24-26 August 2004 San Antonio Marriott Rivercenter San Antonio, Texas
Sponsored by DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY BOARD
INDEX OF SESSIONS
INDEX OF SESSIONS
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OPENING REMARKS AND GENERAL SESSION......................................................... 1
2A EXPLOSIVES SAFETY ........................................................................................................ 1 2B STRUCTURES ....................................................................................................................... 3 2C INSENSITIVE MUNITIONS................................................................................................ 8 3A EXPLOSIVES SAFETY PRACTICES I ........................................................................... 11 3B STRUCTURAL CHARACTERIZATION......................................................................... 15 3C HAZARD CLASSIFICATION/IM TESTING .................................................................. 19 4A EXPLOSIVES SAFETY PRACTICES II.......................................................................... 24 4B BLAST EFFECTS I.............................................................................................................. 27 4C HAZARD CLASSIFICATION .......................................................................................... 30 5A EXPLOSIVES SAFETY-PERSONNEL PROTECTION ................................................ 35 5B BLAST EFFECTS II ........................................................................................................... 38 5C UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO)/CHEMICAL DEMIL I....................................... 42 6A MITIGATION/MAXIMUM CREDIBLE EVENT CONTROL...................................... 46 6B BLAST EFFECTS III-DEBRIS STUDIES ........................................................................ 49 6C UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO)/CHEMICAL DEMIL II ..................................... 52 7A EXPLOSIVES SAFETY METHODS................................................................................. 56 7B BLAST EFFECTS IV-BUILDING/GLASS RESPONSE ................................................. 60 7C UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO)/CHEMICAL DEMIL III.................................... 63 7D POSTER SESSION .............................................................................................................. 66
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8A EXPLOSIVES SAFETY-ACCIDENTS..............................................................................68 8B STRUCTURES-DEBRIS STUDIES....................................................................................72 8C HAZARD CLASSIFICATION - SHOCK/IMPACT SENSITIVITY I ...........................76 9A RISK MODELS ...................................................................................................................79 9B UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES.....................................................................................82 9C HAZARD CLASSIFICATION - SHOCK/IMPACT SENSITIVITY II..........................85 10A FORCE PROTECTION/ANTI TERRORISM I ............................................................89 10B STRUCTURES-ADVANCED METHODS ......................................................................93 10C FIELD STORAGE I ..........................................................................................................96 11A RISK METHODS/TESTING ..........................................................................................101 11B STRUCTURAL RESPONSE MODELS & APPLICATION .......................................104 11C FIELD STORAGE II........................................................................................................108 12A FORCE PROTECTION/ANTI TERRORISM II.........................................................111 12B STRUCTURES-DESIGN STANDARDS & METHODS ..............................................115 12C STRUCTURES-DEBRIS MODELS ...............................................................................119
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INDEX OF AUTHORS
INDEX OF AUTHORS
Chrostowski, Joh D. Session 5A .............................................. 37 Session 12C .......................................... 120 Contestabile, E. Session 8A .............................................. 69 Cox, P. A. Session 8B .............................................. 72 Crull, Michelle M. Session 3A .............................................. 14 Session 4C ........................................ 32, 33 DeFrank, John Session 7A .............................................. 58 Döerr, Andreas Session 4B .............................................. 30 Session 11A .......................................... 104 Session 12C .......................................... 122 Dow, John Session 6C .............................................. 52 Session 7C .............................................. 63 Earhart, H. Glenn Session 5C .............................................. 46 Ellis, Sam Session 3A .............................................. 12 Elron, Yoram Session 8B .............................................. 73 Eytan, Reuben Session 3B .............................................. 17 Fitzgerald, Gary A. Session 12A .......................................... 111 Forsht, Denice Session 6C .............................................. 54 Frame, Barbara J. Session 3C .............................................. 23 Session 6A .............................................. 47 Ganguly, D. S. S. Session 3A .............................................. 14 Gerber, James D. Session 4A .............................................. 26 Gouldstone, Frank G. Session 12C .......................................... 121 Guengant, Yves Session 8A .............................................. 71 iii
Anderson, John Session 10A.............................................91 Session 11C ...........................................109 Andrews, Sidney B. Session 9A...............................................81 Arbuckle, Ted Session 7A...............................................59 Atwood, Alice I. Session 3C ...............................................20 Baker, Bob Session 11A...........................................103 Barker, Darrell D. Session 6B ...............................................51 Barnes, Peter Session 3C ...............................................19 Bastos-Netto, D. Session 6B ...............................................50 Bech, Thomas Nørgaard Session 4B ...............................................29 Becvar, Keith Edward Session 12A...........................................112 Benton, Donald R. Session 6C ...............................................55 Bogosian, David Session 5A...............................................35 Session 7B ...............................................61 Bowles, Patricia Moseley Session 4C ...............................................31 Brown, Mary Session 8C ...............................................78 Butcher, A. Garn Session 3C ...............................................22 Campbell, Carol J. Session 8C ...............................................77 Campbell, Jeffrey Session 4C ...............................................33 Carr, Kevin R. Session 8C ...............................................79 Chew, Soon-Hoe Session 4B ...............................................27 Chong, Karen Session 6A...............................................49
Gündisch Rainer Session 11C .......................................... 110 Hardwick, Meredith Session 9A .............................................. 80 Held, Manfred Session 4B .............................................. 27 Session 9C ........................................ 86, 87 Helim, A. O. Abd El Session 10A ............................................ 89 Henderson, Jon Session 7B .............................................. 62 Hollands, Ron Session 7A .............................................. 57 Hung, K. C. Session 4B .............................................. 28 Isenberg, Tim Session 4A .............................................. 24 Jones, A. G. Session 8C .............................................. 78 Justice, D. Bart Session 12A .......................................... 114 King, Kim W. Session 3B .............................................. 18 Knight, Greg Session 8B .............................................. 75 Knight, Timothy C. Session 12B .......................................... 115 Krauthammer, Theodor Session 2B ................................................ 5 Session 11B .......................................... 107 Kummer, Peter O. Session 7B .............................................. 61 Session 11A .......................................... 101 Laker, T. S. Session 4A .............................................. 26 Langberg, Helge Session 2B ................................................ 7 Session 12C .......................................... 119 Lattery, Jerome Session 9C .............................................. 87 Lawson, Christy Session 10A ............................................ 90 Lawver, Darell Session 11B .......................................... 104 LeBoeuf, William C. Session 6B .............................................. 49 iv
Lindfors, Allen J. Session 8C............................................... 76 Little, Lyn Session 6A............................................... 46 Loyd, Robert Session 7D............................................... 67 Lu, Yong Session 5B............................................... 41 Ludwig, Paul E. Session 10C........................................... 100 Maher, John Session 4A............................................... 24 Marchand, Kirk A. Session 12B........................................... 118 Marchandin, Pascal Session 2C............................................. 8, 9 Mathis, James T. Session 5A............................................... 36 Mendler, James J. Session 9A............................................... 82 Mensing, Richard W. Session 11A........................................... 102 Meyer, Sarah Session 7B............................................... 60 Miller, Paul L. Session 7C............................................... 63 Moreton, Peter Allen Session 8A............................................... 68 Moriarty, Rob Session 10A............................................. 92 Mullin, Scott A. Session 5B............................................... 41 Murtha, Robert N. Session 6A............................................... 48 Nebuda, Dale Session 2B................................................. 5 Needham, Charles Session 4C............................................... 34 Nilsson, Erik Session 5A............................................... 38 Nordquist, Tyrone D. Session 7C............................................... 64 Nussbaumer, Peter Session 11A........................................... 103 O’Daniel, James L. Session 7C............................................... 65
Olson, Eric Session 9A...............................................80 Opichka, Sherene Session 8B ...............................................74 Oswald, Charles J. Session 5A...............................................36 Session 12B ...........................................116 Pan, Tso-Chien Session 9B ...............................................85 Pearson, Dale Session 5B ...............................................39 Peugeot, Frederic Session 2C ...............................................10 Pfitzer, Tom Session 9A...............................................81 Pirtskhalava, David Session 5C ...............................................43 Polcyn, Michael A. Session 3B ...........................................15 Proper, Kenneth W. Session 6A...............................................48 Session 11C ...................................110, 111 Rattanapote, Melody K. Session 8A...............................................71 Reed, Jack Session 8A...............................................70 Reese, Timothy A. Session 5C ...............................................42 Rhijnsburger, Marnix Session 5C ...............................................45 Session 10C .............................................98 Scarborough, Duane S. Session 11C ...........................................108 Schwartz, Daniel F. Session 9C ...............................................88 Schwer, Douglas Session 4B ...............................................29 Seah, Yeow Teck Session 9B .........................................83, 84 Seipel, William F. Session 2B .................................................6 Session 5B ..............................................39 Shall, John S. Session 3B ...............................................17 Starr, Craig M. Session 2B .................................................4
Stevens, David Session 10A ............................................ 92 Session 12B .......................................... 117 Strickland, W. S. Session 6B .............................................. 51 Supatashvili, D. Session 5C .............................................. 44 Swansiger, Rosalind W. Session 2A ................................................ 2 Swanson, Roger L. Session 2A ................................................ 1 Session 7A .............................................. 56 Sweirk, Thomas E. Session 2C ................................................ 9 Swisdak, Michael M. Session 7D .............................................. 66 Session 10B ............................................ 94 Tan, Su Chern Session 12C .......................................... 120 Tancreto, James E. Session 10B ............................................ 95 Tatom, John W. Session 6B .............................................. 52 Session 7D .............................................. 66 Session 10B ............................................ 93 Session 11A .......................................... 101 Thomas, J. Kelly Session 5B .............................................. 40 Tilbrook, Lyndon Session 3A .............................................. 13 Tobias, John M. Session 7A .............................................. 58 van Deursen, J. R. Session 4A .............................................. 25 van Dongen, Philip Session 10C ............................................ 97 van Wees, Rolf M. M. Session 3B .............................................. 16 Session 10C ........................................... 99 Vinson, Robert L. Session 6C .............................................. 53 Vretblad, Bengt E. Session 10C ............................................ 96 Waclawczyk, Johnny H. Session 12A .......................................... 113
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Wager, Phillip C. Session 2A ................................................ 3 Session 7D .............................................. 68 Wallace, I. G. Session 2A ................................................ 2 Session 3C .............................................. 21 Session 9C .............................................. 86 Watry, Craig Session 11B .......................................... 105 Weerheijm, J. Session 10B ............................................ 95 Session 12A .......................................... 114 Wesevich, James W. Session 11B .......................................... 106
Westover, D. L. Session 3A............................................... 12 Whitney, Mark G. Session 8B............................................... 75 Session 11B........................................... 106 Young, Lee Ann Session 10A............................................. 90 Zaugg, Mark M. Session 6C............................................... 55 Zehrt, William H. Session 12B........................................... 117
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OPENING REMARKS
Captain William E. Wright, USN, Chairman, United States Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board
SESSION 1 TUESDAY 8:45AM– 9:45 AM
GENERAL SESSION
Mr. Phillip W. Grone, United States Principal Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment
EXPLOSIVES SAFETY
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. Jim McLay, MOD/UK Defense Ordnance Safety Group
SESSION 2A TUESDAY 10:15 AM – 11:55 AM
Swanson, Roger L. Session 2A
WEAPONS SAFETY: THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE
Author: Roger L. Swanson, Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity, Farragut Hall (Bldg D-323), 23 Strauss Avenue, Indian Head, MD 206405555, Tel: (301) 744-4447, Fax: (301) 744-6087, E-mail: SwansonRL@navsea.navy.mil
This paper will discusses the rationale and benefits to DON, DoD, and our Warfighters by the evolution and development of a National approach to weapons and ordnance safety, and more importantly to platform operational explosive safety as the DoD increasingly operates in a joint manner; e.g., Sea Basing. A systematic approach to platform safety and weapons and ordnance safety will be a positive enhancer of National Combat Capability. Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA) is the DON explosive safety technical authority. NOSSA consolidated all Navy weapons and ordnance related safety programs under one overall Explosives Safety Program (ESP); i.e., all aspects of weapons and ordnance safety from cradle to grave. NOSSA and the other Services’ safety organizations will be challenged by the changing nature of the Department of Defense (DoD) as it transforms from historically very separate and distinct Departments into organizations that will not only talk "jointness" but may also plan and act in a joint manner. This paper will address the inter-relationships amongst the various portions of the overall Explosive Safety programs and the possible synergism of a joint or National effort that would facilitate a common focus to ensure optimum support to the Nation’s Warfighters. This paper will discuss and offer an answer to the question; how does the Navy, the other Services, and perhaps major allies blend or work together to move towards increased jointness in the increasingly complex and interwoven world of weapons and ordnance safety to enhance our National Combat Capability. 1
Issues to be considered that may influence future jointness include; existing and planned weapons and ordnance designs; Services’ engineering and safety organizations (DoD in-house and contractor); production, maintenance, and/or storage sites that are organic, commercial, and foreign; and Warfighter protocols, organizations, operations -- dedicated single Service, permanent, or temporary joint operations.
Wallace, I. G. Session 2A
UK EXPLOSIVES COMPETENCIES – SETTING THE STANDARDS
Presenter: Prof. I. G. Wallace, Head Of Department Of Environmental & Ordnance Systems, Cranfield University/RMCS, Shrivenham Campus, Swindon, Wiltshire SN6 8LA, UK, Tel: +44 (0) 1793 785681, Fax: +44 (0) 1793 785772, E-mail: i.g.wallace@cranfield.ac.uk
Co-Author: R. Parry, DOSG BM1b, Defence Ordnance Safety Group, Ash 2B #3212, MoD Abbey Wood, Bristol BS34 8JH, UK, Tel: +44 (0)117 9135547, Fax: +44 (0)117 9135903, E-mail: DOSGBM1@dpa.mod.uk Explosives safety depends on having a community of explosives workers who are competent in manufacturing and undertaking tasks involving explosives. This paper describes the work being undertaken in the UK to develop occupational standards for all explosives occupations. It describes the process of occupational mapping designed to identify all workers in the explosives sector and functional analysis which involves an analysis of occupations to identify the knowledge and skills required for explosives related jobs. The paper also examines the provision of explosives training and education and how the provision is to develop to support these working standards.
Swansiger, Rosalind W. Session 2A
EXPLOSIVES TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION PROGRAM AT LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
Author: Rosalind W. Swansiger, Chair, Explosives Safety Committee, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, PO Box 808, L-282, Livermore, CA 94551, Tel: (925) 422-9083, Fax: (925) 424-3281, E-mail: swansiger1@llnl.gov About four years ago, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory began a complete reorganization of our training and qualification program for explosives workers. We recognized that training was not consistent from one organization to another across the laboratory, and that that might lead to problems when workers moved between organizations. Although all workers took the same classroom instruction, OJT varied in content and duration. We decided to define a set of basic skills that would be common to all explosives handlers and to develop a template set of lesson plans for those skills. The templates could be tailored to differences in work procedures from one facility to another, identifying the critical points that should be stressed in every 2
workplace. We defined nine basic OJT areas for instruction and developed template lesson plans for them. We have also developed a large set of templates for teaching other more; job-specific skills. The basic template can be used to develop a training plan for any OJT task. All of the elements of the training process for an individual are captured on a Training Qualification Record Form. The top portion of the form contains a complete description of the employee's proposed explosives-related job. The training plan section of the form lists required classes and OJT tasks. The training plan is described in detail in Document 17.7 of Volume H of the LLNL ES&H Manual.
AUTOMATING EXPLOSIVES SAFETY SITING - ISSUES AND CHALLENGES
Presenter: Phillip C. Wager, Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center, Code C62, 1100 23rd Ave, Port Hueneme, CA 93043-4370, Tel: (805) 982-1239, DSN 551-1239, E-mail: phillip.wager@navy.mil
Wager, Phillip C. Session 2A
The DoD Program Office for Environmental Information Technology Management (EITM) and the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) have provided funding and oversight for the development of the Explosives Safety Siting (ESS) Software. The software is currently in use at numerous DoD installations. ESS enables the user to use electronic maps and data available at most DoD installations to evaluate the distance between potential explosives sites and exposed sites against DoD, Air Force, Army and Navy regulations. ESS also enables the automated generation of Explosives Safety Quantity Distance Arcs and the creation of, and tracking of explosives safety site plan submittals. Installation and setup of the ESS software requires installations to provide electronic maps, facilities data and explosives data. When installations maintain their data in accordance with DoD standards and proper configuration management, the setup and maintenance of the application is much easier. This paper discusses the type of data required for automated siting, typical problems encountered with data preparation, and how to avoid/overcome these problems.
STRUCTURES
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. Kevin P. Hager, Naval Facilities Engineering Services Center
SESSION 2B TUESDAY 10:15 AM – 11:55 AM
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Starr, Craig M. Session 2B
IMPACT LOAD TRANSFER THROUGH CLADDING PANELS
Presenter: Craig M. Starr, Protective Technology Center, Pennsylvania State University, 3127 Research Drive, State College, PA 16801,Tel: (814) 865-9524, Fax: (814) 865-9630, E-mail: cms289@psu.edu
Co-Authors: Theodor Krauthammer and Stacy Worley, Protective Technology Center, Pennsylvania State University, 3127 Research Drive, State College, PA 16801, Tel: (814) 865-3102, Fax: (814) 865-9630, E-mail: tedk@psu.edu, Tel: (814) 865-7355, Fax: (814) 865-9630, E-mail: skworley@engr.psu.edu Generally, cladding systems are holistically grouped into a nonstructural area of design in conventional structural design practice. Typically, engineers derive a characteristic design load, apply it across the face of a structure, and using tributary areas calculate member design forces. While this method is permissible for most static, quasi-static, and seismic loads, this approach may not be applicable for short duration dynamic forces such as impact or blast loads. In most short duration dynamic loads the external façade of a structure becomes heavily damaged, which would change the force transfer to an underlying structure. This change in force transmission may prove to be a benefit or detriment to a structural system. The objective of this study was the assessment of cladding-structure interaction under localized impact loads through the use of physical testing. This study was carried out utilizing precision impact testing criteria to investigate various aspects of impact load transfer through cladding into supporting structures. Twelve 8”x24”x120” Aerated Autoclaved Concrete cladding specimens were tested under four loading conditions to provide data that could be parametrically evaluated. The loading conditions were created by varying the mass and drop height of an impactor. A pendulum was implemented to generate the short duration impact forces necessary to test the cladding specimen. Data collected from each specimen included impact and reaction forces as well as accelerations of the impactor face, multiple points across the rear of the specimen, and each support. The major finding of this study was that cladding systems may provide buildings with an external barrier capable of reducing short duration loading effects. One test case offered only a 4% reduction in transferred force and in general did not behave in a manner similar to the other test cases. However, the remaining three test cases produced data that indicated an impact force dissipation of approximately 25-50 % depending on loading condition. A reduction of transferred impact force of these magnitudes would provide a significant benefit to the structural behavior of a building under short duration dynamic loading conditions. This paper will describe each test case and characteristic tests within each, discuss impact load transfer, explain and discuss the findings, and provide conclusions and recommendations.
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LOAD-IMPULSE DIAGRAMS FOR REINFORCED CONCRETE BEAMS
Presenter: Theodor Krauthammer, Protective Technology Center, Pennsylvania State University, 3127 Research Drive, State College, PA 16801, (Tel) 814-865-3102, Fax: (814) 865-9630, E-mail: tedk@psu.edu Co-Author: Tian Boon Soh, Research Engineer, Defence Science & Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Singapore 109679, E-mail: chrisnet@pacific.net.sg
Krauthammer, Theodor Session 2B
A numerical method for computing rational load-impulse diagrams of reinforced concrete beams has been developed. The method is based on established Single-Degree-of-Freedom (SDOF) techniques that take into account arbitrary support conditions and nonlinear structural behavior. The behavior and modeling of reinforced concrete members subjected to severe localized impulsive loads are also examined in order to establish reliable dynamic resistance functions for both flexural, and flexural combined with diagonal shear and direct shear responses. Transformation factors based on the actual deformation characteristics of the continuous structural members are then computed. The characteristics and the development of load-impulse diagrams were studied as were the derivation of closed-form solutions for a perfectly elastic Single-Degree-of-Freedom system with simple load pulses. To maximize the computation efficiency of the numerical method, careful selection of dynamic parameters for dynamic analyzes were required, and the procedure has been derived in the study. This approach was used to analyze simple mechanical systems with idealized load pulses and resistance functions. In addition, a number of reinforced concrete beams, tested by other investigators, were analyzed to determine the characteristics of load-impulse diagrams for flexural, and flexural combined with diagonal and direct shear responses. This paper will present a summary of the method, examples of its application, and a summary of the findings.
SINGLE DEGREE OF FREEDOM BLAST EFFECTS DESIGN SPREADSHEETS (SBEDS)
Presenter: Dale Nebuda, P.E., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Protective Design Center, 12565 West Center Road, Omaha, NE 68144-3869, Tel: (402) 221-4914, Fax: (402) 221-4315, E-mail: dale.nebuda@usace.army.mil
Nebuda, Dale Session 2B
Co-Author: Charles J. Oswald, PhD, P.E., Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc., 3330 Oakwell Court, Suite 100, San Antonio, TX 78218-3024, Tel: (210) 824-5960, Fax: (210) 824-5964, E-mail: Coswald@BakerRisk.com SBEDS is an Excel® based tool for design of structural components subjected to dynamic loads using single degree of freedom (SDOF) methodology. This paper summarizes the results of an effort sponsored by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Protective Design Center, to develop a tool for designers to use in satisfying Department of Defense (DoD) antiterrorism standards. 5
The user can choose from 10 common structural components and enter readily available parameters related to material properties and geometry and allow the workbook to calculate the SDOF properties or directly enter the SDOF properties. Masonry, reinforced concrete, steel, cold-formed metal, and wood components are included. Standard components can be selected from dropdown menus. Various support conditions can be selected. A flexure resistance function is used with compression membrane and/or tension membrane contributions where applicable. SDOF properties are computed in accordance with UFC 3-340-01 (formerly Army TM 5-855-1). Either uniformly distributed or concentrated midspan loadings are accommodated. The workbook will read an ASCII file containing pressure/force time pairs or the user can enter a piecewise linear load consisting of up to 8 segments. Additionally, a uniform distributed pressure from detonation of a high explosive hemispherical surface burst that accounts for negative phase loading can be generated within the workbook by specifying the charge weight and standoff distance. Numeric integration of the equation of motion is accomplished using a constant velocity method with user specified dampening considered. Maximum and minimum displacements, maximum support rotation, ductility, and peak reactions are reported. Additionally, histories for displacement, resistance, reactions, and load are available. Shear capacity is the component is evaluated and reported.
Seipel, William F. Session 2B
SINGLE-DEGREE-OF-FREEDOM PLASTIC ANALYSIS (SPAN32)
Presenter: William F. Seipel, P.E., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Protective Design Center, 12565 West Center Road, Omaha, NE, 68144, Tel: (402) 221-3063, Fax: (402) 221-4315, E-mail: William.F.Seipel@ usace.army.mil
Co-Author: Timothy C. Knight, P.E., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Protective Design Center, 12565 West Center Road, Omaha, NE, 68144, Tel: (402) 221-3176, Fax: (402) 221-4315, E-mail: Timothy.C.Knight@usace.army.mil SPAn32 is the product of many years of development. It was developed as an in-house SingleDegree-of-Freedom code to aid in the design and analysis of structural members subjected to dynamic loads. SPAn32 was written originally for design and analysis of hardened structural members subjected to high explosive loadings. These dynamic loads can be generated from any type of explosion that results in a uniform load on the face of the member. The uniform loading could be any of the following types; air blast, or ground shock. It performs an equivalent single degree of freedom dynamic analysis of the response of a structural member. It is a useful tool in analysis of conventional construction subjected to any uniform dynamic load. SPAn32 is currently version 1.3.0.0 and is limited distribution, critical technology. Current capabilities of the SPAn32 include: 1) analysis of one-way and two-way steel members, 2) Analysis of one-way and two-way reinforced concrete members. 3) analysis of a user defined member. One of many applications of this program is the design and analysis of new reinforced concrete construction for an environment where explosive hazard is greater than normal construction allows or required standoff is not available. Reinforced concrete continues to be a form of 6
construction that can provide the needed protection with ease of constructability. A summary of SPAn32 and a design example using the reinforced concrete model in SPAn32 will be discussed and presented.
WOOMERA 5-TONNE TRIAL: THE NORWEGIAN PARTICIPATION
Presenter: Helge Langberg, Norwegian Defence Estates Agency, R & D Box 405, Sentrum, 0103 Oslo, Norway, E-mail: helge.langberg@ forsvarsbygg.no
Langberg, Helge Session 2B
Co-Authors: Hans Øiom, Norwegian Defense Logistics Organization / Ammunition PO Box 24, N-2431 Raufoss, Norway, E-mail: hoiom@mil.no, and Geir Arne Grønsten, Norwegian Defence Estates Agency, R & D, Box 405, Sentrum, 0103 Oslo, Norway, E-mail: geir.arne.gronsten@forsvarsbygg.no In 1998 Norway built a typical Norwegian house in Woomera, South Australia. Since then the house has been subjected to air blast loading from the controlled explosion of 40 tonne NEQ TNT in 1999, 27 and 5 tonne NEQ TNT in 2002. The house was placed at the Inhabited Building Distance (IBD) in 1999, and sustained only moderate damage, mostly in the form of damage to inside plasterboards. The house was repaired for future trials with preferably higher loads. The test series continued in 2002, with the house at twice the IBD in the 27 tonne trial. As expected, the damages were minimal in this trial. Next was the 5 tonne trial. Artillery rounds placed in an ISO-container arranged in a simulated field storage was detonated at 177 m away from the house. The load was predicted to be twice the load from the 40 tonne event in 1999. Apart from window breakage, it was found that there was little damage to the structure itself. Moreover, the observed window breakage was consistent with earlier tests. This paper details the measurement setup and presents the blast environment and the structural response. Some comparisons to predictions are given.
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SESSION 2C TUESDAY 10:15 AM – 11:55 AM
INSENSITIVE MUNITIONS
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. Robert Maline, OUSD(AT&L) Defense Systems, Land Warfare and Munitions
Marchandin, Pascal Session 2C
THE EVOLUTION OF NIMIC TO MSIAC: NEW SERVICES & PRODUCTS TO SUPPORT THE INTERNATIONAL MUNITIONS SAFETY COMMUNITY
Presenter: Pascal Marchandin, NIMIC, Pilot-MSIAC, NIMIC, NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium, Tel: +32 (0)2.707.54.26, Fax: +32 (0)2.707.53.63, E-mail: p.marchandin@hq.nato.int Co-Author: Patrick Touzé, NIMIC, Pilot-MSIAC, NIMIC, NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium, Tel: +32 (0)2.707.54.95, Fax: +32 (0)2.707.53.63, E-mail: p.touze@hq.nato.int After a three-year transition period that started in 1988, NIMIC was formally established in 1991 as an Information Analysis Center (IAC) dedicated to Insensitive Munitions. Over the years NIMIC has effectively supported the development and implementation of IM technologies. The NIMIC Nations now see the development and fielding of Insensitive Munitions becoming a normal part of the safety design process. The Pilot-MSIAC (Munitions Safety Information and Analysis Center) operation was created within NIMIC in January 2003 to broaden the NIMIC scope to ammunition safety with the objective of transitioning into MSIAC in 2005. The MSIAC’s scope will cover the whole life cycle of munitions and the support to the CNAD Ammunition Safety Group (CASG, also called AC/326). This paper presents a series of new activities (products and services) that have already started in Pilot-MSIAC to achieve the new objectives defined by the NIMIC/Pilot-MSIAC Steering Committee. Some of the most significant new tasks are: • The development of an Ammunition Safety Analysis Software • The development of an International Munitions and Explosives Accidents Database • The organization of two workshops in collaboration with NATO AC/326: o RS-RDX Technical Meeting in November 2003 o Debris from Explosions Technical Meeting in conjunction with 31st DoD Explosives Safety Seminar • The development of online services to support the NATO AC/326 sub-groups activities
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INSENSITIVE MUNITIONS OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT
Author: Thomas E. Swierk, Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, 17320 Dahlgren Road, Dahlgren, VA 22448, Tel: (540) 6534458, Fax: (540) 653-4662, E-mail: SwierkTE@nswc.navy.mil
Swierk, Thomas E. Session 2C
Co-Author: Fred J. Fisch, Ph.D., P.E., Ship Survivability/Vulnerability Consultant, 2203 Eastlake Road, Timonium, MD 21093-2707, Tel: (410) 252-4287, E-mail: abfjf@earthlink.net The Insensitive Munitions Advanced Development Program was established in 1984 as a resource for new technology to provide solutions for IM deficiencies. This technology would be applied to all current and future Navy weapon systems. Continued support for this program in the out-years has come under more rigorous scrutiny, especially future R&D investments. This has far reaching implications since the ultimate goal of IM is platform survivability. The October 2000 attack on the USS Cole had major consequences in terms of loss of human lives, military assets and operational capability. However, from the ammunition safety point of view, it was considered a near miss. This event could underscore the need for fully IM compliant weapons to minimize losses such as this. But it also leaves one major issue unresolved. To answer the question “How much IM is enough ?”, one must conduct a series of system and platform level analyses to assess their vulnerabilities or deficiencies in the event of an enemy attack or accident. This paper will describe the planned analyses and present a top level summary of results obtained thus far. The project team is nearing completion of the first year of a planned two-year effort consisting of four separate case studies: sea-based surface combatants that include DDG, CVN and T-AKE class ships in addition to a pierside scenario that encompasses port operations. Each case study will complete tasks that include a scenario development, a description of the threats, an event analysis for the IM hazards and a summary analysis of the outcome on safety and the related operational implications.
THE NIMIC COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS MODEL: CBAM 2.0
Presenter: Pascal Marchandin, NIMIC, Pilot-MSIAC, NIMIC, NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium, Tel: +32 (0)2.707.54.26, Fax: +32 (0)2.707.53.63, Email: p.marchandin@hq.nato.int
Marchandin, Pascal Session 2C
As a response to the recommendations from the NIMIC Cost and Benefits Analysis workshop (Sweden, June 2001), NIMIC has developed the Cost Benefit Analysis Model (CBAM) and started its distribution at the end of 2003. The primary goal of CBAM is to aid in the assessment of the costs and benefits of introducing IM into service. However, it is now evident that there are some additional potential usages of CBAM version 2.0 which include: • Life Cycle Cost calculation of military weapon systems (and life cycle cost comparison between different technologies) 9
• •
Risk Analysis Threat Hazard Assessment
This paper presents the methodology applied in CBAM 2.0, the different screens and the data to be collected prior to the start of a risk-based cost benefit analysis for the introduction of less sensitive munitions into service. Potential uses of CBAM outside the IM community (e.g., the munitions safety community) are also discussed.
Peugeot, Frederic Session 2C
THE NIMIC FRAGMENT IMPACT DATABASE (FRAID)
Author: Dr. Frederic Peugeot, NIMIC / Pilot MSIAC, NATO HQ, B-1110 Brussels, Belgium, Tel: (32-2)707.5447, Fax: (32-2)707.53.63, E-mail: f.peugeot@hq.nato.int
One of the stimuli specified in NATO STANAG 4439 on Insensitive Munitions (IM) requirements, and in the national IM requirements of the United States, Italy, United Kingdom and France is fragment impact, or fragment attack. While national and international policies request All Up Round tests to validate the response of a munition to this threat and in general to IM threats, a methodology using a combination of smallscale testing, modelling and expert analysis has emerged in recent years as a best practice. To assist the community in this difficult task, NIMIC staff has gathered information related to fragment impact test or modeling results. The objective of this paper is to present the NIMIC Fragment Impact Database (FRAID) version 1.3. This software currently available to the NIMIC member nations will provide them with +1000 fragment impact results on +65 compositions. It will enable users to compare fragment impact response of various formulations and/or to assess the effect of various variables on response such as fragment shape, fragment orientation, fragment obliquity, confinement thickness...
Peugeot, Frederic Session 2C
THE NIMIC EXCEL WORKSHEETS ON GAP TESTS (NEWGATES)
Author: Dr. Frederic Peugeot, NIMIC / Pilot MSIAC, NATO HQ, B-1110 Brussels, Belgium, Tel: (32-2) 707.5447, Fax: (32-2) 707.53.63, E-mail: f.peugeot@hq.nato.int
In recent years, NIMIC has been striving to encourage the use of small-scale testing in Insensitive Munitions assessments. Indeed, small-scale testing increases the ability and confidence of designers to understand, predict and as a consequence reduce the hazards associated with munitions.
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Among the small-scale tests to be considered, is the gap test. This test is performed at many Research & Testing establishments using similar but not identical versions. As shown Figure 1, a gap test is composed of an inert barrier interposed between a standard donor explosive and a tested receptor/acceptor explosive. The thickness of the barrier is adjusted to establish a critical attenuator thickness for which the probability of detonation of the acceptor is 50%. To date, by changing the donor, the confinement(s), the barrier, or the dimensions, more than 30 gap tests have been defined and used either nationally or internationally. In order to assist the IM community, NIMIC has produced a software tool containing information related to ten Gap Tests: the small scale water gap test, the NOL and the LANL small scale gap tests, the Intermediate scale gap test, the NOL and the LANL large scale gap tests, the two versions of the UN (7b) EIDS gap test also known as the Expanded large scale gap test, the Modified enlarged scale gap test and the Super large scale gap test.
Donor Attenuator (Inert barrier) Acceptor Figure 1: Gap Test schematic drawing
The objective of this paper is to present the NIMIC Excel Worksheets on GAp TESts (NEWGATES) version 1.3. This software, currently available to governmental organizations, contractors and universities from the NIMIC member nations, will provide them with 6 databases: • General Information (dimensions, scope, principles). • Pressure calibration curves • Time calibration curves • Shock curvature calibration curves • 409 gap test results • +250 Hugoniots With this friendly tool, including easy access to key references, users will able to compare gap tests results and/or calculate critical initiation pressures and critical initiation times.
EXPLOSIVES SAFETY PRACTICES I
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. Richard Adams, Naval Ordnance Safety & Security Activity
SESSION 3A TUESDAY 1:00 PM - 2:40 PM
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Westover, D. L. Session 3A
USE OF A GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR RELATING EXPLOSIVES LICENCES TO NONEXPLOSIVES MANAGEMENT
Presenter: Dr. D. L. Westover, AWE, Aldermaston, Reading, Berkshire, RG7 4PR, UK, Tel: +44 118 982 6597, Fax: +44 118 982 5032, E-mail: dave.westover@awe.co.uk
Co-Authors: C. Peters, AWE, Aldermaston, Reading, Berkshire, RG7 4PR, UK, Tel: +44 118 982 4424, Fax: +44 118 982 5320, E-mail: chris.peters@awe.co.uk, and M. Willis, AWE, Aldermaston, Reading, Berkshire, RG7 4PR, UK, Tel: +44 118 982 6812, Fax: +44 118 982 5032, E-mail: martin.willis@awe.co.uk AWE has two industrial sites and is responsible for the research, development and production of the UK’s nuclear deterrent and as such we are subject to nuclear, explosives and general industrial regulation. AWE is presently moving from UK Ministry of Defence regulation to civilian explosives regulation. This transition involves changes to our Quantity Distances (QDs) and the way our Licences are administered. This legislative change has highlighted explosives safety issues to a wide cross-section of our community. The use of a Geographical Information System (GIS) has proved a valuable tool in identifying the extent of the impact of our Explosives Licences to this wider non-explosives audience. The configured GIS Maps are the underpinning basis for a suite of Company documents, for facility and project management relating to the siting of new building projects and modification management. We have requirements to refurbish or replace some of our infrastructure and at the same time continue with research and production. The intranet based GIS system allows the on and off-site impact of changes in QD to be visualized immediately, overlaying on high-resolution aerial photography, as well as traditional vector maps.
Ellis, Sam Session 3A
DALAB — A TOOLBOX FOR CALCULATION AND ASSESSMENT OF DANGER AREAS FOR BALLISTIC AND EXPLOSIVE EVENTS
Author: Sam Ellis, Defence Ordnance Safety Group, Ash 2B #3212, MoD Abbey Wood, Bristol, BS34 8JH, UK, Tel: +44 117 91 35345, Fax: +44 117 91 35903, E-mail: dosgst5@dpa.mod.uk DOSG have a large collection of tools for dealing with ballistic and explosive events. These have been collected over a long period of time and have generally all been built as individual tools with little attempt at fitting them together.
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One of these, the Weapon Danger Area Assessment and Prediction System (WDA APS) has been developed over a period of 16 years and is now in routine use to assess safety on small arms ranges. This suite of programs was developed primarily to a UK specification, but with a view to providing a standard for the NATO Range Safety Working Group (NRSWG) and its partner organisation the International Range Safety Advisory Group (IRSAG). The capability to handle fragmentation events (from single warheads to stacks of munitions) was added in the mid 1990s. With the development of a modelling strategy for DOSG, and the need to extend the capabilities of the WDA APS, we have taken the opportunity to “refactor” the existing programs to provide a general framework for calculation and assessment of ballistic and explosive events. This new collection of programs is called DALAB — Danger Area LABoratory. The range safety programs will be the benchmark implementation for the NRSWG and IRSAG with specifications and capability covered by a series of Allied Range Safety Publications (ARSPs). The explosive event programs will be central to DOSG capability in providing safety advice for storage and transport of munitions. A brief description of the DOSG modelling strategy will be given; the DALAB framework will be described and results illustrating some of DALAB’s capabilities will be presented.
ESTABLISHMENT AND COMMISSIONING OF A RAN AMMUNITIONING FACILITY ON AUSTRALIA’S EAST COAST
Tilbrook, Lyndon Session 3A
Presente: Group Captain Lyndon Tilbrook, Director, Directorate of Ordnance Safety, CP4-3-164, Department of Defence, Canberra, ACT 2600, Australia, Tel: + 61 2 6266 3131, Fax: 61 2 6266 4781, E-mail: lyndon.tilbrook@defence.gov.au Co-Author: Anthony Robson, Directorate of Ordnance Safety, CP4-3-163, Department of Defence, Canberra, ACT 2600, Australia, Tel: + 61 2 6266 4498, Fax: 61 2 6266 4781, E-mail: tony.robson@ defence.gov.au The Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) East Coast Fleet Base is located in Sydney Harbour. The ammunitioning activity for warships in Sydney Harbour ceased in 1999 with the closure of the ‘ammunition pipeline’. The pipeline was closed because a major Defence facility (RAN Armament Depot Newington) was closed and the land sold as part of the infrastructure redevelopment for the 2000 Olympic Games. Alternate arrangements for the ammunitioning and de-ammunitioning of RAN ships was required and a site was selected in Twofold Bay near Eden, NSW. The site met the Navy requirements of a sheltered wharf in a deep water harbour that is close to the Fleet Base in Sydney Harbour and the Navy’s East Australia Exercise Area. Point Wilson, a Commonwealth owned EO import and storage port facility west of Melbourne, Victoria, has been used in the interim years for ammunitioning RAN ships, but the Twofold Bay facility has now been completed and is near commissioning. The Twofold Bay ammunitioning complex consists of a multipurpose wharf and associated jetty and a land based depot comprising explosive ordnance transit and storage facilities located approximately 15 kilometres inland from the wharf. Although funded by Defence the wharf will be available for 13
commercial and public use when not required for RAN operations (approximately 70 days/year) except for 5 days/year when the local indigenous community will have exclusive use. The project has opened up the area for commercial and public use for the first time. This novel joint use of the wharf and private/State Forestry ownership of land containing safeguarding arcs required the Commonwealth to obtain some control over activities that could take place near the wharf when ammunitioning was in progress. The need for an increase in port security through adoption of the ISPS Code was recognised. This paper discusses these issues and others encountered during the commissioning this ammunitioning facility.
Crull, Michelle M. Session 3A
EXPLOSION EFFECTS SOFTWARE WORKING GROUP ESTABLISHED
Presenter: Michelle M. Crull, PhD, PE, U.S. Army Engineering & Support Center, Huntsville, Attn: CEHNC-ED-SY-T (Crull), PO Box 1600, Huntsville, AL 35807-4301, Tel: (256) 895-1653, Fax: (256) 895-1737, E-mail: Michelle.M.Crull@hnd01.usace.army.mil
The DDESB has established an Explosion Effects Software Working Group (EESWG). Their mission is to review/evaluate explosion effects software being used by the explosives safety community to support projects, which the DDESB Secretariat is then asked to approve. The concern of the Secretariat is that because of the proliferation of new codes and revision of "core" codes, it is very difficult to keep track of what codes have been recommended for use, what code changes have been reviewed, or even what differences exist between revisions of the same code. The role of the EESWG is to assist the Secretariat by reviewing/evaluating explosives safety software codes that are available, determining their bases (i.e, pedigree) and anchor points, developing a listing of recommended codes, and developing a mechanism for configuration control for these codes. Evaluation procedures and a preliminary list of explosion effects software based on members experience have been developed. A questionnaire has been sent to the points of contact for these software packages to obtain the necessary information. A survey for users of such software has also been developed and distributed. A DDESB Technical Paper (TP) will provide information to the explosives safety community on the evaluated software.
Ganguly, D. S. S. Session 3A
PROCESS SAFETY THROUGH INBUILT SAFETY GADGETS DURING NITRATION: A STEP IN MANUFACTURING OF EXPLOSIVES
Presenter: Dr. D. S. S. Ganguly, Joint General Manager, High Explosives Factory, Khadki, Pune – 411 003, India, Tel: 091 020 25821886, 091 020 25819566, 091 020 25819567, Fax: 091 020 25813204, E-mail: hefpune@pn2.vsnl.net.in
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Nitration is one of the most important reactions in industrial synthetic organic chemistry. The nitration products find wide applications in explosives. There are various types of nitration which involves introduction of one or more nitro group into a hydrocarbon by means of a mixture of conc. nitric and sulphuric acids. The nitration reaction is highly exothermic. A study of the thermal properties of nitrating acids is consequently essential for an adequate understanding of this unit process. The chemical engineer must, moreover, know how to develop and use thermodynamic data in designing nitrating equipment and providing safe and efficient operations. In an exothermic change, the enthalpy decreases. The nitration reaction must be controlled by systematic cooling designed to withdraw the energy evolved. When all the energy set free by an exothermic reaction is forced to appear as heat, the quantity of it lost to the cooling mechanism equals the decrease in enthalpy: Q = - ∆H Here Q, the heat of reaction, represents the total amount of heat lost by the reacting system from the start of the reaction till the products return to the initial temperature and pressure of the system. Simplest way to integrate the heat effects involved is to sum up the enthalpies. In the case of explosives namely 2,4,6-Trinitrotoulene (TNT), Tetryl (CE) manufactured in continuous as well as batch process demands accurate metering and control equipments. This paper describes various such controlling parameters, during process of nitration by the aid of inbuilt safety gadgets. This paper also describes the modern inbuilt safety gadgets used in sophisticated nitration plant for manufacturing of explosives viz. TNT, CE etc. Thus, this paper clearly outlines the use of various inbuilt safety gadgets to improvise safety in highly sophisticated sensitive nitration plants for manufacturing of highly sensitive & powerful primary explosives.
STRUCTURAL CHARACTERIZATION
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. David S. Shatzer, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
SESSION 3B TUESDAY 1:00 PM – 2:40 PM
Polcyn, Michael A. Session 3B
RESPONSE LIMITS FOR MASONRY AND COLDFORMED STEEL STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS
Presenter: Michael A. Polcyn, Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc., 3330 Oakwell Court, Suite 100, San Antonio, TX 78218-3024, Tel: (210) 824-5960, Fax: (210) 824-5964, E-mail:mpolcyn@bakerrisk.com
Co-Authors: Edward J. Conrath, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, CEMRO-ED-ST, 12565 West Center Road, Omaha, NE 68144-3869, Tel: (402) 221-3152, E-mail: Ed.J.Conrath@nwo02.usace.army.mil, and Charles J. Oswald, Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc., 3330 Oakwell Court, Suite 100, San Antonio, TX 78218-3024, Tel: (210) 824-5960, Fax: (210) 824-5964, E-mail: coswald@bakerrisk.com 15
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Protective Design Center (PDC) was tasked with the development of portions of the new Department of Defense (DoD) Security Engineering Manual. This manual will support the newly developed DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standard for Buildings and provide an update to information contained in older security manuals. Since the development of the earlier manuals, many structural components used in conventionally constructed facilities have been tested against airblast loading, and much has been learned about their response to blast. In order to utilize this newer information, it is important for it to be summarized in a usable format for engineers involved in the design or analysis of blast loaded structures. Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc. (BakerRisk) supported the PDC by developing response limits for masonry and cold-formed steel. These response limits consider life safety risk, debris, and repair. Specifically, limits were developed for the following components: Masonry • Unreinforced CMU • Single, double, and triple-wythe brick • European clay tile • Reinforced CMU Cold-Formed Steel • Metal deck • Standing seam metal roof panels • Cold-rolled girts and purlins • Metal studs
van Wees, Rolf M. M. Session 3B
DESIGN OF CONCRETE TEST BUNKERS
Presenter: Rolf M. M. van Wees, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843391, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: wees@pml.tno.nl
When TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory wanted to design new bunkers for explosion testing to replace its old facilities, it appeared that special design codes for such bunkers do not exist. Bunkers in which repeated firings are performed are only built once in a while; there are worldwide probably only a couple of hundred of such bunkers. It appears that they are often designed with normal concrete design codes like the CEB/FIP Model Code 1990. That might be uneconomical or unsafe, because normal concrete structures are predominantly exposed to gravity force (i.e. a single static load) while test bunkers experience repeated loads at high strain-rate. For test cells that need to withstand accidental explosions there exists a good design guide, TM 5-1300 (1990), but this guide is only applicable to a single explosion load. When a reinforced concrete structure is repeatedly loaded, the first place where damage is expected is the concrete-reinforcement bond of the most highly loaded reinforcement bars. The damage will lead to debonding of the rebar, which produces widening of the microcracks. In the next shots, concrete particles may become lodged in the cracks and keep them open. This can lead to pretensioning of the 16
rebar, higher interface stresses, more damage and more debonding. Eventually, the distributed crack pattern can deteriorate into a single concentrated crack. TNO-PML developed a design method and criteria to prevent this from happening, which are described in this paper.
PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE IN THE PROTECTIVE UPGRADING OF EXISTING AMMUNITION MAGAZINES AND EXPLOSIVE FACILITIES
Author: Reuben Eytan, Eytan Building Design Ltd, 27 Motta Gur Street, 69694 Tel Aviv, Israel, Tel: 972-3-6428480, Fax: 972-3-6429355, E-mail: ebd@netvision.net.il
Eytan, Reuben Session 3B
The paper includes the description of several practical methodologies for the protective upgrading of existing ammunition facilities and explosive facilities. The protective upgrading refers to several requirements: a. protection of the existing installation against terrorist attacks. b. protection of the existing installation against large weapons attacks in war situations. c. reducing the hazard from an internal explosion to civilian buildings adjacent to the existing installation. d. increasing the amount of explosives in the existing installation. e. reducing safety distances between structures inside the existing installation. The protective upgrading methodologies include various types of strengthening measures such as shielding blast walls, high strength concrete shielding elements, reinforced earth elements, innovative energy absorbing materials, retrofit composites on existing walls and ceilings, blast-resistant windows, layered protective elements and more. Real-life examples of implementing protective upgrading methodologies in actual projects as well as results of full scale explosive tests will be presented. Shortly, the paper will present the recent unique Israeli practical experience in developing, testing, designing and actually implementing innovative and cost effective protective upgrading methodologies, which surely will be of interest to the Seminar participants.
PRECAST CONCRETE OVAL ARCH STORAGE MAGAZINE, USACE STD. 421-80-05 – OVERVIEW, DEPLOYMENT, AND CASE HISTORIES
Author: John S. Shall, National Accounts Manager, The Reinforced Earth Company, 8614 Westwood Center Drive, Suite 1100, Vienna, VA 22182, Tel: (703) 821-1175, Fax: (703) 821-1815, E-mail: jshall@reinforcedearth.com
Shall, John S. Session 3B
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The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has developed an alternative design for the Army’s Standard Earth Covered Ammunition Storage Magazine (ECM). The design combines the benefits of threedimensional Finite Element Method (FEM) modeling with advanced, innovative manufacturing and installation techniques. The main feature of the new design is the use of precast concrete arch segments as an alternative to conventional pour-in-place concrete. The design utilizes TechSpan™, a precast concrete arch system manufactured by The Reinforced Earth Company. TechSpan’s 3-hinge design is combined with the incorporation of backfill as an element of the FEM model. The optimized design model gives TechSpan™ the inertia and flexibility to absorb explosive energy while remaining structurally intact. In addition, the new design satisfies DoD requirements for Lightning Protection by ensuring continuity of reinforcements throughout the structure. In addition to utilizing a precast concrete arch, the design includes variable alternative solutions for constructing the Magazine Wingwalls and Protective Walls. Mechanically Stabilized Earth (MSE) retaining walls are used for this application. DEPLOYMENT: In 1996 the Corps’ Engineering and Technical Support Center, Huntsville began a technical evaluation of RECo technologies, and in particular, the TechSpan™ system. Their positive recommendation to the Army’s Defense Ammunition Center (ADAC) launched a program to develop a new standard design using precast concrete components. The ADAC made its recommendations to the DoD Explosives Safety Board in support of the design concept. In September 1998 the design was approved by the DoD for deployment. The design is designated as USACE Std. 421-80-05, Magazine, Precast Concrete Earth Covered. The first installation of a TechSpan Arch Magazine occurred in May, 2001. Case Histories: To date, the new design has been constructed at six separate military installations. The Presentation will address government implementation procedures, variances in sizes and applications, and projectspecific details of completed projects as well as future applications.
King, Kim W. Session 3B
SEALED BLAST CONTAINMENT VESSEL DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
Presenter: Kim W. King, P.E., ABS Consulting, 15600 San Pedro, Suite 400, San Antonio, TX 78232, Tel: (210) 495-5195, Fax: (210) 495-5134, E-mail: kking@absconsulting.com
Co-Authors: Bert von Rosen, Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory, 555 Booth Street, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0G1, Tel: (613) 947-3527, Fax: (613) 956-1230, E-mail: bvonrose@NRCan.gc.ca, and Rick Guilbeault, Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory, 555 Booth Street, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0G1, Tel: (613) 995-2332, Fax: (613) 995-1230, Email: rguilbea@NRCan.gc.ca
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NABCO, Inc. has produced three portable bomb disposal chamber that are used in the destruction of conventional and chemical-biological improvised explosive devises (IED). The original Sealed Total Containment Vessel (TCV) unit is rated for multiple 10-lb TNT equivalent detonations in the venting mode of operation. Additionally, the original Sealed TCV is designed to limit the risk of exposure to hazardous materials during the transportation and destruction of an IED that has an associated chemical or biological hazard. An exterior door and various ports served to contain the gas and byproducts during and after the detonation. The charge rating for the Sealed TCV is currently 3-lbs TNT equivalent in the sealed mode of operation. Two new bomb disposal vessels have been designed and tested to contain an IED with an associated chemical or biological hazard, the New Sealed TCV and the Sealed Upscale Total Containment Vessel (UTCV). The New Sealed TCV is similar to the original Sealed TCV, except the internal door has been eliminated and the external door modified to fully automate closing. The Sealed UTCV is similar to the New Sealed TCV only 1.5 times larger. Tests were conducted to evaluate the performance of New Sealed TCV and the Sealed UTCV during and following an explosive discharge. The testing was designed and performed to characterize the leakage characteristics of the two vessels. Testing was performed by placing a tracer gas inside the vessels during the simulated destruction of an IED. Additionally, the test program was intended to identify and eliminate any physical weaknesses in the system, quantify structural response of the system under various explosive charge weights, and identify operational and maintenance problems. This paper describes the design, testing procedures, and test results for both programs. The testing was performed based on test procedures previously used by ABS Consulting with improvements based on those test results. All testing included the detonation of high explosives in full scale prototype vessels. A simulant gas was injected into each test vessel and detection equipment was used to monitor the environment outside the vessel during an event.
HAZARD CLASSIFICATION/IM TESTING
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. Mark Skogman, Defense Ammunition Center
SESSION 3C TUESDAY 1:00 PM – 2:40 PM
INSENSITIVE MUNITIONS AND HAZARD CLASSIFICATION
Presenter: Peter Barnes, Defence Ordnance Safety Group, Bristol, UK, Email: dosgst6@dpa.mod.uk
Barnes, Peter Session 3C
Co-Authors: Peter Eickhoff and Jon Henderson, Defence Ordnance Safety Group, Bristol, UK, and Ron Hollands, BAE Systems RO Defence, Glascoed, Usk, Monmouthshire, NP15 1SG, UK, Tel: +44(0) 291-674181, Fax: +44-(0) 291-674103, E-mail: ron.hollands@baesystems.com In addition to enhancing battle winning capability introduction of Insensitive Munitions (IMs) to the military inventory provides potential benefits such as reduction in logistic burden and storage restrictions by lowering the munition hazard division (HD) from HD1.1. The aims of this paper are to 19
review developments and current thinking in the UK and internationally on the various options for reclassification of IMs and then to throw the issue open for further debate. In the UK both MOD and industry are exploring the advantages to be gained from initially reducing the HD of munitions from 1.1 to 1.2 or 1.3. Discussions are underway between DOSG, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and industry with the aim of establishing a common rationale on reclassification and taking a unified view on UN and military test requirements. From an industrial manufacturing perspective RO Defence is establishing a high volume filling plant for castable polymer-bonded explosives (PBXs) and is seeking HSE approval for a HD 1.3 classification for its planned curing and storage facilities Debate on reclassification of IMs is also taking place at an international level and is being carried out through the auspices of NATO AC/326 SGV. A working paper has been published proposing the adoption of the HD1.2.3 category. This proposal is generally endorsed by the UK but it is argued that the optimum HD for insensitive munitions should be HD 1.6. The case is made that insensitive munitions fully meet the intent behind the HD1.6 classification. It is acknowledged that there are significant problems and obstacles to be overcome if this avenue is followed, including the need to review and perhaps modify the Series 7 substance testing requirement. However, assuming the arguments are sound the potential benefits make the challenge and hard decisions worth taking.
Atwood, Alice I. Session 3C
A CHARACTERIZATION OF THE COOKOFF BEHAVIOR OF AN ADVANCED PROPELLANT FORMULATION
Presenter: Alice I. Atwood, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Code 4T4310D, 1 Administration Circle, Stop 1109, China Lake, CA 93555, Tel: (760) 939-0203, Fax: (760) 939-2597, E-mail: Alice.atwood@navy.mil
Co-Authors: D. Tri Bui, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Code 4T4310D, 1 Administration Circle, Stop 1109, China Lake, CA 93555, Tel: (760) 939-0202, Fax: (760) 9392597, E-mail: Dung.bui@navy.mil; Patrick O. Curran, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Code 4T4310D, 1 Administration Circle, Stop 1109, China Lake, CA 93555, Tel: (760) 939-7482, Fax: (760) 939-2597, E-mail: Patrick.curran@navy.mil; and Melody K. Rattanapote, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Code 4T4310D, 1 Administration Circle, Stop 1109, China Lake, CA 93555, Tel: (760) 939-7482, Fax: (760) 939-2597, E-mail: Melody.rattanapote@navy.mil This paper presents a progress report on the small scale combustion and cookoff characterization of an HTPE/BuNENA propellant formulation. Propellant formulators are faced with a complex challenge to develop solid rocket propellants which maximize both safety and performance. Studies are underway to develop hazards classification 1.3 propellants with significant performance improvements over traditional fielded systems. One family of propellants under development, incorporates the energetic nitroplastisizer, BuNENA with an HTPE polymer.
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Traditional combustion characterization tests are being performed along with small scale cookoff pipe tests. The results of these experiments will be compared to those of a traditional HTPB based propellant formulation. The effects of heating rate on the cookoff temperature and level of reaction violence will also be reported., Current slow cookoff results show a relatively low cookoff temperature of about 140 degrees C as compared to 238 degrees C for the HTPB based propellant. Cookoff reaction violence as estimated by fragment formation indicates that the highest level of reaction violence occurred with a thermal heating profile which included a mid-temperature soak. It is speculated that the accumulation of highly reactive, gaseous products resulting from the binder decomposition play an important role in the level of reaction violence.
THE APPLICATION OF TIME-TEMPERATURE INDICATORS TO THE SAFETY OF EXPLOSIVES ORDNANCE
Wallace, I. G. Session 3C
Presenter: Prof. I. G. Wallace, Cranfield University/RMCS, Shrivenham Campus, Swindon, Wiltshire SN6 8LA UK, Tel: +44 (0)1793 785681, Fax: +44 (0)1793 785772, EMail: i.g.wallace@cranfield.ac.uk Co-Authors: Dr. J. M. Bellerby, Cranfield University/RMCS, Shrivenham Campus, Swindon, Wiltshire SN6 8LA UK, Tel: +44 (0)1793 785335, Fax: +44 (0)1793 785772, E-mail: J.M.Bellerby@cranfield.ac.uk; C. Castan-Remis, Cranfield University/RMCS, Shrivenham Campus, Swindon, Wiltshire SN6 8LA UK, Tel: +44 (0)1793 785092, Fax: +44 (0)1793 785772, E-mail: C.Castan-Remis@cranfield.ac.uk; and Dr. P. Barnes, DOSGST6, Defence Ordnance Safety Group, Ash 2B #3212, Walnut 2c#67, MoD Abbey Wood, Bristol BS34 8JH UK, Tel: +44 (0)117 9135647, Fax:(+44 (0)117 9135903, E-mail: DOSGST6@dpa.mod.uk The safety and reliability of explosives ordnance may deteriorate with time. The rate of deterioration will depend on a number of environmental factors of which one of the most dominant is ambient temperature. For many natures of ordnance there is no systematic means of monitoring the environmental conditions “seen” by ordnance in service. With the increased number of operations conducted in areas of high ambient temperature, there is concern that ordnance natures may experience unacceptable levels of degradation. In the UK there are ongoing programmes to develop data loggers to monitor the in-service environment and to link this environmental data to ageing phenomena. An approach to environmental monitoring is to use time-temperature indicators (TTIs) to determine the time-temperature history of explosives ordnance. This paper describes TTI technology that is widely used in the food industry to monitor the condition of perishable foodstuffs. It explores the application of this technology to explosives ordnance and describes a colorimetric indicator that has been developed at Cranfield University for explosives ordnance.
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Butcher, A. Garn Session 3C
DEVELOPMENT OF A SUBSCALE BONFIRE TEST PROTOCOL
Presenter: A. Garn Butcher, Safety Management Services, Inc, 1847 West 9000 South, Suite 205, West Jordan, UT 84088, Tel: (801) 567-0456, Fax: (801) 567-0457, E-mail: gbutcher @ sms-ink.com
Co-Author: Alice Atwood, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Code 4T4310D, 1 Administration Circle, Stop 1109, China Lake, CA, 93555, Tel: (760) 939-0203, Fax: (801) 5670457, E-mail: Alice.atwood@navy.mil An effort has been commissioned to study the feasibility of developing a subscale bonfire test protocol to use for classification of large solid propellant rocket motors. The subscale protocol would be incorporated into the TB700-2. The motivation behind this effort is to properly classify solid propellant motors for storage and transportation hazards in the most accurate and economical means possible. The classification of the motor determines how much can be stored and how far reaching a hazard it poses relative to accidental initiation. This paper looks at the determining factors of classification, current testing requirements for determining hazards class and the data required to determine that classification. A process of examining the effects upon munitions in a fire is pursued from two directions: The first direction examines the events that could unfold given a fire are examined relative to physical factors of the fire and the configuration of the motor. This process, typically referred to as a “What-if” analysis, outlines all the situations and resultant events that could exist in a fire involving a rocket motor. The second direction starts with a motor and examines the processes required to cause a specific type of reaction from a thermal initiation scenario. The deductive logic used in this method asks what is required to cause a specific response or event. Each of these paths are outlined and put into a FaultrEase analysis to define the possible paths to reaction. Each path is identified with key parameters required to achieve the next possible event in the sequence. And- and Or- gates specify the links between paths and multiple paths can be combined into an overall view of the potential sequence of events that could occur. Parameters include physical states of materials, thermal properties of materials, their relationship to each other and the physical characteristics of the fire source. Eventually, probabilities or other controlling factors can be added to the path descriptions that will allow a calculation of the most likely sequence of events based on probability. The end result of the effort will be to identify the event critical path(s) required to achieve a transition to detonation from a fire. The information can then be used to determine if subscale testing can logically and accurately represent a full-scale motor and to what extent modeling will be required to make this representation.
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This is a work in progress. The paper will present the basic structure of the path definition and the FaultrEase representation of the paths. Information relative to physical parameters that define the path and the probabilities of occurrence available at the time of publication will be included.
CHARACTERIZATION OF PROPELLANT IGNITION THRESHOLDS FOR VARIOUS CLASSES OF MATERIALS
Presenter: Barbara J. Frame, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, PO Box 2008, MS 6053, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6053, Tel: (865) 576-1892, Fax: (865) 574-8257, E-mail: framebj@ornl.gov
Frame, Barbara J. Session 3C
Co-Author: James G. R. Hansen, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, PO Box 2008, MS 6053, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6053, Tel: (865) 241-2102, Fax: (865) 574-8257, E-mail: hansenjg@ornl.gov The ignition of on-board ammunition propellant via fragment impact is a catastrophic event that can lead to loss of the artillery capability, the artillery vehicle itself and quite possibly human life. A measure of this vulnerability is the “propellant ignition threshold” which is the maximum velocity a propellant can sustain from an in-coming projectile without undergoing ignition. Vulnerability to this threat is dependent to a large extent on the combination of velocity, mass and temperature of the impacting fragment. The trajectory of the projectile through materials adjacent to the propellant can also impact the propellant ignition threshold, making their selection important to the design in terms of improving survivability of the artillery and vehicle. The Oak Ridge National Laboratory as part of a program with the U. S. Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) located at Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey has conducted a study of several classes of materials to characterize their effects on propellant ignition. Specimens evaluated included metal (aluminum), miscellaneous thermoplastics and elastomers, polymers containing metal powder and short glass fiber fillers, continuous fiber-reinforced composites (carbon, Spectra and Zylon), and two-layered combinations of aluminum with a second (non-metallic) material. The results of this study indicated that the material composition adjacent to the propellant can have an effect on the propellant ignition threshold. Aluminum and metal-filled polymers tended to produce lower ignition thresholds than unfilled plastics. A continuous fiber reinforced composite typically used for ballistic energy absorption applications (Zylon) also produced a lower ignition threshold than a non-energy absorbing composite made with carbon fiber. Layering aluminum with some of the non-metallic materials was successful at boosting the propellant ignition threshold above the threshold of bare (non-layered) aluminum. A summary of these and other propellant ignition test results to-date is provided in this article, including discussions of any observed correlations between the test results and selected material properties. A description of the testing methodology is also presented.
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SESSION 4A TUESDAY 3:10 PM – 4:50 PM
EXPLOSIVES SAFETY PRACTICES II
SESSION MODERATOR: Ms. Linda James, Defense Contract Management Agency
Isenberg, Tim Session 4A
EXPLOSIVES SAFETY KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
Presenter: Tim Isenberg, U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center, 1C Tree Road, Bldg 35, ATTN: SJMAC-AVK, McAlesster, OK, Tel: (918) 420-8137, Fax: (918) 420-8772, E-mail: tim.isenberg@us.army.mil
Co-Author: Christine Holiday, U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center, 1C Tree Road, Bldg 35, ATTN: SJMAC-AVK, McAlester, OK, Tel: (918) 420-8137, Fax: (918) 420-8772, E-mail: christine.holiday@us.army.mil If the Department of Defense and Services explosive safety career fields are similar to the rest of our workforce, they will be losing a large number of senior personnel throughout their ranks. These personnel will take critical “know-how” and experience developed over 30 years and through three wars with them when they leave. The U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center recently conducted a pilot project known as “Project Exodus” to harvest and transfer critical knowledge from personnel involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom ammunition reset operations. This presentation will provide an overview of the project exodus knowledge management methodology, a demonstration of the knowledge asset created for ammunition reset operations with a focus on explosive safety lessons to be learned and an explanation of how this knowledge management methodology could benefit the DoD explosive safety program. Maher, John Session 4A
LARGE SCALE PROPELLANT BLENDING – EXPLOSIVES SAFETY CHALLENGES: AN AUSTRALIAN STORY
Presenter: John Maher, ADI Limited, C/- CP4-3-154 Campbell Park Offices, Canberra ACT 2600 Australia, Tel: 02 6266 2463, Fax: 02 6266 4781, E-mail: john.maher2@defence.gov.au Co-Author: Peter Kilpatrick, ADI Limited, Private Bag No. 1 Mulwala NSW 2647 Australia, Tel: 03 5742 2289, Fax: 03 5742 1873, E-mail: peter.kilpatrick@adi-limited.com As a key production process in the manufacture of propellant, the blending of large quantities of propellant poses particular challenges in explosives safety.
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Several years ago the introduction of a “faster” propellant product line at ADI’s Mulwala plant and the results of some precautionary classification type trials raised concerns amongst the ADI’s Executive Safety Committee, an advisory body to the Director of Land Ordnance. This led to a protracted process of re-assessment touching on hazard classification, risk assessment, licensing, operating and manning practices, and importantly the question as to what extent personnel should be exposed to explosives. This paper describes that journey, the drivers for the change and the final outcome – a new unique plant to conduct large scale propellant blending.
REASSESSMENT OF SAFETY DISTANCES FOR EOD OPERATIONS: SMALL-AMMUNITION AND AIRCRAFT BOMB FRAGMENTATION TRIALS AND EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS OF MITIGATION TECHNIQUES
van Deursen, J. R. Session 4A
Presenter: J. R. van Deursen, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843463, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: deursen@pml.tno.nl Co-Authors: G. H. Lodder, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel:+31 15 2843467, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: lodder@pml.tno.nl, and Dr. L. H. J. Absil, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843395, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: absil@pml.tno.nl In the Netherlands World War II ammunitions, like dropped aircraft bombs and dumped ammunition, still pose a great problem to the Dutch community. The Ordnance Disposal Unit (EOD) of the Royal Netherlands Army has to clear old WWII-munitions almost every day. The military field manual VGVK 19 is used when performing EOD operations in the Netherlands. In this manual, safety distances like evacuation distances and fragment zones are given for different ammunition articles. Within the EOD-organisation, doubts have arisen concerning the validity of these safety distances. Consequently, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory was tasked to evaluate and if need be, alter these. Most of the safety distances given in the VGVK-19 manual are based on observations made during the Second World War. Since then, ammunition-articles have been changed, making alterations to those distances preferable. In addition, the EOD currently utilises protective measures/ structures. TNO-PML first conducted a series of tests with different small ammunition articles, with charge weights less than 25 kg. For a fragment safety distance of 190 m given in VGVK-19, it turned out that the fragment safety distance varied from 74 – 723 m. Next, a series of trials was conducted in Hjerkinn Norway to determine fragment safety distances of large GP bombs with and without the use of mitigation techniques. The performed trials consisted of trials with Mk 82 (500 lbs) GP bombs: in the open at ground level; in an open pit; in a pit with a 25
protective structure on top; and trials with Mk 82 bombs covered with either 10 or 15 calibres of sand. For each test, blast measurements were performed and the fragments were collected, weighed and the throw-out distance was recorded. In the paper, the findings of this test programme will be described and new safety distances for EOD operations will be presented. Laker, T. S. Session 4A
PROGRESS IN SHIPBOARD FIRE-FIGHTING TACTICS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES NAVY
Presenter: T. S. Laker, Research Department, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Code 4T4310D, Stop 1109, 1 Administration Circle, China Lake, CA 93555-6100, Tel: (760) 939-3019, Fax: (760) 939-2597, E-mail: travis.laker@navy.mil Co-Author: H. L. Bowman, Research Department, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Code 4T4310D, Stop 1109, 1 Administration Circle, China Lake, CA 93555-6100
Through a series of accidents aboard air-capable ships, the U.S. Navy has learned the value of wellformulated fire-fighting techniques. Cookoff of ordnance continues to be a major hazard to firefighting personnel and naval assets. Although a great deal of experimental cookoff data has been generated in the past, it has not been presented to shipboard fire fighters in the most effective way possible. This paper gives a description of the current ordnance loadout of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers and the potential fire hazards posed by such a loadout. An argument for a revision of the fire-fighting data requirements is presented along with a proposal for a new data format that greatly increases the amount of information available to shipboard fire fighters. It is argued that additional information will allow the fire fighting personnel to deal more safely and effectively with ordnance in shipboard fires. Gerber, James D. Session 4A
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NAVY’S WEAPON SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM
Presenter: James D. Gerber, Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA), Code N31, Indian Head, MD, Tel: DSN 354-6018, Tel: (301) 744-6018, E-mail: james.gerber1@navy.mil
In 1973 the U.S. Navy published a system safety manual titled “OD 44942 – Weapon System Safety Guidelines Handbook”. The document has become known throughout industry as OD 44942. In 2001, the Navy decided that the document needed to be revised and updated in order to incorporate information on technology and analysis methodology improvements that have occurred since the 1970’s. In 2002 NAVSEASYSCOM determined there was a need to have Principal’s For Safety (PFS) for all Navy weapon systems and combat systems “Safety Certified”. This paper discusses the development philosophy, development process and content of the new Navy system safety manual that will replace OD 44942. The paper will also discuss how this manual 26
serves as the foundation for an extensive web based system safety training site, and discuss how the training supports the introduction of the Navy’s PFS Certification program.
BLAST EFFECTS I
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. Helge Langberg, Norwegian Defence Estates Agency
SESSION 4B TUESDAY 3:10 PM – 5:10 PM
AIRBLAST OF DIFFERENT HIGH EXPLSIVES IN THE DAMAGE DISTANCE
Presenter: Prof. Dr. Manfred Held, 86523 Schrobenhausen, Germany, Tel: 49-8252-996-345, Fax: 49-8252-996-126, E-mail: manfred.held@tdw.lfk.eads.net
Held, Manfred Session 4B
With a simple, but very effective method the momentum loads of different high explosive composition are measured with high polar angle resolutions. Damage from charges in the kilogram range is only caused by the transferred momentum, because the positive pressure duration of the blast wave lasts only in the millisecond range. Therefore it is enough to measure and compare only the transferred momenta. In the nearfield, respectively in the fireball the pressure history cannot be easily measured in the normally nasty environment. The blast contours are measured in the scaled distances Z of 0,50, 0,75, 1,00 and 1,50 m/kg1/3 from the cylindrical charges with length to diameter ratios of 2:1. In the bridge wave directions the impulse density values are about two magnitudes less compared to the axial and radial directions. Very surprising is the findings, that the aluminised high explosive charges have in these near scaled distances rather less blast momentum than not alumized charges.
PROTECTIVE APPLICATIONS OF GEOSYNTHETICS REINFORCED SOIL (RS) STRUCTURES AGAINST BLAST
Presenter: Soon-Hoe Chew, National University of Singapore, #07-01, Blk E1A, 1 Engineering Drive 2, Singapore 117576, E-mail: cvecsh@nus.edu.sg
Chew, Soon-Hoe Session 4B
Co-Authors: Zhi-Wei He, National University of Singapore, E-mail: engp1853@nus.edu.sg; G. P. Karunaratne, E-mail: md@geo5eng.com; Andy Hong-Wei Tan, E-mail: g0202346@nus.edu.sg; National University of Singapore, #07-01, Blk E1A, 1 Engineering Drive 2, Singapore 117576, Tel: +65-68746472, Fax: +65-67791635; and Yeow-Teck Seah, Defence Science & Technology Agency, Singapore, Building & Infrastructure, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defence Technology Tower A, Singapore 109679, Tel: +65-63733560, Fax: +65-62735754, E-mail: syeowtec@dsta.gov.sg 27
Soil structures are effective in protecting property and personnel from accidental explosion of stored explosives and terrorist bomb attacks. In particular, Reinforced Soil (RS) structures have great potentials in these applications due to their rapid construction, cost-effectiveness, minimal occupied ground area, ability to deform significantly before failure and high tolerance for differential settlements. However, not many studies have been reported on dynamic response of RS structures subjected to short duration excitations induced by explosions. This paper presents test results of seven full-scale geotextile RS walls, which were constructed and tested in Woomera, South Australia. These walls (labelled as RS0 to RS6) were placed at varying distances from ground zero. Four walls (RS0 to RS3) were subjected to a blast event of Net Equivalent Quantity (NEQ) of 27 ton and the other three walls (RS4 to RS6) were subjected to NEQ of 5 ton. Using various instruments such as air pressure transducers, accelerometers, specially set strain gauges on geotextiles and soil total pressure cells, the loading and response of the structures during the blast events were recorded. The deformation of the wall face was measured via reference points on the ground triangulated with a network of grids marked on the wall face. During the trial, RS0, a wall located only 1m away from the 27ton donor building, partially collapsed and all other walls (RS0~RS6), located further away, survived with only minimal deformation. The geotextile facing of the RS walls (RS1 to RS6) suffered only superficial damage from direct fragment impacts. Visual inspection and measurements from the sensors within the walls showed that RS walls remained globally and internally stable. Therefore, it can be concluded that a properly designed RS wall can effectively mitigate blast effects and fragment impacts.
Hung, K. C. Session 4B
WATER MITIGATION – NUMERICAL SIMULATION AND TESTING
Presenter: K.C. Hung, Institute of High Performance Computing, 1 Science Park Road, #01-01, The Capricorn, Singapore Science Park II, Singapore 117528, Tel: +65 6419-1564, Fax: +65 6778-0522, E-mail: hungkc@ihpc.nus.edu.sg
Co-Authors: K.Y. Lam, Institute of High Performance Computing, 1 Science Park Road, #01-01, The Capricorn, Singapore Science Park II, Singapore 117528, Tel: +65 64191-2014, Fax: +65 67780522, E-mail: lam_khin_yong@ihpc.nus.edu.sg; Karen Chong, Defense Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Tel: +65 6373-3583, Fax: +65 6273-5754, E-mail: coiyin@dsta.gov.sg; and Chor Boon Ng, Defense Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Tel: +65 6373-3621, Fax: +65 6273-5754, E-mail: nchorboo@dsta,gov.sg Water has been demonstrated to be a good mitigator of blast effects. Numerical simulations were performed to study the effects of water mitigation in a free field and semi-confined environment. Comparisons between numerical simulation and experimental test data are presented, together with the results of a series of parametric tests.
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MITIGATION OF BLASTS USING WATER MIST
Presenter: Douglas Schwer, Laboratory of Computational Physics and Fluid Dynamics, Naval Research Laboratory, 4555 Overlook Ave, SW, Washington, DC 20375-5320, Tel: (202) 767-3615, Fax: (202) 767-4798, E-mail: schwer@lcp.nrl.navy.mil
Schwer, Douglas Session 4B
Co-Author: K. Kailasanath, Laboratory of Computational Physics and Fluid Dynamics, Naval Research Laboratory, 4555 Overlook Ave, SW, Washington, DC 20375-5320 In recent years, there has been interest in evaluating new methods for mitigating the effects of blasts on general civilian and military spaces. Water mist systems have recently been shown to be effective in controlling and extinguishing fires, and are currently being implemented in fire protection systems in the machinery spaces of LPD-17 and DD(X). Water mist systems are also attractive for blast mitigation for several reasons: these systems can be used in a wide range of spaces with very little redesign of the space, vaporization of water extracts large amounts of energy from the resulting blast, water is non-toxic to personnel and environmentally safe, and these systems can serve a dual-role both as a blast mitigation and fire protection system. The purpose of this research is to determine the effectiveness of water mist in mitigating both the initial blast wave caused from an explosive and also the quasi-static pressure associated with blasts in enclosures. The present research uses multi-phase numerical simulations to elucidate some of the issues associated with using water mist to mitigate blasts. Initial simulations examined the effect of water mist on the blast wave assuming the space was initially flooded with water mist before the explosive was detonated. Results showed that the droplets are generally swept away with the shock wave and have only a small effect on the initial blast wave overpressure, but can substantially decrease the temperature and shock wave velocity associated with the initial shock wave. Within multi-dimensional enclosures the picture becomes much more complex because of reflected shock waves. Water mist tends to either vaporize within the enclosure or collect on the outer walls of the enclosure. Current simulations suggest that water mist can significantly reduce the development of quasi-static pressure within the enclosure, which can be as damaging as the initial blast overpressure. We examine both situations described above and comment on other challenges with using water mist systems for blast mitigation in real spaces.
ENERGY ABSORPTION FROM LAND MINE BLASTS IN BOTTOM PLATES OF LIGHT VEHICLES
Presenter: Thomas Nørgaard Bech, DEMEX A/S, Esromgade 15, DK-2200 Copenhagen N, Denmark, Tel: 45 3810 8970, E-mail: tn@demex.dk.
Bech, Thomas Nørgaard Session 4B
Co-Authors: Trine Bjerre Pedersen, DEMEX A/S, Esromgade 15, DK-2200 Copenhagen N, Denmark, Tel: 45 3810 8970, E-mail: tp@demex.dk., and Solvejg Qvist, DEMEX A/S, Esromgade 15, DK-2200 Copenhagen N, Denmark, Tel: 45 3810 8970, E-mail: sq@demex.dk. Armed forces and NGO’s frequently use light vehicles in peacekeeping missions throughout the world. However, bottom plates in light vehicles subjected to Anti Tank Mines explosions do not perform any serious protection for the personnel in the vehicles. Thus, service men are in danger to 29
be exposed to lethal Anti Tank Mine accidents. In order to improve the protection level for the personnel in light vehicles, bottom plates are considered to be the first protective barrier against the mine blast. This means that the bottom plate structure must absorb as much energy as possible in order to reduce the accelerations in the cabin. This paper presents research and development performed in Denmark by DEMEX A/S and contains a parameter analysis followed by explosive testing of structures carried out in order to find optimal solutions for bottom plate protection. Dynamic testing has been performed to study the structure behaviour of materials subjected to explosive loads. The main objective with the present work is to determine the capability of both existing and new developed material concepts for absorption of explosive energy in the bottom plates.
Döerr, Andreas Session 4B
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF THE DEBRIS LAUNCH VELOCITY
Presenter: Andreas Döerr, Fraunhofer-Institut Kurzzeitdynamik, ErnstMach-Institut, Am Klingelberg 1, 79588 Efringen-Kirchen, Germany, Tel: #49 7628 / 9050 – 46, Fax: #49 7628 / 9050 – 77, E-mail: Doerr@Emi.Fhg.De
Co-Author: Rickard Forsen, FOI Weapons And Protection, Grindsjöen Research Centre, Se-147 25 Tumba, Sweden, Tel: #46 8 55 50 3941, Fax: #46 8 55 50 4180, E-mail: Rickard.Forsen@Foi.Se The debris launch velocity is one of the most significant parameters that determines the debris throw distance and therefore the debris dispersion. In order to improve the DISPRE Code the Klotz Group decided to systematically analyse this important parameter. An extensive experimental test program was carried out to obtain data on the launch velocity. Up until now experiments were performed on single moving wall elements that were propelled by the forces of an internal explosion. In the recent investigations multiple launch tests were performed to analyze the launch velocity of five simultaneously launched slabs. The test set-up is a closer representation of real launch conditions than the single slab launch and gives insight into the time dependent venting process, which is very relevant in the acceleration process. In this paper the multiple launch test program will be describe and the results of the investigation presented.
SESSION 4C TUESDAY 3:10 PM - 4:50 PM
HAZARD CLASSIFICATION
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. G. Edward Walseman, Naval Ordnance Safety & Security Activity
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EXPLOSIVES SAFETY AND ARMAMENT SURVIVABILITY (ESAS) PREDICTIVE MODEL REFINEMENT
Bowles, Patricia Moseley Session 4C
Presenter: Patricia Moseley Bowles, Applied Research Associates, Inc, 1848 Lockhill-Selma Rd., Suite 102, San Antonio, TX 78213-1569, Tel: (210) 344-7644, Fax: (210) 344-7456, E-mail: tbowles@ara.com Co-Authors: Matthew Barsotti, Applied Research Associates, Inc, 1848 Lockhill-Selma Rd., Suite 102, San Antonio, TX 78213-1569, Tel: (210) 344-7644, Fax: (210) 344-7456, E-mail: mbarsotti@ara.com; Lyn Little, U.S. Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety, 1 C Tree Road (Bldg 35), Attn: SJMAC-EST, McAlester, OK 74501-9053, Tel: (918) 420-8765, Fax: (918) 4208503, E-mail: lyn.little@us.army.mil; and Joseph P. Caltagirone, U.S. Army TACOM-ARDEC, AMSTA-AR-WEA, Bldg 321, Picatinny Arsenal, NJ 07806-5000, Tel: (973) 724-3662, Fax: (973) 724-3131, E-mail: jcalta@pica.army.mil The Explosives Safety and Survivability (ESAS) model, developed for USATCES, is being refined to increase functionality and accuracy of predictions. ESAS is a hazard prediction tool designed to ensure the safe placement of Army combat vehicles (ACVs) in forward deployed areas. Whether during battle maneuvers or in peacekeeping missions, the threat of attack on ACVs is always present in these areas. However, an additional hazard presents itself in these situations due to the potential for explosive propagation between vehicles. An ACV could be hit by enemy fire, detonating explosives stored inside the vehicle; stored explosives might be accidentally detonated; or fire resulting from an enemy hit may cause cook-off of an ACV’s contents. In any of these scenarios, the affected ACV becomes a donor that could produce blast and fragment throw. Both primary fragments from the stored munitions and secondary debris from the vehicle itself could be generated, creating a potential hazard to adjacent vehicles and their explosive contents. Thus, the configuration of the vehicle deployment area is critical for the maintenance of a combat ready vehicle force and personnel safety. The existing ESAS model consists of two components: Damage Calculation Software and Scenario Prediction Software. The Damage Calculation Software encompasses Visual Basic, Excel, and TCL program components used to develop damage map data lookup tables. These tables are used by the Scenario Prediction Software to generate the end result, a prediction of damage to vehicles in various layout scenarios. A large test program is planned to develop donor environment data and ACV vulnerability data for ESAS. Ongoing ESAS refinement includes additions to the Damage Calculation Software functionalities, Scenario Prediction Software refinement, development and incorporation of a cookoff fire threat assessment model, preliminary setup work for the testing phase, and a feasibility study to investigate the practicality of using the ENDGAME frameworks to create high-fidelity data for ESAS.
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Crull, Michelle M. Session 4C
EXPLOSIVE TESTING OF MULTIPLE ROUND CONTAINERS
Presenter: Michelle M. Crull, PhD, PE, U.S. Army Engineering & Support Center, Huntsville, Attn: CEHNC-ED-SY-T (Crull), PO Box 1600, Huntsville, AL 35807-4301, Tel: (256) 895-1653, Fax: (256) 895-1737, E-mail: Michelle.M.Crull@hnd01.usace.army.mil
Co-Authors: Billy Bullock, PE, U.S. Army Engineering Research & Development Center, Attn: CEERD-GS-V (Bullock), 4909 Halls Ferry Road, Vicksburg, MS 39180-6199, Tel: (601) 634-4054, Fax: (601) 634-2309, E-mail: Billy.Bullock@erdc.usace.army.mil, and Gary Hlavsa, Office of the Product Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel, ATTN: SFAE-CD-NM, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Edgewood, MD 21010-4005, Tel: (410) 436-2029, Fax: (410) 436-8737, E-mail: Gary.Hlavsa@pmcd.apgea.army.mil Multiple Round Containers (MRCs) are designed to contain leakage of potential Chemical Warfare Material (CWM). These stainless steel containers were not designed to withstand the effects of an internal detonation and, before this test program, had never been explosively tested. To store explosively configured recovered CWM (RCWM) the interim holding facility (IHF) must be sited for both explosive and chemical hazards. To determine if fragments from an explosively configured chemical munition escape the MRC with sufficient energy to cause propagation to an adjacent MRC, the U.S. Army Engineering & Support Center, Huntsville (USAESCH), the Office of the Product Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel (PMCD) and the U.S. Army Engineering Research and Development Center (ERDC) developed a test program. The 2003 test program included explosive testing of 75mm MkII, 4.2” M2, and 105mm M60 simulated chemical munitions inside MRCs. High speed digital photography, witness panels and post detonation forensics were used to determine if fragments escaped the MRC. Pressures were measured inside the MRCs. Additionally, a 105mm M60 simulated chemical munition inside an MRC and its packing crate was detonated inside an IHF. This test was designed to determine if there was any fragmentation, either primary or secondary, outside the IHF in the event of a detonation. The results of the tests indicate that an MRC provides enough protection to ensure that an unintentional detonation of one item in an MRC does not propagate to other items. Therefore, the explosive MCE and the MCE for an instantaneous chemical release is one item when the explosive amount and fragment threat are no larger than that presented by the 105mm M60. This reduces the required quantity distance for siting of the interim hazard facility on RCWM sites.
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EFFECTS OF BLACK POWDER FILLED ORDNANCE
Presenter: Michelle M. Crull, PhD, PE, U.S. Army Engineering & Support Center, Huntsville, Attn: CEHNC-ED-SY-T (Crull), PO Box 1600, Huntsville, AL 35807-4301, Tel: (256) 895-1653, Fax: (256) 895-1737, Email: Michelle.M.Crull@hnd01.usace.army.mil
Crull, Michelle M. Session 4C
Co-Author: Richard Landis, DuPont, Barley Mill Plaza (27/2264), PO Box 80027, Wilmington, DE 19880, Tel: (302) 892-7452, Fax: (256) 892-7641, E-mail: richard.c.landis@usa.dupont.com Black powder filled ordnance is frequently encountered during a military munitions response on a Formerly Used Defense Site (FUDS). During a military munitions response, quantity-distances (QDs) are required for both intrusive operations (unintentional detonations) and demolition operations (intentional detonations). Methods for determining the overpressure and fragmentation effects for high explosive filled ordnance are well defined. However, these effects are not well documented for black powder filled ordnance. The U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center, Huntsville and DuPont teamed on a test program to determine the fragmentation effects of black powder filled ordnance. 75mm and 37mm projectiles, 8in Civil War cannonballs, and 3in pipe bombs filled with black powder were tested. Break screens were used to measure fragment velocities and Celotex bundles were used to capture fragments which were measured and weighed. Results of these tests are discussed in this paper. Fragmentation characteristics were calculated for each item tested using the methods for high explosive filled ordnance with an appropriate TNT equivalent for black powder. These calculated characteristics are compared to the test results. Recommendations are made for determining Q-Ds for black powder filled ordnance.
HAZARD ASSESSMENT TESTING OF IN-PROCESS INFRARED DECOY COMPOSITION
Presenter: Jeffrey Campbell, Ordnance Engineering Department, Crane Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Code 4071, 300 Highway 361, Crane, IN 47522-5001, Tel: (812) 854-2861, Fax: (812) 854-2899, E-mail: campbell_jeff@crane.navy.mil
Campbell, Jeffrey Session 4C
Co-Authors: Bradley Stevenson, Ordnance Engineering Department, Crane Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Code 4071, 300 Highway 361, Crane, IN 47522-5001, Tel: (812) 854-2983, Fax: (812) 854-2899, E-mail: stevenson_b@crane.navy.mil, and Steven Backer, Ordnance Engineering Department, Crane Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Code 405300 Highway 361, Crane, IN 47522-5001, Tel: (812) 854-5467, Fax: (812) 854-1198, E-mail: backer_steve@crane.navy.mil Fabrication of magnesium fueled infrared (IR) decoys has resulted in several industrial accidents in recent years due in part to the sensitivity of that composition to ignition stimulus and the tendency of the composition to react vigorously when ignited. Unlike many detonating explosives, the pyrotechnic IR decoy composition is most hazardous when dry composition is in the unconsolidated 33
state. In an unconsolidated state, dry composition burns very rapidly and has a tendency to produce substantial pressure waves under some conditions. Crane Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center has made recent measurements of the reaction of loose infrared decoy composition in an effort to reduce the hazards associated with the production of that composition. This paper will present the results and analysis of the testing which was instrumented with standard and high speed video equipment as well as pressure transducers for measuring the pressure waves generated. The testing included the ignition of approximately 20 pounds of the material in several test scenarios varying solvent content in both confined and unconfined configurations and the testing of 75 pounds of the material in a mockup of the planned pilot production equipment.
Needham, Charles Session 4C
THE EFFECTS OF METAL CASES ON THE AFTERBURN EFFICIENCY OF ALUMINIZED EXPLOSIVES
Presenter: Charles Needham, Applied Research Associates, 4300 San Mateo Blvd, Suite A220, Albuquerque, NM 87110, Tel: (505) 883-3636, Fax: (505) 872-0794, Email: cneedham@ara.com Co-Authors: John Schneider and Craig Watry, Applied Research Associates, 4300 San Mateo Blvd, Suite A220, Albuquerque, NM 87110, Tel: (505) 883-3636, Fax: (505) 872-0794, E-mail: jschneider@ara.com and cwatry@ara.com The performance of aluminized explosives has been observed to be reduced when the mixture is delivered in a medium to heavy case. Most U.S. applications call for some level of penetration capability for a warhead. This requires a relatively heavy case to provide the needed delivery capability. We have examined the effects of the case acceleration and break-up on the behavior of the explosive mixture using our SHAMRC CFD methodology and our latest physics and chemistry based afterburn model. The kinetic energy of the case fragments is typically greater than half the detonation energy of the mixture. This energy is extracted from the detonation products in the time that the case expands to twice its original diameter, typically 50 microseconds. This loss of energy cools the fireball, slows the heating of the aluminum particulates and may severely reduce the amount of aluminum burned. This is especially true for detonations in the free field. Secondary shocks can reheat and ignite the aluminum if they interact before expansion has cooled the fireball. Experimental data comparisons from several tests confirm the behavior of these explosive mixes.
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EXPLOSIVES SAFETY-PERSONNEL PROTECTION
SESSION MODERATOR: CAPT. Kemp Skudin and Mr. Richard Eldridge, Chief of Naval Operations
SESSION 5A WEDNESDAY 8:10 AM - 9:50 AM
BLUNT TRAUMA FROM BLAST-INDUCED BUILDING DEBRIS
Presenter: David Bogosian, Karagozian & Case, 2550 N. Hollywood Way, Suite 500, Burbank, CA 91505, Tel: (818) 303-1254; Fax: (818) 240-4966, E-Mail: Bogosian@Kcse.Com
Bogosian, David Session 5A
Co-Author: Hrire Der Avanessian, Biodynamics Engineering, Inc., 860 Via De La Paz, Suite B-3, Pacific Palisades, CA 90272, Tel: (310) 454-0924, Fax: (310) 454-8747, E-mail: hrire@biodynamics-eng.com Protecting building occupants from blast effects is a primary focus of current research. One of the primary injury mechanisms is blunt trauma, as structural and architectural elements of the building as well as building contents are projected by the force of the blast and impact humans inside the building. A series of experiments was performed recently in which instrumented anthropomorphic test devices (ATDs) were placed in cubicles and subjected to impacting debris from windows and wood stud walls to observe their response. Injury levels were estimated using established human injury criteria and scaling techniques, some of which have been validated through years of automotive safety testing. The tests provided a significant number of data points (23 in all) that allow the quantification of relationships between blunt trauma injury levels and the blast impulse on the building. By testing various configurations of windows, the data supports conclusions regarding the effect of window parameters on injury level, such as annealed vs tempered glass, glass thickness, and size. Additionally, a number of retrofit concepts were tested, including anti-shatter film using both daylight and restrained application, and shielding by computer equipment. One test exposed an ATD to wood stud debris, while one other exposed the ATD to blast effects only, without any debris. Taken as a set, these tests provide a coherent and well documented data set with important implications regarding the efficacy and potentially deleterious effects of commonly used retrofit techniques with regard to the blunt trauma levels received by occupants.
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Mathis, James T. Session 5A
PERSONNEL PROTECTION EVALUATION FOR BLAST HAZARDS TO BOMB-SUIT-WEARER
Presenter: James T. Mathis, Analytical & Computational Engineering, Inc. (ACE), 3463 Magic Drive, Suite 359, San Antonio, TX 78101, Tel (210) 582-5860, Fax: (210) 582-5861, E-mail: Jtmathis@Aceng.Net
Co-Author: J. Keith Clutter, Analytical & Computational Engineering, Inc. (ACE), 3463 Magic Drive, Suite 359, San Antonio, TX 78101 Traditional evaluation of a explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) bomb suit involved an explosive test of a suit suspended from a support. Damage to the suit has been used as qualitative assessment for potential injury if a person were to be in the suit. Detailed examination of the exposure of the suit to blast loading is not traditionally made. This paper discusses the use of 3-D Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) simulation of explosive detonations against the wearer of a typical bomb suit. The focus is to assess the differential overpressure loads on the various bomb suit components protecting critical body parts. Since overpressures and impulses can vary significantly, depending on the position and orientation of the wearer, simulations are preformed for a range of orientations including kneeling and standing, at various standoff distances. Blast loads on the head, neck, and torso regions are predicted for each orientation, capturing ground, and other surface reflections that can enhance effects of the blast, not normally observed during tests of individual bomb suit components. From the results of the simulations, design improvements for existing suits are suggested.
Oswald, Charles J. Session 5A
PREDICTION OF INJURIES TO OCCUPANTS OF BLAST-LOADED BUILDINGS WITH THE BICADS COMPUTER PROGRAM
Presenter: Charles J. Oswald, Ph.D., P.E., Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc., 3330 Oakwell Court, Suite 100, San Antonio, TX 78218-3024, Tel: (210) 824-5960, Fax: (210) 824-5964, E-mail: coswald@bakerrisk.com The BICADS (Building Injury Calculator And DatabaseS) computer program is an approximate methodology to estimate injuries to occupants in a wide variety of blast-loaded buildings. The percentages of occupants with each of four different injury levels are calculated based on user input that defines basic building construction parameters, the percentage of building occupants in perimeter and interior space, and the blast source. Simplified or detailed input options are available with photographs, explanatory text boxes, and several help files to aid user input. The BICADS program calculates injuries to exposed building occupants from failed nearby structural components and from windows and interior non-structural components. The program divides the building floor space into floor panels and calculates the percentages of building occupants on each floor panel with each injury level from each relevant type of building component and then sums the 36
injuries to get the total building injury information. The total percentages of building occupants with each injury level, as well as values for a wide range of intermediate calculations including blast loads and building component damage levels, can be viewed and printed in graphical and tabular formats.
HuLC (HUMAN LETHALITY CODE)
Presenter: Jon D. Chrostowski, ACTA, Inc., 2790 Skypark Drive #310, Torrance, CA 90505, Tel: (310) 530-1008, Fax: (310) 530-8383, E-mail: chrostowski@actainc.com
Chrostowski, Jon D. Session 5A
Co-Authors: David D. Bogosian, Karagozian and Case Structural Engineers, 2550 N. Hollywood Way #500, Burbank, CA 91505, Tel: (818) 240-1919, Fax: (818) 240-4960, E-mail: bogosian@kcse.com, and Hrire Der Avanessian, Biodynamics Engineering, Inc., 860 Via de la Paz #B-3, Pacific Palisades, CA 90272, Tel: (310) 454-0924, Fax: (310) 454-8747, E-mail: hrire@biodynamics-eng.com This paper describes the Human Lethality Code (HuLC), a tool for assessing the effects of an external explosion on building occupants and evaluating alternative blast mitigation schemes. HuLC may be utilized at two distinct levels: (a) “campus” level analyses that provide assessments of a group of buildings using limited data on construction, window design and using simple blast effects models; (b) “building” level analyses that perform more detailed assessments of a particular building using detailed construction, window and occupancy data and more sophisticated analytical models. Within the building level, analyses may be performed of an entire building, or simply of a single room within the building. To perform a rapid assessment of a campus of buildings, HuLC is designed to run within a Geographical Information System (GIS) framework with a customized Graphical User Interface (GUI). The GIS/GUI combination allows a user to bring in a base map of the area of interest, create a building layer, define building locations and set their attributes (size, construction, windows and population), and characterize the explosive source and location. Fast-running, generic structure and window blast vulnerability models are then used to estimate the overall level of building damage, as well as the level of occupant serious injury and fatality. To perform a more detailed assessment of a particular building, the GUI allows a user to select a building from the GIS base map and construct a model of the building, floor by floor, including the definition of wall structural properties, window position and properties, and room size and position. The user can also populate rooms with common types of furniture and human occupants. The explosion analysis at this level uses physics-based models to determine the detailed damage state of the structure/windows and assess the effect of building damage on occupants via human vulnerability models.
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Nilsson, Erik Session 5A
VOCATIONAL TRAINING FOR PERSONNEL IN THE SWEDISH EXPLOSIVES SECTOR
Presenter: Erik Nilsson, KCEM, Gammelbackavagan 6, Karlskoga, Sweden, E-mail: erik.nilsson@kcem.se, www.kcem.se
Co-Author: Hans Wallin, KCEM, Gammelbackavagan 6, Karlskoga, Sweden Since the time of Alfred Nobel the explosives sector has worked systematically to create and maintain a safe and efficient industry. A rapidly changing world however put new issues on the agenda. A new branch, Demilitarisation of old ammunition for example claims not only written technical information as drawings and specifications, but also lots of unwritten experiences and knowledge, that must be handed over to new generations as long as the ammunition is in stock. At the same time new explosives and products are introduced for production. Accidents with Explosives have claimed the lives of more than a thousand people around the world since the turn of the Millennium. Added to the loss of life has been the significant loss of production and defence capability and infrastructure. Many of the accidents have been caused, not by failure of design, but by human failure. Much of the human failure can be attributed to the lack of the necessary competencies, skills and training of the people concerned. This paper describes some of milestones passed in the Swedish explosives sector during the earlier Millennium. It will also describe initiatives being taken in Sweden and also the Leonardo da Vinci programme of the European Union to ensure that workers at all levels in the explosives community in the EU have the skills and competencies required to safely sustain activities involving explosives. It will describe the development and evolution of a range of explosives competencies and the training and qualifications framework being developed to generate and maintain the competencies. Finally, The novel Swedish distance- Learning model for explosives vocational education, designed, built on modern technology and active search for knowledge will be presented.
SESSION 5B WEDNESDAY 8:10 AM – 9:50 AM
BLAST EFFECTS II
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. Jon Henderson, Defence Ordnance Safety Group
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EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL BLAST LOAD DEVELOPMENT FOR A DETONATION IN AN EXPLOSIVES STORAGE VESSEL WITH THE DOOR OPEN
Pearson, Dale Session 5B
Presenter: Dale Pearson, ABS Consulting, 15600 San Pedro, Suite 400, San Antonio, TX 78232, Tel: (210) 495-5195, Fax: (210) 495-5134, E-mail: dpearson@absconsulting.com Co-Authors: Kim W. King, P.E., ABS Consulting, 15600 San Pedro, Suite 400, San Antonio, TX 78232, Tel: (210) 495-5195, Fax: (210) 495-5134, E-mail: kking@absconsulting.com, and Keith Clutter, Analytical and Computational Engineering, Inc. 3463 Magic Drive, Suite 359, San Antonio, TX 78101, Tel: (210) 582-5860, Fax: (210) 582-5861, E-mail: clutter@aceng.net The use of explosive storage containment vessels as opposed to traditional explosives storage magazines has increased in recent years. Advantages of the explosive storage vessel include minimal site preparation, available as an off-the-shelf item, reduced quantity-distance requirements, and transportability. These storage vessels can be used by federal Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and local Bomb Squads to store explosive counter measure tools, as well as commercial businesses who use explosives in production and have need to store energetic materials on site. Typical proof testing for explosives storage vessels includes a full scale detonation of the design charge weight in the vessel with the door closed. One such vessel has been tested with the door in the open position, to simulate a catastrophic accidental event while the vessel is open. Additionally, a computational fluid dynamics model has been developed to simulate the detonation inside the vessel with the door open. The model predicts the dynamic pressure outside the vessel. This paper will describe the test method and test results. A comparison of the theoretical and empirical pressure data will be discussed.
BLAST EFFECTS ESTIMATION MODEL (BEEM)
Author: William F. Seipel P.E., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Protective Design Center, 12565 West Center Road, Omaha, NE 68144, Tel: (402) 221-3063, Fax: (402) 221-4315, E-mail: William.F.Seipel@usace.army.mil
Seipel, William F. Session 5B
BEEM is a Windows-based program suitable for operation on a notebook computer by Engineers/Technicians/Security Personnel in the performance of damage assessments to buildings and people. BEEM is a collaborative development effort of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Engineering Research and Development Center, Waterways Experiment Center ERDC-GSL, Protective Design Center CENWO-ED-S and Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD). BEEM models the effects of various types of explosive devices and shows the degree of damage to personnel and buildings nearby. BEEM is based on simplified engineering models that allow for quick analysis of several different explosive threat scenarios. Current uses include calculating blast loads for incident and reflected pressures from ground-level hemispherical bursts, estimating blast damage of structural elements and predicting hazards to personnel from window 39
glass, and predicting human injury from airblast. Applications of this program include 1) Assessing threats to facilities; 2) designing tool for retrofit of buildings; 3) planning for siting new construction. BEEM displays its results in an interactive 3D graphical environment and in eXtensible Markup Language (XML) data format. This generated output is suitable for inclusion into a report or presentation of the resulting blast analysis. Examples and discussion of these capabilities are presented.
Thomas, J. Kelly Session 5B
EVALUATION OF DOOR BLAST SHIELDS
Author: J. Kelly Thomas, Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc. (BakerRisk), 3330 Oakwell Court, Suite 100, San Antonio, TX 78218-3024, Tel: (210) 824-5960, E-mail: Kthomas@BakerRisk.com
Co-Authors: Jihui Geng and Andrew D. Hallgarth, Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc. (BakerRisk), 3330 Oakwell Court, Suite 100, San Antonio, TX 78218-3024 A door blast shield is a potential mitigation option when the blast load on an entryway to a building is sufficiently large that a blast door may be required. That is, when a conventional door does not offer sufficient blast resistance. Blast doors can represent a significant capital expense, pose operational issues, and require regular maintenance. An effective door blast shield could allow the use of a conventional door in these cases. This paper describes an evaluation of the performance of conventional door blast shield designs. The primary focus of this paper is on an “L-Shaped” door blast shield since this shield type has been utilized at a variety of sites. A series of tests was performed using a scale model of the shield in a large shock tube fitted with a 16-foot long, open-ended extension section with an 8-foot square cross section. Tests were conducted with side-on pressures ranging from 1 to 4 psig and durations up to approximately 30 milliseconds. The scale model was placed such that the blast wave would strike the model at a normal (i.e., 90 degrees) orientation and at 45 degrees. The shock tube tests showed that the “L-Shaped” shield was not effective at reducing the blast load applied to the door, and actually increased the applied blast load under some conditions. Several other shield configurations were also examined. Benchmark calculations were performed using the experimental door blast shield data in order to validate a numerical model (i.e., a computation fluid dynamics code). The model predictions and experimental data were in excellent agreement. The results obtained with the numerical model provided a basis to understand the performance of the blast shield. The numerical model was then utilized to examine the performance of the shield with alternative blast loads. Other shield configurations were also examined using the numerical model.
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RESEARCH IN CLOSE-IN BLAST LOADING FROM HIGH EXPLOSIVES
Presenter: Scott A. Mullin, Southwest Research Institute, 6220 Culebra Road, PO Drawer 28510, San Antonio, TX 78228-0510, Tel: (210) 5222340, Fax: (210) 522-6290, E-mail: scott.mullin@swri.org.
Mullin, Scott A. Session 5B
Co-Authors: James D. Walker, Southwest Research Institute, 6220 Culebra Road, PO Drawer 28510, San Antonio, TX 78228-0510, Tel: (210) 522-2051, Fax: (210) 522-6290, E-mail: james.walker@swri.org; Richard Lottero, U.S. Army Research Laboratory, Attn: AMSRD-ARL-WMTB, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005-5066, Tel: (410) 278-6035, Fax: (410) 278-6877, Email: lottero@arl.army.mil; and James E. Drotleff, FMC Corporation, Ground Systems Division, 2830 De La Cruz Blvd., PO Box 58123, Santa Clara, CA 95052 This work was performed under contract to the U.S. Army Research Laboratory by Southwest Research Institute and FMC Corporation. It involved the use of experimental and theoretical means to study blast loading caused by the detonation of high explosive (HE) at close-in ranges. Close-in blast loading from HE is generally defined as explosive products interacting with a target during the time that the HE has expanded between 3 and 50 times its original volume. This is a region where pressures can be hundreds of thousands of psi. Such an environment is very difficult to instrument, and there are few experimental data in that region. The impulse generated from close-in blast loading can cause gross structural damage to light armored vehicles, and is a serious threat to the vehicle and its crew. Precision, right circular cylindrical, top-detonated HE charges with a nominal mass of one kilogram were used for all experiments. Pressure measurements were taken on the surface of a nonresponding flat plate using a variety of gages. Predictions of the blast loading on the plate were made with a hydrodynamic computer code. Very good repeatability was experienced with some gage types, while others did not work well or had too low a signal relative to noise to be fully effective. The frequency response of the gages was also addressed. Firings against a ballistic pendulum were conducted using bare explosive charges, as well as charges with different casing thickness to quantify the effect of casing thickness on total integrated impulse. A full set of all data taken is included to serve as documentation of the work.
CHARACTERIZATION OF EFFECT OF REINFORCING STEEL BARS ON CONCRETE BREAK-UP UNDER HIGH-INTENSITY EXPLOSIVE LOADING
Presenter: Yong Lu, Nanyang Technological University, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Block N1 #1B-42, Singapore 639798, Tel: +65 6790 5272, Fax: +65 6791 0676, E-mail: cylu@ntu.edu.sg
Lu, Yong Session 5B
Co-Authors: Kai Xu, Nanyang Technological University, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Block N1 #1B-42, Singapore 639798, Tel: +65 6790 6913, Fax: +65 6791 0676, E-mail: ckxu@ntu.edu.sg, and Su Chern Tan, Defence Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defence Technology Tower A, Singapore 109679, Tel: +65 6373 3517, Fax: +65 6273 4547, E-mail: tsuchern@dsta.gov.sg 41
The process of reinforced concrete (RC) break-up under blast loading is very complex and involves non-linear high-dynamic response of the constituent materials as well as the material interaction and structural effects. In this paper, a numerical study is conducted to characterise the effect of the reinforcing steel bars on the concrete break-up under different blast loading intensities, and subsequently comment on the appropriate ways to effectively model the reinforcement effect in the simulation of RC break-up. For this study, a numerical model for a typical RC plate unit with fixed sides is established, in which the concrete is modeled by the Pseudo-tensor strength model, taking into account the effect of hydrostatic pressure on the deviatoric strength of the material, while the reinforcing bars are modelled using separate steel elements. Because of the short duration and small global displacement at which concrete fragments are formed under blast loading, it is deemed appropriate to adopt perfect bonding between concrete and steel, such that the failure at the concretesteel interface is determined by the concrete strength. The effect of the reinforcing steel bars on the nominal debris size and ejection velocity are discussed based on the numerical results.
SESSION 5C WEDNESDAY 8:10 AM - 9:30 AM
UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO)/ CHEMICAL DEMIL I
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. Jim Wheeler, Defense Ammunition Center
Reese, Timothy A. Session 5C
CHEMICAL & EXPLOSIVE SAFETY – TEAMWORK EXCELLENCE
Presenter: Timothy A. Reese, EA Engineering Science and Technology, 15 Loveton Circle, Sparks, MD 21152, Tel: (410) 771-4950, x 555, Fax: (410) 472-9875, E-mail: treese@eaest.coml
Co-Authors: Roger H. Walton, P.E., U.S. Army Environmental Center, 5179 Hoadley Road, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5401, Tel: (410) 436-7104, Fax: (410) 436-7109, E-mail: Roger.Walton@aec.apgea.army.mil; Billy R. Sanders, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Building E1391-1T; Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-0056, Tel: (410) 671-6003, Fax: (410) 679-8253, E-mail: Bill.Sanders@nab02.usace.army.mil; Bob Crouse, U.S. Army Garrison Aberdeen Proving Ground, Building E-4430, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010, Tel: (410) 436-3157, Fax: (410) 436-4565, E-mail: Bob.Crouse@us.army.mil; Paul Greene, U.S. Army Guardian Brigade, Building E-1942, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010, Tel: (410) 436-6351, E-mail: Paul.E.Greene@us.army.mil; and Dennis Bolt, U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical & Biological Center 5183 Blackhawk Road, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010, Tel: (410) 436-5903, E-mail: Dennis.Bolt@us.army.mil In contrast to predecessor projects for removal of suspect chemical warfare materiel, the Lauderick Creek CWM Removal Action at Aberdeen Proving Ground, was faced with significant challenges due to the expanse of the cleanup area. Encompassing 453 acres of varying terrain, the site required unconventional solutions for both worker and public protection. Cleanup of chemical warfare 42
materiel requires maximum public and worker protection. At sites with disposal areas (e.g. Memphis Depot and Spring Valley) this is accomplished through use of Vapor Containment Structures and Personal Protective Equipment. Lauderick Creek was different; the need for mobility drove all aspects of the project. Existing regulations and procedural documents did not provide an adequate framework for addressing the numerous site challenges. Development of the Safety Submission brought together a team of personnel that created and implemented innovative solutions to accomplish the cleanup. The overall approach and examples of the various technology applied to accomplish the goals of this action will be described. Principal focus areas are: Real-time exclusion zone management; mobile command center; chemical agent monitoring; fragment protection; remote activated water spray system; community outreach.
RECYCLING AND DESTRUCTION OF STOCKPILES OF AMMUNITION AND BOMBS IN FORMER MILITARY BASES IN GEORGIA
Pirtskhalava, David Session 5C
Presenter: David Pirtskhalava, State Military Scientific and Technical Center "DELTA", 73 Mnatobi str., 0169, Tbilisi, Georgia, Tel: (995 32) 955 027, Fax: (995 32) 956 080, E-mail: delta_ctbilisi@email.com Co-Authors: Joe McDonagh, OSCE, Krtsanisi Governmental Residence, Dacha No 5, Tbilisi, Georgia, Tel: (995 32) 779 615, Fax: (995 32) 942 330, E-mail: joe.mcdonagh@osce.org, and David Supatashvili and Jemal Ramishvili, State Military Scientific and Technical Center "DELTA", 73 Mnatobi str., 0169, Tbilisi, Georgia, Tel: (995 32) 956 080, Fax: (995 32) 956 080, E-mail: delta_ctbilisi@email.com With the financial and technical support of the OSCE in Georgia it is being implemented the very important project - "Recycling and Destruction of Stockpiles of Ammunition and Bombs in Former Military Bases in Georgia", which provides the neutralization, reprocess and destruction of all outdated and useless ammunition, abandoned by Russian armed forces. The recycling technology was beforehand elaborated by the experts of the State Military Scientific and Technical Centre "DELTA". Above mentioned technology provides the reprocess of different kinds of powder comprise in ammunition and its use in civil purposes, also destruction of fuzes, caps-detonators and other pyroelements using ecologically clean technology, TNT smelting from warheads and its second hand use. For example, industrial explosive substance made up from the powder of 122 mm artillery shells and KS-19 zenith artillery rounds was examined at mining quarrying. They are certificated for the use in mining industry. For today the recycling works of products received after safe dismantle of 23 and 30 mm rounds are being implemented.
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Supatashvili, D. Session 5C
DEMILITARIZATION OF SURFACE-TO-AIR GUIDED MISSILES IN GEORGIA
Presenter: D. Supatashvili, State Military Scientific and Technical Center "DELTA", 73 Mnatobi str., 0169, Tbilisi, Georgia, Tel: (995 32) 956 080, Fax: (995 32) 956 080, E-mail: delta_ctbilisi@email.com
Co-Authors: P. Courtney-Green, NAMSA, L-8302 Capellen, (G. D. Luxembourg), Tel: (352) 30636449, Fax: (352) 3063-4100, E-mail: pcourtney-green@namsa.nato.int, and K. Lekishvili, D. Pirtskhalava, A. Dolidze, R. Khachidze, State Military Scientific and Technical Center "DELTA", 73 Mnatobi str., 0169, Tbilisi, Georgia, Tel: (995 32) 956 080, Fax: (995 32) 956 080, E-mail: delta_ctbilisi@email.com After disintegration of the USSR and partial withdrawal of the Russian armies from Georgia on some military bases several hundreds of the guided "Surface-to-Air" type missiles and also unguided missiles of various types are remaining, quantity of which can increase after a withdrawal of the remaining Russian military bases. The left missiles basically are kept open-air with rough infringements of the storage and protection conditions, that creates danger of their spontaneous or diversional explosion and, proceeding from this, possible victims of people and high level risk-factors of the ecological accidents. The commission supplied by the Government of Georgia, has studied the storage conditions of the specified missiles and has presented the conclusions to the Council of Safety of Georgia on the demilitarization of the specified missiles. Because of absence of financing the Ministry of Defense could neutralize and disassemble only a few tens of missiles of the S-200 type. By the OSCE support the certain amount of liquid missiles fuel is neutralized and utilized, and today with the support of the NAMSA demilitarization of guided missiles such as S-75 is made. Demilitarization of the missiles is made by the experts of the Military Scientific-Technical Center "DELTA" on the basis of developed technology which provides neutralization and disassembly of missiles, and also utilization of components received as a result of disassembly, with the purpose of their use for the civil purposes, and when it is impossible - their destruction (warheads, pyroelements, gunpowder unsuitable for utilization, etc.). In the territory of military bases and in an environment the monitoring before and after the demilitarization is made, as a result of which ecological conditions is studied and the recommendations for improvement of an environment are developed.
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EVALUATION AND TESTING OF A TEMPORARY UXO STORAGE UNIT
Presenter: Marnix Rhijnsburger, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843822, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: rhijnsburger@pml.tno.nl
Rhijnsburger, Marnix Session 5C
Co-Authors: Jolanda van Deursen, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843463, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: deursen@pml.tno.nl, Ans van Doormaal, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843392, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: doormaal@pml.tno.nl, and Rolf van Wees, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843391, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: wees@pml.tno.nl This paper describes the evaluation and testing of a temporary UXO storage unit for small explosive quantities (up to 25 kg). In the Netherlands it is every day practice that UneXploded Ordnance (UXO) originating from World War II (WWII) is found. These ‘discoveries’ occur during building and construction work in the vicinity of formerly military strategic places like bridges, airfields and railroads. However, also at other large building and construction locations UXO can be found. These locations are often in close proximity to existing buildings and infrastructure. Since 1998 a small number of civil companies are authorised to search for UXO in the Netherlands, but not to eliminate. In case a life shell or a large bomb is found, the UXO is removed as soon as possible by the Netherlands EOD. In case small and relatively safe UXO is found, the UXO is put away in a temporary storage unit at the site. The Netherlands EOD removes and eliminates the stored UXO at a more suitable moment in time or when the storage limit is reached. Since the temporary UXO storage unit is often in close proximity to houses and roads, it is demanded by the authorities that the civilian population will not be in danger. It is therefore needed that the temporary UXO storage unit will not produce hazardous explosion effects outside its prescribed safety distance in case of an accidental explosion. Together with the Leemans Company, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory has designed a temporary UXO storage unit that is able to mitigate the explosion effects of 25 kg NEQ of cased ammunition. Two tests have shown that the predicted debris throw and the blast agreed well with the observations during the test. For this temporary UXO storage unit with 25 kg NEQ of cased ammunition safety distances are determined based on debris throw (39 meters) and glass panel failure due to blast (33 or 60 meters for respectively double and single pane windows constructed according to the Netherlands building code).
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Earhart, H. Glenn Session 5C
CAPTURED ENEMY AMMUNITIONAN IRAQI LEGACY
Presenter: H. Glenn Earhart, Chief of International Operations, Directorate of Ordnance and Explosives, U.S. Army Engineering & Support Center, Huntsville, PO Box 1600, Huntsville, AL 35807-4301, Tel: (256) 895-1577, Cell: (256) 990-1852, Fax: (256) 722-8709, E-mail: Glenn.H.Earhart@HND01.usace.army.mil
Co-Author: C. David Douthat, PE, CSP, Director of Ordnance and Explosives, U.S. Army Engineering & Support Center, Huntsville,, PO Box 1600, Huntsville, AL 35807-4301, Tel: (256) 895-1510, Fax: (256) 722-8709, E-mail: Charles.D.Douthat@HND01.usace.army.mil In July 2003, the Combined Joint Task Force-7 tasked the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Huntsville Engineering Support Center with the collection, transportation, storage and destruction of an estimated 600,000 short tons of Iraqi Captured Enemy Ammunition (CEA). On 8 August 2003, contracts were awarded to four contractors to execute this very important mission in support of Iraqi Freedom. Within 6 weeks of contract awards, the first CEA demolition was performed in Iraq. To date over 150,000 tons of CEA has been transported and stored and 130,000 tons have been destroyed. This paper will describe the process, the challenges, the successes, safety issues, security challenges and lessons learned in execution of the CEA mission.
SESSION 6A WEDNESDAY 10:20 AM - NOON
MITIGATION/MAXIMUM CREDIBLE EVENT CONTROL
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. Wayne R. Frazier, NASA Headquarters
Little, Lyn Session 6A
PRESCRIBED BURNING AS A VEGETATION CONTROL METHOD
Presenter: Mr. Lyn Little, U.S. Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety, 1C Tree Road, Bldg 35, Attn: SJMAC-EST, McAlester, OK 74501, Tel: (918) 420-8765, Fax: (918) 420-8503, E-mail: lyn.little@us.army.mil
Co-Authors: Kenyon L. Williams, U.S. Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety, 1C Tree Road, Bldg 35, Attn: SJMAC-EST, McAlester, OK 74501, Tel: (918) 420-8756, Fax: (918) 420-8503, Email: Kenyon.Williams@us.army.mil, and Daryl Sieczkowski, U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center, 1C Tree Road, Bldg 35, Attn: SJMAC-DEV, McAlester, OK 74501, Tel: (918) 420-8988, Fax: (918) 420-8811, E-mail: daryl.sieczkowski@dac.army.mil Current U.S. Army explosives safety regulations require that vegetation be controlled but prohibits burning within 200 feet of explosives facilities. In some areas, prescribed burning is viewed as the most desirable means of vegetation control. It is purported to be more cost effective than cutting and is considered to be more environmentally friendly than herbicide usage. One of the biggest 46
challenges is vegetation control on earthcovered magazines (ECMs). Some installations currently perform prescribed burns on ECMs under waiver to current Army explosives safety requirements. One of the goals of the Army Explosives Safety Test Program is to conduct tests validate, establish, or modify explosives safety criteria. The U.S. Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety decided to conduct a test to evaluate the risk involved in prescribed burns on ECMs, with the possible outcome being a change to Army regulations. To assess the risks, two test burns were conducted on ECMs at two different locations. This paper will address the data collected during the test burns, discuss the associated risks, and explore possible outcomes.
FIRE BLOCKING BLANKET FOR PROTECTION OF STORED AMMUNITION
Frame, Barbara J. Session 6A
Presenter: Barbara J. Frame, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, PO Box 2008, MS 6053, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6053, Tel: (865) 576-1892, Fax: (865) 574-8257, E-mail: framebj@ornl.gov Co-Author: James G. R. Hansen, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, PO Box 2008, MS 6053, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6053, Tel: (865) 241-2102, Fax: (865) 574-8257, E-mail: hansenjg@ornl.gov Munitions stored in the open are vulnerable to a multitude of external threats that can lead to their detonation. Various mechanisms that may cause detonation include fire propagation, projectile impact and blast pressure. Stacks of munitions stored in close proximity to one another are particularly vulnerable in that the deflagration of one stack may promote the deflagration or detonation of one or more of its neighbor. Depending on stack proximity, this series of events can propagate like dominos, destroying an entire ammunition depot via a catastrophic chain reaction. This article describes the development and demonstration of a protective fire blocking blanket for the prevention of propagation of reactions and fire between pallets of stored ammunition. When placed over the pallet, this blanket serves as a barricade to prevent penetration of hot fragments, flame and low velocity projectiles from reaching and detonating the contents beneath. The initial concept and design for the fire blocking blanket was first developed by the U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL). The blanket design is currently being engineered and optimized for field deployment by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory under a program conducted by the U. S. Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) located at Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey. The fire blocking blanket design consists of individual modules that may be assembled in the field, and are sized to be compatible with three of the pallet platforms typically employed by the U. S. military (CROP, 463L and M1), in addition to meeting the Army’s personnel weight lifting restrictions. Blanket construction consists of multiple layers of materials specifically designed to defeat threats posed from high temperature exposures, fire, and/or projectile impact. The program’s scope includes the manufacture by a commercial sewing contractor of full-size prototypes which will be evaluated later this year under realistic field test conditions. A summary of these activities, as well as the results of all studies conducted in support of material selection for this program are presented. 47
Proper, Kenneth W. Session 6A
EXPLOSIVES SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF ARMS ROOMS
Author: Kenneth W. Proper, Office Of The Director Of Army Safety, Attn: DACS-SF, 2211 S. Clark St, Crystal Plaza 5, Room 980, Arlington, VA 22202, Tel: (703) 601-2408, Fax: (703) 601-2417, E-mail: William.Proper@Hotmail.com Today, more than ever before units are finding it necessary to maintain arms rooms. This paper builds upon a method developed and used by the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), which provides an electronic method for licensing arms rooms. The automated program includes a risk assessment, an automated inventory form and license. In addition to sharing and demonstrating the program developed in Microsoft Excel, the paper will explain the rationale used for assessing the risk and propose possible enhancements. Further, because of being an Excel Spreadsheet, the program can be used on a palm-held device.
Murtha, Robert N. Session 6A
CONTRIBUTION OF HD 1.1 AND 1.2 TO HD 1.1 DETONATION AT Q-D LESS THAN IMD
Presenter: Robert N. Murtha, Naval Facilities Engineering Services Center, ESC62, 1100 23rd Avenue, Bldg 1100, Port Hueneme, CA 930434370, Tel: (805) 982-1178, Fax: (805) 982-3481, E-mail:
Robert.Murtha@navy.mil Co-Authors: Kevin P. Hager, Naval Facilities Engineering Services Center, ESC62, 1100 23rd Avenue, Bldg 1100, Port Hueneme, CA 93043-4370, Tel: (805) 982-1382, Fax: (805) 982-3481, Email: Kevin.Hager@navy.mil, and James E. Tancreto, Naval Facilities Engineering Services Center, ESC62, 1100 23rd Avenue, Bldg 1100, Port Hueneme, CA 93043-4370, Tel: (805) 982-1180, Fax: (805) 982-3481, E-mail: James.Tancreto@navy.mil This paper describes a study to determine the contribution of an earth-covered magazine (ECM) containing HD 1.2/1.3 ammunition to a HD 1.1 ECM event when the separation between the magazines does not meet the magazine distance separation required by DOD 6065.9-STD. Current explosives safety criteria would require that the sum of the contents of both magazines be used to determine ESQD arcs. The arcs are drawn from the outside edges of both magazines. This study uses sympathetic detonation criteria, developed in the HP Magazine program from flyer plate tests, to determine the response in the HD 1.2/1.3 acceptors. The likely reaction (or non-reaction) is determined and findings are provided. In general, the current criteria are very conservative.
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SINGAPORE LARGE SCALE TESTS IN SWEDEN – EQUIVALENT TNT IN MIXED STORAGE
Presenter: Karen Chong, Defense Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defense Technology Tower A, Singapore, Tel: +65 63733583, Fax: +65 6273-5754, E-mail: coiyin@dsta.gov.sg
Chong, Karen Session 6A
Co-Authors: Rick Tan Yong Kiang, Defense Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defense Technology Tower A, Singapore, Tel: +65 6373-3546, Fax: +65 6273-5754, E-mail: tyongki1@dsta.gov.sg, and Yingxin Zhou, Defense Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defense Technology Tower A, Singapore, Tel: +65 6373-3546, Fax: +65 6273-5754, Email: zyingxin@dsta.gov.sg A large-scale underground test for mixed propellant and high explosive storage was performed Älvdalen, Sweden in 2002 to derive the equivalent TNT for mixed storage. This was part of a series of tests performed between 2000-2002 to validate the safety design of Singapore’s underground ammunition facility. A series of small-scale parametric mixed storage tests were performed in the free-field environment as preparation for the large-scale tunnel tests. The equivalent TNT for mixed storage in the free field and in the vented underground storage chamber was derived; and explosion effects compared and presented in this paper.
BLAST EFECTS III – DEBRIS STUDIES
SESSION MODERATOR: Dr. Paul D. Wilde, Federal Aviation Administration
SESSION 6B WEDNESDAY 10:20 AM – 11:40 AM
LeBoeuf, William C. Session 6B
EVALUATION OF BALLISTIC RESISTANT WINDOW SYSTEMS TO BLAST LOADS
Presenter: William C. LeBoeuf, ABS Consulting, 15600 San Pedro, Suite 400, San Antonio, TX 78232, Tel: (210) 495-5195, Fax: (210) 495-5134, Email: wleboeuf@absconsulting.com
Co-Author: Kim W. King, ABS Consulting, 15600 San Pedro, Suite 400, San Antonio, TX 78232, Tel: (210) 495-5195, Fax: (210) 495-5134, E-mail: kking@absconsulting.com Ballistic resistant, or bullet resistant windows, are windows designed to resist the penetration of a defined ballistic projectile threat. The typical window configuration of a bullet resistant window consists of a glass clad polycarbonate system comprised of outer layers of glass, that act to slow and spread the bullet upon impact with the hard and brittle surface, and inner layers of polycarbonate, that act to trap the projectile. The window system is then attached to the curtain wall system by means of window framing and anchorage. The expected performance of these window systems to different 49
ballistic threat levels is well known due to the large amount of commercial testing and industry research. However, less is known with respect to their performance due to an explosive event. This paper will investigate the inherent blast strength of these windows based on available calculation methodologies and correlate with the experimental blast resistance of typical ballistic resistant windows. The purpose of this paper is the evaluation of the risk to occupants due to blast loading on existing typical ballistic resistant window systems not designed for blast resistance.
Bastos-Netto, D. Session 6B
EFFECTS OF ORIENTATION, SHAPE, VELOCITY AND MASS OF BLAST INDUCED WINDOW BREAKAGE FRAGMENTS TO WOUND TRAUMA
Presenter: D. Bastos-Netto, National Institute for Space Research (INPE), Rod. Presidente Dutra km 40, Cachoeira Paulista, 12630-000, São Paulo, Brazil, Tel: (55) 12 560 9401, Fax: (55) 560 9386, E-mail: demetrio @ lcp.inpe.br Co-Authors: L.G.de Mendonça-Filho, Fabrica Presidente Vargas (FPV –IMBEL), Av. 15 de Março S/N Piquete 12620-000, São Paulo, Brazil, Tel: (55) 12 3156 9094, Fax: (55) 12 3156 9090, E-mail: letivan.fpv @imbel.gov.br, and R. Guirardello, University of Campinas (UNICAMP), Av. Albert Einstein 500, Campinas, 13083-970, São Paulo. Brazil, Tel: (55) 19 3788 3955, E-mail:guira @feq.unicamp.br The most frequent damage associated to a blast explosion event is the window breakage, for the glasses commonly used there usually are so sensitive to low level load pressures that a small charge of explosive can generate window breakage in a broad area. Also associated human consequences such as injuries and fatalities are related to aspects such as glazing fragment sizes and shapes, thrown distances, propelled impact and number of fragments per unit area. Although many of these aspects have already been extensively studied there is relatively little information on the effects caused by wound trauma. Many relevant information related to the effect of fragments in producing skin penetration and laceration still need deeper investigation. This work deals with aspects of the penetration potential of glass fragments. The experimental setup consists of an explosive charge placed in front of a building where a glass window panel is positioned along the axis of the explosive charge. The generated blast wave loads the glass window breaking it in several fragments. Behind the window there is an optical system to assist the evaluation of the cloud fragments speed along with a special foam that collects and “freezes” some of those fragments. This allows the identification of aspects such as the orientation, shape, velocity, and mass of the fragments as compared to the frequency of deep penetration. In this test procedure the effects of the standoff distance and of the type and dimensions of the glass panels are also investigated.
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INFLUENCE OF SUPPORT FLEXIBILITY ON GLAZING RESPONSE
Author: Darrell D. Barker, P.E, ABS Consulting, 15600 San Pedro, Suite 400, San Antonio, TX 78232, Tel: (210) 495-5195, Fax: (210) 495-5134, E-mail: dbarker@absconsulting.com
Barker, Darrell D. Session 6B
Response of glazing to blast loads is a complex interaction of structural properties. Glass is a brittle material whose response is cont5rolled by internal and surface flaws and is difficult to predict analytically. Response prediction models often use an empirical approach relying on curve fits of extensive test data to establish properties. Test programs typically utilize stiff supports to reduce variabilities introduced by responding supports. Additionally, design criteria for glazing often requires limited frame response to promote a glass-fails-first response. These factors have produced models and design aids which fail to incorporate the potential benefits of flexible supports on glazing response. This paper describes an assessment of the influence of flexible supports on glazing performance. The effects of glazing gaskets (wet and dry), frame fasteners (bolts) and flexible frames are addressed analytically and empirically. Recommendations for analysis and retrofits to improve performance are included.
BLAST RESPONSE OF GLASS/ PET PLATES
Presenter: W. S. Strickland, Air Force Research Laboratory, Deployed Base Systems Branch, AFRL/MLQD, Tyndall AFB, FL 32403, Tel: (850) 283-9709, Fax: (850) 283-3722, E-mail: stan.strickland@tyndall.af.mil
Strickland, W. S. Session 6B
Co-Authors: O. Cazacu and C. A. Ross, Dept of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, University of Florida, Graduate Engineering and Research Center, Shalimar, FL 32579, Tel: (850) 833-9350, Fax: (850) 833-9366, E-mail: ross@gerc.eng.ufl.edu; cazacu@gerc.eng.ufl.edu The paper presents a vulnerability analysis of a new blast-resistant window system, called Flex window, developed at the Air Force Research Laboratory. The window system is composed of the following basic components:(1) a rigid metal box frame (2) double panels of glass laminated on both sides with a PET (polyethylene terephthalate) thin film (3) an air chamber separating the two glass panels (4) a flexible film anchoring system providing elastic boundaries. The proposed analysis is based on data from blast tests on the Flex window. These experiments show that the applied blast load can be modeled by an initial step function of pressure followed by an exponential decay, whereas the internal pressure between the panels can be represented by a normal distribution. From high-speed video recordings it can be concluded that the front panel responds in a plastic hinge mode when a blast wave impacts normally the external panel. Thus, the analysis is done using yield line methods. Fully plastic moment distributions are assumed. The calculation of the displacement of the external panel is based on the premise that this plate, which is exposed to the blast load, will begin to deform in a traveling hinge. Before the loading phase is complete the traveling hinge mode shape will 51
transform to a static fundamental mode shape and the remaining displacements will occur in this mode. The center point displacements of the two plates are calculated for different sets of values of the ultimate moment and maximum internal and external pressures, respectively. From the calculations of the time variation of the separation between plates it can be concluded that for the higher peak pressures the plates may collide severely. In general, the load on the interior glass plate is reduced by over 50%, providing a high level of protection.
Tatom, John W. Session 6B
COMPARISON OF SAFER DEBRIS DENSITY PREDICTIONS TO TEST DATA
Presenter: John W. Tatom, APT Research, Inc, 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3392, Fax: (256) 837-7786, E-mail: JTatom@APT-Research.com
Co-Authors: Michael M. Swisdak, Jr., Indian Head Division/Naval Surface Warfare Center, Code 440E, 101 Strauss Avenue, Indian Head, MD 20640-5035, Tel: (301) 744-4404, Fax: (301) 7446406, E-mail: swisdakMM@ih.navy.mil, and Kristy L. Newton, APT Research, Inc, 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3385, Fax: (256) 837-7786, E-mail: KNewton@APTResearch.com This paper compares the predictions of the latest Safety Assessment for Explosives Risk (SAFER) model versus physical test data recovered from various testing programs. Such tests include: 40 and 27 tonne trials (Woomera), ESKIMO 1, Distant Runner, and SciPan 1. The SAFER predictions are based on model runs using the best match available to the actual donor building involved in the test. This type of debris analysis is not the standard output of SAFER, as the program is designed to assess the probability of human fatality. However, all of the SAFER predictions presented were obtained from the system logs of actual SAFER runs without adjustment.
SESSION 6C WEDNESDAY 10:20 AM - NOON
UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO)/ CHEMICAL DEMIL II
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. James C. King, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment
Dow, John Session 6C
BEYOND DEMILITARIZATION: MUTILATION OF RECYCLED MUNITIONS RESIDUES
Presenter: John Dow, Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity, 23 Strauss Avenue, Indian Head, MD 20640, Tel: (301) 744-4906, Fax: (301) 744-6749, E-mail: dowjp@ih.navy.mil.
Co-Author: Lauren Zellmer, Naval Air Weapons Station, 429 E Bowen Road Stop 414, Code N45NCW, China Lake, CA 93555, Tel: (760) 939-3219, Fax: (760) 939-2980, E-mail: lauren.zellmer@navy.mil. 52
Current demilitarization requirements for munitions residues gleaned from military ranges are focused on preventing the further use of the materiel for its originally intended military or lethal purpose. After demilitarizing to the standard, many munitions still look like ordnance. After munitions range residue is sold, it often gets mixed in with scrap metal from other sources. Scrap metal is often collected for some time, sold and resold. Once the munitions enter the recycling stream, the mere appearance of being a live munition may result in confusion and callbacks to military Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel to remove a perceived explosive hazard. It would be better to process munitions residue until it no longer looks like ordnance. This means to process it until a reasonable person will not mistake it for a hazardous material -- remove the "military lookalike.” This paper reviews some best practices, gives some examples, and suggests ways to go "beyond demil" to the point of "making it no longer look like a munition" during the recycling of munitions residues.
RANGE RESIDUE RESOURCE RECOVERY AT AIR NATIONAL GUARD RANGES
Author: Robert L. Vinson III. P.E., Cape Environmental Management, Inc., 12037 Starcrest Drive, San Antonio, TX 78247, Tel: (210) 377-2008, Fax: (210) 377-2111, E-mail: rvinson@capeenv.com
Vinson, Robert L. Session 6C
CAPE Environmental Management processed range residue (inert bombs, target vehicles, etc.) at three Air National Guard ranges. Work began in September 2002 and concluded in February 2003. CAPE Submitted a report detailing project activities to the ANG Bureau in May 2003. UXO technicians, equipment operators and laborers screened range residue for Ammunition, Explosives and other Dangerous Articles items, including unexploded ordnance (UXO), Low Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW), and hazardous materials. UXO Technicians segregated 66 suspect AEDA items and recovered 53 LLRW radioactive items during the project. Over 100 pounds of hazardous waste (e.g., lead acid batteries) were recovered and turned over to the Range Staff for disposal. CAPE’s field team employed a variety of non-explosive methods to ensure ordnance related or military vehicle residue meet DoD demilitarization standards. Demolition shears and cutting torches were used to process the residue to meet scrap industry standards, allowing sale of the recyclable metal. Final production figures included cutting 2,755 full scale inert bombs from 250 pounds to 2000 pounds, 31 heavy targets (e.g., armored vehicles), 184 light targets (jeeps, trucks), 28 aircraft and other miscellaneous metal items (Conex boxes, etc,). The project generated 2.81 million pounds (1,404 tons) of steel/cast iron and 232,000 pounds (116 tons) of aluminum/brass for sale. CAPE screened and disposed of over 240 tons of non-recyclable debris (tires, parachutes, etc.) as industrial waste.
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CAPE located qualified recycling vendors, negotiated the best sale price and managed transport of recyclable metal to the facilities. CAPE returned over $110,000 in revenue from recyclable metal sales to the Government as a credit. CAPE successfully demonstrated a new method for processing BDU-33 munitions. The system employs a movable hydraulic bench to separate steel tail fins from the cast iron body. A hydraulic press pushes out the Mk-4 signal cartridge, rendering the BDU-33 inert. Over 378 tons of BDU-33s were processed during this project. The project demonstrated this new approach to BDU-33 processing was a cost effective option relative to other BDU-33 processing options currently available.
Forsht, Denice Session 6C
INTERROGATION OF UXO USING THE PELAN
Author: Denice Forsht, NAVEODTECHDIV, 200 Stump Neck Road, Indian Head, MD 20640, Tel: (301) 744-6850 x303, Fax: (301) 744-6947, E-mail: forsht@eodpoe2.navsea.navy.mil
In 1995, NSWC-White Oak was selected for closure; several thousand ordnance shapes were recovered. 750,000 lbs. of demilitarized ordnance was determined to be inert; 258,000 lbs. of ordnance shapes remain that require demilitarization. Traditionally hand-torches were used to demilitarize inert munitions. But due to recent explosive incidents during demilitarizing munitions, NOSSA is investigating alternatives to the traditional methods and recommending the use of remote operations. The PELAN has proven itself as a munitions and explosive device filler-identification system that shows promise in many arenas (explosives, chemical agents, radiological). The PELAN was selected as the candidate technology/system that most closely meets EOD needs and has been selected to transition to a $115M acquisition program to provide up to 400 PELAN systems to the Joint Service EOD (JSEOD) operators. Successful testing at the NAVEODTECHDIV led to the use of PELAN in July 2003 at the closed Naval facility in White Oak, Maryland. The Naval Facilities Command (NAVFAC) is managing an effort to return the facility to public use that includes disposing of any Unexploded Ordnance (UXO). PELAN was used by NAVEODTECHDIV, to prove that 600+ excavated UXO items were filled with inert substances (concrete, wax, plaster of paris) saving the Navy the cost of disposing the items as explosively loaded. The PELAN is a man-portable device, which uses a pulsing neutron generator. The neutrons initiate several types of nuclear reactions within the object under scrutiny, which result in the formation of gamma rays. The energy of the resulting gamma rays provides information about the elements (Carbon, Hydrogen, Oxygen, Nitrogen) contained within the object, in addition the number of gamma rays detected provides information about how much of each element is present. An analysis of the elements present and their ratios to one another allows for the identification of the filler material.
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THE MUNITIONS ASSESSMENT AND PROCESSING SYSTEM (MAPS)
Benton, Donald R.
Session 6C Presenter: Donald R. Benton, U.S. Army, Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Office, Director U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, AMSCM-ECNS/Donald Benton, 5183 Blackhawk Road, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5424, Tel: (410) 436-8735, Fax: (410) 436-7999, E-mail: donald.benton@us.army.mil Co-Author: Donald R. Soubie, Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center, U.S. Army, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, AMSSB-RCB-CP/Soubie, 5183 Blackhawk Road, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5424, Tel: (410) 436-4678, Fax: (410) 436-4684, E-mail: donald.soubie@us.army.mil The MAPS is a newly fabricated, fixed facility designed to demilitarize explosively configured, recovered chemical warfare materiel (RCWM) at the Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. In concert with input from the surrounding communities and the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE), the MAPS was designed and built to provide an alternative to the open detonation (or long term storage) of stable, explosively configured RCWM. The U.S. Army was issued a Research, Development and Demonstration Permit by the MDE for MAPS construction/operations in Mar 2001. The MAPS facility is equipped with a glove-box, a drill box, an explosion containment chamber, and a burster detonation vessel. These components are used to drill the munition (under containment), drain the chemical fill, decontaminate solid waste, and detonate the explosive components in a gas-tight chamber. The process area of the MAPS facility is under negative pressure vapor containment provided by a 10-12,000 ft3/min carbon filter system. MAPS also contains a suite of chemical agent monitors used for both personnel safety and process control. Systemization and testing of the MAPS will take place throughout 2004. The paper will provide a summary of the facility’s design features, capital costs, operational costs, procedural challenges, sliding hazard arc, and a summary of the testing to date.
AN AUTOMATED DEMIL LINE FOR M483 ICM PROJECTILES IN THE U.S.
Presenter: Mark M. Zaugg, EBV Explosives Environmental Company, PO Box, 86, Joplin, MO 64802, Tel: (801) 295-2003, (417) 624-0212 ext 409, Fax: (801) 295-6013, (417) 782-6366, Email: mark.zaugg@ebveec.com
Zaugg, Mark M. Session 6C
Co-Author: David R. Zoghby, Frank Winkler, EBV Explosives Environmental Company, PO Box 1386, Joplin, MO 64802, Tel: (801) 295-2003, (417) 624-0212 ext 409, Fax: (801) 295-6013, (417) 782-6366, E-mail: dave.zoghby@ebveec.com EBV Explosives Environmental Company, Joplin, MO, has installed the first commercial demil line in the U.S. dedicated to the disassembly and demil of M483 ICM projectiles, which is currently in operation.
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Presentation details the equipment and operations of the line from receipt of munitions, through disassembly, safing of grenade submunition fuzes, disposal of energetic components, and recycling of high value metal components. Process line is highly automated, with extensive use of pick-andplace robotics. The presentation includes video of the actual equipment operations. Explosive safety aspects of the operation are highlighted.
SESSION 7A WEDNESDAY 1:00 PM – 2:40 PM
EXPLOSIVES SAFETY METHODS
SESSION MODERATOR: Group Captain Lyndon Tilbrook, Director, Directorate of Ordnance Safety, Joint Logistics Command, Joint Operations Group, Department of Defence, Australia
Swanson, Roger L. Session 7A
QUALITY EVALUATION (QE) A METHOD FOR INDEPENDENT TEST AND EVALUATION OF INSERVICE MUNITIONS
Author: Roger L. Swanson, Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity, Farragut Hall (Bldg D-323), 23 Strauss Avenue, Indian Head, MD 20640-5555, Tel: (301) 744-4447, Fax: (301) 744-6087, E-mail: SwansonRL@navsea.navy.mil This paper discusses the Quality Evaluation (QE) of in-service munitions that can provide additional/follow-on operational test and evaluation opportunities and data to assess/predict aging and environment stress effects on in-service munitions. This T&E process can result in the same success in assuring continued high performance of the munitions stockpile that DT/OT&E oversight has brought to the early phases of the acquisition process. The paper drives home the concept that while it is certainly appropriate to design exhaustive developmental and operational tests to assure performance, reliability, and safety of new weapons prior to full scale production, it is equally appropriate to continue the formal and independent T&E of munitions that exist in the DON/DOD stockpile. Specifically the paper describes life cycle reliability and performance degradation issues that may only reveal themselves after years of in-service storage, handling, use, and environmental exposures and the importance of addressing their effects. The requirement is to determine the current and projected conditions of in-service high value weapons and ordnance in terms of their safety, reliability, and performance parameters and/or characteristics. The paper describes the QE program as a mechanism that provides that independent life-cycle T&E, consistent with the concept of followon test and evaluation, to assure the detection of degradation trends and assess safety, reliability, or performance risks. This independent T&E is critical to the Fleet, Warfighter, and Acquisition and Maintenance Communities to determine necessary follow-on actions; continued use or removal of unacceptable weapons or ordnance from the stockpile either through use, maintenance, or disposal.
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AGEING STUDIES ON A RANGE OF UK POLYMERBONDED EXPLOSIVES
Presenter: Ron Hollands, BAE Systems RO Defence, Glascoed, Usk, Monmouthshire, Np15 1SG, UK, Tel: +44-(0)1291-674181; Fax: +44(0)1291-674103; E-mail: ron.hollands@baesystems.com
Hollands, Ron Session 7A
Co-Authors: Peter Barnes & Phil Cheese, MOD Defence Ordnance Safety Group, DOSG, Bristol, UK, E-mail: dosgst6@dpa.mod.uk, and Dave Mullenger, QinetiQ, Fort Halstead, Kent, UK, dcmullenger@qinetiq.com Reduced vulnerability energetic materials play a key role in a systems approach to meeting Insensitive Munitions (IM) requirements. In the UK a series of rubbery, cast-cured polymer-bonded explosives (PBXs), known by their ROWANEX designations, has been developed for a wide range of IM applications. In hazard assessment trials the ROWANEX explosives exhibit low order responses and have demonstrated an inability to undergo deflagration to detonation transition (DDT). Furthermore, cast PBXs with their improved mechanical properties compared with traditional, brittle TNT-based high explosives offer potential advantages over the whole life cycle of the weapon system as a result of enhanced environmental survivability. Reviews, sponsored by DOSG, of the benefits to be achieved from a transition to IM and the implications of the change from TNT-based explosives to cast-cured PBXs, have identified the potential for reduced levels of in-service surveillance. As part of these studies the characterisation and qualification requirements for high explosives are also being re-evaluated. The need has, therefore, arisen to establish confidence that the potential benefits can be realised and that the reduced vulnerability of a cast-cured PBX payload is not compromised during service life. To this end the UK is undertaking a series of ageing trials which fall into the following categories: (a) A collaborative programme between RO Defence, DOSG & QinetiQ involving the accelerated ageing of PBX-filled charge scale test vehicles to simulate 20 years service life. The conditioned charges which include UK burning tubes and large scale gap test vehicles are to be tested to assess any change in sensitiveness and explosiveness properties with ageing. Non-destructive inspection of the aged charges will be carried out prior to the destructive testing. (b) Accelerated ageing trials on samples of ROWANEX PBXs undertaken as part of qualification with periodic testing to assess changes in mechanical properties, chemical stability and small scale hazard properties. (c) Environmental trials on PBX-filled munitions conducted as part of RO Defence private venture IM weapon system development programmes. These trials have demonstrated that with an appropriate design good explosive filling quality can be maintained after an accelerated ageing programme equivalent to a significant service life. In this paper the reasoning behind the various trials will be explained and further details given on how the ageing and subsequent testing were carried out. Lastly the implications of the results of the trials will be reviewed.
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Tobias, John M. Session 7A
FLASHOVER INDUCED BY LIGHTNING EVENTS
Presenter: John M. Tobias, PhD, PE, U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command, ATTN: AMSRD-CER-ST-WL-AA, Ft. Monmouth, NJ 07703, Tel: (732) 427-0221, Fax: (810) 958-0746, E-mail: john.tobias@us.army.mil
Flashover occurs when a high voltage is induced on an object that exceeds the breakdown value of an insulating surrounding. The flashover can then occur between parts intended to carry current, such as a lightning protection down conductor and other grounded objects. Flashover produces several undesired effects that are deleterious to explosives safety. The first and most obvious effect is the imposition of current upon parts not intended to carry current. A second, more spectacular event is the heating, arc and mechanical effects that can result from flashover. A third effect is the production of electromagnetic radiation from the visible to radio frequency spectrum. In this paper we explore the causes of flashover, the qualitative effects of flashover and the methods and standards available to mitigate flashover effects. The intent of the paper is to promote an awareness of flashover induced by lightning events and to familiarize with the requirements to prevent flashover.
DeFrank, John Session 7A
IEEE RECOMMENDED PRACTICE FOR DETERMINING SAFE DISTANCES FROM RADIO FREQUENCY TRANSMITTING ANTENNAS WHEN USING ELECTRIC BLASTING CAPS DURING EXPLOSIVE OPERATIONS
Presenter: John DeFrank, U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion & Preventive Medicine, 5158 Blackhawk Road, Aberdeen Proving Ground EA, MD 21010-5403, Tel: (410) 436-3353, Fax: (410) 436-5411, E-mail: john.defrank@us.army.mil Co-Author: James G. Stuart, Ph.D., Franklin Applied Physics, Inc., PO Box 313 Oaks, PA 19456, Tel: (610) 666-6645, Fax: (610) 666-0173, E-mail: JStuartPhD@aol.com This recommended practice provides an analysis of electromagnetic radiation phenomena that could present a potential hazard to the transportation, handling, or use of electric blasting caps or detonators by commercial or military personnel. It discusses the transfer of electromagnetic energy from a radiation source to the receiving antenna formed by electric blasting cap wires or circuit wiring, techniques for determining whether an electromagnetic radiation hazard is likely to exist, and operating procedures that can be used to minimize the possibility of accidental initiation. This document provides recommendations for limiting the amount of electrical energy absorbed and recommended methods for determining safe distances from radio and radar transmitting antennas when one is using electric blasting caps. Safety is determined by comparing the RF power pickup to the blasting cap’s no-fire power level. 58
Regulations exist, and other documents have been published, which cover various aspects of this hazard, but these are not generally available, nor do they specifically address electric blasting caps. This document provides recommended practices for theoretical and practical assessment of this hazard. Two models are described, which are used to calculate safety distances. The horizontal dipole model is used for the case in which antenna dimensions are large compared with wavelength. The vertical loop model is used for dimensions small in relation to wavelength. The DoD should consider using this recommended practice as part of the HERO program.
NEXT GENERATION TRANSIENT VOLTAGE SURGE SUPPRESSION
Presenter: Ted Arbuckle, Raycap Corporation, 311 Ironwood Road, Guelph Ontario, Canada N1G 3G2, Tel: (519) 763-5456, Fax: (519) 763-4294, E-mail: tarbuckle@raycap.com
Arbuckle, Ted Session 7A
Over the past two decades there has been a dramatic increase in the number of electronic devices we use on a daily basis, both in our professional and personal lives. These devices are subjected to electrical transients which can damage or destroy the sensitive components which are used to construct them. The use of Transient Voltage Surge Suppressors (TVSS) to protect electrical devices is well known and they are often provisioned as a commodity item. What is less well known is that the potential for unsafe failure modes such as fire, soot, smoke, toxic fumes, loss of protection, and damage to property and equipment. These failure modes have led to multiple revisions of the Underwriters Laboratory safety standard UL 1449. Unfortunately the response of the vast majority of TVSS suppliers has been to sacrifice equipment protection in order to “meet” the new standards. This has been achieved by fusing at very low currents and/or by adding thermal trips to the TVSS suppression modules. This paper describes some of the existing protection designs and the weakness and possible unsafe failure modes associated with them. The paper presents a new approach that has overcome the shortcomings of intern
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SESSION 7B WEDNESDAY 1:00 PM – 2:40 PM
BLAST EFFECTS IV – BUILDING/GLASS RESPONSE
SESSION MODERATOR: Dr. Michelle M. Crull, U.S. Army Engineering & Support Center
Meyer, Sarah Session 7B
INJURY BASED GLASS HAZARD ASSESSMENT
Presenter: Sarah Meyer, Applied Research Associates, 1848 Lockhill-Selma Rd., Ste. 102, San Antonio, TX 78230, Tel: (210) 344-7644, Fax: (210) 344-7456, E-mail: smeyer@ara.com
Co-Authors: Mr. Lyn Little, U.S. Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety, 1 C Tree Road, Bldg 35, Attn: SJMAC-EST, McAlester, OK 74501, Tel: (918) 420-8765, Fax: (918) 420-8503, E-mail: lyn.little@us.army.mil, and Ed Conrath, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Protective Design Center, 12565 West Center Road, Omaha, NE 68144-3869, Tel: (402) 221-3152, Fax: (402) 221-4315, Email: Ed.J.Conrath@nwo02.usace.army.mil Glass fragmentation is a major cause of injury in blast events. Under funding from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Protective Design Center, Applied Research Associates (ARA) has adapted the recently developed Shard Fly-Out Model (SFOM) and Multi-Hit Glass Penetration Model (MHGP) for use in HazL (Window Fragment Hazard Level Analysis), a Single Degree of Freedom prediction code for glass response to airblast loading. Given a blast scenario (window description, blast parameters and the location of a person relative to the window), the MHGP code estimates the severity of injuries caused by glass shards penetrating the person. Using the SFOM, a statistically realistic fragment debris field is generated and propagated outward from the window. For those fragments that impact the person, the ORCA-Glass code simulates the glass penetration through tissue. From each penetration, the user obtains detailed information about the resulting wound, including an Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) Score. This data is then passed into the Multi-Hit Injury Severity model which accumulates the injury severities from each shard penetration to compute the overall Injury Severity Score (ISS). Data from the MHGP test program showed that the British Glazing Hazard Guide criteria were extremely conservative. HazL was originally based on the British Glazing Hazard Guide criteria. In an effort to make HazL less conservative and prevent the recommendation of costly and unnecessary retrofits, the MHGP model has been modified to allow injury-based hazard level predictions in HazL. Injury-based hazard levels are defined by the predicted ISS for the given window, blast conditions, and human position. Additionally, ARA has developed a PDA (Personal Digital Assistant) Tool to allow quick field assessment of hazard level and risk based on injury-based range-to-effect curves generated for monolithic annealed, monolithic fully tempered, and annealed insulating glass unit windows in a variety of dimensions and lite thicknesses. 60
INFILTRATION OF AIRBLAST INTO BUILDINGS THROUGH GLAZED OPENINGS
Presenter: David Bogosian, Karagozian & Case, 2550 N. Hollywood Way, Suite 500, Burbank, CA 91505, Tel: (818) 303-1254, Fax: (818) 240-4966, E-mail: bogosian@kcse.com
Bogosian, David Session 7B
Co-Author: Simon Fu, Karagozian & Case, 2550 N. Hollywood Way, Suite 500, Burbank, CA 91505, Tel: (818) 303-1267, Fax: (818) 240-4966, E-mail: simon@kcse.com The Explosives Safety Manual contains a number of methodologies which can be used to estimate the level of blast pressure infiltrating a building through openings. These are applicable to open vents and typically do not consider the effect of window glass. A recent set of experiments was conducted using reinforced concrete cubicles, each with a single glazed opening on its façade. These tests provide an important and useful data set for quantifying the level of attenuation achieved as the blast wave interacts with the window, enters the cubicle, and generates pressure inside the cubicle. The experiments also measured blast pressures on the front and back face of computer monitors inside the room, providing additional information regarding the uniformity of the pressure within the room. By using this data and comparing it to the various TM 5-1300 methods, an assessment of these methods can be made and a preferred methodology selected. Of these, the infill pressure algorithm (TM 5-1300, section 2-15.5) represented the test data most accurately, albeit with significant conservatism. A simple adjustment factor was derived (as a function of the scaled distance from the charge) which eliminates that conservatism and provides an easy-to-use method for computing the blast pressure infiltrating a room through a glazed opening.
GLASS BREAKAGE AND INJURY - YET ANOTHER NEW MODEL?
Presenter: Peter O. Kummer, Bienz, Kummer & Partner Ltd, Langaegertenstrasse 6, CH-8125 Zollikerberg / Switzerland, Tel: +41 1 391 27 37, Fax: +41-1 391 27 50, E-mail: bkp@bkpswiss.ch
Kummer, Peter O. Session 7B
Today, many quite sophisticated models exist for the calculation of glass breakage due to air blast loading and subsequent effects on persons within reach of the flying glass shards. Further, experience from accidents shows that the lethality rate from flying glass is rather low. Therefore, one might ask the question why do we need an additional new model and what shall it be used for. Despite the fact that the lethality rate due to flying glass shards is comparatively low, a literature review showed that glass breakage is often the most far-reaching explosion effect and sometimes is responsible for the largest number of injured persons. This is especially true in case of explosions in 61
urban areas due to accidents during the transport of ammunition or due to terrorist attacks like the one at Oklahoma City. In addition, the review showed that most of the existing glass breakage and lethality/injury models need too many input parameters which are usually not at hand. As an example, beside the size of the window also the thickness of the glass panes is often needed as a main calculation parameter. However, how do we know about the thickness of a glass pane in an existing window in a house before the accident happens destroying this window? These are some of the reasons why an easily applicable tool for standard quantitative risk analysis purposes, based on a few easily gatherable parameters, was developed in Switzerland. This paper describes the new generic model for glass breakage and lethality/injury due to flying glass. Further, it is imagined that this tool also will help to develop emergency maps and plans, and support rescue forces when it comes to cordon off endangered areas.
Henderson, Jon Session 7B
EFFECTS OF MULTI-TONNE EXPLOSIONS ON COMMERCIAL STRUCTURES
Presenter: Jon Henderson, Defence Ordnance Safety Group, UK Ministry of Defence, Ash 2B #3212, MoD Abbey Wood, Bristol, UK, BS34 8JH. Tel: +44 117 913 5575, Fax: +44 117 913 5903, E-mail: DOSGTS1@dpa.mod.uk
The UK Explosives Storage and Transport Committee sponsored a 27 Tonne NEQ explosives test at Woomera, South Australia, in late 2002. A primary aim of the test was to examine the damage to typical UK commercial building structures in order to allow comparison with existing damage prediction techniques and to allow development of an empirically based prediction tool. The test is outlined with detailed descriptions of the observed damage to the test structures. The results of the test are correlated with those from the subsequent 5 tonne explosives test conducted in 2004. In addition current studies are outlined which will improve the predictive capability for explosion effects and damage assessments for the types of structures tested.
Henderson, Jon Session 7B
EMPIRICALLY BASED EXPLOSION DAMAGE ASSESSMENT MODELS FOR MODERN STRUCTURE TYPES
Presenter: Jon Henderson, Defence Ordnance Safety Group, UK Ministry of Defence, Ash 2B #3212, MoD Abbey Wood, Bristol, UK, BS34 8JH. Tel: +44 117 913 5575, Fax: +44 117 913 5903, E-mail: DOSGTS1@dpa.mod.uk The UK Explosives Storage and Transport Committee has sponsored a series of tests since 1999 in Australia aimed at improving the available data on the reaction of modern structures to large explosions. Currently the building damage models used in UK are derived primarily from detailed 62
assessments of bombing damage caused in UK during WW2. Although a large proportion of UK housing stock is similar to, or of, pre WW2 design there is a proliferation of new types, particularly commercial structures, which have never been tested. A range of modern building types, including conventional housing as well as commercial structures, have been tested and data collected on the blast and debris environment and the observed building damage. The damage observed to the range of structures from the various trials is examined and a series of empirically derived models are proposed and compared with existing models. Studies to supplement gaps in the data are also discussed.
UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO)/ CHEMICAL DEMIL III
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. Richard W. Wright, Mitretek Systems
SESSION 7C WEDNESDAY 1:00 PM – 2:20 PM
HOT FIRE FLASHING IN THE FIELD
Presenter: John Dow, Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity, 23 Strauss Avenue, Indian Head, MD 20640, Tel: (301) 744-4906, Fax: (301) 744-6749; E-mail: dowjp@ih.navy.mil.
Dow, John Session 7C
Co-Author: Steve Granade, Naval Base Ventura County, 311 Main Road, Suite 1, Point Mugu, CA 93042, Tel: (805) 989-3806, Fax: (805) 989-1011, E-mail: steve.granade@navy.mil. Recovery of scrap metal from fired military munitions on military practice and training ranges continues to result in live munitions entering the recycling stream. Recent trends point to increased clearance of operational ranges, which will likely increase this waste stream. Additionally, standards of acceptable risk have tightened, and make it necessary to move beyond visual inspection of these residues as a means to ensure the material is inert. The use of relatively elaborate, controlled furnaces and ovens and furnaces in field situations to accomplish the flashing process is often impractical. This paper discusses practical considerations of re-implementing a past practice, hot fire flashing, using best current environmental and engineering practices, in order to reduce or eliminate the risks inherent in visual classification of munitions residues.
DEMILITARIZATION OF RECOVERED OE SHAPES USING ABRASIVE WATERJETS AT THE FORMER NSWC-WHITE OAK FACILITY
Miller, Paul L. Session 7C
Author: Paul L. Miller, Gradient Technology, 113 Wandering Lane, Harvest, AL 35749-8266, Tel: (256) 726-8721, Fax: (256) 721-5582, E-mail: miller@gradtech.com
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The synergistic combination of high pressure abrasive waterjet and enclosed detonation chamber technologies successfully disposed of several hundred large ordnance shapes unearthed at the former Naval Surface Warfare Center - White Oak (NSWC-WO) facility. A large number of OE shapes, up to Mk84 2000lb GP bombs, were recovered during excavation and remediation of several landfills at the former NSWC-WO. The demilitarization effort was contracted to the AGVIQ-CH2M-Hill Joint Venture and overseen by the U.S. Navy in conjunction with the Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board. Waterjet demilitarization operations were subcontracted to Gradient Technology who fielded a mobile 55,000 psi abrasive waterjet system to section the OE shapes. Disposal of recovered explosives and ordnance components was accomplished by CH2M-Hill using their mobile Donovan Blast Chamber. The abrasive waterjet system safely sectioned the OE shapes and collected the water and residual materials in a hold-and-test tank until analyzed and ultimately disposed of by the prime contractor. In all, some 275,000 lbs of recovered OE shapes were safely demilitarized in approximately 12 weeks.
Nordquist, Tyrone D. Session 7C
MUNITIONS ITEMS DISPOSITION ACTION SYSTEM (MIDAS)
Author: Tyrone D. Nordquist, Defense Ammunition Center, 1 C Tree Road, McAlester, OK 74501, Tel: (918) 420-8144, Fax: (918) 420-8717, E-mail: Tyrone.Nordquist@dac.army.mil
The MIDAS Program, established at the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center (DAC), provides the Department of Defense with the consistent and defendable munitions characterization data and environmental, safety and health analysis capabilities to efficiently execute the munitions demilitarization program. To date, over 6800 munitions are characterized in MIDAS. Centrally located MIDAS data is available and used by government, industry, academia, and the international community as a management tool for munitions. The MIDAS Team characterizes munitions and organizes component, part, and constituent information into relational databases. The program allows viewing and/or printing of hierarchical listings of munitions components, parts, materials (PEP and inert), and bulk items (e.g., surface finishes and plating), including material descriptions, Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) numbers, specifications and weights. Analysis of energetic materials and metals for recovery and reuse is a key part of the MIDAS system development. Ammunition parts, components and bulk explosives generated from demil programs are assessed for reuse in future munitions acquisition and development as well as other commercial applications. The MIDAS Team conducts a quarterly assessment of the munitions stockpile to assure that technology gaps are identified for those new items newly being transitioned into the Resource Recovery and Disposition Account (RRDA). This information is then made available to the research and development community to develop demilitarization alternatives as well as develop technologies to address the potential environmental issues for each ammunition items to be demilitarized. In support of the Executive Orders and the subsequent release of other Department of Defense guidance, the Defense Ammunition Center has initiated MIDAS interface enhancements to provide 64
facilities the ability to address new compliance requirements. The Munitions Analytical Compliance System (MACS) was designed to calculate chemical usage and disposition results (releases) from munitions constituents, characterized within the MIDAS database. This MIDAS interface provides the munitions community with a tool to analyze the ammunition characterization data from the environmental, safety and health perspective. The enhancements will not only facilitate compliance report generation for demilitarization sites, but will also establish a broad-based pollution, safety and health assessment capability for the total munitions community.
NUMERICAL STUDY TO REDUCE FRAGMENT VELOCITIES DURING WEAPON DISPOSAL
Presenter: Dr. James L. O’Daniel, USACE/Engineer Research and Development Center, 3909 Halls Ferry Road, Vicksburg, MS 39180, Tel: (601) 634-3036, Fax: (601) 634-2211, E-mail: James.L.O’Daniel@ erdc.usace.army.mil
O’Daniel, James L. Session 7C
Co-Authors: Sharon B. Garner, USACE/Engineer Research and Development Center, 3909 Halls Ferry Road, Vicksburg, MS 39180, Tel: (601) 634-2712, Fax: (601) 634-2211, E-mail: Sharon.B.Garner@erdc.usace.army.mil, and Dr. Michelle M. Crull, U.S. Army Engineering & Support Center, PO Box 1600, Huntsville, AL 35807-4301, Tel: (256) 895-1653, Fax: (256) 8951737, E-mail: Michelle.M.Crull@hnd01.usace.army.mil Ordnance disposal involves careful destruction of the combination of explosive and metal casing in a controlled environment. One such method includes wrapping the ordnance in sheets of explosive and detonating it within a steel structure that was designed to withstand the high pressure and severe fragments that are generated. After several disposal events, it was seen that the fragments were severely damaging the structure, requiring that the fragment velocities, and therefore the fragment impulses, be reduced to an acceptable level. Numerical methods were applied, using the finite element (FE) code EPIC to model the detonation and initial velocity of the expanding metal casing. As typical FE methods cannot accurately model the breakup of a metal plate into a large number of small fragments, the relative initial expansion of the casing was observed. Relative values of velocity were compared between the detonation of only the ordnance and various scenarios that included the donor explosive wrapped around the weapon. Many two-dimensional simulations, as well as several three-dimensional simulations, were performed, studying the effects of varying several parameters. Locations and times of detonation were varied to attempt to determine procedures that would lower the initial casing velocity as much as possible. Comparisons were made between the various simulations and against limited experimental data to determine the quantitative accuracy of the simulations. The research reported herein was performed under funding provided by the U.S. Army Engineering & Support Center, Huntsville. The authors acknowledge the Chief of Engineers for support to all aspects of this program and permission to present this work. All simulations were performed on the Origin 3000 system at the ERDC Major Shared Resource Center.
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POSTER SESSION 7D WEDNESDAY 1:00 – 4:30 PM
POSTER SESSION
SESSION MODERATOR: Dorothy L. Becker, Johns Hopkins University/Chemical Propulsion Information Agency
Swisdak, Michael M. Session 7D
DDESB BLAST EFFECTS COMPUTER—VERSION 6
Author: Michael M. Swisdak, Jr., Indian Head Division/Naval Surface Warfare Center, Code 440E, 101 Strauss Avenue, Indian Head, MD 20640-5035, Tel: (301) 744-4404, Fax: (301) 744-6406, E-mail: swisdakMM@ih.navy.mil
The Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) Blast Effects Computer (BEC) has been evolving since its introduction in 1997. Version 5.0 was released in November 2001. This paper describes the additions/changes that have been made subsequent to that release—resulting in a new version (6). The new features associated with Version 6 include improvements to the “close-in” airblast algorithms, incorporation of additional airblast data into the existing algorithms, changes to the TNT equivalent weight input routines, changes to the methodology used to calculate impulserelated airblast parameters, and the addition of a summary output table for the test site elevation.
Tatom, John W. Session 7D
SAFER 3 ALGORITHMS
Presenter: John W. Tatom, APT Research, Inc, 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3392, Fax: (256) 837-7786, E-mail: JTatom@APT-Research.com
Co-Authors: Michael M. Swisdak, Jr., Indian Head Division/Naval Surface Warfare Center, Code 440E, 101 Strauss Avenue, Indian Head, MD 20640-5035, Tel: (301) 744-4404, Fax: (301) 7446406, E-mail: swisdakMM@ih.navy.mil, and James E. Tancreto, Naval Facilities Engineering Services Center, ESC62, 1100 23rd Avenue, Bldg 1100, Port Hueneme, CA 93043-4370, Tel: (805) 982-1382, Fax: (805) 982-3481, E-mail: James.Tancreto@navy.mil This poster session will describe the current scientific algorithms in SAFER (Safety Assessment for Explosives Risk). Each branch of SAFER (blast, building failure, debris, and thermal) will be explained, in terms of both methodology and supporting data/literature.
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ADVANCED FIRE PROTECTION DELUGE SYSTEM (TESTS WITH LARGE QUANTITIES OF IR FLARE COMPOSITION & PROPELLANT)
Author: Presenter: Robert Loyd, U.S. Army Field Support Command, AMSFS-SF, 1 Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island, IL 61299-6000; Tel: (309) 782-2975, Fax: (309) 782-2988, E-mail: bob.loyd@us.army.mil
Loyd, Robert Session 7D
Co-Author: Virgil Carr, Air Base Technologies Division, Air Force Research Laboratory, 139 Barnes Drive Suite 2, Tyndall Air Base, FL 32403, Tel: (850) 283-3744, Fax: (850) 283-9797, E-mail: virgil.carr@tyndall.af.mil Over the last seven years the Advance Fire Protection Deluge System (AFPDS) Research Project has evolved into one of the most successful munitions fire protection and safety efforts ever. This “cutting edge” technology has potentially enabled the reduction of ultra high-speed deluge system response time by a factor of ten (10 ms vs. 100 ms from detection to water flow) thereby improving the safety of personnel working with energetic materials in the process. It virtually eliminates false activations and accidental water flow as previously experienced in similar applications with older systems. The AFPDS utilizes multi-spectrum high-speed optical fire detectors, high-rate discharge (HRD) water spheres, a fast acting electronic controller, and pressurized backup water. Over 300 munitions “burn” evaluations have been conducted with 30 different pyrotechnic, propellant, and high explosive materials. This presentation addresses the evolution of the AFPDS and latest evaluations with larger quantities of IR flare composition (up to 100 pounds) and propellants (up to 50 pounds). These tests took place in 2003 and will continue in early 2004 at the DOD Fire Research Laboratory at Tyndall Air Force Base, FL. Additionally, field-testing of the AFPDS with more than 16 systems installed and another 7 in the design and planning stage for military, DOE, and private sector contractors will continue until transitioned to industry. Applications include: ammunition surveillance facilities, research & development operations, IR flare production activities, propellant loading functions, ammunition production, and munitions testing. Other potential uses include: explosion mitigation; armored vehicle ammunition storage areas and crew compartments; IR decoy flare handling and maintenance areas on Navy ships; specialty chemical manufactures; etc. The AFPDS technology is being transitioned to private industry via a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with a well-known fire protection equipment manufacturer. Development of self-contained portable units and further reduction of total system response time are additional goals. Additionally, DOD and commercial/NFPA organizations are beginning to address the AFPDS in their standards.
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Wager, Phillip C. Session 7D
DDESB-SPONSORED DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY SITING (ESS) SOFTWARE
Presenter: Phillip C. Wager, Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center, Code C62, 1100 23rd Ave, Port Hueneme, CA 93043-4370, Tel: (805) 982-1239, DSN 551-1239 The Explosives Safety Siting (ESS) Software is currently in use at dozens of DoD installations. ESS enables the user to use electronic maps and data available at most DoD installations to evaluate the distance between potential explosion sites and exposed sites against DoD, Air Force, Army and Navy regulations. ESS also enables the automated generation of Explosives Safety Quantity Distance Arcs and the creation of, and tracking of explosives safety site plan submittals. ESS is currently being installed at 30 Navy and 6 Marine Corps installations worldwide. We will demonstrate "Lessons Learned" in the ongoing deployment of the ESS software. We will also have a discussion on how a DoD installation can prepare to install ESS.
SESSION 8A WEDNESDAY 3:10 PM – 4:50 PM
EXPLOSIVES SAFETY - ACCIDENTS
Mr. Edward W. Kratovil, Naval SESSION MODERATOR: Ordnance Safety and Security Activity
Moreton, Peter Allan Session 8A
A REVIEW OF THE EXPLOSIVES ACCIDENTS THAT OCCURRED IN THE UK IN THE YEAR 2000
Presenter: Dr. Peter Allan Moreton, MBTB Ltd, 28 Hazelborough Close, Warrington, Cheshire, WA3 6UL, England, Tel: 0044 1925 831175, Fax: 0044 1925 831175, E-mail: petermoreton@msn.com
Co-Author: Dr. Roy Merrifield, Health and Safety Executive, Chemicals and Hazardous Installations Division, Daniel House, Stanley Precinct, Bootle, Merseyside, L20 3DL, England, Tel: 0044 151 951 4804, Fax: 0044 151 951 3824, E-mail: roy.merrifield@hse.gis.gov.uk In this paper we present a review of the accidents that occurred on UK licensed explosives manufacturing sites during the year 2000 and were reported to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) under the terms of the 1875 Explosives Act. Details of these accidents are undoubtedly of interest to the wider explosives community, particularly as many countries have now introduced legislation that requires formal assessments of manufacturing operations to show that risks have been reduced as low as reasonably practicable.
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In our presentation we shall also review the EIDAS Database system, which was set up by the HSE in the late 1980s and which now contains details of over 13,000 explosives accidents. As part of this review we shall explore ways in which information might be shared more widely, so that maximum benefit may be gained from the lessons learnt from accidents.
TNT EQUIVALENCY OF FIREWORKS SHELLS: AN INSIGHT TO THE CARMEL EXPLOSION
Presenter: E. Contestabile, Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory, 555 Booth St. Ottawa Ontario, K1A 0G1, Canada, Tel: (613) 995-1363, Fax: (613) 995-1230, E-mail: econtest@nrcan.gc.ca
Contestabile, E. Session 8A
Co-Authors: B. von Rosen, Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory, 555 Booth St. Ottawa Ontario, K1A 0G1, Canada, Tel: (613) 947-3527, Fax: (613) 995-1230, E-mail: bvonrose@nrcan.gc.ca; R. Guilbeault, Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory, 555 Booth St. Ottawa Ontario, K1A 0G1, Canada, Tel: (613) 995-2332, Fax: (613) 995-1230, E-mail: rguilbea@nrcan.gc.ca; D. Wilson, Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory, 555 Booth St. Ottawa Ontario, K1A 0G1, Canada, Tel: (613) 947-3527, Fax: (613) 995-8060, E-mail: dowilson@nrcan.gc.ca; Kim W. King, P.E., ABS Consulting, 15600 San Pedro, Suite 400, San Antonio, TX 78232, Tel: (210) 495-5195, Fax: (210) 495-5134, E-mail: kking@absconsulting.com ; and L. Lim, Department of Industry and Resources, Western Australia In March 2002 an accident occurred in Carmel, Western Australia. While two operators were manipulating finished fireworks articles, an ignition occurred which quickly spread to a nearby transport container. Having caught fire, the contents exploded and the container burst. The resulting fragments pierced two steel, fireworks magazines within a 40-m radius resulting in the initiation of their contents. The contents of one magazine simply burned while the other exploded some time later, toppling a magazine that was 50 m away. Only one bermed fireworks magazine survived, there were no injuries but the facility was totally destroyed, and damage to windows of nearby properties occurred to a radial distance of approximately 4.5 km. The evolution and culmination of the accident will be described and then, experimental data on the TNT equivalency of fireworks shells will be presented to substantiate the resulting damage and the seismic activity recorded by a nearby station. This is a classical run-away incident where an innocent activity is the spark, which ends up as a catastrophic event. The authors will comment on the fireworks storage conditions and will present possible methods that could be used to prevent such incidents and mitigate damage.
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Reed, Jack Session 8A
TWA FLIGHT 800 EXPLOSION STILL NOT EXPLAINED
Author: Jack Reed, JWR, Inc., 5301 Central NE, Suite 220, Albuquerque, NM 87108, E-Mail: jwreed@nmia.com
Airblast noise reported by 255 Long Island residents varied from thunderlike rumbles to very loud bangs, as many as four or five of them in succession. Official NTSB findings were that this noise came from an explosion, of roughly 20-lb TNT equivalent, from residual fuel fumes in the "empty" central wing tank (CWT). It was set off by a spark from fuel gage wiring which had worn and become shorted with a higher voltage source line. NASA acousticians determined that this small explosion could be heard at 15 and more kilometers distance. The contention here is that a much larger explosion, of the order of a ton of TNT, was necessary to cause the ear-witness descriptions of the explosion. As reported to the 2002 ESB Seminar, an explosion test of approximately 1-ton TNT equivalent was recorded at 11-km and the recorder operators described it as making a loud bang. Another similar explosion test in December 2003 was recorded at several locations, and again operators reported noises quite comparable to the range of reports from Long Island ear-witnesses of the TWA Flight 800 explosion. It must be concluded that the official explanation of this disaster is incorrect, as the small postulated CWT explosion could not have caused nearly so much noise, considering both the amplitude and frequency of the two explosion yields. TWA Flight 800 disintegrated off Long Island NY, near 8:30 EDT, 16 July 1996. Immediate reports from other flyers described flaming streaks from what appeared to be missiles. Search for terrorists began quickly, looking for strangers or any suspicious activity on land or on boats at sea. Over 1,000 FBI agents were assembled to collect and inspect recovered debris, interview eyewitnesses, and analyze sightings to give a launch point for this missile. After months of investigation, the FBI could find no evidence of such a criminal attack, and turned the project over to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to find an accidental cause. When more than 90% of the aircraft was recovered and inspected, the “empty” central fuel tank became the targeted explosion source, possibly set off by sparking, frayed fuel-gage wiring, enhanced by a nearby hot air conditioner. On the other hand, an early TV interview with a lady in East Moriches, NY, 15 km distant, told of hearing a loud bang; she looked up and saw a huge fireball out over the ocean. What she heard and what she saw were different things, separated by nearly 50 seconds sound travel time. This acoustic discrepancy has not been adequately investigated. Roger Rosenblatt wrote in Time magazine, that when his house shook he went outside to see what happened to cause that loud bang. When finally released, FBI reports gathered from more than 200 “ear-witnesses” give similar observations. To this author, they confirm that at least a ton of TNT equivalent explosion occurred to initiate this disaster. NASA acousticians engaged by NTSB, however, through spectral analysis techniques for sonic booms, concluded that a 10-kg TNT explosion, as postulated from detonating vapors in the fuel tank, could be heard on Long Island. Evidence for a much larger yield is here presented, but its form remains a mystery.
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A SURVEY OF TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE ACCIDENTS INVOLVED IN THERMAL EVENTS
Presenter: Melody K. Rattanapote, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Code 4T4310D, 1 Administration Circle, Stop 1109, China Lake, CA 93555, Tel: (760) 939-7482, Fax: (760) 939-2597, E-Mail: melody.rattanapote@navy.mil
Rattanapote, Melody K. Session 8A
Co-Authors: Alice I. Atwood, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Code 4T4310D, 1 Administration Circle, Stop 1109, China Lake, CA 93555, Tel: (760) 939-0203, Fax: (760) 9392597, E-mail: Alice.atwood@navy.mil, and Josephine Covino, Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board, 2461 Eisenhower Ave, Alexandria, VA 22331-0600, Tel: (703) 325-8625, Fax: (703) 325-6227, E-mail: Josephine.covino@ddesb.osd.mil A survey has been made of the transportation and storage accidents that have taken place between 1 January 1900 and 30 December 2003. Those incidents which include fire were the topic of the investigation. This study has been initiated a part of the process to develop a sub-scale bonfire test protocol. These data will be used to describe the thermal stimulus that could exist in a transportation and storage scenario. Over 6200 individual incidents occurring in the DOD were examined. The data were then divided by type (transportation or storage). In the area of transportation the incidents were further divided by type of transportation, either truck or train, and the type of accident, equipment failure or impact. The incidents involved in storage of munitions were more difficult to categorize with respect to a thermal stimulus. For example, if an energetic sample exothermed while in storage causing a fire, and subsequent violent reaction it was omitted based on the fact that hazards classification at this time is related to pristine, undamaged energetics. Those incidents that were listed as being “spontaneous” or caused by lightning were included in the survey. These data will not only be used in the sub-scale test protocol development, but, will also be made available to the modeling community for use in the development of cookoff hazards models.
AMMONIUM NITRATE DETONATION INDUCED BY CONTACT WITH SODIUM DICHLOROISOCYANURATE
Presenter: Yves Guengant, SNPE Matériaux Energétiques, Centre de Recherches du Bouchet, 9 rue Lavoisier, 91710 Vert Le Petit, France, Tel: +33 1 6499 1403, Fax: +33 1 6499 1595, E-mail: y.guengant@snpe.com
Guengant, Yves Session 8A
Co-Authors: Patrick Della Pieta, Michel Dervaux, Claire Franson, Guy Jacob, Hélène Mace, SNPE Matériaux Energétiques, Centre de Recherches du Bouchet, 9 rue Lavoisier, 91710 Vert Le Petit, France, Tel: +33 1 6499 1403, Fax: +33 1 6499 1595
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Toulouse Plant Disaster on September 21th, 2001, was caused by the partial or total detonation of 300 tons of Ammonium Nitrate. This detonation has been initiated by still unidentified cause. It could be a chemical reaction between Ammonium Nitrate and Sodium Dichloroisocyanurate. This is one of the hypothesis of judicial inquiry. Furthermore, some incidents about unexpected reactions between Ammonium Nitrate and chlorinated components are reported in literature. For plant safety assessment, it has been decided to conduct a study to determine the conditions that could lead to Ammonium Nitrate detonation, according to such a chemical reaction process. The first aim of this study was to prove the formation of Nitrogen Trichloride following solid-solid reaction between Ammonium Nitrate and Sodium Dichloroisocyanurate particles. Using pure and dry materials, this has been demonstrated by UV/VIS spectrometry. Nitrogen trichloride is an unstable and dangerous substance; its most frequent decomposition mode is detonation; it is a yellow liquid at room temperature. Its thermodynamical properties have been determined using chemical equilibrium computer codes. It was then possible for us to assess Ammonium Nitrate detonation ability through shock-to-detonation transition (SDT) and deflagration-to-detonation transition (DDT) initiated by Nitrogen Trichloride detonation. For the second part of the study, fifty-six experimental tests have been performed at a scale up to thirty kilograms. Through contact with Sodium Dichloroisocyanurate, full detonations of Ammonium Nitrate have been obtained without any other stimuli. These detonations have been proved by blast overpressure measurements and mechanical damages in surroundings. Favorable conditions are moderate humidity of Ammonium Nitrate (about 1.5%), sufficient contact surface between particles, retaining of decomposition gases, and lack of light. Thus, it is important to consider that chlorinated components can cause detonation of Ammonium Nitrate stockpile. It is a relevant scenario for serious accidents.
SESSION 8B WEDNESDAY 3:10 PM – 4:50 PM
STRUCTURES-ADVANCED METHODS
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. James E. Tancreto, Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center
Cox, P. A. Session 8B
FLYWHEEL CONTAINMENT SYSTEM DESIGN AND TEST
Presenter: P. A. Cox, Southwest Research Institute, 6220 Culebra Road, San Antonio, TX 78238, Tel: (210) 522-2315, Fax: (210) 522-6290, E-mail: pcox@swri.org
Co-Authors: S. A. Mullin, Tel: (210) 522-2340, Fax: (210) 522-6290, E-mail: smullin@swri.org and Donald J. Grosch, Tel: (210) 522-3176, Fax: (210) 522-6290, E-mail: dgrosch@swri.org, Southwest Research Institute, 6220 Culebra Road, San Antonio, TX 78238; and M. L. Lazarewicz, Tel: (978) 887-6447, Fax: (978) 694-9127, E-mail: lazarewicz@beaconpower.com, Beacon Power Corporation (BPC), 234 Ballardvale Street, Wilmington, MA 01887 72
Small chambers for flywheel containment were designed for the assumption that loads on the internal boundary of the chamber could be defined in terms of the loads from a high explosive charge detonated in the chamber. This approach was taken because, at the time of the design, composite flywheel failure mechanisms were not well understood and the forces produced on the chamber by failure of a composite flywheel were not yet well characterized. The assumption was made that the rotor could instantly disintegrate (or explode) and instantly release all of its kinetic energy. Equating the total kinetic energy in the flywheel at failure to the unit detonation energy in the explosive, gave an equation for the equivalent charge weight. Detonating the equivalent charge at the center of the rotating mass of the flywheel produced design loads for the containment chamber. Two chambers were designed using this methodology. One, intended for the routine testing of flywheels, was designed to withstand multiple flywheel failures and to operate in indoor pits. The other chamber was designed to withstand a single flywheel failure and to operate outdoors and over a wider range of temperature. The chamber for outdoor use was built by BPC and successfully tested at the SwRI Ballistics Range. In subsequent development, all failure mechanisms that result in very short duration rotor disintegration were eliminated in Beacon’s commercial flywheel designs by increasing stress margins at the expense of reduced energy density (joules/kg). Only failure mechanisms resulting in imbalance, where rotor integrity during shutdown could be assured, were kept. Loads from these commercial flywheel designs were determined to be substantially smaller in magnitude than those from the equivalent high explosive charge, indicating that the design approach was conservative. The approach, however, may still be appropriate for research flywheel designs with higher stress and performance where orderly shutdowns maintaining rotor integrity cannot be assured. The results from this work should be considered for flywheels used in high performance research.
MINIMIZING SAFETY DISTANCES FOR STRUCTURES IN DANGER ENGINEERING & ECONOMICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Presenter: Yoram Elron, PE, M.Sc., Systems’ Analysis & Engineering, 11 TARAD Str., Ramat-HaSharon, Israel 47250, Tel: +972-3-5492634, Fax: +972-3-5497567, E-mail: yelron@netvision.net.il
Elron, Yoram Session 8B
Co-Author: Reuben Eytan, PE, M.Sc., M. R. Eytan - Building Design (EBD) Ltd., Specialist Consultants for Protection, Security & Hardening, 27 Motta Gur Str., Tel-Aviv, Israel 69694, Tel: +972-3-6428480, Fax: +972-3-6429355, E-mail: ebd@netvision.net.il Facilities containing explosive materials, such as munitions production installations, munitions magazines, munitions treatment workshops, etc., create inherent hazards to their surroundings. These hazards are usually mitigated by keeping clear areas around such facilities according to required safety distances. Currently used regulations dictate large clear areas, which have adverse economic impact by prevention of alternative or additional uses of such areas and by forcing much longer, therefore more expensive, infrastructure facilities in any given relevant military or defense related 73
installation. Moreover, wherever hazard inducing facilities are close enough to other public or private uses of surrounding areas, hampering of civilian activities has adverse economic impact too, which must be taken into systematic considerations. In the paper presented during the 30th DOD/ESB seminar “A Novel Design of Highly resistant Structure for Munitions Magazines Based Mainly on Reinforced-Soil Technology” and in subsequent works presented to relevant experts of the ESB and the Armed Services it was shown, based on accumulated data from many tests, that relatively large soil bodies are able to absorb and mitigate very large energies produced by explosions. Thus, donor structures built by using reinforced-soil technology are relatively safer than other types of structures at affordable costs and may demand lesser safety distances. On the other side of the spectrum of considerations intelligent protective engineering design of ordinary structures in the vicinity of the hazardous ones may lessen the required safety distances too. The systematic approach to combinations of these two concepts may sustain better economic considerations for overall design of relevant facilities. “Soft-Hardening” is a new engineering approach to the problem of protection against the effects of explosive blasts and projectiles’ impacts/penetrations. This approach is based on absorption of energies by resilience, achieved by confining RC core between layers of relatively soft & compressible material, which bonds to concrete to create a composite structure. This approach has been so far extensively tested. Implementation, which is quite easy to achieve in practice, is based on careful assessment of tests’ results.
Opichka, Sherene Session 8B
INVESTIGATION OF ROOF SNOW LOADS ON BLAST CONTAINMENT STRUCTURES
Presenter: Sherene Opichka, U.S. Army Engineering & Support Center, Huntsville, Attn: CEHNC-ED-CS-S (Opichka), PO Box 1600, Huntsville, AL 35807-4301, Tel: (256) 895-1656, Fax: (256) 895-1602, E-mail: Sherene.M.Opichka@hnd01.usace.army.mil
Co-Author: William Zehrt, P.E., U.S. Army Engineering & Support Center, Attn: CEHNC-ED-CS-S (Zehrt), PO Box 1600, Huntsville, AL 35807-4301, Tel: (256) 895-1829, Fax: (256) 895-1602, E-mail: William.H.Zehrt@hnd01.usace.army.mil The Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) has funded the U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center, Huntsville, Structural Branch to investigate roof snow loads and their typical durations at sites throughout the United States. In this study, we will evaluate the inclusion of snow load in the unit weight calculation for frangible roof surfaces. Our evaluation will focus on two areas. First, we will assess the relationship between ground snow loads and design roof snow loads on typical DoD structures. Second, we will investigate typical snow loads and their durations at sites throughout the US. The resulting data may be used in the future development of a risk-based approach to snow load criteria.
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EQUIVALENT K-18 LEVEL OF PROTECTION
Author: Mark G. Whitney, Analytical & Computational Engineering, Inc. (ACE), 3463 Magic Drive, Suite 359, San Antonio, TX 78232, Tel: (210) 582-5860, Fax: (210) 582-5861, E-mail: mgwhitney@aceng.net
Whitney, Mark G. Session 8B
DDESB 6055.9 guidelines indicate that traditional facility siting distances (in standard QD tables) can be reduced when an appropriate degree of protection is provided by use of hardened construction. For example, HE facilities of similar hazard are traditionally separated at K-18 (Intraline distance). This can be reduced to K-9 if barricading is provided that results in an equivalent level of protection as K-18 (without barricading.) This paper evaluates barricading requirements in order to provide an equivalent K-18 protection level. This includes evaluation of the following: • Blast pressures and impulses • Primary Fragments • Debris • Thermal Exposure An example situation is evaluated, where two HE operating lines are separated by K-9 with a barricade between. Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) modeling is used to predict blast loads at the exposed site (ES) that are reduced by the barricade shielding. These loads are compared with that expected from K-18 separation without a barricade. The analysis also discusses the requirement for the barricade to control primary fragments, for the barricade to control potential explosion site (PES) generated debris, and for the barricade itself to not be a source of debris. An important part of this paper is evaluation of barricade length and height using CFD to determine how loads at the ES are influenced. This data is plotted to in non-dimensional format, giving preliminary guidelines for selecting the size (height and length) of the barricade needed to reduce blast loads to the desired K-18 level. This work is a result of an in-house investigation at ACE and was not funded by government or private contracts; hence, no permissions are required to present the results. This work does not include any classified or sensitive information and is suitable for public publication.
FACET3D - A NEW 3D MODELING BLAST ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR HIGH EXPLOSIVE AND VAPOR CLOUD THREATS
Knight, Greg Session 8B
Author: Greg Knight, ADS Consulting, 15600 San Pedro, Suite 400, San Antonio, TX 78232, Tel: (210) 495-5195, Fax: (210) 495-5134, E-mail: gknight@absconsulting.com An initial step in assessment of terrorist threats and accidental explosions is, quite often, a screening analysis to determine the potential consequences associated with blast damage. To facilitate this process, FACET3D (Facility Assessment and Consequence Evaluation Tool) has been developed to rapidly predict blast loads and structural response. FACET3D is a WindowsTM program incorporating a dedicated 3D DirectX® graphics engine and analytical high explosive and vapor 75
cloud routines to provide blast results in a detailed 3D environment. The tool is easy to use with object oriented model development, analysis and post processing. FACET3D has been used to assess multiple GSA and DOD facilities. This paper describes the unique features and uses of FACET3D, including some examples of buildings that have been assessed using the software. The paper includes detailed review of blast methodologies, structural materials and failure criteria using pressure-impulse diagrams, creation of multimedia results, reporting, predefined buildings and materials. The paper also describes a unique path tracing methodology , a feature that is absent from many other analytical blast codes. The paper describes the results of a typical screening assessment and demonstrates the utility of the tool for rapid assessment of multiple explosion threats and hazards.
SESSION 8C WEDNESDAY 3:10 PM – 4:50 PM
HAZARD CLASSIFICATION – SHOCK/IMPACT SENSITIVITY I
SESSION MODERATOR: Center Mr. Kevin Carr, Air Force Safety
Lindfors, Allen J. Session 8C
SHOCK SENSITIVITY OF PROPELLANTS USING THE SUPER LARGE SCALE GAP TEST
Presenter: Allen J. Lindfors, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Code 4T4330D, Stop 1109, 1 Administration Center, China Lake, CA 93555-6100, Tel: (760) 939-0218, Fax: (760) 939-2597, E-mail: allen.lindfors@navy.mil
Co-Authors: O. E. Ross Heimdahl, Thomas L. Boggs, and Therese M. AtienzaMoore, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Code 4T4330D, Stop 1109, 1 Administration Center, China Lake, CA 93555-6100 The hazard classification of propellants and large rocket motors incorporating these propellants is an important safety consideration. The governing documents are the UN “Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods” and the Department of Defense (DOD) Ammunition and Explosives Hazard Classification Procedures Joint Technical Bulletin TB 700-2. A comprehensive experimental and computational study of the current Super Large Scale Gap Test configuration, as well as several alternatives has been conducted. First, the role of booster composition, size, shape, and the effects of geometry changes in attenuator design are covered. Second, the roles of confinement, and propellant reactivity are explored. Finally, this paper describes a series of shock initiation studies. These studies showed that the new geometries, confinement, and booster systems gives good agreement with the old approach. Shock wave pulse duration and reactivity also played a large role in the outcome of the experimental series for one of the propellants studied.
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SHOCK SENSITIVITY CHARACTERIZATION OF PROPELLANTS FOR LARGE BOOSTER APPLICATIONS
Campbell, Carol J. Session 8C
Presenter: Carol J. Campbell, ATK Thiokol Propulsion, Research and Development Laboratories, M/S 244, PO Box 707, Brigham City, UT 84302-0707, Tel: (435) 8635383, Fax: (435) 863-2271, E-mail: Carol.Campbell@atk.com Co-Authors: Ingvar A. Wallace, ATK Thiokol Propulsion, Propellant Design Engineering, M/S LD0, PO Box 707, Brigham City, UT 84302-0707, Tel: (435) 863-8999, Fax: (435) 863-2884, E-mail: Ingvar.Wallace@atk.com and Robert R. Bennett, ATK Thiokol Propulsion, Research and Development Laboratories, M/S 244, PO Box 707, Brigham City, UT 84302-0707, Tel: (435) 8638267, Fax: (435) 863-2271, E-mail: RobertR.Bennett@atk.com Changes made by the Department of Defense (DoD) to the hazard classification guidelines in Technical Bulletin (TB) 700-2, NAVSEAINST 8020.8B, TO 11A-1-47, and DLAR 8220.1, implemented in January 1998 and modified in January 2002, represent a significant departure in alternate test procedures for hazard classification of large solid rocket motors. Before implementation of the new alternate test protocol, hazard classification of large solid rocket motors depended largely on the results of small-scale tests, particularly the Naval Ordnance Laboratory large-scale gap test (NOL LSGT), along with analogy to existing rocket motors. When using the NOL LSGT to determine shock sensitivity, the input pressure is varied at a fixed sample diameter of 1.44 inches, at constant confinement. Under the new protocol, the classification of large rocket motors will include shock sensitivity testing of much larger samples (as well as a bonfire test). Several options for shock testing exist under the new alternate test protocol. Option 2 of the protocol requires gap testing at 70 kbar of a sample with diameter 1.5 times Dcrit (but no less than 5-in diameter), with an L/D of four, and confinement equivalent to motor confinement. Thus, the shock sensitivity sample to be tested is determined by factors such as the critical diameter of the propellant, and the rocket motor design. A three-dimensional characterization (diameter versus shock pressure versus confinement) is necessary to fully understand shock sensitivity of a given propellant and understand how the new test protocol will affect propellant classification. Detonability response results will be presented for propellants with different energies, different critical diameters, and different binder types (inert vs. energetic). The shape of the detonability response surfaces is of utmost importance not only with regard to hazard classification of new propellants, but also for determining the best propellant and design approaches for achieving higher performance while avoiding the costs and logistics problems associated with a 1.1 hazard classification.
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Jones, A. G. Session 8C
IMPACT SAFETY OF COMPLIANT EXPLOSIVES
Presenter: A. G. Jones, Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston, Reading, Berkshire, United Kingdom, RG26 4PR, Tel: #44 118 982 7530, Fax: #44 118 982 6827, E-mail: Andrew.G.Jones@awe.co.uk.
Co-Author: S. P. Wortley, Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston, Reading, Berkshire, United Kingdom, RG26 4PR, Tel: #44 118 982 4287, Fax: #44 118 982 6827, E-mail: Steve.Wortley@awe.co.uk Low velocity impact is a plausible abnormal environment that may be encountered during the lifecycle phases of processing, transportation and storage of explosives. It is important to establish whether an explosive store is vulnerable to such an impact and the likely magnitude of any response. In a presentation at the last DoD Explosive Safety Seminar in 2002 experiments were described in which hemispherical EBW detonators were impacted by low speed projectiles to establish threshold reaction levels. In this paper, the work has been extended to examine the low speed impact response of a relatively mechanically weak HMX-based UK explosive containing a highly plasticised nitrocellulose binder. The results are compared to the response of more mechanically resilient U.S. HMX-based compositions in the LLNL Steven test as well as aggressively aged UK material that had become mechanically weaker due to the degradation of the NC. These tests resulted in unexpectedly low ignition threshold conditions. Experiments with a modified test rig that enabled tight control of the impact orientation and continuous measurement of the penetration of a projectile were performed to examine the effect that variables such as confinement and projectile diameter have on ignition threshold and growth of reaction. Additional experiments were performed to establish whether the presence of a detonator would compromise the safety of the initiation train. These experiments involved impacting an embedded EBW detonator in the HMX-based explosive to determine the effect on the reaction threshold and the extent of reaction growth.
Brown, Mary Session 8C
THE EFFECTS OF VENTING ON PARTIALLY CONFINED ALUMINIZED EXPLOSIVE DETONATIONS
Presenter: Dr. Mary Brown, Applied Research Associates, Southwest Division, 4300 San Mateo Blvd, Suite A220, Albuquerque, NM 87110, Tel: (505) 883-3636, Fax: (505) 872-0794, E-mail: cneedham@ara.com
Co-Authors: Charles Needham, Dr. Jose Pirez, and Craig Watry, Applied Research Associates, Southwest Division, 4300 San Mateo Blvd, Suite A220, Albuquerque, NM 87110, Tel: (505) 8833636, Fax: (505) 872-0794, E-mail: mbrown@ara.com, jpirez@ara.com, and cwatry@ara.com A series of calculations have been completed for the detonation of non-ideal explosives in multiroom structures. Parameters that were varied included: the size of the charge, the loading density (explosive mass to room volume), the shape of the room and the vent area to the atmosphere. 78
Two different explosive mixtures were evaluated. The detonations were calculated in a variety of closed geometric rooms. Comparisons of the aluminum burn rates and total aluminum burned were made as a function time for each of the calculations. The aluminum burn is a strongly non-linear function. As aluminum burns, the temperature of the gas increases, this, in turn, increases the rate of aluminum heating and causes earlier ignition of more aluminum. We observed that reflections from nearby walls, and therefore higher reflected shock pressures, significantly enhanced the aluminum burn. The calculations indicate a strong dependency on the vent area. A relatively small vent area (0.3% of the wall area) gives results very near those of a completely sealed structure. An increase to a vent area of ~1.5% of the wall area of the structure reduces the aluminum burned by 20%. This is caused by the cooling of the fireball gasses and the reduction in heating rate of the aluminum. We also noted that the position of the vent area significantly changes the amount and rate of aluminum burned. Comparisons are made with several experimental overpressure waveforms which confirm the accuracy of the computational model.
AIM-7, AIM-9, and AIM-120 ALL UP ROUND CONTAINERS STORAGE REDUCED MAXIMUM CREDIBLE EVENT TEST
Carr, Kevin R. Session 8C
Presenter: Kevin R. Carr, HQ Air Force Safety Center Weapons Division, AF Test And Hazard Classification, HQ AFSC/SEWCH, 9700 G Avenue SE, Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5670, Tel: (505) 846-2662, Fax: (505) 846-6027, E-mail: Kevin.Carr@Kirtland.Af.Mil The Air Force Safety Center (AFSC/SEW) sponsored a series of confirmatory tests regarding the closest spacing possible for a reduced Maximum Credible Event (MCE), and to investigate the weapons propagation effects between the All Up Rounds AIM-7 Sparrow missile with WAU-17 warheads and the AIM 120 AMRAAM with WDU-33 and WDU-41 warheads in shipping and storage containers. This testing model will provide the basis for a reduced MCE and hazard fragmentation distance for the AIM-7 Sparrow, AIM-9 Sidewinder, and AIM-120 AMRAAM all up round missiles in their shipping and storage containers. This presentation will include a discussion of the test set up, video of the tests, the conclusive non-propagation results and additional lessons learned including the non-propagation properties of the containers.
RISK MODELS
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. Eric Olson and Col. B. Olson, Air Force Safety Center
SESSION 9A THURSDAY 8:10 AM – 9:50 AM
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Olson, Eric Session 9A
RBESCT PROGRAM PLAN / VISION
Presenter: Eric Olson, AFSC/SEW, 9700 Ave. G. SE, Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5670, Tel: (505) 846-5658, Fax: (505) 846-6027, E-mail: Eric.Olson@ kirtland.af.mil
Co-Authors: Dr. Jerry Ward, DOD Explosives Safety Board, Hoffman Building 1, Room 856C, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22331-0600, Tel: (703) 325-2525, Fax: (703) 325-6227,Email: Jerry.Ward@ddesb.osd.mil; Tom Pfitzer, APT Research, Inc., 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3388, Fax: (256) 837-7786, E-mail: tpfitzer@aptresearch.com; and Meredith Hardwick, APT Research, Inc., 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3380, Fax: (256) 837-7786, E-mail: mhardwick@apt-research.com In July 2002, the Risk Based Explosives Safety Criteria Team (RBESCT) developed and adopted a longer-term plan defining the goals for further development and use of risk-based approaches for use by the DoD. The RBESCT also developed a 6-year program plan to accomplish the goals. The plan contains a “landscape” which defines the applicable needs for risk-based calculations in terms of lifecycle phases, and proximity to explosives. This landscape serves to help focus the development of new algorithms and modeling protocols to be used in future models. This paper provides an overview of the strategic plan and the program plan developed by the RBESCT.
Hardwick, Meredith Session 9A
SAFETY ASSESSMENT FOR EXPLOSIVES RISK (SAFER) MODEL STATUS
Presenter: Meredith Hardwick, APT Research, Inc., 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-338, Fax: (256) 837-7786, E-mail: mhardwick@apt-research.com
Co-Authors: Tom Pfitzer, APT Research, Inc., 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3388, Fax: (256) 837-7786,E-mail: tpfitzer@apt-research.com, and Dr. Jerry Ward, DOD Explosives Safety Board, Hoffman Building 1, Room 856C, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22331-0600, Tel: (703) 325-2525, Fax: (703) 325-6227, E-mail: Jerry.Ward@ddesb.osd.mil In 1997 the Risk Based Explosives Safety Criteria Team (RBESCT) was formed as an initiative to define a plan of action for adopting risk-based criteria for explosives safety within the U.S. Department of Defense. That initiative has resulted in the development of the Safety Assessment for Explosives Risk (SAFER) model. In May 2000, the SAFER Version 1 was released. The SAFER model has been approved for trial use within the U.S. DoD through December 2004. This paper provides an overview of the current model, SAFER Version 2, and planned improvements for SAFER Version 3.
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CRITERIA SELECTION FOR RISK-BASED EXPLOSIVES SAFETY STANDARDS
Presenter: Tom Pfitzer, APT Research, Inc., 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3388, Fax: (256) 837-7786, E-mail: tpfitzer@apt-research.com
Pfitzer, Tom Session 9A
Co-Authors: Bill Pfitzer, APT Research, Inc., 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3395, Fax: (256) 837-7786, E-mail: bpfitzer@apt-research.com; Meredith Hardwick, APT Research, Inc., 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3380, Fax: (256) 8377786, E-mail: mhardwick@apt-research.com; and Dr. Jerry Ward, DOD Explosives Safety Board, Hoffman Building 1, Room 856C, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22331-0600, Tel: (703) 325-2525, Fax: (703) 325-6227, E-mail: Jerry.Ward@ddesb.osd.mil In 1999, the Risk-Based Explosives Safety Criteria Team (RBESCT) developed the Universal Risk Scales (URS) to assist in the job of selecting appropriate criteria for defining “How safe is safe enough”. The URS summarized research, precedents, and other standards that contain risk acceptance criteria. These data are plotted as points alongside a logarithmic scale quantifying risk. Also plotted are a number of actual risk statistics derived from accident data. The URS was foundational for the selection of the risk acceptance criteria currently used as part of the DDESB trial period when the SAFER model is used to perform risk-based explosives safety siting assessments. This paper provides an update to the previously published URS.
CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY ASSOCIATED WITH A HAZARD RISK MATRIX
Andrews, Sidney B.
Session 9A Presenter: Sidney B. Andrews, Jr.; Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity, Commander, Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity, (Attn: Code N311/Mr. S. Andrews) Farragut Hall (D323), 23 Strauss Avenue, Indian Head, MD 206405555, Tel: (301) 744-6083, Fax: (301) 744-6087, E-mail: andrewssb@navsea.navy.mil MIL STD 882 requires system developers to generate a Hazard Risk Matrix (HRM) which provides an indication of the degree of risk due to safety hazards that may lead to mishaps associated with the system. The HRM generally presents the risk remaining after all the risk mitigating techniques have been applied. This risk is called the residual risk. Mishap risk is an expression of the impact and possibility of a mishap in terms of potential mishap severity and probability of occurrence. The HRM is a 4 column by 5 row matrix. The columns are for severity of the consequences (impact): catastrophic, critical, marginal, and negligible. The rows are for the probability of the mishap occurring: frequent, probable, occasional, remote, and improbable. The interior of the table contains numbers representative of the risk associate with each of the 20 (4 X 5) combinations of degrees of severity and probabilities. Clearly, the risk associated with catastrophic-frequent presents the most risk, while negligible-improbable presents the least risk. The interior of the table has been blocked into 4 degrees of risk: high, serious, medium and low.
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DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.2 requires residual risks to be accepted at increasing levels of responsibility depending on the level of risk as shown in the HRM: the Program Manager accepts the low and medium risks; the Program Executive Officer (PEO) accepts the serious risks; and the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) accepts the high risks. While the requirements of DoDI 50002 make sense, the full story may be overlooked. A number of low and medium risks cumulatively may sum to a degree of risk that is equivalent to a serious risk and should be accepted by the PEO. In some cases the sum of the risks may be equivalent to a high risk which should be accepted by the CAE. This paper addresses a technique for assessing the cumulative totals of all the risks in an HRM so that a true picture of the total risk is known.
Mendler, James J. Session 9A
RISK ACCEPTANCE METHODOLOGY DEVELOPMENT FOR COMMERCIAL BUILDINGS
Author: James J. Mendler, ABS Consulting Incorporated, 15600 San Pedro, Suite 400, San Antonio TX 78232, Tel: (210) 495-5195, Fax: (210) 495-5134, E-mail: jmendler@absconsulting.com
Current methodologies for terrorist based risk assessments of commercial buildings are limited and under-developed for public use. This has limited analysis to high profile facilities due to the inherent costs associated with these studies. This paper seeks to define a cost effective method to determine acceptable risk for commercial/public buildings for non-chemical/non-biological terrorist threats, based on building type and function. The calculated risk will be based on a user defined threat and building function. Threats, assumed in this investigation will be based on high explosive events. The purpose of defining the building’s risk is to allow a user of this proposed method to correlate their associated risk value against established risk values for a defined building. The end product, is a methodology for developing a comparative bases that enables rapid screening of commercial/public buildings and assist users in defining buildings that would be candidates for potential mitigation actions. This methodology will be based on industry accepted risk analysis methods along with empirical information for typical building and threat types for a commercial application. The results will produce a scientific risk index based on empirical data that may disagree with the perceived risk due to misinformation or lack of understanding by the general public of American commercial property owners.
SESSION 9B THURSDAY 8:10 AM – 9:30 AM
UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. Hans Oiom, Norwegian Defense Logistics Agency
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GROUND SHOCK PREDICTION FOR UNDERGROUND AMMUNITION STORAGE SAFETY
Presenter: Yeow Teck Seah, Defence Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defence Technology Tower A, Singapore 109679, Republic of Singapore, Tel: +65 6373-3560, Fax: +65 273-5754, E-mail: syeowtec@dsta.gov.sg
Seah, Yeow Teck Session 9B
Co-Authors: Chee Hiong Lim Defence Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defence Technology Tower A, Singapore 109679, Republic of Singapore, Tel: +65 6373-3451, Fax: +65 273-5821, E-mail: lcheehio@dsta.gov.sg; Yew Hing Ong, Defence Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defence Technology Tower A, Singapore 109679, Republic of Singapore, Tel: +65 6373-3498, Fax: +65 273-5754, E-mail: oyewhing@dsta.gov.sg; Chong Chiang Seah, Defence Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defence Technology Tower A, Singapore 109679, Republic of Singapore, Tel: +65 6373-3571, Fax: +65 273-5754, E-mail: schongch@dsta.gov.sg; Yong Lu, Nanyang Technological University, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Block N1 #1b-42, Singapore 639798, Republic of Singapore, Tel: +65 6790-5272, Fax: +65 6791-0676, E-mail: cylu@ntu.edu.sg; and Chenqing Wu, University of Western Australia, School of Civil and Resource Engineering, Australia, Tel: +61-893808182, Fax: +61-8-93801018, E-mail: wu@civil.uwa.edu.au Current explosives safety criteria for ground shock due to accidental explosion in underground ammunition storage is defined only by Peak Particle Velocity (PPV). Depending on the frequency content of the ground motion, much higher levels of velocity could, in fact, be tolerated without incurring significant structural damage to the inhabited building. Frequency-based criteria for control of vibrations, however, require methods to predict both Peak Particle Velocity (PPV) and Principal Frequency (PF). The prediction of PPV using empirical formulae, usually derived from blast monitoring in quarry and mining operations and explosives tests, has been discussed in many publications, but little is mentioned about PF predictions. In a previous paper, an extensive parametric studies, taking into account the effects of site geology, chamber geometry, loading density and charge distribution, using validated numerical models, predictions for both PPV and PF of ground motions resulting from underground ammunition storage explosions were reported. In this paper, based on the previous studies, prediction equations for PPV and PV in different rock types (i.e. good, fair, poor) and single-and-mixed media were proposed.
PROPOSED Q-D FOR REINFORCED CONCRETE STRUCTURES SUBJECTED TO GROUND SHOCK
Presenter: Yeow Teck Seah, Defence Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defence Technology Tower A, Singapore 109679, Republic of Singapore, Tel: +65 6373-3560, Fax: +65 273-5754, E-mail: syeowtec@dsta.gov.sg
Seah, Yeow Teck Session 9B
Co-Authors: Chee Hiong Lim, Defence Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defence Technology Tower A, Singapore 109679, Republic of Singapore, Tel: +65 6373-3451, Fax: 83
+65 273-5821, E-mail: lcheehio@dsta.gov.sg; Yew Hing Ong, Defence Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defence Technology Tower A, Singapore 109679, Republic of Singapore, Tel: +65 6373-3498, Fax: +65 273-5754, E-mail: oyewhing@dsta.gov.sg; Yingxin Zhou, Defence Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defence Technology Tower A, Singapore 109679, Republic of Singapore, Tel: +65 6373-3570, Fax: +65 273-5754, E-mail: zyingxin@dsta.gov.sg; and Chong Chiang Seah, Defence Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defence Technology Tower A, Singapore 109679, Republic of Singapore, Tel: +65 6373-3571, Fax: +65 273-5754, E-mail: schongch@dsta.gov.sg In an underground ammunition storage facility, one of the critical safety issues is the distance in which buildings could be safely sited when there is ground shock resulting from an underground accidental explosion. In most current codes of practice, Quantity-Distances (Q-D) for structures subjected to ground shock tends to be generally conservative. In a country such as Singapore where land is scarce and expensive, there is a need to re-assess and define a Q-D that is both accurate and representative so as to fully utilise the usage of land. In this paper, a Q-D was derived based on a recent research on ground shock prediction method and building damage criterion. The ground shock prediction method is adopted as it addresses deficiencies in past empirical formulae such as the prediction of Principal Frequency (PF), the effects of geology and chamber geometry. The building damage criterion was adopted as it addresses the effects of PF, which is critical in the assessment of building damage. With these, a more rational Q-D can then be proposed.
Seah, Yeow Teck Session 9B
ROCK COVER STUDY FOR AMMUNITION STORAGE
Presenter: Yeow Teck Seah, Defence Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defence Technology Tower A, Singapore 109679, Republic of Singapore, Tel: +65 6373-3560, Fax: +65 273-5754, E-mail: syeowtec@dsta.gov.sg
Co-Authors: Chee Hiong Lim, Defence Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defence Technology Tower A, Singapore 109679, Republic of Singapore, Tel: +65 6373-3451, Fax: +65 273-5821, E-mail: lcheehio@dsta.gov.sg; Yew Hing Ong, Defence Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defence Technology Tower A, Singapore 109679, Republic of Singapore, Tel: +65 6373-3498, Fax: +65 273-5754, E-mail: oyewhing@dsta.gov.sg; Yingxin Zhou, Defence Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defence Technology Tower A, Singapore 109679, Republic of Singapore, Tel: +65 6373-3570, Fax: +65 273-5754, E-mail: zyingxin@dsta.gov.sg; and Chong Chiang Seah, Defence Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defence Technology Tower A, Singapore 109679, Republic of Singapore, Tel: +65 6373-3571, Fax: +65 273-5754, E-mail: schongch@dsta.gov.sg For an ammunition storage facility, one of the most critical safety criteria is in ensuring sufficient rock cover such that blast leakages, spalling, breaking up and cratering of the ground would not occur. A review on design codes and manuals revealed that the recommendations on rock cover vary for different countries. In addition, it is not always given in the codes and manuals how the criteria were derived nor the rationale behind them. In a previous paper, a 2-D model was proposed to account for the different parameters such as rock properties and loading density that could affect the required depth of rock cover. In this paper, a 3-D model was proposed to refine the previous study. 84
Parametric studies were conducted on a single rock media model and a soil-rock media model. An improved equation with relation to the depth of rock cover required will be proposed.
RESPONSE OF RC FRAMES TO EXPLOSION-INDUCED GROUND MOTIONS
Presenter: Tso-Chien Pan, Protective Technology Research Centre, c/o School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Nanyang Ave, Singapore 639798, E-mail: cpan@ntu.edu.sg
Pan, Tso-Chien Session 9B
Co-Author: Chee Leong Lim, Protective Technology Research Centre, c/o School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Nanyang Ave, Singapore 639798 Within a multitude of potential hazards, explosion-induced ground motions (EIGMs) can possibly be one of the most devastating to a given structure. Thus, to better understand the dynamic response phenomena, detailed consideration should be placed on the response characteristics as well as the possible failure mechanisms that can be expected of a reinforced concrete (RC) frame subjected to EIGMs. Here, a framework integrating the current understanding and efforts by other researchers leading to an engineering-based methodology is described. As EIGMs are ground accelerations with an extremely high amplitude that occurs within fractions of a second, small structural deformations during the forced-vibration period (Phase I) are expected. Such small structural deformations result in a possible elastic response within Phase I. However, the significantly large accelerations during Phase I may produce large member forces, while the member strength capacities would increase in association with the increased material strain rates. Within an engineering framework of determining possible member failure mechanisms, member forces determined should be compared with the strainrate-based member strength capacities. Currently, empirical methods to predict member shear strength capacity have been developed for air-blast loads on columns. Furthermore, the highfrequency composition of EIGMs would produce significant local-mode responses. However, the finite element method encompasses two possibilities of modeling a beam-column element, which are namely the Euler-Bernoulli beam and the Timoshenko beam. Within the domain of structural response to an EIGM load, the choice of using the finite element method and its validity require investigation. It has been demonstrated that the use of Timoshenko beam produces an upper limit to the wave propagation speed while the choice of Euler-Bernoulli beam does not. Thus, this paper demonstrates the combined effects of incorporating the strain-rate effect and the choice of beamcolumn element model on the dynamic response of RC frames to EIGM loading.
HAZARD CLASSIFICATION – SHOCK/IMPACT SENSITIVITY II
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. Lon D. Santis, Institute of Makers of Explosives
SESSION 9C THURSDAY 8:10 AM – 9:50 AM
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Wallace, I. G. Session 9C
LOW VELOCITY IMPACT OF EXPLOSIVES
Presenter: Prof. I. G. Wallace, Head Of Department Of Environmental & Ordnance Systems, Cranfield University/RMCS, Shrivenham Campus, Swindon, Wiltshire SN6 8LA UK, Tel: +44 (0)1793 785681, Fax: +44 (0)1793 785772, E-Mail: i.g.wallace@cranfield.ac.uk
Co-Authors: Dr. P. Barnes, DOSGST6, Defence Ordnance Safety Group, Ash 2B #3212, Walnut 2c#67, MoD Abbey Wood, Bristol, BS34 8JH, UK, Tel: +44 (0)117 9135647, Fax: (+44 (0)117 9135903, E-mail: DOSGST6@dpa.mod.uk; Professor N. K. Bourne, Head of Dynamic Response Group, Department of Environmental & Ordnance Systems, Cranfield University/RMCS, Shrivenham Campus, Swindon, Wiltshire SN6 8LA UK, Tel: +44 (0)1793 784154, Fax: +44 (0)1793 784195, Email: N.K.Bourne@cranfield.ac.uk; and Professor A. Milne, Fluid Gravity Eng Ltd, 83 Market Street, St Andrews, Fife, Scotland KY16 9NX UK, Tel: +44 (0)1334 460 808, Fax: +44 (0)1334 460813, E-mail: alec@fges.demon.co.uk Low velocity impact and penetration of explosives ordnance is a continuing cause of explosives accidents. Existing safety assessment methodologies do not routinely involve an assessment of the susceptibility of munitions to this threat. A number of laboratories have developed laboratory scale tests that examine low velocity impacts. This paper describes the Extremely Low Velocity Impact System (ELVIS) facility built at Cranfield University, Royal Military College of Science, to explore the phenomena of impact and penetration of explosives. It presents the results of preliminary tests using a number of explosives and projectiles. The paper also describes the use of the facility to validate mathematical models used to simulate low velocity impact.
Held, Manfred Session 9C
DISCUSSION TO FRAGMENT TESTS AFTER MIL 2105 B
Author: Prof. Dr. Manfred Held, TDW, 86523 Schrobenhausen, Germany, Tel: 49-8252-996-345, Fax: 49-8252-996-126, E-mail: manfred.held@tdw.lfk.eads.net
Two points are very questionable to the fragment test No. 5.2.4 at MIL 2105 B. One is the fragment weight of 16 g with the velocity of 2.400 m/s. If the map of fragment hazards are considered this combination does not really exist. To launch few fragments with this weight originally a high explosive charge of 80 kg Comp B was necessary. This was reduced to 10,6 kg Octol and a five point simultaneous initiation. Second point is the shape of a cubical fragment. Dickinson and Wilson <1> calculated, that with a flat hit of the cubical fragment the initiation velocity is around 1.000 m/s, with a edge hit 1.800 m/s and with a corner hit around 2.300 m/s. For reproducible test conditions such a range reaction possibilities seems to be unacceptable. Further the wanted hit positions cannot be easily aimed with these charges.
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The author is recommending to use small EFP charges, which can be designed for the desired velocity and with a hemispherical front contour which have only deviations of +/- 1 cm from the aiming point. One needs only a 80 g Comp B charge. It can be easily fired 5 such charges to get 5 controlled precise hits on the wanted aiming points on the testing device.
DISCUSSIONS TO SHAPED CHARGE JET TESTS AFTER MIL STD 2025 B
Author: Prof. Dr. Manfred Held, TDW, 86523 Schrobenhausen, Germany, Tel: 49-8252-996-345, Fax: 49-8252-996-126, E-mail: manfred.held@tdw.lfk.eads.net
Held, Manfred Session 9C
In contrast to the fragment impact test the shaped charge jet impact test No. 5.2.6 is very conservative. The detailed description for the shaped charges, which should be used, is already modified from the first edition of the MIL STD 2105 B. The 50 mm Rockeye warhead, fired at 147 mm standoff, is not internationally to everybody available and represents not the real threat by modern shaped charge systems. On one hand it exist a very large number of shoulder launched projectiles with about 300 mm to 400 mm perforation capabilities. But the missile warheads have mostly 100 mm to 150 mm diameters with perforation potentials of 800 mm to 1.200 mm and jet tip velocities over 9 mm/µs. After the perforation of 100 mm RHA or less the residual jet tip velocities are over 8 mm/µs with large jet diameters. Further missile WH are nearly 100 % using now tandem shaped charges, where the jet of the precursor charge can sensitize propellant and high explosive charges, where the later arriving main jets can start now violent reactions. The initiation criteria for shaped charge jets as function of jet velocities, diameter, material, acceptor charge configurations, covered or not, unconfined and confined etc. will be shortly described. Finally it will be tried to give recommodations for different levels of shaped charge threats.
AIM 120 WARHEAD SYMPATHETIC DETONATION CHARACTERIZATION
Presenter: Jerome Lattery, Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center (EMRTC), 1001 South Road, Socorro, NM 87801, Tel: (505) 8355857, Fax: (505) 835-5630, E-mail: jlattery@emrtc.nmt.edu
Lattery, Jerome Session 9C
Co-Authors: Dr. Robert Abernathy, EMRTC, 1001 South Road, Socorro, NM 87801, Tel: (505) 8355728, Fax: (505) 835-563, E-mail: robert@emrtc.nmt.edu, and Richard Overley, EMRTC, 1001 South Road, Socorro, NM 87801, Tel: (505) 835-5020, E-mail: roverley@emrtc.nmt.edu An important aspect of ordnance safety is the estimation of clearance distances necessary for protection of neighboring warheads from sympathetic detonation. With the versatility of the AIM 120 air-to-air missile, many different types of aircrafts can be used and many different attachment configurations are available. Although testing of specific configurations can be very useful, it is 87
more practical to develop a general model of warhead behavior. Such a model could then be used to predict the behavior of a large number of different deployments. The project is sponsored by the Air Force Safety Center. This study combined testing and numerical modeling. Testing involved first creating an inert standin (mock) for the PBX-110 explosive used in the AIM 120 warhead. This allowed for direct embedding of PVDF gauges in test specimens for measurement of pressures generated within the body of explosive by fragment or flyer impact. The measured pressures were compared to calculated unreacted explosive behavior. The derived equation of state for the mock was then compared with that of real PBX-110 derived in the past. The study also included testing of live AIM 120 warheads. In one test the fragmentation pattern was studied with the use of witness panels placed in an arena test around a warhead. On the same test case expansion velocity was inferred by framing camera photography. Two additional tests were performed to determine the reaction of a live warhead to single fragment impact. In these tests a fragment of the same mass as a AIM-120 fragment was fired against the warhead. In both cases the fragment ignited the warhead, but no detonation occurred.
Schwartz, Daniel F. Session 9C
SMALL INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE (SICBM) ROCKET MOTOR SYMPATHETIC DETONATION STUDY
Presenter: Daniel F. Schwartz, Air Force Research Laboratory Propulsion Directorate, 106 N. Mercury Blvd. Edwards AFB, CA 935247380, Tel: (661) 275-5135, Fax: (661) 275-5068, E-mail: daniel.schwartz@edwards.af.mi Co-Author: Dr. Claude E. Merrill, Air Force Research Laboratory Propulsion Directorate, 10 E. Saturn Blvd. Edwards AFB, CA 93524-7680, Tel: (661) 275-5169, Fax: (661) 275-5435. E-mail: claude.merrill@edwards.af.mil The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Propulsion Directorate at Edwards Air Force Base California utilized two surplus Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (SICBM) rocket motors in a sympathetic detonation test with a spacing of 15 feet (4.6 meters) between them (typical max spacing in storage bunkers and transport trailers) to gain technical value from assets deemed undesirable for test firing. The Stage 1 SICBM motor containing 19,200 lbs (8709 kg) of detonable Hazard Division (HD) 1.1 propellant was used as the donor motor and the Stage 3 SICBM motor containing 3040 lbs (1379 kg) of the same propellant formulation was used as the acceptor motor in the test. It was assumed that the propellant and rocket motor community would be interested in observing how large the differential can be between detonation by shock-to-detonation transition (SDT) initiation values and by lesser shocks that might occur with operational scenarios of nearby detonation shocks or flight fallbacks. In addition, observation of fragment throw/impact data from modern, carbon composite, case rocket motors could help determine fragment hazards from such events. Such data might provide the modeling and simulation community information that could be coupled to rocket motor hazard codes for predicting rocket motor responses to shock and fragment stimuli. This paper
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outlines the sympathetic detonation test conducted at AFRL, to observe interactions between a detonating Stage 1 Small ICBM rocket motor and a nearby Stage 3 Small ICBM rocket motor.
FORCE PROTECTION/ANTI TERRORISM I
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. Curt P. Betts, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Protective Devices
SESSION 10A THURSDAY 10:20 AM – NOON
Helim, A. O. Abd El Session 10A
FALL OUT FROM SEPTEMBER 11th - A GLIMPSE FROM A PASSENGER SURVEY (BEFORE AND AFTER) AT CANADIAN AIRPORTS
Presenter: A. O. Abd El Halim, Department Of Civil And Environmental Engineering, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1S 5B6, Tel: (613): 520-2600 Ext 5789, Fax: (613)-520-3951 E-mail: ahalim @ccs.carleton.ca Co-Authors: M. M. Elshafei, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1S 5B6, and E. Contestabile, Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory, 555 Booth St. Ottawa Ontario, Canada, K1A 0G1, Tel: (613) 995-1363, Fax: (613) 995-1230, E-mail: econtest@nrcan.gc.ca The events of September 11th 2001 had a serious impact on the political, economic, and social aspects of world affairs. One of the main victims of these events was the demand for air travel. The immediate result was a significant drop in the number of passengers and flights. This incident greatly affected any tranquility that passengers may have previously felt at busy airports. A study at Carleton University, based on an earlier survey of passengers regarding various parameters that reflected their perceived Level of Service at different Canadian airports, serves as a backdrop to the findings of a survey after the September 11th 2001 events. Although the changes in the perceived Level of Service could have been guessed as having changed, it actually shifted. For example, new security checks assured travelers of their personal safety while the more stringent security rules assured passengers that their luggage would be on their flight and waiting for them on arrival. In other words, the perceived Level of Service did not always drop in the various parameters investigated. The paper presents the results using an Artificial Neural Network approach on Canadian airports classified according to their passenger volume and on the two surveys, before and after September 11th. The authors conclude that the results of this study can provide a useful tool for airport authorities to gauge the level of service as perceived by the passengers and that the model can be used to forecast changes and enhance perception, especially at times of high alert. The authors also allude to possible solutions, ensuing from the survey that can be used to alleviate passenger apprehension in a moment of crisis. 89
Young, Lee Ann Session 10A
DEVELOPMENT OF INJURY ESTIMATION DATA FOR THE USAF FORCE PROTECTION BATTLELAB
Presenter: Lee Ann Young, Applied Research Associates, Inc, 1848 Lockhill-Selma Rd., Suite 102, San Antonio, TX 78213-1569, Tel: (210) 344-7644, Fax: (210) 344-7456, E-mail: lyoung@ara.com
Co-Author: Lynn Robert Moriarty, Captain U.S. Air Force, USAF Force Protection Battlelab, 1517 Billy Mitchell Blvd, Bldg 954, Lackland AFB, TX 78236-0119, Tel: (210) 925-5028 E-mail: lynn.moriarty@lackland.af.mil Over the last few years the USAF Force Protection Battlelab has written and published the Vehicle Bomb Mitigation Guide (VBMG), a document designed to present force protection personnel with ready reference material associated with planning and executing programs and operations for protecting Air Force personnel and assets against the threat of vehicle bombs. The VBMG contains a large number of standoff charts that a user can employ to determine the minimum safe standoff distance to provide protection from a blast weapon. Although these standoff charts represent the latest recommendations for safe standoff distances, they are based not upon the risk of injuries to personnel exposed to the posed vehicle bomb threats, but upon the extent of structural damage that may be caused to buildings in the vicinity of a detonation. The objective of this effort was to develop analogous safe standoff charts that are injury-based and applicable to the scenario in which personnel are inside and outside buildings at various standoff distances from detonations of a variety of sizes of vehicle bombs. To meet this objective, a stand-alone version of the Blast Analysis Module (BAM), Injury-Based Glazing Range-to-Effect curves, Bowen’s curves and structural damage data were employed to predict ranges at which injuries would be likely to occur to personnel housed in expeditionary and above-ground permanent structures. The injury mechanisms of interest were blast lung (primary blast injuries), ear damage, window debris penetration, and blunt trauma from structural debris and building collapse. The injury ranges were reported in a form readily accessible to physical security specialists concerned with determining minimum safe standoff distances for vehicle bombs ranging in size from 50 to 25,000 pounds.
Lawson, Christy Session 10A
SECURITY ENGINEERING WORKING GROUP AFTP INFORMATION / TECHNOLOGY WEBSITE
Presenter: Christy Lawson, Applied Research Associates Incorporated, 1848 Lockhill-Selma Rd., Suite 102, San Antonio, TX 78213, Tel: (210) 344-7644, Fax: (210) 344-7456, E-mail: clawson@ara.com
Co-Authors: Bernie Deneke, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 6506 Hampton Blvd, Norfolk, VA 23508, Tel: (757) 322-4233, E-mail: denekebj@nfesc.navy.mil; Captain Rob Moriarty, U.S. Air Force, Force Protection Battlelab, 1517 Billy Mitchell Blvd, Bldg 954, Lackland AFB, TX 782360119, Tel: (210) 925-5028, E-mail: lynn.moriarty@lackland.af.mil; and Wade Martin, U.S. Cost, 600 90
Northpark Town Center, Suite 950, 1200 Abernathy Road, N.E. Atlanta, GA 30328, Tel: (770) 4811607, E-mail: wmartin@uscost.com In the past, reliable anti-terrorism (AT) and force protection (FP) information resources for use by the Department of Defense (DoD) have been scattered and sometimes difficult to obtain. Under joint funding from the Air Force’s – Force Protection Battlelab (AF FPB) and the Naval Facilities Engineer Command's – Engineering Innovation and Criteria Office (NAVFAC EICO), and with support from the Security Engineering Working Group (SEWG), U.S. Cost and Applied Research Associates (ARA) have developed a centralized web portal for AT information related to planning, design, and construction for security and protection of DoD facilities. Four main topics will be covered in the website: 1) Process and Procedures will cover a variety of planning and engineering design criteria, as well as operational procedures related to security and consequence management. 2) Facilities will provide AT force protection information regarding perimeter security, permanent buildings, expeditionary and temporary structures, and other DoD facilities. 3) Threats and Aggressor Tactics will describe many threats including external blast (vehicle or placed), internal detonation, and indirect and direct weapons fire and how to design facilities to protect against them. 4) Technologies will provide AT information regarding access control, vehicle counter mobility, and structural hardening for windows and doors. Information pertaining to a particular topic will be cross-linked across the other topic areas. The information provided will be based on criteria and guidance from experts, searchable databases, design support tools, worked examples of key problems, and computer based training videos. The target audience for the website is DoD and other government personnel, especially security force personnel, as well as the military architect and engineering communities. The Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) is hosting the ATFP Information/Technology Website, which is expected to “go live” for public viewing in late 2004.
OVERVIEW OF A FOUR YEAR PROGRAM BEING CONDUCTED BY DRDC SUFFIELD: “FORCE PROTECTION AGAINST ENHANCED BLAST”
Anderson, John Session 10A
Presenter: John Anderson, DRDC Suffield, PO Box 4000, Stn. Main, Medicine Hat, Alberta Canada T1A 8K6, Tel: (403) 544-4570, Fax: (403) 544-4704, E-mail: John.Anderson@drdc-rddc.gc.ca Co-Authors: Kevin Scherbatiuk, Stephen Murray, PO Box 4000, Stn. Main, Medicine Hat, Alberta, Canada T1A 8K6, Tel: (403) 544-5022 (Scherbatiuk), (403) 544-4729 (Murray), Fax: (403) 5444704, E-mail: Kevin.Scherbatiuk@drdc-rddc.gc.ca, Stephen.Murray@drdc-rddc.gc.ca Blast loading of protective structures, with consequent blast ingress and personnel vulnerability (PV), is of increasing priority due to the expanding role of the Canadian Forces in military operations in urban terrain and operations out-of-area. The growing threat of blast weapons, including terrorist-
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style bombing attacks targeting both military and civilian personnel, has resulted in a multi-faceted program at DRDC Suffield for blast-threat assessment of military field fortifications including: • Implementation of full-scale blast field-trials against typical military field fortifications to establish a measurements database for blast diffraction loading of the structures, structural damage, blast ingress, and an assessment of personnel vulnerability and incapacitation; Validation of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) software codes with the capacity to model blast sources such as thermobaric explosives and fuel-air explosives (FAE) with subsequent blast diffraction loading over and into structures; validation of computational structural mechanics codes/fast-running models to model structural response; Assessment of experimental issues from currently available diagnostics for personnel vulnerability to blast and their related algorithms for injury assessment;
•
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An overview of the Program will be described including the first set of three field-trial operations evaluating blast effects against bunkers and fortified observation positions, some of which include PV diagnostics. Selected experimental results for external and internal blast loading, for the case of a FAE attack, will be compared to the results from CFD modeling showing good agreement. In addition to direct blast effects, high-speed imagery shows that dust lofting may be a significant problem with regard to obscuration, eye-damage, and breathing within field fortifications. Outlines for subsequent trials will be presented, including an ISO-container based donor/acceptor trial simulating a munitions storage facility constructed by the Canadian Forces at Camp Julien (Afghanistan).
Stevens, David and Moriarty, Rob Session 10A
COUNTER-MOBILITY EVALUATION OF VEHICLE BARRIERS FOR DOD USE
Co-Presenters: David Stevens, Applied Research Associates, 1848 Lockhill-Selma Road, Suite 102, San Antonio, TX 78213, Tel: (210) 3447644, Fax: (210) 344-7456, E-mail: dstevens@ara.com, and Capt. Rob Moriarty, USAF Force Protection Battlelab, 1517 Billy Mitchell Blvd, Bldg 954, Lackland AFB, TX 78236, Tel: (210) 925-5028, Fax: (210) 925-5415, E-mail: lynn.moriarty@lackland.af.mil Co-Author: Aldo McKay, Applied Research Associates, 1848 Lockhill-Selma Road, Suite 102, San Antonio, TX 78213,Tel: (210) 344-7644, Fax: (210) 344-7456, E-mail: amckay@ara.com The goal of this effort was to evaluate the ability of novel barriers and gates to provide countermobility protection against deliberate vehicle attack. Currently, reinforced concrete barriers are used for counter-mobility and protection purposes at entry control points and at other critical base facilities. These barriers are typically not anchored to the pavement and rely on the mass and frictional resistance of adjacent barriers to defeat vehicle penetration. Recent terrorist attacks have shown that the detonation of large vehicle bombs in the vicinity of these barrier systems can create large, fast-moving debris that are hazardous to humans. 92
New types of barriers have been developed and have been proven to produce a considerably smaller debris threat. However, before these low-debris barriers could be recommended for field use, their ability to defeat deliberate vehicle impact must be validated. In an effort to assess the counter-mobility capabilities of these low-debris barriers and to provide a baseline for current barriers, Applied Research & Associates performed six crash tests. The tests consisted of a 15,000-lb truck impacting the center of the line of barriers at 30 mph. The depth of penetration of the truck was recorded and used to evaluate the overall performance of each barrier type. The barrier configurations evaluated were: regular reinforced concrete Jersey barriers not anchored to the pavement; sand-filled plastic barriers joined with three 12-strand ropes and not anchored to the pavement; two configurations of lightweight concrete, polymer-coated Jersey barrier shapes anchored to the pavement; and, Hesco Concertainer Bastions, in a configuration defined by the Department of State. The sixth test was performed using a novel gate system suitable for used at entry control points of government facilities. The results from these tests are presented and discussed in the paper.
STRUCTURES – DEBRIS STUDIES
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. Pascal Marchandin, NATO Insensitive Munitions Information Center
SESSION 10B THURSDAY 10:20 AM – NOON
STATUS OF TESTING PROGRAM TO BENEFIT EXPLOSIVES SAFETY STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Presenter: John W. Tatom, APT Research, Inc, 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3392, Fax: (256) 837-7786, E-mail: JTatom@APTResearch.com
Tatom, John W. Session 10B
Co-Authors: Michael M. Swisdak, Jr., Indian Head Division/Naval Surface Warfare Center, Code 440E, 101 Strauss Avenue, Indian Head, MD 20640-5035, Tel: (301) 744-4404, Fax: (301) 7446406, E-mail: swisdakMM@ih.navy.mil, and James E. Tancreto, Naval Facilities Engineering Services Center, ESC62, 1100 23rd Avenue, Bldg 1100, Port Hueneme, CA 93043-4370, Tel: (805) 982-1382, Fax: (805) 982-3481, Email: James.Tancreto@navy.mil In 2002, testing was proposed to generate needed data to assist in developing improved explosives safety standards within the U.S. Department of Defense. This testing emphasizes two major areas: (1) full-scale donor/acceptor trials examining debris generation and acceptor response and (2) debris penetration testing of representative roof/wall materials. The full scale donor/acceptor trials are referred to as the SciPan series. SciPan 1 and 2 have been completed and are the subject of another paper at this seminar. The first phase of the SPIDER program has also been completed and is also being reported separately at this seminar. This paper describes the status and future of this testing
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program, reasons for choosing specific tests, potential benefits, and planning for future phases of both the SciPan and SPIDER programs.
Swisdak, Michael M. Session 10B
SCIPAN 1 and SCIPAN 2—RESPONSE OF REINFORCED CONCRETE TILTUP CONSTRUCTION TO BLAST LOADING
Author: Michael M. Swisdak, Jr., Indian Head Division/Naval Surface Warfare Center, Code 440E, 101 Strauss Avenue, Indian Head, MD 20640-5035, Tel: (301) 7444404, Fax: (301) 744-6406, E-mail: swisdakMM@ih.navy.mil Co-Authors: James E. Tancreto, Naval Facilities Engineering Services Center, ESC62, 1100 23rd Avenue, Bldg 1100, Port Hueneme, CA 93043-4370, Tel: (805) 982-1382, Fax: (805) 982-3481, Email: James.Tancreto@navy.mil, and John W. Tatom, APT Research, Inc, 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3392, Fax: (256) 837-7786, E-mail: JTatom@APTResearch.com This report presents the results of the first phase of a planned multi-year testing program designed to provide data in explosive effects areas where data are lacking or absent entirely. Specifically, the first test of this phase, called SciPan 1, had two objectives: (1) Determine the debris characteristics from a typical operating building PES and (2) Determine the response of tilt-up, reinforced concrete ES to the overpressure loads produced by the detonation of 27,000 pounds at 750 ft. The second test of this phase, SciPan 2, exposed the ES to the higher blast loads produced by the detonation of a 5,000-lb hemispherical surface burst at 240 ft. This paper describes the test set-ups, including the designs of the PES and ES and then summarizes the results from both the debris characterization effort of SciPan 1 and the response of the ES.
Swisdak, Michael M. Session 10B
DEBRIS-BASED INHABITED BUILDING DISTANCES FOR ABOVEGROUND STRUCTURES
Author: Michael M. Swisdak, Jr., Naval Surface Warfare Center Indian Head Division, Code 440E, 101 Strauss Avenue, Indian Head, MD 206405035, Tel: (301) 744-4404, Fax: (301) 744-6406, E-mail: swisdakMM@ih.navy.mil Currently, inhabited building distances (IBD) based on either primary fragments or structural debris are not adequately addressed in explosives safety standards. Ongoing work in both the United Kingdom and the United States has begun to address this problem. Available trials data have been reanalyzed in a consistent manner to obtain debris-based inhabited building distances. Based on this analysis, more precise debris inhabited building distances can now be predicted for typical aboveground structures. This paper describes the data used in this study and then presents the IBD relationships that have been derived. Those relationships are also compared with the current quantitydistance criteria to indicate those areas where the current standards may not be adequate.
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BREAK-UP OF AMMUNITION MAGAZINES AND THE DEBRIS INHABITED BUILDING DISTANCE
Weerheijm, J.
Session 10B Presenter: Dr. Ir. J. Weerheijm, TNO-PML, Lange Kleiweg 137, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 284 33 90, Fax: +31 15 284 3958, E-mail: weerheym@pml.tno.nl, and Delft University of Technology, Faculty of Civil Engineering and Geosciences, P.O.Box 5048, 2600 GA Delft, The Netherlands Co-Authors: Ir. M. M. van der Voort, TNO-PML, Lange Kleiweg 137, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 284 34 62, Fax: +31 15 284 39 58, E-mail: voort@pml.tno.nl, and Ir. C. Wentzel, TNO-PML, Lange Kleiweg 137, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 284 36 95, Fax: +31 15 284 39 58, E-mail: wentzel@pml.tno.nl Swisdak observed that there are two regimes for the scaled Inhabited Building Distance. The distance as a function of the loading density exhibits two plateaus with a steep drop at the loading density of 15 kg/m3. This critical value corresponds with the threshold of the “composite shock overloading regime” defined by the Klotz Group. What can be learned from these observations? To answer this question, TNO-PML combined the ongoing KG-research on break-up, debris throw with the data presentation of Swisdak. The results are presented in the paper. The main parameters governing the debris throw distance are the debris mass distribution, the initial velocity, the launch angle and the drag properties. With the help of a debris throw model developed at TNO, dealing with all these parameters and the Klotz Group result for the launch velocity (DLV), it has been examined which mass class dominates the debris IBD for the various loading densities. Furthermore the acceleration phase of the debris throw has been investigated numerically. This resulted in knowledge about systematic and stochastic deviations from the DLV launch velocity. Also information was obtained concerning the distribution of debris over launch angles. The analysis clearly demonstrates that a prediction of the debris throw is only possible when the break-up and the resulting mass distribution can be quantified. The paper describes the debris throw model, the analysis and the results related to the “two plateau” observation of Swisdak.
SPIDER—A TEST PROGRAM TO DETERMINE THE RESPONSE OF TYPICAL WALL AND ROOF PANELS TO DEBRIS IMPACT
Tancreto, James E. Session 10B
Presenter: James E. Tancreto, Naval Facilities Engineering Services Center, ESC62, 1100 23rd Avenue, Bldg 1100, Port Hueneme, CA 93043-4370, Tel: (805) 982-1382, Fax: (805) 982-3481, E-mail: James.Tancreto@navy.mil Co-Authors: John W. Tatom, APT Research, Inc, 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL, 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3392, Fax: (256) 837-7786, E-mail: JTatom@APT-Research.com, and Michael M. Swisdak, Jr., Indian Head Division/Naval Surface Warfare Center, Code 440E, 101 Strauss Avenue, 95
Indian Head, MD 20640-5035, Tel: (301) 744-4404, Fax: (301) 744-6406, E-mail: swisdakMM@ih.navy.mil This paper describes a test program (the Science Panel Impact Debris Evaluation and Review (SPIDER) Program) designed to obtain data for developing improved hazard predictions inside an exposed site (ES) from impact and penetration by fragments and debris. Data will include the kinetic energy required for penetration and the characteristics of secondary fragments produced inside the ES. The first phase of this effort, SPIDER 1 is currently underway. This paper describes testing details, including description of the roof targets and the steel and concrete impactors. Preliminary results will also be compared with pre-test predictions.
SESSION 10C THURSDAY 10:20 AM – NOON
FIELD STORAGE I
SESSION MODERATOR: LTC. Paul-Ernst Ludwig, German Joint Support Command
Vretblad, Bengt E. Session 10C
OPERATIONAL AMMUNITION SAFETY
Author: Bengt E. Vretblad, National Defence College, PO Box 27805 Stockholm, Sweden, Tel: +46 70 748 89 56, Fax: +46 70 711 89 56, Email: bengt.vretblad@fhs.mil.se
Ammunition safety related to International missions and operations is a concern for many countries within NATO/PfP. The NATO Ammunition Safety Group, AC/326, has to this end set up a Subgroup for Operational Ammunition Safety. During operations, safety methods based upon Quantity Distance concepts can often not be applied. Instead, risks associated with the operations must be dealt with explicitly. The Operational Ammunition Safety Subgroup is developing a manual to be used for operations addressing the needs of the Operation Commander. Earlier work within NATO on risk based methods has resulted in the Allied Ammunition Storage and Transport Publication, AASTP-4 Part I, for use in development and applying risk based methods to explosives and AASTP-4 Part II for calculating risk and for risk assessment. The models in AASTP-4 cover Frequency Methodology, Explosion Effects and Consequences, Exposure and Assessment. Most of the models have been used in and are approved by different countries. The effects given include blast, debris, thermal and ground shock. These are used in consequence models to calculate lethality.
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The consequences are both from direct effects such as blast and fragments on personnel and indirect effects from blast and debris hitting glass panes and causing structural damage to buildings and vehicles and lethality from these effects. An international team of explosive safety experts from Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden and U.S. has been working to improve the NATO Risk Analysis methods for ammunition safety. To validate the models scenarios have been identified and used for risk calculations with the different models. The comparisons illustrate the differences between the models and how and when these can influence on calculated risks. The comparisons have led to further studies and to improvements of the models. Important areas for improvements are the probability of event and damage criteria. These effects in particular were addressed at a specialist meeting in April 2004. Conclusions and results from this specialist meeting are presented in the paper.
THE PARTICIPATION OF THE NETHERLANDS IN THE UK/AUS DEFENSE TRIAL 840. A GENERAL OVERVIEW
Presenter: Philip van Dongen, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843396, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: dongen@pml.tno.nl
van Dongen, Philip Session 10C
Co-Authors: Rolf M. M. van Wees, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843391, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: wees@pml.tno.nl; M. P. Marnix Rhijnsburger, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843822, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: rhijnsburger@pml.tno.nl; Reinoud M. van de Kasteele, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel:+31 15 2843389, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: kasteele@pml.tno.nl; Dr. Richard H. B. Bouma, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843685, Fax: +31 15 2843958, E-mail: bouma@pml.tno.nl; and Dr. H. J. Verbeek, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843483, Fax: +31 15 2843958, E-mail: verbeek@pml.tno.nl Military personnel are exposed to a wide range of threats during peace-keeping or peace-enforcing missions. Surprisingly, the largest single threat comes from their own bulk stored ammunition and explosives. Because of space constraints, the ammo is often stored inside the camp, close to the living quarters. Moreover, it may be exposed to enemy fire and bomb attacks. Survivability can be ensured by the prevention of sympathetic detonation between storage units (e.g. containers), which limits the explosion to a single unit and by reducing the explosion effects on personnel, by the interception of high-speed fragments and debris and positioning the different field structures in the camp far enough from the ammo storage.
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TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory has worked out the details of this approach in a two-year programme sponsored by the Netherlands Ministry of Defence. Analytical, numerical and experimental methods were combined to find practical solutions. The paper gives a general overview on how the Netherlands MOD and TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory used the 5 tonne explosion in the UK/Australian Defence Trial 840 to validate minimum Quantity-Distances to prevent for sympathetic detonations and to protect personnel and material. This paper introduces two corresponding papers on this research programme on Field Storage: - Study of barricades to prevent sympathetic detonation in field storage; - Study on Quantity-Distances to protect personnel and material.
Rhijnsburger, Marnix Session 10C
THE PARTICIPATION OF THE NETHERLANDS IN THE UK/AUS DEFENSE TRIAL 840. STUDY ON QUANTITYDISTANCES TO PROTECT PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL
Presenter: Marnix Rhijnsburger, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843822, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: rhijnsburger@pml.tno.nl Co-Authors: Jolanda van Deursen, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843463, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: eursen@pml.tno.nl; Reinoud van de Kasteele, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843389, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: kasteele@pml.tno.nl; and Philip van Dongen, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843396, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: dongen@pml.tno.nl This paper describes how the Dutch MOD and TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory performed the 5 tonne explosion in the UK/Australian Defence Trial 840 and tested various typical compound structures on their ability to give protection to personnel during detonation of a single ammunition storage module in a field storage situation. The largest single hazard to soldiers in out-of-area operations does not come from the enemy, but from their own ammunition storage. Driven by operational demands and the limited space inside a compound, the distance between the ammunition storage and personnel is usually less than for comparable situations at home. Safety of personnel and material can be improved by creating stand-off and/or shielding. Quantitydistances are usually defined for groups of structures, based on their function. The resistance to blast loading is not taken into account. A definition based on both parameters would be much more efficient, or can give more flexibility. For that reason, the protective level of different types of compound structures has been studied in the trial. Analytical techniques have been applied to predict the blast resistance of each structure. Dynamic measurements of the response during the trial are used to validate and optimize the prediction tools
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Based on the results of the 5 tonne trial, damage footprints for specific field structures are optimised and a uniform methodology is available for other typical boxed shaped field structures. These damage footprints can be used to choose an appropriate quantity-distance based on the accepted damage level. They can also be used to evaluate the distance which can be gained by additional shielding of critical components. For the tested exposed sites the footprints are recalculated and a reduction in quantity-distances between 20-70% has been found.
THE PARTICIPATION OF THE NETHERLANDS IN THE UK/AUS DEFENSE TRIAL 840. STUDY OF BARRICADES TO PREVENT SYMPATHETIC DETONATION IN FIELD STORAGE
van Wees, Rolf M. M. Session 10C
Presenter: Rolf M. M. van Wees, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843391, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: wees@pml.tno.nl Co-Authors: Philip van Dongen, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843396, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: dongen@pml.tno.nl, and Dr. Richard H.B. Bouma, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 2843685, Fax: +31 15 2843958, E-mail: bouma@pml.tno.nl This paper describes how the Netherlands MOD and TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory used the 5 tonne explosion in the UK/Australian Defence Trial 840 to test various barricades intended to prevent sympathetic detonation in field storage situations. The Defence trial 840 comprised a 27 tonne explosion (20 September 2002) and a 5 tonne explosion (7 Octobre 2002) near Woomera, South Australia. The largest single hazard to soldiers in out-of-area operations does not come from the enemy, but from their own ammunition storage. Driven by operational demands and the limited space inside a compound, the distance between the ammunition storage and personnel is often less than for comparable situations at home. Therefore, it is imperative that the hazard is minimised, by compartimentisation in order to prevent sympathetic detonation between storage modules. Barricades should be easy and inexpensive to construct, and the distances between the storage modules should be as low as possible to conserve valuable space inside the compound. Based on these requirements, four barricades with associated distances were designed: a 2 m thick soil barricade, a 3 m thick soil barricade, a sloped soil barricade and a 3.2 m thick water barricade. Based on the results of the 5 tonne trial, its (numerical) analysis and on other trials that have been done in the past, a model is proposed that predicts the launch velocity of the barricade and the load on the acceptor ammunition. In addition, a criterion is proposed for sympathetic detonation of sensitive acceptor ammunition. The model and criterion allow the design of barricades and distances for various amounts of explosive, barricade fill materials and, in principle, for various sensitivities of acceptor ammunition.
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Ludwig, Paul E. Session 10C
PROPOSAL FOR A SUITABLE AND SAFE FIELD STORAGE OF AMMUNITION
Author: Dipl.Ing./Dipl.Kfm. Paul-E. Ludwig, LTC, Joint Support Command – Ammunition Safety Management, PO Box: 90 61 10 D 51127 Cologne, Germany, Tel: 49 2203 908 1253, E-mail: PaulErnstLudwig@ Bundeswehr.org
In the past GE conducted tests regarding the response of ammunition of Hazard Division 1.2 in case of a fire. Here also a possibility was reviewed to use prefabricated concrete bunkers for storage. During these tests the bunkers were subjected to loads of ammunition in Hazard Class 1.2, caused by exploding projectiles over a period of up to 2.5 hours with interior temperatures ranging from 800 to 1050o C. .Investigations following the fire tests showed that the inner layer of the concrete had spalled off up to the first reinforcement but this fact did not affect strength and statics. When storing ammunition in containers it must be considered that the containers can only be protected against lightning at high cost and that the storage temperatures, too, may lead to problems (ISAF, KABUL up to 66o C). There is the risk of spontaneous combustion due to overheating. Based on the bonfire tests in GE with Hazard Divisions 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 ammunition a new concept is proposed that in combination with structural protective measures and organizational changes will increase safety during storage and at the same time is cost-effective: For the field storage of ammunition the use of prefabricated concrete profiles is proposed which are assembled in modular design technique Regarding the compact construction of ammunition storage bunkers for Hazard Divisions 1.2 through 1.4 ammunition the following layout is suggested: Construction of the individual bunkers in a herringbone-pattern as depicted in when stored smaller quantities or when the storage area is limited. Stored ammunition is highly protected against heat development and temperature variations as well as against lightning stroke because the reinforcement can be grounded. Due to the all-around closed type of construction in reinforced concrete – with earth cover, if required – high protection against terrorist attacks from the outside is ensured (see e.g. rocket fire at ISAF). Contrary to container storage these bunkers also have a very strong roof so that there is no danger of debris ejection through it.
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RISK METHODS/TESTING
SESSION MODERATOR: National Defence College Dr. Bengt E. Vretblad, Swedish
SESSION 11A THURSDAY 1:00 PM – 2:42PM
ARE ALL RISK CRITERIA CREATED EQUAL AND USED EQUALLY?
Presenter: John W. Tatom, APT Research, Inc, 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3392, Fax: (256) -837-7786, E-mail: JTatom@APT-Research.com
Tatom, John W. Session 11A
Co-Authors: Tom Pfitzer, APT Research, Inc., 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL, 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3388, Fax: (256) 837-7786, E-mail: tpfitzer@apt-research.com; Bill Pfitzer, APT Research, Inc., 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3395, Fax: (256) 8377786, E-mail: bpfitzer@apt-research.com; and Meredith Hardwick, APT Research, Inc., 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3380, Fax: (256) 837-7786, E-mail: mhardwick@apt-research.com An answer to the question “how safe is safe enough?” is an important starting point for the practice of risk management. The recent trend toward the use of QRA has emphasized the need for these answers. To fulfill this need, the Risk-Based Explosives Safety Criteria Team (RBESCT) has sponsored work to develop a comprehensive set of standards to be used in a general risk management context. These standards address individual protection from annualized risk, and group protection from single events with high consequences. A group of 24 numerical standards have been defined and are in the process of review at this time. This paper presents the 24 criteria and outlines the basis of their development.
REDUCING RISKS TO THE MAX - DOES IT COST A FORTUNE? THE MARGINAL COST APPROACH
Presenter: Peter O. Kummer, Bienz, Kummer & Partner Ltd, Langaegertenstrasse 6, CH-8125 Zollikerberg, Switzerland, Tel: +41 1 391 27 37, Fax: +41-1 391 27 50, E-mail: bkp@bkpswiss.ch
Kummer, Peter O. Session 11A
Switzerland has more than 30 years of practical experience of applying a quantitative risk based concept in the field of handling and storing of ammunition and explosives in the military area. In the risk analysis, as part of this concept, individual and collective risks of exposed persons (ES) originating from potential explosion sites (PES) are calculated. In the risk evaluation, the other part of the risk assessment, the calculated risks are compared with pre-defined safety criteria. 101
For restricting individual risks upper limits are used. The basic idea behind this criterion is equity of the exposed persons. The main aim of limiting of the collective risk, however, is minimisation of the total loss from an accidental event. But how can the total loss from accidental events be limited in a sensible way? It easily can be shown that restricting collective risks by upper bound values might lead to excessive costs for safety measures and a squander of financial resources. In contrast, the marginal cost criteria approach offers a much better way for loss minimisation leading to a maximum risk reduction for a minimum of (always limited) financial recourses. This paper explains the basic concept behind the marginal cost criteria and how it can be successfully applied in practice.
Mensing, Richard W. Session 11A
AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH FOR TREATING UNCERTAINTY IN PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENTS
Author: Dr. Richard W. Mensing, Analytics International Corp., PO Box 35, Mount Vernon, VA 22121, Tel: (916) 408-1531, E-mail: rwmensing@prodigy.com Treatment of aleatory (random variability) and epistemic (knowledge) uncertainties has become de rigueur in probabilistic risk assessments. Aleatory uncertainty is the random variation inherent to the situation being analyzed (the world) where as epistemic uncertainty is the state of knowledge about the world available to perform the analysis. Treatment of both types of uncertainties generally involves extensive manipulation of, and sampling from, probability distributions used to model the uncertainties. Typically calculations for such analysis are best done with the use of an inner and an outer loop simulation process. The results of the analysis are estimates of the appropriate risk distribution or parameter, e.g., the expected loss or Risk, with uncertainty bounds. These results provide decision makers and risk managers with both an estimate of risk as well as a measure of how well the relevant world is understood and modeled. However, some current risk assessment software models, particularly those based on expected value models, can have difficulty being retrofitted to accommodate either type of uncertainty as well as the two-loop process. In such cases, it may be possible to substitute analytic approaches with sufficient statistical rigor to provide acceptable estimates of Risk and the epistemic uncertainties associated with the estimation process. This paper describes an analytic approach developed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for application to the Safety Assessment for Explosives Risk (SAFER) model developed for the DoD Explosives Safety Board (DDESB). The method is limited to being able to assume that the lognormal distribution adequately models (1) many of the random variables inherent to the world and (2) the epistemic uncertainties in determining the median of the lognormal distributions modeling the random variation.
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UNCERTAINTY AS MODELED IN SAFER 3
Presenter: Bob Baker, APT Research, Inc., 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3371, Fax: (256) 837-7786, E-mail: bbaker@apt-research.com
Baker, Bob Session 11A
Co-Authors: Dr. John Hall, APT Research, Inc,. 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3379, Fax: (256) 837-7786, E-mail: jhall@apt-research.com; Tom Pfitzer, APT Research, Inc., 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3388, Fax: (256) 837-7786, Email: tpfitzer@apt-research.com; and Kristy Newton, APT Research, Inc,. 4950 Research Drive, Huntsville, AL 35805, Tel: (256) 327-3385, Fax: (256) 837-7786, E-mail: knewton@aptresearch.com The Safety Assessment For Explosives Risk (SAFER) model evaluates situations involving explosives activities and provides an estimate of the resultant risk to personnel in the surrounding area. The SAFER model aggregates the risk from a variety of fatality mechanisms. Each mechanism is based on scientific algorithms and each has an associated uncertainty. To evaluate the overall uncertainty associated with the final predictions, a working group of uncertainty experts was convened in 2003 to improve the initial uncertainty module in SAFER Version 2.0. The product of their work was an analytical method for SAFER uncertainty. This paper describes that method which is implemented in the SAFER Version 3.0 model. The paper also presents examples and makes a comparison between the analytical model and a Monte Carlo approach.
A PROTOTYPE MODEL FOR THE PROBABILITY OF AN EXPLOSION IN AMMUNITION STORAGES
Presenter: Peter Nussbaumer, Dipl. Ing. ETHZ, Bienz, Kummer & Partner Ltd, Langaegertenstrasse 6, CH-8125 Zollikerberg / Switzerland, Tel: +41 1 391 27 37, Fax: +41-1 391 27 50, E-mail: bkp@bkpswiss.ch
Nussbaumer, Peter Session 11A
Co-Author: Andreas F. Bienz, Dipl. Ing. ETHZ, Bienz, Kummer & Partner Ltd, Langaegertenstrasse 6, CH-8125 Zollikerberg / Switzerland, Tel: +41 1 391 27 37, Fax: +41-1 391 27 50, E-mail: bkp@bkpswiss.ch The risk-based safety concept for assessing the safety of the military handling of ammunition and explosives in Switzerland takes both the probability and the potential damages of accidental explosions into account. The existing model for determining the probability of an explosion in a storage is being revised, in order to use the storages safely according to the state of knowledge as well as most economically. At present, a prototype of the new model exists. In addition to taking account of the different magazine construction types and the quantity of stored ammunition as up to now, the prototype does also differentiate between other relevant factors such as different ammunition types and operation conditions.
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The approaches, technical basics and engineering processes leading to the concept and quantification of the prototype are illustrated, and a comparison with other models is made. Further steps of development are outlined.
Döerr, Andreas Session 11A
CONSEQUENCE MODELS FOR SMALL NET EXPLOSIVE QUANTITIES
Presenter: Andreas Döerr, Fraunhofer-Institut Kurzzeitdynamik, ErnstMach-Institut, Am Klingelberg 1, 79588 Efringen-Kirchen, Germany, Tel: #49 7628 / 9050 – 46, Fax: #49 7628 / 9050 – 77, E-mail: doerr@emi.fhg.de Co-Authors: Gerhard Guerke, Fraunhofer-Institut Kurzzeitdynamik, Ernst-Mach-Institut, Am Klingelberg 1, 79588 Efringen-Kirchen, Germany, Tel: #49 7628 / 9050 – 24, Fax: #49 7628 / 9050 – 77, E-mail: guerke@emi.fhg.de, and Dieter Ruebarsch, Major Gaf, Joint Support Command, Militaerischer Anteil Ernst-Mach-Institut, 79588 Efringen-Kirchen, Germany, Tel: #49 7628 / 9050 – 35, Fax: #49 7628 / 9050 – 77, E-mail: ruebarsch@emi.fhg.de The Ernst-Mach-Institute develops a model for the risk assessment of non standard ammunition storage scenarios called Explosive Quantitative Risk Assessment Germany (ESQRA-GE). Version 1.1, which was released to MOD in March 2003, was developed for net explosive quantities 1000 kg < NEQ < 100 000 kg. Since small amounts of ready ammunition are stored inside the field camps in close proximity to the soldiers there is at the time a growing need to provide answers and solutions for small net explosive quantities NEQ < 1 tonne. Approaches and models to describe the effects of an accidental explosion of small quantities will be discussed and presented.
SESSION 11B THURSDAY 1:00 PM – 2:40 PM
STRUCTURAL RESPONSE MODELS & APPLICATIONS
SESSION MODERATOR: Safety Center Dr. Firooz A. Allahdadi, Air Force
Lawver, Darell Session 11B
COMPARISION OF FINITE ELEMENT METHODS AND TM 5-1300 METHODS FOR RESPONSE PREDICTION OF A FULL SCALE INTERNAL BLAST LOADING TEST ON REINFORCED CONCRETE SLABS
Presenter: Darell Lawver, Weidlinger Associates, Inc., 4410 El Camino Real, Los Altos, CA 94022, Tel: (650) 949-3010, Fax: (650) 949-5735, E-mail: lawver@ca.wai.com
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Co-Authors: Howard Levine and Darren Tennant, Weidlinger Associates, Inc., 4410 El Camino Real, Los Altos, CA 94022, Tel: (650) 949-3010, Fax: (650) 949-5735, E-mail: levine@ca.wai.com, and tennant@ca.wai.com A full scale test of 150 lbs of a Tritonal based explosive was performed inside one room of a building structure to evaluate internal pressure loading on the room surfaces and the response of the walls, roof and floor of the structure. The room was approximately 27 feet by 29 feet in plan with a ceiling height of 12.8 feet. The blast was almost fully contained with only two open door vent openings that allowed significant quasi-static pressure build up in the room. This paper will discuss the predicted versus actual pressure gage readings that occurred during the test. The paper will also compare reinforced concrete wall response predictions using first principles finite element methods and the TM 5-1300 approach. Wall reinforcement details with respect to TM 5-1300 design requirements and actual slab response under blast loading will also be discussed.
CALCULATIONS IN SUPPORT OF NON-IDEAL EXPLOSIVE TESTS IN THE INDIAN HEAD BOMB PROOF CHAMBER
Watry, Craig Session 11B
Presenter: Craig Watry, Applied Research Associates, Southwest Division, 4300 San Mateo Blvd, Suite A220, Albuquerque, NM 87110, Tel: (505) 883-3636, Fax: (505) 8720794, E-mail: cneedham@ara.com Co-Authors: John Schneider and Charles Needham, Applied Research Associates, Southwest Division, 4300 San Mateo Blvd, Suite A220, Albuquerque, NM 87110, Tel: (505) 883-3636, Fax: (505) 872-0794, E-mail: jschneider@ara.com and cwatry@ara.com The ARA afterburn model has been used to calculate the behavior of a number of explosives and mixes when detonated in the Bombproof Chamber at Indian Head, Maryland. All charges were bare, i.e., uncased. The charges ranged from near ideal explosives to aluminized explosives to mixtures with ammonium perchlorate and aluminum. The charges ranged in size from about 2 pounds to more than 35 pounds. Charge size effects were observed for aluminized explosives both experimentally and in the calculation results. Larger charges were observed to burn a larger percentage of the aluminum. Although there was sufficient oxygen in the chamber to burn all of the aluminum, none of the charges completely burned the aluminum powder. Because the particulates are finite, they slip relative to the fluid. We found that the particulates were concentrated near the exterior of vortices that formed in the chamber, thus separating the particulates from the oxygen containing gasses. This high degree of non-uniform mixing is a key to the explanation of the observed restriction of aluminum burn. A number of comparisons are made between experimental data and calculational results. The calculations clearly show the particulate motion, and help explain the incomplete aluminum burn. The aluminum burn model coupled to the hydrodynamic flow shows the increased aluminum burn with charge size.
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Wesevich, James W. Session 11B
ENGINEERING-LEVEL FINITE ELEMENT MODELING OF CONTAINED BLAST CHAMBERS
Presenter: James W. Wesevich, Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, 3330 Oakwell Court, Suite 100, San Antonio, TX 78218-3024, Tel: (210) 824-5960, Fax: (210) 824-5964, E-mail: wesevich@bakerrisk.com
Blast chambers are currently designed to resist hundreds to thousands of multiple airblast and fragment loads when used for rapid demilitarization of dated explosive ordnances or when used for high explosives (HE) R&D testing. These reusable chambers are typically constructed using steel shells, steel frames with liners, or reinforced concrete. Although established single-degree-offreedom (SDOF) methods in TM5-1300 can be used to initiate the design, dynamic non-linear finite element modeling is required to identify highly localized regions of stress/strain and to verify design adequacy. The SDOF method is limited in capturing the structural response when there is a significant airblast gradient (i.e., pressure, impulse, and time of arrival) over a component’s span. This gradient includes the initial reflected airblast and any reverberations from adjacent reflected surfaces. The structural component’s model must also include the tensile loading effects from adjacent loaded components framing into the component. Finite element analysis (FEA) modeling can include the effects of tension membrane, airblast spatial gradients, and varying time of arrivals. The general perception of structural FEA blast effects modeling is that it requires high costs and levels of expertise. This paper discusses engineering-level approaches to modeling blast chambers using LS-DYNA. These approaches do not necessarily require a full-up model of the entire blast chamber, but focus on the higher responding elements with appropriate boundary conditions. Simplified non-linear material models can also be incorporated into these models. Once localized stress/strain locations are identified, improvements to the chamber design are possible with the use of these FEA models to increase the chamber’s TNT equivalent charge rating. These regions can be instrumented with active strain gauges to verify the chamber’s performance during proof testing. The structural FEA models can be driven by a large number of airblast target histories generated from simplified internal detonation weapon effects software, namely BLASTX.
Whitney, Mark G. Session 11B
PRIMARY FRAGMENT HAZARDS – COUPLED SOURCE AND TARGET APPROACH
Presenter: Mark G. Whitney, Analytical & Computational Engineering, Inc. (ACE), 3463 Magic Drive, Suite 359, San Antonio, TX 78232, Tel: (210) 582-5860, Fax: (210) 582-5861, E-mail: mgwhitney@aceng.net
Explosion hazards design manuals (e. g., TM 5-1300) provide methods for one to size thickness of shields and barricades. These methods always separate the source and the target. The source (weapon) fragment characteristics are determined by Gurney and Mott relationships. The second step is to evaluate penetration or perforation into a given target (such as a steel shield or a concrete barricade) using depth-of-penetration equations. The paper describes an approach that couples the source and the target into a single set of prediction curves. Two examples are provided; one is a steel106
shield and the second a concrete-barricade. Prediction curves relate shield or barricade thickness directly to parameters such a weapon charge weight to casing ratio (W/Wc) or to Confidence Level (CL). This reduces the current two-step process to a single calculation. Further, the fragment capacity of a typical shield or barricade can be characterized by a single curve. The paper provided this for example a 12 inch Substantial Dividing Wall (SDW) where fragment velocity vs weight plot (V-W plot) is provided. This plot is the primary fragment equivalent to a P-i diagram that relates blast pressure and impulse to the structural capacity of the wall. Another topic addressed in this paper is method to quantify the definition of “Lightly- Cased” vs “Heavily-Cased” charges. Curves are presented showing fragment-delivered impulse to a barricade as a function of W/(W+Wc) compared with shock delivered impulse. The curves indicate that when the shock-impulse greatly exceeds the fragment impulse to the breach area, then the charge can be considered uncased. This work is a result of an in-house investigation at ACE and was not funded by government or private contracts; hence, no permissions are required to present the results. This work does not include any classified or sensitive information and is suitable for public publication.
STRUCTURAL STEEL CONNECTIONS UNDER INTERNAL BLAST
Presenter: Theodor Krauthammer, Protective Technology Center, Pennsylvania State University, 3127 Research Drive, State College, PA 16801, Tel: (814) 865-3102, Fax: (814) 865-9630, E-mail: tedk@psu.edu
Krauthammer, Theodor Session 11B
Co-Authors: Joonhong Lim and Hyun Chang Yim, Protective Technology Center, Pennsylvania State University, 3127 Research Drive, State College, PA 16801, Tel: (814) 863-2932, Fax: (814) 8659630, E-mail: jxl387@psu.edu and hzy102@psu.edu Recent earthquakes in the U.S. have highlighted troublesome weaknesses in design and construction technologies of moment-resisting structural steel frames. Although researchers anticipated problems with structural concrete details, as shown by the extensive attention to this topic in the literature, they felt confident in the ability of structural steel details to exhibit superior performance. Unfortunately, steel connections exhibited a surprisingly poor performance, underlined by brittle failures. As a result, the U.S. steel construction industry embarked on an extensive assessment of such details, to remedy the observed deficiencies. During about the same period, domestic and international terrorism has become an issue to be addressed by structural engineers. Here, too, it has been shown that structural detailing plays a very significant role during the structural response to blast. In blast resistant design, however, most of the attention has been devoted to structural concrete. However, many buildings that could be targeted by terrorist activities consist of moment-resisting steel frames with various types of wall systems. Obviously, the blast-induced behavior of structural steel details in such buildings is of interest. Typical structural steel welded connection details were considered for assessment under blast effects. The assessments were based on the design procedures outlined in TM 5-1300 to determine their blast resistance capabilities. These assessments were used to determine the maximum amount of high explosives (HE) whose detonation would not cause failure of the connection. Then, these details were 107
included in three-dimensional finite element simulations subjected to internal explosions, using the HE amounts obtained in the assessments. The finite element simulations were validated by comparisons with impact tests data before the HE simulations. It was found that some of the connections failed catastrophically, while others exhibited acceptable behavior. These finding raised important concerns about the blast resistance of structural steel connections, and about the assumed safety in using current design recommendations for such structural details. This paper will include a description of the study, a discussion of the findings and critical issues to be addressed in future research.
SESSION 11C THURSDAY 1:00 PM – 2:40 PM
Scarborough, Duane S. Session 11C
FIELD STORAGE II
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. John T. Knight, Raytheon Missile Systems Company
MUNITIONS SURVIVABILITY SOFTWARE
Author: Duane S. Scarborough, ARDEC Logistics Research & Engineering Directorate (LRED), ATTN: AMSRD-AAR-AIL-F, Bldg. 455, Picatinny Arsenal, NJ 07806-5000, DSN 880-2262, Tel: (973) 724-2262, Fax: DSN 880-5459, Com: (973) 724-5459, E-mail: dscar@pica.army.mil or duane.scarborough@us.army.mil
The Munitions Survivability Software (MSS) Program is a planning program for Army logisticians, which automates the process for building a field-storage based, ammunition storage area (ASA) by ammunition units in contingency operations. It reduces the current paper and calculator process time from about 80 hours to about 2-3 hours. MSS resides on the Army’s Standard Army Ammunition System–Modernized (SAAS-MOD) computer system. MSS is user friendly and easy to use. The user inputs an ammunition stockage objective in MSS and sets parameters for the type of ASA being built. MSS takes the ammunition information and parameters and builds the ASA using current Army ammunition doctrine, and safety and quantity distance rules in DA PAM 385-64, Ammunition and Explosive Safety Standards. A template for the ASA is developed which outlines all aspects of the ASA. The template is printable. The user then opens MSS’s geographic information system (GIS) module and loads digitized maps, satellite images and terrain data for the part of the world where the ASA will be built. MSS leads the user through the process of laying the built ASA and its site components on the selected terrain. This completed map is printable. A follow-on program, MSS 2, is currently in development. MSS 2 improves on MSS capabilities, and enables “real-time” ammo management; allows the user to move stacks within storage sections, move stacks and sections based on terrain features, move DODICs between stacks within a section, draw safety walls around stacks of ammunition, build “real time” stacks and sections, use on SAASMOD or Stand-alone capability. 108
RESULTS OF TRIALS AGAINST A SCAFFOLD-BASED OBSERVATION POST DESIGNED BY THE NETHERLANDS AND ADAPTED FOR TESTING AT DRDC SUFFIELD
Anderson, John Session 11C
Presenter: John Anderson, DRDC Suffield, PO Box 4000, Stn. Main Medicine Hat, Alberta Canada T1A 8K6, Tel: (403) 544-4570, Fax: (403) 544-4704, E-mail: John.Anderson@drdc-rddc.gc.ca Co-Authors: Kevin Scherbatiuk and Stephen Murray, PO Box 4000, Stn. Main Medicine Hat, Alberta Canada T1A 8K6, Tel: (403) 544-5022 (Scherbatiuk), (403) 544-4729, (Murray), Fax: (403) 5444704, E-mail: Kevin.Scherbatiuk@drdc-rddc.gc.ca, Stephen.Murray@drdc-rddc.gc.ca; and Philip van Dongen and Marnix Rhijnsburger, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, Lange Kleyweg 137, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, E-mail: Dongen@pml.tno.nl, and Rhijnsburger@pml.tnl.nl Blast loading of protective structures, with consequent blast ingress and personnel vulnerability, is of increasing priority due to the expanding role of the Canadian Forces in military operations in urban terrain and operations out-of-area. The growing threat of blast weapons, including terrorist-style bombing attacks targeting both military and civilian personnel has resulted in a multi-faceted program for blast-threat assessment of military field fortifications at DRDC Suffield. As part of the evaluation of various protective structures, the Canadian Forces Engineers requested that a scaffold-based elevated observation post, designed by The Netherlands, be evaluated as part of the DRDC Suffield program “Force Protection Against Enhanced Blast”. The designed observation post was extensively tested by the Royal Netherlands Army Corps of Engineers in close co-operation with TNO against different threats, including shoulder-launched anti-tank weapons, artillery rounds, and the blast loading from a five ton explosion at 75 m distance. This paper outlines the results of trials against a North American version of this structure. Various levels of blast loading were generated by 66 and 200 litre fuel-air explosive devices, 2 kg thermobaric explosive devices, a 2268 kg explosive charge representing a large vehicle terrorist weapon and 155 mm fragmenting artillery rounds. The results demonstrate that personnel vulnerability issues dominate, specifically that the blast loading levels required to damage/destroy the structure would represent a significant threat to personnel occupying the structure. Selected experimental results for external blast loading and structural response are compared to the results from analytical modeling of the events. In addition to direct blast effects, high-speed imagery shows that dust lofting may be a significant problem with regard to obscuration, eye-damage, and breathing within this field fortification.
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Gündisch, Rainer Session 11C
PARTITION WALL CONCEPT FOR THE STORAGE OF AMMUNITION
Presenter: Rainer Gündisch, Bundeswehr Testing Center for Protection and Special Technologies (WTD 52), Oberjettenberg, D – 83458 Schneizlreuth, Germany, Tel: +49 – (0)8651 – 79 – 1373, Fax: +49 – (0)8651 – 1600, Email: RainerGuendisch@bundeswehr.org
Co-Author: Jörg Tscholakov, Bundeswehr Testing Center for Protection and Special Technologies (WTD 52), Oberjettenberg, D – 83458 Schneizlreuth, Germany, Tel: +49 – (0)8651 – 79 – 1379, Fax: +49 – (0)8651 – 1600, E-mail: JoergTscholakov@bundeswehr.org The experiences of the German Bundeswehr at missions abroad showed that the usage of gabions is not the ideal way to prevent ammunition from sympathetic detonation. Therefore a simplified concept, the so called ‘Partition Wall Concept’, was developed and tested at the WTD 52. The advantages of this new concept are: - usage of any kind of filling material - unproblematic and fast build up - very durable and service-free construction - closer placement of the ammunition to the field camp - minimized required space for the ammunition storage Preliminary tests demonstrated that partition walls can prevent ammunition in neighboring containers from sympathetic detonation caused by debris and fragments, shock waves and the crush of containers. In a second step, scaled tests were performed to demonstrate the effect of the partition walls on debris and fragment flow and on the pressure distribution. As this tests proved, a significant reduction of peak pressure and debris was reached by using partition walls and consequently, the risk for the field camp minimized. Full scale tests will be performed to verify the results of the preliminary and the scaled tests and to demonstrate the easy handling and durability of the new construction.
Proper, Kenneth W. Session 11C
FIELD ASSESSMENT OF PORT RISK
Author: Kenneth W. Proper, Office Of The Director Of Army Safety, Attn: DACS-SF, 2211 S. Clark St, Crystal Plaza 5, Room 980, Arlington, VA 22202, Tel: (703) 601-2408, Fax: (703) 601-2417, E-Mail: Kenneth.William.Proper@Hotmail.Com
During rapid deployments now required of military units, it often necessary to quickly assess the risk to a port and its surrounding area due to receiving or shipping of ammunition. This paper builds upon a method developed and used by the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) during Operation Iraq Freedom in Turkey and Italy. A unique feature of the program is that it provides Command with the 110
ability to rank and compare ports based on the level of risk for each port conducting ammunition operations of similar net explosive weights (NEWs). Further, the automated program allows comparison of various NEW scenarios at a port and its associated risk. In addition to sharing and demonstrating the program developed in Microsoft Excel, the paper will explain the rationale used for assessing the risk and propose possible enhancements. Further, because of being an Excel Spreadsheet, the program can be used on a palm-held device.
FIELD ASSESSMENT OF AMMUNITION STORAGE LOCATIONS
Author: Kenneth W. Proper, Office Of The Director Of Army Safety, Attn: DACS-SF, 2211 S. Clark St, Crystal Plaza 5, Room 980, Arlington, VA 22202, Tel: (703) 601-2408, Fax: (703) 601-2417, E-Mail: Kenneth.William.Proper@Hotmail.Com
Proper, Kenneth W. Session 11C
During rapid deployments now required of military units, it often necessary to quickly assess the risk associated with the storage of ammunition at basic load ammunition holding areas (BLAHA), uploaded parking areas, and other ammunition locations, in order to develop the required ammunition storage licenses. This paper builds upon a method developed and used by the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Italy. It is based upon the Army’s explosives safety requirements for Contingency Operations. A unique feature of the program is that it provides a risk assessment, the required ammunition storage license and a waiver when required. Further, the automated program allows the user to compare various ammunition storage scenarios and their associated risks. In addition to sharing and demonstrating the program developed in Microsoft Excel, the paper will explain the rationale used for assessing the risk and propose possible enhancements. Further, because of being an Excel Spreadsheet, the program can be used on a palm-held device.
FORCE PROTECTION/ANTI TERRORISM II
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. Robert Loyd, U.S. Army Field Support Command Safety Team
SESSION 12A THURSDAY 3:10 PM – 4:50 PM
EVALUATING A LNG DOUBLE-HULL TANKER AGAINST TERRORIST THREATS
Presenter: Gary A. Fitzgerald, ABS Consulting Inc., 15600 San Pedro, Suite 400, San Antonio, TX 78232, Tel: (210) 495-5195, Fax: (210) 4955134, E-mail: gfitzgerald@absconsulting.com
Fitzgerald, Gary A. Session 12A
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Co-Author: Ben F. Harrison, P.E., ABS Consulting Inc., 15600 San Pedro, Suite 400, San Antonio, TX 78232, Tel: (210) 495-5195, Fax: (210) 495-5134, E-mail: bharrison@absconsulting.com The use of hazardous materials to cause explosive events is a definite threat in the United States. Tens of thousands of tanker trucks with millions of pounds of flammable and explosive materials transverse the nation every day. Terrorists have used bombs on tanker trucks to blow up fuel depots and synagogues overseas. Highway patrol officers are now checking thousands of vehicles carrying such materials and verifying “HAZ-MAT” licenses of the truck drivers. This has heightened the alert level of both public and industry and made us rethink what is possible. One of the biggest targets seen by the public are the LNG terminals used as shipping and storage points that supply large amounts of fuel to the country. The sheer quantity of fuel being stored and shipped makes some people uneasy. The disruption to our life and effect on our economy is seen to be as alluring to a terrorist as the headlines and media sensation such an attack would create. Thus, the LNG industry is responding to this concern by evaluating these potential threats. A successful, detailed evaluation of these threats can be performed and used to improve security and change current practices if needed and ultimately help qualm the perceived fear that comes from these LNG terminals. This paper provides a detailed examination of work ABS Consulting, Inc. has performed that evaluated a LNG double-hull tanker for a contact charge using analytical methods.
Becvar, Keith Edward Session 12A
ELECTRONIC VEHICLE BOMB MITIGATION GUIDE (eVBMG)
Presenter: Keith Edward Becvar, Applied Research Associates, Inc, 1848 Lockhill-Selma Rd., Suite 102, San Antonio, TX 78213-1569, Tel: (210) 344-7644, Fax: (210) 344-7456, E-mail: kbecvar@ara.com
Co-Authors: Lynn Robert Moriarty, Captain U.S. Air Force, USAF Force Protection Battlelab, 1517 Billy Mitchell Blvd, Bldg 954, Lackland AFB, TX 78236-0119, Tel: (210) 925-5028, E-mail: lynn.moriarty@lackland.af.mil, and Matthew Barsotti, Applied Research Associates, Inc, 1848 Lockhill-Selma Rd., Suite 102, San Antonio, TX 78213-1569, Tel: (210) 344-7644, Fax: (210) 3447456, E-mail: mbarsotti@ara.c The Vehicle Bomb Mitigation Guide (VBMG) is an effort to expeditiously get ready reference material into the hands of the warfighter, to aid in planning and executing programs and operations for protecting Air Force personnel and assets against the threat of vehicle bombs. Using the accumulated knowledge from several major Force Protection Battlelab initiatives, the VBMG instructs in the best practices for conducting vehicle searches and using blast and fragment mitigation devices. It was designed for use by a variety of key players, ranging from the airman at the base gate to the installation commander. Since the time that the VBMG was first developed, it has been promulgated throughout the Department of Defense and has been adopted as a Technical Support Working Group publication. The VBMG is now being brought into the age of accessibility by putting the latest information, in electronic form, directly in the hands of the warfighter. Applied Research Associates, Inc., with funding from the United States Air Force Force Protection Battlelab, has created a Personal Digital 112
Assistant (PDA) based e-book version of the VBMG that is viewable on Palm and PocketPC based PDAs. In addition, a PDA version of a “safe standoff calculator” to facilitate planning and design of access control points has been developed. The e-book version of the VBMG places the reference material needed in the field with the end-user. The most current version of the VBMG is electronically accessible via computer networks and downloadable to the PDA. Thus, the distribution of the VBMG to the warfighter will be facilitated and the information contained therein can always be the most current. This paper discusses the scope of the VBMG and introduces the audience to the use of e-books and simple PDA based calculators for field use.
DEVELOPMENT AND FINAL PROOF TESTING OF THE URBAN EXPLOSIVES STORAGE VESSEL
Presenter: Johnny H. Waclawczyk, P.E., ABS Consulting Inc., 15600 San Pedro Suite 400, San Antonio, TX 78232, Tel: (210) 495-5195, Fax: (210) 495-5134, E-mail: jwaclawczyk@absconsulting.com
Waclawczyk, Johnny H. Session 12A
Co-Authors: Kim W. King, P.E., ABS Consulting Inc., 15600 San Pedro Suite 400, San Antonio TX 78232, Tel: (210) 495-5195, Fax: (210) 495-5134, E-mail: kking@absconsulting.com; Bert von Rosen, Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory, 555 Booth St., Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0G1, Tel: (613) 947-3527, Fax: (613) 995-1230, E-mail: bvonrose@nrcan.gc.ca; and Rick Guilbeault, Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory, 555 Booth St., Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0G1, Tel: (613) 995-2332, Fax: (613) 995-1230, E-mail: rguilbea@nrcan.gc.ca U.S. Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Federal, State and Local Bomb Squads are faced with a growing problem of storing explosive counter measure tools used to defeat improvised explosive devices (IED). These explosive tools range from traditional high explosives like C4 and TNT to new low explosives designed to optimize tool characteristics. The problem is that these tools and their explosive components cannot be stored near or with the Bomb Squads due to various Federal, State and local laws governing the use, storage, and safety of explosives. Because these regulatory groups typically do not allow explosives to be stored near or in urban areas, EOD response times can be dangerously long. This increase in response time has the potential of causing loss of lives and property. The Urban Explosives Storage Magazine (UESM) was developed to alleviate this potentially serious problem. The UESM is a cylindrical vessel 8 feet in diameter and approximately 11 feet tall. It weighs approximately 12000 lbs and is transportable. The vessel is designed to withstand an internal detonation of 50-lbsTNT net explosive weight with minimal leakage pressures, temperatures, and fire directly outside the vessel. Use of the UESM is intended to relieve the Q-D requirements for explosives storage magazines. The current design is pending approval by the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB). This paper describes the development and final proof testing of the UESM vessel.
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Weerheijm, J. Session 12A
PROTECTION AND SAFETY BY OUT OF AREA COMPOUND DESIGN
Presenter: Dr. Ir. J. Weerheijm, TNO-PML, Lange Kleiweg 137, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 284 33 90, Fax: +31 15 284 3958, E-mail: weerheym@pml.tno.nl
Co-Authors: Philip van Dongen, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel:+31 15 2843396, Fax: +31 15 2843954, E-mail: dongen@pml.tno.nl; Ir. M. M. van der Voort, TNO-PML, Lange Kleiweg 137, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 284 34 62, Fax: +31 15 284 39 58, E-mail: voort@pml.tno.nl; and Ir. C. Wentzel, TNO-PML, Lange Kleiweg 137, PO Box 45, 2280 AA Rijswijk, The Netherlands, Tel: +31 15 284 36 95, Fax: +31 15 284 39 58, E-mail: wentzel@pml.tno.nl, The survival of troops during peace-keeping or peace-enforcing operations is paramount. Therefore, the Corps of Engineers of the Royal Netherlands Army is tasked to provide adequate protection for military personnel during hazardous situations. Since 1996 research programmes are conducted by TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory in co-operation with the Corps of Engineers and military experts with the objective to determine and improve the protection level of semi-permanent structures and develop a tool to judge and optimize the overall safety by the design of the camps out of area (compounds). Safety and risks are related to threat and therefore the MOD worked on the threat definition resulting in a 5-level threat definition and required protection level. Based on these threat levels, TNO and MOD identified the threat from individual weapon systems and determined the available knowledge to quantify the protection level of the commonly used compound structures. Knowledge gaps have been identified and projects were initiated to develop and gather the required knowledge, tools and data. A methodology has been developed to relate the threat from the individual weapon system to the consequences for the protected and unprotected personnel inside the compound. The methodology enables the quantification of the overall compound safety for a given threat scenario, the definition of the structural protection requirements of compound elements and the optimization of the compound lay-out.
Justice, D. Bart Session 12A
COMPARISON OF REAL-WORLD DATA TO DIRE MODEL PREDICTIONS
Presenter: D. Bart Justice, Axios Solutions, Inc., PO Box 18574, Huntsville, AL 35804, Tel: (256) 426-7452, Fax: (775) 923-4336, E-mail: bjustice@blasteffects.com
Co-Author: Dr. Frank B. Tatom, Engineering Analysis, Inc., 715 Arcadia Circle, Huntsville, AL 35801, Tel:(256) 533-9391, Fax: (256) 533-9325, E-mail: eai@mindspring.com A large number of software packages have emerged with claims of accurately modeling the effects of explosions on buildings and personnel. This paper examines the results obtained from APT 114
Research’s DIRE (Death and Injuries Resulting from Explosions) software in relation to several realworld examples. DIRE is a “donor/target” modeling package, and seeks to simplify the scenario by looking at the donor explosion in relation to one target building at a time. In particular, part of this study examines the results from two well-documented terrorist attacks, the Murrah Building and Khobar Towers, and compares the outputs generated from DIRE. The scope of this report focuses on DIRE’s results for number of deaths, number of major and minor injuries, and building damage and glass breakage percentages. Assumptions are discussed as well as the validity of the inputs that were chosen for each of the cases. These inputs include donor type, type of explosive mechanism, amount of explosives, target building category and type, roof type, glass type, percent glass on the target building, floor area, distance from donor, number of people in the building, and number of stories in the building. Given the assumptions that were made and the inputs that were chosen, the results for both cases were very favorable in predicting the number of deaths and building damage that would occur from such explosions.
STRUCTURES – DESIGN STANDARDS & METHODS
SESSION MODERATOR: Dipl. Ing. Andreas Döerr, Ernst-MachInstitut, Germany
SESSION 12B THURSDAY 3:10 PM – 4:50 PM
PSADS AUTOMATED DESIGNER
Presenter: Timothy C. Knight P.E., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Protective Design Center, 12565 West Center Road, Omaha, NE 68144, Tel: (402) 221-3176, Fax: (402) 221-4315, E-mail: Timothy.C.Knight@usace.army.mil
Knight, Timothy C. Session 12B
Co-Author: Bruce A. Walton P.E., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Protective Design Center, 12565 West Center Road, Omaha, NE 68144, Tel: (402) 221-4923, Fax: (402) 221-4315, E-mail: Bruce.A.Walton@usace.army.mil In 1998 a new joint services technical manual was issued on the Design and Analysis of Hardened Structures to Conventional Weapons Effects (Army TM 5-855-1, AFPAM 32-1147(1), NAVFAC P1080, DSWA DAHSCWEMAN-97). At the same time the first version of the Protective Structures Automated Design System (PSADS 1) was issued. PSADS contains a hypertext version of the manual along with a suite of 13 independent support codes. This manual and its support codes constituted a major leap in protective structures design guidance and support. In the last few years the DAHSCWE manual has been updated and is now published as UFC 3-340-01, June 2002. PSADS 2 includes the updated manual and was released in April 2003 for worldwide distribution to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors, as well as ABCA and NATO militarily aligned member countries. An important feature of PSADS is the Automated Design Advisor, which will guide the designer through the methodology more quickly and accurately. This feature, not implemented in version 1, is 115
included in the current release of PSADS 2 under the label of Automated Designer. The initial version of Automated Designer implements only a limited amount of the manual material. Included are the design/analysis of reinforced concrete slabs for airblast and/or fragment load, direct concrete spall effects, penetration of weapons into several types of media, and prediction of weapon fragmentation and fragment penetration into several types of media. Examples and discussion of these features are presented.
Oswald, Charles J. Session 12B
COMPONENT EXPLOSIVE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT WORKBOOKS FOR MASONRY WALLS
Presenter: Charles J. Oswald, Ph.D., P.E., Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc., 3330 Oakwell Court, Suite 100, San Antonio, TX 782183024, Tel: (210) 824-5960, Fax: (210) 824-5964, E-mail: coswald@bakerrisk.com Co-Author: Dale Nebuda, P.E., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Protective Design Center, 12565 West Center Road, Omaha, NE 68144-3869, Tel: (402) 221-4914, Fax: (402) 221-4315, E-mail: dale.nebuda@usace.army.mil
Concrete masonry unit (CMU) walls represent one of the most popular structural materials in conventional building construction worldwide. A recent study determined that at least half of the buildings within the Department of Defense (DoD) were constructed using unreinforced or reinforced CMU walls. CMU construction is also prevalent within petrochemical and chemical plants where the threat of accidental explosion is commonplace. Due to their inherent weakness in resisting blast loads, CMU walls represent a significant debris hazard to building occupants. This paper summarizes an effort sponsored by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Protective Design Center (PDC), to improve the methodology to predict damage to reinforced and unreinforced CMU walls and implement the methodology into user-friendly Excel® workbooks. This effort builds off previous work sponsored by the Office of Special Technology, Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) that resulted in the Concrete Masonry Unit Database Software (CMUDS) computer program. The CMUDS program collected a large database of blast testing data on reinforced and unreinforced CMU and fit the data to dimensionless responses charts in the form of pressure-impulse (P-i) diagrams. A major feature of the P-i diagrams is a “layover” effect within the impulse sensitive regime to account for a reduction in damage caused by the negative phase of the blast load. The current effort improved the P-i diagram curve-fits to the data and modified the diagrams to predict response in terms of the DoD’s four levels of protection (LOP) used in antiterrorism design. The P-i diagrams were programmed into Excel® workbooks to allow for ready assessments of specific wall geometries with various reinforcing and boundary conditions to input explosive threats. These workbooks will be incorporated in the Component Explosive Damage Assessment Workbooks (CEDAW), which will contain similar blast damage analysis capabilities for 17 other common structural components.
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PROGRESSIVE COLLAPSE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR DOD FACILITIES
Presenter: David Stevens, Applied Research Associates, 1848 LockhillSelma Road, Suite 102, San Antonio, TX 78213, Tel: (210) 344-7644, Fax: (210) 344-7456, E-mail: dstevens@ara.com
Stevens, David Session 12B
Co-Authors: Kirk Marchand, Walter P. Moore and Associates, Inc., 1221 South MoPac Expressway, Suite 355, Austin, TX 78746, Tel: (512) 330-1282, Fax: (513) 330-1295, E-mail: kmarchand@walterpmoore.com; Bernie Deneke, NAFVAC EICO, 6506 Hampton Blvd, Norfolk, VA, 23508, Tel: (757) 322-4233, Fax: (757) 322-4416, E-mail: denekebj@efdlant.navfac.navy.mil; and Ed Conrath, USACE PDC, 12565 West Center Road, Omaha, NE 68144, Tel: (402) 221-3152, Fax: (402) 221-4315, E-mail: Ed.J.Conrath@nwo02.usace.army.mil The tri-services, including the United States Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as other Defense Agencies, have recently developed a Unified Facility Criteria (UFC) for the prevention of progressive collapse within multi-story structures. Progressive collapse occurs when the final damage to a structure is disproportionately larger than the local damage that initiated the event, e.g., removal of a single column or load-bearing wall leads to the collapse of a significant portion of the structure. Large numbers of fatalities and injuries can occur due to progressive collapse, as observed in the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and in the collapse of the World Trade Center. In this paper, the development of the Progressive Collapse UFC is briefly reviewed and a general description of the overall philosophy and approach is given. Some details of the approach as applied to reinforced concrete and steel design are presented. Two example problems are briefly described and summarized. To speed the dissemination of the Progressive Collapse UFC throughout the Department of Defense (DoD), web-based e-learning modules have been developed to assist in educating government agencies and their contractors. In this paper, the e-learning modules, which describe the overall approach and present worked examples demonstrating the application, are briefly described.
DDESB TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP TO REVISE TECHNICAL MANUAL 5-1300/NAVFAC P-397/AFR 8822 – STATUS UPDATE
Zehrt, William H. Session 12B
Presenter: William H. Zehrt, Jr., PE, U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center, Attn: CEHNC-ED-CS-S (Zehrt), PO Box 1600, Huntsville, AL 35807-4301, Tel: (256)-8951829, Fax: (256)-895-1602, E-mail: William.H.Zehrt@HND01.usace.army.mil Co-Author: Patrick F. Acosta, PE, U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center, Attn: CEHNC-EDCS-S (Acosta), PO Box 1600, Huntsville, AL 35807-4301, Tel: (256) 895-1661, Fax(256)-895-1602, E-mail: Patrick.F.Acosta@HND01.usace.army.mil
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In 2003, the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) established a technical working group to revise the tri-service blast design manual, “Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions,” Army Technical Manual 5-1300/NAVFAC P-397/AFR 88-22 (TM 5-1300). As an unlimited distribution document approved for public release, the updated manual will provide both government and private sector engineers with an invaluable source of information and guidance. When first published in 1969, TM 5-1300 represented the state-of-the-art in the analysis and design of blast resistant structures. Based primarily on explosive tests of reinforced concrete walls, the manual provided a thorough introduction to the blast design process, including detailed procedures for the calculation of blast loads, for the development of simplified analytical models, and for the structural design and detailing of blast resistant elements. Revision 1, published in 1990, updated the manual and expanded its scope to include structural steel, masonry, and other structural materials. Since 1990, the increased computational capacity of mainframe and personal computers has revolutionized the design of both conventional and blast resistant structures. Recent research supports not only the update of current design procedures but also the expansion of coverage to incorporate new, cost effective, innovative materials. Guidance also is needed on retrofit of existing structures and on means to enhance the constructability and reduce the cost of often complex, blast resistant construction. This paper provides a status update of the working group’s activities and plans for future work. Emphasis is given to anticipated revisions and additions to the manual.
Marchand, Kirk A. Session 12B
SHOCK “VENTING” THROUGH COMPONENT COLLAPSE: A REVIEW OF ANALYTICAL AND NUMERICAL PROCEDURES
Presenter: Kirk A. Marchand, Walter P. Moore Engineers and Consultants, 1221 South MoPac Expressway, Austin, TX 78746, Tel: (513) 330-1282, Fax: (513) 330-1295, E-mail: kmarchand@ walterpmoore.com Co-Author: David Stevens, Applied Research Associates, South Texas Division, 1848 Lockhill-Selma Road, San Antonio, TX 78213, Tel: (210) 344-7644, Fax: (210) 344-7456, E-mail: dstevens@ara.com High explosive loads like those generated by terrorist attack or explosive loads generated from accidental detonations produce shocks in air capable of damaging and destroying conventional construction components and materials. Historically, protective military facilities have been designed to mitigate the hazards associated with these threats through robust structural design and through the elimination of non-structural weak points such as windows, doors, infill walls and lightweight roofs. Unfortunately, conventional structures necessarily having many of these types of components are increasingly under attack by terrorists. While these more conventional structures may be designed to mitigate the most severe blast loading effects, such as progressive collapse, they have significant vulnerabilities associated with windows and doors, infill walls, partition walls and roof systems. Not only will these failed components produce hazardous debris, they will also permit 118
the passing of residual air shock loads. These loads are hazardous to people and structures inside the building perimeter. Research in recent years (Applied Research Associates, 1999; Home Office Police Scientific Development Branch, UK, 2003) has defined general parameters for use in analytic procedures for prediction of vented shock. Limited tests have been conducted to validate the predictions and numerical analysis of this complex phenomenon has been attempted. The results of research to date suggests that, while approximate reductions in blast pressures and impulses “venting” through failed structures can be predicted, these predictions are limited by the data sets used for validation. Additionally, the number of assumptions necessary for rigorous numerical analysis raises questions concerning the validity of these results. This paper will present a review of the state-of-the-art in shock venting procedures, a summary of experimental data and a comparison to analytic predictions, and “best” numerical approaches. Recommendations for improvements to the predictive techniques as well as data needed to support these techniques will be presented.
STRUCTURES-DEBRIS MODELS
SESSION MODERATOR: Mr. Peter Kummer, Bienz, Kummer & Partner Ltd., Switzerland
SESSION 12C THURSDAY 3:10 PM – 4:50 PM
AIR BLAST AND DEBRIS THROW FROM EXPLOSIONS IN SMALL AMMUNITION HOUSES
Author: Helge Langberg, Norwegian Defence Estates Agency, PO Box 405 Sentrum, NO-0103 Oslo, Norway, Tel: + 47 23093988, Fax: +47 23093176, E-mail: helge.langberg@forsvarsbygg.no
Langberg, Helge Session 12C
In 2002 and 2003, the Norwegian Defence Estates Agency (NDEA) together with Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) have performed a test series with explosions in small concrete ammunition houses. The goal of the test series was to evaluate the quantity of explosives that could be stored inside the structure before it starts to break up, and also to establish air blast and debris throw distribution around the structure for even larger amount of explosives. Tests were performed with loading densities in the range 0.2 – 6 kg/m3 with spherical and cylindrical PETN based high explosive charges placed inside the structure. For all tests, air blast was measured and debris sampled in different directions outside the ammunition house. Debris were counted, weighed and measured in seven directions and at ranges from 25 to 350 m from the structure. High speed videos were used to study the debris launch velocity of the different structural elements in every single tests. Altogether, a large database covering air blast, debris launch velocities, debris throw and mass distribution has been established from the trials. 119
This paper presents the test program and the main results and conclusions from the study. Chrostowski, Jon D. Session 12C
PRE-TEST ANALYSIS OF ROOF PENETRATION BY INERT DEBRIS IN SUPPORT OF SPIDER 1 TESTING
Presenter: Jon D. Chrostowski, ACTA Inc, 2790 Skypark Drive #310, Torrance, CA 90505, Tel: (310) 530-1008, Fax: (310) 530-8383, E-mail: chrostowski@actainc.com
Co-Author: Wenshui Gan, ACTA Inc., 2790 Skypark Drive #310, Torrance, CA 90505, Tel: (310) 530-1008, Fax: (310) 530-8383, E-mail: gan@actainc.com The penetration of roof structures by falling debris can result from explosive accidents occurring on the ground or from launch vehicle accidents at altitude. In either case, roof penetrating debris can cause injuries to building occupants and must be considered when assessing the risk associated with explosive events. To support debris risk modeling, a test series called Spider 1 (Science Panel Impact Damage Evaluation and Review) was defined by the DoD RBESCT (Risk Based Explosives Safety Criteria Team) to evaluate the penetration of steel and concrete impactors through plywood, corrugated metal and reinforced concrete roofs. The paper describes pre-test analyses (both nonlinear DYNA3D and simplified empirical models) performed to aid in the design of test articles for each roof type, and to provide a good starting point for initial tests in terms of impactor size, weight and velocity. This paper serves as a companion paper to the one describing the actual Spider 1 testing and results.
Tan, Su Chern Session 12C
DEVELOPMENT OF DEBRIS BREAKUP MODEL AND ITS INITIAL VERIFICATION AGAINST DLV CLAMPED TEST
Presenter: Su Chern Tan, Defence Science and Technology Agency, 1 Depot Road #12-05, Defence Technology Tower A, Singapore 109679, Tel: +65 6373 3517, Fax: +65 6273 4547, E-mail: tsuchern@dsta.gov.sg Co-Authors: Yong Lu, Nanyang Technological University, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Block N1 #1B-42, Singapore 639798, Tel: +65 6790 5272, Fax: +65 6791 0676, E-mail: cylu@ntu.edu.sg and Kai Xu, Nanyang Technological University, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Block N1 #1B-42, Singapore 639798, Tel: +65 6790 6913, Fax: +65 6791 0676, E-mail: ckxu@ntu.edu.sg Work has been underway between Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) and Nanyang Technological University (NTU) for formulating practical guidelines for the breakup and debris prediction of aboveground concrete magazines. A comprehensive understanding of the breakup mechanism of concrete and reinforced concrete due to internal blast loading was attained with the establishment of a numerical model. The numerical model stems from a two-curve concrete strength 120
model taking into account the effect of hydrostatic pressure on the deviatoric strength of the reinforced concrete, while considering the strain rate effect on the concrete and reinforcement dynamic strength as well. The authors had derived earlier on the strain rate effect on the concrete dynamic strength, based on continuum fracture mechanics and experimental data. An erosion technique is used to capture the breakup process and the debris formation. Initial verification of the model against the DLV Clamped Test conducted by EMI was carried out where promising comparisons on the crack patterns and debris launch velocities between numerically simulated and test data were achieved.
THE UK STRUCTURAL DEBRIS THROW MODEL
Presenter: Frank G. Gouldstone, Cavendish Tricorne Limited, 17 Cavendish Road, Sutton, Surrey SM2 5EY, UK, Tel: +44 20-8643-1627, Fax: +44 208770-0818, E-mail: FrankG@cavendish-tricorne.co.uk
Gouldstone, Frank G. Session 12C
Co-Author: Craig A. Hoing, UK Defence Ordnance Safety Group, DOSG ST5b, Ash 2B #3212, MoD Abbey Wood, Bristol BS34 8JH, UK, Tel: +44 117-91-35005, Fax: +44 117-91—35903, E-mail: dosgst5b@dpa.mod.uk UK interest in debris projected as the result of accidental explosions in brick wall, concrete roof and all-concrete magazines has resulted in the need for a predictive model. In particular the model should cover circumstances where the amount of explosive involved and its loading density in the building are relatively small. Various stages of the development of a prototype model of the break up and dynamics of a brick and mortar walled building with a frangible roof, under impulsive loading were reported at the 28th and 29th DoD Explosives Safety Seminars and at PARARI ‘99. An improved sub-model of the bounce and roll of debris has been added and the model has been extended to deal with brick-walled buildings with a reinforced concrete roof and all-concrete magazines. A brief resumé of the model is given. The paper focuses on the agreement that has been obtained between test results and model predictions of debris distribution, size and mass.
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Döerr, Andreas Session 12C
THE DEBRIS THROW MODEL DHP
Presenter: Andreas Döerr, Fraunhofer-Institut Kurzzeitdynamik, ErnstMach-Institut, Am Klingelberg 1, 79588 Efringen-Kirchen, Germany, Tel: #49 7628 / 9050 – 46, Fax: #49 7628 / 9050 – 77, E-mail: doerr@emi.fhg.de
Co-Authors: Gerhard Guerke, Fraunhofer-Institut Kurzzeitdynamik, Ernst-Mach-Institut Am Klingelberg 1, 79588 Efringen-Kirchen, Germany, Tel: #49 7628 / 9050 – 24, Fax: #49 7628 / 9050 – 77, E-mail: Guerke@Emi.Fhg.De, and Dieter Ruebarsch, Major GAF, Joint Support Command, Militaerischer Anteil Ernst-Mach-Institut, 79588 Efringen-Kirchen, Germany, Tel: #49 7628 / 9050 – 35, Fax: #49 7628 / 9050 – 77, E-mail: Ruebarsch@Emi.Fhg.De Debris throw is one of the major hazards when stored ammunition detonates in a reinforced concrete structures. A debris throw model called Debris Hazard Prediction (DHP) was developed by the Ernst Mach Institute. The input to debris mass distribution, debris launch velocity, launch angles and air drag coefficients is generated based for the most part upon experimental data. With this input and trajectory calculations it is possible to determine the hazardous area due to flying debris.
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