Observations on the Second Presidential Elections of Indonesia, September 20, 2004, Kabupaten of Mimika, Papua Province Brigham Golden Columbia University bmg9@columbia.edu (646) 827-4318
I. Summary: Despite the fact that the final margin separating the candidates reflected the national totals almost exactly, the Second Presidential Election of 2004 (Pilpres II) held in the Kabupaten of Mimika, Papua Province could not be called typical to Indonesia. From an administrative standpoint, the elections in Mimika were far inferior to those observed by international monitors in other parts of the archipelago. And though there is no clear indication the widespread irregularities observed there had a material affect upon the final results, the shortcomings observed and widely reported there could lead to fundamental questions about the legitimacy of future elections in the region. In Mimika, where a large segment of the population is already deeply alienated from the political process, the risks of such a lack of legitimacy are greater, and the possible consequences more acute. Certainly, it must be said, the elections were peaceful—culminating a largely non-violent campaign season. This in itself may be no small feat in a region that has been the site of sectarian conflict fueled by national politics many times in the past—and as recently as last year. Instead, the major troubles in Mimika were administrative, both in planning and on election-day execution. In particular, the absence of voter lists and the disregard for voter identification cards at polls removed major safeguards against multiple voting. Though the possibility of widespread manipulation opened by these administrative deficiencies appears to have been mitigated by the strong presence of party representatives, these failures were widespread and significant. Many of these administrative problems appear to have been related to the local election commission (KPUD). The availability and dispersal of funds by the Commission was greatly reduced for the Pilpres II. The reasons for this were not entirely clear, though were widely believed to be an effect of intense politicization and internal conflict within the Commission which began with the highly contentious (and as yet unresolved) Legislative elections in April 2004. Whatever the cause, the lack of guidance and funding put a great number of local election officials were put in the difficult position of trying to conduct elections with woefully insufficient support. Though most seemed to be doing the best they could under the circumstances, it was clear that the lack of funds in particular had a strongly adverse effect upon the election process. The irony that funding constraints should adversely affect the elections in a newly autonomous and wealthy regency whose local economics and demographic are driven directly or indirectly by the operations of the largest gold and copper mine in the world should be duly noted (although KPU officials did report smoother operations in Tembagapura subdistrict where the company, Freeport Indonesia. provided direct financial and logistical support). Though
even intentional mishandling of funds may reflect only greed, it is also true that funding problems served to remove important safeguards. Whether or not manipulation did occur in the Pilpres II, this did little to assuage the fears of some that might occur—a fear made more acute following the Legislative Elections in April, whose results remain contested due to allegations of manipulation. [See LTO reports for more information on the reported violations from previous rounds] It is particularly important to note that the participation of ethnic Papuans in Indonesian elections seems to have increased significantly since 1999, when perhaps as few as ten percent of all ethnic Papuans in Mimika chose to vote. Though some sources and local media reported that voting participation had diminished between the Legislative Elections (April 10) and Pilpres I (July 5), and expected it too fall further, the change from 1999 was dramatic. Unfortunately, the polling and tabulation sites that most seemed to suffer from administrative deficiencies described above—and thus those most prone to the real possibility of manipulation—were in predominantly Papuan communities. Continued neglect of administrative capacities in these communities will only exacerbate the estrangement that many ethnic Papuans feel with respect to Indonesia’s democratic development. This team believes that ethnic Papuans will be better involved in future elections if they understand the voting process and see that their vote is treated with respect by the administrative institutions. In conclusion, though there is no indication that widespread irregularities had a material effect upon the final margin of the Presidential elections in Mimika, shortcomings such as those observed and were reported elsewhere in the region could lead to questions about the legitimacy of future elections there. We therefore urge all parties to take this opportunity to review deficiencies and improve the administration of future elections in this important region. In particular, we hope that the Indonesian government will focus specific efforts on better integrating and involving ethnic Papuans in the voting process—at all levels.
II. Background Located on the southwestern part of the island of New Guinea, Mimika is distinct from most other parts of Indonesia in a variety of respects. Though half of its population are indigenous Melanesians—Papuans—whose history and culture stands in sharp contrast to the Malays who comprise most of Indonesia, the region is further distinct if compared even to its neighbors in Papua because its demography, economy and politics are dominated by the massive mining operations of a single company, P.T. Freeport Indonesia. Though sharing with the rest of Papua a large number of small communities of largely indigenous Papuans scattered in remote mountains and coastal regions, Mimika’s largest population centers are comprised of immigrants from elsewhere in Indonesia. Though some of these people live as farmers on government-sponsored transmigration sites, the vast majority of immigrants in Mimika have come to participate in the massive economy generated by the mine, and thus live either in communities directly managed by the company (e.g. the exclusive employee towns of Kuala Kencana and Tembagapura) or in urbanizing areas which grow parasitically near the company’s operations (e.g. the rapidly urbanizing and ghettoized city of Timika). With nearly 12,000 employees, PTFIC directly employs well over ten percent of the entire region’s inhabitants.
The Kabupaten of Mimika was formed in 2000 to accommodate the rapid population growth in the region—which sometimes approached 20% a year during the 1990’s. The dramatic growth of Mimika and the wealth of PTFIC’s operations—coupled with the large scale decentralization of power and funding streams under the Law on Special Autonomy—have fostered an increasingly strong Kabupaten government, under Bupati Klemens Tinal.
III. Methods This monitoring team arrived in Mimika on September 18 to research and observe the final planning and execution of the Pilpres II. The team spent September 18 and 19, investigating the final preparations for the elections by meeting with election and party officials, as well as community leaders and local journalists. There were no other election monitors in Mimika, foreign or domestic, although EU monitors had visited the area earlier. This time was also spent preparing for observing voting at polls and tabulation centers on election day. Observing elections—not to mention administering them—in Mimika is not a simple affair. Five of the eight kecamatan in Mimika have polling stations that require boats, planes and, in a few instances, helicopters to access. The team did its best to select locations with an eye to their proximity and the relative diversity of their constituencies. On September 20, the team witnessed nine polling stations (TPS) in two districts (Mimika Baru and Kuala Kencana), as well as a tabulation center in the Desa of Harapan/Kwamki Lama. These locations included a variety of urban and semi-urban locations in the city of Timika, one transmigration site, the PTFIC employee village of Kuala Kencana, and the ethnic Papuan ghetto of Kwamki Lama.
IV. Final Preparations (Sept 18 and 19): Overview: The Regional Election Agency (KPUD) was clearly in disarray at the time of the elections due to ongoing political divisions which dated back to the still unresolved legislative elections in April. Further, funding deficiencies had forced the KPUD to rely heavily on PTFIC and other branches of the government, particularly the Bupati Klemens Tinal— despite the fact that Tinal may have been involved with the problems in April. Due to these troubles the KPUD was unable to distribute honoraria and necessary documents to polling stations and tabulation centers, throughout the Kabupaten. There was even concern that many polling stations would not open. In addition, there was also widespread concern regarding funds for the party representatives of SBY. This stood in stark contrast to Megawati representatives, who had been active in the KPUD and seemed to have significant funding sources. Administrative concerns (conflict and funding troubles at the KPUD):
On Sept 18, the KPUD was in apparent disarray. Five of its six members were there and active, but had not been working, or in any kind of communication with the other—KPUD director Vince Tebay—since the scandal surrounding the legislative elections in April. As it was described to us, the five active members of the KPUD were involved with the filing of allegations against Tebay in a case alleging partisan manipulation by Tebay in apparent conspiracy with the Bupati Klemens Tinal. It was not clear what the status of this case was, though it appeared to remain under investigation but the KPU and perhaps the courts. It is important to note that here was concern among the KPUD staff that this conspiracy was afoot again in the Pilpres II. Further complicating the KPUD’s efforts in Mimika, the KPUD had been given only Rp. 56 million rupiah to manage the Pilpres II by the Provincial KPU. This stood in stark contrast to Pilpres I, when the KPUD had been given Rp. 550 million. Rp. 150 million was being paid directly by the Provincial government to airlines that would handle transport to remote sites because, it was said, the government did not trust the KPUD to handle the money. This massive shortfall had forced the KPUD to ask the Bupati to distribute moneys to local TPS and tabulation officials at the district level so that the election could proceed. Because the Bupati had not been forthcoming about how much it had paid to the districts, there was a fear at the KPU that many the officials at many polling stations would simply refuse to conduct the election on September 20th. Due to its unexpected and last-minute funding constraints the KPUD was forced to rely heavily on the Bupati, Klemens Tinal, the kecamatan heads, and PTFIC to provide transportation and administrative services to all those within its project area in the mountains. The traditional role of kabupaten and kecamatan officials in machine politics in Indonesia raised further concerns about this practice. Party Representatives/ Monitors: There was also significant concerns surrounding the distribution of funds to representatives of SBY candidacy that would serve as witnesses. Money was short (only 100,000 Rp. Per person had been promised), and a large sum (over 40 million Rp) was even reported missing under suspicious circumstances on the day we arrived. On the other hand, Megawati’s representatives had an efficient organization and were distributing money to witnesses during the elections. Though there was a representative of the so called ―Quick Count‖, there were no other monitors—either domestic or international—in the Kabupaten of Mimika at the time of the elections. The coordinator of a domestic observer team during the legislative elections reported that she had lost interest after seeing no action taken by complaints during the previous rounds. Security: Like the previous two elections in 2004, violent conflict was not an issue at the Pilpres II. The relative quiescence of the long electoral season was surprising to many, as Mimika is a region that has been the site of sectarian conflict fueled by national politics on many occasions in the past—and as recently as last year. As it happened, the ebb and flow of conflict in Mimika—
which usually faults along ethnic lines—did not appear to coincide with the oppositional arrangements of party politics during the Presidential election in Mimika. The only suspected exception to this was the role of the Bupati, Klemens Tinal, a local Amungme (local tribesman) who was widely assumed to be a strong Megawati supporter in the Pilpres I, and was in fact possibly related to the unresolved controversies over the Legislative elections as well. V. Voting Day (September 20): Overview: The elections were peaceful, and despite extensive procedural failures by the KPUD that created conditions in which manipulation would be possible, no obvious fraud that might have influenced the outcome was observed. Party witnesses were well-represented—despite concerns that representatives (Tim Sukses) of SBY were too short of funds to field them. Participation of ethnic Papuans seems to have increased significantly since 1999, though some sources reported that it had fallen off between the Legislative elections and Pilpres I, and expected it too fall further. (In fact, front page headlines in both local papers noted the poor turnout). The success of the election, however, was undermined by extensive procedural failures. Few in Mimika received their voter ID cards or an invitation, and voter lists were not available to many polling officials below the kecamatan level, leading to the loss of crucial safeguards and to some confusion among voters. Said one community leader who had not received a card or an invitation the day before the vote, ―before we didn’t want vote. Now we want to but we don’t know were to go.‖ Procedural flaws appeared to be worst among largely ethnic Papuan communities. These procedural flaws seemed to have been caused by the lack of funds and possibly the conflict within the KPU. Aside from the failure to produce and distribute the lists, cards, and invitations, money shortages also led to a drastic reduction of TPS to only 201 for 107,000 voters. At many TPS’ expected voters swelled from 300 to 600 or over 1000. Besides taxing the KPPS, it meant some did not count the ballots at opening because it would have taken too long. Administrative concerns (No safeguards against double voting): We had heard the day before the election from several people that they had not received invitations or voter ID’s. They were not worried about being allowed to vote, since in the previous rounds ID’s had been issued on the spot. On election day we observed virtually no voters registration lists, voter ID’s, or properly executed invitations. One of the nine TPS’s had a registration list but was not using it; they said they would check their handwritten list of voters against the printed list after the voting was over. Several TPS were recording names of voters by hand, and most were checking some form of ID, usually drivers licenses or KTP (or Freeport badges in their administrative center/employee town, a practice that was reportedly okayed by the KPUD). At one TPS a voter who pulled out an ID was harshly reprimanded by the inker, ―Tak Usah KTP!‖ (Don’t bother with an ID!) One of the nine TPS had sent out invitations and was checking them on arrival – the rest were filling
them out on the spot or not bothering with them at all. Ink was being wiped on sponges or rags in more than half of TPS and not checked in any. A discussion with a KPU member the morning after the vote clarified that they were very aware of the above problems. The voter ID cards for the legislative elections had been very inaccurate, with lots of doubles and gaps. People were invited to come to the KPU to get a card before the next round but few did. Cards cost Rp. 5000 and there were no funds for them, so no new ones were issued. The voters list was provided to the kecamatan level (PPK/PPD) but was never distributed to the TPS, in part because there were no funds for photocopying. A member of the KPU staff said that invitation letters were also sent from KPU to PPD/K but ―maybe PPS and TPS did not follow the schedule because funds were minimal.‖ Instead, some made radio announcements about TPS locations two days before. Security Concerns: Many boxes had no locks throughout the day and after closing. In several cases the guards were actually pramuka (boy scouts) temporarily given Limnas uniforms. (Pramuka do have a special role in Indonesia. As one guard explained to me, ―Pramuka works very closely with the policewhenever they have an operation, we’re there too‖). We did not see any indication that they were trying to manipulate the process, though at our closing site one of them was tallying the votes. Counting (Kwamki Lama TPS 5 and PPS) a) At the TPS level there was no C1 available (Panwas later reported a shortage of C1 forms). The tally was written first on scrap paper simultaneously by a Limnas/pramuka guard and by a KPPS staff member (who arrived at the same number), and then transferred to the large format paper. In any case reconciliation would not have been possible since they did not know how many people had voted, and were unsure of the opening number of ballots. (They remembered 13 packets of 50, but they counted 669 used and unused ballots at the end, which was the number at all other TPS in the Kwamki Lama kelurahan and was probably correct.) A policeman was recording the results to send to the police station for what appeared to be an official parallel count process. b) PPS tabulation: This took place on the front porch of the Lurah’s office. The Lurah was nominally in charge and was recording basic information (total, spoiled, unused, SBY, Mega, invalid) on scrap paper as it came in. (He said he had stepped into the role after a PPS staff member had fled an ethnic conflict (perang suku) several months ago). The porch was crowded with uniformed and plainclothes police, a couple of party witnesses, a member of Panwas, and KPPS staff arriving with their ballot boxes. A few of the 10-15 policemen took an active role, receiving the boxes, writing the TPS numbers on the tops with markers, directing arriving information. It is possible that the loosely recorded data was later transferred to the appropriate sheet (D1) but there was no sign of them when we left, with two TPS still to arrive. The TPS we observed closing had forgotten to put the empty ballots in the box – when this was discovered the box was opened, the ballots placed inside, and the box locked and resealed with
scotch tape. This was reassuring, since several hundred blank ballots would have been tempting to anyone with fraud in mind. Many of the boxes were not locked and sealed, possibly because materials had been left in or out (as other international monitors reported) or because no locks had been provided. A visit to the PPK (called a PPD for distrik in Papua) at the Mimika Baru kecamatan office the next morning found boxes had arrived from 8 kelurahan, with 4 still to go (including Kwamki Lama). The process was being managed by a professional looking staff member on loan from the church who was recording results at his desk. (4200 for SBY to 2114 Mega based on the small kelurahans already reporting). He hoped the rest would be in by mid-day and planned to a public tabulation with PPS staff and witnesses present. He said they had received no money since Pilpres I but had continued to work out of a feeling of nationalism. Incidents: We heard from a plainclothes policeman police and from the Panwas member that at TPS 11/12 in Kwamki Lama an SBY supporter had punched 36 ballots before being caught. He was described as a party witness delivering food boxes (though papers the next day described him as someone who the SBY Tim Sukses member had picked up on his way to the TPS). He was reportedly detained and taken to the Polsek in Kuala Kencana. The press reported on it thoroughly and it seemed to have been taken seriously by Panwas and the police. In Pilpres I, some 1200 ballots were illegally punched for SBY in the same kelurahan. At the Kwamki Lama PPS we were shown results from TPS 7 in which of 669 votes, Mega won 668 (with one spoiled). At TPS 6 it was something like 600 to 30 in Mega’s favor. While suspicious, there is no way to tell to what extent there was manipulation or at what stage. Since people were free to vote anywhere, it is possible that Mega supporters were delivered to these TPS, rather than intimidated once they got there. [Note: The TPS was administered and patronized by members of the Moni ethnic group, generally not known to follow orders but somewhat easily bought]. There is more circumstantial evidence in the September 21 local paper, which quoted a member of Tim Sukses SBY that the candidate’s witnesses were barred from entering TPS 6 and 7. Tim SBY was said to be ―investigating‖ and would bring a complaint to Panwaslu if they found cause. Tembagapura (second-hand information): We did not try to visit Tembagapura on election day, since driving an hour a way in a Freeport vehicle seemed impractical. Efforts to arrange a visit the next morning ran into polite resistance, possibly due to the short notice. A KPU member, who we had found to be very open at our previous meeting, spent the day up there and reported the next day that things went well with the help of good KPPS staff and Freeport helicopters to deliver materials to remote regions. She said participation was low, as some people misunderstood the process of the legislative elections and were angry that local candidates they had voted for did not receive seats. Others in Waa reportedly were not interested in voting unless they were paid. TPS level voter lists were provided and were being checked off. Of 19728 registered voters, 8291 voted. Twelve buses of employees on their day off left Tembagapura – it’s not clear if or
where they voted. Preliminary results: SBY: 4870, Mega: 3298. There were no Mega witnesses, and 16 SBY witnesses for 27 TPS.