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Intensifying Diplomacy on Sudan

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					                                 Intensifying Diplomacy on Sudan
                          Payton L. Knopf, International Affairs Fellow in Residence
                                               October 4, 2010



President Barack Obama's presence at a high-level meeting on Sudan at the United Nations on
September 24 was the most recent sign of his administration's intensified diplomatic efforts to avert a
catastrophic return to war in Africa's largest state. On January 9, southern Sudan is scheduled to vote
in two referenda. One is on self-determination for the south; the other is on the disposition of the oil-
rich and ethnically divided region of Abyei. Both are cornerstones of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) that ended Sudan's civil war.


After reports of internal Obama administration squabbling over whether and how to engage with the
government in Khartoum, the president's presence at the UN meeting, the roll-out of a new U.S.
strategy on Sudan ten days earlier, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent phone calls and
meetings with senior northern and southern leaders all seemed designed to promote policy coherence
and message discipline.


The next three months will test whether this approach succeeds in inducing the key political actors in
Sudan to manage successfully the referenda and the post-referenda environment. Four factors will
determine its effectiveness:


1) Having refocused efforts on Sudan, the administration must sustain its diplomatic approach,
maintaining unity both within the U.S. government and among the key international stakeholders of
the CPA


2) The administration must work with the parties and other stakeholders to reconcile the tension
between the credibility of the referenda--preparations for which are woefully behind schedule--with
the date of the referenda, which is sacrosanct for southern Sudanese


3) Western governments, and the United States in particular, must establish a framework for their
post-referenda relationship with northern Sudan


4) U.S. goals and strategy for addressing the situation in Darfur must be articulated in more detail
and must be consistent with efforts to promote fulfillment of the CPA.


Maintaining Diplomatic Unity


The Obama administration's renewed engagement has been rightly applauded by the media and by
advocacy groups. However, expectations are now higher than ever that Washington can steer the
parties toward an outcome in January that upholds the core of the CPA--including southern Sudan's
right to self-determination--but avoids a return to war sparked by disputes over borders or the
disposition of the oil fields.
If fair, a referendum on self-determination will certainly lead to southern independence, while flawed
referenda are likely to spawn attempts by Khartoum to deny the results, as well as to embolden other
African voices opposed to secessionist movements.


The stakes are high. Collapse of Sudan into civil war will undercut U.S. credibility as a peacemaker in
Africa and further destabilize one of the world's most volatile regions. Civil war will also erode
confidence in African states' ability to resolve the continent's conflicts--given that both the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU) were witnesses to
the CPA--and exacerbate tensions throughout Africa over the issue of self-determination for
secessionist movements.


The September 24 meeting and resulting communiqué demonstrated solidarity within the
international community on the importance of credible and on-time referenda, of developing post-
referenda arrangements between north and south, and of acknowledging that the parties' obligations
to the CPA do not end on January 9. Consistent re-affirmation of these benchmarks will be critical to
pushing the parties to overcome the political and logistical obstacles to the referenda over the next
one hundred days. The planned visit by a UN Security Council delegation to Sudan this week provides
an opportunity for reiterating publicly the international expectations of the parties. In addition,
Uganda, the UK, and the United States--each with a stake in Sudan--hold the presidency of the
Security Council in October, November, and December, respectively. A Council resolution during this
period would send a further signal of the seriousness of purpose embodied in the September 24
communiqué.


Reconciling Credible and Timely Referenda


The tension between credible referenda and timely referenda present another challenge. As a result of
political machinations between the parties, the institutions for administering the referenda are
nascent or yet to be established, meaning technical preparations--including design of the ballot and
voter registration--are behind schedule. Re-energized engagement by the international community on
this issue, including the UN secretary-general's appointment on September 21 of a panel to assist and
monitor execution of the referenda, are laudable.


However, the United States and other stakeholders must assess whether credible referenda are
possible on January 9 given the current state of preparations. They must also, without inadvertently
encouraging northern obstructionism, begin to develop alternative scenarios through quiet
discussions with the parties. If fair, a referendum on self-determination will certainly lead to southern
independence, while flawed referenda are likely to spawn attempts by Khartoum to deny the results,
as well as to embolden other African voices opposed to secessionist movements.


Establishing a Framework for U.S.-Sudan Relations


On September 14, the U.S. government outlined four stages for improved U.S.-Sudan relations. U.S.
engagement on Sudan has long centered on setting benchmarks for normalized relations and
consequences for failure to comply, with mixed results. The CPA timeline and a reinvigorated focus on
Sudan throughout the international community may provide added leverage for securing Sudanese
compliance with this latest set of stages. But the United States must be prepared for Sudan to fall
short on one or more, even if the referenda and the transition to southern Sudanese independence can
be managed without mass hostilities.


The difficulty in addressing the situation posed by the International Criminal Court's (ICC)
indictment of President Omar al-Bashir on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity is an
example of the risks inherent in a "carrots and sticks" approach. President Obama iterated during the
UN meeting that "there can be no lasting peace in Darfur--and no normalization of relations between
Sudan and the United States--without accountability for crimes that have been committed." But there
is little likelihood that Sudan will turn over Bashir to the ICC, and therefore every chance that the
relationship it seeks with the United States cannot be realized. Given that the northern elite's desire
for better relations with the U.S. constitutes Washington's principle source of leverage, this inherent
dichotomy decreases U.S. capacity to affect a change in Khartoum's behavior.


U.S. policymakers should therefore focus more on exploring how to engage Khartoum than on
whether to engage Khartoum, since the United States will have abiding policy interests concerning
Sudan for years to come. Reports that one of the State Department's most senior and well-respected
diplomats will be sent to Khartoum as chargé d'affaires in the near future is an important step in
moving beyond using the assignment of senior diplomats as a reward to the regime. The complexity
and seriousness of U.S. interests requires sustained, adept diplomacy to achieve U.S. objectives.


Redefining Goals for Darfur


U.S. policymakers should therefore focus more on exploring how to engage Khartoum than on
whether to engage Khartoum, since the United States will have abiding policy interests concerning
Sudan for years to come.


Finally, the administration will have to confront the shifting reality in Darfur. The UN-AU
peacekeeping force alone cannot resolve the underlying tensions in that region and, in fact, has not
proven able to stem the rising violence. The political morass of competing and ever-splintering rebel
groups and competition among tribes, often fed by Khartoum, pushes prospects of long-term stability
further into the distance.


An important step toward progress would be for the United States to build a new international
consensus defining "resolution of the Darfur conflict." Darfur likely will remain a volatile region for
some time, but the international community could pursue realistic goals for ending the most
egregious violence; fulfilling Darfuris' aspirations for autonomy, compensation, and wealth-sharing;
and fostering inter-tribal reconciliation. After years of stalled peace agreements and internationally
sponsored negotiations that lead to minimal progress, improved conditions in Darfur are most likely
to be achieved in discrete diplomacy with Khartoum, with Darfur rebel leaders, and with key tribal
constituencies rather than in high-profile negotiating sessions in foreign capitals.
Having invested in supporting the CPA, with its massive reform of Sudan's governing structure--a
commitment reaffirmed by the Obama administration and other international stakeholders last week-
-the United States and its partners must sustain serious and coordinated high-level engagement. The
country's challenges will continue to be myriad, but a loss of focus and dilution of diplomatic cohesion
over the coming months will have dramatic consequences for the stability of the country and for U.S.
interests in the region.


The author is a Foreign Service officer in the U.S. Department of State currently in a fellowship at
the Council on Foreign Relations. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. government, or the Council
on Foreign Relations.

				
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