1
Union Calendar No. 555
110TH CONGRESS REPORT
" HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES !
2d Session 110–858
MISLEADING INFORMATION FROM THE
BATTLEFIELD: THE TILLMAN AND LYNCH
EPISODES
FIRST REPORT
BY THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOGETHER WITH
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
SEPTEMBER 16, 2008.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69–006 PDF WASHINGTON : 2008
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York TOM DAVIS, Virginia
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania DAN BURTON, Indiana
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio JOHN L. MICA, Florida
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri CHRIS CANNON, Utah
DIANE E. WATSON, California JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York DARRELL E. ISSA, California
JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky KENNY MARCHANT, Texas
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina
Columbia VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
JIM COOPER, Tennessee BILL SALI, Idaho
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland JIM JORDAN, Ohio
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
PETER WELCH, Vermont
JACKIE SPEIER, California
PHIL BARNETT, Staff Director
EARLEY GREEN, Chief Clerk
LAWRENCE HALLORAN, Minority Staff Director
(II)
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, September 16, 2008.
Hon. NANCY PELOSI,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MS. SPEAKER: By direction of the Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee’s first
report to the 110th Congress.
HENRY A. WAXMAN,
Chairman.
(III)
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CONTENTS
Page
Executive Summary ................................................................................................. 1
I. Investigations into Corporal Tillman’s Death ............................................. 6
A. Investigations by the Department of Defense ................................... 6
B. The Committee’s Investigation ........................................................... 9
II. Chronology of Events Related to Corporal Tillman .................................... 11
A. The Military Service of Corporal Patrick Tillman ............................ 11
B. Initial Pentagon Reactions .................................................................. 11
C. Early Reports of Friendly Fire ........................................................... 13
D. The Silver Star Award and Corporal Tillman’s Memorial Service .. 15
E. The Announcement of the Fratricide ................................................. 16
III. The White House Response ........................................................................... 20
A. News Breaks at White House ............................................................. 20
B. Statement Issued Prematurely ........................................................... 22
C. Discussion of Corporal Tillman in Presidential Speech ................... 24
D. Knowledge of Fratricide ...................................................................... 27
IV. Secretary Rumsfeld’s Response .................................................................... 29
V. General Myers’s Response ............................................................................. 32
VI. General Abizaid’s Response .......................................................................... 35
VII. The Response of Other Senior Military Leaders ......................................... 36
A. General Bryan Brown .......................................................................... 36
B. Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger ................................................ 37
VIII. The Response to the Capture and Rescue of Private Jessica Lynch 41
A. Private Lynch’s Capture and Rescue ................................................. 41
B. The Dissemination of Inaccurate Information .................................. 41
C. The Response of Public Affairs Officials ............................................ 45
IX. Other Cases Brought to the Committee’s Attention ................................... 46
X. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 47
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
Additional Views of Hon. Tom Davis ..................................................................... 50
(V)
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Union Calendar No. 555
110TH CONGRESS REPORT
" HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES !
2d Session 110–858
MISLEADING INFORMATION FROM THE BATTLEFIELD: THE
TILLMAN AND LYNCH EPISODES
SEPTEMBER 16, 2008.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. HENRY A. WAXMAN, from the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, submitted the following
FIRST REPORT
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
On July 17, 2008, the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform approved and adopted a report entitled ‘‘Misleading Infor-
mation from the Battlefield: The Tillman and Lynch Episodes.’’ The
chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the
House.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report summarizes what the Oversight Committee has
learned about (1) the misleading information given to the Tillman
family and the public following the death of Corporal Patrick Till-
man on April 22, 2004, and (2) the misleading information released
about the capture and rescue of Private Jessica Lynch in Iraq in
March and April, 2003.
Corporal Tillman and Private Lynch are the two most famous
soldiers in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The misinformation in
both their cases is an unconscionable distraction from their actual
service and heroism. Their dedication to country and willingness to
voluntarily put themselves at great risk are extraordinary exam-
ples of patriotism and bravery.
The military has conducted seven separate investigations into
Corporal Tillman’s death by friendly fire in the mountains of Af-
ghanistan. Two early Army investigations focused on reconstruct-
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2
ing the events that resulted in the shooting. The scope of later in-
vestigations was broadened to include evaluations of whether mili-
tary officials complied with the Army’s casualty notification regula-
tions, whether military personnel involved in Corporal Tillman’s
death committed criminal acts, and whether the previous investiga-
tions had been properly conducted.
These investigations have looked down the chain of command, re-
sulting in punishment or reprimands for enlisted personnel and of-
ficers who acted improperly before and after Corporal Tillman’s
death. To date, the highest ranking officer to receive a punishment
related to Corporal Tillman’s death is a three-star general.
In contrast, the Committee’s investigation into Corporal Till-
man’s fratricide has looked up the chain of command. The purpose
of the investigation has been to determine what the top officials at
the White House and the Defense Department knew about Cor-
poral Tillman’s fratricide, when they knew this, and what they did
with their knowledge.
The Committee’s investigation adds many new details to the Till-
man story. But on the key issue of what senior officials knew, the
investigation was frustrated by a near universal lack of recall. The
Committee interviewed several senior officials at the White House,
including Communications Director Dan Bartlett, Press Secretary
Scott McClellan, and chief speechwriter Michael Gerson. Not a sin-
gle one could recall when he learned about the fratricide or what
he did in response.
Similarly, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told the Com-
mittee: ‘‘I don’t recall when I was told and I don’t recall who told
me.’’
The highest-ranking official who could recall being informed
about Corporal Tillman’s fratricide was former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers, who said, ‘‘I knew
right at the end of April, that there was a possibility of fratricide
in the Corporal Tillman death.’’ General Myers testified that it
would have been ‘‘logical’’ for him to pass this information to Sec-
retary Rumsfeld, but said ‘‘I just don’t recall whether I did it or
not.’’ He also said he could not recall ‘‘ever having a discussion
with anybody in the White House about the Tillman case, one way
or another.’’
The Committee’s investigation into the inaccurate accounts of
Private Lynch’s capture and rescue also encountered a consistent
lack of recollection. Witnesses who should have possessed relevant
information were interviewed by the Committee. They said they
had no knowledge of how the report that Private Lynch fired her
weapon and was wounded during her capture was spread to the
media and the public. Nor could they explain why it took so long
for the military to correct the inaccurate story of the ‘‘little girl
Rambo from the hills of West Virginia’’ that was widely reported
during the opening days of the Iraq war.
THE WHITE HOUSE RESPONSE TO CORPORAL TILLMAN’S DEATH
The death of Corporal Tillman on April 22, 2004, generated a
flurry of attention and action inside the White House. On the day
following his death, April 23, White House officials sent or received
nearly 200 e-mails concerning Corporal Tillman. Several e-mails
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came from staff members on President Bush’s reelection campaign,
who urged the President to respond publicly to Corporal Tillman’s
death. The White House did respond, rushing out a statement not-
withstanding a Department of Defense policy intended to provide
a 24-hour period for private grieving before officials publicly dis-
cuss a casualty.
In comparison to the extensive White House activity that fol-
lowed Corporal Tillman’s death, the complete absence of any com-
munications about his fratricide is hard to understand. The Com-
mittee requested all White House documents related to Corporal
Tillman. The White House provided what it described as a com-
plete response, giving the Committee access to approximately 1,500
pages of e-mails and other documents and withholding only drafts
of a speech in which the President discussed Corporal Tillman. Yet
there is not a single discussion of the fratricide in any of these com-
munications.
On April 29, 2004, Major General Stanley McChrystal sent a
‘‘personal for’’ or ‘‘P4’’ memorandum up his chain of command. This
memo warned that the President might be preparing a speech
about Corporal Tillman without knowing that he was killed by
friendly fire, and it urged the generals receiving the memo to pre-
vent any ‘‘unknowing statements by our country’s leaders which
might cause public embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal
Tillman’s death become public.’’ When the President spoke about
Corporal Tillman’s death in a speech at the White House Cor-
respondents’ Dinner two days later, the President commented on
Corporal Tillman’s character and his sacrifice in enlisting, but did
not address the circumstances of Corporal Tillman’s death.
The Committee interviewed seven officials in the White House
about the response to Corporal Tillman’s death. Universally, these
officials said they could not recall when they learned about the
fratricide or when the President learned. Former presidential
speechwriter Michael Gerson, who worked on the President’s May
1 speech at the Correspondents’ Dinner, said that he could not re-
member when he learned about the friendly fire, whether he knew
about it while preparing the Correspondents’ Dinner speech, or
whether he ever discussed the fratricide with the President.
Former Communications Director Dan Bartlett said he did not
have a ‘‘specific recollection’’ of when he learned of the friendly fire.
Asked whether he informed the President of the fratricide, he stat-
ed, ‘‘I don’t remember a particular conversation, but I can’t rule out
that I talked to him about it.’’ Former Press Secretary Scott
McClellan said he also could not remember when he or the Presi-
dent learned about the fratricide.
SECRETARY RUMSFELD’S RESPONSE TO CORPORAL TILLMAN’S DEATH
Secretary Rumsfeld took a personal interest in Pat Tillman’s en-
listment in the U.S. Army Rangers in 2002. Just after Corporal
Tillman enlisted, Secretary Rumsfeld sent him a personal note
commending him for his ‘‘proud and patriotic’’ decision. Around the
same time, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote a ‘‘snowflake’’ memorandum
to the Secretary of the Army, noting that Corporal Tillman
‘‘sound[s] like he is world-class’’ and saying, ‘‘We might want to
keep our eye on him.’’
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Testifying before the Committee, Secretary Rumsfeld said he had
no recollection of when he learned about the fratricide or what he
did in response. He testified, ‘‘I don’t recall when I was told and
I don’t recall who told me. But my recollection is that it was at a
stage when there were investigations under way.’’
GENERAL MYERS’S RESPONSE TO CORPORAL TILLMAN’S DEATH
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard
Myers, learned of Corporal Tillman’s death soon after it occurred.
One day after Corporal Tillman’s death, General Myers called the
commissioner of the National Football League to inform him of the
incident.
General Myers also learned quickly about the possible fratricide.
He told the Committee that he knew by the end of April, but could
not recall whether he informed Secretary Rumsfeld or President
Bush. General Myers did recall discussing the fratricide with his
public affairs advisor, telling him, ‘‘We need to keep this in mind
in case we go before the press. We’ve just got to calibrate ourselves.
With this investigation ongoing, we want to be careful how we por-
tray the situation.’’ General Myers told the Committee that he had
no responsibility to share the information about the possible frat-
ricide with the Tillman family or the public.
GENERAL ABIZAID’S RESPONSE TO CORPORAL TILLMAN’S DEATH
General John Abizaid, commanding general at CENTCOM and
the main addressee on General McChrystal’s P4 message, testified
that due to a delay at his headquarters, he did not receive the P4
message until approximately May 6, 2004, a week after it was sent.
When he finally received the message, he immediately called the
Joint Chiefs chairman, General Myers, and discovered that General
Myers was already aware of the potential fratricide.
General Abizaid also testified that after returning from theater
to Washington, DC, he informed Secretary Rumsfeld sometime be-
tween May 18 and May 20, 2004, that ‘‘there was an investigation
that was ongoing, and it looked like it was friendly fire.’’
THE RESPONSE OF OTHER SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS TO CORPORAL
TILLMAN’S DEATH
The Committee investigated the response of other top military
leaders in Corporal Tillman’s chain of command, including General
Bryan Brown of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and
Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger of U.S. Army Special Oper-
ations Command (USASOC). General Brown testified to the Com-
mittee that he received General McChrystal’s P4 message in late
April, but made no effort to notify his superiors or the Tillman fam-
ily about the potential fratricide. He said he made the ‘‘bad as-
sumption’’ that these tasks would be handled by the ‘‘normal chain
of command.’’
General Kensinger declined to testify before the Committee in
August 2007, but later agreed to be interviewed by Committee
staff. He acknowledged that he did not inform the Tillman family
as soon as he found out about the potential fratricide, but claimed
that he only learned about the fratricide after attending the May
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3, 2004, memorial for Corporal Tillman. This version of events was
contradicted by General Kensinger’s deputy, Brigadier General
Howard Yellen, who told Committee staff that he spoke with Gen-
eral Kensinger about the fratricide within two or three days after
it occurred. It was also contradicted by Lieutenant Colonel David
Duffy, who testified that he personally delivered the P4 message to
General Kensinger three days before the memorial service, and by
Colonel Clarence Chinn, deputy commander of the 75th Ranger
Regiment, who testified that General Kensinger informed him that
Corporal Tillman’s death was a possible fratricide.
THE RESPONSE TO THE CAPTURE AND RESCUE OF PRIVATE JESSICA
LYNCH
In the opening days of the Iraq war, a false account of the cap-
ture and rescue of Private Jessica Lynch became a front-page story
across the country. Defense Department officials have openly ac-
knowledged that the account of Private Jessica Lynch’s capture and
rescue in the opening days of the Iraq war was an ‘‘awesome story,’’
but they could not explain to the Committee how and why the em-
bellished account became so widely disseminated. Key public af-
fairs officials told the Committee they could not recall any details
of the Jessica Lynch incident.
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I. INVESTIGATIONS INTO CORPORAL TILLMAN’S DEATH
A. INVESTIGATIONS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
There have been seven investigations conducted by the Depart-
ment of Defense into the death of Corporal Tillman in Afghanistan
on April 22, 2004, and the Department’s response. Each investiga-
tion has had serious flaws or limitations on its scope.
In the days following Corporal Tillman’s death, the 2nd Battalion
of the 75th Ranger Regiment conducted an Army Regulation 15–
6 investigation (commonly referred to as a ‘‘15–6’’ investigation)
into the circumstances surrounding the casualty.1 This investiga-
tion reportedly concluded that Corporal Tillman’s death was a like-
ly fratricide.2 In a subsequent review of this investigation, the De-
fense Department Inspector General concluded that it was ‘‘tainted
by the failure to preserve evidence, a lack of thoroughness, and the
failure to pursue investigative leads.’’ 3
In early May, the commander of the 75th Regiment decided not
to approve the battalion-level investigation because ‘‘he did not find
the work thorough or complete and concluded further investigation
by someone more senior from the regimental level was required.’’ 4
He instead authorized a new regimental-level 15–6 investigation,
which was approved by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) on
May 28, 2004.5 This investigation concluded that ‘‘CPL Tillman’s
death was the result of fratricide during an extremely chaotic
enemy ambush.’’ 6 The Inspector General found this second 15–6 in-
vestigation also ‘‘lacked credibility,’’ in part because the investiga-
tor ‘‘failed to visit the scene,’’ ‘‘failed to identify and interview rel-
evant witnesses,’’ and drew conclusions that ‘‘were not based on
evidence included in the report.’’ 7
In August 2004, after an inquiry from the Tillman family, Army
officials discovered that another investigation required by Army
regulations, a ‘‘safety investigation,’’ had not been initiated.8 Three
months later, in October 2004, the friendly fire incident was belat-
edly reported to the Army’s Safety Center, which produced a report
1 Captain Richard M. Scott, Commander, Headquarters & Headquarter Company, 2nd Battal-
ion, 75th Ranger Regiment, AR 15–6 Final Report [Incomplete Draft] (Apr. 29, 2004).
2 Id. Although a complete draft of Captain Scott’s report has not been located, the Department
of Defense Inspector General collected available drafts and exhibits and identified Captain
Scott’s major findings. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Re-
lated to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 7 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).
3 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death
of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 2 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).
4 Id. at 20.
5 U.S. Central Command, Report of Fratricide Investigation (May 28, 2004) (containing May
8, 2004, AR 15–6 report by Lieutenant Colonel Ralph L. Kauzlarich, Executive Officer, 75th
Ranger Regiment).
6 Id. at 1.
7 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death
of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 2, 31–32 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).
8 Id. Army rules require both a 15–6 ‘‘legal’’ investigation and a prompt safety investigation
in cases of fratricide. Army Regulation 385–40 (1994); DOD Instruction 6055.7 (2000).
(6)
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in December of that year.9 The safety report concluded that a ‘‘high
volume of fire’’ from several Rangers ‘‘struck one of the Rangers in
the fighting position, fatally wounding him.’’ 10
In response to further inquiries from the Tillman family, the
Army’s Special Operations Command (USASOC) authorized in No-
vember 2004 another 15–6 investigation into the events surround-
ing Corporal Tillman’s death. This investigation was completed in
January 2005.11 The scope of this investigation included not only
the circumstances of Corporal Tillman’s death, but also subsequent
communications within Corporal Tillman’s chain of command.12
One of this investigation’s conclusions was that the Army’s failure
to immediately tell the Tillman family about the fratricide sus-
picions was ‘‘due to a desire to complete the investigation and gath-
er all available facts, so as not to give the family an inaccurate or
incomplete picture of what happened.’’ 13
Reviewing this third 15–6 investigation, the Defense Department
Inspector General concluded that the report ‘‘did not address ac-
countability for failures by the chain of command—to comply with
Army policy for reporting and investigating friendly fire incidents,
to coordinate with other investigative authorities, to provide timely
information concerning suspected friendly fire to CPL Tillman’s
next of kin, and to ensure accuracy in documentation submitted in
support of the Silver Star’’ posthumously awarded to Corporal Till-
man.14
After Corporal Tillman’s family and others questioned the thor-
oughness and objectivity of this fourth Army investigation, the De-
partment of Defense Inspector General and the Army Criminal In-
vestigation Command (CID) undertook concurrent investigations
into Corporal Tillman’s death. The results of these two investiga-
tions were provided to the Acting Secretary of the Army, Pete
Geren, on March 26, 2007.15
The IG investigation found that ‘‘Corporal Tillman’s chain of
command made critical errors in reporting Corporal Tillman’s
death and in assigning investigative jurisdiction in the days follow-
ing his death.’’ 16 The IG also determined that a Silver Star post-
humously awarded to Corporal Tillman was based on documents
with ‘‘materially inaccurate statements’’ that ‘‘erroneously implied
that CPL Tillman died by enemy fire.’’ 17 An official from the In-
spector General’s office testified before the Committee that the IG
concluded that two statements written in support of the Silver Star
award had been altered ‘‘somewhere in the approval chain.’’ 18 But
he stated that his office did not attempt to determine which com-
9 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death
of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).
10 U.S. Army Safety Center, U.S. Army Accident Report, Date of Accident 040422 (undated).
11 Brigadier General Gary M. Jones, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Regula-
tion (AR) 15–6 Investigation—CPL Patrick Tillman (Jan. 7, 2005).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 10.
14 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death
of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 3 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 2.
17 Id. at 54.
18 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Thomas Gimble, Act-
ing Defense Department Inspector General, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battle-
field, 110th Cong., at 99 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110–54).
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puters were used to alter the statements or who had access to the
statements when they were altered.19 Nevertheless, the IG con-
cluded that Corporal Tillman’s ‘‘immediate superiors believed his
actions merited the award’’ notwithstanding the friendly fire.20
The CID investigation concluded that the soldiers who fired at
Corporal Tillman ‘‘believed they were under enemy fire and were
returning fire at enemy combatants.’’ 21
Neither the IG nor the CID investigation examined the actions
of top military leaders including the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For example, neither report
determined whether these leaders were forwarded General
McChrystal’s P4 message.
On the same day the IG and CID reports were completed, March
26, 2007, Acting Secretary Geren directed the commander of the
Army Training and Doctrine Command, General William Wallace,
to independently review the findings of the earlier investigations
into Corporal Tillman’s death.22 As a four-star general and one of
the highest-ranking officers in the Army, General Wallace had the
authority to independently investigate the matter and discipline of-
ficers below his rank.
On July 31, 2007, the Army wrote Chairman Waxman and Rank-
ing Member Tom Davis that General Wallace had completed his re-
view and generally supported the findings of the IG and CID inves-
tigations.23 This letter also informed the Committee that General
Wallace had sanctioned seven officers for their actions in the after-
math of Corporal Tillman’s death.24 The officers sanctioned in-
cluded four general officers and three field-grade officers. The high-
est-ranking officer to be sanctioned was now-retired Lieutenant
General Philip Kensinger, the former commander of the Army’s
Special Operations Command (USASOC).25
Also on July 31, 2007, Army Secretary Pete Geren publicly an-
nounced General Wallace’s findings. Although he denied that there
was a ‘‘conspiracy . . . to deceive the public,’’ he stated:
[T]here was a perfect storm of mistakes, misjudgments,
and a failure of leadership that brought us where we are
today, with the Army’s credibility in question about a mat-
ter that strikes at the very heart of Army core values—our
commitment to our fallen soldiers and their grieving fami-
lies; soldiers’ loyalty to fallen soldiers.26
19 Id.
20 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death
of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 54 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).
21 U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, Report of Investigation into Death of Corporal
Tillman and AMF Soldier Thani, at 2 (Mar. 19, 2007).
22 Executive Summary, Army Action—Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) Report
Related to the Death of Corporal (CPL) Patrick D. Tillman (undated).
23 Letter from Major General Galen B. Jackman, Chief of Legislative Liaison, U.S. Army, to
Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (July
31, 2007); Letter from Major General Galen B. Jackman, Chief of Legislative Liaison, U.S.
Army, to Tom Davis, Ranking Member, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
(July 31, 2007).
24 Id.; see also Executive Summary, Army Action—Department of Defense Inspector General
(DoDIG) Report Related to the Death of Corporal (CPL) Patrick D. Tillman (undated).
25 Id.
26 Defense Department Briefing with Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and Vice Chief of Staff
of the Army General Richard Cody (July 31, 2007).
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CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid, in testimony be-
fore this Committee, assessed the military’s response to Corporal
Tillman’s death more bluntly, saying, ‘‘It’s very difficult to come to
grips with how we screwed this thing up. But we screwed this
thing up.’’ 27
B. THE COMMITTEE’S INVESTIGATION
The Committee began its investigation into Corporal Tillman’s
death in April 2007. On April 24, 2007, the Committee held a hear-
ing during which it received testimony from two members of Cor-
poral Tillman’s family, an Army Ranger who was an eyewitness to
Corporal Tillman’s death, the acting Department of Defense Inspec-
tor General, and the commander of the Army Criminal Investiga-
tion Command.28 The Committee also took testimony from former
Private First Class Jessica Lynch, who described the misinforma-
tion surrounding her capture and rescue in Iraq in 2003.
Members of Corporal Tillman’s family and Private Lynch testi-
fied that government officials spread inaccurate accounts of what
happened to Corporal Tillman and Private Lynch on the battlefield.
They stated that these misleading narratives provided inspiring
stories of heroism for the American public, but they fundamentally
mischaracterized the two soldiers’ actual conduct and sacrifice.
Corporal Tillman’s brother Kevin Tillman, a former Army Ranger
who served together with his brother in Afghanistan, testified that
the story of Corporal Tillman’s death by enemy fire that spread in
the weeks after his death was ‘‘utter fiction,’’ and said he believed
it was intended to distract the public from the unsuccessful siege
of Fallujah, the emerging story of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib,
and other bad news about the war.29 He stated:
In the days leading up to Pat’s memorial service, media ac-
counts, based on information provided by the Army and
the White House, were wreathed in a patriotic glow and
became more dramatic in tone. A terrible tragedy that
might have further undermined support for the war in
Iraq was transformed into an inspirational message that
served instead to support the nation’s foreign policy wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan.30
Following the April 24, 2007, hearing, Chairman Waxman and
Ranking Member Davis decided that the Committee’s investigation
into Corporal Tillman’s fratricide would focus on the actions of offi-
cials at the top of the chain of command. Specifically, the Commit-
tee sought to determine when the President, senior White House
officials, the Secretary of Defense, and other top military leaders
learned that Corporal Tillman had been killed as a result of friend-
ly fire and what they did upon learning this information. The Com-
mittee also posed questions regarding the dissemination of mislead-
27 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John
Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department
Knew, 110th Cong., at 217 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49).
28 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on Misleading Informa-
tion from the Battlefield, 110th Cong. (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110–54).
29 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Kevin Tillman,
Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 17 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Se-
rial No. 110–54).
30 Id.
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ing information pertaining to the capture and rescue of Private
Lynch.
The Committee held a second hearing on August 1, 2007, during
which it received testimony from former Secretary of Defense Don-
ald Rumsfeld; former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen-
eral Richard Myers; former commander of U.S. Central Command,
General John Abizaid; and former commander of U.S. Special Oper-
ations Command (SOCOM), General Bryan Brown, about their
knowledge of the circumstances of Corporal Tillman’s death.31
In the course of the Committee’s investigation, the Committee re-
quested that the White House produce all documents received or
generated by any official in the Executive Office of the President
from April 22 until July 1, 2004, that related to Corporal Till-
man.32 The Committee reviewed approximately 1,500 pages pro-
duced in response to this request. The documents produced to the
Committee included e-mail communications between senior White
House officials holding the title of ‘‘Assistant to the President.’’ Ac-
cording to the White House, the White House withheld from the
Committee only preliminary drafts of the speech President Bush
delivered at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner on May 1,
2004.33
The Committee also conducted nontranscribed interviews of
three former assistants to the President: former Director of Com-
munications Dan Bartlett, former Press Secretary Scott McClellan,
and former Chief Speechwriter Michael Gerson. Because these offi-
cials indicated they had only a limited recall of the events in ques-
tion, they were not called back for a transcribed interview or depo-
sition. Transcribed interviews were conducted with four other
former White House officials: former Spokesman Taylor Gross,
former Director of Fact-checking John Currin, former National Se-
curity Council (NSC) Director of Communications Jim Wilkinson,
and former NSC Press Secretary Sean McCormack.34
The Committee reviewed over 31,000 documents produced by the
Department of Defense. The Committee conducted transcribed
interviews of six current or former general officers: General Bantz
Craddock, former senior military assistant to Secretary Rumsfeld;
Admiral Eric Olson, former deputy commander of U.S. Special Op-
erations Command; Lieutenant General John Sattler, former direc-
tor of operations at U.S. Central Command; Lieutenant General
James Lovelace, former Director of the Army Staff; Lieutenant
General (Retired) Philip Kensinger, former commander of U.S.
Army Special Operations Command (USASOC); and Brigadier Gen-
eral (Retired) Howard Yellen, former deputy commander at
USASOC. In addition, the Committee interviewed seven other offi-
cers and civilian officials from Secretary Rumsfeld’s office, the of-
fice of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and USASOC.
31 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on the Tillman Frat-
ricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong. (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial
No. 110–49).
32 Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, to Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President (April 27, 2007).
33 Letter from Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman,
and Tom Davis, Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform (Aug. 10, 2007).
34 No contemporaneous transcript was produced from the interview with Mr. McCormack, but
an unofficial transcript was created from an audio recording of the interview.
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II. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATED TO CORPORAL
TILLMAN
A. THE MILITARY SERVICE OF CORPORAL PATRICK TILLMAN
Patrick Tillman, a defensive back for the Arizona Cardinals, and
his brother Kevin Tillman, a former professional baseball player,
enlisted in the United States Army in May 2002. Although the Till-
man brothers refused to talk publicly about why they were joining
the Army, their enlistment was widely reported in the media. Their
father, Patrick Tillman, Sr., explained to one newspaper that his
sons did not want recognition ‘‘separate from their peers’’ because
they felt all the soldiers with whom they served deserved equal rec-
ognition.35
Both Pat and Kevin Tillman trained as elite Army Rangers and
were assigned to the A Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regi-
ment, based in Fort Lewis, Washington. Their battalion did a tour
of duty in Iraq in 2003 and began a tour in Afghanistan in 2004.
At the beginning of this tour, both Pat and Kevin Tillman held the
rank of Specialist (E4).
On April 22, 2004, during operations in a rugged region of east-
ern Afghanistan, the Tillmans’ platoon was divided into two parts
(‘‘serials’’). Specialist Pat Tillman was a part of Serial 1, which pro-
ceeded towards the village of Manah, Afghanistan, through a nar-
row canyon. Specialist Kevin Tillman was a part of Serial 2, which
was supposed to take a different route, but ultimately changed
plans and followed Serial 1 along the same canyon road.36
During its passage through the canyon, Serial 2 came under at-
tack. When the Rangers in Serial 1 heard the sounds of the am-
bush, they dismounted from their vehicles and took positions to as-
sist Serial 2. As Serial 2 emerged from the canyon, several Rangers
riding in the lead vehicle opened fire on a nearby ridge, killing Spe-
cialist Pat Tillman and an Afghan soldier who had been conducting
operations with the platoon, and injuring two other Rangers, in-
cluding the platoon leader. The Army posthumously awarded Till-
man the Silver Star and promoted him to the rank of Corporal.37
As he testified at the Committee’s hearing on April 24, 2007,
Specialist Kevin Tillman did not witness the firefight that took his
brother’s life. He also testified that he was quickly flown back to
Bagram Air Base and later accompanied his brother’s remains back
to the United States.38 He told the Committee that during these
events, he was under the impression that his brother had been
killed by the enemy.39
B. INITIAL PENTAGON REACTIONS
On the morning of April 23, 2004, news of Corporal Tillman’s
death broke in the United States. Initial reports from a Defense
35 Ex-Player Tillman Likely in Danger Zone as an Army Ranger, Washington Times (Mar. 21,
2003).
36 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death
of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).
37 Id.
38 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Kevin Tillman,
Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 18 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Se-
rial No. 110–54).
39 Id. at 30.
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Department spokesman in Afghanistan indicated that a U.S. sol-
dier, identified later that day as Corporal Tillman, had ‘‘died after
a firefight with anti-coalition militia forces about 25 miles south-
west of a U.S. base at Khost, which has been the scene of frequent
attacks.’’ 40
On April 23, 2004, and in the following days, thousands of sto-
ries, commentaries, and tributes to Corporal Tillman appeared in
newspapers, television, and the Internet. An internal ‘‘Weekend
Media Assessment’’ produced by the Army Chief of Staff’s Office of
Public Affairs on Monday April 25, 2004, reported that the story
of Corporal Tillman’s death had helped generate the most media
interest in the U.S. Army ‘‘since the end of active combat last
year.’’ 41 The report also noted that ‘‘The Ranger Tillman story had
been extremely positive in all media.’’ 42
E-mails reviewed by the Committee also show that the news of
Corporal Tillman’s death was discussed by public affairs officials in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
the Army on April 23, 2004, potentially including a ‘‘front office’’
morning meeting led by Secretary Rumsfeld’s public affairs chief,
Mr. Larry Di Rita.43
Although Mr. Di Rita told Committee staff he could not recall
any particular discussions he had about Corporal Tillman’s death
on April 23, 2004, documents produced by the Department of De-
fense show that Mr. Di Rita sent two e-mails that day related to
Corporal Tillman. In the first of these e-mails, Mr. Di Rita re-
sponded to a request from the White House Media Affairs Director,
who was seeking information about Corporal Tillman for a Sports
Illustrated reporter.44 Mr. Di Rita responded that he would ‘‘see
what we can do. details are sketchy just now.’’ 45
In the second e-mail, Mr. Di Rita responded to a Department of
Defense aide who had drafted a statement for the Department of
Defense to use to respond to press inquiries.46 Mr. Di Rita edited
the proposed statement and sent it back to the aide. His revised
version stated, ‘‘[o]ur thoughts and prayers go out to the family of
Army Sgt Pat Tillman,’’ and noted, ‘‘[w]e mourn the death of every
servicemember who makes the ultimate sacrifice in the Global War
on Terror.’’ 47
The same day, April 23, a memo was prepared by the Army
Human Resources Command for the Army Deputy Chief of Staff
G–1, Lieutenant General Franklin Hagenbeck. This executive sum-
mary (‘‘EXSUM’’) document explained that Corporal Tillman’s cas-
40 Former NFL Player Killed in Afghanistan, Associated Press (Apr. 23, 2004); U.S. Military
Says NFL Player Killed in Afghanistan Exemplified All Soldiers’ Patriotism, Associated Press
(Apr. 24, 2004).
41 E-mail from David Compton, Office of the Army Chief Public Affairs, to numerous address-
ees (Apr. 25, 2004).
42 Id.
43 E-mail from Lieutenant Commander Jane Campbell, Office of the Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for Public Affairs, to Major Kristen Carle, Office of the Army Chief for Public Affairs (Apr.
23, 2004). (Reporting that Corporal Tillman’s death ‘‘was a topic of the discussion at the front
office this morning and CJCS PA [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Public Affairs] is also
involved.’’).
44 E-mail from Lawrence Di Rita, Office of the Secretary of Defense, to Jeanie Mamo, Director
of White House Media Affairs (Apr. 23, 2004).
45 Id.
46 E-mail from Lawrence Di Rita, Office of the Secretary of Defense, to Bryan Whitman, Office
of the Secretary of Defense (Apr. 23, 2004).
47 Id.
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ualty ‘‘was a high-profile death because SPC Tillman was a mem-
ber of the Arizona Cardinals and SPC Kevin Tillman was a former
minor league baseball prospect in the Cleveland Indians organiza-
tion when they enlisted together for three years.’’ 48 The summary
said that in accordance with the Army’s policy of holding casualty
information for 24 hours after the soldier’s family has been noti-
fied, the Army would not officially announce Corporal Tillman’s
death until 11 p.m. that night.
C. EARLY REPORTS OF FRIENDLY FIRE
As the Tillman family and the American public absorbed the
news that Corporal Tillman had been killed in Afghanistan, appar-
ently by enemy forces, suspicions that he had actually been killed
by friendly fire quickly traveled through the Department of De-
fense. But while military officials at the highest levels knew within
a matter of days that Corporal Tillman’s death was a likely frat-
ricide, they did not share this information with the Tillman family
or the public for another month.
Members of Corporal Tillman’s platoon knew almost immediately
he had been killed by his fellow Rangers.49 Moreover, within 24
hours, the top officers in Corporal Tillman’s battalion and regi-
ment, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Bailey and Colonel Craig Nixon,
also knew about the suspicions of friendly fire and had authorized
the first Army Regulation 15–6 investigation into the cir-
cumstances of his death.50
Within several days, Colonel Nixon, the commander of the 75th
Ranger Regiment, transmitted the information that Corporal Till-
man may have been killed as a result of fratricide to Major General
Stanley McChrystal, the commander of the joint task force in Af-
ghanistan under which Corporal Tillman’s battalion was operat-
ing.51 General McChrystal subsequently called General Bryan
Brown, the top officer at the U.S. Special Operations Command,
the combatant command under which Corporal Tillman’s battalion
operated in Afghanistan.52
Colonel Nixon also informed Brigadier General Howard Yellen,
the deputy commander of the Army Special Operations Command,
the Army administrative command responsible for the 75th Ranger
Regiment. According to General Yellen, on April 24 or April 25,
2004, he informed his commander, Lieutenant General Philip
Kensinger, of the potential fratricide.53
A few days later, on April 29, 2004, General McChrystal sent a
message to the top generals in Corporal Tillman’s chain of com-
48 Shari Lawrence, Army Human Resources Command, ‘‘EXSUM’’ Document (Apr. 23, 2004).
49 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of U.S. Army Specialist
Bryan O’Neal, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 94 (Apr.
24, 2007) (Serial No. 110–54); Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of
Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 13 (Mar. 26, 2007)
(IPO2007E001).
50 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Thomas Gimble, Act-
ing Defense Department Inspector General, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battle-
field, 110th Cong. (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110–54).
51 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Lieutenant General Stanley
McChrystal, at 3 (Nov. 26, 2006).
52 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of General Bryan Brown, at
5 (Nov. 17, 2006).
53 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Brigadier General
Howard Yellen (Retired), at 39 (July 25, 2007).
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14
mand alerting them that the first 15–6 investigation was nearing
completion and would find that ‘‘it is highly possible that Corporal
Tillman was killed by friendly fire.’’ 54 According to General
McChrystal, Colonel Nixon assisted him in preparing the mes-
sage.55
The principal addressee of this communication was General John
Abizaid, commander of CENTCOM, the geographic combatant com-
mand that includes Iraq and Afghanistan. The message was also
sent to two recipients for ‘‘information’’ purposes. These recipients
were General Brown, the SOCOM commander, and General
Kensinger, the commander of USASOC.56
General McChrystal sent this communication as a ‘‘personal for’’
or P4 message, a format flag rank officers reserve for sensitive,
‘‘for-your-eyes-only’’ information. Such a communication, according
to General Abizaid, is ‘‘designed to pass information that’s consid-
ered very, very important.’’ 57 According to General Myers, informa-
tion in a P4 is ‘‘supposed to be pretty close hold.’’ 58
General McChrystal’s P4 message stated:
Sir, in the aftermath of Corporal Patrick Tillman’s un-
timely yet heroic death in Afghanistan on 22 April 04, it
is anticipated that a 15–6 investigation nearing completion
will find that it is highly possible that Corporal Tillman
was killed by friendly fire. This potential is exacerbated by
the unconfirmed but suspected reports that POTUS [Presi-
dent of the United States] and the Secretary of the Army
might include comments about Corporal Tillman’s heroism
and his approved Silver Star medal in speeeches [sic] cur-
rently being prepared, not knowing the specifics surround-
ing his death. . . .
I felt that it was essential that you received this informa-
tion as soon as we detected it in order to preclude any un-
knowing statements by our country’s leaders which might
cause public embarrassment if the circumstances of Cor-
poral Tillman’s death become public.59
The day before General McChrystal sent this P4 message,
speechwriting staff from both the Department of Defense and the
White House had contacted a public affairs official at USASOC,
Carol Darby, seeking information about Corporal Tillman’s enlist-
ment, rank, previous duty assignments, and reason for enlisting.60
White House staffer John Currin informed the USASOC official he
54 ‘‘Personal For’’ message from Major General Stanley McChrystal to General John Abizaid,
General Bryan Brown, Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004).
55 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Lieutenant General Stanley
McChrystal (Nov. 26, 2006).
56 ‘‘Personal For’’ message from Major General Stanley McChrystal to General John Abizaid,
General Bryan Brown, Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004).
57 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John
Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department
Knew, 110th Cong., at 190 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49).
58 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard
Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department
Knew, 110th Cong., at 190 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49).
59 ‘‘Personal For’’ message from Major General Stanley McChrystal to General John Abizaid,
General Bryan Brown, Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004).
60 E-mail from Carol Darby, Media and Community Relations Division Chief, U.S. Army Spe-
cial Operations Command, to Lieutenant Colonel Hans Bush, Chief of Public Affairs, U.S. Army
Special Operations Command (Apr. 28, 2004).
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was seeking this information for a speech President Bush would
deliver at the May 1, 2004, White House Correspondents’ Dinner.61
Admiral Eric T. Olson, the deputy commander of SOCOM in
April 2004, told the Committee that the point at which General
McChrystal sent the P4 would have been the appropriate time to
tell the Tillman family about the possibility of fratricide. According
to Admiral Olson, ‘‘as soon as there is solid indication of the cause
of death, that should be communicated to the family.’’ 62 Admiral
Olson said he did not see the P4 when it was sent in April 2004,
but he told the Committee that the information in the P4 was suffi-
ciently certain to share with the family before the memorial serv-
ice. His ‘‘after-the-fact’’ reflection was:
But now having seen the contents of that P4, during which
General McChrystal said it’s highly probably there was
fratricide, and that P4 was released before the memorial
service, it would have been reasonable to expect that the
family was informed of the possibility of fratricide.63
D. THE SILVER STAR AWARD AND CORPORAL TILLMAN’S MEMORIAL
SERVICE
On April 29, 2004, the same day General McChrystal sent his P4
message, the Army posthumously awarded Corporal Tillman the
Silver Star, an honor reserved for Army soldiers who have dem-
onstrated ‘‘gallantry in action against an enemy of the United
States.’’ 64 Prior to the award’s approval by the acting Army Sec-
retary on April 29, 2004, several officers in Corporal Tillman’s regi-
ment who were aware of the possibility of friendly fire, including
the regimental commander, Colonel Nixon, reviewed and edited the
Silver Star award.65 Yet the final Silver Star citation asserted that
Corporal Tillman ‘‘put himself in the line of devastating enemy
fire.’’ 66 Both of the eyewitness statements submitted with the Sil-
ver Star paperwork were altered by somebody within the 75th
Regiment’s chain of command.67
On April 30, 2004, the same day General McChrystal’s P4 mes-
sage reached USASOC headquarters, USASOC issued a press re-
lease announcing the Silver Star award. The release stated that
Corporal Tillman was being awarded the Silver Star ‘‘for his self-
less actions after his Ranger element was ambushed by anti-coali-
tion insurgents during a ground assault convoy through southeast-
ern Afghanistan.’’ 68 The release also referred to ‘‘hostile fires di-
rected at the Rangers’’ and stated that Corporal Tillman ‘‘was shot
and killed while focusing his efforts on the elimination of the
enemy forces and the protection of his team members.’’ 69
61 Id.
62 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Admiral Eric T.
Olson, at 60 (July 27, 2007).
63 Id. at 61.
64 Army Regulation 600–8–22 § 3–10(b) (2006).
65 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death
of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 53 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001).
66 Silver Star Award Citation for Corporal Patrick D. Tillman, United States Army (undated).
67 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death
of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 55 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001).
68 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Awards Silver Star to Fallen Ranger (Apr.
30, 2004).
69 Id.
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According to Brigadier General Howard Yellen, USASOC’s dep-
uty commander in April 2004, the release did not explicitly say how
Corporal Tillman was killed, but ‘‘for the civilian on the street, the
interpretation would be that he was killed by enemy fire.’’ 70 When
interviewed by the Committee, General Kensinger said he did not
recall reviewing the release, but ‘‘possibly could have.’’ 71 He agreed
that ‘‘a member of the public reading this probably would have con-
cluded or assumed that Corporal Tillman had been killed by the
enemy.’’ 72
Three days after this Army press release, on May 3, 2004, a me-
morial service was held for Corporal Tillman in San Jose, Califor-
nia. During the ceremony, Senior Chief Petty Officer Steven White,
a personal friend of Corporal Tillman and a Navy SEAL, gave a eu-
logy in which he described the circumstances of Corporal Tillman’s
death using language that suggested he was killed by enemy
forces.73 According to Senior Chief White, a member of the 75th
Regiment had read him portions of the Silver Star citation that
morning, and he based his speech on this information. Testifying
before the Committee in April 2007, Senior Chief White said he felt
‘‘let down’’ by the military because he was given inaccurate infor-
mation to present publicly. He told the Committee: ‘‘I’m the guy
that told America how he died, basically, at that memorial, and it
was incorrect. That does not sit well with me.’’ 74
E. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE FRATRICIDE
The information that Corporal Tillman had likely been killed by
friendly fire was not shared with the American public until the
morning of May 29, 2004. On that day, the Saturday of the Memo-
rial Day weekend, Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger appeared
at a press availability at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the head-
quarters of the Army’s Special Operations Command, and an-
nounced that an Army investigation had concluded that ‘‘Corporal
Tillman probably died as a result of friendly fire while his unit was
engaged in combat with enemy forces.’’ 75
General Kensinger’s statement was the only public statement
issued by any Department of Defense or White House official ac-
knowledging that Corporal Tillman had not been killed by the
enemy, as the American public had believed for more than a
month. When he was asked why the White House played no role
in the public fratricide announcement, former White House Press
Secretary Scott McClellan told Committee staff, ‘‘We would leave
that to the proper department, and that would be DOD.’’ 76 White
70 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Brigadier General
Howard Yellen, at 69 (July 25, 2007).
71 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General
Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 54 (Feb. 29, 2008).
72 Id.
73 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on Misleading Informa-
tion from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 110 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110–54).
74 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Senior Chief Petty
Officer Stephen White, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at
111 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110–54).
75 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Press Statement: USASOC Announces Tillman In-
vestigation Results (May 29, 2004) (online at news.soc.mil/advisories/Press-Media%20Releases/
2004/040529–01.htm).
76 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Scott McClellan
(Sept. 10, 2007).
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House Communications Director Dan Bartlett, asked why the
White House issued a statement after Corporal Tillman died but
not after the fratricide was announced, explained these events
‘‘were fundamentally different things.’’ 77 According to Mr. Bartlett,
media interest in a presidential statement about the fratricide ‘‘was
not there.’’ 78
Evidence reviewed by the Committee suggests that one reason
the Department of Defense publicly released this information on
May 29, 2004, was because the Tillman family had already begun
learning about the friendly fire and because the media was about
to report it.79 In the days before this announcement, the Depart-
ment of Defense scrambled to release the information in a way that
would cause the least amount of public relations damage to the De-
partment.
The second Army 15–6 investigation into Corporal Tillman’s
death was substantially completed by May 16, 2004.80 The conclu-
sion of this investigation, authored by Lieutenant Colonel Ralph
Kauzlarich, was that ‘‘Corporal Tillman’s death was the result of
fratricide during an extremely chaotic enemy ambush.’’ 81 Over the
next two weeks, the report moved upward through the regiment’s
chain of command. On Friday, May 28, 2004, CENTCOM’s director
of operations, Lieutenant General John F. Sattler, signed off on the
report on behalf of General Abizaid, the CENTCOM commander.82
General Sattler told the Committee that during this period, Gen-
eral Abizaid called him at CENTCOM headquarters in Qatar and
asked him to review Colonel Kauzlarich’s investigation. General
Sattler recalled that General Abizaid told him reviewing the report
was a top priority, ‘‘so whatever I thought was my number one pri-
ority no longer was.’’ 83 General Sattler concurred with its find-
ings.84
Although officials told the Committee that the military was wait-
ing for the investigation to be signed before notifying the family,
the record shows that two Tillman family members were actually
informed of the friendly fire before May 28, 2004. Earlier in the
week, the 2nd Battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment had returned
to its headquarters in Fort Lewis, Washington, where Specialist
Kevin Tillman encountered the members of his platoon for the first
time since his brother’s death. Fearing that Kevin Tillman would
hear about the friendly fire from his fellow soldiers, the 2nd Battal-
ion’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Bailey, was author-
ized to disclose the information to Kevin Tillman and Corporal Till-
77 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett (Sept.
12, 2007).
78 Id.
79 See, e.g., E-mail from Colonel George Rhynedance, Office of the Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for Public Affairs, to Bryan Whitman, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Pub-
lic Affairs (May 29, 2004) (‘‘No one will ever tell you, but nice job on this one. May have mini-
mized . . . damage by pushing the panic button early.’’).
80 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death
of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 29 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001).
81 U.S. Central Command, Report of Fratricide Investigation, at 11 (May 28, 2004).
82 Id.; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General John F.
Sattler, at 50 (July 24, 2007).
83 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General John F.
Sattler, at 46 (July 24, 2007).
84 Id.
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18
man’s wife, Marie Tillman.85 According to Colonel Nixon, the com-
mander of the 75th Ranger regiment, Colonel Bailey asked for this
authorization after he determined that ‘‘Kevin was getting some
sense of what was going on.’’ 86 The Department of Defense Inspec-
tor General concluded that Kevin and Marie Tillman were in-
formed of the friendly fire on May 26 and May 27, 2004, respec-
tively.87
At the same time General Sattler was reviewing the report, other
high-level Pentagon officials began preparing for public release of
the finding of fratricide. On May 28, Larry Di Rita, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and General Brown, the
SOCOM commander, coordinated a video teleconference to plan the
public announcement of the fratricide.88 According to various inter-
views conducted by the Committee, the video teleconference in-
cluded Mr. Di Rita, General Brown, Admiral Olson, General
Kensinger, CENTCOM chief of staff Major General Steve
Whitcomb, various public affairs officials, and at least one law-
yer.89
Mr. Di Rita told Committee staff that he recognized at the time
that this was a ‘‘very important public event’’ 90 He recalled that
that he was ‘‘brought in to it, on the basis of my professional re-
sponsibilities, which was to help with the public affairs posture on
this incident.’’ 91 While military public affairs officers were plan-
ning to release the fratricide information in a ‘‘passive’’ posture, in
which the Department would only respond to press queries, Mr. Di
Rita decided to adopt an ‘‘active approach’’ and hold a press con-
ference to release the information. Describing the teleconference,
Mr. Di Rita explained:
I spent time working with the responsible offices . . . de-
ciding that it was something that probably required some
public interaction, as distinct from an announcement. I
seem to recall that we discussed the importance of this,
the fact that it was fairly large news, that what everybody
believed to be true was no longer the case, no longer true,
and that it required more of a public presentation than a
simple announcement, particularly inasmuch as this thing
had been concluded late in the week, or at least they were
prepared to announce it late in a week, and I thought it
was important.92
According to Admiral Olson and General Brown, during the tele-
conference, General Brown suggested that Mr. Di Rita make the
announcement since it was such a high-profile matter.93 Mr. Di
85 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Colonel James Craig Nixon,
at 121 (Oct. 28, 2006).
86 Id.
87 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death
of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 44 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001).
88 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Colonel Hans Bush
(Sept. 19, 2007).
89 Id.; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Admiral Eric T.
Olson (July 27, 2007).
90 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lawrence Di Rita,
at 69 (Sept. 24, 2007).
91 Id. at 63.
92 Id.
93 General Bryan Brown, Response to Questions from BG Jones (Dec. 9, 2004) (‘‘[W]e initially
told Mr. DiRita that OSD PA should make the announcement. They determined it should be
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19
Rita apparently decided that his ‘‘responsibilities’’ for managing the
announcement did not extend to actually making the announce-
ment. He told the Committee, ‘‘a public affairs officer, to me, was
not the answer.’’ 94
Admiral Olson described the following discussion:
As I recall, General Brown suggested that the Public Af-
fairs Office for the Secretary of Defense be the one to make
the announcement as a defense matter. Larry Di Rita
thought it was more appropriate for a uniformed officer to
make the announcement. Then the question was who is
the appropriate uniformed officer. It is not a SOCOM re-
sponsibility, it was an Army responsibility. Because Gen-
eral Kensinger had an Army chain of command outside of
SOCOM, the discussion just sort of circled in on General
Kensinger as the appropriate officer.95
Another teleconference participant also recalled that Mr. Di Rita
recommended that General Kensinger make the public announce-
ment. Colonel Hans Bush, who was the head of USASOC’s public
affairs office at the time, recalled, ‘‘General Brown acknowledged
the recommendation and then said, General Kensinger, you meet
the criteria. Congratulations, you’re the guy.’’ 96 When Committee
staff asked General Kensinger if he considered this a direct order
by General Brown to make the announcement, he responded, ‘‘Not
in so many words. . . . You can be directed to do it, or you can be
highly encouraged to think that is the right decision.’’ 97
General Kensinger explained that because he was unfamiliar
with the details of the investigation, he did not believe he was the
appropriate person to deliver the news. Colonel Bush, the USASOC
public affairs chief, described General Kensinger’s reaction: ‘‘It was
a little odd to be presenting someone else’s findings, and I think
he felt that way.’’ 98 Because the friendly fire investigation had
been conducted and approved by CENTCOM, General Kensinger
told the Committee he thought ‘‘it would have been CENTCOM or
somebody else would have made it, above CENTCOM.’’ 99 He stated
that he acquiesced to the assignment only after he was told he
would not have to answer any questions from the media.
At the press conference at Fort Bragg on May 29, 2004, General
Kensinger read a prepared statement approved by CENTCOM and
the Secretary of Defense’s public affairs office.100 The statement as-
serted that ‘‘investigation results indicate that Corporal Tillman
a uniformed member of the chain of command. The logical choice was LTG Kensinger. I
agreed.’’).
94 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lawrence Di Rita,
at 67 (Sept. 24, 2007).
95 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Admiral Eric T.
Olson, at 40 (July 27, 2007).
96 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Colonel Hans Bush,
at 57 (Sept. 19, 2007).
97 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General
Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 63 (Feb. 29, 2008).
98 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Colonel Hans Bush,
at 57 (Sept. 19, 2007).
99 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General
Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 64 (Feb. 29, 2008).
100 E-mail from Bryan Whitman, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Af-
fairs, to Colonel Joseph Curtin, Office of the Chief Public Affairs (May 28, 2004).
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20
probably died as the result of friendly fire.’’ 101 According to Colonel
Bush, ‘‘It was specifically requested by CENTCOM that we include
‘probably’ in that sentence.’’ 102 However, this language differed
from the investigative report itself, which stated, ‘‘My findings lead
me to believe that CPL Tillman’s death was the result of frat-
ricide.’’ 103 The report was not made public at that time.
After the press conference, Pentagon public affairs officials con-
gratulated each other for limiting the impact of the disclosure.
Colonel George Rhynedance, an assistant to Mr. Di Rita in the Sec-
retary of Defense’s public affairs office, wrote to Bryan Whitman,
another employee in the same office: ‘‘No one will ever tell you, but
nice job on this one. May have minimized . . . damage by pushing
the panic button early.’’ 104
In another e-mail on the day of the announcement, Colonel Jo-
seph Curtin, an Army public affairs officials, wrote, ‘‘Story will run
hot today and diminish over the weekend.’’ He also noted, ‘‘Senior
leaders want to make sure the public affairs community vigorously
respond to any media query that potentially questions the Silver
Star award.’’ 105 In response, Lieutenant Colonel John Robinson, a
CENTCOM public affairs official, wrote ‘‘the WWII Memorial and
attack in Saudi Arabia have helped dilute the story somewhat.’’ 106
III. THE WHITE HOUSE RESPONSE
Testimony and e-mails obtained by the Committee show that
White House officials were intensely interested in the news of Pat
Tillman’s death. On April 23, the White House rushed out a press
statement acknowledging Corporal Tillman’s death twelve hours
before the Department of Defense publicly confirmed the casualty.
This early statement was issued notwithstanding a military rule
intended to protect military families from media attention during
the first 24 hours after learning about a casualty. A week later, on
May 1, 2004, President Bush gave a speech discussing Corporal
Tillman’s military service. Yet when the Committee inquired into
how and when White House officials learned Corporal’s death was
a fratricide, the White House provided no responsive e-mails, and
each of the former officials interviewed by Committee staff pro-
fessed to have no recollection.
A. NEWS BREAKS AT WHITE HOUSE
There was intense interest in the news of Corporal Tillman’s
death at the White House as the story broke in the press on the
morning of April 23, 2004. Documents and interviews with White
House officials show that as White House staff members learned
the news from cable television and other media sources, they quick-
101 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Press Statement: USASOC Announces Tillman
Investigation Results (May 29, 2004) (online at news.soc.mil/advisories/Press-Media%20Releases/
2004/040529–01.htm).
102 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Colonel Hans Bush,
at 57 (Sept. 19, 2007).
103 U.S. Central Command, Report of Fratricide Investigation (May 28, 2004).
104 E-mail from Colonel George Rhynedance, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs, to Bryan Whitman, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
(May 29, 2004).
105 E-mail from Colonel Joseph Curtin, Office of the Chief Public Affairs to multiple recipients
(May 29, 2004).
106 E-mail from Lieutenant Colonel John Robinson to multiple recipients (May 29, 2004).
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ly shared and discussed it with their colleagues and friends. Ac-
cording to former White House Communications Director Dan Bart-
lett, he discussed Corporal Tillman’s death directly with President
Bush. Mr. Bartlett told Committee staff that he ‘‘had conversations
with the President about this news event.’’ 107 Although Mr. Bart-
lett claimed he could not recall what was said, he told Committee
staff that he ‘‘likely’’ discussed with the President the ‘‘appropriate
response’’ for the White House to take.108
Barry Jackson, a deputy to President Bush’s political adviser
Karl Rove, sent Mr. Rove language for a potential presidential trib-
ute to Pat Tillman.109 Speechwriter Matthew Scully wrote an e-
mail to fellow speechwriter Michael Gerson highlighting Corporal
Tillman’s death as a ‘‘big story.’’ 110 Condoleezza Rice, then Na-
tional Security Advisor, was informed of Corporal Tillman’s death
by her executive assistant, Army Major Jennie Koch Easterly.111
Several high-level staff members of President Bush’s reelection
campaign contacted White House officials to suggest public re-
sponses to Corporal Tillman’s death. Matthew Dowd, the cam-
paign’s chief strategist, sent an e-mail to Mr. Bartlett, writing,
‘‘You hear about pat tilman? Potus should call his family or go to
Arizona or his hometown.’’ 112
Mark McKinnon, the campaign’s media advisor, also e-mailed
Mr. Bartlett, saying: ‘‘Realize President really shouldn’t do any-
thing that he hasn’t done for any other soldier killed in the mili-
tary, but certainly think he could say something about he exempli-
fies the ultimate in humility, heroism and sacrifice.’’ 113
Commentators and reporters contacted the White House to offer
advice. For example, Wall Street Journal columnist Peggy Noonan
e-mailed the White House’s Director of Strategic Initiatives, Peter
Wehner, recommending that he ‘‘find out what faith Tillman prac-
ticed and have the president go by that church and light a candle
or say a prayer.’’ 114 Karl Rove exchanged e-mails about Pat Till-
man with Associated Press reporter Ron Fournier, under the sub-
ject line ‘‘H-E-R-O.’’ In response to Mr. Fournier’s e-mail, Mr. Rove
asked, ‘‘How does our country continue to produce men and women
like this,’’ to which Mr. Fournier replied, ‘‘The Lord creates men
and women like this all over the world. But only the great and free
countries allow them to flourish. Keep up the fight.’’ 115
In total, the White House staff sent or received nearly 200 e-
mails relating to Corporal Tillman’s death on April 23, 2004.
107 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett
(Sept. 12, 2007).
108 Id.
109 E-mail from Barry Jackson, Deputy to the President’s Senior Advisor, to Karl Rove, Senior
Advisor to the President (Apr. 23, 2004).
110 E-mail from Matthew Scully, Deputy Director of Presidential Speechwriting, to Michael
Gerson, Assistant to the President for Speechwriting (Apr. 23, 2004).
111 E-mail from Jennie M. Koch, Executive Assistant to the National Security Advisor, to
Gregory Schulte, Executive Secretary, National Security Council (Apr. 23, 2004).
112 E-mail from Matthew Dowd, Chief Strategist, 2004 George W. Bush presidential campaign,
to Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004).
113 E-mail from Mark McKinnon, Chief Media Advisor, 2004 George W. Bush presidential
campaign to Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004).
114 E-mail from Peggy Noonan to Peter Wehner, White House Director of Strategic Initiatives
(Apr. 23, 2004).
115 E-mail from Ron Fournier to Karl Rove, Senior Advisor to the President (Apr. 23, 2004).
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B. STATEMENT ISSUED PREMATURELY
At approximately noon on April 23, 2004, the White House
issued a statement of condolence from the President. Before releas-
ing this statement, White House officials failed to confirm with the
Defense Department that Corporal Tillman had actually died. They
also failed to determine whether information about the casualty,
which occurred during a special operations mission, was classified.
Moreover, the White House rushed to release its statement not-
withstanding a military requirement intended to protect military
families from media attention during the first 24 hours after a cas-
ualty.
Taylor Gross, the White House spokesman responsible for media
outlets in the South and Southwestern United States, told Commit-
tee staff that he drafted a White House statement on the morning
of April 23 after receiving several calls from Arizona media out-
lets.116 He sent the draft to Communications Director Dan Bartlett
and Press Secretary Scott McClellan for approval at 11:40 a.m. The
statement read:
Pat Tillman was an inspiration on the football field and in
his private life. As with all who made the ultimate sac-
rifice in the war on terror, his family are in the thoughts
and prayers of President and Mrs. Bush.117
Minutes later, both Mr. Bartlett and Mr. McClellan approved the
message on behalf of the President. Mr. Bartlett noted that the
statement might ‘‘set a precedent,’’ but wrote ‘‘I’m fine with it.’’ 118
He later clarified: ‘‘good to go.’’ 119 Speaking to Committee staff,
Mr. Bartlett explained that he made this decision due to the high
level of media interest in the story. According to Mr. Bartlett, the
story of Pat Tillman ‘‘made the American people feel good about
our country . . . and our military.’’ 120
Mr. Bartlett’s response to Matthew Dowd’s April 23, 2004, e-
mail, which suggested that the President visit Corporal Tillman’s
family, offers additional insight into the White House’s approach to
the reports. He wrote:
I agree he is a hero. But there will be a lot of pressure not
to single out one guy just because he was a football player.
We are providing a statement to AZ press, but we will
need to discuss anything further.121
116 Although various e-mails reviewed by the Committee referred to this as a ‘‘statement’’ or
a ‘‘comment,’’ Mr. Gross explained that he had technically written a ‘‘response to an inquiry,’’
rather than a ‘‘presidential statement’’ because it was released only in reply to particular que-
ries. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Taylor Gross, at 61
(Sept. 5, 2007). Other White House officials also told the Committee that they saw a distinction
between Mr. Gross’s ‘‘response to questions’’ and a more formal, proactive ‘‘presidential state-
ment.’’ White House officials were unhappy with news coverage of Mr. Gross’s April 23 com-
ment, possibly because the press referred to it is as a ‘‘statement’’ from the White House. See
E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy Assist-
ant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004).
117 E-mail from Taylor Gross, White House spokesman, to Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the
President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004).
118 E-mail from Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications, to Scott
McClellan, White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004).
119 E-mail from Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications, to Taylor
Gross, White House spokesman (Apr. 23, 2004).
120 Id.
121 E-mail from Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications, to Matthew
Dowd, Chief Strategist, 2004 George W. Bush presidential campaign (Apr. 23, 2004).
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When Committee staff asked Mr. Bartlett whether there were
further discussions within the White House about responding to
Corporal Tillman’s death, Mr. Bartlett said he thought it was likely
there were discussions, but he did not have any specific recollection
of them.122
Although Mr. Gross’s statement was approved by President
Bush’s top communications advisors, it appears that no one in the
White House confirmed with the military whether Corporal Till-
man had actually died. The White House also did not confirm with
the military that it could talk publicly about Corporal Tillman,
whose regiment regularly participated in sensitive missions. Ac-
cording to Mr. Gross, ‘‘by and large things are confirmed by the
White House before they’re stated,’’ whether in ‘‘a reactive state-
ment or a proactive statement.’’ 123 But Mr. Gross told Committee
staff that he drafted this statement quickly (‘‘about a two-hour
turnaround time’’), without consulting the Defense Department.124
Mr. Gross stated:
I personally did not verify with DOD, but I got my state-
ment approved via my normal chain of commend. . . . You
know, again, frankly, confirming—confirming that was—
you know, that’s above my pay grade. That was for a supe-
rior.125
Mr. Gross’s superiors did not verify the statement either. Mr.
McClellan told Committee staff that ‘‘the way it usually was done
was, you know, you confirm he was killed.’’ 126 But Mr. McClellan
asserted that confirmation of these facts was not his job, and that
he did not attempt to verify the statement before approving it for
release. He also did not check whether information relating to Cor-
poral Tillman’s death was classified, explaining, ‘‘It was obvious. It
was in the news.’’ 127
Likewise, Mr. Bartlett said, ‘‘I did not take any formal steps’’ to
confirm the information.128 Nevertheless, he ‘‘personally was under
the impression that this was true’’ based on the ‘‘totality of infor-
mation coming from the media.’’ 129 Mr. Bartlett also denied that
confirming the accuracy of a presidential statement was his job. He
explained: ‘‘Generally my conversations with DOD were at a much
higher level.’’ 130
If White House officials had checked with the Department of De-
fense, they would have learned that the Department had not yet
publicly announced Corporal Tillman’s death. In accordance with a
policy intended to give the families of war casualties a 24-hour pri-
vate grieving period, the Defense Department did not announce the
122 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett
(Sept. 12, 2007).
123 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Taylor Gross, at 67
(Sept. 5, 2007).
124 Id. at 42.
125 Id. at 52.
126 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Scott McClellan
(Sept. 10, 2007).
127 Id.
128 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett
(Sept. 12, 2007).
129 Id.
130 Id.
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casualty until late that evening.131 This 24-hour policy was man-
dated by an act of Congress, the Military Family Peace of Mind
Act, which President Bush signed into law in November 2003 as
part of the Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act.132
The act sought to ‘‘provide service members’ next-of-kin with a pe-
riod of privacy before the public is made aware of service members’
death.’’ 133 In the case of Corporal Tillman, the family was not noti-
fied until approximately 10:00 p.m. on April 22.
An hour after the White House released its statement, deputy
press secretary Claire Buchan learned that DOD was not yet con-
firming Corporal Tillman’s death. She sent an e-mail to Scott
McClellan and Trent Duffy, another deputy press secretary, with
the subject line ‘‘alert—do not use tillman statement.’’ 134 The e-
mail stated, ‘‘dod is not confirming that he is dead—next of kin still
being notified. unfortunately taylor’s statement is on the wire.’’ 135
Later in the afternoon, Ms. Buchan e-mailed National Security
Council spokesman Sean McCormack and asked him to ‘‘bug your
friend at DOD’’ about the Tillman casualty announcement. Mr.
McCormack quickly wrote back that DOD was ‘‘not confirming yet.
this will soon become a problem.’’ 136 Later that night, Scott
McClellan concurred, writing, ‘‘Media affairs commented when
asked for reaction from arizona press. They did not check to verify
if it had been confirmed.’’ 137
Noam Neusner, a speechwriter for President Bush, criticized the
hastily issued comment as it was reported in the press, noting that
it inappropriately equated Corporal Tillman’s football career with
his military service. In an e-mail obtained by the Committee, he
wrote:
That statement, as quoted, was ridiculous. Pat Tillman
wasn’t a hero on the football field. He played football. But
he died for his country. We shouldn’t try to tie the two
things together—he didn’t.138
C. DISCUSSION OF CORPORAL TILLMAN IN PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH
On May 1, 2004, President Bush delivered a speech during the
annual White House Correspondents’ Dinner. The President de-
voted a significant portion of the speech to a discussion of Corporal
Tillman. According to Dan Bartlett, ‘‘We made a strategic decision
131 Department of Defense, Instruction Number 1300.18 (2008).
132 Pub. L. 108–136.
133 U.S. House of Representatives, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1588 (Report 108–
354), at 695 (Nov. 7, 2003). Representative Walter B. Jones, the original sponsor of the act, ex-
plained that some military families ‘‘had little time to grieve’’ because they were forced to ‘‘fend
off aggressive press inquiries’’ in the hours after a loved one’s death. A 24-hour delay on public-
ity, he said, ‘‘would not unreasonably impair the public’s access to information about military
activities, but could provide an immeasurable amount of relief to those who have endured the
loss.’’ Statement of Representative Walter B. Jones, Congressional Record, E889 (May 7, 2003).
134 E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Trent Duffy, Deputy
White House Press Secretary, and Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23,
2004).
135 Id.
136 E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Sean McCormack,
NSC Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004). Mr. McCormack told the Committee he had no recollection
of the events described in this e-mail.
137 E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy As-
sistant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004).
138 E-mail from Noam Neusner, Special Assistant to the President for Economic Speech Writ-
ing, to Erin Healy, Assistant White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004).
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to pay tribute to the troops’’ during the 2004 speech because the
White House ‘‘got singed pretty bad’’ for a previous speech in which
the President’s jokes were considered inappropriate during war-
time.139
Documents reviewed by the Committee show that White House
officials had decided to include Corporal Tillman in the Cor-
respondents’ Dinner speech by April 27, 2004. On that day, White
House Research Assistant Lee Bockhorn e-mailed White House
speechwriter, Michael Gerson, a number of press clippings in re-
sponse to Mr. Gerson’s request for the ‘‘’most moving’’ stuff on Till-
man, particularly anything he said.’’ 140
In his speech, the President spoke about the sacrifices of military
personnel, singling out Corporal Tillman’s service. He said:
The loss of Army Corporal Pat Tillman last week in Af-
ghanistan brought home the sorrow that comes with every
loss and reminds us of the character of the men and
women who serve on our behalf. Friends say that this
young man saw the images of September the 11th, and
seeing that evil, he felt called to defend America. He set
aside a career in athletics and many things the world
counts important, wealth and security and the acclaim of
the crowds. He chose, instead, the rigors of Ranger train-
ing and the fellowship of soldiers and the hard duty in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq.
Corporal Tillman asked for no special attention. He was
modest because he knew there were many like him, mak-
ing their own sacrifices. They fill the ranks of the Armed
Forces. Every day, somewhere, they do brave and good
things without notice. Their courage is usually seen only
by their comrades, by those who long to be free, and by the
enemy. They’re willing to give up their lives, and when one
is lost, a whole world of hopes and possibilities is lost with
them.141
One sentence in this passage—‘‘Friends say that this young man
saw the images of September the 11th, and seeing that evil, he felt
called to defend America’’—was the subject of extensive discussions
during the speechwriting process. Although the White House did
not give Committee staff access to the earlier drafts of the Presi-
dent’s speech, it appears from e-mails that in at least one of the
earlier drafts, this sentence read, ‘‘Pat Tillman saw the burning
towers on television and felt called to fight the evil behind it.’’ 142
White House e-mails reviewed by the Committee show that John
Currin, the White House Director of Fact-Checking, quickly discov-
ered that he could not find any substantiation for the statement
that Corporal Tillman had enlisted after he ‘‘saw the burning tow-
ers on television.’’ When Mr. Currin asked White House speech-
139 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett
(Sept. 12, 2007).
140 E-mail from Lee Bockhorn, White House Research Assistant, to Michael Gerson, Assistant
to the President for Speechwriting (Apr. 27, 2004).
141 President George W. Bush, Remarks at White House Correspondents’ Dinner (May 1, 2004).
142 E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking, to Michael Gerson, Mat-
thew Scully, and John McConnell, White House Speechwriters (Apr. 28, 2004).
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writer Matthew Scully about the source of this statement, Mr.
Scully responded: ‘‘Should be in news accounts.’’ 143
In an effort to confirm this statement, Mr. Currin contacted
Carol Darby, a public affairs officer at U.S. Army Special Oper-
ations Command, to ask whether she could confirm why Pat and
Kevin Tillman had joined the Army. According to Ms. Darby, she
told him:
No, that I could not, that I had never talked to either of
the brothers and I had never seen anything in print of any
sort that stated why they joined the Army. But I had seen
press reports where Pat’s coach had spoke of something
along those lines, but it really didn’t give exactly why Pat
joined the Army. And he asked if I could send him some
of those press reports and I did have those.144
After speaking with Ms. Darby and receiving her faxed articles
discussing Corporal Tillman’s enlistment, Mr. Currin urged the
speechwriting team to change or remove text claiming that Cor-
poral Tillman joined the Army as a result of the attacks of Septem-
ber 11. On April 28, 2004, he wrote to speechwriter Matthew
Scully:
My DoD contact, who checked with the Rangers, confirm
that he never gave any media interview or discussed the
reason why he left the NFL to join the Rangers. . . .
[G]iven that he never spoke to the press about his reasons
for joining the Rangers, we simply do not have support for
the statement that he decided to join the Rangers after
seeing the burning towers on television.145
Two hours later, Mr. Currin e-mailed Michael Gerson, the chief
White House speechwriter:
There is no direct support for the statement that Pat Till-
man saw the burning towers on television and felt called
to fight the evil behind it. Tillman and his brother never
discussed their reasons with the press, nor have their par-
ents. Tillman kept his reasons to himself. The people at
Fort Lewis, the base for Tillman’s unit, could not confirm
that September 11 was the reason why Tillman joined the
Army. All that I and Carol Darby at USASOC (Ft. Lewis)
could find is mention in a news article from March 2003
that says that ‘‘friends say the brothers were deeply af-
fected by the September 11 terrorist attacks and felt com-
pelled to enlist.’’ We do not know if these friends were
speculating about Tillman’s reasons or if they had direct
knowledge of Tillman’s reasons. The bottom line is that
Tillman never stated publicly his reasons for joining the
143 E-mail from Matthew Scully, deputy director of Presidential Speechwriting, to John
Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking (Apr. 28, 2004).
144 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Carol Darby, at 39
(Sept. 18, 2007).
145 E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking, to Matthew Scully, dep-
uty director of Presidential Speechwriting (Apr. 28, 2004).
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27
Rangers, and it is speculation that he did so because of
September 11.146
Mr. Currin thought the issue was important enough that he sent
a third message to the speechwriters on the following day, April 29.
In this e-mail, he wrote that Ms. Darby of USASOC had offered to
call the Tillman family on his behalf, but Mr. Currin advised
against it. He wrote:
As I mentioned yesterday, Pat Tillman and his family
never spoke about the reasons why he chose to leave the
NFL and join the Army, and the statement in the remarks
for the correspondence dinner attributing his motivation to
seeing the burning towers on 9/11 is speculation. I spoke
yesterday with Carol Darby at Ft. Lewis (the base for the
Rangers) to check on Tillman’s correct rank and see if she
could verify Tillman’s reasons for joining the Rangers.
Carol phoned me just now to ask if we wanted to go
through the CACO [casualty assistance officer] assigned to
the Tillman family and see if they would want to talk to
us about Corporal Tillman’s reasons for joining the Army.
I am not certain if we would want to approach the family
in their time of grief (they will receive Corporal Tillman’s
remains today), or if you can work around the problem of
not knowing as fact the reasons that motivated Tillman to
join the Army. Let me know if you want me to go through
the Tillman family CACO to see if the family will let us
know his reasons. My sense, however, is that because Till-
man wanted to keep his reasons private, and because his
family continues to respect his wish to this day, we should
as well, and work as best we can around the specula-
tion.147
Yet the final draft, approved and read by the President, retained
the admittedly ‘‘speculative’’ statement about Corporal Tillman’s
motivation for enlisting. Rather than remove the passage, the
speechwriters attributed it to unknown ‘‘friends.’’
D. KNOWLEDGE OF FRATRICIDE
The record before the Committee does not explain when and how
White House officials learned that Corporal Tillman’s death was
due to fratricide. Although the Committee requested from the
White House all documents related to Corporal Tillman, none of
the documents produced discussed the fratricide. Moreover, none of
the White House officials interviewed by Committee staff had any
recollection of how they learned of the fratricide or what they did
in response.
As discussed in part II, on April 29, 2004, General McChrystal
sent a P4 message to the commanding general at CENTCOM, and
sent information copies to the commanders of SOCOM and
USASOC, urging that they inform the President of the likely frat-
ricide. The P4 cited ‘‘unconfirmed but suspected reports that
146 E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking, to Michael Gerson, Mat-
thew Scully, and John McConnell, White House Speechwriters (Apr. 28, 2004).
147 E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking, to Michael Gerson, Mat-
thew Scully, and John McConnell, White House Speechwriters (Apr. 29, 2004).
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28
POTUS [the President of the United States] and the Secretary of
the Army might include comments about Corporal Tillman’s hero-
ism and his approved Silver Star medal in speeeches [sic] currently
being prepared’’ and stressed that it was ‘‘essential’’ that the P4 re-
cipients were immediately informed about the fratricide ‘‘to pre-
clude any unknowing statements by our country’s leaders which
might cause public embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal
Tillman’s death become public.’’ 148
Two days after the P4 memo was sent, President Bush gave his
speech at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner. As the P4 ad-
vised, the President did not discuss how Corporal Tillman died.
None of the documents provided to the Committee indicate whether
the P4 or the information in the P4 reached the White House.149
General Richard Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, was by statute the ‘‘principal military advisor to the Presi-
dent.’’ 150 Although he knew at the end of April that Corporal Till-
man was likely killed by friendly fire, he told the Committee that
he could not remember ‘‘ever having a discussion with anybody in
the White House about the Tillman case, one way or another.’’ 151
The former White House officials interviewed by the Committee
also provided no details about how they, or the President, learned
of the fratricide. Committee staff interviewed seven White House
employees, including the President’s communications director,
press secretary, chief speechwriter, and top NSC communications
officials. None could recall when they learned the death of Corporal
Tillman was under investigation as a possible fratricide, or what
they did in response.
Dan Bartlett, White House communications director in 2004, told
the Committee he did not have a ‘‘specific recollection’’ as to when
he learned of the friendly fire. Asked whether he informed the
President of the fratricide, he stated, ‘‘I don’t remember a particu-
lar conversation, but I can’t rule out that I talked to him about
it.’’ 152
Scott McClellan, the White House Press Secretary in 2004, said
he did not remember when he or the President learned about the
fratricide, but stated that he ‘‘maybe’’ could have heard about the
fratricide just before the public release on May 29, 2004.153
Michael Gerson, former chief White House speechwriter, did not
recall when he learned about the friendly fire, whether he knew
about the fratricide while preparing the President’s Correspond-
148 ‘‘Personal For’’ message from Major General Stanley McChrystal to General John Abizaid,
General Bryan Brown, and Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004).
149 Although the acting Defense Department Inspector General, Thomas Gimble, testified that
his office ‘‘think[s] the P4 memo stopped with the three generals that were on it,’’ the IG did
not interview Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, or any White House officials during its inves-
tigation. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Thomas Gimble,
Acting Defense Department Inspector General, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Bat-
tlefield, 110th Cong. (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110–54).
150 10 U.S.C. 151(b).
151 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard
Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department
Knew, 110th Cong., at 34 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49).
152 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett
(Sept. 12, 2007).
153 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Scott McClellan
(Sept. 10, 2007).
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29
ents’ Dinner speech, or whether he ever discussed the fratricide
with the President.154
Taylor Gross, former White House spokesman, told Committee
staff, ‘‘after the 23rd of April, I did not have any official conversa-
tion with anyone that I can recall regarding this matter on an offi-
cial or informal basis.’’ He said, ‘‘after that date, my only informa-
tion that I recall having about Pat Tillman’s death or anything to
do with Pat Tillman’s death, friendly fire or otherwise, was reading
in the news reports.’’ 155
President Bush was asked directly by a reporter in August 2007
when he learned that Corporal Tillman was killed by friendly fire.
He said he did not remember. He explained: ‘‘I can’t give you the
precise moment. But obviously the minute I heard that the facts
that people believed were true were not true, that I expect there
to be a full investigation and get to the bottom of it.’’ 156
IV. SECRETARY RUMSFELD’S RESPONSE
Evidence obtained by the Committee shows that Secretary of De-
fense Donald Rumsfeld took a personal interest in Pat Tillman’s
enlistment in the Army Rangers. Evidence also establishes that
after Corporal Tillman was killed, senior military officials who re-
ported directly to Secretary Rumsfeld, including the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs and several combatant commanders, became
aware of the fratricide. Yet when Secretary Rumsfeld testified be-
fore the Committee in August 2007, he stated he had no recollec-
tion of how or when he learned of the fratricide and no recollection
of what he did in response.
On June 25, 2002, about a month after Pat Tillman enlisted in
the Army, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote a so-called ‘‘snowflake memo’’
to the Secretary of the Army with the subject line, ‘‘Pat Tillman.’’
The memo attached a Chicago Tribune newspaper account about
Mr. Tillman’s enlistment and read, ‘‘Here is an article on a fellow
who is apparently joining the Rangers. He sound[s] like he is
world-class. We might want to keep our eye on him.’’ 157 Documents
produced to the Committee show that a friend living in the Chicago
area had initially brought the Tribune article to Secretary Rums-
feld’s attention.158 Three days later, on June 28, 2002, Secretary
Rumsfeld sent Mr. Tillman a personal letter applauding him for his
decision to enlist. He wrote, ‘‘I heard that you were leaving the Na-
tional Football League to become an Army Ranger. It is a proud
and patriotic thing you are doing.’’ 159
When he was asked about the June 25 snowflake memo to Sec-
retary White, Secretary Rumsfeld told the Committee he did not in-
tend to ‘‘single out’’ Corporal Tillman for progress reports or other
special treatment. He said the purpose of his memo was to commu-
154 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Michael Gerson
(Sept. 11, 2007).
155 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Taylor Gross, at 102
(Sept. 5, 2007).
156 White House, President Bush Discusses American Competitiveness Initiative During Press
Conference (Aug. 9, 2007).
157 Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to Tom White, Secretary of the
Army (June 25, 2002).
158 Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to William H. Layer (June 26, 2002).
159 Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to Mr. Pat Tillman (June 28, 2002).
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30
nicate that, ‘‘here is an individual who is serving his country and
is prominent and gave up a good deal to do that; and that we, as
people in the Department, ought to acknowledge that and be grate-
ful for his service, as I was.’’ 160
Colonel Steven Bucci, Secretary Rumsfeld’s military assistant at
the time, recalled that Mr. Tillman’s enlistment was a major event
that caught the attention of Secretary Rumsfeld. He told the Com-
mittee, ‘‘it was all over the newspapers. It was sort of a big event
for everybody.’’ 161 Both Colonel Bucci and Lieutenant General
Bantz J. Craddock, former senior military assistant to Secretary
Rumsfeld, told the Committee this was the only time they could re-
call Secretary Rumsfeld writing personal notes praising the enlist-
ment of an individual soldier.162
Larry Di Rita, who was serving as Special Assistant to the Sec-
retary in June 2002, had a similar recollection of why Secretary
Rumsfeld took a personal interest in Pat Tillman’s enlistment. Mr.
Di Rita told Committee staff that he did not remember being in-
volved in the drafting of Secretary Rumsfeld’s June 25 snowflake
memo or June 28 letter, but he generally remembered the attention
Corporal Tillman’s enlistment received within the Secretary’s of-
fice. He told the Committee:
This was a noteworthy event in the country. It had to do
with the Department for which he [Secretary Rumsfeld]
had oversight responsibility and control. . . . [T]his was
less than a year after 9/11. So there was still a great deal
of interest in what was happening with respect to the
Armed Forces. . . . [I]t was a very unusual circumstance,
a football player leaving the NFL to join the Army. I don’t
recall that it had happened to anybody else while we were
serving. So the nature of that kind of event is not surpris-
ing to me that the Secretary would have chosen to single
it out.163
In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary Rumsfeld said
he could not recall when he learned about the fratricide or who told
him. He told the Committee:
I don’t recall when I was told and I don’t recall who told
me. But my recollection is that it was at a stage when
there were investigations under way, in which case I
would not have told anybody to go do something with re-
spect to it. . . . And it was not something that I would in-
ject myself into the normal course of my role as secretary
of defense.164
160 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Donald Rumsfeld,
Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th
Cong., at 203 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49).
161 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Dr. Steven Bucci,
at 26 (Sept. 20, 2007).
162 Id.; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General Bantz
J. Craddock, at 18 (July 27, 2007).
163 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lawrence Di Rita,
at 41 (Sept. 24, 2007).
164 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Donald Rumsfeld,
Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th
Cong., at 35 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49).
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When he was asked how he could not have known that Corporal
Tillman’s death was being investigated as a fratricide, Secretary
Rumsfeld responded: ‘‘You’re talking about an institution of some-
thing like 3 million people: active duty, Reserve, Guard, civilians,
contractors. . . . It’s not possible for someone to know all the
things that are going on.’’ 165 Furthermore, Secretary Rumsfeld told
the Committee, ‘‘I know that I would not engage in a cover-up. I
know that no one in the White House suggested such a thing to
me.’’ 166
The Committee received conflicting evidence about when Sec-
retary Rumsfeld learned about the fratricide. General Abizaid, the
CENTCOM commander, recalled informing Secretary Rumsfeld
‘‘that there was an investigation that was ongoing and it looked
like it was friendly fire’’ between May 18 and May 20, 2004, more
than a week prior to the public announcement.167
But Secretary Rumsfeld informed the Committee that his mili-
tary assistant, Colonel Steven Bucci, recalled that Secretary Rums-
feld did not learn about the fratricide until after May 20. In a let-
ter to the Committee, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote:
I am told that I received word of this development some-
time after May 20, 2004, but my recollection reflects the
fact that it occurred well over two years ago. As a result,
I do not recall when I first learned about the possibility
that Corporal Tillman’s death might have resulted from
fratricide. I am confident that I did not discuss this matter
with anyone outside the Department of Defense.168
The Committee interviewed Colonel Bucci, who returned to the
Secretary’s personal office on Monday, May 24, 2004, after a six-
month temporary assignment to the Coalition Provisional Author-
ity in Iraq. Sometime during that week, he said he received a call
from the Army Chief of Staff’s executive assistant or the Secretary
of the Army’s military assistant. His colleague told him, ‘‘We’re
pretty sure that this may have actually been a fratricide event, and
you need to let the Secretary know.’’ 169 Colonel Bucci’s colleague
also told him officials were ‘‘trying to ascertain exactly which cali-
ber weapon had killed him [Corporal Tillman] and trying to check
that against the weapon that his brother was carrying,’’ in order
to eliminate any possibility that Corporal Tillman had been killed
by his brother, Specialist Kevin Tillman.170
Colonel Bucci stated that he shared this information with Sec-
retary Rumsfeld within fifteen minutes, at one of the Secretary’s
daily ‘‘stand up’’ staff meetings. He told the Committee:
I said, ‘‘Sir, you know, I have bad news. The Army thinks
and they are pretty sure that this was actually a frat-
ricide.’’ And he said, ‘‘Oh, gosh, that’s a shame. Well, they
165 Id. at 177.
166 Id. at 178.
167 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John
Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department
Knew, 110th Cong., at 32 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49).
168 Letter from Donald Rumsfeld to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, and Tom Davis, Ranking
Minority Member, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (July 26, 2007).
169 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Dr. Steven Bucci,
at 26 (Sept. 20, 2007).
170 Id. at 32.
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32
need to settle it and get the word out as quickly as pos-
sible.’’ And it was clear to me from his reaction and the re-
action of General Craddock and the others that that was
the first time anyone had heard anything about it being a
fratricide.171
When asked to further explain his observation that the people in
the meeting appeared to be hearing the fratricide news for the first
time, Colonel Bucci explained:
We tend in the military to not be particularly happy when
there’s fratricide of any sort. You know, it’s enough of a
tragedy when you lose soldiers to the enemy. When you
lose them because your own guys did something, you
know, made a mistake, it’s particularly tragic. So, yeah,
everybody’s response to me said this was the first time
they were hearing about that aspect of it.172
When the Committee interviewed Secretary Rumsfeld’s senior
military assistant, General Bantz J. Craddock, he did not recall
this conversation. Instead, he recalled that he first heard about the
suspected fratricide ‘‘over the fence at my quarters one weekend’’
from his colleague and neighbor at Fort Myer, Lieutenant General
James Lovelace, who at that time was Director of the Army
Staff.173 General Craddock told the Committee:
As I said, I recall at sometime—and it would have been on
a weekend. I don’t recall when. My neighbor, Jim Lovelace,
indicated it was a possibility, that it was a concern that it
might have been a fratricide and it was, like I was, ‘‘you’re
kidding.’’ 174
General Craddock told the Committee that he could not recall
ever talking to Secretary Rumsfeld about Corporal Tillman.175 He
stated that he was ‘‘surprised and taken aback’’ to hear the news
of the fratricide, but he never raised the issue with Secretary
Rumsfeld, General Myers, or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.176 General Lovelace told the Committee that he did not re-
call the ‘‘over the fence’’ conversation with General Craddock. He
also told the Committee that, based on a review of his e-mails, he
believed he learned about Corporal Tillman’s fratricide on May 27,
2007, two days before the public announcement.177
V. GENERAL MYERS’S RESPONSE
General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
2004, testified before the Committee on August 1, 2007. As Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs, General Myers was the highest-ranking of-
ficer in the military and the ‘‘principal military adviser to the
171 Id.
172 Id. at 34.
173 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General Bantz J.
Craddock, at 19 (July 27, 2007).
174 Id. at 27.
175 Id. at 17.
176 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General Bantz J.
Craddock, at 28 (July 27, 2007).
177 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General
James Lovelace, at 20 (July 31, 2007).
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33
President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of De-
fense.’’ 178 In that role, he communicated many times a day with
Secretary Rumsfeld, including attending a daily ‘‘roundtable’’ meet-
ing in Secretary Rumsfeld’s office.179 Moreover, according to Sec-
retary Rumsfeld, he and General Myers also ‘‘met with the White
House frequently.’’ 180
When General Myers testified before the Committee on August
1, 2007, he confirmed that he learned about the friendly fire sus-
picions only days after Corporal Tillman died. He testified: ‘‘I knew
right at the end of April, that there was a possibility of fratricide
in the Corporal Tillman death, and that General McChrystal had
started an investigation.’’ 181 General Myers did not recall how he
learned of the investigation, but thought he might have heard it
from the operations office within the Joint Chiefs of Staff.182
General Myers’s early knowledge of the fratricide was confirmed
by General Abizaid, commander of CENTCOM. General Abizaid
testified that he called General Myers after receiving the P4 mes-
sage on or after May 6, 2004, but found that General Myers was
already aware of the situation:
I called the chairman, I told the chairman about having re-
ceived General McChrystal’s message that friendly fire
was involved. . . . And it was my impression from having
talked to the chairman at the time that he knew about
it.183
According to Lieutenant General Sattler, General Abizaid’s top
operations officer at CENTCOM, General Abizaid likely called Gen-
eral Myers with the understanding that the Chairman would pass
the information in the P4 message on to Secretary Rumsfeld. Gen-
eral Sattler stated:
I’m sure that General Abizaid’s goal would have been to let
the Secretary know immediately as in his chain of com-
mand. And there’s obviously two different ways. One is
point to point; the other one is through his confidant and
advisor, the Chairman. So, yes, I would be very surprised
if General Abizaid did not know, one way or the other, the
Secretary was going to be informed immediately.184
General Myers could not recall whether he informed the Sec-
retary of Defense or the President about the fratricide. General
Myers acknowledged in his testimony that it would have been ‘‘log-
178 10 U.S.C. 151(b); although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not in the chain
of command between combatant commanders and the Secretary of Defense, the Goldwater-Nick-
les Act allows the Chairman to act as a conduit for communications between the combatant com-
manders and the Secretary, 10 U.S.C. 163(a).
179 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General Bantz J.
Craddock, at 34 (July 27, 2007).
180 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Donald Rumsfeld,
Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th
Cong., at 34 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49).
181 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard
Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department
Knew, 110th Cong., at 32 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49).
182 Id.
183 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John
Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department
Knew, 110th Cong., at 31 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49).
184 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General John F.
Sattler, at 41 (July 24, 2007).
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34
ical’’ for him to share the news with the Secretary of Defense, but
said ‘‘I just don’t recall whether I did it or not’’ and ‘‘I don’t have
any documentation that says I did.’’ 185 General Myers also testified
that he could not recall ‘‘ever having a discussion with anybody in
the White House about the Tillman case, one way or another.’’ 186
Shortly after learning of the possibility of a fratricide, General
Myers had a conversation with his top public affairs official, then-
Captain Frank Thorp, about how to discuss the circumstances of
Corporal Tillman’s death. He told the Committee:
[I]n working with my former public affairs adviser, I said,
you know, ‘‘We need to keep this in mind in case we go be-
fore the press. We’ve just got to calibrate ourselves. With
this investigation ongoing, we want to be careful how we
portray the situation.’’ . . . I do remember talking to him
about the potential of fratricide and just say we’ve got to
be cautious here, . . . if we make any comments.187
When the Committee interviewed now-Admiral Thorp, he had a
similar recollection of the encounter:
He pulled me aside, as I recall, pulled me in his office and
gave me a heads—I don’t remember his exact words, but
I do remember him saying, giving me a heads up that he
has heard it is possible fratricide and advising me to make
sure that I kept him honest and correct in his public re-
marks.188
General Myers told the Committee he was ‘‘cautious’’ when dis-
cussing Corporal Tillman’s death to avoid exerting ‘‘command influ-
ence’’ over those investigating the fratricide, even though General
Myers, as Joint Chiefs Chairman, was not technically in the chain
of command. He denied engaging in a cover-up of the friendly
fire.189
General Myers told the Committee that he took no steps to notify
the Tillman family or speak in public about the possibility of
friendly fire. He told the Committee that notifying the family
‘‘wouldn’t be our responsibility’’ at the Joint Chiefs because it is
done in ‘‘Army channels.’’ He said it would have been ‘‘absolutely
irresponsible of me to interfere with Army procedures, frankly.’’ 190
He further explained:
I mean, it sounds harsh, and it is harsh, but the reality
is there is a lot of things going on, and this—Corporal Till-
man’s death was significant, but it wasn’t the kind of issue
that occupied a whole lot of time. . . . We were working
on the battle of Fallujah. We had a myriad of issues. Abu
185 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard
Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department
Knew, 110th Cong., at 223 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49).
186 Id.
187 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard
Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department
Knew, 110th Cong., at 33 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49).
188 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Rear Admiral Frank
Thorp, IV, at 26 (Sept. 19, 2007).
189 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard
Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department
Knew, 110th Cong., at 197 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49).
190 Id. at 219.
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35
Ghraib had just broke; we spent a lot of time in the media
with Abu Ghraib. There were a lot of issues taking our at-
tention. I think it would have been irresponsible for the
chairman to get involved in what are Army matters.191
Although General Myers did not notify the Tillman family of the
possible friendly fire, he did notify the National Football League on
April 23 that Corporal Tillman had been killed.192 Greg Aiello, Vice
President for Public Relations for the NFL, told Army representa-
tives that General Myers called NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue
on April 23, 2004, to notify him of the casualty.193 Mr. Tagliabue
confirmed to Committee staff that he received this call.194 At the
time General Myers made this call, Defense Department policy re-
quired that the Department refrain from public comment on the
death of a soldier until 24 hours after family notification.
VI. GENERAL ABIZAID’S RESPONSE
General John Abizaid, commanding general of CENTCOM, was
the military officer at the top of Corporal Tillman’s operational
chain of command and the main addressee on General
McChrystal’s P4 memo. General Abizaid testified before the Com-
mittee that he was traveling in Iraq and Afghanistan when the P4
memo was sent and that CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Flor-
ida failed to forward him the message in a timely way. As a result,
General Abizaid testified, he received the P4 message a week or
more after it was sent, probably around May 6, 2004.195
General Abizaid told the Committee that immediately after re-
ceiving the P4, he contacted General Myers, the Joint Chiefs Chair-
man, to notify him that Corporal Tillman’s death was a suspected
friendly fire. He stated, ‘‘[a]s soon as I saw the message . . . I
called the chairman; I told the chairman about it.’’ 196 General
Abizaid testified that when he called General Myers, ‘‘it was my
impression from having talked to the chairman at the time he
knew about it.’’ 197 General Abizaid also testified that in their con-
versation, he told General Myers he thought the ‘‘leadership’’
should know about the suspected fratricide, by which he meant
‘‘the secretary and the president.’’ 198
During his visit to Afghanistan in late April, General Abizaid
spoke with Corporal Tillman’s platoon leader, 1st Lieutenant David
Uthlaut, who had been injured in the same firefight in which Cor-
poral Tillman was killed. In his April 30, 2004, press availability
in Qatar, General Abizaid made the following comment:
191 Id.
192 Shari Lawrence, Army Human Resources Command, ‘‘EXSUM’’ Document (Apr. 23, 2004).
193 Id.
194 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Paul Tagliabue (May
27, 2008).
195 General Abizaid blamed the delay in his receipt of the P4 on ‘‘a problem within my own
headquarters.’’ According to CENTCOM’s Director of Operations at the time, Lieutenant Gen-
eral John Sattler, ‘‘we had problems with our P4 system’’ while deployed outside of the continen-
tal United States that might have caused such a delay. House Committee on Oversight and Gov-
ernment Reform, Interview of General John F. Sattler, at 33 (July 24, 2007).
196 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John
Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department
Knew, 110th Cong., at 31 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49).
197 Id.
198 Id. at 233.
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I’d also like to say that while I was in Afghanistan yester-
day I had the opportunity to talk to 1st Lieutenant Dave
Hutman [sic] of the 1st Ranger Battalion, of the Ranger
battalion—maybe I’ve got the wrong Ranger battalion that
he was with. He was the platoon leader of Pat Tillman. I
asked him yesterday how operations were going. I asked
him about Pat Tillman. He said, ‘‘Pat Tillman was a great
Ranger and a great soldier, and what more can I say about
him?’’ And I’d say that about every one of those young men
and women that are fighting, not only in Afghanistan but
in Iraq. I also probably bear some understanding that—
that lieutenant I was talking to happened to be a former
first captain of corps of cadets at West Point, and when he
was talking to me, he was still nursing a large number of
wounds that he sustained in that firefight where Pat Till-
man lost his life.199
General Abizaid testified that Lieutenant Uthlaut ‘‘gave no indi-
cation that there was a friendly fire issue’’ during their conversa-
tion.200
In a written response to the Committee, General Abizaid said he
was not informed about the friendly fire suspicions before or during
this trip to Afghanistan. He also reiterated his testimony that he
did not know about the friendly fire before he reviewed General
McChrystal’s P4 message on about May 6, 2004.201
General Abizaid told the Committee that when he traveled to
Washington, DC, between May 18 and May 20, 2004, he informed
Secretary Rumsfeld ‘‘that there was an investigation that was on-
going and it looked like it was friendly fire.’’ 202 Yet when asked by
the Defense Department Inspector General whether he spoke with
the Secretary upon learning of the fratricide, General Abizaid stat-
ed, ‘‘No. I didn’t talk to the Secretary of Defense about it.’’ 203
VII. THE RESPONSE OF OTHER SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS
A. GENERAL BRYAN BROWN
General Bryan Brown, the SOCOM commander, told the Com-
mittee he received General McChrystal’s April 29, 2004, P4 memo,
but failed to inform his superiors or the Tillman family of the frat-
ricide. According to General Brown:
When I got the P4, I made the assumption and probably
the bad assumption since I was an info addressee and not
the ‘‘to’’ that that information would flow through the nor-
199 Department of Defense, Gen. Abizaid Central Command Operations Update Briefing (Apr.
30, 2004) (online at www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2557).
200 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John
Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department
Knew, 110th Cong., at 31 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49). Then-Captain Uthlaut told the
DOD IG that he was unaware of the friendly fire for approximately 10 days while recuperating
after the firefight. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Captain
David Uthlaut, at 5 (July 29, 2006).
201 Letter from General John Abizaid (Retired) to Chairman Henry Waxman and Ranking
Member Tom Davis, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Jan. 15, 2008).
202 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on the Tillman Frat-
ricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 32 (Aug. 1, 2007)
(Serial No. 110–49).
203 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of General John Abizaid, at
9 (Dec. 13, 2006).
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37
mal chain of command. It would have been very simple for
me to pick up the phone and call the chairman, I didn’t.
I did respond to the P4 back to General McChrystal but
quite frankly, I just made the assumption, a bad assump-
tion now—I know that normal P4 traffic moves pretty
fast—that that would go to the chairman immediately. So
it’s unfortunate it was poorly handled and unfortunately
it’s the Tillman family that had to pay the price for it.204
General Brown told the Defense Department Inspector General
that he knew about the friendly fire suspicions even before receiv-
ing the memo because he received a phone call from General
McChrystal a few days earlier notifying him that the shooting was
a possible friendly fire and that an Army 15–6 investigation was
under way. He also said that he believed the Department of De-
fense should have notified the Tillman family of the investigation
as soon as it became aware of the information.205
According to General Brown, notifying the family was not his re-
sponsibility because he was a combatant commander.206 Neverthe-
less, General Brown told the Committee that when he learned the
notification had not taken place, more than a month after the
shooting, he initiated an effort to notify the Tillman family before
the public announcement on May 29, 2004.207
B. LIEUTENANT GENERAL PHILIP KENSINGER
Precisely how and when General Kensinger, the commanding
general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC),
learned of the fratricide remains a subject of dispute. When the
Committee interviewed General Kensinger, he stated that he was
unaware of any suspicions of friendly fire when he attended Cor-
poral Tillman’s memorial service in San Jose, California, on May
3, 2004. But his account is contradicted by the testimony of several
other officers, as well as by General Kensinger’s own prior state-
ments, all of which suggest he learned about the possibility of
friendly fire prior to the May 3 memorial service. All the witnesses
agree, however, that General Kensinger made no effort to inform
the Tillman family of the fratricide until the end of May 2004.
When the Committee interviewed General Kensinger on Feb-
ruary 29, 2008, he was asked when he first learned that Corporal
Tillman’s death may have been caused by friendly fire.208 General
Kensinger responded, ‘‘to the best that I remember, it was after the
memorial service when I got the P4.’’ 209 General Kensinger said he
204 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Bryan
Brown, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department
Knew, 110th Cong., at 218 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49).
205 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of General Bryan Brown, at
16 (Nov. 17, 2006).
206 Id.
207 Id. at 39.
208 General Kensinger had been invited to attend the August 1, 2007, Committee hearing, but
refused, citing a ‘‘previously scheduled business matter.’’ E-mail from Charles Gittins, Attorney
for General Kensinger, to Majority Staff, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee
(July 22, 2007). A subpoena was issued to compel his appearance, but U.S. Marshals could not
locate General Kensinger prior to the hearing. Subpoena from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman,
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, to Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger
(July 31, 2007).
209 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General
Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 24 (Feb. 29, 2008).
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38
did not learn about suspicions of friendly fire until Colonel Clar-
ence K.K. Chinn, the deputy commander of the 75th Ranger Regi-
ment, told him about them after the memorial service. He also stat-
ed that he did not see General McChrystal’s P4 memo until after
he returned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, after the service. He
told the Committee this recollection was based in part on his feel-
ing that he would have been uncomfortable attending the memorial
service knowing about the friendly fire suspicions. He stated:
I mean I just have a hard time going back and trying to
rectify the dates. And that is why I said that it was after
the memorial service. Because I would have had a dif-
ferent feel—I just know myself. I would have had a dif-
ferent feeling at the memorial service if I had known about
this before going to the memorial service.210
General Kensinger’s statements are contradicted by the testi-
mony of Brigadier General Howard Yellen, the deputy commander
of USASOC in April 2004. He told the Defense Department Inspec-
tor General that on April 24, the commander of the 75th Ranger
Regiment, Colonel Nixon, called and told him ‘‘I think we have a
possible fratricide.’’ 211 General Yellen told Committee staff he
shared this information with General Kensinger on the same day.
He stated: ‘‘I either went by and went into his office and told him,
or brought it up at a daily update.’’ 212 When asked about this con-
versation, General Kensinger told the Committee, ‘‘I don’t remem-
ber that.’’ 213
General Yellen also told the Committee that General Kensinger
‘‘[a]bsolutely’’ knew about the suspected fratricide prior to the me-
morial service on May 3.214 According to General Yellen, he had a
discussion with General Kensinger prior to the memorial about the
need to disclose to the Tillman family the possibility of fratricide.
General Yellen told the Committee:
I remember indicating that not saying anything might not
be to our best—bad news doesn’t get better with time. And
I remember General Kensinger saying the investigation is
not yet complete. . . . My recommendation was just to ex-
plain to the family that we have a suspicion that this may
have been friendly fire. We have a thorough investigation
currently ongoing and we are going to brief you just as
soon as that investigation is complete. We are going to
come out there and we’re going to lay all the facts on the
table for you and explain this, as we do for all of our 15–
6 collateral investigations. . . . I mean, this was not un-
usual in going out and briefing a family. In fact, General
Shinseki, when he was Chief of Staff, instituted that pol-
icy.215
210 Id. at 30.
211 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Brigadier General Howard
Yellen, at 8 (Dec. 1, 2006).
212 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Brigadier General
Howard Yellen (Retired), at 40 (July 25, 2007).
213 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General
Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 25 (Feb. 29, 2008).
214 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Brigadier General
Howard Yellen (Retired), at 39 (July 25, 2007).
215 Id. at 62.
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39
According to General Yellen, General Kensinger did not support
sharing the information with the Tillman family before the inves-
tigation was complete. General Yellen summed up their disagree-
ment in the following way: ‘‘He wanted to have a complete report.
And I, my approach is you don’t need the completed report.’’ 216 Al-
though he did not recall specific conversations with General Yellen
about notifying the family of the fratricide investigation, General
Kensinger told the Committee he recalled believing ‘‘that until the
investigation was completed you didn’t notify the family.’’ 217
General Kensinger’s assertion to the Committee that he learned
about friendly fire suspicions after the May 3 memorial is also con-
tradicted by another former member of General Kensinger’s staff,
Lieutenant Colonel David Duffy. Colonel Duffy told the Depart-
ment of Defense Inspector General that he personally delivered
General McChrystal’s P4 message to General Kensinger on the
morning of April 30, 2004, three days before the memorial service.
Colonel Duffy stated:
Once I got it I hand carried it immediately up to GEN
Kensinger, the commander at the time. . . . I mean, I sat
down. He sat in on chair, I sat in the other and I handed
it to him.218
Colonel Duffy recalled that General Kensinger was concerned
about the P4 message, and warned him to avoid discussing it:
[H]e read it and, you know, was dismayed by the contents
obviously. And then basically looked me in the eye and
said if it leaked anywhere that, you know, it was on me.
. . . I do know that he said words to the effect of ‘‘Damn,
I wish they hadn’t have told me.’’ 219
Colonel Duffy noted that General Kensinger’s warning not to dis-
close the information in the P4 was not a routine occurrence:
That’s unusual. That the only time it ever happened. The
only time. . . . And I had a good relationship with GEN
Kensinger. But it was like, you know, ‘‘Hey if leaks out,
Duffy, you know, you’re dead,’’ or something.220
Although General Kensinger told Committee staff that he only
received P4s ‘‘very infrequently’’ and agreed that they tended to be
urgent messages, he said that he had no recollection that Colonel
Duffy, or anyone else, delivered the message from General
McChrystal.221 He had no explanation for the delay he says he ex-
perienced in receiving the P4, stating: ‘‘I can’t tell you why I didn’t
get it in a timely manner. I don’t know.’’ 222 According to his dep-
uty, General Yellen, P4s were generally delivered promptly at
216 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Brigadier General Howard
Yellen, at 74 (Dec. 1, 2006).
217 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General
Philip Kensinger (Retired), at 59 (Feb. 29, 2008).
218 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Lieutenant Colonel David
Duffy, at 7 (Nov. 30, 2006).
219 Id. at 8.
220 Id. at 16.
221 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General
Philip Kensinger (Retired), at 28 (Feb. 29, 2008).
222 Id.
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40
USASOC because ‘‘personnel understood the sensitivity and the ex-
pediency of those messages.’’ 223
General Kensinger’s account was also contradicted by a third of-
ficer, Colonel Clarence Chinn, the deputy commander of the 75th
Ranger Regiment in 2004. In an interview with the Defense De-
partment Inspector General, Colonel Chinn disputed the idea that
he had informed General Kensinger of the ongoing fratricide inves-
tigation. He told investigators that sometime after the memorial
service, General Kensinger informed him that Corporal Tillman’s
death was a possible fratricide. Colonel Chinn stated that he was
certain of his recollection:
Oh, I am very clear. I, I am absolutely, one hundred per-
cent positive he told me. . . . And the reason I am very
aware of that because I was not very happy about not
knowing and going to a memorial service for a soldier un-
aware that that is what happened.224
Finally, General Kensinger’s statements to the Committee are
contradicted by his own previous testimony to Army investigators
that he learned the information shortly before the May 3 memorial
service. On two separate occasions, he testified that he was told
about the friendly fire investigation by Lt. Colonel Chinn, who
picked him up at the airport before the memorial.225 When Army
investigators then asked him if there was ‘‘a conscious decision
made not to tell the family of that possibility,’’ General Kensinger
responded:
On that particular day, considering what I was told, the
answer is: Yes. You know, the decision was made not to—
first of all, we didn’t have enough information to say that
it was. And I think what we wanted to do is make sure
that we told them the right information. Again, that was
a memorial service. I didn’t think it was my responsibility
to go up to them and say, ‘‘Hey, you know, this is a pos-
sible friendly fire.’’ Again, I think that would just not be
the right thing to do personally. Again, I didn’t have any
information. Mine was all hearsay.226
Despite the conflicts in testimony relating to when General
Kensinger found out about the ongoing fratricide investigation, all
the witnesses agree that when he did find out, General Kensinger
chose not to tell the Tillman family. Instead, he waited until the
investigation had been completed at the end of May 2004. This
delay was not consistent with Army regulations, which required
the Army to notify the Tillman family that it was investigating
Corporal Tillman’s death as a possible fratricide.227
223 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Brigadier General
Howard Yellen, at 47 (July 25, 2007).
224 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Colonel Clarence Chinn,
at 26 (Nov. 7, 2006).
225 Brigadier General Mike Jones, Interview of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Nov.
29, 2004); Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Lieutenant General
Philip Kensinger, Jr., at 6 (Dec. 8, 2006).
226 Brigadier General Mike Jones, Interview of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr., at
3 (Nov. 29, 2004).
227 Army Regulation 600–34 § 3–7 (2003) (‘‘[W]ithin a reasonable period of time after family
members are notified of the death of a soldier, but not more than 30 days after the date of notifi-
cation, the CAO [casualty assistance officer] . . . will ensure that the PNOK [primary next of
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VIII. THE RESPONSE TO THE CAPTURE AND RESCUE OF
PRIVATE JESSICA LYNCH
A. PRIVATE LYNCH’S CAPTURE AND RESCUE
Private First Class Jessica Lynch was a member of the Army’s
507th Maintenance Company, a logistics team assigned to support
a Patriot missile battery during the initial invasion of Iraq. While
the company was heading towards Baghdad as part of a convoy on
March 23, 2003, several vehicles experienced mechanical problems,
and the company fell hours behind. As a result, the company
missed a turn and headed into territory controlled by Iraqi
forces.228
Iraqi forces attacked the company as it traveled through the city
of An Nasiriyah. Private Lynch was severely injured when the
Humvee she was riding in crashed into another convoy vehicle.
Iraqi forces captured Private Lynch and transported her to a mili-
tary hospital and later to the Saddam Hussein General Hospital in
An Nasiriyah.229
For the next seven days, Iraqi hospital staff treated Private
Lynch’s life-threatening wounds, which included numerous shat-
tered bones. During that time, Marines conducting operations in
the area learned that Private Lynch was being held at the hospital
and that Iraqi forces were using the hospital as an operations cen-
ter.230
Late on the night of April 1, 2003, a U.S. special forces unit res-
cued Private Lynch and recovered the remains of nine U.S. soldiers
who had been killed during the earlier battle. Private Lynch was
transported to the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany
for further treatment.231
B. THE DISSEMINATION OF INACCURATE INFORMATION
On April 1, 2003, immediately after the rescue of Private Lynch,
military officials at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) head-
quarters in Doha, Qatar, called in members of the media to an-
nounce the success of the mission. CENTCOM’s chief spokesman
Jim Wilkinson stated: ‘‘America doesn’t leave its heroes behind.
. . . Never has. Never will.’’ 232 He also stated, ‘‘We also have other
POWs we are just as worried about. This is good news today but
we need a lot more good news.’’ 233
The next morning, Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, another
CENTCOM spokesman, gave his daily press briefing. During this
kin] and other family members . . . [a]re informed of the investigations, the names of the agen-
cies conducting the investigations, and the existence of any reports by such agencies that have
or will be issued as a result of the investigations’’); Army Regulation 600–8–1 § 4–13(b) (1994)
(providing a script for notifying family members in cases of friendly fire, including, ‘‘His/her
death is the result of suspected friendly fire. An investigation is being conducted.’’).
228 U.S. Army, Attack on the 507th Maintenance Company, 23 March 2003, An Nasiriyah, Iraq
(undated) (online at www.army.mil/features/507thMaintCmpy/AttackOnThe507MaintCmpy.pdf).
229 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Jessica Lynch,
Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 22 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Se-
rial No. 110–54).
230 U.S. Central Command Operational Update Briefing with Major General Victor Renuart,
CENTCOM Director of Operations (Apr. 5, 2003).
231 Id.
232 American Troops Rescue Iraq POW Lynch, Associated Press (Apr. 1, 2003).
233 Id.
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briefing, he showed a four-minute video of the rescue operation and
gave the following narration:
[C]oalition Special Operations forces did stage an oper-
ation last night into the town of An Nasiriya. It was in the
Saddam Hospital in An Nasiriya, a facility that had been
used by the regime as a military post.
We were successful in that operation last night and did re-
trieve Pfc. Jessica Lynch, bringing her away from that lo-
cation of danger, clearing the building of some of the mili-
tary activity that was in there. There was not a fire-fight
inside the building I will tell you, but there were fire-fights
outside of the building getting in and getting out.
There were no coalition casualties as a result of this and
in the destruction that occurred inside of the building, par-
ticularly in the basement area where the operations cen-
ters had been, we found ammunition, mortars, maps, a ter-
rain model, and other things that make it very clear that
it was being used as a military command post.
The nature of the operation was a coalition special oper-
ation that involved Army Rangers, Air Force pilots and
combat controllers, U.S. Marines and Navy Seals. It was
a classical joint operation done by some of our nation’s fin-
est warriors, who are dedicated to never leaving a comrade
behind.234
On the same day, April 2, 2003, the Washington Post printed its
first report (‘‘Missing Soldier Rescued; U.S. Forces Remove POW
From Hospital’’) on the Lynch rescue. The front page story was
written by Vernon Loeb and Dana Priest, and it provided a factu-
ally accurate account of the rescue. The story’s opening paragraph
began:
Jessica Lynch, a 19-year-old private first class missing
since the ambush of an Army maintenance company 10
days ago in southern Iraq, has been rescued by Special Op-
erations forces, defense officials said yesterday. CIA
operatives in Iraq located Lynch in a hospital near
Nasiriyah, where she was being held because of multiple
wounds, officials said, and a helicopter-borne team of Navy
SEALS and Army rangers rescued her about midnight
local time.235
The story quoted Mr. Wilkinson, who said of Private Lynch,
‘‘[s]he’s safe in coalition hands and happier than where she
was.’’ 236
The April 2 story did not include any details about heroic actions
by Private Lynch. But just one day later the Washington Post re-
ported sensational new details. The April 3 front page story (‘‘She
Was Fighting to the Death’’), written by Susan Schmidt and Ver-
non Loeb, began with a vivid battlefield account:
234 U.S. Central Command Operational Update Briefing with Brigadier General Vincent
Brooks, CENTCOM Deputy Director of Operations (Apr. 2, 2003).
235 Missing Soldier Rescued; U.S. Forces Remove POW From Hospital, Washington Post (Apr.
2, 2003).
236 Id.
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Pfc. Jessica Lynch, rescued Tuesday from an Iraqi hos-
pital, fought fiercely and shot several enemy soldiers after
Iraqi forces ambushed the Army’s 507th Ordnance Mainte-
nance Company, firing her weapon until she ran out of
ammunition, U.S. officials said yesterday. Lynch, a 19-
year-old supply clerk, continued firing at the Iraqis even
after she sustained multiple gunshot wounds and watched
several other soldiers in her unit die around her in the
fighting March 23, one official said.237
The article quoted ‘‘one official’’ as saying that at the time of her
capture, Private Lynch ‘‘was fighting to the death. She did not
want to be taken alive.’’ 238 The authors stated that according to
this anonymous official, Private Lynch ‘‘was also stabbed when
Iraqi forces closed in on her position,’’ though there was no ‘‘indica-
tion’’ that Lynch’s wounds were ‘‘life-threatening.’’ 239 The article
also stated:
Several officials cautioned that the precise sequence of
events is still being determined, and that further informa-
tion will emerge as Lynch is debriefed. Reports are thus
far based on battlefield intelligence, they said, which
comes from monitored communications from Iraqi sources
in Nasiriyah whose reliability has yet to be assessed. Pen-
tagon officials said they heard ‘‘rumors’ of Lynch’s heroics
but had no confirmation.240
On the same day, April 3, 2003, the Military Times ran a similar
account with confirmation from Navy Captain Frank Thorp.241 At
the time, Captain Thorp was a CENTCOM public affairs officer
stationed at the command’s Qatar headquarters. He subsequently
became the top public affairs official for General Myers and was
promoted to Rear Admiral. According to this report:
Thorp said Lynch ‘‘waged quite a battle prior to her cap-
ture. We do have very strong indications that Jessica
Lynch was not captured very easily,’’ he said. ‘‘Reports are
that she fired her (M–16 rifle) until she had no more am-
munition.’’ 242
The dramatic story and video of Private Lynch’s rescue domi-
nated the media for the next few days. In the words of one
CENTCOM public affairs official, Lieutenant Colonel John Robin-
son, ‘‘It was an awesome story.’’ 243
The story of Private Lynch’s rescue unfolded during a difficult
time for the White House. An April 3, 2003, Washington Post story
detailed the difficulties the Bush Administration was having at the
time with communications about the war. The Post reported that
the Administration’s plan ‘‘did not allow for strong Iraqi resistance
237 ‘She Was Fighting to the Death’; Details Emerging of W. Va. Soldier’s Capture and Rescue,
Washington Post (Apr. 3, 2003).
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Remains Found at Iraqi Hospital to be Flown to U.S., Military Times (Apr. 3, 2003).
242 Id.
243 A Broken Body, a Broken Story, Pieced Together; Investigation Reveals Lynch—Still in Hos-
pital After 67 Days—Suffered Bone-crushing Injuries in Crash During Ambush, Washington Post
(June 17, 2003).
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44
and overestimated the welcome allied troops would receive.’’ 244 The
story also noted:
After nearly two weeks of discouraging news from Iraq,
the White House viewed yesterday as an excellent message
day. There were new details on the rescue of prisoner of
war Jessica Lynch by U.S. Special Operations forces.245
Those new details, however, included an entirely fictional ac-
count of her capture. It is not uncommon for initial battlefield re-
ports to have factual inaccuracies, since they are often written in
difficult circumstances and under intense time pressures. Subse-
quent reports then correct the record. The opposite was true,
though, in Private Lynch’s case. The initial reporting was accurate.
It was the subsequent stories that invented new facts. This un-
usual situation raised concerns that the misinformation might be
part of a deliberate propaganda strategy. As New York Times col-
umnist Frank Rich wrote, ‘‘[w]hen American forces were bogged
down in the war’s early days, she was the happy harbinger of an
imminent military turnaround: a 19-year-old female Rambo who
tried to blast her way out of the enemy’s clutches, taking out any
man who got in her way.’’ 246
In a June 17, 2003, story, the Washington Post disclosed that Pri-
vate Lynch did not engage the enemy, was not wounded by gun-
shots, and was rescued without significant resistance. According to
the Post, the source of the inaccurate account was a top-secret bat-
tlefield intelligence report that military officials had quickly leaked
to the press without verifying.247
In late 2003, Vernon Loeb, one of the authors of the erroneous
April 3 Post story, stated: ‘‘I don’t think we were spun at all. . . .
I don’t think the Pentagon ever set out to make Jessica Lynch a
poster child for battlefield heroism.’’ 248 According to an article in
the American Journalism Review, Mr. Loeb and one of his editors
at the Post ‘‘say they have no reason to doubt that their April 3
story accurately reflected the information contained in those [intel-
ligence] reports—even if the reports had inaccuracies. ‘We had mul-
tiple sources because multiple people were reading the same intel-
ligence reports.’ ’’ 249
In May 2004, the Washington Post reported that another U.S.
soldier had been captured and then executed in the same ambush
during which Private Lynch was taken captive. The article noted
that this soldier’s mother ‘‘believed the Army had not given her son
244 White House is Revising its War Message; Setbacks Providing Lessons, Washington Post
(Apr. 3, 2003).
245 Id.
246 Pfc. Jessica Lynch Isn’t Rambo Anymore, New York Times (Nov. 9, 2003).
247 A Broken Body, a Broken Story, Pieced Together; Investigation Reveals Lynch—Still in Hos-
pital After 67 Days—Suffered Bone-crushing Injuries in Crash During Ambush, Washington Post
(June 17, 2003). The military conducted at least two investigations into Private Lynch’s capture
and rescue, one by the Army and one by the Defense Department Inspector General, but neither
specifically addressed the dissemination of false information. Defense Department Office of In-
spector General, Executive Summary: Alleged Premeditated Fabrication and Inappropriate Con-
duct of U.S. Military Personnel Involved in the Rescue of Private First Class Jessica Lynch, U.S.
Army (undated); U.S. Army, Attack on the 507th Maintenance Company, 23 March 2003, An
Nasiriyah, Iraq (undated) (online at www.army.mil/features/507thMaintCmpy/
AttackOnThe507MaintCmpy.pdf).
248 Steve Ritea, Jessica Lynch’s Story: A Little Too Perfect? American Journalism Review
(Aug./Sept. 2003).
249 Id.
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45
credit for actions first attributed to Lynch.’’ The article further ex-
plained that the soldier’s ‘‘family and others have said that early
reports depicting a blond soldier bravely fighting off Iraqis may
have been mistakenly attributed to Lynch, possibly because of an
erroneous translation of Iraqi radio transmissions.’’ 250
C. THE RESPONSE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICIALS
The Committee exchanged e-mails and interviewed now-Admiral
Thorp about his knowledge of the capture and rescue of Private
Lynch. In an April 2007 e-mail to Committee majority staff, Admi-
ral Thorp described his statements to the Military Times reporter
about Private Lynch. He wrote:
As I recall, this was a short interview and media des-
perately wanted me to confirm the story that was running
in the States. . . . I never said that I had seen any intel
or even intimated the same. . . . I may have said I am fa-
miliar with ‘‘the reports’’ meaning the press reports, but as
you can see I did not confirm them. . . . We did have re-
ports of a battle and that a firefight had occurred. . . .
That is what I stated . . .251
Five months later, during a transcribed Committee interview,
Admiral Thorp was asked about the same conversation with the
Military Times reporter. At this time, he denied having any mem-
ory of the interaction, stating, ‘‘I do not recall specifically talking
to this reporter about this.’’ 252
During the interview, Admiral Thorp was asked what his source
was for his statements that Private Lynch ‘‘waged quite a battle’’
and that he had ‘‘strong indications’’ that she ‘‘was not captured
very easily’’ and fired her rifle ‘‘until she had no more ammuni-
tion.’’ Admiral Thorp responded that he could not recall making
these statements, but stated that if he had, he would have gath-
ered the information from ‘‘various sources.’’ 253 He also said that
his statements could have been ‘‘based on things that I had heard,’’
including other press reports.254
Admiral Thorp explained that in the opening days of Operation
Iraqi Freedom, he regularly confirmed press reports by citing other
press reports. He explained how this process worked at CENTCOM
headquarters in Qatar:
I could give you one anecdote to tell you, to give a perspec-
tive as to what was going on, which was on numerous oc-
casions I would be standing there watching a television
monitor on CNN reporting from a unit in Iraq in which a
journalist next to me would ask me to confirm that what
we were watching together on TV was happening, which
obviously he had the same knowledge I did of that live sit-
250 Family Learns Iraqis Executed Soldier Captured at Same Time as Lynch, Washington Post
(May 29, 2004).
251 E-mail from Rear Admiral Frank Thorp, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint
Communication, to Majority Staff, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee (Apr.
19, 2007) (ellipses in original).
252 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Rear Admiral Frank
Thorp, IV, at 69 (Sept. 19, 2007).
253 Id. at 73.
254 Id.
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46
uation on the ground. It would not be odd for me to then
tell another journalist later that I saw something on CNN.
. . . So there were times where I would say I just saw on
CNN a report that boom, boom, boom. Whether somebody
attributed that to me, that a Navy spokesman said there
are reports, that I have no way of knowing because it was
happening so fast and so furious. But I absolutely felt that
in my realm of responsibility, to share other reports that
were already out, that reporters had made to make sure
that everyone knew.255
Admiral Thorp told the Committee that he did not recall seeing
classified battlefield intelligence reports about Private Lynch, and
he said he did not remember if his remarks were based on such re-
ports.256 When asked whether he knew at the time he spoke to re-
porters that Private Lynch had not actually fired any shots, Admi-
ral Thorp replied: ‘‘I would absolutely never, ever, ever, ever say
anything that I knew to not be true.’’ 257
According to Admiral Thorp, the public affairs official who at-
tended CENTCOM operational briefings was Jim Wilkinson, the
Director of Strategic Communications for CENTCOM commander,
General Tommy Franks.258 When the Committee interviewed Mr.
Wilkinson, he said he was not a source for the story and that he
was never familiar with the operational details of Private Lynch’s
capture and rescue. He told the Committee: ‘‘I still, to this day,
don’t know if those details are right or wrong. I just don’t know.
I don’t remember seeing any operational report.’’ 259
Neither Mr. Wilkinson nor Admiral Thorp said they knew the
identity of the ‘‘U.S. officials’’ cited in the April 3, 2003, Washing-
ton Post story. Neither could explain why initial news reports about
Private Lynch’s capture and rescue were accurate, and subsequent
stories contained significant errors.
IX. OTHER CASES BROUGHT TO THE COMMITTEE’S
ATTENTION
The Committee’s investigation has focused on the information
the Defense Department provided about the two most famous U.S.
soldiers in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars: Corporal Tillman and
Private Lynch. During the course of the investigation, however,
families and friends of soldiers killed or injured in the wars con-
tacted the Committee’s majority staff to recount similar experi-
ences in which the Pentagon provided misleading information
about a battlefield casualty.
For example, the family of Specialist Jesse Buryj of Canton,
Ohio, who died in Iraq on May 5, 2004, experienced many of the
same frustrations as the Tillman family. The Army initially
claimed that Specialist Buryj had been killed by the enemy and
posthumously awarded him a Bronze Star for his valor while
255 Id. at 71.
256 Id. at 75.
257 Id. at 76.
258 Id. at 73.
259 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of James R. Wilkinson,
at 58 (Mar. 14, 2008).
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47
guarding a highway checkpoint.260 Nine months later, after several
investigations, the family learned his death was actually a frat-
ricide.261 In July 2004, Specialist Buryj’s parents accepted an invi-
tation to meet President Bush at a campaign rally. They asked him
to help them learn the truth about how their son died. According
to the family, the President agreed to assist.262 Specialist Buryj’s
mother recalled that after the meeting, her case received more at-
tention, but the military still did not provide a satisfactory account
of what happened to her son.263 A few months later, a Bush-Che-
ney campaign official contacted the family. Rather than offer as-
sistance, the official asked Specialist Buryj’s mother to appear in
a campaign commercial for the President. Mrs. Buryj refused.264
The Committee’s majority staff was also contacted by the family
and friends of Private First Class LaVena Johnson, a weapons sup-
ply manager from Florissant, Missouri, who died, family members
say, in a suspicious non-combat incident near Balad, Iraq, on July
19, 2005. According to news reports, the Army ruled the death a
suicide, and a medical examiner concurred with this finding.265 But
Private Johnson’s family believes Army investigators ignored phys-
ical evidence inconsistent with a finding of suicide. They also be-
lieve that the Army has additional information about the cir-
cumstances of Private Johnson’s death that it has not shared with
the family.
While the names of these soldiers are not as well-known as Pat
Tillman and Jessica Lynch, their sacrifices were just as great and
their families are just as deserving of the truth.
X. CONCLUSION
The men and women who serve in the military act selflessly and
courageously in defending our country and fighting for freedom.
They are willing to risk serious injury and even death in fulfilling
their responsibilities. And too often their willingness to sacrifice be-
comes an actual and irreplaceable loss for their families and for our
country.
Our nation cannot adequately recognize that service, but we can
honor their sacrifice by keeping faith with their trust and dedica-
tion.
That starts by making sure our troops never go to battle unless
it is absolutely necessary. It also means making sure they have the
benefit of the best equipment and intelligence and the best medical
care if they are injured.
Our nation also has an inviolate obligation to share truthful in-
formation with a soldier’s family and the American people should
injury or death occur. As Corporal Tillman’s brother, Kevin, told
the Committee:
Pat and these other soldiers volunteered to put their lives
on the line for this country. Anything less than the truth
260 An Army Death, and a Family Left in the Dark, Washington Post (Jan. 17, 2006).
261 Id.
262 Id.; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Majority Staff, Telephone
Interview of Peggy Buryj (June 2, 2008).
263 NOW, PBS (Nov. 17, 2006) (online at www.pbs.org/now/transcript/246.html).
264 An Army Death, and a Family Left in the Dark, Washington Post (Jan. 17, 2006).
265 Father Wants Soldier’s Death Reinvestigated, Associated Press (June 4, 2008).
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48
is a betrayal of those values that all soldiers who have
fought for this nation have sought to uphold.266
That standard was not met in either Corporal Tillman’s or Pri-
vate Lynch’s cases.
Neither case involved an act of omission. The misinformation
was not caused by overlooking or misunderstanding relevant facts.
Instead, in both cases affirmative acts created new facts that were
significantly different than what the soldiers in the field knew to
be true. And in both cases the fictional accounts proved to be com-
pelling public narratives at difficult times in the war.
The fictional version of Private Lynch’s circumstances came
when many Americans were first beginning to worry about the di-
rection of the Iraq war. The heroic efforts of Private Lynch became,
in the words of one CENTCOM officer, ‘‘an awesome story.’’
Specialist Kevin Tillman told the Committee that he believed the
combination of a difficult battle in Fallujah, bad news about the
state of the war, and emerging reports about Abu Ghraib prison
created a motive to fictionalize the details about his brother’s
death. Whether he is correct or not, the public affairs staff of the
Army recounted that the death of Corporal Tillman generated the
most media coverage of the Army ‘‘since the end of active combat’’
and was ‘‘extremely positive in all media.’’
As the Committee investigated the Tillman and Lynch cases, it
encountered a striking lack of recollection. In Private Lynch’s case,
Jim Wilkinson, who was the Director for Strategic Communications
for the CENTCOM Commander and attended CENTCOM oper-
ational briefings, told the Committee he did not know where the
false information originated or who disseminated it.
In Corporal Tillman’s case, even after seven Defense Department
investigations, no one has been able to identify the person who cre-
ated the false information about enemy fire. At the top of the chain
of command, where the Committee focused its attention, pertinent
questions also remain unanswered. The White House was intensely
interested in the first reports of Corporal Tillman’s death. On April
23, White House officials sent or received nearly 200 e-mails con-
cerning Corporal Tillman. In contrast, the White House could not
produce a single e-mail or document relating to any discussion
about Corporal Tillman’s death by friendly fire. Not a single writ-
ten communication about the personal reactions or the substantive,
political, and public relations implications of the new information
was provided to the Committee.
Despite receiving information from all the top military leaders in
Corporal Tillman chain of command—including Secretary Rums-
feld, General Myers, and General Abizaid—the Committee could
not determine if any of the officials had communicated with Presi-
dent Bush or White House officials about fratricide in Corporal
Tillman’s case. The lack of recollection also prevented the Commit-
tee from understanding how information about Corporal Tillman
was handled within the Defense Department and how the Defense
266 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Kevin Tillman,
Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 21 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Se-
rial No. 110–54).
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49
Department and the White House shared information on this mat-
ter.
If the testimony the Committee received is accurate and if the
documents submitted are complete, then the intense interest that
initially characterized the White House’s and Defense Depart-
ment’s reaction to Corporal Tillman’s death was followed by a stun-
ning lack of curiosity about emerging reports of fratricide and an
incomprehensible carelessness and incompetence in handling this
sensitive information.
The pervasive lack of recollection and absence of specific informa-
tion makes it impossible for the Committee to assign responsibility
for the misinformation in Corporal Tillman’s and Private Lynch’s
cases. It is clear, however, that the Defense Department did not
meet its most basic obligations in sharing accurate information
with the families and with the American public.
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ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. TOM DAVIS
The tragic loss of Army Corporal Pat Tillman in Afghanistan in
April 2004 painfully reminds all Americans of the costs of war. He
was a true hero, a role model whose personal sense of duty drew
him from the ranks of elite professional sports to perilous military
service in the barren hills of Afghanistan. Nothing we say can im-
prove or diminish his shining legacy of patriotism and self-sacrifice.
What is said about the death of a hero should be said thought-
fully, carefully, and reverently. Events surrounding the timeless
end of a heroic life should never be shaped or shaded by either side
to fuel the political disputes of the day. This bipartisan investiga-
tion asked whether Pentagon or White House officials broke that
rule by manipulating information to build public support for an un-
popular war. The record before us contains substantial evidence of
inadvertence, misjudgment, ineptitude, error—and even negligence.
But, as the Committee’s report acknowledges, the investigative
record is incomplete, and therefore inconclusive, on the question
whether government officials purposefully delayed or distorted in-
formation about battlefield events. The same rule against political
misinformation argues strongly against the Committee filling those
evidentiary gaps with unsupported inferences and negative charac-
terizations. However inconvenient or frustrating, the absence of
evidence cannot be used to prove a conclusion the actual evidence
does not sustain.
As much out of disappointment as disagreement, we submit
these Additional Views to supplement and clarify the factual find-
ings of the Committee Report. This has been a bipartisan investiga-
tion from the outset, and we appreciate the majority sharing early
drafts with us and incorporating our suggestions into the final re-
port. Nevertheless, we believe it necessary to state certain matters
for the public record separately because we find the report not al-
ways complete and balanced in its discussion of key questions.
What should be a factual summary gets weighed down by conclu-
sions, inferences and characterizations not reasonably supported by
the investigative record. The facts deserve an unfettered oppor-
tunity to speak for themselves.
The Committee Report concludes the White House and DoD dis-
played ‘‘carelessness and incompetence’’ in handling information
about the death and friendly-fire incident. We agree. Rules and
procedures put in place precisely for the purpose of providing time-
ly and accurate information about combat deaths were ignored.
Those errors, omissions and delays understandably fueled sus-
picions senior government officials knew the actual circumstances
of Corporal Tillman’s death, but manipulated the information to
avoid bad news. After several investigations, it now seems clear
those officials could have known friendly fire was suspected. It was
a disservice to the memory of Corporal Tillman, to his family, his
(50)
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51
unit and this nation to let the happy myth outrun the unpleasant
facts, even for a day.
But even serial incompetence at the highest levels does not con-
stitute proof of a conspiracy—intentional distortion of public state-
ments about both Patrick Tillman and Jessica Lynch. So the Com-
mittee attempts to build a bridge of circumstance—faded memories
and a lack of e-mail traffic—to link the hard facts of ineptitude to
soft speculation that only conscious manipulation explains other-
wise ‘‘incomprehensible’’ actions and a ‘‘stunning lack of curiosity’’
about conflicting battlefield reports.
An objective presentation of the facts makes such speculation
and characterizations unnecessary, even counterproductive to an
accurate historical record. It seems perfectly comprehensible, even
inevitable, that years later people might not recall the exact mo-
ment they obtained specific information about these events. The
Committee concludes witnesses should have detailed recollection
about fleeting conversations and transactions that stand out from
the torrent of daily activities only in magnified hindsight. We need
not reach conclusions about what government officials should have
known to summarize the factual findings of an extensive investiga-
tion.
It’s said the first casualty of war is the truth. We now know in
the fog of war the truth comes under friendly fire as well. Whether
exaggerated accounts of heroism, delayed acknowledgement of frat-
ricide, or widely published—but utterly fictional—blogs describing
alleged cruelty by U.S. troops, misinformation from the battlefield
corrodes the bond of trust that defines us as a nation of free men
and women.
Corporal Patrick Tillman, like thousands of other brave Ameri-
cans, gave his life in service to this nation. His death was made
even more heartbreaking by the fact it was found to have been
caused by fratricide. The U.S. Army’s egregious mishandling of the
process meant to ensure complete and timely notification to fami-
lies turned this ‘‘friendly fire’’ incident into a prolonged, decidedly
unfriendly spectacle of official malfeasance and miscommunication.
As then-Acting Secretary of the Army Pete Geren conceded, ‘‘We as
an Army failed in our duty to the Tillman family, the duty we owe
to all the families of our fallen soldiers: Give them the truth, the
best we know it, as fast as we can.’’
That is our charge as well.
I. THE INVESTIGATION
The Committee’s inquiry into the circumstances in which senior
White House and Pentagon officials became aware that Army Cor-
poral Pat Tillman was a victim of fratricide took more than four-
teen months. In this period, the Committee held two hearings in
which it heard from ten witnesses, including former Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and retired Generals Richard Myers,
John Abizaid, and Bryan Brown. Committee staff received 50,000
pages of documents from the Pentagon, the White House, and the
Defense Department Inspector General and reviewed additional
documents ‘‘in camera.’’ In addition, staff interviewed 19 witnesses,
totaling nearly 29 hours and producing more than 1,200 pages of
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52
transcription.1 The Committee also received supplementary infor-
mation from three individuals.2
In an effort to determine the origins of the Washington Post story
about Jessica Lynch’s purported behavior at the time of her cap-
ture, the Committee took testimony from Ms. Lynch and one of her
physicians at a hearing which also examined the Tillman situation.
Staff posed questions to two other persons in three interviews. In
addition, staff evaluated twenty-nine U.S. Army documents made
available to a media outlet pursuant to a Freedom of Information
Act request in an effort to learn more about the procedural prob-
lems which apparently allowed an Army soldier to report inac-
curate details from the battlefield for The New Republic.
II. SECRETARY RUMSFELD, SENIOR DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE LEADERSHIP
A. EXTENT OF SECRETARY RUMSFELD’S INTEREST IN PAT TILLMAN’S
ENLISTMENT AND MILITARY SERVICE
Written material produced by Secretary Rumsfeld between the
time of Corporal Tillman’s enlistment and his death provides an
understanding of Secretary Rumsfeld’s interest in Corporal Tillman
and his enlistment. Shortly after Corporal Tillman enlisted, Sec-
1 See Interview by House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [hereinafter House
Oversight Committee or the Committee] staff of General John F. Sattler, U.S. Marines, in Wash-
ington, D.C. (Jul. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Sattler Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Com-
mittee staff of Brigadier General Howard W. Yellen, U.S. Army (Retired), in Washington, D.C.
(Jul. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Yellen Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff
of General Bantz Johnson Craddock, U.S. Army, in Washington, D.C. (Jul. 27, 2007) [hereinafter
Craddock Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of Admiral Eric T. Olson,
U.S. Navy, in Washington, D.C. (Jul. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Olson Transcript]; Interview by
House Oversight Committee staff of Lieutenant General James Lovelace, U.S. Army, by tele-
phone (Jul. 31, 2007) [hereinafter Lovelace Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Commit-
tee staff of Taylor Gross, former White House Communications official, in Washington, D.C.
(Sep. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Gross Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of
Carol Darby, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Army, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 19, 2007) [hereinafter
Darby Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of Colonel Hans Bush, U.S.
Army, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Bush Transcript]; Interview by House
Oversight Committee staff of Rear Admiral Frank Thorp IV, U.S. Navy, in Washington, D.C.
(Sep. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Thorp Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff
of Colonel Steven P. Bucci, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S.
Department of Defense, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Bucci Transcript];
Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of John Currin, former Director of Fact-Check-
ing, Office of Presidential Speechwriting, White House, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 21, 2007)
[hereinafter Currin Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of Lawrence Di
Rita, former director, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Di Rita Transcript]; Interview
by House Oversight Committee staff of George Rhynedane, IV, former Senior Military Assistant
to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, in Washington, D.C.
(Sep. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Rhynedance Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee
staff of Hedy Henderson, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, in
Washington, D.C. (Sep. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Henderson Transcript]; Interview of Sean McCor-
mack, Spokesman, National Security Council, by House Oversight Committee Staff, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Feb. 20, 2008) [hereinafter McCormack Transcript] [Note, no contemporaneous tran-
script was produced for this interview, however, an unofficial transcript was created from an
audio recording of the interview]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of Lieutenant
General Philip Kensinger, Jr., U.S. Army, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 29, 2008) [hereinafter
Kensinger Transcript]; Interview of James Wilkinson, Strategic Communications, U.S. Central
Command, by House Oversight Committee Staff, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 14, 2008) [herein-
after Wilkinson Transcript].
2 Untranscribed interview of Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, by House Over-
sight Committee Staff, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 9, 2007) (Committee staff notes on file) [here-
inafter McClellan Interview]; Untranscribed interview of Michael Gerson, Chief Speechwriter,
White House, by House Oversight Committee Staff, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 11, 2007) (Com-
mittee staff notes on file) [hereinafter Gerson Interview]; Untranscribed interview of Dan Bart-
lett, Director, White House Communications, by House Oversight Committee Staff, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Sep. 12, 2007) (Committee staff notes on file) [hereinafter Bartlett Interview].
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53
retary Rumsfeld distributed a memorandum (known colloquially as
a ‘‘snowflake’’) regarding Corporal Tillman to U.S. Army Secretary,
Tom White.3 Secretary Rumsfeld also sent Corporal Tillman a per-
sonal note.4 After Corporal Tillman’s death, Secretary Rumsfeld
signed a condolence letter to Corporal Tillman’s widow.5
The enlistment of Corporal Tillman and his brother, Kevin Till-
man, in May 2002 was the subject of numerous news reports.
Thereafter, an individual who appears to be a personal acquaint-
ance of Secretary Rumsfeld sent Secretary Rumsfeld a note about
Corporal Tillman’s enlistment, enclosing a related June 2, 2002
newspaper column.
On June 25, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld forwarded the June 2,
2002 article to Secretary White with a note that stated (in full):
Here is an article on a fellow who is apparently joining the
Rangers. He sound [sic] like he is world-class. We might
want to keep our eye on him.6
The following day, Secretary Rumsfeld responded to his acquaint-
ance (addressing him by nickname) writing (in full):
Thanks so much for sending along the article from the
Tribune. I had not seen it. You are quite right—this fellow,
Pat Tillman, sounds like a world-class American.7
On June 28, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote to Corporal Tillman,
saying:
I heard you were leaving the National Football League to
become an Army Ranger. It is a proud and patriotic thing
you are doing.8
The phraseology and timing of this exchange strongly implies
that Secretary Rumsfeld learned from his acquaintance and not the
Army or Defense Department bureaucracy that a professional foot-
ball player, of whom he appears not to have been previously aware,
had enlisted. It also suggests that Secretary Rumsfeld believed his
memorandum to Secretary White would be the first time the
Army’s top civilian leader learned about Corporal Tillman and his
service commitment.
Secretary Rumsfeld testified under oath that he did not intend
the comment ‘‘[w]e might want to keep our eye on him’’ as a literal
instruction.9 Rather, it appears that this was intended as a rhetori-
cal statement. Testimony and other evidence support this interpre-
tation. For example, the apparently standard clause ‘‘please re-
3 Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense, to Thomas
White, Secretary, U.S. Army (Jun. 25, 2002; 14:39 EDT) [hereinafter Rumsfeld/White Snow-
flake] (Committee staff notes on file).
4 Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense, to Corporal
Patrick Tillman (Jun. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Rumsfeld/Tillman Letter] (Committee staff notes
on file).
5 Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense, to Mrs. Patrick Till-
man (May 3, 2004) [hereinafter Rumsfeld/Condolence Letter] (Committee staff notes on file).
6 Rumsfeld/White Snowflake.
7 Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense, to [Acquaintance]
[name withheld by Committee staff] (Jan. 26, 2002) (emphasis in the original). Note Secretary
Rumsfeld’s statement that ‘‘[he] had not seen [the article regarding Tillman].’’ Id.
8 Rumsfeld/Tillman Letter.
9 The Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew before the
House Oversight Committee, 110th Cong. (Aug. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Tillman Hearing II], at Tr.
107–08 (referring to Rumsfeld/White Snowflake).
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54
spond by’’ at the bottom of Secretary Rumsfeld’s memorandum was
crossed out, as if to suggest no reply was expected.10 Also, the
Committee received no documents or testimony that indicated that
Corporal Tillman’s activities were, in fact, monitored in any way by
Secretary Rumsfeld or other Department of Defense or White
House officials. In fact, the Committee received testimony that in-
dicated the opposite: Secretary Rumsfeld was not keeping track of
Corporal Tillman.11 Finally, there is no indication that Secretary
Rumsfeld ever noted or was concerned by the fact that no follow-
up information was ever conveyed to him, lending strong credence
to the suggestions that Secretary Rumsfeld did not expect any.
Indeed, in testimony received by the Committee, no one (includ-
ing his closest assistants) recalled Secretary Rumsfeld referring to
Corporal Tillman between his June 28, 2002 letter to Corporal Till-
man and the time of Corporal Tillman’s death in 2004.12 Secretary
Rumsfeld’s senior military assistant told the Committee that, in
light of the press of business in Secretary Rumsfeld’s office, he did
not ever discuss Corporal Tillman with Secretary Rumsfeld even
upon Corporal Tillman’s death.13
On April 29, 2004, one week after Corporal Tillman’s death, an
executive secretary in Secretary Rumsfeld’s office drafted a condo-
lence letter for Corporal Tillman’s widow. The executive secretary
10 Rumsfeld/White Snowflake.
11 See, e.g., Craddock Transcript at Tr. 47–48 (Q: ‘‘Do you have any knowledge of the fact that
the Secretary--either Secretary of the Army or Secretary of the Defense kept an eye on [Corporal
Tillman] after his enlistment?’’ A: ‘‘Not that I’m aware of. Again, if that happened, it happened
before I got there. Nothing was left to me by my predecessor, stay on top of this, watch this
or be aware of this.); Lovelace Transcript at Tr. 49–50 (Q: ‘‘When you arrived in your position
as Army Staff Director, did you get the impression at any time that, in fact, Army leadership
was, quote, keeping an eye on Tillman?’’ A: ‘‘No.’’ Q: ‘‘You didn’t get correspondence about him,
memos about him, phone calls about him?’’ A: ‘‘No.’’); Di Rita Transcript at Tr. 39 (Q: ‘‘Okay.
Based on your close working relationship with Secretary Rumsfeld, what did he mean when he
said, We might want to keep our eye on him?’’ A: ‘‘I think he was making a point that this
is somebody who has done something of a very high-profile nature, and that is impressive, and
we ought to recognize that somewhere along the way, we appreciate this kind of commitment
to public service. I would imagine that is the extent of his intent there.’’ Q: ‘‘Were there times
later in Corporal Tillman’s service where he turned to you and said, How is this Tillman guy
doing?’’ A: ‘‘ I don’t remember him ever doing that.’’ Q: ‘‘Check up on Tillman?’’ A: ‘‘Yeah, it
would have been unlike him, but that is not to say it wouldn’t have happened. I just don’t re-
member that.’’ Q: ‘‘How common was it for Secretary Rumsfeld to single out a soldier like this
on a snowflake or in a communication with the Secretary?’’ A: ‘‘Let me just step back on that.
It was very common of Secretary Rumsfeld to see something in the paper and comment on it
by saying --by shooting a note to somebody and saying, This is interesting. Could I get more
information? Or did you see this? I find this something worth following up on. Or something
like that. So that was not uncommon. So he was -- he didn’t read the papers cover to cover every
day, but he was generally aware of what was happening in areas involving the Department of
Defense. So as much attention as this would almost certainly have gotten when Pat Tillman
joined, it is not surprising that he would have seen it and said, Wow, that’s interesting.’’); Di
Rita Transcript at Tr. 76–78 (A: ‘‘And in this case, this was primarily an outgoing -- it is a bit
of the way Rumsfeld operated: ‘‘Hey, let’s just keep an eye on that fellow; that’s interesting.’’
But it wasn’t like he was asking for a report back or anticipating something.’’ Q: ‘‘You don’t
think he was -’’ A: ‘‘I would tend to doubt it. I’m looking at that the way -- the person who
transcribed the Dictaphone kind of drew the same conclusion. I mean, she just decided not to
put a date [by which a response was required] on there, because it’s not the kind of thing where
a deadline really applies.’’ Q: ‘‘Am I correct that you said in your testimony that you don’t recall
seeing a report come back?’’ A: ‘‘I don’t recall anything coming back. From Secretary White?’’
Q: ‘‘Correct.’’ A: ‘‘Yeah, no, I don’t recall anything.’’ Q: ‘‘How about from anyone else?’’ A: ‘‘I don’t
recall. I don’t recall.’’).
12 See, e.g., Bucci Transcript at Tr. 29; Craddock Transcript at Tr. 17.
13 Craddock Transcript at Tr. 24, 28–29 (Q: ‘‘Wasn’t [the news of Corporal Tillman’s death]
a hot one on April 23rd, you know, when every newspaper and television station in America
was, you know, talking about it?’’ A: ‘‘[] I can’t tell you that it was a hot one and everything
came to a stop and we focused on Pat Tillman. I apologize for that. It is bad, but that’s not
the way I recall it. [] But, I’ve got to tell you, I don’t recall that everything came to a screeching
halt to deal with this.’’). Craddock believed he learned of Corporal Tillman’s death ‘‘on the
news.’’ Craddock Transcript at Tr. 19–21.
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apparently used a brief Pentagon statement issued on the day after
Corporal Tillman was killed to prepare this condolence letter.14
Secretary Rumsfeld signed the condolence letter dated May 3,
2004. There seems to be nothing extraordinary about the way it
was drafted and promulgated; the Committee received testimony
that Secretary Rumsfeld signed similar communications to families
of all those killed in action.15
B. SECRETARY RUMSFELD’S KNOWLEDGE OF FRATRICIDE AS A CAUSE
OF CORPORAL TILLMAN’S DEATH
Secretary Rumsfeld also testified under oath before the Commit-
tee that he never instructed anyone to withhold information about
the finding that Corporal Tillman’s death resulted from fratricide
and that he was not aware of (nor was he a party to) any related
‘‘cover-up.’’ 16 He testified that he had neither foreknowledge of the
Correspondents Dinner speech in which the President referenced
Corporal Tillman nor any discussions with the White House about
the circumstances of Corporal Tillman’s death prior to such details
becoming public.17
Secretary Rumsfeld testified before the Committee that he did
not remember when or how he learned that fratricide was the sus-
pected cause of Corporal Tillman’s death.18 From the testimony
and evidence provided to the Committee, it is possible to identify
a period in which these details were probably conveyed to him.
In testimony before this Committee, Secretary Rumsfeld repeated
the statement he had made previously in letters to Chairman Wax-
man, Ranking Member Davis, and to the DoD Inspector General
(DoD IG), namely: ‘‘I am told I received word of this development
[i.e., the suspicion of fratricide] after May 20, 2004.’’ 19 According
to Secretary Rumsfeld, he was able to proffer a date because, in re-
sponding to questions from the DoD IG on this matter on December
15, 2006,20 an aide consulted others to determine if they remem-
bered circumstances Secretary Rumsfeld did not.21 One aide, Colo-
nel Steven Bucci, apparently recalled details of Secretary Rums-
feld’s notification and was able to determine the period in which
this occurred.
The Committee took sworn testimony from Colonel Bucci. Colonel
Bucci testified that, in the course of his normal duties in Secretary
Rumsfeld’s office between May 24 and May 28, 2004, he received
a phone call from one of the military assistants in the Army.22
14 E-mail from Monica Generous, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Executive Services, U.S.
Department of Defense, to various (Apr. 29, 2004; 15:34 EDT) (bates no. 1871).
15 See Craddock Transcript at Tr. 48–49; Di Rita Transcript at Tr. 58–59, 85, 89–90.
16 Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 55, 72, 152, 100.
17 Id. at Tr. 30–31, 64, 98. See also Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department
of Defense, to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Oversight and Government Reform Commit-
tee, and Tom Davis, Ranking Member, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee,
(Jul. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Rumsfeld/Committee Letter].
18 Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 30, 157. Secretary Rumsfeld also told the Committee that he was
not disturbed by the timing or method of his notification. Id. at Tr. 104.
19 Id. at Tr. 15–16.
20 Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense, to Thomas Gimble,
Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense (Dec. 15, 2006).
21 Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 32–34, 125–7. See also Bucci Transcript at Tr. 40–41; Craddock
Transcript at Tr. 38–39.
22 Bucci Transcript at Tr. 31 (‘‘[] I got a phone call in the morning there at the office from
one of the military assistants in the Army. And I can’t remember whether it was the Chief of
Staff’s executive assistant or Secretary of Army’s military assistant who called me.’’).
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From this call, Colonel Bucci learned that an investigation into
Corporal Tillman’s death had been undertaken and that this in-
quiry had determined that fratricide was the likely cause of
death.23 Colonel Bucci further testified the caller suggested that
this information be conveyed to Secretary Rumsfeld, which Colonel
Bucci did ‘‘about 15 minutes’’ later at a regularly-scheduled morn-
ing meeting.24
Colonel Bucci testified he believed this was the first Secretary
Rumsfeld learned that friendly fire was being considered as a cause
of Corporal Tillman’s death.25 Colonel Bucci testified that Secretary
Rumsfeld responded to the news by saying [something to the effect
of] ‘‘Oh, gosh, that’s a shame. Well, they need to settle it and get
the word out as quickly as possible.’’ 26 Colonel Bucci testified that
he was able to determine the date range in which these events
transpired because he returned from six months of duty in Iraq on
May 20, 2004, but did not report to work in Secretary Rumsfeld’s
office until May 24, 2004. Assuming this information is correct,
Colonel Bucci received the call from the military assistant before
a daily morning briefing sometime in that five-day period between
May 24 and May 28, 2004.27
Additional details add further credence to the timing and sub-
stance of Colonel Bucci’s account. According to the DoD IG, on May
25, 2004, Army Maj. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander of
the Joint Task Force to which Corporal Tillman was assigned, ap-
proved the investigative report of Corporal Tillman’s death and
conveyed it to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).28 The director
of the Army staff, Lt. Gen. James J. Lovelace, testified before the
Committee that he was informed of the investigation and its find-
ings (namely, that ‘‘[Corporal] Tillman’s death was the result of
fratricide’’) by both Lt. Gen. Philip Kensinger and the Army Oper-
ations Center ‘‘on or about’’ May 27, 2004.29 Inasmuch as this is
two days after Gen. McChrystal’s approval and in the period
CENTCOM was considering the report, it is logical for Lt. Gen.
Lovelace to have been notified at this time.
Lt. Gen. Lovelace said that it was also on May 27, 2004, that he
called Lawrence Di Rita, at that time the director of the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, with this
news and took steps to have Gen. Bantz Craddock (Colonel Bucci’s
supervisor), and assistants to the Army Secretary and to the Army
Chief and Vice Chief of Staff receive this information by e-mail.30
23 Id. at Tr. 31–32.
24 Id. (‘‘[] I got a phone call in the morning there at the office from one of the military assist-
ants in the Army. And I can’t remember whether it was the Chief of Staff’s executive assistant
or Secretary of Army’s military assistant who called me. And they said, hey, you need to let
the Secretary know. We’re pretty sure that this may have actually been a fratricide event, and
you need to let the Secretary know.’’).
25 Id. at Tr. 32.
26 Id. at Tr. 31–32. For a description of the timing and attendance at morning ‘‘stand up[]’’
meetings, see Bucci Transcript at Tr. 11.
27 Id. at Tr. 39, 33.
28 Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, Thomas
F. Gimble, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense (Mar. 26, 2007) [hereinafter
DoD IG Report] (unnumbered appendix). On May 28, 2004, Marine Maj. Gen. John Sattler, the
CENTCOM director of operations, approved the AR 15–6 report, in the absence of Gen. John
Abizaid, the CENTCOM Commander. See DoD IG Report (unnumbered appendix). See also
Sattler Transcript at Tr. 42–43, 46–51, 54–56.
29 Lovelace Transcript at Tr. 20, 21, 35–36, 57. For findings, see DoD IG Report at 29.
30 Lovelace Transcript at Tr. 23–27, 55–56, 58. Lt. Gen. Lovelace was interviewed tele-
phonically by Committee staff. During the call, Lt. Gen. Lovelace had in his possession an e-
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57
Thus, it seems possible that it was Lt. Gen. Lovelace’s communica-
tions which resulted in the call Colonel Bucci remembers receiving.
Gen. Craddock, Secretary Rumsfeld’s senior military aide, testi-
fied he learned about the possibility of fratricide from Lt. Gen.
Lovelace in person. Gen. Craddock recalls seeing Lt. Gen. Lovelace
in the yard separating their homes 31 and remarking that ‘‘[Cor-
poral] Tillman may have been killed by friendly fire.’’ 32 Gen.
Craddock said he was ‘‘surprised and taken aback’’ by this informa-
tion.33 Although Lt. Gen. Lovelace testified he did not recall this
conversation, because he claims to have found out about the friend-
ly fire ‘‘on or about May 27’’ and the backyard exchange had to
have occurred before Lt. Gen. Lovelace had an e-mail sent on this
topic on May 27, the two generals probably encountered each other
on or just before May 26.34
Furthermore, when Gen. Craddock was asked by Committee
staff: ‘‘[D]id you ever get a report or ever hear that an investigation
was going on into [Corporal Tillman’s death],’’ Gen. Craddock re-
plied, ‘‘I do recall [that it was] being investigated’’ 35 and said he
‘‘probably’’ learned of this from the Chairman or Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Department’s General Counsel in
the course of the notification being provided to Secretary Rums-
feld.36 Gen. Craddock’s encounter with Lt. Gen. Lovelace likely pre-
ceded Gen. Craddock’s learning about the investigation, otherwise
Gen. Craddock would not have been ‘‘surprised’’ upon hearing of
the possibility of fratricide in the death of Corporal Tillman. As-
suming the recollections of Gen. Craddock and Lt. Gen. Lovelace
are correct, Gen. Craddock likely learned of the investigation May
27 or May 28.
The recollections of Gen. Craddock and others are consistent
with Colonel Bucci’s description and add further credence to the
timing and substance of Colonel Bucci’s account. However, these
specifics do not prove whether Colonel Bucci’s report to Secretary
Rumsfeld was, in fact, the first Secretary Rumsfeld learned of the
possibility of fratricide as the cause of Corporal Tillman’s death.
CENTCOM commander, U.S. Army Gen. John P. Abizaid, testi-
fied before the Committee about his interaction with Secretary
Rumsfeld in May 2004. Gen. Abizaid said, ‘‘I was in Washington
from the 18th to the 20th [of May 2004] and I talked with [Sec-
mail showing when and how he notified the others. This e-mail informed his recollection of the
matter. See Lovelace Transcript at Tr. 22–23. Additionally, with one exception, Lt. Gen. Lovelace
stated he believed the principals to each aide learned about the fratricide investigation as a re-
sult of his e-mail. Lt. Gen. Lovelace appears to have agreed with the question posed by Commit-
tee staff that ‘‘[Y] ou have no knowledge of when the Secretary himself might have [learned].’’
Id. at Tr. 27. However, this is confused somewhat by a mischaracterization by Majority inter-
viewers of ‘‘May 20 [2004]’’ as a date certain that ‘‘[Secretary Rumsfeld] learned that Corporal
Tillman’s death was a suspected fratricide.’’ Id. Secretary Rumsfeld stipulated that he had been
told he was informed ‘‘after May 20, [2004].’’ Rumsfeld/Committee Letter (emphasis added). See
also Di Rita Trancript at Tr. 44 for his recollection that he recalled learning of the fratricide
‘‘shortly before it was publicly announced, I would imagine, because I remember being involved
in some of the discussions about how it would be announced. But I don’t remember when that
was.’’
31 Both generals at the time lived in military housing, and their yards shared a fence. See
Craddock Transcript at Tr. 19.
32 Id. at Tr. 19.
33 Id. at Tr. 27, 29. Gen. Craddock also testified that, after learning of the fratricide from Lt.
Gen. Lovelace, he never raised the issue with Secretary Rumsfeld, Gen. Myers, or Gen. Peter
Pace, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
34 Lovelace Transcript at Tr. 20–21, 23–25, 55–56.
35 Craddock Transcript at Tr. 32–33.
36 Id. at Tr. 32–34.
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58
retary Rumsfeld] during that period, and I believe during that pe-
riod I discussed with him the fratricide investigation.’’ 37 In a De-
cember 2006 colloquy with the DoD IG, however, about ‘‘what if
any action you took after receiving the information that friendly
fire was suspected,’’ Gen. Abizaid was asked, ‘‘[d]id you have any
discussions with [] the Secretary of Defense,’’ to which Gen. Abizaid
answered, ‘‘No. I didn’t talk to the Secretary of defense about it.’’ 38
The Committee is unable to reconcile these statements.
No individual who gave testimony to the Committee provided
support to Gen. Abizaid’s recollection of talking with Secretary
Rumsfeld between May 18 and May 20, 2004, about the possibility
of Corporal Tillman’s death being a fratricide. No one recalled this
exchange nor said that Secretary Rumsfeld commented upon it. In
addition, if Secretary Rumsfeld had been informed during this pe-
riod, there is no evidence that he ordered any action to be taken
as a result.
The Committee received testimony and documents that public af-
fairs officials at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command
(USASOC) were among those individuals informed on May 27,
2004, that an investigation into Corporal Tillman’s death was
about to be approved by CENTCOM. Consequently, these officials,
working with Di Rita, began preparations for notifying Congress
and the media.39 Gen. Abizaid’s possible notification of Secretary
Rumsfeld would have come just as the friendly fire investigation
was about to formally conclude and preparations for announcing
the findings were about to begin. It is not clear what instructions
Secretary Rumsfeld could have issued at that time even if he had
wanted to do so.40
Based upon documentary evidence provided to the Committee, as
well as interviews and testimony, the most senior officials at the
Pentagon seem not to have been preoccupied by the news of Cor-
poral Tillman’s death, aware of the breadth of related media cov-
erage, inquisitive about the ensuing investigation, or cognizant of
the existence or application of Army next-of-kin regulations.41 In
addition, to the extent senior officers at the Pentagon and others
were aware of impressions held by the public relating to the cir-
cumstances of Corporal Tillman’s death, it is not at all apparent
they understood that such impressions were being derived from ac-
37 Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 76. See also id. at Tr. 26.
38 Interview by DOD IG staff of Gen. John P. Abizaid, then-U.S. CENTCOM Commander (Dec.
13, 2006) [hereinafter Abizaid IG Transcript], at Tr. 7, 9. There is further uncertainty about
this matter. According to Gen. Abizaid, his only knowledge of the possibility of fratricide as the
cause of Corporal Tillman’s death derived from an Army communication known as a P4 (dis-
cussed further in text below). See Letter from Gen. (Ret.) John P. Abizaid, former U.S.
CENTCOM Commander, to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Oversight and Government
Refrom Committee, and Tom Davis, Ranking Member, House Oversight and Government Re-
form Committee (Jan. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Abizaid/Committee Letter]. However, the IG deter-
mined Gen. Abizaid received this P4 sometime between May 6 and May 20, 2004 (See DoD IG
Report (unnumbered appendix)). Assuming the accuracy of Gen. Abizaid’s recollection that he
received the P4 before meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld, it appears either Gen. Abizaid
misremembers the date of his meeting (and it actually occurred later than he remembers), or
the DoD IG erred in concluding Gen. Abizaid could have received the P4 as late as May 18,
2004 or thereafter. It is not possible to reconcile both possibilities.
39 Bush Transcript at Tr. 53–54, 81–84. See also E-mail from Lt. Col. Hans Bush, U.S. Army,
to various (Jun. 2, 2004; 10:17 EDT) (bates nos. 2250–2905 to 2250–2906). For description of
the routine circumstances of this e-mail, see, e.g., Bush Transcript at Tr. 66–67, 79–81, 90. For
Di Rita’s description of his involvement, see Di Rita Transcript at Tr. 63–76.
40 See, e.g., Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 33.
41 Id. at Tr. 47–48 (statement by Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense).
See also Craddock Transcript at Tr. 37–38.
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59
tions (or inaction) ascribed to the DoD, and hence ostensibly sub-
ject to corrective action by DoD. This situation is further com-
plicated by DoD’s persistent deference to the military’s hierarchical
environment and delineated lines of authority in which responsibil-
ity for handling Army battle deaths rested only with certain indi-
viduals and institutions.42
In addition, as outlined above, it seems Pentagon officials initi-
ated arrangements to announce the friendly fire findings as soon
as they received word that the investigation was concluding. The
DoD IG concluded that Kevin Tillman, Corporal Tillman’s brother,
was informed of the fratricide finding on May 26, 2004.43 The IG
concluded that Corporal Tillman’s wife, Marie Tillman, was notified
the next day.44 The Committee took testimony from several wit-
nesses who suggested the timeline for Marie Tillman’s notification
was spurred by the fact that media inquires were being made
about the friendly fire results even before Lt. Gen. Philip
Kensinger’s public announcement.45
III. THE WHITE HOUSE
A. INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF DEATH
The Army Special Operations Command communicated word of
Corporal Tillman’s death to the Army Human Resources Command
in Alexandria, Virginia at 4:28 p.m. on April 22, 2004.46 As out-
lined in the DoD IG’s report, because of erroneous details provided
by the Army medical facility which received Corporal Tillman’s
body, the form which transmitted the details of death indicated
‘‘hostile’’ fire from ‘‘enemy forces’’ as the cause of death.47 There is
no evidence that senior Defense or White House officials were
aware of this report.
Evidence gathered by the Committee, including e-mails and
interviews conducted by Committee staff demonstrate that White
House staffers learned about Corporal Tillman’s death from tele-
vision news reports or from individuals who had received informa-
tion from these sources.48 As a result of news coverage, a number
of White House employees, friends, family members, and colleagues
sent e-mail to advise of the tragedy and to express their own per-
sonal shock and remorse.49 That day and later, some individuals
provided unsolicited suggestions for White House action or sought
more information from their contacts there.50
42 See, e.g., Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 70–72, 113–114, 147–149.
43 See DoD IG Report (unnumbered appendix).
44 Id.at 44.
45 See, e.g., Bush Transcript at Tr. 58.
46 E-mail from SFC Darien Swilley, USA SOC, to various (Apr. 22, 2004; 16:28 EDT).
47 DOD IG Report at 42–43.
48 See, e.g., Currin Transcript at Tr. 17; Gross Transcript at Tr. 8, 39–40. Further, McClellan
stated that he learned from Gross. McClellan Interview.
49 See, e.g., E-mail from Ron Fournier, Reporter, Associated Press, to Karl Rove, Political Advi-
sor, White House (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:45 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–00684); E-mail from Peter
H. Wehner, Director, Strategic Initiatives, White House, to various (White House official ap-
pears to have been blind carbon copied) (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:44 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01040).
50 See, e.g., E-mail from Steve Cardona to Michael Gerson, Chief Speechwriter, White House
(Apr. 25, 2004; 16:35 EDT) (bates HOGR004–00976 to -0977); E-mail from Barry S. Jackson,
Deputy Political Advisor, White House, to Karl Rove, Political Advisor, White House (Apr. 23,
2004; 17:05 EDT) (bates HOGR004–01120); E-mail from Peggy Noonan to Peter H. Wehner
(Apr. 23, 2004; 12:47 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–00560).
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The White House produced nearly 200 pages of e-mails referenc-
ing Corporal Tillman in response to the Committee’s subpoena. It
is difficult to argue, however, that the large number of e-mails
somehow reflects a particular interest on the part of White House
staffers in the matter of Corporal Tillman’s death. In fact, a large
percentage of this computer traffic consists of messages to and from
White House employees (many very junior) and friends or family
in which the parties mention Corporal Tillman’s death and express
sympathy. In some instances, the chains continue at great length
and diverge into a myriad of unrelated private topics. Because the
Committee’s subpoena required the entirety of such exchanges be
produced, this had the affect of inflating the volume of material
provided to the Committee and providing a distorted impression of
official White House interest beyond that reported herein.
Taylor Gross, a spokesman in the White House Media Affairs of-
fice, who was responsible for media outlets and issues in the South
and Southwestern U.S., told the Committee that he learned from
a cable television news broadcast at approximately 10:00 am on
April 23, 2004 that Corporal Tillman had been killed.51 Shortly
thereafter, Gross had started to receive a number of inquiries from
Arizona journalists about ‘‘what the President thinks about Pat
Tillman’s death.’’ 52 The interest of Arizona media stemmed from
the fact that Corporal Tillman had played college and professional
football in Arizona. At 11:40 am, Gross, on his own initiative, draft-
ed remarks which he proposed to distribute to reporters in re-
sponse to such queries, and then sought approval from his super-
visors, including White House Communications Director Dan Bart-
lett and White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan, for the com-
ments he had prepared.53 Specifically, Gross proposed replying to
these media inquiries by saying:
Pat Tillman was an inspiration on the football field and in
his private life. As with all who made the ultimate sac-
rifice in the war on terror, his family are in the thoughts
and prayers of President and Mrs. Bush.54
Five minutes later, Bartlett wrote McClellan, ‘‘does this set a
precedent? i’m fine with it.’’ 55
In this period, Bartlett also received an e-mail from Matthew
Dowd, a Bush campaign official who suggested (using an abbrevia-
tion for the President of the United States,) that
Potus should call his family or go to Arizona [. . . .] True
hero.56
51 Gross Transcript at Tr. 8, 39–40.
52 Id.at Tr. 41.
53 Gross Transcript at Tr. 49–50.
54 E-mail from Daniel J. Bartlett, White House Communications Director, to Taylor Gross,
Spokesman, White House Media Affairs, and Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary
(among others) (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:55 EDT) (bates HOGR004–01083) (responding to E-mail from
Taylor Gross, Spokesman, White House Media Affairs, to Daniel Bartlett, White House Commu-
nications Director, and Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, (among others) (Apr. 23,
2004; 11:55 EDT)).
55 E-mail from Daniel J. Bartlett, White House Communications Director, to Scott McClellan,
White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:45 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01084).
56 E-mail from Daniel J. Bartlett, White House Communications Director, to Matthew Dowd,
Bush Campaign Official (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:53 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01704) (responding to
E-mail from Matthew Dowd, Bush Campaign Official, to Daniel J. Bartlett, White House Com-
munications Director (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:50 EDT)).
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Bartlett responded at 11:53 am and, in doing so, conveyed the con-
cerns he was apparently contemplating in considering Gross’ pro-
posal. ‘‘. . . I agree he is a hero,’’ Bartlett wrote,
But there will be a lot of pressure not to single out one guy
just because he was a football player. We are providing a
statement to the AZ press, but we will have to discuss any-
thing broader.57
McClellan responded to Gross’ suggestion similarly:
[I t]hink it is fine to respond if asked, as long as we always
keep in context of president mourns loss of all those who
have sacrificed to make America safer.58
With agreement apparently at hand, Bartlett e-mailed Gross: ‘‘good
to go.’’ 59 With this approval, Gross replied to press queries from
his region with the two-sentence script.60
Based on staff interviews and e-mails, it seems White House offi-
cials specifically rejected other options when deciding to proceed in
this manner. One alternative was to offer comments on the matter
without waiting to receive press inquiries. Another possibility was
to issue a Presidential ‘‘statement’’ remarks intended to be directly
attributed to the chief executive. While these alternatives may
seem to differ little from the chosen course of action, the distinc-
tions were significant to the White House press office as it wrestled
with the issue. The press officials sought to acknowledge the trag-
edy of Corporal Tillman’s death, but in a manner which did not
slight others. White House staffers believed their approach (a rel-
atively junior employee responding only when asked) properly bal-
anced these competing demands.61
Indeed, it was not possible to determine how and when the Presi-
dent learned that Corporal Tillman had been killed.62 However, the
President was out of Washington on April 23, 2004; the deputy
57 Id.
58 E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Daniel J. Bartlett, White
House Communications Director (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:54 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01091); see
also McClellan Interview. Senior advisors on the Presidential campaign agreed. Mark McKinnon,
Media Advisor, Bush Campaign, wrote to Bartlett: ‘‘[I r]ealize President really shouldn’t do any-
thing that he hasn’t done for any other solider killed in the military, but certainly think he
could say something about he exemplified the ultimate in humility, heroism, and sacrifice.’’ E-
mail from Mark McKinnon, Media Advisor, Bush Campaign, to Daniel J. Bartlett, White House
Communications Director (Apr. 23, 2004; 13:01 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01099).
59 E-mail from Daniel J. Bartlett, White House Communications Director, to Taylor Gross,
Spokesman, White House Media Affairs, and Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary
(among others) (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:55 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01083) (responding to E-mail
from Taylor Gross, Spokesman, White House Media Affairs, to Daniel Bartlett, White House
Communications Director, and Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary (among others)
(Apr. 23, 2004; 11:55 EDT)).
60 Gross Transcript at Tr. 79.
61 Id. at Tr. 60–62, 86–87. See also Bartlett Interview; McClellan Interview.
62 Gross told the Committee he never talked to the President about Corporal Tillman on the
day the soldier was killed or otherwise. Gross Transcript at Tr. 113. In responding to an e-mail
about Corporal Tillman’s death from a friend, Gross wrote ‘‘[d]on’t know if you saw my quote
about this in the AZ Republic web site, but obviously the President was notified and the White
House mourns his loss.’’ E-mail from Taylor Gross, Spokesman, White House Media Affairs, to
[name withheld by Committee staff] (Apr. 23, 2004; 19:07 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–00234 to
00236). Gross also told Committee staff that he actually had no knowledge of the President’s
notification. Gross Transcript at Tr. 111–113. It is possible Gross meant to imply otherwise in
order to impress a friend.
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press secretary traveling with him forwarded inquiries about Cor-
poral Tillman to colleagues in the White House.63
In Washington, however, soon after Gross acted upon Bartlett’s
instructions, two problems became apparent. First, once Gross pro-
vided his remarks to the Arizona media, some outlets elsewhere re-
peated his comments, but inaccurately described them as a ‘‘state-
ment’’ from the President.64 Because officials had specifically
sought to avoid this situation, this mischaracterization caused con-
fusion and angst in the White House. ‘‘[Dan Bartlett] approved a
comment from taylor gross for the Arizona papers,’’ one staffer
explained with apparent exasperation, yet ‘‘our wires are asking
what the white house statement was.’’ 65 ‘‘[W]e are not putting out
a statement, we are responding if asked,’’ explained McClellan.66
Media reports of the White House reaction confused even those
who worked there. A White House speechwriter, employed in the
office charged with authoring Presidential statements, was per-
plexed by the coverage.67 ‘‘Did we issue a ‘statement of sympathy’
on Tillman’s death?’’ he asked a colleague, ‘‘So says MSNBC.’’ 68
Another befuddled staffer queried McClellan that afternoon, ‘‘Did
we put out a statement as MSNBC said[?]’’ 69 ‘‘No-ap reported it
that way,’’ McClellan responded. He added, ‘‘[w]e should correct
msnbc too.’’ 70 Later that evening, McClellan instructed Gross and
the individual in charge of Media Affairs, ‘‘let’s make sure we cor-
rect if people r [sic] saying we put out a statement.’’ 71
The second problem became apparent when the White House
press office learned that the Defense Department had not yet offi-
cially confirmed the fact that Corporal Tillman had been killed.
This meant that the White House was in the awkward position of
commenting upon a wartime death before the Pentagon had an-
nounced it. The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act, which
became law in November 2003, contained a provision prohibiting
DoD from releasing the names of casualties until twenty-four hours
after next-of-kin had been notified. The legislation was meant to
prevent the possibility of family members learning of a death from
news accounts. By ensuring that relatives will not be contacted by
63 E-mail from Trent Duffy, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Claire Buchan, Deputy
White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004; 15:15 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01080). See also
McClellan Interview.
64 See, e.g., E-mail from Trent Duffy, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Claire Buchan,
Deputy White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004; 15:15 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01080);
E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Sean McCormack, Spokes-
man, National Security Council (Apr. 23, 2004; 16:07 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01107); E-mail
from Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy Assistant, White House Communications, to Scott McClellan,
White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004 16:31) (bates no. HOGR004–01110).
65 E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Scott McClellan, White
House Press Secretary (among others) (Apr. 23, 2004; 12:40 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01109)
(emphasis in original).
66 E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Claire Buchan, Deputy White
House Press Secretary, Trent Duffy, Deputy White House Press Secretary, and Sean McCor-
mack, Spokesman, National Security Council (Apr. 23, 2004; 13:37 EDT) (Committee staff notes
from in camera review).
67 Gross Transcript at Tr. 84–86; Currin Transcript at Tr. 8, 14–15.
68 E-mail from Noam Neusner, White House, Speechwriter, to Erin Healy, White House staff
(Apr. 23, 2004; 16:50) (Committee staff notes from in camera review).
69 E-mail from Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy Assistant, White House Communications, to Scott
McClellan, White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004 16:31) (bates no. HOGR004–01110).
70 E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy As-
sistant, White House Communications (Apr. 23, 2004; 19:10 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01122).
71 E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Jeanie Mamo, Director,
Media Affairs, White House, and Taylor Gross, Spokesman, White House Media Affairs (Apr.
23, 2004; 19:21 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01124).
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the media immediately upon notification, the provision also ensures
that survivors have time to consider how to respond.
Unfortunately, because the media were running stories about
Corporal Tillman’s death even in the absence of official confirma-
tion, the law’s goals were stymied even before the White House
elected to respond to inquiries on the matter. Significantly, how-
ever, White House officials denied knowing of the legislation.72
This may be because in the seven months between its enactment
and Corporal Tillman’s death, the White House had not been
queried about a specific wartime death, and thus, there had been
little cause for White House employees to know of a prohibition on
Pentagon actions. There is no evidence the White House inten-
tionally acted in contravention of this provision.
It seems that White House and DoD officials did not commu-
nicate about the Corporal Tillman case until after Gross began to
reply to inquires.73 As a result, Claire Buchan, one of two White
House deputy press secretaries, somehow learned that the Penta-
gon had not yet announced Corporal Tillman’s death. At 12:54 pm
(fifty-nine minutes after approval had been given to Gross), Buchan
sent an e-mail to McClellan. The e-mail was captioned ‘‘alert—do
not use tillman statement,’’ the text said, in part, ‘‘dod is not con-
firming that he is dead,’’ but conceded, ‘‘unfortunately, taylor’s
statement is on the wire.’’ 74
Apparently seeking details of what she thought was an immi-
nently forthcoming Defense Department release, Buchan then in-
quired of Sean McCormack, the National Security Council’s spokes-
man, ‘‘can you bug your friend at dod[?]’’ 75 Presumably speaking
of Pentagon officials, McCormack replied, ‘‘not confirming yet;’’ 76
and he added, ‘‘this will soon become a problem.’’ 77 Buchan re-
sponded
trust me. it is already. i have everyone and their brother
bugging me for ‘the statement.’ can they give you any
sense of timing? 78
In fact, the Pentagon release was not issued until 11:15 pm; about
ten hours later. As required, this was twenty-four hours after Cor-
poral Tillman’s family was informed of his death.79
72 See, e.g., Gross Transcript at Tr. 68–70; McClellan Interview; Bartlett Interview.
73 Gross had no knowledge whatsoever of any communications between DoD and the White
House. Gross Transcript at Tr. 45.
74 E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Trent Duffy, Deputy
White House Press Secretary, and Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004;
12:54 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01108). This e-mail also reports ‘‘next of kin still being noti-
fied.’’ Id. (NB: This was erroneous; by this time Corporal Tillman’s parents and widow had been
informed.)
75 E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Sean McCormack,
Spokesman, National Security Council (Apr. 23, 2004; 16:07 EDT) (bates no. HOGR0004–01107)
(including E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Sean McCor-
mack, Spokesman, National Security Council (Apr. 23, 2004; 16:00 EDT)).
76 Id. (including E-mail from Sean McCormack, Spokesman, National Security Council, to
Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004; 16:06 EDT)).
77 Id.
78 Id. Buchan continued, ‘‘are you anticipating a bigger problem than just managing this?’’ Id.
79 E-mail from Shari Lawrence, Deputy Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Army Human Resources
Command, to various (Apr. 23, 2004; 15:59 EDT) (bates no. 200–205) (forwarding death notice
data sheet of Corporal Tillman). For instructions on release date and time as well as death no-
tice data sheet, see id. Note that the release indicates the statement ‘‘[t]he incident is under
investigation.’’ Id. This apparently was standard phraseology used on all announcements of the-
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64
Four hours before the DoD release, in the course of instructing
subordinates to ensure media outlets corrected any
mischaracterization of Gross’ remarks, McClellan outlined his un-
derstanding of what had transpired that day:
Media affairs commented when asked for reaction from Ar-
izona press. They did not check to verify if it had been con-
firmed.80
In an interview with the Committee, Gross acknowledged that he
did not confirm news accounts of Corporal Tillman’s death before
drafting the proposed response. He explained that he assumed, if
confirmation was to be secured, it was the responsibility of oth-
ers.81 Bartlett, in his interview with the Committee, said he as-
sumed someone had done so.82 Although the Committee did not re-
ceive any White House documents which reflect this, Gross also re-
called ‘‘verbal conversations’’ with staffers (although he could not
remember which) about the veracity of the broadcast reports,
whether or not Corporal Tillman’s family had been informed, and
the desirability of a response from the Pentagon or White House.83
McClellan told the Committee that although Corporal Tillman’s
death was certainly newsworthy, it did not ‘‘dominate’’ press office
duties that day.84 Gross recalls no after-action follow-up on the
matter.85 Indeed, Gross told the Committee that ‘‘my knowledge of
Pat Tillman’s death, and any information about Pat Tillman’s
death stopped’’ on April 23.86 He declared ‘‘I never once, to my
recollection, again took up the subject’’ aside from ‘‘maybe a friend
or two e-mailing me or contacting me over the phone. . . .’’ 87
Staffers also apparently did not attempt to discern the basis of
the mix-up surrounding Gross’ remarks. This may be because it
was a Friday when the White House reacted to news of Corporal
Tillman’s death. By the next business day (Monday, April 26), con-
cern about White House actions appear to have dissipated and
other events had come to preoccupy staffers.
It seems Buchan did not take note of the official Pentagon re-
lease until returning to work after being off for the weekend. On
April 26 at 11:36 am she e-mailed McCormack, ‘‘i see the army is
finally confirming it.’’ 88 Although she had known since the after-
noon of April 23 that the White House response had preceded the
Defense Department’s announcement, she seems not to have mon-
itored the situation later that day in order to determine how long
in advance Gross’ remarks had circulated.
ater deaths at the time. See, e.g., Bush Transcript at Tr. 23–24; Henderson Transcript at Tr.
24.
80 E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy As-
sistant, White House Communications (Apr. 23, 2004; 19:10 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01122).
81 Gross Transcript at Tr. 52–3, 64–67, 70, 93–96.
82 Bartlett Interview. In addition, McClellan said this was something Gross’ office ‘‘could have
done.’’ McClellan Interview (Committee staff notes).
83 Gross Transcript at Tr. 41–42, 44, 46–47.
84 McClellan Interview.
85 Gross Transcript at Tr. 75.
86 Id. at Tr. 98.
87 Id.
88 E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Sean I. McCormack,
Spokesman, National Security Council (Apr 26, 2004; 11:36 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01105).
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B. CORRESPONDENTS DINNER SPEECH
On May 1, eight days after the announcement that Corporal Till-
man had been killed, the President gave remarks at the annual
White House Correspondents Dinner. In this short speech, the
President spoke of wartime journalists (including those killed in ac-
tion) and World War II veterans. He also said:
The loss of Army Corporal Pat Tillman last week in Af-
ghanistan brought home the sorrow that comes with every
loss, and reminds us of the character of the men and
women who serve on our behalf. Friends say that this
young man saw the images of September the 11th, and
seeing that evil, he felt called to defend America. He set
aside a career in athletics and many things the world
counts important: wealth and security and the acclaim of
the crowds. He chose, instead, the rigors of Ranger train-
ing and the fellowship of soldiers and the hard duty in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq. Corporal Tillman asked for no special
attention. He was modest because he knew there were
many like him, making their own sacrifices.89
In an April 27, 2004 e-mail to Gerson from research assistant,
Lee Bockhorn, Bockhorn conveyed three news clippings about Cor-
poral Tillman to the speechwriter, with the note, ‘‘[y]ou asked for
the ‘most moving’ stuff on Corporal Tillman, particularly anything
he said. . . .’’ 90 Bockhorn noted ‘‘pretty remarkable’’ comments by
Corporal Tillman on September 12, 2001, about the affect of the
previous day’s terrorist attacks on his professional aspirations.91
‘‘At times like this,’’ one clip quoted Corporal Tillman as saying,
compared to other relatives who had served in the military, he be-
lieved he hadn’t ‘‘done a damn thing as far as laying myself on the
line like that.’’ 92
As the speech was being finalized, a draft was provided to John
Currin, the White House speechwriting ‘‘fact-checker’’ for review.93
On the morning of April 28, Currin e-mailed Hedy Henderson, a
counterpart at the Defense Department.94 He wrote
I hope you can help us confirm some information. We are
putting in the President’s remarks at the correspondent’s
[sic] dinner a few lines about Pat Tillman. We need to get
confirmed his rank and that he did tours of duty in both
Afghanistan and Iraq.95
89 E-mail from Robert Pratt, White House staff, to various (May 3, 2004; 13:01 EDT) (bates
no. HOGR004–00613) (forwarding E-mail from Margaret Suntum, White House staff, to various
(May 3, 2004; 12:54 EDT), including Official Remarks by the President at the White House Cor-
respondents Dinner, May 1, 2004).
90 E-mail from Lee Bockhorn, Research Assistant, White House, to Michael J. Gerson, Chief
Speechwriter, White House (Apr. 27, 2004; 13:49 EDT (bates no. HOGR004–01137).
91 Id.
92 Id. (citing, Richard Lacayo, One For The Team, TIME MAG. (May 3, 2004) (quoting Corporal
Pat Tillman)). See also, Currin Transcript at Tr. 9, 47–48.
93 For description of fact checker responsibilities and process, see Currin Transcript at Tr. 6–
7, 12.
94 For Henderson’s role, see Currin Transcript at Tr. 15, 23; Henderson Transcript at Tr. 22–
23, 31. For understanding of the routine nature of contact, see Henderson Transcript at Tr. 29,
46–49.
95 E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting factchecker, to Hedy Henderson, Of-
fice of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (Apr. 29, 2004; 13:50 EDT) (bates
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Henderson responded by forwarding the April 23, 2004 Defense De-
partment press release announcing the death and commented ‘‘I’m
still checking the Afghanistan/Iraq part.’’ 96
Between 12:40 pm and 2:03 pm on April 27, 2004, Currin and
Henderson then exchanged five e-mails about the nations in which
Corporal Tillman served and the proper way to refer to his rank.
When Currin was told that Corporal Tillman was a Specialist, he
replied (referencing those who crafted the speech), ‘‘The writers
pulled from a news article that put his rank as sergeant;’’ as if by
explanation, Henderson responded only with the Internet link to an
Army Special Operations Command statement about Corporal Till-
man’s death (which noted he ‘‘received a posthumous lateral ap-
pointment April 26 from the rank of specialist to corporal’’) and the
name and telephone number of Carol Darby, the Special Oper-
ations Command’s civilian public affairs officer at Fort Lewis,
Washington.97 Currin apparently then called Darby to discuss
these matters further.98
Henderson told the Committee ‘‘probably sometime in late May’’
2004 she learned ‘‘[f]rom the news’’ that Corporal Tillman was pos-
sibly a victim of fratricide.99 Before then she did not know an in-
vestigation was underway nor had she heard any suggestion that
speeches with which she was involved ‘‘should avoid going into de-
tail about how Corporal Tillman died.’’ 100
Darby similarly testified that she had no knowledge of fratricide
or an investigation until weeks after her communication with
Currin; this was consistent with an affidavit she had executed in
February 2005.101 Lastly, Currin told the committee that neither
Henderson nor Darby apprised him that friendly fire was suspected
in Corporal Tillman’s death or an inquiry was ongoing, and no
speech draft he saw referenced in any way the circumstances in
which the soldier died.102 Indeed, he did not learn of the fratricide
finding until after the Army released the information publicly on
May 29.103
no. 14005) (forwarding E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting factchecker, to
Hedy Henderson, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (Apr. 28, 204;
11:45 EDT).
96 Id. (forwarding E-mail from Hedy Henderson, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. De-
partment of Defense, to John Currin, White House speechwriting factchecker (Apr. 28, 2004;
11:59 EDT). Henderson told Committee staff that she recalled these were the only points Currin
raised with her during this call, not Corporal Tillman’s enlistment motivations. Henderson said
she had ‘‘vague’’ recollections that it was ‘‘very possible’’ this topic came up. Henderson Tran-
script at Tr. 27–28, 34–40, 44–45. Currin had the same recollection. Currin Transcript at Tr.
75–76.
97 E-mail from Hedy Henderson, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of De-
fense, to John Currin, White House speechwriting factchecker (Apr. 28, 2004; 14:03 EDT) (citing
U.S. Army Special Operations Command News Service, Press Release 040423–01: Army Ranger
killed in Afghanistan, Apr. 23, 2004) (forwarding E-mail from John Currin, White House speech-
writing factchecker to Hedy Henderson, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of
Defense (Apr. 28, 2004; 13:46 EDT). See also Henderson Transcript at Tr. 28, 38, 42–43. For
the routine origins of the release, see Darby Transcript at Tr. 28–31. Henderson also apparently
talked with Darby before referring Currin to her. Id.
98 Currin Transcript at Tr. 29–31.
99 Henderson Transcript at Tr. 21.
100 Id. at Tr. 21–22, 29.
101 Sworn Statement by Carol Darby, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Army (Feb. 22, 2005) (avail-
able in DoD IG Report (unnumbered appendix)).
102 Currin Transcript at Tr. 35, 71.
103 Id. at Tr. 72.
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In describing her contact with the fact-checker, Darby told the
Committee Currin also asked ‘‘if I could tell him why Pat Tillman
joined the Army. . . .’’ 104 She recounted her response:
I told him no, that I could not, that I had never talked to
either of the [Tillman] brothers and I had never seen any-
thing in print of any sort that stated why they joined the
Army. But I had seen press reports where Pat’s coach had
spoke [sic] of something along those lines, but [the reports]
didn’t really give exactly why Pat joined the Army.105
In response to a request from Currin, Darby faxed him copies of
the articles she had at hand.106
Currin apparently reviewed this material, and then queried Mat-
thew Scully, one of Gerson’s deputies:
What is your source for the statement that Corporal Till-
man seeing on September 11 the burning towers on tele-
vision, felt called to fight that evil. Going back to press ac-
counts at the time, Corporal Tillman refused to give his
reasons, and kept it to himself.107
Scully replied (possibly referencing the packet of news clips that
had been provided by Bockhorn) ‘‘[s]hould be in news accounts.’’ 108
Currin told the Committee he never saw the e-mail from Bockhorn
or its attachments.109 This may be why, in reply to Gerson, Currin
(while also noting Corporal Tillman ‘‘ha[d] been posthumously pro-
moted to Corporal’’) responded:
My DoD contact, who checked with the Rangers, confirm
[sic] that he never gave any media interview [sic] or dis-
cussed the reasons why he left the NFL to join the Rang-
ers. [. . .] But given that he never spoke to the press
about his reasons for joining the Rangers, we simply do
not have support for the statement that he decided to join
the Rangers after seeing the burning towers on tele-
vision.110
About one and a half hours later, Currin wrote again:
There is no direct support for the statement that Pat Till-
man saw the burning towers on television and felt called
to fight the evil behind it. Tillman and his brother never
discussed their reasons with the press, nor have their par-
104 Darby Transcript at Tr. 39.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact checker, to Matthew Scully,
Deputy Speechwriter, White House (Apr. 28, 2004; 14:09 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01093).
Throughout the time the Tillman brothers were stationed at Fort Lewis, Darby was responsible
for conveying various media requests to them. She told the Committee she thought they declined
interview requests because ‘‘they wanted to do what they had joined to do without the interrup-
tions of media query and media involvement;’’ in describing to the Committee her encounter
with Currin, Darby denied the suggestion that she knew Tillman refused to reveal the reason
he joined the Army. Rather, she stated she did not know his motivation. Darby Transcript at
Tr. 22, 41–42.
108 E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact checker, to Matthew Scully,
Deputy Speechwriter, White House (Apr. 28, 2004; 14:25 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–010904)
(forwarding E-mail from Matthew Scully Deputy Speechwriter, White House, to John Currin,
White House speechwriting fact checker (Apr. 28, 14:11 EDT).
109 Currin Transcript at Tr. 51, 53.
110 E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact checker, to Matthew Scully,
Deputy Speechwriter, White House (Apr. 28, 2004; 14:25 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–010904).
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ents. Tillman kept his reasons to himself. The people at
Fort Lewis, the base for Tillman’s unit, could not confirm
that September 11 was the reason why Tillman joined the
Army. All that I and Carol Darby at USASOC (Ft. Lewis)
could find is mention in a news article from March 2003
that says that ‘‘friends say the brothers were deeply af-
fected by the September 11 terrorist attacks and felt com-
pelled to enlist.’’ We do not know if these friends were
speculating about Tillman’s reasons or if they had direct
knowledge of Tillman’s reasons. The bottom line is that
Tillman never stated publicly his reasons for joining the
Rangers, and it is speculation that he did so because of
September 11.111
The next afternoon, it seems that Darby called Currin to discuss
the matter further. The fact-checker summarized this conversation
in an e-mail to Gerson, Scully, and a third speechwriter:
As I mentioned yesterday, Pat Tillman and his family
never spoke about the reasons why he chose to leave the
NFL and join the Army, and the statement in the remarks
for the correspondence dinner attributing his motivation to
seeing the burning towers on 9/11 is speculation. I spoke
yesterday with Carol Darby at Ft. Lewis (the base for the
Rangers) to check on Tillman’s correct rank and see if she
could verify Tillman’s reasons for joining the Rangers.
Carol phoned me just now to ask if we wanted to go
through the CACO assigned to the Tillman family and see
if they would want to talk to us about Corporal Tillman’s
reasons for joining the Army. I am not certain if we would
want to approach the family in their time of grief (they
will receive Corporal Tillman’s remains today), or if you
can work around the problem of not knowing as fact the
reasons that motivated Tillman to join the Army. Let me
know if you want me to go through the Tillman family
CACO to see if the family will let us know his reasons. My
sense, however, is that because Tillman wanted to keep
his reasons private, and because his family continues to re-
spect his wish to this day, we should as well, and work as
best we can around the speculation.112
In a subsequent exchange of e-mails, Gerson referred Currin to a
‘‘new draft’’ of the speech which the writer believed addressed the
fact-checker’s concerns. Currin responded by saying, ‘‘I gather you
111 E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact checker, to Matthew Scully,
Deputy Speechwriter, White House, Michael Gerson, Chief Speechwriter, White House, and oth-
ers (Apr. 28, 2004; 15:53 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01095).
112 E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact checker, to Matthew Scully,
Deputy Speechwriter, White House, Michael Gerson, Chief Speechwriter, White House, and oth-
ers (Apr. 29, 2004, 13:47 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01096) (‘‘CACO’’ which is mentioned in this
e-mail is an abbreviation for Casualty Assistant Calls Officer, an individual assigned by the
Army to provide advice and counseling to next of kin on the military’s procedures and protocols
in the case of active duty deaths.). Currin told Committee staff that he routinely submitted writ-
ten remarks and sometimes other back-up material to the White House staff secretary about
the items he fact-checked. Thus, it is possible that at least one other White House official (other
than those known to be the e-mail recipients) were apprised of the substance of Currin’s con-
versations with Darby. Currin Transcript at Tr. 12–14, 42–44, 64–65, 74–75.
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have worked around the issue?’’ 113 to which Gerson responded: ‘‘I
think so.’’ 114 Currin seemed to concur. When he reviewed the later
version, he did not object to any discussion of Corporal Tillman’s
enlistment, but rather to the fact that the soldier’s rank was incor-
rectly noted as ‘‘corporal.’’ In the next nine minutes, he sent or re-
ceived five e-mails on the subject, to ensure that this detail was
properly revised.115
Currin agreed when the Committee asked him if his preoccupa-
tion with Corporal Tillman’s rank indicated ‘‘satisfaction’’ with the
way the speech draft addressed enlistment motivations. However,
he also said it was ‘‘perhaps not 100 percent’’ in compliance with
his suggestions.116 In addition, when asked if it was accurate to
say that in his ‘‘research and fact-checking’’ he learned that the
Tillman brothers considered their ‘‘reasons for joining the military
as something they didn’t want to talk about in public,’’ he replied
‘‘that is probably fair.’’ 117
Contemporary media accounts of Corporal Tillman’s time in the
Army are replete with reports of acquaintances commenting upon
the circumstances of the Ranger’s enlistment. In addition to the
two cited by Bockhorn, one 2002 article said, ‘‘[s]ome close to him
suspect that the Sept. 11 attacks had an influence on his deci-
sion.’’ 118 A month earlier, a Kansas newspaper reported,
‘‘[a]lthough Tillman had been considering joining the military be-
fore Sept. 11, friends say the terrorist attacks stoked his patriotic
embers.’’ 119 Another story explained, ‘‘Several of Tillman’s con-
fidants say the Sept 11 terrorist attacks influenced’’ him.120 In July
2002, the Des Moines Register described Corporal Tillman’s reason
for joining the military: ‘‘It’s a personal decision, he told friends,
who think it has something to do with what happened to this coun-
try last Sept. 11.’’ 121
The exchange between Currin and Darby on April 27 and April
28 likely spurred Army Maj. Gen. Stanley McChrystal to send his
Personal For (or ‘‘P4’’) message to Gen. Abizaid on April 29, al-
though this connection cannot be precisely established. The DoD IG
testified before the Committee that the P4 ‘‘stopped with the three
generals that were on it.’’ 122 The Committee’s inquiry supports this
conclusion. No other individual, including Secretary Rumsfeld, Gen.
113 E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact checker, to Michael J. Gerson,
Chief Speechwriter, White House (Apr. 29, 2004; 14:01 EDT) (bates HOGR004–01086).
114 E-mail from Michael J. Gerson, Chief Speechwriter, White House, to John Currin, White
House speechwriting fact checker (Apr. 29, 2004; 14:02 EDT) (Committee staff notes from in
camera review).
115 See E-mails to/from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact checker (Committee staff
notes from in camera review). See also Currin Transcript at Tr. 55–56.
116 Id. at Tr. 35–37, 55, 63, 67–68.
117 Currin Transcript at Tr. 57, 70.
118 Nick Wishart, Tillman Declines to Discuss his Enlistment in Army, ST. LOUIS POST-DIS-
PATCH, Jul. 14, 2002, D5 (noting ‘‘[Tillman] is not talking to the media . . . He wants to be left
alone to pursue his most recent goal, leaving the rest of us to speculate on his motivations.’’)
119 Mark Emmons, Tillman Takes His Won Path from NFL to Army; Friends and Family of
Arizona’s Pat Tillman Aren’t Surprised He’s Giving Up NFL Lifestyle to Become an Army Rang-
er, WICHITA EAGLE, Jun. 4, 2002, 1D.
120 Troy Johnson, NFL No Match for Tillman’s New Challenge; Former Cardinal Defensive
Back to Begin Army’s Ranger Training, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jul. 12, 2002, 5B.
121 Carlson John, Decision to Serve, Rather than Be Served, Admirable, DES MOINES REGISTER,
Jul. 10, 2002, 1B.
122 Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield before the House Oversight and
Government Reform Committee, 110th Cong. (Apr. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Tillman Hearing I]
(prepared statement by Thomas Gimble, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense).
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Myers, Lt. Gen. Lovelace and DiRita, testified to having had knowl-
edge of the P4 or its contents.123
C. OTHER ACTIVITIES
The White House intergovernmental affairs office apparently re-
sponded to a request from the San Jose Mayor to assist in arrang-
ing for Corporal Tillman’s widow to fly to California with her late
husband’s remains.124 On the other hand, it is difficult to deter-
mine if the White House contemplated involvement in Corporal
Tillman’s memorial service. On May 6, Brook Holladay, an appar-
ently junior-level employee reported to another staffer about receiv-
ing a telephone call from ‘‘Stu Hadley’’ who was involved with plan-
ning a memorial service for Corporal Tillman at the University of
Arizona. Holladay said Hadley reported ‘‘someone from the White
House called and offered a message for the event to be read;’’ Hol-
laday lamented that Hanley did not ‘‘have the name of the person
who called.’’ 125 After an exchange of e-mails, Holladay reported on
what appears to be a second call with Hadley, stating he ‘‘COULD
NOT HAVE BEEN MORE UNDERSTANDING OR NICER about
this whole situation! All’s good.’’ 126
Although the situation appeared to be satisfactorily resolved, the
e-mail exchange continued between eleven more staffers. One vol-
unteered ‘‘this issue probably rises to a Karl-level,’’ presumably a
reference to Presidential aide Karl Rove.127 This brought the reply,
‘‘[t]hey are checking with them.’’ 128 This suggests that either a
White House staffer or the Arizona contact was getting in touch
with ‘‘Karl.’’ The Committee found no further evidence that the
White House contemplated or actually sent a message about Cor-
poral Tillman to the University of Arizona or that Rove was in-
volved. Of course, even if it was determined that Rove con-
templated proffering some sort of official statement to be read at
a University of Arizona event, this does not indicate that he was
aware of the likelihood that Corporal Tillman had been killed by
friendly fire.
D. KNOWLEDGE OF FRATRICIDE
No White House staffer interviewed by the Committee said they
knew that fratricide was suspected until the Army’s announcement
123 See Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 28, 63, 93 (statements by Gen. Richard Myers); Id. at Tr.
16 (statements by Donald Rumsfeld); Id. at Tr. 75 (statement by Donald Rumsfeld, regarding
having never received any P4 message); Lovelace Transcript at Tr. 28–29; Di Rita Transcript
at Tr. 55.
124 E-mail from Jim Cunneen, President and CEO, San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Com-
merce, to Ruben Barrales, Intergovernment Affairs Office, White House (Apr. 30, 2004; 11:37
EDT) (bates nos. HOGR004–00379–00381) (forwarding E-mail from Jim Cunneen, President and
CEO, San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce, to Ruben Barrales, Intergovernment Af-
fairs Office, White House (Apr. 29, 2004; 02:00 EDT); E-mail from Jeananne Fair, White House
staff, to Ruben Barrales, Intergovernment Affairs Office, White House (Apr. 27, 2004; 17:34
EDT) (bates no., HOGR004–01111); E-mail from Pat Dando, Mayor, City of San Jose, to Ruben
Barrales, Intergovernment Affairs Office, White House (Apr. 28, 2004; 17:26 EDT) (bates no.
HOGR004–00135).
125 E-mail from Brook Holladay, White House staff, to Brooke Chambers, White House staff
(May 7, 2004; 14:15 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01113–01114) (forwarding E-mail from Brook
Holladay, White House staff, to Brooke Chambers, White House staff (May 6, 2004; 15:08 EDT)).
126 Id. (Emphasis in original.)
127 E-mail from Brooke Manning, White House staff, to David Holt, White House staff (May
6, 2004; 15:51 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01117–01119) (forwarding E-mail from Brooke Holt,
White House staff, to David Holt, White House staff (May 6, 2004; 15:39 EDT)).
128 Id.
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71
on the subject.129 The Committee did not obtain any information
to the contrary. It also found no evidence which suggested that
other White House staffers or the President had foreknowledge of
the friendly fire suspicions.
When the Pentagon released the fratricide findings, White House
press and speechwriting officials considered it a Defense Depart-
ment matter about which a comment or explanation from the Presi-
dential staff was unnecessary.130 The media apparently shared this
view. There is no record of any question about Corporal Tillman
being posed in a White House press conference immediately after
the release by the Army of the findings of the friendly fire inves-
tigation; this was confirmed by White House officials.131
IV. OTHER CASES
A. JESSICA LYNCH
The April 3, 2003, front page Washington Post article which at-
tributed special heroism to Private Jessica Lynch was based on in-
formation provided by unnamed ‘‘U.S. officials.’’ 132 The Washington
Post article was widely circulated and formed the basis of addi-
tional stories in other publications in the following days. Many
other media outlets apparently sought to substantiate claims about
Private Lynch’s actions at the time she was captured. As then-U.S.
Navy Captain Frank Thorp, a CENTCOM public affairs official, re-
counted to Committee staff, ‘‘I remember specifically everyone and
their brother and sister trying to chase that story and being unable
to.’’ 133
Some charge that now-Rear Admiral Thorp or other administra-
tion or Pentagon officials intentionally misinformed the Washing-
ton Post as part of an effort to make Private Lynch appear to be
particularly heroic and thus buttress support for the Iraq War. It
is also possible the flawed Washington Post article resulted from
prosaic circumstances. The story may have been based upon inno-
cent confusion about details conveyed amidst the war. Alter-
natively, some have argued that the problematic Washington Post
article may have been advanced by proponents of an expanded role
for women in the military namely, by demonstrating that Private
Lynch had behaved valiantly in combat, efforts to allow other fe-
males into front-line units would have presumably been aided. A
cursory examination of some of the articles subsequently written
based upon the initial Washington Post article lends support to this
suggestion.134
129 See Gross Transcript at Tr. 101–2; Currin Transcript at Tr. 72; Bartlett Interview; McClel-
lan Interview; Gerson Interview.
130 McClellan Interview.
131 See Gross Transcript at Tr. 107–108, 117–118; Bartlett Interview; McClellan Interview. In
addition, Committee staff performed an article search and a search of White House press gag-
gles and did not find any instance of White House officials being quoted or asked, respectively,
about Corporal Tillman immediately after to the announcement of the finding of friendly fire.
132 Susan Schmidt and Vernon Loeb, ‘She Was Fighting to the Death,’ Details Emerging of
W.Va. Soldier’s Capture and Rescue, WASH. POST, Apr. 3. 2003, p. A1.
133 Thorp Transcript at Tr. 79.
134 In the week following the Post story, editorials and articles appeared, relating Lynch’s
heroics to the prospect of women being given combat roles. See Joan Lowy, Heroics of female
POW raise combat debate, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 3, 2003; Pfc. Jessica Lynch
shows again that women can handle combat; she kept firing at attackers until ammunition ran
Continued
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The Committee’s investigation of the identity and motivation of
the Washington Post’s source for the article was limited to posing
a handful of questions to two witnesses: Rear Admiral Thorp and
Jim Wilkinson, a CENTCOM official charged with strategic com-
munications during the April 2003 time period. Neither stated any
knowledge of the background of the leak.135 The Committee ob-
tained no further information on this topic.
Significantly, the Post journalists and their editors, according to
a 2003 account in the American Journalism Review, reject the sug-
gestion they were intentionally mislead by Pentagon officals; 136
they instead trace the difficulties to flawed data from the battle-
field. This possibility seemed buttressed in 2004 when it was sug-
gested that erroneous translations of Iraqi radio transmissions
about the convoy ambush may have led some to believe Private
Lynch undertook actions actually performed by another soldier.137
After Private Lynch’s rescue, an Army 15–6 investigation was
conducted to learn more about the actions of her unit on the day
it was attacked.138 In the month after the Washington Post article,
another news account reported that ‘‘two Pentagon officials in
interviews cast doubt on the Washington Post’s report. The officials
said all evidence suggests that [Private] Lynch’s truck crashed in
the chaos of the ambush . . ..’’ 139 The article attributed to these
same ‘‘officials’’ the view that Private Lynch ‘‘suffered several bone
fractures and was in no position to put up a fight.’’ 140 Indeed, an
Army spokesman, who described the inquiry as ‘‘extremely com-
plex,’’ stipulated it would answer the query ‘‘[w]hen the ambush
hit, did the vehicle wreck or did she fight?’’ 141
On June 17, 2003, the Washington Post reported that Private
Lynch did not engage the enemy, was not wounded by gunshots,
and was rescued without significant resistance.142 According to
press reports, the 15–6 investigation results, officially released the
following month, said much the same.143
On April 5, 2003, three days after Private Lynch’s rescue, Air
Force Maj. Gen. Victor Renuart, in the course of a CENTCOM
briefing, told assembled reporters he would ‘‘spend a minute or two
talking about the rescue of Private Lynch,’’ and declared ‘‘you’ll for-
give me for referring to notes a little bit more, but the facts of this
out, official says, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 4, 2003, p. 8A; Women are proving they’re just as tough
as the men; The arguments for keeping women out of combat are quickly losing credibility, PORT-
LAND (ME) PRESS HERALD, Apr. 5, 2003, 9A; Lynch quells gender debate, BOSTON HERALD, Apr.
6, 2003, 26; Jessica’s Lesson, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT AND CHRONICLE, Apr. 7, 2003, 8A; Frank
Ritter, Lynch settles the question of women in combat, TENNESSEAN, Apr. 9, 2003, 13A; Martha
Ackmann, A woman’s place is on the battlefield, too, RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), Apr. 10,
2003, L11.
135 Thorp Transcript at Tr. 68–79; Wilkinson Transcript at Tr. 43–76.
136 Steve Ritea, Jessica Lynch’s Story: A Little Too Perfect?, AMERICAN JOURNALISM REVIEW
(Aug./Sep. 2003).
137 Andrew Kramer, Family Learns Iraqis Executed Soldier Captured at Same Time as Lynch,
WASH. POST, May 29, 2004, A15.
138 Rowan Scarborough, Army to probe Lynch Capture, WASH. TIMES, May 23, 2003, A01.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Dana Priest, William Booth and Susan Schmidt, A Broken Body, a Broken Story, Pieced
Together; Investigation Reveals Lynch—Still in Hospital After 67 Days—Suffered Bone-crushing
Injuries in Crash During Ambush, WASH. POST, June 17, 2003, A01 [hereinafter Jun. 17, 2003
Post Follow-up].
143 Dana Priest, M-16s Jammed During Ambush in Iraq, WASH. POST, Jul. 10, 2003, A14.
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are important . . .’’ 144 Significantly, when describing the oper-
ation, Gen. Renuart made no assertions about Private Lynch’s re-
sponse when her unit was attacked.
[A]s you know, on or about 23rd of March [Private Lynch’s]
507th maintenance company was ambushed in the vicinity
of An Nasiriyah. A number of members of that mainte-
nance company were killed, a number captured and a
number were unaccounted for, [Private Lynch] being one of
them.145
Gen. Renuart explained further that the military’s special forces
subsequently ‘‘got an indication’’ that an injured American POW
was being ‘‘held in . . . the Saddam Hospital, in An Nasiriyah.’’ 146
As a result, he said, highly trained elite Army, Air Force, Navy,
and Marine units were ordered to ‘‘very rapidly get into the area
of the hospital to determine the location of Private Lynch and then
to bring her out, and at the same time, exploit some areas of the
hospital where we had reports of enemy headquarters, command
and control facilities and the like.’’ 147
In the assault, one group of Marines was charged with creating
a diversionary attack to allow a main rescue group to approach the
hospital unimpeded. Gen. Renuart explained that this second ele-
ment ‘‘persuaded a local physician to lead them to Private Lynch’s
location.’’ 148 The General also said some military personnel on the
rescue team discovered a ‘‘weapons cache’’ in the hospital and a
three-dimensional map of the town. Gen. Renuart said this ‘‘terrain
model’’ included red and blue markers which ‘‘depicted with rel-
ative accuracy the general position of U.S. forces and also enemy
forces in the town.’’ 149
Lynch’s rescue was, as later recounted by CENTCOM public af-
fairs official, Lt. Colonel John Robinson, ‘‘an awesome story.’’ 150
However, notwithstanding Robinson’s declaration and Gen.
Renuart’s explanation, some questioned the conduct of the rescue
operation. Six weeks after Private Lynch’s rescue, the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) aired a documentary segment en-
titled ‘‘War Spin’’ on its Correspondent television program. About
the rescue, the documentary concluded: ‘‘her story is one of the
most stunning pieces of news management ever conceived.’’ 151 The
program asserted ‘‘the US military knew there were no Iraqi forces
guarding the hospital, and quoted a local doctor saying the troops
used blank rounds to ‘make a show’ of the operation.’’ 152 ‘‘War
Spin’’ also questioned whether Private Lynch ‘‘had been slapped
144 Transcriptof CENTCOM Operational Update Briefing by Maj. Gen. Victor Renuart, FED-
ERAL NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 5, 2003.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Jun. 17, 2003 Post Follow-up.
151 John Kampfner, Saving Private Lynch Story ‘Flawed’, BBC NEWS (ONLINE), May 15, 2003,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/3028585.stm [last visited Jul.
14, 2008].
152 Id.
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about on her hospital bed and interrogated’’ before troops came to
her aid.153
A Pentagon spokesman termed these assessments ‘‘void of all
facts and absolutely ridiculous.’’ 154 However, three Members of
Congress asked the Defense Department Inspector General to un-
dertake an inquiry to determine the veracity of the BBC’s asser-
tions. Writing about the charges in ‘‘War Spin,’’ one wrote, ‘‘[I]f
these allegations prove true the US military put Private Lynch’s
life in greater risk in order to produce a made-for-TV event to boost
public support for this war,’’ and noted, ‘‘if true, this is hardly a
fitting way to treat Private Lynch in light of her bravery and cour-
age.’’ 155
None of the accusations made by the BBC, however, appears to
be accurate. A DoD IG inquiry was undertaken in response to the
request from the Members. In September 2003, the DoD IG re-
ported that, under its oversight, the CENTCOM Inspector General
had completed an investigation which included ‘‘extensive evidence
not available to the media.’’ 156 Investigators ‘‘concluded that the al-
legations were not substantiated’’ and ‘‘no further investigation was
warranted.’’ 157 The operation to locate and repatriate Private
Lynch ‘‘constituted a valid mission to recover a U.S. POW under
combat conditions,’’ the IG found.158
In addition, the inquiry found ‘‘[t]he level of force used by [the
U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF)] to perform the mission
was consistent with the anticipated resistance and established doc-
trine.’’ 159 The video tape collected during the mission (and shown
later to reporters) ‘‘was filmed by a combat cameraman and a mem-
ber of USSOF in accordance with standard procedures’’ and the IG
determined ‘‘no public affairs personnel were involved in the plan-
ning or filming of the operation.’’
In sum, the IG reported:
USSOF conducted a personnel recovery mission, during
wartime, in a nonpermissive environment, to rescue a U.S.
POW from a hostile enemy location. During the mission
USSOF received enemy fire from the hospital building, the
surrounding complex, and nearby areas. They successfully
engaged the enemy forces they encountered, neutralizing
them without sustaining any casualties of their own.160
The IG also conveyed an assessment of the possibility mission par-
ticipants were ‘‘acting for the camera;’’ there was no evidence of
this, investigators reported.161 Indeed, ‘‘all USSOF members,’’ the
IG stated, ‘‘were offended by such an accusation.’’ 162 These results
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Letter from Pete Stark, Member of Congress, to Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Defense (Jun. 2, 2003) (on file with Committee staff).
156 Letter from Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense, to Rahm
Emmanuel, Member of Congress (Sep. 2, 2003) (see Attachment: Executive Summary) (on file
with Committee Staff).
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
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were conveyed to the Committee by the DoD IG at the Committee’s
first hearing into this matter.163
B. SCOTT THOMAS BEAUCHAMP
While an Army private stationed in Iraq in 2007, Scott Thomas
Beauchamp ‘‘blogged’’ for The New Republic under a pseudonym.
His postings recounted acts he had allegedly witnessed or partici-
pated in during his time in theater. These included U.S. soldiers
mocking a disfigured woman, making playthings of the bones of
dead children, and intentionally running over stray dogs. To some,
these episodes illustrated the morally debasing effects of the Iraqi
conflict on U.S. service personnel. When others disagreed and ex-
pressed doubt about the events reported, Beauchamp responded
‘‘[m]y pieces were always intended to provide my discrete view of
the war; they were never intended as a reflection of the entire U.S.
Military.’’ 164 He also revealed his actual identity. ‘‘I was initially
reluctant to take the time out of my already insane schedule fight-
ing an actual war in order to play some role in an ideological battle
that I never wanted to join,’’ and ‘‘That being said, my character,
my experiences, and those of my comrades in arms have been
called into question, and I believe it is important to stand by my
writing under my real name.’’ 165
On August 2, 2007, however, The New Republic editors disclosed
that their initial inquiry into Beauchamp’s veracity had found a
‘‘significant’’ discrepancy in one story: some witnesses recalled see-
ing a mutilated woman fitting the description provided by
Beauchamp in Kuwait, not Iraq.166 This is important because if
Beauchamp and others had encountered her and behaved inappro-
priately towards her there, it could not been because of the rigors
of combat. This is because Beauchamp’s unit was in Kuwait before
it entered the fight. But, only five days later, the Army announced
the results of an inquiry into the claims in Beauchamp’s blog: not
only was the boorish behavior towards the injured disproved, but
all ‘‘the allegations made by PVT Beauchamp were found to be
false,’’ according to Multilateral Division-Baghdad spokesman
Major Steven F. Lamb.167 Major Lamb explained that Beauchamp’s
‘‘platoon and company were interviewed and no one could substan-
tiate his claims.’’ 168 In December 2007, in light of inconsistencies
coming to light, The New Republic’s editor published an expla-
nation of their position declaring, ‘‘[W]e cannot stand by these sto-
ries.’’ 169
The next month, twenty-seven sworn statements from soldiers
were provided to a New York media outlet as a result of a Freedom
163 Tillman Hearing I (prepared statement by Thomas Gimble, Acting Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Defense).
164 Scott Thomas Beauchamp, Blog: The Plank, NEW REPUBLIC (ONLINE), Jul. 26, 2007.
165 Id.
166 Editors, A statement on Scott Thomas Beauchamp, NEW REPUBLIC (ONLINE), Aug. 2, 2007.
167 Marcus Baram, Pentagon: Baghdad Diarist Writes Fiction, ABC NEWS, Aug. 7, 2007. See
also Howard Kurt, Army Concludes Baghdad Diarist Accounts Untrue, WASH. POST, Aug. 8,
2007.
168 Id.
169 Franklin Foer, Fog of War: The story of our Baghdad Diarist, NEW REPUBLIC (ONLINE),
DEC. 10, 2007.
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of Information Act request.170 These sworn statements buttress the
reported conclusions of the Army’s investigation: no interviewee ad-
mitted to having any information which supported any of
Beauchamp’s alleged observations. In addition, in one sworn state-
ment by Beauchamp’s squad leader indicates that Beauchamp did
not consult with him before making blog posts in violation of ‘‘oper-
ational security’’ regulations governing soldiers on the battle-
field.171
It is not clear how an Army private was able to repeatedly and
intentionally disseminate misinformation from the battlefield to a
major publication, especially when doing so violated security provi-
sions and slandered his fellow troops.
Æ
170 The New Republic’s Soldier’s Tale, RADAR [MAGAZINE] (ONLINE), available at http://
www.radaronline.com/exclusives/2008/01/scott-beauchamp-new-republic-documents-foia.php [last
visited Jul 14, 2008] [hereinafter RADAR article].
171 Sworn affidavit by E–6/Squad Leader [name withheld by Committee staff] (Jul. 28, 2007;
18:21) (reported in RADAR article).
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