International Fuel Cycle
60th Anniversary of the founding of the Federation of American Scientists
National Press Club, Washington, DC, 30 November 2005, 10:15 AM
Frank von Hippel
Princeton University
Acheson-Lillienthal (Oppenheimer) Report
(1946)
“…there is no prospect of security against atomic warfare in a
system of international agreements to outlaw such weapons
controlled only by a system which relies on inspection and
similar police-like methods.
“The reasons… are not merely technical but primarily the
inseparable political, social, and organizational problems
involved in enforcing agreements between nations, each free to
developed atomic energy but only pledged not to use bombs.
“So long as intrinsically dangerous activities may be carried out by
nations, rivalries are inevitable and fears are engendered that
place so great a pressure on a systematic enforcement by
police methods that no degree of ingenuity or technical
competence could possibly cope with them.”
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Acheson-Lillienthal Recommendation
International Atomic Development Authority would
control all “dangerous” activities and materials,
including:
• Enrichment
• Reprocessing
• HEU and Pu
Idea revived after 1974 Indian test of “peaceful nuclear
explosive” using Atoms for Peace plutonium
After Iran’s uranium-enrichment program became known
in 2003, IAEA Director General ElBaradei proposed
that fuel-cycle facilities be under “multilateral” control.
Iran has offered to put its enrichment program under
multinational control.
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The system we have
“Inalienable right” to nuclear technology for “peaceful purposes
without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II”
(NPT, Article IV)
IAEA inspections in non-weapon states
Export restraints (Nuclear-Supplier’s Group, U.N. Security Council
resolution 1540)
Arrangements to intercept clandestine exports (Proliferation Security
Initiative)
Multinational pressure & incentives for suspect countries not to
acquire (E3 on Iran)
Proposals for fuel-service guarantees if you are in compliance with
NPT and do not acquire a fuel-cycle facility.
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Three elements for a more multinational system
(some ideas stimulated by a Princeton student workshop)
1. Discourage national enrichment plants in states
with small nuclear generating capacity.
2. Encourage multinational arrangements for
centrifuge enrichment plants.
3. Encourage multinational interim spent-fuel storage
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1. Discourage national enrichment plants in states
with small nuclear generating capacity.
Look at history!
Haves (end 2003 capacity in GWe) Have Nots
-- U.S. (96) -- South Korea (15)
-- France (63) -- Canada (12, natural uranium fueled)
-- Japan (44) -- Ukraine (11)
-- Russia (21) -- Sweden (9)
-- Germany (21, part of a multinational) -- Spain (7)
-- U. K. (12, part of multinational) -- Belgium (6)
-- China (6, part of multinational) -- Taiwan (5)
-- India (3, for naval reactors) --Switzerland (3)
-- Brazil (2, originally for weapons & navy) -- Bulgaria (3)
-- S. Africa (2, shutdown:originally for weapons) --Finland (3)
--Argentina (1, shutdown: originally for weapons) -- Slovak Republic (2)
-- Iran? (1) -- Hungary (2)
-- Netherlands (0.5, part of a multinational) --Czech Republic (2)
-- Pakistan (0.5, for weapons) -- Mexico (1)
-- DPRK? (0, for weapons) --Slovenia (0.6)
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2. Encourage multinational arrangements for
centrifuge enrichment plants
In particular, don’t proliferate the technology!
It is happening already!
Urenco: Centrifuges made in the Netherlands used in Netherlands,
U.K., Germany & (soon) France and the U.S.
Tenex (Russia): Centrifuges made in Russia used in plants in
Russia and China.
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3. Encourage multinational interim spent-fuel storage
Reprocessing will not be economic before global nuclear
generating capacity climbs from 360 GWe to >> 3000
GWe.*
Long-term foreign spent-fuel storage for non-weapon
states with less than 5 GWe (8% of global capacity)
would reduce number of non-weapon states with old
spent fuel from from 24 to 8 (Belgium, Canada, Germany,
Japan, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, [and Ukraine, which already
exports its spent fuel to Russia]).
-- Russia is interested. High international standards should be
set.
-- Politically difficult in U.S. but we are already doing it for foreign
spent research-reactor fuel
*”The Economics of Reprocessing Versus Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel” by Matthew Bunn, Steve Fetter,
John Holdren and Bob van der Zwaan, Nuclear Technology 150, 2005, pp. 209-230. 8