________________________________________________________________________________ Risk Position Effect Equity Long bias Usually long exposure to market risk. Stock specific risk usually div ersified. Limited opportunity to sell short or use deriv ativ es. One of the main differences betw een emerging markets and dev eloped markets from a risk perspectiv e is that correlation among stocks in an emerging market is much higher than in dev eloped markets w hereas the correlation among emerging markets themselv es is l ow er than among dev eloped markets. The country factor is the main v ariable. Credit Long default risk Large exposure to the countries credit rating. Currency Neutral Macro funds are famous for currency bets. Emerging market funds buy and sell underv alued financial instruments and hedge, w hen possible, residual risk such as currency. The focus is on exploiting inefficiencies as opposed to taking currency bets. Liquidity Long liquidity Emerging market hedge funds are long inefficient markets and illiquid securities. They prov ide and enhance liquidity. Source: UBS Warburg Risk or opportunity? A risk to the pessimist is an opportunity to the optimist. Investing in emerging markets therefore is full of risks or opportunities, depending on your viewpoint. The risks include the difficulty of getting information, poor accounting, lack of proper legal systems, unsophisticated local investors, political and economic turmoil, and companies with less experienced managers. The opportunities are due to yet -to-be exploited inefficiencies or undetected, undervalued and under-researched securities. The 1994 Mexican Peso The 1994 Mexican Peso Crisis, when the Mexican Peso devalued by more than Crisis 40% in December 1994, is an interesting example of the difference between a traditional emerging market fund and an alternative emerging market fund. Table 20: Hedge Fund versus Mutual Fund Returns During Peso Crisis ____________________________________________________________________ MSCI Latin Mutual Funds speciallsed Hedge Funds speciallsed American Index in Latin America in Latin America* % % % December 1994 -15.0 -17.4 -3.6 January 1995 -11.0 -14.0 -6.3 Source: Fung and Hsieh (2000) * HFRI Emerging Markets Latin American Index In Search of Alpha October 2000 Em erging m arket hedge There were 18 hedge funds managing US$1.8bn specialised in Latin America from funds outperform ed the I1FR database. 1 The average returns were -3.6% and -6.3% respectively. This em erging m arket m utual compares with -15.0% and -11.0% respectively for the MSCI Latin American funds Index. In comparison, Lipper Inc. reported that there were 19 US equity mutual funds specialising in Latin America, with assets of US$4.3bn. These funds returned on average -17.4% in December 1994 and -14.0% in January 1995. This was more or less in line with the benchmark index. Hedge funds hedge the One explanation for the speciality hedge funds outperforming the benchmark risks they do not w ant to be indices and mutual funds was that they had earlier hedged their Latin American exposed to positions. Another explanation is that the speciality hedge funds were primarily betting on Brady bonds (which are denominated in US Dollars and therefore have no currency risk), as their returns were more in line with those of Brady bonds than Latin American equities. In our opinion, this highlights two characteristics of investing in hedge funds: (1) By investing in a speciality hedge fund, one is not necessarily buying the beta of the local asset class, in this case emerging markets. The hedge fund manager might seek investment opportunities elsewhere (Brady bonds) and hedge unwanted risks (currency swings). This means that returns can be uncorrelated with traditional funds; (2) It also means that transparency is lower. If the plan sponsor is not in constant dialogue with the hedge fund manager, transparency is low. Even if there is a dialogue, the hedge fund manager might not want to reveal his positions, especially not the short positions. In Search of Alpha October2000 Long/Short Equity Long/short equity is by far the largest discipline. According to Tremont (1999), this style represents around 30.6% of all funds and 29.8% of all assets under management. Freedom to use leverage, Nicolas (1999) classifies this category as 'equity hedge', and he further subdivides sell short and hedge m arket the discipline into equity hedge and equity non-hedge. In this report we classify all risk strategies with a long bias into the 'opportunistic' section and strategies which seek to eliminate market risk entirely into 'relative value'. The difference between long/short managers with long bias to traditional long-only managers is their freedom to use leverage, take short positions, and hedge long positions. Their main objective is to make money and not necessarily to beat an index. The focus of these funds can be regional, sector specific or style specific. Long/short equity funds tend to construct and hold portfolios that are significantly more concentrated than traditional fund managers. Short sale hedges risk, Long/short strategies combine both long as well as short equity positions. The short enhances yield, and, positions have three purposes, which can vary over time or by manager. First, the potentially, generates alpha short positions are intended to generate alpha. This is one of the main differences when compared with traditional long-only managers. Stock selection skill can result in doubling the alpha. A long/short equity manager can add value by buying winners as well as selling losers. Second, the short positions can serve the purpose of hedging market risk. Third, the manager earns interest on the short as he collects the short rebate. Position lim its to control Many long/short equity managers use position limits to control stock specific risk risk and liquidity and, more importantly, control liquidity. Some institutionalise daily P&L analysis similar to proprietary trading desks of investment banks. Selling short is not the opposite of going long. Selling Inflated earning The ability to sell short allows the hedge fund managers to capitalise on 1 expectations and opportunities unavailable to most traditional managers. One example of a successful aggressive accounting short stock position done by equity long/short managers was a short position on Pediatrix Medical Group Inc., a provider of physician management services to hospital-based neonatal intensive care units. In Search of Alpha October 2000 In & Example The company was en vogue on Wall Street in late 1998 and early 1999 due to the perceived high rate of growth in its revenues and profits. To some hedge fund managers, the stock was a potential short because the company’s projected growth rate, attributed to the industry, far exceeded the rate at which babies were being born. Further research uncovered both ‘aggressive’ accounting practices and inappropriate charges to insurance carriers. Hedge fund managers sold the stock short outright. Eventually, the company announced that earnings would be far below analysts’ expectations and officials said they were investigating the company for possible insurance fraud. This concludes our brief description of hedge fund strategies. On pp98-150 we analyse risk, return and correlation characteristics of the strategies just described. On the next page we summarise the findings of our performance analysis.
Pages to are hidden for
"Reserve Primary Money Market Fund Who First Withdrew Funds"Please download to view full document