Nuclear Operations FM 100-30 by rlnac


									                                                                             FM 100-30
                                                                      29 OCTOBER 1996

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

                                                        DENNIS]. REIMER
Official:                                            General, United States Army
          e 1LL-J
          B. HUDSON
                                                             Chief of Staff

Administrative Assistant to the
   Secretary of the Army


Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in
accordance with the initial distribution number 115477, requirements for FM 100-30.
                                                                                                                                           FM 100-30
Field Manual                                                                                                       HEADQUARTERS
100-30                                                                                                DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
                                                                                                      Washington, DC, 29 October 1996

                                       NUCLEAR OPERATIONS
PREFACE         ........................................................................                                                                 VI

Chapter 1      TRANSITION FROM JOINT NUCLEAR DOCTRINE ....................... 1-1
               THE NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT .......................................... 1-1
               LEVELS OF WAR........................................................ 1-1
               DETERRENCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1-2
               THE THREAT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1-2
               NUCLEAR FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1-4
               LEADERSHIP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1-4
               TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1-4
               SUMMARy ............................................................. 1-5
Chapter 2      EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2-1
               WEAPONS EFFECTS AND THE COMBAT ENVIRONMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2-1
                     Blast. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2-1
                    Thermal Radiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2-1
                     Residual Ionizing Radiation, Initial Radiation, and the
                      Operational Exposure Guide (OEG) ...................................... 2-2
                     Electronmagnetic Pulse (EMP) ........................................... 2-3
               UNIT SURVIVABILITY .................................................. 2-4
                     Positioning (Dispersion) ................................................ 2-5
                     Mass Versus Dispersion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2-5
                     Countermeasures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2-5
FM 100-30

               Mitigation Techniques .................................................. 2-6
            EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY ............................................ 2-6
               Methods and Techniques to Enhance Survivability ........................... 2-6
               Nuclear Environment Arrival Times ....................................... 2-7
            DYNAMICS OF COMBAT POWER ......................................... 2-7
            SUMMARY ........................................... " ................ 2-7
Chapter 3   PLANNING NUCLEAR OPERATIONS .................................... 3-1
            JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS ........................................... 3-1
               The Deliberate-Planning Process .......................................... 3-2
                  Planning Guidance .................................................. 3-2
                  Targeting ......................................................... 3-3
               The Crisis-Action Planning Process ....................................... 3-3
               Force Projection ....................................................... 3-3
                  The Stages of Force Projection ........................................ 3-3
                  Entry Operations .. ',' ............................................... 3-3
            THE CORPS AS A JOINT TASK FORCE ..................................... 3-5
            JOINT NUCLEAR-WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT SUPPORT ..................... 3-5
               The Planning and Execution Cycle ........................................ 3-5
               Coordination .......................................................... 3-8
               Contingency Operations ................................................ 3-10
            MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS ......................................... 3-11
            PLANNING JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS ............................... 3-12
               Command Guidance ................................................... 3 -12
               The Operational Level of War. .......................................... 3-13
               Airspace Coordination ................................................. 3-13
               Nuclear Targeting ..................................................... 3-13
                  Identifying Enemy Targets .......................................... 3-13
                  Targeting Considerations ........................................... 3-14
                  Troop Safety ..................................................... 3-14
                  Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess (D3A) Targeting Methodology .......... 3-15
                  Defeat Criteria .................................................... 3-15
               Collateral-Damage Prevention ........................................... 3-16
               Options ............................................................. 3-16
            BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS (BOS) .............................. 3-17

                                                                                   FM 100-30

               Intelligence .......................................................... 3-17
               Maneuver ........................................................... 3-17
               Fire Support ......................................................... 3-18
               Mobility and Survivability .............................................. 3-18
               Combat Service Support (CSS) .......................................... 3-18
               Command and Control. ................................................ 3-18
               Air Defense ......................................................... 3-18
            RECONSTITUTION ..................................................... 3-19
            SUMMARy ............................................................ 3-19
            RESPONSIBILITIES ...................................................... 4-1
            THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ....................................... 4-1
               Mission Analysis ....................................................... 4-1
               Commander's Guidance ................................................ 4-2
               Course of Action Development ........................................... 4-2
               Course of Action Analysis ............................................... 4-4
            THE COMMANDER'S DECISION .......................................... 4-5
            PROCEDURES ........................................................... 4-7
               Plans (Orders) Preparation .................... , .......................... 4-7
               Approval and Issuance of the OPLAN (OPORD) ............................. 4-7
            SUPERVISION ........................................................... 4-8
            MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT AND FEEDBACK ............................ 4-9
            SUMMARy ............................................................. 4-9
Chapter 5   NUCLEAR SUPPORT TO COMBAT OPERATIONS ......................... 5-1
            TENETS OF ARMY OPERATIONS .........................................             5-}'

            AREA OF OPERATIONS (AO) ............................................. 5-1
            CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENSIVE OPERA nONS ......................... 5-2
               Forms of Tactical Offense ............................................... 5-2
               Forms of Maneuver .................................................... 5-3
            PLANNING THE OFFENSE ............................................... 5-3
               Mission .............................................................. 5-3
               Enemy .............................................................. 5-4
               Troops .............................................................. 5-4
               Terrain and Weather ................................................... 5-4

FM 100-30

                 Time Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5-4
            CONDUCTING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ................................. 5-4
            CHARACTERISTICS OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS ........................ , 5-5
                 Mobile Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5-5
                 Area Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5-6
            PLANNING THE DEFENSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5-7
                 Mission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5-7
                 Enemy ............................................................... 5-7
                 Troops .............................................................. 5-7
                 Terrain and Weather ................................................... 5-7
                 Time Available. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5-8
            CONDUCTING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5-8
                 Deep Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5-8
                 Close Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5-8
                 Rear Operations ....................................................... 5-9
                 Reserve Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5-9
            SUMMARy.: ........................................................... 5-9
            THE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PROCESS ............................... 6-1
            COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OPERATIONS ................................ 6-1
                 Anticipation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6-1
                 Integration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6-1
                 Continuity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6-2
                 Responsiveness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6-2
                 Improvisation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6-2
            COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS ................................ 6-2
                 Personnel Support.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6-2
                 Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6-3
                 Transportation ........................................................ 6-4
                 Combat Health Support (CHS). ................................... . . . . . .. 6-4
                 Field Services ........................................................ 6-5
                 Supply .............................................................. 6-6
            SUMMARY ............................................................. 6-8
GLOSSARY               ........................................................... Glossary- I

                                                                                                                             FM 100-30

        ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................ Glossary-l
             Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Glossary-I
             Definitions ..................................................... Glossary-3
REFERENCES        . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. References-I
INDEX             .............................................................. Index-l


        In th~ Jlast, Soviet-styled armored echeloned formations were the primary threat to the United
     States (US). In response to this threat the US designed and stockpiled tactical nuclear weapons.
     Today's threats consist of regional instabilities and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
     tion (WMD). However, the US, as well as many other nations, actively pursues a policy of
     nonproliferation. Despite this, the number of nations who have, or are developing, nuclear
     weapons continues to grow. Therefore, the US may some day find itself confronted by an opponent
     who possesses nuclear weapons. Because of the continuing reduction in the size of US military
     forces, the US could also find itself opposed by an overwhelming conventional threat. Either
     scenario could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the -US must concern itself with
     countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
        Despite the continuing drawdown of US military forces, the current national military strategy
     includes fighting and winning two near-simultaneous regional wars with conventional forces. Any
     US threat of employing nuclear weapons is to deter a potential adversary's use of such weapons.
     If deterrence fails. the goal is to end hostilities on terms acceptable, at the lowest level of conflict,
     to the US and its allies. However, the US unilaterally reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if
     necessary. Use would be restricted, of course, with tight limits on tfie area and time of use. This
     would allow the belligerent to recognize the "signal" of limited response and to react accordingly.
       The Army describes battlefield nuclear warfare (BNW) in terms of being able to conduct
     continuous combat operations in a nuclear environment. The presence of any nuclear-capable
     system, before, during, or after nuclear-weapons employment by either friendly or enemy forces,
     creates a nuclear environment. The implications of their very presence creates the nuclear
       Before 1991, the US Army had custody of tactical nuclear weapons which were to be employed,
     on Presidential release, by organic Army field artillery units. In September 1991, the Presidential
     Nuclear Initiative (PNI) removed the organic nuclear responsibility from the US Army. Today the
     Army neither has custody of nuclear weapons nor do corps and aivisions employ tfiem. The US
     Air Force or the US Navy are now responsible for delivery of nuclear weapons in support of Army
     operations. The Army retains its role in nominating nuclear targets ana is also responsible for
     nuclear force protection.
        This manual establishes Army doctrine for operations in a nuclear environment and details the
     doctrine for integrating nuclear considerations into all other aspects of the battlefield. It also
     describes the Army's role in nominating targets at corps and above levels and protecting the force
     from the effects of nuclear weapons detonation.
        Nuclear operations may occur at strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Nuclear
     employment in a theater of operations has theater strategic, operational, and tactical results;
     execution has national strategic implications. The corps' role is to function at either the tactical
     or, operational levels of war. At the tactical level, the corps accomplishes missions as Field Manual
     (FM) 100-15 describes. At the operational level, when directed and augmented, the corps functions
     as either the Army force (ARFOR), the joint force land component command OFLCC), or ajoint
     task force OTF). By viewing the corps in its many possible roles, the reader can also discern
     nuclear procedures for echefons above corps (EAC) and joint missions.
       This manual can help educate and train commanders and staffs at corps and operational levels
     in nuclear operations and educate and train divisions in nuclear force protection. It is used with
     Joint Publications OP) 3-12.1, 3 -12.2 (SRD), or 3-12.3, and serves as the bridge between joint and

                                                                                        FM 100-30

Army doctrine. It is also used with FM 25-50, which contains training doctrine for nuclear
   The proponent of this publication is headquarters (HQ) , US Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC). Submit changes and suggestions, on Department of the Army (DA) Form
2028, to the Commanding General, US Army, Combined Arms Center (CAC) , ATTN: ATZL-
SWW-L, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027.
   The reader should review the glossary to become familiar with terms and definitions used in
this manual.
   Masculine pronouns apply to both men and women.

                                                  Chapter 1
                              TRANSITION FROM JOINT
                                NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

              THE NUCLEAR                                 weapons into other systems to achieve the greatest
                                                          operational advantage. Nuclear-weapons use will
              ENVIRONMENT                                 not change warfare fundamentals. However, it will
  A nuclear environment exists if either adversary        create conditions that could significantly affect how
in a conflict possesses nuclear capabilities and if any   commanders apply them.
of the following elements are present:
• There is a capability by a belligerent to deliver                    LEVELS OF WAR
  weapons of mass destruction.
                                                             The levels of war-strategic, operational, and
• A nuclear weapon is in the area of responsibility       tactical-help clarify activities by echelons within
  (AOR).                                                  the theater across tne full range of military opera-
• There is a possibility of deployment or employ-         tions. They provide a usefuf framework within
   ment of nuclear weapons into an AOR.                   which a CINC can order activities within his area of
                                                          responsibility. The levels of war also help com-
   In a nuclear environment decisive battles might        manders visualize a logical flow of operations, an
be greatly compressed. The course of campaigns            allocation of resources, and the assignment of tasks.
could be radicany altered or accelerated. The threat      Each level of war is defined by the extent of com-
of, and the lethal consequences of, nuclear-weapons       mand authority, scope of perspectives, designated
use can greatly influence military operations and         responsibilities, and the intended outcome.
increase the battlefield's complexity. The Army,
supported by joint assets, must be capable of con-           At the strategic level of war, the perspectives are
ducting all operations in such an environment.            worldwide ana long-range. At the operational level
                                                          of war, military forces attain theater strategic objec-
   Nuclear operations fall into two basic categories:     tives through designing, organizing, and conducting
immediate nuclear support and preplanned nuclear          campaigns and major operations. The concern at the
support. Both terms define the use of nuclear weap-       tactical level of war is the execution of battles and
ons against hostile forces in support of friendly air,    engagements.
land, and naval operations (nuclear support). Sflould
the employment of nuclear weapons oecome neces-              The CINC normally operates at the theater stra-
sary, tne commander in chief (CINC) and/or joint          tegic level of war. The corps commander could be
forces commander, after receiving release permis-         the senior Army commander subordinate to the
sion from the President through tlie National Com-        CINCo In this capacity he may operate at the opera-
mand Authorities (NCA) , can use either of these two      tional or tactical levels. In tnis situation the corps
forms of support--                                        commander may also be responsible for the nuclear
                                                          target-nomination Q~ocess and the nuclear, biologi-
• To alter the balance between firepower and ma-          cal, and chemical tNBC) protection process.
                                                             Concerns and views regarding nuclear emrloy-
• To affect the tempo and destructiveness of              ment differ at each leveT of nuclear operatIOns.
  operations.                                             Battlefield nuclear operations support the opera-
• To respond to the enemy's use of weapons of             tional-level commander's concept and intent. Corps
  mass destruction.                                       and EAC commanders are normally responsible for
                                                          nuclear target nominations. Commanders at divi-
  Using nuclear weapons at the proper time and            sion and lower levels normally operate at the tactical
place can create conaitions for aecisive results.         level of war and are responsiDle for the NBC defense
Commanders at corps and above integrate nuclear           process.

FM 100-30

               DETERRENCE                                  • A modern nuclear force.
   Although the US military force's overriding mis-        • The capability and flexibility to support a spec-
sion is to aeter war, especially nuclear war, the intent      trum of response options.
behind the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiative            • A deployable defensive system for theater
(PNI) was to enhance national security through                protection.
arms reduction while preserving the capability to
regenerate selected forces if required. Recent arms           The threat of nuclear escalation is a major concern
control agreements and unilateral initiatives provide      in any military operation involving the armies of
for real reductions in the arsenals of nuclear powers.     nuclear powers. Controlling escalation is essential
However, even with the most optimistic outlook, the        to limiting a rational threat s incentive for nuclear
sheer number of remaining weapons is formidable.           response.r:scalation control involves a careful se-
An increasing number of potentially hostile states         lection of options to convey to the enemy that,
are developing or have Hie capability: to develop          although the US is capable of escalating operations
weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the US             to a higher level, it has deliberately withberd strikes.
must maintain a modem, reliable, and fully capable            The US views restraint in the use of nuclear
strategic deterrent as its number one defense              weapons as an important way to control the escala-
priority.                                                  tion of warfare. Restraint provides leverage for a
   Deterrence is the product of a nation's military        negotiated termination of military operations. How-
capabilities and that nation's willingness to use          ever, the US cannot assume a potential enemy, will
those capabilities. The US' policy is to terminate         view restraint in the same way, or that he wIll not
conflict at the lowest possible level of violence          employ weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the
consistent with national and allied interests. The         US must be capable of deploying those forces nec-
ability to conduct operational- and tactical-level         essary to defeat aggression, provide coercion, and
nuclear activities ennances US deterrent policy.           bring the war to a speedy termination on terms
                                                           favorable to the US and its allies. Commanders and
   The potential employment of nuclear weapons at          staffs at all levels must continue to be familiar with
theater level, when combined with the means and            nuclear-weapons effects, the actions required to
resolve to use them, makes the prospects of conflict       minimize such effects, and the risks associated with
more dangerous and the outcome more difficult to           using nuclear weapons.
predict. The US' position is that it can achieve
aeterrence if any potential enemy believes the out-
come of nuclear war to be so uncertain, and the                            THE THREAT
conflict so debilitating, that he will have no incen-
tive to initiate a nuclear attack. The resulting uncer-      The Cold War era's definitive threats to American
tainty reduces a potential aggressor's willingness to      security were nuclear surprise attack and the possi-
risk escalation by initiating conflict.                    ble invasion of Western Europe. The new threat is
                                                           worldwide regional instability (including the possi-
   At the same time, a credible defensive capability,      ble regional use of nuclear weapons) coupled with
which would include the threat of employing nu-            the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
clear weapons, could bolster the resolve of allies to
resist an adversary's attempts at political coercion.         Developing countries as well as regional powers
For example, the US' capability of responding to           are gaining the ability to manufacture nuclear arse-
biological and chemical attacks with nuclear weap-         nals. The current threat from developing nations
ons would likely reduce or eliminate such attacks.         primarily consists of short- and intermediate-range
                                                           ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft capable of
   Nuclear weapons contribute to but do not by             carrying nuclear weapons and other weapons of
themselves ensure deterrence. To have a credible           mass destruction. Other threats, such as terrorists
nuclear deterrent requires a nation to have the            groups, may also possess nuclear weapons.
means, the ability, and the will to employ nuclear
weapons. The nation must also have-                           A nation that has the capability of using ballistic
                                                           or cruise missiles and high-speed aircraft to deliver
• A reliable warning system.                               weapons of mass destruction at extended ranges

                                                                                                      FM 100-30

significantly increases those weapons' effective-            The Department of Defense's (DOD) counterpro-
ness as instruments of terror. Such capability also       liferation initiative recognizes the goal of prevent-
enhances the possibility of conflict escalation be-       ing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
yond a hostile region's boundaries.                       and their associated delivery systems. It also recog-
                                                          nizes that the US must continue to expand its efforts
   The use of, or the threat of using, weapons of mass    to protect forces, interests, and allies. The initiative
destruction within a campaign or major operation          has two fundamental goals:
can cause large-scale shilts in objectives, phases,
and courses of action (COA). Nuclear weapons              • To strengthen DOD's contribution to govern-
make it possible to drastically change the effective         mentwide efforts to prevent, or diplomatically
ratio of regional forces and equipment and to create         reverse, the acquisition of weapons of mass
conditions favorable to a threat's operations. Con-          destruction.
sequently, if a potential adversary is not successful     • To protect US interests and forces (as those of its
conventionally, he might consider using weapons of           allies) from WMD effects by assuring that US
mass destruction.                                            forces have the equipment, doctrine, and intelli-
   The most accepted enemy employment method-                gence needed to confront, if necessary, any future
ology to destroy critical targets is surprise. A poten-      opponent who possesses weapons of mass
tial enemy might try to destroy massed units and all         destruction.
other critical targets using various nuclear-weaRons         The Department of Defense marshals its unique
burst options lspace bursts, air bursts, surface          technical, military, and intelligence expertise-
bursts, oelow-surface bursts). Such attacks might be
single attacks or part of a group of massed nuclear       • To improve arms control compliance.
strikes. Therefore, retaliation or escalation would       • To control exports.
result in the likelihood of nuclear use against
friendly forces. Or, retaliation or escalation could      • To inspect and monitor the movement of nuclear
be used in response to an enemy's first use of              materials.
weapons of mass destruction.                              • To interdict shipments for inspection during
  One element of the commander's critical infor-             crises.
mation requirements (CClR) is determining if the          • To strengthen the norms and incentives against
theater threat is capable of using weapons of mass           WMD acquisition.
destruction. The answer dictates future command
actions.                                                     The Department of Defense's acquisition strategy
                                                          in the areas of command, control, communications,
                                                          and intelligence (el), counterforce operations, ac-
                                                          tive defense, and passive defense address the fol-
       PROLIFERATION,                                     lowing critical counterproliferation challenges:
                                                          • Detecting and destroying WMD capabilities from
    COUNTERPROLIFERA TION                                    production through storage to depfoyment.
   Proliferation is the process by which one nation       • Conducting military operations in a WMD envi-
after another comes into the possession of or attains        ronment.
the right to determine the employment of nuclear          • Dealing with consequences of WMD use, includ-
weapons, each potentially able to launch a nuclear           ing meaical treatment, clean-up, and recovery.
attack upon another nation. Nonproliferation efforts
focus on Rreventing the spread of missiles and            • Coping with the diffusion of new technologies.
weapons of mass destruction through arms and ex-          NOTE: This manual concerns the nuclear part of
port controls beyond the scope of corps and EAC           weapons of mass destruction.
mterest. Counterproliferation strategy focuses on
military measures centering both on how to deter or          Although nuclear weapons are an element of de-
discourage as well as how to defend and attack            terrence, potential regional adversaries might or
against the possible use of such weapons.                 might not understancf the deterrence value of the

FM 100-30

US' nuclear weapons. If the goals of promoting               2. Train junior leaders to think and operate
peace, deterring war, and resolving conflicts fail,             independently.
aeterrence fails. 'Therefore, fighting and terminating
hostilities become paramount. United States doc-             3. Develop small-unit cohesion.
trine assumes that if the potential foe is capable of           Commanders and staffs must fully understand the
using weapons of mass destruction, then US forces             potential of nuclear-weapons use by both an adver-
must act accordingly.                                        sary and by a US joint force. They must also have a
                                                             working knowled-ge of-
            NUCLEAR FORCES                                   • Nuclear-weapons effects.
   Nuclear-capable forces (Navy and Air Force) are           • Employment doctrine.
instruments of national power in regional conflicts.         • Survivability measures necessary to preserve
They contribute to theater deterrence or provide a              combat power.
war-fighting option to the NCA.
                                                             • Medical requirements as a result of a nuclear
   Because the Army no longer has an organic nu-                explosion.
clear capability, the Navy or Air Force will provide
nuclear support. The Army can now only nominate              • The psychological impact of nuclear warfare on
nuclear targets, usually at no lower than the corps             soldiers and units. -
level. The aivision normally is limited to NBC                  As commanders plan and fight successive battles
protection activities.                                       involving actual or possible nuclear operations, they
   The capability of the US to deploy nuclear forces         must continually assess their soldiers' psychologi-
into a theater significantly complicates the enemy's         cal and physiological stresses. Commanders must
planning process. The alert status of nuclear forces         emphasize situations in training, exercises, and
IS a function of the world situation at any given time       leadership which will help soldiers accomplish their
and, thus, enhances their responsiveness.                    missions.

                 LEADERSHIP                                                    TRAINING
    Battlefield stress in a nuclear environment will be         On a nuclear battlefield every soldier will con-
higher than US forces have ever experienced. Only            front new and strange circumstances and be under
disciplined, well-trained, and physically fit units can      constant danger of attack. Nuclear weapons will
function well in such an environment. Commanders             quickly cause many casualties as well as interme-
who understand this and who provide soldiers with            diate and long-term radiation effects. Soldiers will
strong, positive leadership; good mental and physical        be exposed to death and destruction of a magnitude
preparation; and clear, comprehensive plans wi1l en-         far beyond imagination and may have to operate in
sure soldiers are in a better position to survive and win.   widely dispersed, isolated, ana semiindependent
                                                             groups. Everyone must understand and practice sur-
    Units may have to operate with reduced mutual            vival and mitigation techniques. Such techniques
support and fire support, with degraded electronic           will give soldIers direction and confidence in a
communications abilities along extended lines of             confusing, frightening situation.
communications (LOC), and possibly without cen-
tralized control or continuous communications.                  The large and sudden losses that a nuclear attack
Therefore, to improve command and control (C 2)              will cause will shock and confuse inadequately
leaders must work toward three general goals                 trained or psychologically unprepared troops. Reac-
(which take on added importance in nuclear                   tion times will be slower, and the ability to respond
operations) :                                                to leadership and the desire to perform at peak
                                                             proficiency may be degraded. The violence, stress,
 1. Instill an aggressiveness in their units that will       and confusion can easily divert attention from bat-
    transcend the shock and stress of the nuclear            tlefield objectives. Extraordinary discipline and
     environment.                                            leadership are vital to overcoming distractions,

                                                                                                  FM 100-30

maintaining the mission's focus, and pressing the                        SUMMARY
                                                           This chapter describes the transition of joint nu-
   Training, the cornerstone of success, technically    clear doctrine to Army-oriented nuclear doctrine. A
and psycfiologically prepares soldiers for the nu-      nuclear environment exists if either adversary in the
clear environment. Successful nuclear oRerations        conflict possesses nuclear capabilities. The levels of
require expanded combat training that includes-         war clarify simultaneous activities Army forces
• Mitigation techniques against nuclear effects.        conduct in the theater. Each level supports the next
                                                        higher level of war.
• Radiation monitoring.
                                                           The overall mission of military forces is to deter
• Decontamination techniques.                           war-especially nuclear war. If deterrence fails, the
• Operations exploiting nuclear-weapons use.            US must be capable of deploying the forces neces-
                                                        sary to defeat aggression, provide cohesion, and
• Recovering and regrouping after an attack.            bring war to a speedy termination on terms favor-
• Handling mass casualties.                             able to the US and its allies.
• Having to use degraded resources to accomplish           The threat is worldwide regional instability (in-
   the mission.                                         cluding possible use of nuclear weapons) coupled
• Nominating nuclear targets.                           with t1i.e proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
                                                        tion. Proliferation occurs when nations acquire and
   Soldiers will fight as well or as poorly as they     have the ability to use nuclear weapons against
have been trained. Clear, concise policies and guide-   another nation. Nonproliferation activities attempt
lines provide control and direction. Commanders         to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruc-
must emphasize the fact that aggressive maneuver,       tion. Counterproliferation centers on how to deter,
even by, relatively small units, will have a high       defend, and attack against possible use of nuclear
probability of success in the confused aftermath of     weapons.
a nuclear attack.
                                                           In the event of either friendly or enemy nuclear-
NOTE: See FM 25-50 for in-depth discussions of          weapons use, commanders must provide soldiers
these topics.                                           witli strong positive leadership, good mental and
                                                        physical preparedness, and clear comprehensive
                                                        plans. Positive leadership will ensure soldiers sur-
                                                        vive and win. Training is the cornerstone for

                                                  Chapter 2

  WEAPONS EFFECTS AND THE                                 Hills may decrease qynamic pressure and offer
                                                          some local protection from flying debris. However,
   COMBAT ENVIRONMENT                                     small hills or folds in the ground are considered
   Nuclear weapons add significantly to the physical      negligible for target analysIs. Wooded hills lessen
and psychological environment of combat. They             dynamic pressure, but do not significantly affect
cause intense, violent effects which severely affect      overpressure. Wooded hills will also produce sig-
unit movement, employment, and protection. Com-           nificant wood splintering, tree blowdown, ana
manders at all levels must understand the opera-          forest fires.
tional and tactical implications of the nuclear              The reflecting nature of a surface over which a
environment and its effect on operations.                 weapon detonates significantly influences the dis-
   The basic effects of a nuclear detonation are blast,   tance to which blast effects extend. Smooth, reflect-
thermal radiation, residual ionizing radiation, initial   ing surfaces such as ice, snow, sand, moist soil, and
radiation, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP). These         water reflect most of the blast energy, maximizing
effects can destroy or neutralize targets as well as      its effects. Conversely, surfaces wIth thick, low,
impair, through physical injury, the operational ca-      combustible vegetation; dry soils with sparse vege-
pability of personnel. Flash blindness, radiation         tation; and desert sand minimize such effects.
sickness, eararum rupture, and second-degree burns           Built-up areas do not significantly affect a blast
are some of the injuries persons might experience.        wave's effects. And, even though urban structures
   Weather, terrain, surface conditions, and man-         may provide some local shieldmg from flying de-
made structures modify nuclear-weapons effects.           bris, they can also increase pressures by channeling
Also, conditions existing naturally on the battlefield    a blast wave.
at any given moment can enhance or mitigate such
effects. Therefore, commanders must adequately               Weather conditions also affect blast damage.
prepare and train their units for all possibilitIes.      Rain and fog lessen the force of the blast wave by
                                                          increasing air density and moisture. These condi-
NOTE: See JP 3-12.2 (SRD) (for US military forces         tions help dissipate the energy of the blast wave as
only), JP 3-12.3, and DA Pamphlet (Pam) 50-3 for          it moves through the heavier air.
in-depth discussions of nuclear effects.
                                                                         Thermal Radiation
                                                            A fireball's intense heat possesses high thermal
   The blast wave (static overpressure and dynamic        energy that, as thermal radiation, is transmitted from
pressure) from a nuclear air burst mostly causes          the point of detonation over a wide area. Thermal
materiel damage. Surface and subsurface bursts            radiation travels at wavelengths from ultraviolet to
generally produce less air-blast damage and more          infrared. The atmosphere absorbs some of the ultra-
cratering.                                                violet radiation; therefore, the prime source of ther-
   Most data on blast effects describe blasts as ob-      mal radiation is the infrared.
served on flat or gently rolling terrain. There is no        Thermal radiation can ignite materiel and cause
quick and simple method for calculating changes in
blast pressures in hilly, mountainous, or forested        serious burns. However, the effect of thermal radia-
terrain. In general, compared to the same distance        tion on a target is influenced by many factors,
on flat terrain, pressures are greater on the forward     including the state of the atmosphere and tlle target's
slopes of steep hills and lower on reverse slopes.        thermal absorption qualities (color, thickness, con-
                                                          sistency, and reflectIve properties). For example,
   Line-of-sight (LOS) shielding is not dependable;       when a weapon detonates oelow an overcast sky,
blast waves can bend or diffract around obstacles.        the underside of the cloud layer acts as a reflector.

FM 100-30

The reflected energy is then added to that coming          rainout. Residual ionizing radiation could be a lin-
directly from the point of explosion.                      gering and widespread operational hazard.
   The differing levels of energy released from the           Within the first minute after a nuclear-weapon
various-yield weapons further complicates the use          detonates, initial radiation, in the form of x-rays,
of thermal effects for targeting. The level of energy      gamma rays, and neutrons, is emitted. Initial radia-
released is not the only effect; the rate at which it is   tion travels at nearly the speed of light and can
released also has impact. Smaller weapons release          penetrate and damage materiel and injure Rersonnel.
thermal energy relatively quicker than larger ones.        Initial radiation can help defeat the enemy, but it can
Also, larger weapons generate heat more slowly,            also endanger friendly forces and the local civilian
taking longer to dissipate or be conducted away.           population.
Therefore, the total amount of thermal energy avail-
able for a given type of weapon is directly propor-           Denser air at sea level absorbs more initial radia-
tional to its yield.                                       tion than thinner air at higher altitudes. As the height
                                                           of burst (HOB) or the temperature of the air in-
  Although not a basic effect, flash blindness is a        creases, the air density decreases. This allows initial
phenomenon that soldiers might experience from             radiation to extend farther because it is less absorbed
the thermal effect from a nuclear explosion. Flash         by air molecules.
blindness takes two forms-dazzle and retinal
burns.                                                       An important factor influencing the amount of
                                                           initial radiation a target receives IS shielding. For
   Dazzle is the most common form of flash blind-          example, the surrounding ground, acting as an ab-
ness. Its effect is similar to the temporary blindness     sorber or shield, will sharply reduce the initial ra-
that camera flash bulbs or bright car headlights at        diation from surface and sUDsurface bursts. Terrain
night cause. The difference is in intensity. Dazzle        features can greatly influence initial radiation ef-
effects from a flash bulb are a temporary inconven-        fects. Minor irregularities, such as ditches, gullies,
ience. Effects from a nuclear burst are prolonged          and small folds in the ground, offer some protection.
and cause far greater loss of vision. Looking directly     Major terrain features, such as large hills and forests,
at a burst causes severe impairment of vision for          can provide significant protection for equipment and
from 2 to 3 minutes by day to over 10 minutes at           personnel, depending on the height of burst.
night when the pupils are fully dilated. Two minutes
is a long time on a battlefield and seems longer to           People inside buildings, tanks, or individual fight-
pilots trying high-speed aircraft.                         ing positions receive lower initial radiation doses
                                                           than people in the open and at the same distance
  The second and more serious form of flash blind-         from the nuclear detonation. How much less de-
ness results from retinal burns received when the          pends on how much initial radiation the intervening
lens of the eyes focus the image of the fireball onto      material absorbs. All material absorbs some nuclear
the back of the eyes. Estimates of the risk of retinal     radiation. However, because of the high penetrating
burns vary. Small pinpoint retinal burns may heal in       power of neutrons and gamma rays, the shielding
time, but greater damage is unlikely to do so and          material must be quite thick to provide significant
will leave a permanent brind spot in the affected eye.     protection.
Some sources believe that only a small percentage
of troops will receive such injuries; others believe          Dense materials such as armored vehicles offer
this could be a more serious tfireat.                      excellent protection against gamma rays. Some
                                                           readily available low-aensity materials offer the
                                                           best protection against neutrons. Depending on its
     Residual Ionizing Radiation, Initial                  moisture content, soil may also be a good neutron
  Radiation, and the 0Eerational Exposure                  shield. For example, an individual fighting position
                  Guide lOEG)                              with 1 meter of overhead soil protection will shield
                                                           its occupant from as much as 98 percent of the
   Residual ionizing radiation typically occurs after      neutron radiation.
the first minute of aetonation. It primarily consists
of energized impurity particles and debris falling            Material sufficient to protect against gamma rays
back to earth because of air movement and/or               also provides some protection against neutrons. As

                                                                                                    FM 100-30

a general guideline, soldiers can construct shields of       Electromagnetic pulse directly injures personnel
minimum thickness meant to absorb both neutrons           only if they are physically toucning metallic collec-
and gamma rays by either alternating layers of high-      tors, such as cables, at the time of an EMP surge.
to low-density materials or by thoroughly mixing          Hazards may also exist from indirect or secondary
such materials.                                           EMP effects. For example, damaged electronic
   Units may encounter nuclear contamination from         equipment might catch fire. Also, pilots may receive
sources oHier than weapons detonation. Possible           incorrect information from digital instruments upset
sources include fallout caused by the destruction of      by EMP. AfPropriate standing operating proce-
an enemy's nuclear weapons production facility,           dures (SOP help mitigate secondary effects.
enemy stockpiled weapons, and nuclear energy re-             Both EMP and TREE can burn out electronic
actors (both friendly and enemy).                         components or upset system operations. Upset con-
   Another source of contamination would be the           ditions can occur at low signal levels because per-
deliberate spread of radioactive materiel over            manent damage occurs wnen currents induced by
friendly forces or terrain. A nuclear environment         EMP and TREE exceed the capacity of a particular
can be created without the introduction or detona-        circuit within a system. Shielding sensitive electri-
tion of a yield-producing weapon. Therefore, com-         cal and electronic components is the best protection
manders at all levels must be aware of this               against burnout. For example, disconnecting an-
possibility as well as the possibility of the contami-    tenna cables when the equipment is not in use is a
nation from non-weapons sources that could signifi-       recommended mitigation technique for EMP in
cantly affect operations.                                 field operations.
NOTE: See FM 3-15 and the FM 3-series manuals                High-altitude nuclear bursts ionize the atmos-
for a description of actions to counter these events.     phere and cause serious widespread blackout of
                                                          high-frequency (HF) shortwave and synchronous
   The operational exposure guide (GEG), ex-              satellite relay communications. Blackouts can last
pressed in terms of negligible or emergency risk          from a few minutes to several hours.
criteria, is the key to nuclear contamination avoid-
ance. The GEG gives the commander a flexible                 In highly ionized regions caused by low-altitude
system of radiatIOn exposure control. The com-            bursts, blackout interference generally decreases as
mander specifies OEG for his unit's level of radia-       EMP frequency increases. (Most EMP energy is at
tion. The level of exposure must be kept as low as        frequencies below 100 megahertz.) Blackouts from
possible. Based on the stated GEG, leaders can            low air bursts are usually not significant. Dust-laden
select units with low radiation exposure to perform       clouds from low air bursts cause blackout effects
necessary missions.                                       lasting from a few seconds to several minutes at
                                                          most, and then only when a fireball or dust cloud
   Establishing and using OEG procedures helps            blocks transmission paths. Actual interference de-
leaders successfully employ units on a radiologi-         pends on how many nuclear bursts occur, the alti-
cally contaminated battlefield while keeping expo-        tudes at which they occur, and the areas over which
sure to the minimum extent possible consistent with       they occur.
the mission. Ignoring exposure control would be
disastrous.                                                 Units can reduce blackout by-
                                                          • Using wire communications systems. (However,
          Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)                       a system with wires, especially long wires, is
   On impact with the earth's atmosphere or with            more susceptible to EMP.)
solid materials, initial radiation liberates free elec-   • Routing radio communications through a retrans-
trons. The free electrons create two additional ef-         mission station or manual relay tolJypass the
fects: the EMP and the transient radiation effects on       blackout region.
electronics (TREE). The EMP can severely degrade
and destroy unprotected command, control, com-            • Assigning alternate frequencies. (If the signal
munications, computers, and intelligence (CI)               operations (SO) officer suspects that an ionized
operations.                                                 region is producing interference, he tries higher

FM 100-30

                                                                  1. Any system that employs high-speed, integrated
       High Vulnerability                                            technology (such as personal computers) are
            Low-power, high-speed digital computer_
                                                                     considered vulnera5le to EMP and TREE if
            Systems employing transistors or semiconductor
            rectifiers:                                              operated in an unshielded environment.
              Computers and power supplies_
              Semiconductor components terminating long
                 cable runs, especially between sltes_
                                                                  2. Older equipment that uses discrete components
              Alarm systems_                                         of semiconductors and transistors are less likely
              Life-support system controls; for example,
                computer chips_
                                                                     to be susceptible to EMP damage than
              Some partially transistorized telephone                state-of-the-art equipment.
              Transistorized receivers and transmitters.
              Transistorized 60- to 400-hertz converters.         3. Equipment with large collectors is more
              Transistorized process control systems.
              Communications links and aircraft navigational
                                                                     susceptible to EMP damage than eguiRment with
                aids.                                                smal1er collectors because the EMP energy
              Visual or targeting aids.
                                                                     collected is a strong function of the surface area
       Low Vulnerability
                                                                     exposed to EMP.
            Semiconductor rectifiers:
             Transmitters.                Teletype-telephones.
              Receivers.                  Power supplies.         4. Unhardened radios operating at freguencies of
              Alarm systems.                                         100 megahertz or be[ow, such as HF systems,
            Equipment employing low-current switches, relays,
                                                                     have a fiigher probability of EMP damage than
              Life-support systems.
                                        Panel Indicators and         communications equipment which operates at
                                         status boards.
              Power systems control     Process controls.            higher frequencies.
            Hazardous equipment containing the following:         NOTE: None of these rules apply to EMP-hardened
                                        Explosive mixtures.
                                        Rocket fuels.
                                                                  equipment. The hardness, or vulnerability level, of
              Pyrotechnic devices.                                specific items of eguipment is classified. For more
              Long power cable runs employing dielectric
                                                                  information, see JP 3-12.2 (SRD).
              Equipment associated with high-energy storage
                                                                          UNIT SURVIVABILITY
       Least Vulnerability
            High-voltage, 60-hertz equipment:
              Transformers, motors.       Rotary converters.
                                                                     Survivability operations take on increased impor-
              Lamps (filaments).          Heavy-duty relays;      tance in a nuclear environment. The destructive
              Heaters.                     circuit breakers.
              Air-insulated power cable                           power of nuclear weapons requires new measures
                                                                  to reduce vulnerability and to increase survivability.
       NOTE: This figure outlines the likely vulnerabilities of
                                                                  The commander must employ appropriate collec-
         certain equipment. The vulnerability of Individual
         items within each category varies considerably.
                                                                  tive NBC protective measures given tfie unit's mis-
         Any equipment attached to a collector or antenna         sion and the threat it faces.
         has an increased vulnerability.
                                                                  NOTE: See also JP 3-12.1.
                                                                     The commander also promotes survivability, at
            Figure 2-1. Range of vulnerability                    least to forward elements of close combat forces, by
                      to EMP effects                              closing with the threat. Commanders should use a
                                                                  scheme of maneuver that contributes both to the
                                                                  combat objective and to survivability; for example,
   frequencies first. When it appears dust is the                 infiltrating at multiple points and conducting spoil-
  proBlem, he tries lower frequencies.)                           ing attacks.
  Figure 2-1 shows the range of vulnerability                       Commanders must rapidly assess nuclear effects
(which varies significantly within each category)                 and determine appropnate actions and responses.
for some common types of equipment. Communi-                      The immediate impact on combat power can de-
cations equipment operators use the following gen-                grade the forces's ability to accomplish current and
eral rules to make rough estimates of the electronic              future missions. The commander must also deter-
equipment's EMP vulnerability:                                    mine long-term effects on future operations. Con-
                                                                  cerns at a11levels are-

                                                                                                   FM 100-30

• Restoration of C, intelligence, and logistic sys-                    Mass Versus Dispersion
   tems and capabilities.
                                                              Because measures that enhance survivability re-
• How the enemy exploits the nuclear strike.               duce combat power, the commander must carefully
• Decontamination of personnel and equipment.              manage active and passive protection measures.
                                                           (Dispersion is an example of the former, camou-
• Combat health support (CHS) response                     flage of the latter.) Protective measures contribute
   requirements.                                           to battlefield success, but they cannot ensure it.
                                                           Massing effects on a target rather than massing
• Radiation exposure levels of subordinate units.          forces significantly renuces the risk to the
• Contaminated areas.                                      command.
• Craters and obstacles created by blast and radia-          When a threat possesses nuclear weapons, US
   tion effects.                                           forces conduct operations in anticipation of their
• Protecting the force by adhering to OEG.                 use. The commander maintains his ability to dis-
                                                           perse forces as rapidly as he massed them or he will
NOTE: See FM 3-4, Chapter 4, for a detailed dis-           present a lucrative nuclear target. This is the mass
cussion of individual protection.                          versus dispersion dilemma.
   Survivability operations, using sound active and        NOTE: See FM 3-3-1 for tactics, techniques, and
passive protective measures ana practices, are in-         procedures (TIP) on solving the mass versus dis-
tended to protect friendly forces from the effects of      persion dilemma.
enemy weapons systems. Sound survivability prac-
tices reduce a force's vulnerability to detection, to
attack (if detected), and to destruction (if attacked).                   Countermeasures
   However, measures to reduce vulnerability to one          An antagonist having sophisticated intelligence
form of attack max increase vulnerability to other         systems is a great threat because it can-
forms of attack and might detract from the overall
effectiveness of the force. For example, dispersion        • Monitor friendly communications.
may reduce vulnerability from nuclear attacks but          • See the battlefield from overhead.
increase vulnerability to infiltration and invite de-
feat in detail. Positioning (dispersion), mass versus      • Locate emitters and control agents deep in rear
dispersion, countermeasures, and mitigation tech-            areas.
niques all lead to unit survivability.                       Countermeasures employ devices or techniques
                                                           to impair the operational effectiveness of an en-
             Positioning (Dispersion)                      emy's activities. Countermeasures might include-
   Positioning or dispersion can enhance survivabil-       • Operations security (OPSEC), which can prevent
ity. However, dispersing combat units in direct pro-         the enemy from obtaining information about
portion to a threat's nuclear weapons and yields is          Army operations.
neither possible nor desirable. The degree of disper-
sion possible should be that which permits mission         • Deception, which can prevent the enemy from
accomplishment while not subjecting the force to an          obtaining unit location and activity information.
unacceptable risk from attack. The difficulties with       • Information security, which can prevent disclo-
dispersion include movement of equipment, coordi-            sure of information about unit locations and ac-
nation, and supportability.                                  tivities from written, verbal, and graphic
   Although dispersion can enhance a unit's sur-             communications sources.
vival, it can also restrict tactical flexibility and in-   • Physical security, which can prevent equipment
hibit mobility. Dispersion reduces vulnerability, but        signatures, profi1es, and patterns.
dispersion beyond the range of effective Creduces
combat power and increases the possibility of              • Signals security (SIGSEC), which can protect
mission failure.                                             nuclear operational in(ormation by using

FM 100-30

  communications security (COMSEC) and elec-              cluding one with residual ionizing radiation, with-
  tronic security (ELSEC) techniques.                     out losing the ability to accomplisn its mission.
• Analysis of information gathered through intelli-         The Army's goal is for soldiers who survive
  gence operations to predict enemy intentions.           exposure to nuclear-weapons effects to retain their
                                                          mission-essential equipment in a condition which
                                                          would enable them to complete their missions.
             Mitigation Techniques                        Equipment failure must not disarm soldiers who
                                                          could otherwise continue their missions.
   Mitigation techniques are expedients the force
accomplishes using only equipment and material
availaole on the battlefield. Mitigation techniques           Methods and Techniques to Enhance
will not totally overcome nuclear vulnerability.                        Survivability
However, used wisely, they can lessen the vulner-
ability of personnel and equipment to nuclear-weap-        Units can ensure the survivability of their equip-
ons effects. Techniques may be as simple as using         ment by-
anchors, tied owns , and outriggers to build shelters;
using equipment at hand to dig shelters; or using         • Avoidance (using mobility, concealment, and de-
tracKed venicles as overhead cover. Techniques              ception to avoid attack).
may also include wetting down or compacting de-           • Redundancy (proliferating so many systems or
fensive positions to enhance radiation protection.          components on the battlefield that the loss of a
   Measures that provide security against detection         few would not affect the mission).
also often provide some protection against nuclear        • Reconstitution (possessing the ability to repair or
attack or can minimize nuclear-weapons effects.             replace equipment on the battlefield in enough
One measure is terrain shielding, which minimizes           time to complete the mission).
the risks of detection as well as reducing the extent
and severity of nuclear-weapons effects.                  • Mitigation (employing field-expedient tech-
                                                            niques which soldiers and units can readily ac-
   Any cover, including natural vegetation, signifi-        complish using only what is available.
cantly reduces thermal radiation effects and may
even diminish the intensity of nuclear radiation.         • Hardening (designing equipment to withstand ex-
Hills and folds of ground between the unit and the          posure to nuclear-weapons effects).
detonation can somewhat reduce nuclear effects.
Natural and man-made terrain features (individual           The best approach to equiIJment survivability is
fighting positions with overhead covers or but-           usually some combination of these means. The com-
toned-up armored vehicles) can also modify blast          mander should consider all of them. Some means
waves and lessen nuclear effects.                         increase survivability against conventional as well
                                                          as nuclear threats, Nonetheless, given the unique
                                                          and often far-reaching effects of nuclear weapons,
               EQUIPMENT                                  some degree of nuclear hardening is the best ap-
                                                          proach in most instances.
             SURVIV ABILITY
                                                             Balanced survivability is the essence of the
   Equipment survivability in a nuclear environment       Army's philosophy. Survivability of mission-essen-
begins with the materiel-acquisition process before       tial equipment must be balanced with that of crew
hostilities begin. Equipment must be able to with-        survivability. It implies specific requirements to
stand the initial effects of a nuclear weapon and still   make crew-served equipment or systems as surviv-
accomplish its mission.                                   able as the crew-but no more survivable than the
                                                          crew-and only in environments of tactical signifi-
   The commander should not confuse nuclear sur-          cance.
vivability with NBC-contamination survivability.
The latter is the capability of a system and its crew     NOTE: See FM 3-3-1 for detailed TTPs for nuclear-
to withstand an NBC-contaminated battlefield, in-         contamination avoidance.

                                                                                                        FM 100-30

                       Time After Detonation
                                                               ons greatly increase a force's warfighting potential,
    Less than a           Less than a          Minutes!hours
                                                               but they can also present new operational challenges
     second                minute               !days          and dilemmas. Figure 2-3, page 2-8, describes how
                                                               each of the basic effects of a nuclear weapon affects
                          Nuclear Effects
                                                               the four dynamics of combat power.
    Prompt gamma          Airblast          Fallout
     rays                                                      NOTE: See FM 100-15 for an in-depth discussion
                          Ground shock      Residual
                                                               on the dynamics of combat power.
    Neutrons              DusUpebbles       Communications!       Possibly the greatest, and least understood, chal-
                           Idebris           radar blackout
                                                               lenge confronting the Army is how to accomQlish
    Initial thermal
                          Cratering         Firestorms         the mission following nuclear-weapons use.l'his
                                                               challenge is difficult out not impossible; the key is
                                             dust              the quafity of leadership and the capability to oper-
               Major portion ofthe                             ate in a nuclear environment.
                thermal radiation
                                                                  Leadership and training may prove to be the
                                                               deciding factor in future conflicts. Knowledge of the
                                                               special physical andlsychological hazards of the
  Figure 2-2_ Arrival times of nuclear effects                 nuclear battlefield, an doctrinar guidance and train-
                                                               ing to counter these hazards, greatly improves the
                                                               Army's ability to operate successfully.

                  Nuclear Environment
                     Arrival Times                                              SUMMARY
   The commander must also be aware of the arrival                Commanders and their staffs understand that,
times of different nuclear effects on the battlefield.         when planning operations, the use or possible use
This knowledge is critical to a system's response              of nuclear weapons has specific, tangible implica-
and survivability. Nuclear effects fall into three             tions that go beyond the actual effects of a detona-
general time frames:                                           tion. Nuclear weapons are highly destructive and
                                                               have harmful effects that otfier weapons do not
 1. Effects which almost instantaneously arrive                have. Commanders must plan for and implement
    after detonation.                                          measures to mitigate such effects.
2. Effects which arrive within the first few seconds              Commanders must also know how nuclear-weap-
    to minutes.                                                ons effects can affect personnel, equipment, and the
3. Effects which typically take from minutes to                dynamics of combat power. They must plan for and
   hours or even days to arrive.                               implement survivability measures and techniques.
                                                               Their confidence and leadership may be the decid-
NOTE: See Figure 2-2.                                          ing factor in how their soldiers survive and succeed
                                                               in a nuclear environment.
                 DYNAMICS OF                                   NOTE: See JP 3-12.2 (SRD) for a more in-depth
                                                               discussion of nuclear-weapons effects and re-
                COMBAT POWER                                   ~ponses. Additional detailed, unclassified data is in
  The dynamics of combat power-maneuver, fire-                 DA Pam 50-3. Additional classified data is in the
power, protection, and leadership-are vital. Nu-               Defense Nuclear Agency Effects Manual (DNA
                                                               EM-I) (SRD), Chapter 17, Section IV.
clear-weapons use by either siae adds another
dimension to each of tnese elements. Nuclear weap-

FM 100-30

            Dynamics of      Initial           Residual
            Combat Power     Blast             Radiation          Radiation        Thermal           EMP
            Maneuver         Creates           Creates NIGA       Creates          Creates           Disrupts C'
                              obstacles         (note)             fallout         flash blindness   Disrupts

            Firepower        Destroys          Produces latent    Minimizes        Not used          Disrupts
             (target          equipment         ineffectiveness    fallout                            fire control
             nomination)                        on deep targets    (low air                           instruments

            Protection       Destroys          Kills soldiers     Causes          Increases          Increases
                              equipment                            fallout         survivability      mitigation
                                                                   considerations concerns            requirements

            Leadership       Produces mass     Increases          Causes           Increases         Results
                              casualties        radiation          psychological    the complexity    in loss
                                                status of units    effects on       of triage with    ofC'
                                                                   soldiers         burn and blast

            NOTE: Neutron-induced gamma activity.

        Figure 2-3. Basic effects of nuclear weapons on the dynamics of combat power

                                                    Chapter 3

             JOINT NUCLEAR                                      Aggressive interface between intelligence and
                                                             acquisition systems, nuclear planners, operations
               OPERATIONS                                    planners, and delivery systems in the joint environ-
   Joint and multinational operations become more            ment ensure targets are struck at the aecisive point
risky with the threat of the enemy's use of weapons          and time. This is the essential element of successful
of mass destruction. The likelihood of an enemy             joint operations. Considerations for nominating nu-
using weapons of mass destruction decreases as US            clear weapons in a theater of operations inclua.e-
and coalition forces demonstrate their ability to           • Enemy use of NBC weapons.
defend against such effects and to react to attacks
with nucfear weapons. The threat of nuclear-weap-           • Lack of conventional containment of enemy
ons use creates unacceptable risk to the enemy.               forces.
That, combined with the will to react if necessary,         • Survival of the force from mass attack.
is the basis for US nuclear deterrent policy.
                                                            • Support of other strategic options.
   Countries that cannot protect themselves against
nuclear weapons may become the primary targets                The corps commander and his superiors amplify
of an enemy whose aim is to disintegrate a coalition        the following points when nominating nuclear
force. If necessary, the US armed force reserves the        weapons:
right to employ all of its assets, including nuclear
weapons, to support coalition needs. Therefore, nu-         • That the enemy has used, or there are indications
clear warfare is most likely during a major regional          that he will immediately use, nuclear weapons.
crisis versus a lesser conflict.                            • That the friendly force is facing overwhelming
  Commanders must consider the aforementioned                  enemy conventional forces and cannot survive
possibilities in all strategic, operational, and tactical      unless it uses nuclear weapons.
planning. They must also evaluate-                          • That the friendly force might require nuclear
                                                               weapons to accomplish the campaign plan.
• The availability of joint nuclear resources.
                                                               The decision to authorize nuclear-weapons em-
• Ways of attaining military objectives.                    ployment is the exclusive prerogative of the Presi-
• The ability to credibly threaten an enemy's high-         Dent. The theater CINC requests the release of
  payoff targets (HPT).                                     nuclear weapons from the NCA if he determines the
                                                            situation requires their use. The NCA's control and
• The risks of enemy nuclear counterattack.                 constraint of nuclear weapons include seven
• Any potential change in a regional military bal-
  ance of power.                                            1. A decision to use nuclear weapons.
• The consequences of a nuclear-nomination                  2. The number, type, and yields of weapons.
                                                            3. The types of targets to be attacked.
• Any reduction in a threat's ability to conduct
  operations or opportunities to prevent him from           4. The geographical area of employment.
  undertaking future military action.
                                                            5. Timing and duration of employment.
• The consequences of failure in the execution of a
  nuclear strike.                                           6. The level of damage to be inflicted on the enemy.
• The results of nuclear effects on the target.             7. Target-analysis methodology.

FM 100-30

   All nuclear weapons are bound by the same US                      • The highest level Army headquarters in theater is
 nuclear policy constraints. Moving nuclear weap-                      the focal point for Army nuclear-target
 ons from peacetime locations to a theater that does                   nomination.
 not have nuclear weapons requires NCA approval.
 Moving weapons within a theater is limited by                       • Continued operations in a nuclear environment.
 guidance set forth in a positioning-approval                        • Force protection, which is imperative in a nuclear
 document.                                                             environment; units can survive the enemy's use
   A nuclear-warfare battlefield requires command-                     of nuclear weapons by anticipating employment.
 ers to conduct continuous operations before, during,
 or after nuclear-weapons detonation. Army nuclear                        The Deliberate-Planning Process
 operations have mostly operational and tactical im-
 jJlications; execution has strategic implications.                  Planning Guidance
 Characteristics of Army nudear operations
 include-                                                              The nuclear deliberate-planning process is the
                                                                     series of actions planners take to develojJ nuclear
• A lack of Army organic nuclear fire support.                       support that sister services will provide. Planners
                                                                     use the Joint Operations Planning and Execution
• Dependence on Air Force and Navy assets to                         System (JOPES) in the deliberate-planning process
  provide nuclear support to Army operations.                        to develop nuclear support plans (Figure 3-1). An

        I I


              JOPES                        CONPlAN

                                                         1NONCRITICAL   -----+_1         CON PLAN

             NUCLEAR                           1

                          f---.I            OPLAN                ~

                          ~                    t                                            !
                                       APP 1 (NUCLEAR)
                                          TOANX C
                                          TO OPlAN

        (:~:~~).---~8FlCC .111----.....        !            ·8ARFOR
         '.. ;~
            ,---,            /f ~        JI'        ~

          NOTE: See Glossary for explanation of acronyms.

                               Figure 3-1, Deliberate-planning process (nuclear)

                                                                                                   FM 100-30

example of deliberate planning is the process the      • The targeting selection can come directly from
commander and staff use when contemplating the           the continental US (CONUS) based on the
possible use of nuclear forces in force projection.      CINC's requirements.
  During the deliberate-planning process, the com-
batant command staff develops the concept plan              The Crisis-Action Planning Process
(CONPLAN) and coordinates it with the various
subordinate commands and services. When di-               Nuclear planning begins during peacetime. Dur-
rected, the combatant command staff develops an        ing a crisis, Army commanders use the crisis-action
operation plan (OPLAN). (Subordinate commands          planning process to modify or expand existing plans
develop and coordinate supporting OPLANs.)             as needed. For the Army, the nuclear crisis-action
                                                       planning process incluaes determining require-
   During the process, the staff coordinates the nu-   ments and developing options for support.
clear appendix of the operation annex to the
OPLAN with corps and various commands. The                When contemplating the use of nuclear weapons,
corps, through the joint force land component com-     based on threat and operational considerations, the
mander QFLCC), Army forces (ARFOR), or joint           CINC decides whether the ]FLCC needs nuclear
task force, provides input to Appendix 1 (Nuclear)     support. He then directs the appropriate air or mari-
to Annex C (Operations) of the OPLAN. The joint        time component commanders to develop a crisis-
force maritime component commander QFMCC)              action plan. USSTRATCOM assists the CINC in
and the joint force air component commander            the crisis-action planning (CAP) process. He then
QFACC) also provide input to Appendix 1. The           issues his OPORD. This phase is the execution-
product of this coordination is the theater OPLAN.     planning phase. The ]FLCC and the corps develop
                                                       supporting plans to enhance the nomination process
NOTE: Both the CONPLAN and the OPLAN must              (Figure 3-2, page 3-4).
conform to current procedures. See]P 5-03.1, Vol-
ume (Vol) 1, for more information.
                                                                        Force Projection
   While developing the OPLAN, planners consoli-       The Stages of Force Projection
date nuclear requirements into a separate, stand-
alone, time-phased force and deployment data              Force projection operations are inherently joint
(TPFDD) document. The Army and the other serv-         and usually begin as a contingency operation in
ices participate in this process to make sure they     response to a crisis situation. force projection has
have considered all reasonable options and have met    eight stages: mobilization, predeployment activi-
all requirements.                                      ties, deployment, entry operations, war termination
                                                       and postconflict operations, redeployment and re-
   Echelons below the CINC mayor may not par-          constitution, and demobilization. lSee FM 100-7
ticipate in the nuclear decision-making process.       and FM 100-15 for details.)
When Army echelons subordinate to the CINC are
involved, tfle procedures in this manual apply.
                                                       Entry Operations
Targeting                                                 There are two types of entry operations-unop-
                                                       posed and opposed. Before either entr_yo)Jeration
  Within the theater, the targeting of nuclear weap-   begins, the G2 determines the enemy's WMD capa-
ons may happen in one of tliree ways:                  bility. This knowledge, as well as the degree of
                                                       opposition the commander can anticipate, influ-
• The theater CINC can conduct planning, target-       ences the selection of which type of entry operation
  ing' and execution without consulting tfie suBor-    he will use.
  dinate commander.
                                                          Unopposed entry operations have specific mean-
• The theater CINC can inform the functional com-      ings to a corps that this manual does not discuss.
  ponent commander of what nuclear weapons are         Opposed entry operations may often be the initial
  available and provide planning guidance for tar-     pliase of a campaign. Commanders make maximum
  get nomination.                                      use of joint capabilities to ensure early lethality and

FM 100-30


            CON PLAN

                                                                         CINC'S            NUCLEAR
                                                                         OPORD              TPFDD

                          Figure 3-2. Crisis-action planning process (nuclear)

force security. Opposed operations occur in one of       coup de main is the preferred means of conducting
three ways: raids, lodgements, or by coup de main.       opposed operations. Using overwhelming combat
Raids are small-scale operations and should not          power against a foe means rapid mission accom-
require nuclear use.                                     plishment, fewer casualties, ana minimal collateral
   Lodgement operations require forces to seize an       aamage.
airhead or beachhead. The intent is to create maneu-        The main objective of nominating nuclear weap-
ver room and to provide for the continuous entry of      ons during coup de main operations is to destroy the
forces and materiel for subsequent operations. Dur-      enemy's weapons of mass destruction. Additional
ing a lodgement. the commander would normally            nuclear weapons are nominated against facilities
nominate targets (such as enemy counterattack            and major troop concentrations.
forces or C2facIlities) based on a low minimum safe
distance (MSD) corresponding to negligible risk to          Nuclear-weapons use during a coup de main en-
unwarned exposed personnel. Applymg safety and           hances strategIc objectives rather than tactical ob-
collateral-damage preclusion data to the operations     jectives. The nuclear weapons nominated might be
maps depicting the forward line of own troops            further from the FLOT than in lodgement
(FLDT) helps ensure troop safety. Combined wIth          operations.
the target-analysis process, the data ensure that the       Stage five is the operations stage. It consists of
targets which commanders nominate are truly HPTs         missions that lead to or directly contribute to accom-
and that the force meets troop and civilian safety       plishing the CIN's campaign objective. (See
requirements. The NCA makes the political deCI-          Chapter 5.)
sion if the loss of the lodgement is more acceptable
than is the use of nuclear weapons.                         Stage six is war termination and postconflict op-
                                                         erations. The fundamental differences between a
NOTE: See JP 3-12.2 (SRD) for more information           potential nuclear war and previous military con-
on the target-analysis process.                          flicts involve the speed, scope, and degree of de-
                                                         struction inherent in nuclear weapons employment
   A coup de main, as used in this manual. is an         as well as the uncertainty of negotiating opportuni-
offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise and     ties and enduring control over military forces.
simultaneous execution of supporting operations to
achieve success in one swift stroke. For example, a         Depending on the scope and intensity of a nuclear
coup de main combines entry and combat opera-            war and how and under what conditions it is brought
tions to achieve the opposed entry aspect of theater     to a conclusion may be quite different from previous
strategic objectives in a single major operation. The    wars. The objective of termination strategy should

                                                                                                     FM 100-30

be to end a conflict at the lowest level of destruction   • Identifies requirements, nominates targets, and
possible consistent with national objectives. United        employs maneuver control and fire support coor-
States nuclear forces supporting command, control,          dination measures (FSCM) to facilitate joint
communications, computer, and intelligence (C 4I)           operations.
systems and employment planning must provide the
capability to deny enemy war aims, even in a con-           The ]ICB-
flict of indefinite duration.                             • Reviews target information. (Each echelon of
   Stage seven is redeployment and reconstitution.          command consolidates, evaluates, and passes up
See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the nuclear aspects       the chain of command proposed targets for re-
of reconstitution. See FM 100-15 for a discussion           view, which are subsequent1y forwarded for ap-
of redeployment aspects.                                    proval.)
   Stage eight is demobilization. In this stage NBC       • Deconflicts targets among members.
defense units that mobilized during stage one
demobilize.                                               • Develops priorities on guidance.
NOTE: See FM 100-17 for a detailed discussion.            • Prepares target lists.
                                                          • Allocates resources to weight the main effort.
       THE CORPS AS A JOINT                               • Synchronizes the delivery of joint fires to support
           TASK FORCE                                       toe OPLAN.
  When the corps commander is the commander of
the joint task force (C]IF) , he-                            JOINT NUCLEAR-WEAPONS
• Passes guidance for joint nuclear support to sub-           EMPLOYMENT SUPPORT
  ordinate commanders.
• Defines and implements a methodology for joint               The Planning and Execution Cycle
  planning.                                                 When the corps and/or EAC plan nuclear-target
• Prioritizes missions and targets.                       nomination, planners go through a joint nuclear-
                                                          weapons employment support planning and execu-
• Allocates resources to accomplish the mission.          tion process (Figure 3-3, page 3-6). A typical
• Through his concept of operations, specifies the        scenario might be as follows:
  required objectives.
                                                          • The corps and/or EAC plan targets for nuclear-
• Task-organizes the joint force to accomplish the          weapons nomination.
                                                          • The US Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency
• Establishes communications and automation ar-             (USANCA) maintains nuclear employment aug-
  chitecture to support joint fire support activities.      mentation teams (NEATs) that will deploy to
• Establishes constraints and conditions for nuclear        augment the nuclear-weapons planning staff of
  employment.                                               Army headquarters at corps or EAC during peri-
                                                            ods determined by the senior Army commander.
• Decides whether or not to create a .ioint targeting
  coordination board OTCB) and what it wIll in-           • The NEATs (one per major regional
  clude.                                                    contingency) -
  When the corps commander is not the C]IF, he-             - Provide expert advice to the commander on all
• Nominates nuclear targets.                                  aspects of nuclear operations.
• Ensures that corps representation on the ]ICB             - Work closely with the strat~ic liaison assis-
   (when established) is adequate to meet the needs           tance team (STRATLAT) to ensure an
  of all subordinate corps elements.                          Army /joint interface in theater nuclear matters.

FM 100-30

                     8  ~            ~
                                         APPROVAL FOR - - - - - - 1 1 USSTRATCOM 1
                                                                   ., .          .

                      AND            I   STRATLAT   I
                                     ~   IN~~~~

                                     I NEAT    I        ~    t
                                                        I I
                                   TARGET                JAOe


                   CONTROLS                                               EXECUTING UNITS
                  CONSTRAINTS            XXX~
                                     1NEAT 1

                                                                          BATTLE DAMAGE


                                         xxx                                NOMINATIONI


              NOTE: See Glossary for explanation of acronyms.

      Figure 3-3. The joint nuclear-weapons employment support planning and execution process

  - Generally deploy at approximately the same          • The JFLCC provides the corps with-
    time as STRATLAT deployment lbut always
    at the senior Army commander's request).                The numbers, types, and yields of nuclear
                                                            weapons available for target planning and tar-
  - Are available at all times to assist Army plan-         get nomination.
    ning staffs at corps level and above in nuclear
    matters (including orders preparation, exercise         Geographical areas for nominating targets.
    participation, OPLAN development, and other             Duration of employment time.
    staff assistance as required) at the com-
    mander's request.                                        Types of targets to nominate.
  - Depend on the supported unit for logistic sup-      • The echelons above COfRs OTF, JFLCC, AR-
    port, communications, and integration into the        FOR) consolidates, deconflicts, and refines the
    unit's reconnaissance, selection, and occupa-         corps' nomination and incorporates the desired
    tion of position (RSOP) plan and the unit's           target into its own plans as options, then forwards
    deployment plans.

                                                                                                             FM 100-30

                        Controls and

                        Commander's                                                Conventional
                          guidance                                                    target

                       Campaign planl
                       operations plan

                                                                                 Conduct preclusion
                                              Nuclear target       -----.         oriented nuclear
                                                                               target analysis method


                                              Nomination for
                                               employment                               1               No

                            ~ Yes
                        Request for
                                                       I            -.......   Employment
                                                    .. No                       taskings


                     Figure 3-4. The nuclear target-analysis nomination sequence

  the options to the theater CINC to consider during                 information to the NCA (via USSTRATCOM)
  employment planning.                                               for presidential approval.
• Each headguarters integrates nuclear options into                - To provide adaptive planning and analysis ca-
  its OPLAN to maximIze all available combat                          pability, as well as all other requisite nuclear
  power; commanders at each level merge, purge,                       requirements, to the theater CINCo
  and coordinate the options to deconflict and
  optimize the effects of nuclear nomination                   •   The NCA, which provides controls and con-
  (Figure 3-4).                                                    straints for nuclear-weapons use in theater, re-
                                                                   turns the approved plan to the CINCo
• The US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
  CINC is the supporting commander to the theater              •   The CINC passes the approved plan down to the
  CINC in the area of nuclear operations and pro-                  JFLCC and corps commander and may provide
  vides, at the theater CINC's request, a                          them with controls and constraints for option
  STRATLAT-                                                        planning and target nomination.
  - To perform all nuclear functions for the theater           •   The theater CINC coordinates with JFLCC head-
     CINC, including preparing the nuclear portion                 quarters for target-location refinements and to
     of all orders.                                                provide information for nuclear strike warnings
                                                                   (STRIKWARN) .
  - To process the nominated targets and, with the
     theater CINC's approval, transmit the                     •   The air component commander (ACC) passes
                                                                   strike information through the battlefield coordi-
                                                                   nation element (BCE) to Army elements.

FM 100-30

• The BCE, which is the Army's coordination ele-          nominations based on the campaign plan and the
  ment at the ]FACC' s air operations center              operational situation.
                                                             The execution of a sister service nuclear mission
    - Monitors and analyzes the land battle.              within each corps is based on theater guidance.
                                                          Corps and ]FLC commanders augment this guid-
    - Provides interface for exchanging current in-       ance with their own planning cycle. A sample thea-
        telligence and operational data between air and   ter nuclear-weapons nomination sequence begins at
        land components.                                  corps and processes up through the chain of com-
•   The air defense artillery (ADA) and Army air-         mand to the NCA ana back down to the ]FACC
    space command and control (NC sections of
                                                          andlor ]FMCC (Figure 3-5, page 3-9). Figures 3-6
    tfie BCE support Army and Air Force interface as      and 3-7, page 3-10, show a sample of a corps
    needed.                                               96-hour pfanning cycle. The NCA must approve all
                                                          political decisions before this process is initiated.
•   The airspace control authority (ACA) (normally
    the ]FACC) ensures deconfliction of other air         NOTE: See ]P 3-12.2 (SRD) for detailed delivery
    assets for the proposed nuclear strike.               and weapons data. The publication also contains
                                                          classified sister service systems capabilities and
•   Air and naval delivery systems require airspace       employment considerations such as accuracy data
    coordination to ensure control of fnendly air de-     and reaction times. It also provides nuclear-target-
    fense (AD) assets and to ensure the suppression       ing guidance. Joint Publication 3-12.1 provides the
    of enemy air defense (SEAD) assets.                   acfvantages and disadvantages of using the various
•   To minimize friendly casualties, all commanders       weapons systems.
    tasked with execution planning-
    - Deconflict force locations.                                            Coordination
    - Plan around effects on communications.                 Coordinating actions and responsibilities is ex-
                                                          tremely important in nuclear operations. Specific
  - Ensure they have the means to keep all other          functions and activities involve forces from two or
     commanders informed of unit locations.               more services or two or more forces of the same
• The Navy amphibious liaison element (NALE)              service. Therefore, coordination must begin imme-
  collocates witfi the AOC and coordinates Navy           diately after mission receipt and continue through-
  and Marine components.                                  out the operation.
• The special operations liaison element (SOLE)             Coordination is essential because subordinate
  coordinates ttie other elements with the special        commanders and staffs must share pertinent infor-
  operations forces (SO F).                               mation and have as much time as possible to prepare
                                                          and rehearse plans. (See Chapter 4.) Units at every
• The special operations coordination (SO COORD)          level must have time to conauct route reconnais-
  clement, if they are to be affected, because of their   sance, rehearsals, and multiple activities to adjust
  p'ossible proximity to the desired ground zero          coordination details and timing and the synchroni-
   (DGZ), receives advance notice of an impending         zation plan accordingly. When properly done, sub-
  nuclear strike.                                         ordinate commanders' intents and concepts of
• Sister services (Air Force and Navy) provide the        operations support and complement the higher com-
  delivery means and weapons systems (aircraft            mander's plan.
  and missiles) that support land forces during nu-
  clear operations.                                          Coordination for nuclear-weapons nomination
                                                          closely follows established interdiction procedures
  This planning cycle is continuous and dynamic.          for conventional support. In multinational opera-
Employment planning may change as weapons,                tions, agreements may require modifications of es-
threat arrays, and population centers change. For         tablishea US Army doctrine. In joint operations, the
example, during wartime, the ]FLCC and corps              ]FLCC and corps commander integrate nuclear-
commander continue to refine and update target            weapons nomination into conventional operations

                                                                                                          FM 100-30

                       NCA                           I    24      I

               JFACC/JFMCC                                                        42

                     JFLCC             ~

                              H -96   83      78    72    60     48    42    36        24   o
                 Example: The NCA takes 24 hours to respond to requests.

          Figure 3-5. A sample theater nuclear-weapons nomination sequence

0100                0400                   0600                0700                0800            1100
Campaign            New                    CTOC                Guidance
coordination        ATOin                  passes              for nuclear
meeting.            effect.                HPTto               nomination.
                                                                              1. Deep attack
                                                                                 cell meets
                                                                                 to review
                                                                                 HPTand make
                                                                              2. Target
                                                                                                   board meets
                                                                                                   and approves

1130                1200                   1300
                                           passed to

               Figure 3-6. A sample corps nuclear-weapons nomination cycle

FM 100-30

            1300                 1400               1500                        1600                       1700
            received                                All targets
            by JFLCC.                               deconflicted.

                                 Controls                                                                  Deconflicted
                                 and                                                                       nominations
                                 constraints                                                               passed to
                                 compared                                                                  theater
                                 to nominated                                                              headquarters.
                                                                                brief goes
                                                                                to commander.

                     Figure 3-7. A sample JFLCC nuclear-weapons nomination cycle

without using special phases and transitions or cre-
ating a signature for a threat to observe.                                                     Information passed to VII Corps

   The corps commander provides input to the CINC
for any nuclear operations within his area of opera-
tions. Therefore, he must be aware of all aspects of                                                              '-..L:....-+--t-      FSCL
nuclear strikes within the CINC's area of responsi-
bility. Strikes require control agreements between                     xx              XX
                                                                           4           3
the cor~s commander and tne JFLCC and the
JF ACe. The JF ACC informs the corps commander
through the BCE of the timing and locations of
strikes as they affect Army operations.
   Lateral coordination between units is as impor-                                                                                 ><
tant as vertical coordination. The corps nucIear,                   ~VII       4~3
                                                                                            VII = X         2=1
                                                                                                                                 X ><
biological, and chemical center (NBCC) transmits
lateral troop-safety information to adjacent corps. If
time is limited, the corps fire support cell transmits
safety' information to the adjacent divisions first.
                                                                    t--l.~                            2--Ll
                                                                                                      XX                XX

The NBCC then notifies the adjacent corps.                                     VII
   Figure 3-8 depicts an example of this safety in-
formation. The diagram assumes a linear battlefield
and is for illustration only. It shows the XCorps
passing information to tne VII Corps on its left.                          Figure 3-8. The linear battlefield
Using the same methodology, Figure 3-9, page
3-11, Ciepicts a noncontiguous battleTield. Botli bat-
tlefields would be on tbe nuclear overlay to the
operations map.                                             weapons employment within the contingency
                                                            force's area of operation. Coordination of fires must
            Contingency Operations                          follow established joint procedures.
   Contingencies require plans, rapid response, and            The CJTF develops plans, including those for
special procedures to ensure the safety and readi-          nuclear weapons, during the early stages of hostili-
ness of personnel, intelligence, and equipment. The         ties. Plans must be flexible enough to support the
CINC can direct a corps commander to deploy his             contingency mission. However, employing nuclear
forces as part of a contingency force. Tlie corps           weapons early in an operation may not be feasible,
commander may then become the CJTF of the con-              desirable, or necessary. As the theater matures, the
tingency force. The CJTF coordinates all nuclear-           CINC may time-phase nuclear weapons to arrive at

                                                                                                   FM 100-30

                                                        would affect political, economic, informational,
                                                        and military operations. The senior US combatant
                                                        commander in a multinational command gives
                                                        guidance and _publishes directives on nuclear -weap-
                                                        ons use by US- forces in such commands. His guid-
                                                        ance includes-
                                                        • Tasking responsibilities across countries.
                                                        • Resolution of conflict between multinational
                                                        • Target selection.
                                                           Despite sustained efforts in the field of arms
                                                        control, there is firm evidence of a continuing,
                                                        worldwide proliferation of weapons of mass de-
                                                        struction and their associated means of delivery.
                                                        Therefore, future world leaders must plan, conduct,
                                                        and support multinational operations against a
                                                        background of a continued risk of hostile forces
  Figure 3-9. The noncontiguous battlefield             employing such weapons.
the optimum time to support combat operations or           Principal factors affecting multinational opera-
for deterrence.                                         tions under a threat, or following the use of nuclear
                                                        weapons, include-
   Regardless of the area into which the unified
commander deploys a contingency force, some             • Intelligence. The intelligence officer makes a
multinational operations are mevitable. When              current, comprehensive, and accurate intelli-
authorized by the NCA and/or the CINC, the ClTF           gence assessment of nuclear threat in the theater
advises coalition and alliance force commanders of        of operations.
plans to deploy nuclear weapons to the area of
operations or of plans to employ them.                  • Availability of NBC defense equipment. Com-
                                                          manders must be aware of the NBC equipment
                                                          available to multinational forces.
           MUL TINATIONAL                               • Training standards. Commanders must be aware
            OPERATIONS                                    of any nmitations in their forces' training and of
                                                          any experience that units have had in operating
   Multinational operations are operations that two       under real or simulated NBC threat conditions.
or more forces or agencies of two or more nations
acting together conduct to accomplish a single mis-     • Updating threat assessments. Multinational com-
sion. Existing alliances, established over a long         manders constantly review the NBC threat and
period of time, or ad hoc coalitions, formed as a         promulgate regular, updated threat assessments
rapid response to unforeseen crises, might have to        so subordinate commanders can make informed
undertake multinational operations to protect their       decisions on the minimum protective measures
common interests. Liaison officers from nuclear-          needed.
capable allied countries advise the commander of
the joint force on their nation's stated nuclear pol-   NOTE: See also Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)
icy.                                                    35A. See JP 3-12.3 for a description of the analysis
                                                        process. Standardization agreements (STANAGs)
   The key to successful multinational operations is    and understood terms are used in multinational op-
mutual trust and confidence. United States com-         erations. For example, the term "nuclear safety line"
manders who work with allied or coalition forces        is not used in US doctrine, but may be used by a
must understand how the use of nuclear weapons          multinational headquarters.

FM 100-30

          PLANNING JOINT                               • Intent of nuclear-weapons nomination (a state-
                                                          ment of the desired results).
                                                       • Synchronizing the scheme of maneuver and other
  At the operational level of war, the commander          means of attack such as conventional fires and
must consider several factors as early as possible        electronic attack.
when planning multinational operations. He must-
                                                       • Target priorities.
• Have a reasonable understanding of his ally and
  coalition forces' equipment, doctrine, and           • Delivery systems, weapons, and yields available
  capabilities.                                           for planning.
• Ensure that the force understands NCA controls       • Acquiring targets through all available means,
  and constraints and the commander's intent for          including national assets.
  nuclear-weapons nomination.                          • Troop-safety limitations and civilian-preclusion
• Ensure that OPLANs clearly state controls and           criteria.
  constraints.                                         • Fallout restrictions.
• Work closely with J3 or G3 operations personnel      • Collateral-damage preclusion criteria.
  to prevent fratricide or collateral damage.
                                                       • Impact of nuclear-weapons effects on future
• Work with other staff sections to prevent viola-        operations.
  tion of any political or military restrictions on
  nuclear-weapons employment.                          • Counterstrike targets considerations.
• Integrate conventional-weapons employment, in-       • Decision points (DPs) for recommending nuclear
  cludmg air and naval systems and operations with        targets.
  nuclear-weapons nomination. (Combining both          • STRIKWARN transmittal to friendly units.
  weapons types, as well as varying operational
  options, creates a synergistic effect.)              • Contingency planning.
  The planning process is continuous and congru-       • Deconfliction.
ent. Planning factors include-                         • Post-strike damage assessment requirements.
• The strategic situation (the ability of friendly        Based on the nuclear weapons damage assess-
  forces to defeat targets using avaiIable conven-     ment, the commander can-
  tional means).
                                                       • Continue the operation as planned.
• The type and extent of operations (the numbers
  and types of individual targets).                    • Reallocate combat assets to continue the opera-
• Damage-limitation measures (target vulnerabil-
  ity).                                                • Recommend another nuclear strike.
• The environmental impact (low-air burst versus       • Implement a contingency plan if the tactical situ-
  surface burst).                                         ation dictates.
• Alert posturing (weapons availability either in or   • Determine obstacles that will affect the scheme
  out of the theater).                                    of maneuver.
• The enemy's ability to reconstitute or regenerate    • Protect the force by adhering to the operational
  his forces.                                             exposure guide.
                                                          Commanders may amplify or modify guidance
              Command Guidance                          (within NCA and/or higher fieadquarters guidance)
                                                       when the evolving battlefield situation calls for a
   Command guidance is the focus of nuclear plan-      change in plans. Nuclear-weapons use should be
 ning at any level. It includes-                       restrictive, with tight political limits so the enemy

                                                                                                     FM 100-30

will recognize the controlled escalation "signal" and    • The strategic objectives.
not assume that we have moved to general war. The
following are considerations that accomplish this        • The size and structure of the theater of war.
"signal":                                                • The number of forces involved.
• Tight limits on the area of employment.
                                                            The intended purpose, not the level of command,
• Timing and duration of employment is short.            determines whether the unit functions at the opera-
• A specific geographic area is selected.                tionallevel. Armies normally design major ground
                                                         operations of a subordinate campaign, while corps
• Complete destruction of enemy forces is not re-        and divisions fight tactical battles and engagements.
  quired to achieve a desired objective.                 A corps commander might also be a joint force land
• Yield limitation is medium to very low. (See           component commander or the commander of a joint
  Glossary for definitions.)                             tactical force.
• Collateral-damage constraints are stringent.              Commanders of unified commands conduct thea-
                                                         ter campaign planning with subordinate headquar-
• Targets are military.                                  ters. The subordinate command and its staff consult
• Aircraft andlor missile delivery platforms are in      with sister services throughout the planning process.
  the theater. (They are not launcoed from the US        In turn, tactical commanders help develop toe initial
  or from one theater to another, but from within        concept of operations and subsequent campaign
  the theater.)                                          plans. ~ubordinate commanders prepare supporting
                                                         JJlans to meet the requirements of the theater plan.
                                                         Commanders at corps and above modify plans as
         The Operational Level of War                    necessary to attain operational objectives so long as
                                                         they stilI achieve the theater's strategic intent. Com-
   At the operational level of war, joint and multina-   manders of joint and combined forces develop com-
tional forces within a theater of operations (TO)        prehensive plans which integrate aspects of each
plan, conduct, and sustain campaigns and major           service commander's operational plans.
operations to accomplish theater strategic objec-
tives. The operational-level commander focuses nu-
clear-weapons planning largely on one or more of                     Airspace Coordination
three general tasks:
                                                            When a CINC requests nuclear-weapons release,
 1. Facilitating maneuver.                               he must consider now he will manage airspace,
2. Isolating the battlefield.                            airspace priorities, communications Instructions,
                                                         and special joint airspace requirements. Since all
3. Destroying critical enemy facilities or functions.    components of the joint force use the airspace above
                                                         surface areas, the CINC must issue airspace control
   The operational level of war is the vital link        measures to de conflict the space.
between national- and theater-strategic aims and the
tactical employment of forces on theoattlefield. The       The CINC will appoint an airspace control
focus at this level is on conducting joint operations.   authority, who is normally also the joint force air
Joint operations include employing multiservice          component commander. Use and control of airspace
military forces to attain theater-strategic objectives   must be coordinated with the airspace control
in a theater of war.                                     authority.
   Combatant commanders usually plan and execute
campaigns. They have theater-strategic intents, con-                 Nuclear Targeting
cepts, and objectives. Service or subordinate joint
commanders have operational intents, concepts, and       Identifying Enemy Targets
objectives in support of the combatant commanders.          This section supports the doctrine of counterforce
The level of command varies with-
                                                         targeting strategy as JP 3-12 describes. Army nu-
• The nature of warfare.                                 clear targeting utIlizes the targeting methodology in

FM 100-30

the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D 3A)           effectiveness over nonnuclear fires. Advantages of
process-                                                 using nuclear weapons vary with-
• To identify enemy high-value targets.                  • The weapon type, yield, and accuracy.
• To determine friendly high-payoff targets.             • The nature and disposition of the target.
• To prioritize targets for attack by the most effec-    • The terrain and weather.
   tive means.
                                                         • The operational or tactical objectives.
• To nominate or deliver selected weapons.
                                                         Commanders must also integrate nuclear-weapons
• To assess the effects of attack against surface        use into conventional fires and maneuver.
                                                            A commander would normally nominate a
NOTE: The D3A process is discussed in more depth         weapon capable of a low air burst rather than one
later in this chapter. See also FM 6-20-10.              that has a surface burst. This would optimize basic
   The most likely enemy nuclear targets are-            nuclear effects and reduce militarily significant
• Nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities.
                                                            Another consideration is the unpredictable time
• Troop concentrations.                                  requirements for nomination of nuclear weapons.
• Command, control, communications, and intelli-         Advanced planning is absolutely critical. When
   gence facilities.                                     commanders nominate targets, destruction of the
                                                         targets should radically alter the situation to the
• Logistics considerations.                              user's advantage. Commanders must know the
• Underground facilities containing HPTs.                strengths and weaknesses of each course of action
                                                         in order to nominate targets which present the high-
• Targets which would severely impact the cam-           est payoff. Therefore, It is imperative that com-
   paign plan.                                           manders conduct continuous planning. Using
• Air defense facilities.                                real-time intelligence assets in determining and up-
                                                         dating targets is essential. Timing and accuracy are
• Weapons of mass destruction.                           major factors in nuclear-weapons nomination
• Mobile land battle targets.                            success.
    At operational and tactical levels of war, com-         The requirement to deconflict duplicate targeting
 manders use targeting methodology to identify and       complicates targeting. Different forces or different
 prioritize targets. The CINC gives first priority to    echelons within the same force may have the same
operational targets. The corps translates operational    needs. Therefore, synchronizing attacks between
guidance into specific tactical targeting priorities.    echelons is absolutely necessary.
The corps commander uses his priorities to nomi-
 nate targets. The ]FLCC nominates targets to the        Troop Safety
]TCB, if there is one. The corps commander must
 take into consideration the time it takes to process      Targeting considerations must also include troop
 his nomination up the chain of command, over to         safety suco as-
 the sister services and their targeting process, then
 to final execution. (Refer to FIgures 3-3, 3-5, and     • Collateral-damage avoidance.
 3-6.) He must also plan conventional operations as      • Personnel safety.
 contingency operations.
                                                         • Preclusion damage avoidance.
 Targeting Considerations                                   Commanders must limit nuclear strikes near
                                                         friendly forces and the civilian populace. However
   Nuclear weapons are not equally suited for all        proximity can vary according to-
 battlefield requirements so there is no reason to
 employ them if they produce only marginal gains in      • The protection available for friendly units.

                                                                                                      FM 100-30

• The location of the civilian populace.                     Before setting target priorities, operations, intel-
                                                          ligence, and fire support officers conduct target-
• The availability of weapons yield.                      value analyses (TVAJ. They consider the-
• The weapons systems used.
                                                          • Perceived importance of the target.
• The deconfliction with SOF, long-range surveil-
  lance units (LRSU), and other friendly locations        • Ease and accuracy of locating targets.
  across the FLOT.
                                                          • Relative ease of destroying the targets (hardness
   Nuclear targets in support of maneuver units are         and mobility).
normally deep, but early warning and protection
measures are important for all units. Normally there      • Probable length of time target destruction will
is no requirement to warn units when the risk will          disrupt a threat force.
not exceed negligible levels and when insufficient
time exists to warn all personnel.                           The initial detection and tracking of designated
                                                          threat units with intelligence sensors should not
  Obstacles created by nuclear weapons can inhibit        always be the attack trigger event. Tracking selected
movement of future operations. Principal obstacles        targets keeps them visibIe while the corps validates
are tree blowdown, fires, area contamination, and         them in the nomination process.
rubble in built-up areas. Commanders nominating
nuclear weapons must consider how such obstacles            The deliver step totally depends on sister services
will restrict maneuver. They must also consider the       reacting to the needs of operational-level and corps
degrading effects of nuclear weapons on both friendly     commanders. For them to respond quickly, they
ana enemy communications and fire control systems.        must have as much lead time as possible. Therefore,
                                                          commanders must consider timing and other events
                                                          while war -gaming.
Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess (OA)
Targeting Methodology                                        During the assessment phase, a battle damage
                                                          assessment (BDA) gives die commander feedback
   The UA targeting methodology enables the com-          on the effectiveness of the nuclear weapon. During
mander and staff to take the initiative in selecting      the decide step, planners determine the requirement
HPTs before they actually present themselves in the       for battle damage assessment for specific high-pay-
target array. Each function occurs both simultane-        off targets and/or counterproliferation targets.
ously and sequentially. Although not a separate
function, target tracking is inherent throughout the
targeting process. Target tracking must be planned        Defeat Criteria
simultaneously with the development of the intelli-
gence collection plan (decide). nis executed during          No single statement of damage criteria covers
the targeting function of detect and supports both        all situations. The appropriate nuclear appendix to
targeting functions of deliver and assess.                the OPLAN includes defeat criteria for nuclear-
                                                          weapons nomination. General guidelines include
   Decide, detect, deliver, and assess targeting          the following:
methodology helps maximize the effectiveness of
the limited number of nuclear weapons available.          • At lower yields, initial radiation, not blast or
The decision to recommend attack of a target pro-           thermal radiation, is the foremost defeat mecha-
vides the focus and priorities for intelligence collec-     nism for mobile land battle targets.
tion and fire planning. The commander orients the
attack after analyzing-                                   • The targeting officer subdivides large targets into
                                                            smaller targets to reduce the size of the targeted
• The intelligence estimate of the situation.               area.
• The commander's mission analysis.
                                                          • The minimum safe distance for friendly units
• Battlefield planning (which projects future               should be one of negligible risk to unwarned,
  operations) .                                             exposed soldiers.

FM 100-30

         Collateral-Damage Prevention                     • The enemy.
  The commander must always seek to avoid civil-          • The terrain.
ian casualties from nuclear weapons in the cam-
paign area. The G5 determines civilian population         • Nearby population characteristics.
centers and produces population overlays depicting        • Desired target effects.
their locations. The fire support element (FSE) uses
preclusion overlays to minimize damage consistent           Nuclear-option planning begins with mission re-
with the commander's guidance. The USANCA                 ceipt and includes four pl1ases:
NEAT uses these overlays during analysis.                 1. Pre-wartime contingency planning that is based
  The commander can reduce most collateral dam-              on the type of operation and constraints.
age by-                                                   2. Wartime planning that supplements peacetime
• Recommending a weapon that fits within collat-             planning oased on limiting requirements, terrain,
  eral-damage preclusion criteria.                           and actual threat intelligence.
• Using damage-preclusion criteria.                       3. Refinements to wartime planning that meet
                                                             changing situations and which update options
• Recommending a low air height of burst.                    based on the latest threat intelligence.
• Placing a DGZ away from the area to be pro-             4. Refinements to approved options that are based on
  tected.                                                     the situations just before target nomination.
NOTE: See JP 3-12.2 (SRD) for procedures to                  Planners develop each option along with the cam-
calculate collateral-damage avoidance.                    paign plan and transmit both to higher headquarters
                                                          for approval. Commanders up the chain of com-
                       Options                            mand, starting with the corps, treat the option and
                                                          the plan as a single entity.
   An option is a discrete grouping of nuclear weap-
 ons and is the basic element for providing nuclear          To provide the control and flexibility the NCA
 support to the Army ensures political       requires and needs, commanders at strategic, opera-
 authorities retain contro of nuclear-weapons em-         tional, or tactical levels must impose a time frame
 ployment.                                                on each option. The time frame must be of sufficient
                                                          length to accommodate uncertainties in intelligence
   An option has specific yields. It is based on the      and friction in battlefield conditions. Specifying a
 mission, enemy, terrain (and weather), troops, and       time frame helps maximize a nuclear option's
 time available (METT-T); collateral-damage guid-         benefits.
 ance; and constraints.
                                                             Commanders must synchronize the necessary
 NOTE: See JP 3-12 and 3-12.1 for more                    time frame with the campaign plan. The NCA migfit
 information.                                             constrain the time frame for options at the opera-
    Operational-level and corps commanders plan           tional or tactical levels based on changes in the
 and recommend options for specific geographical          strategic environment. As a result, the nomination
 areas, during short time periods, and for specific       time for an option starts about 96 hours before
 purposes. However, an option's area varies with the      execution.
 echelon of command and its objective. At the op-            During both offensive and defensive operations,
 erationallevel of war, the area of employment may        each command echelon provides to their subordi-
 cover several corps. In a corps this may extend from     nates more detailed nuclear planning gUidance
 the corps FLOT to the limit of the area of operations.   based on METT-T factors. Within the hmits of this
 The numbers and types of weapons in an option will       guidance, the operations officer and the fire support
 vary depending on-                                       coordinator (FSCOORD) refine the planned option
 • The level of command that develops it.                 to support the scheme of maneuver. This is not a
                                                          one-step decision, but a continuous, dynamic proc-
 • The mission.                                           ess of adapting plans to meet operational require-

                                                                                                   FM 100-30

ments, constraints, and option parameters to pro-      • Conducting intelligence preparation of the battle-
vide the best effect before target nomination.           field (IPB) to facilitate tne targeting process.
  Before refinement, the nominating commander          • Developing the situation by determining if a
must understand the intent of his next higher com-       threat is nuclear-capable.
mander. The commander can recommend-
                                                       • Developing suitable nuclear targets
• Updating target information.
                                                       • Protecting the force by disrupting a threat's nu-
• Adjusting individual aiming points within the          clear operations.
  option area.
                                                       • Performing the battle damage assessment.
• Exchanging higher yield weapons for lower yield
  weapons.                                                In nuclear operations reliable and rapid collec-
                                                       tion, assessment, evaluation, and dissemination of
• Identifying and prioritizing aiming points.          target information is critical to the nomination proc-
• Coordinating nonnuclear fires with nuclear fires.    ess. Intelligence collection-
   The commander nominating the option has the         • Identifies a threat's intent to employ nuclear
flexibility of selecting aiming points 10 the option     weapons.
area. This maximizes the effectiveness of the option
and helps attain operational objectives. However,      • Locates his nuclear-capable delivery systems.
the commander must always consider troop safety        • Identifies targets vulnerable to nuclear fires.
in final aiming-point refinement, using updated coI-
lateral-damage overlays with troop-safety contours        The intelligence officer uses electronic warfare
and the nuclear-weapons template. Higher com-          support measures (ESM) to determine a threat's
mands normally state collateral-damage preclusion      intentions and to discover lucrative nuclear targets
criteria in generalized terms and gross numbers. The   for exploitation. Electronic warfare support meas-
nominating commander may impose more restric-          ures include search, interception, identification, and
tive employment constraints.                           location functions.

    BATTLEFIELD OPERATING                                                  Maneuver
         SYSTEMS (BOS)                                    Maneuver is movement relative to the enemy to
                                                       put him at a disadvantage. Commanders maneuver
   The basic BOS (intelligence, maneuver, fire sup-    forces to create conditions for tactical and opera-
port, mobility and survivability, combat service       tional success. Maneuver enhances the friendly
support, command and control, and air defense) are     force's ability to destroy the enemy or hinder his
the same whether commanders employ nuclear             movement tnrough the direct or indirect application
weapons or not. There is no doctrinal transition       of lethal power or the threat thereof. Conversely,
period from conventional to nuclear warfare. How-      maneuvering large forces invites attack. The com-
ever, commanders may have to make some changes         mander must always consider this issue during op-
in planning techniques and procedures to accom-        erational planning.
plish these functions on the nuclear battlefield.
                                                          Maneuver and firepower are inseparable and
                                                       complementary elements. While one might be
                    Intelligence                       more important in one phase of an operation, both
   Intelligence operations are the organized efforts   are characteristic of all operations. The com-
of a commander to gather and analyze information       mander combines them to maximize relative com-
about the enemy's activities. Intelligence supports    bat power. Nuclear weaj)ons greatly enhance the
operations by-                                         flexibility of maneuver. They cilso have the poten-
                                                       tial to be the principal means of destroying a
• Providing early indications and warnings of a        threat's will to fight. When a commander nomi-
  threat's intention to employ nuclear weapons.        nates nuclear weapons, maneuver exploits their

FM 100-30

 effects. The commander can also nominate nuclear             active survivability measures. Chapter 2 explains
 weapons-                                                     this in greater detail.
• To support his scheme of maneuver.                             Corps and division commanders can anticipate
• To mass combat power rapidly without shifting               higher losses throughout the battlefield when the
  maneuver forces.                                            enemy uses nuclear weapons. Mass casualties and
                                                              few available replacements will require that the
• To delay, disrupt, or destroy a threat's forces in          commander develop plans and procedures to
  depth.                                                      efficiently reconstitute combat power. This, in turn,
                                                              will impact reconstitution planning.
                     Fire Support
    Fire support is the integration and synchroniza-                  Combat Service Support (CSS)
 tion of fire and effects to delay, disrupt, or destroy         As the scale and complexity of Army operations
 enemy forces, combat functions, and facilities in            increase, the importance of combat service support
 pursuit of operational and tactical objectives. The          to their success increases as well. Combat service
 flexibility of nuclear-weapons nomination makes it           support to the nuclear battlefield includes providing
 possible to rapidly shift toe focus and concentration        support to sister services. Coordination is vital.
 of combat power over wide areas.                             Combat service support units operate at all levels of
                                                              war. Chapter 6 explains this in greater detail.
  Operational-level and corps commanders can
nommate nuclear weapons-
• To support their scheme of maneuver.                                     Command and Control
• To mass effects rapidly without shifting maneu-                Command means visualizing the current and fu-
  ver forces.                                                 ture states of friendly and enemy forces then formu-
                                                              lating concepts of operations to accomplish the
• To attack a threat's forces in depth.                       mission. Command occurs from wherever the com-
                                                              mander is, whether at a command post (CP) or in a
                                                              tank moving with the main effort.
           Mobility and Survivability
                                                                 Control monitors the status of organizational ef-
    Mobility operations Rreserve the friendly force's         fectiveness and identifies deviations Trom set stand-
 freedom of maneuver. Mobility missions include-              ards and corrects them. Commanders acquire and
•   Breaching enemy obstacles.                                apply means to accomplish their intents. Ultimately,
                                                              commanders provide a means to measure, report,
•   Increasing battlefield circulation.                       and correct performance. The corRs commander
•   Improving existing routes or building new ones.           must be able to make the final decision on nomi-
                                                              nated target locations before passing the informa-
•   Providing bridge and raft supports for river crossings.   tion to his higher headquarters.
•   Identifying routes around contaminated areas.                Reliable communications are central both to bat-
    Nuclear weapons will cause extensive damage               tle command and to control. This is particularly true
 and may drastically alter the military aspect of             when nominating nuclear weapons. Being able to
 terrain. Therefore, commanders must determine if             quickly pass orders is critical. Toerefore, command-
 using such weapons would create so many obstacles            ers must establish methods to ensure positive
 that units woula spend more effort breaching them            command and control (such as using EMV mitigat-
 than would be worthwhile.                                    ing measures, alternative nets, communications,
                                                              ana so on).
 NOTE: See DA Pam 50-3 for a detailed discussion
 of nuclear-weapons effects on terrain.
    Survivability operations protect friendly forces                              Air Defense
 from the effects of enemy weapons systems. Hard-               Air defense units are particularly susceRtible to
 ening facilities and fortifying battle positions are         the effects of nuclear weapons detonations. Missiles

                                                                                                     FM 100-30

and their associated launchers are vulnerable to         accumulation should not be assigned to units whose
blast and thermal radiation. Radars, control vans,       members have low doses. This helps battalions and
and missile electronics are vulnerable to EMP. Re-       companies retain equal radiation states.
fer to Chapter 2 for survival mitigation techniques.
                                                         NOTE: See also FM 100-9, FM 100-10, FM 12-6,
                                                         FM 63-3, FM 100-7, and FM 100-16.
           RECONSTITUTION                                   Regardless of measures taken to enhance force
   The ASCC plans and conducts operational and           survivability, some close combat forces will suffer
tactical reconstitution operations. Timely reconsti-     severe losses. The nuclear environment does not
                                                         allow the luxury of long personnel and materiel
tution in terms of people, organizations, command        pipelines and the withdrawal and rehabilitation of
structure, and materiel is essential to continuing the   units. Therefore, at least initially, the commander
mission. Reconstitution is a total process. Its major    accomplishes force reorganization, reconstitution,
elements are reorganization, assessment, and regen-      and restoration from resiaual assets.
eration. Weapons system replacement operatIOns
facilitate the receipt of bore-sighted equipment and
qualified crews to units undergoing reorganization                         SUMMARY
or regeneration.
   Reorganizationis the action the commander takes          The Army's role in planning nuclear operations
to shift internal resources within a degraded unit to    is the heart of Army nuclear doctrine. Planners
increase its combat effectiveness. It may include        conduct the planning process of joint nuclear opera-
such measures as cross-leveling equipment and per-       tions in a deliberate manner, but in a crisis they may
sonnel, matching operational weapons systems with        undertake whatever actions are necessary.
crews, or forming composite units. The latter in-           The Army also participates in force-projection
volves joining two units reduced in number to form       operations as part of a joint force. This may mclude
a single full-strength unit. Commanders should           multinational forces as well. The corps heaaquarters
maintain as much squad, crew, or team integrity as       can also function as a joint task force headquarters.
possible under the circumstances to contribute to        In this role the corps takes on additional responsi-
unit cohesion and to provide a base for rebuilding       bilities. The corps can use the guidance in this
if regeneration is required.                             chapter when the CINC requires target nomination.
   Assessmentmeasures a unit's capability to per-           The Army at corps and above is supported by
form its mission.                                        USANCA NEAT during the planning and execu-
   Regeneration is incremental and involves the re-      tion cycle. The CINC is supported by STRATLAT
builcfing of a unit through-                             from USSTRATCOM. Knowledge of their actions
                                                         is important to Army planners for coordination and
• Replacing personnel, equipment, and supplies on        interface.
   a large scale. (The commander can combine per-
   sonnel, equipment, and supplies to return the            Planning nuclear operations begins with the com-
   degraded unit to the specified level of combat        mander's guidance and ends with nuclear targeting
   effectiveness.)                                       and collateral-damage preclusion. The mechanism
• Reestablishing or replacing essential command          for articulating the nominated targets is an option.
   and control.                                          Specific nuclear combat functions describe particu-
                                                         lar requirements in a nuclear environment.
• Conducting mission-essential training for the             Reconstitution and reorganization of decimated
   newly rebuilt unit.
                                                         units in a nuclear environment is accomplished by
   Commanders must consider individual RES dur-          shifting elements in order to increase effectiveness.
ing unit regeneration. Personnel with high dose          Regeneration is the rebuilding of decimated units.

                                                Chapter 4
                    AND PROCEDURES

          RESPONSIBILITIES                              ing to its functional area. The following discussion
                                                        lists staff elements and functions by event sequence.
   This chapter discusses the sequence of actions          The G2 staff's considerations include-
(and the personnel responsible for those actions)
that the senior Army commander conducts after           • Current or anticipated high-value targets, includ-
receiving controls and constraints to nominate nu-         ing ballistic an ell or crUIse missiles that have a
clear targets. Because the division does not nor-          variety of munitions (for example, weapons of
mally nominate nuclear targets, its warfighting tasks      mass destruction).
are normally force protection and NBC defense
from nuclear-weapons effects.                           • Current threat antiballistic missile and/or anti-
                                                           delivery systems.
   Procedures and actions for theater nuclear-weap-     • Weather data to facilitate weapons selection and
ons nomination are part of the command and staff           fallout prediction and to evaluate effects on future
action process. The commander and his staff con-           operations.
sider factors and events unigue to nuclear ogerations
during the process. The NEAT from USANCA                   The G3 staff's considerations include-
assists the Army commander. If the corps is a joint
force land component command or a joint task            • Existing CONPLANs, OPLANs, OPORDs, and
force, responsibilities expand to include joint            SOPs for nuclear nomination.
considerations.                                         • The initial coordination between the FSCOORD
   The senior Army commander's concern is the nu-          and the BCE for nuclear-weapons status.
clear-nomination process and nuclear-force protec-      • Constraints that higher headquarters imposes on
tion. The division commander's concern is how              the number and yields of nuclear weapons.
enemy use of nuclear weapons will affect the divi-         The G1 staff's considerations include-
sion's scheme of maneuver when executing the corps
commander's intent and when protecting me force.        • Plans for handling mass casualties in the event of
                                                           the enemy's use of weapons of mass destruction.
      THE DECISION-MAKING                               • Coordinating with the medical brigade and or
                                                           medical group for help with planning and han-
            PROCESS                                        dling contaminated patients. (See the FM 3-series
                                                           manuals and FM 8-10-7 for handling biological
   The decision-making process includes mission            and chemical casualties.)
analysis; commander's guidance; COA develop-
ment, analysis, and the decision; publishing the        • Battlefield nuclear warfare (BNW) implications
OPORD; and execution. The process is also used in          on current personnel strengths.
organizing nuclear operations staff procedures.         • The current radiation exposure states (RES) of
NOTE: See Chapter 3 for a discussion of coordina-          battalion-size units.
tion and execution.                                        The G4 staff's considerations include resupply
                                                        and reconstitution requirements based on enemy
                Mission Analysis                        nuclear-weapons use.
                                                           The G5 staff's considerations include-
   During mission analysis each staff agency main-
tains current day-to-day information necessary for      • Identifying population centers and preclusion
preliminary nuclear-weapons considerations rei at-         data which would warrant preclusion from blast,

FM 100-30

  radiation, and thermal effects based on higher                  Commander's Guidance
  headquarters' constraints.
                                                         Once the commander receives or deduces his
• Determining the current locations of civilians in   mission, he conducts mission analysis. He restates
  the operational area.                               the mission and expresses his clear intent on how to
• Conducting psychological operations (PSYOP)         conduct the operation to support the campaign plan.
  and providing information to civilian popula-       Once he has been directed to nominate nuclear
  tions.                                              targets, he will need supplemental command guid-
                                                      ance from higher headquarters. He will then pass
• Determining the status of noncombatants.            the following elements of command guidance to his
                                                      staff for conaucting planning:
  The FSCOORD staffs considerations include-
• Conducting nuclear planning.                        • The desired results of nuclear-weapons nomina-
• Nuclear-option planning criteria as stated from
   higher headquarters, plans, and SOPs.              • The priority and types of targets to be nominated.
• Integrating nuclear nomination plans with con-      • Identification of tactical contingencies that might
  ventional operational plans and the scheme of         require nuclear-weapons nomination.
  maneuver.                                           • The desired degree of damage to enemy forces.
• Integrating USANCA NEAT's analysis.                 • Collateral-damage criteria for civilian protection.
• Advising on the impact of US nuclear weapons        • Restrictions on fallout from surface bursts.
  on the enemy.
   The NBC chemical center (NBCC) staffs con-         • Constraints from higher headquarters.
siderations include-                                  • Other necessary constraints, such as troop safety
• Identifying contaminated areas.                       or preclusion of damage to equipment ana
• Assisting in nuclear planning.
                                                         The commander and staff must also consider
• Conducting nuclear vulnerability analyses.          troop safety at all times in terms of degrees of risk
• Maintaining the current assessment of threat ca-    and vulnerability. They must consider the risks as-
   pability to employ weapons of mass destruction.    sociated with using a lower category of protection
                                                      for each situation and weigh these against the
• Developing a radiological monitoring and sur-       achievable payoff (for example, a status of "emer-
   veying plan.                                       gency risk to warnedlrotected" instead of "negli-
• Predicting fallout hazards and how they might       gible risk to unwarne exposed" personnel).
   affect operations.
• Advising on the impact of enemy use of nuclear                      Course of Action
   weapons on the civilian population.                                 Development
   The G6 staffs considerations include-                 Based on guidance for nuclear planning, each
                                                      staff agency conducts its own estimate in support of
• Advising on how EMP will affect communica-          the operation. The information the staff collects is
   tions equipment.                                   then used in COA development. Each staff element
• Advising on the availability and vulnerability of   checks its data for suitability, feasibility, accept-
   digital equipment.                                 ability, and distinguishability within its own area of
• Advising on mitigation against EMP effects.
                                                        The G2 staff-
• Ensuring communications links are secure and
   operable for transmission of high-priority         • Identifies potential enemy nuclear targets based
   messages.                                            on event templates and current intelligence.

                                                                                                  FM 100-30

• Determines an enemy's nuclear capabilities and          The FSCOORD staff-
  his vulnerabilities to attack by any means.
                                                        • Formulates nuclear options for each contingency
• Evaluates friendly vulnerabilities to enemy nu-         the G3 identifies.
  clear-weapons use and how they would affect
  operationa1 plans.                                    • Determines nuclear planning parameters.
  The G3 staff-                                         • Receives preclusion data from the GS.
• Integrates nuclear and conventional weapons into      • Develops and refines nuclear analysis based on
  a COA analysis.                                         input from the USANCA NEAT and the corps
• Modifies target -defeat criteria based on opera-        targeting officer.
  tional considerations.                                  The targeting officer provides current operational
• Identifies NBC defense considerations.                information to the USANCA NEAT.
• Develops nuclear-nomination decision points for         The NBCC staff-
  both offensive and defensive operations.
                                                        • Prepares the NBC estimate.
• Determines collateral-damage criteria.
                                                        • Provides expert information on nuclear effects,
• Determines requirements for unit replacements.          vulnerability analysis, and mitigation of enemy
  The G1 staff-                                           use.
• Develops an estimate of casualties expected from      • Coordinates the NBC warning and reporting sys-
  an enemy nuclear-weapons attack.                        tem throughout the NBCC.
• Estimates the impact of mass casualties on com-       • Details passive measures to reduce friendly vul-
  bat health support and mortuary operations. The         nerability.
  medical brigaae, medical group, and command
  surgeon's staff provides input to the G1 on the         At this time-
  impact of mass casualties on combat health sup-
  port.                                                 • Based on the information they exchange, the G1,
                                                          G4, and GS redefine their estimates.
• Determines the commander's guidance for radia-
  tion casualties to enter medical channels.            • The G2 completes the intelligence estimate, in-
                                                          cluding an analysis and listing of the enemy's
• Identifies personnel issues with respect to nuclear     current nuclear-weapons capabilities, and up-
  operations.                                             dates the target-collection plan.
  The G4 staff specifies COAs for logistics.            • The G3 completes the operations estimate speci-
  The GS staff-                                           fying the desired damage and determines how
                                                          nuclear-weapons effects will impact courses of
• Develops the civilian population center overlay.        action.
• Develops the collateral-damage and preclusion-
  area overlays or lists.                               • The FSCOORD completes his estimate and de-
                                                          termines targets to be nominated (supported by a
  The G6 staff-                                           targeting officer and the USANCA NEAT) after
• Develops an estimate of the situation for signal        considering-
  support.                                                - The importance of the targets in priority.
• Establishes requirements for voice, data, and
  broadcast traffic.                                      - The safety criteria for the weapons to be
• Provides the concept and visualizes signal sup-
  port for the battlefield after the commander            - The specific limiting requirements within the
  chooses a course of action.                               recommended course of action.

FM 100-30

                  Course of Action                        • Compares troop-safety criteria with the GEGs of
                       Analysis                             battalion task forces and other battalion-size
   The staff conducts a quick initial staff analysis to     units.
 identify CGAs that are infeasible or not supportable.    • Analyzes vulnerabilities to an enemy's nuclear
 After discarding these, the staff conducts a detailed      attack based on mass versus dispersion of battal-
 CGA analysis that consists of-                             ion-size units.
 • War-gaming CGAs.                                       • Assesses the impact of nuclear-weapons employ-
                                                            ment on an enemy's CGAs.
 • Comparing CGAs to determine which will best
   accomplisn the mission.                                • Compares various conventional alternatives to
 • Presenting a recommendation to the commander.            the nuclear-nomination process.
   The G2 staff-                                          • Compares the effectiveness of nuclear and non-
                                                            nuclear weapons.
 • Examines how nuclear weapons will influence            • Coordinates with other staff members to create
   the enemy.                                               the decision support template (DST).
 • Searches for indications of an enemy's intent to       • War-games CGAs for nuclear operations.
   use nuclear weapons.
 • Determines an enemy's likely reaction to the           • Advises the commander on operational aspects of
   Army's nomination of nuclear weapons.                    reconstitution.
                                                            The G1 staff-
 • Determines damage-assessment alternatives.
 • Analyzes any indication of an enemy's intent to        • Assesses the potential for mass casualties. (The
   use weapons of mass destruction against friendly         medical brigade and/or medical group and the
   operations.                                              command surgeon's staff provides input to the
                                                            G1 on the impact of mass casualties on combat
 • Analyzes an enemy's probable reaction to the use         health support.)
   of nuclear weapons against him.                        • Reviews law-of-land-warfare considerations and
 • Analyzes the terrain based on friendly or enemy          requirements.
   use of nuclear weapons and on the weather and          • Provides personnel input to the G3's reconstitu-
    how it will affect nuclear-weapons employment           tion plans.
    or mitigation.
                                                            The G4 staff-
 • Analyzes damage assessments after nuclear
    detonation.                                           • Reviews the logistic implications of battlefield
                                                             nuclear warfare.
 • Prepares an assessment of the enemy's capability
   to employ other weapons of mass destruction.           • Provides logistic input to the G3' s reconstitution
    The G3 staff-                                            plans.
 • Reviews and analyzes nuclear implications for          • Examines the effect of nuclear weapons on logis-
                                                             tic operations for each course of action.
    the mission.
                                                          • Conducts operational analysis and risk assess-
 • Integrates nuclear weapons into CGAs.                     ment, determining ways to minimize loss of lo-
 • Examines friendly nuclear capabilities and vul-           gistics personnel and equipment.
    nerabilities.                                            The G5 staff-
 • Formulates troop-safety, OEG, and collateral-          • Determines the effects of BNW on civil-military
    damage factors.                                          operations (CMG).
 • Formulates defeat criteria.                            • Reviews civilian casualty and collateral-damage
 • Determines nomination decision points.                    parameters.

                                                                                                   FM 100-30

• Prepares the preliminary collateral-damage             • The situation and the course of action.
                                                         • The commanders' estimate.
• Compares information with each of the opera-
   tional COAs on the locations of civilians.            • The G2's and FSE's target-value analysis.
   The G6 staff-                                         • The G3's analysis of nuclear-weapons effects.
• Compares digital support required to support           • The commander's and staffs comparison of
   each course of action.                                  COAs.
• War-games actions when digital support is lost         • The decision.
  because of EMP effects.                                • The statement of the commander's intent.
   The FSCOORD staff-
• Examines nuclear-weapons effects of the                         THE COMMANDER'S
   mission.                                                           DECISION
• Examines the target analysis that the USANCA             Based on the staff's recommendation, the com-
   NEAT provides.                                        mander decides if a situation warrants nuclear-
• Examines collateral-damage requirements.               weapons nomination to accomplish a mission that
                                                         might otherwise be infeasible. He must also deter-
• Examines nuclear operations and planning.              mine the adverse impact on the mission by nuclear
• Recommends target nominations to the                   weapons.
   commander.                                            NOTE: See Chapter 5.
• Recommends nuclear targets by military impor-            Considerations affecting the situation and the
   tance and priority.                                   course of action include-
• Specifics the impact of nuclear operations on fire     • The area of operations (terrain and weather
  support COAs ..                                          effects).
  The targeting officer assists the USANCA NEAT          • The enemy's situation (his vulnerability to US
in target analysis.                                        nuclear weapons and the assessment of his capa-
  The NBCC staff-                                          bility and intent to use nuclear weapons).
• Prepares fallout predictions required for nuclear      • Readiness. (The ability of sister services to rap-
   nomination.                                             idly deliver nuclear weapons and to maneuver
                                                           combat power.)
• Provides the G3 with technical data needed to
  develop vulnerability of friendly forces to fallout.   • Vulnerability. (Friendly vulnerability to nuclear
                                                           weapons is a function of time and space; the
• Estimates predicted fallout effects on operations        commander must consider the degree of risk he
  in respective areas of interest.                         is willing to accept.)
• Assists the G3 in force-protection planning.           • Relative combat power (comparison of friendly
• Evaluates friendly decontamination capabilities.         and enemy nuclear weapons and maneuver com-
                                                           bat power).
  After the staffs briefing, the commander reviews       • Courses of action (defined in terms of what,
their analyses, evaluates all estimates, and               when, where, how, and why).
determines how nuclear-weapons use would affect
the scheme of maneuver. This course of action            • Reconstitution assessment of units.
comparison, which leads to a staff recommendation
and the commander's decision, includes-                    During the commander's estimate, the com-
                                                         mander and staff war-game each COA against the
• The mission.                                           selected enemy capability. The commander

FM 100-30

 war-games each COA from start to finish and re-            The commander's and staffs comparison of
 hearses the plan. The G3 and FSCOORD update             COAs weighs the advantages and disadvantages
 nuclear targets for nomination during this process.     that emerge during the analysis. They make realistic
 The commander and staff must be alert for likely        assessments of the risks of probable enemy reac-
 times and areas where the enemy might use nuclear       tions during each phase of the operation.
                                                           After comparing COAs, the commander deter-
    During the war game, the commander and his           mines which will Best accomplish the mission. He
 staff continuously reassess the vulnerability of the    announces his decision. The commander amplifies
 force to enemy nuclear strikes. The planner looks at    his statement of intent with respect to conducting
 the target he presents through the eyes of an enemy     operations. (It is a critical requirement that subordi-
 target analyst to answer such questions as-             nates must oRerate within the intent of the senior
 • Does my force present a target that the enemy will    commander.) The commander's statement of intent
    decide is worth expending a nuclear weapon to        includes-
                                                         • The effects he desires from the nuclear weapons
 • Does the enemy have time to locate, analyze, and        he nominates (such as halting the enemy) or his
    attack my force?                                       decision not to nominate nucfear weapons.
 • Will my force move at such a high rate of speed       • Constraints placed on the senior Army com-
    that an enemy cannot attack it?                        mander by the operational-level commander.
 • Will my force be so close to the enemy that he          (The senior Army commander reviews the nu-
    will have to violate his own doctrinal constraints     clear option to ensure it follows the campaign
    in order to strike'?                                   plan.)
 • What type of weapon with what yield will the          • Nuclear-nomination decision points.
    enemy use to attack my force?
                                                           The commander must identify decision points as
 • Will a nuclear-capable enemy's use of nuclear         early as possible because it is imperative that the
    weapons at this location restrict his maneuver?      G3, G2, and FSCOORD know where such decision
 • Will my nomination of nuclear weapons at this         points might occur. They must also know the turn-
    location restrict my maneuver?                       around time for the decision process. There are two
                                                         examples of discussion points in the planning se-
    The G2's and FSE's target-value analysis             quence. One is at the operational level when nuclear
 determines-                                             weapons would be required to ensure the success of
 • The perceived criticality of the targets.             the campaign plan. The second is at a time when the
                                                         command 1acks significant maneuver forces and
 • The case of locating the targets.                     conventional combat power to accomplish a
 • The relative ease of destroying the targets.          mission.
 • The relative length of time of disruption of forces     The commander's statement of intent also in-
   that could be expected from destroying the target.    cludes-
   The G3's analysis of nuclear-weapons effects          • Collateral-damage avoidance requirements, if
 includes-                                                 different from the SOP.
 • The probable enemy reaction.                          • Damage assessment, if different from the SOP.
 • Critical events and how to achieve success.
                                                         • The number of weapons recommended to accom-
 • Nuclear recommendation of decision points.              plish the mission.
 • The advantages and disadvantages of nuclear-          • A statement of the desired level of troop-safety
   weapons nomination.                                     risk. If the risk is not the same as in the SOP, It
 • Troop-safety constraints.                               must be so stated.

                                                                                                    FM 100-30

               PROCEDURES                               • Specifies noncombatant casualty and collateral
                                                          damage parameters.
           Plans (Orders) Preparation
                                                        • Identifies aspects of BNW to exploit by PSYOP.
  Based on the commander's decision, each staff
agency coordinates and writes its portion of the          The G6 staff-
01lLAN or OPORD and submits it to the com-
mander for his approval.                                • Provides the signal annex that integrates commu-
                                                          nications consiaerations into the OPLAN.
  The G2 staff-
                                                        • Develops plans for positioning communications
• Integrates enemy nuclear capabilities intelli-          assets.
  gence into the OPLAN.
• Identifies an enemy's BNW capability in the enemy       The FSCOORD staff-
  situation intelligence annex of the OPLAN.            • Creates and publishes nuclear support plans with
• Defines vulnerabilities to the enemy's nuclear          nuclear options.
                                                        • Identifies joint service nuclear planning coordi-
• Defines enemy strengths against nuclear                 nation requirements.
                                                        • Develops plans to prevent collateral damage.
• Integrates nuclear operations requirements into
  the OPLAN.                                            • Passes force-protection guidance to the divisions
• Defines the nuclear aspect of the mission and           and to the analysts who determine WMD
  concept of operations.                                  vulnerability.
• Specifies nuclear Crequirements.                        The NBCC staff-
• Defines nuclear troop safety.                         • Develops plans for monitoring fallout from
                                                          friendly delivered nuclear weapons.
• Develops plans for aerial radiation survey and
  monitoring assessments.                               • Initiates planning to minimize effects.
  The G1 staff-                                         • Advises on contaminated areas.
• Identifies procedures for handling BNW mass
  casualties.                                           • Advises on decontamination.
• Identifies personnel replacement and unit reconsti-   • Passes STRIKWARN messages to the next lower
  tution requirements and priorities under BNW con-       echelon.
  ditions (assisted by the medical brigade andlor
  medical group and the command surgeon's stafO.        • Prepares fallout predictions required for nuclear
• Identifies alternative administrative procedures
  in the event of automated data processing (ADP)
  capability loss.                                         Approval and Issuance of the OPLAN
  The G4 staff-                                                         (OPORD)
• Integrates logistic considerations into the             The corps commander approves plans (orders)
  OPLAN.                                                and the nuclear option for each contingency in the
                                                        plan. The option is then transmitted furol}gh the
• Provides logistic input to reconstitution plans.      operational-level commander to the CINC for
  The G5 staff-                                         inclusion in his OPLAN. The CINC passes the
                                                        option to the NCA for final approval and execution.
• Publishes noncombatant demographic data and           The G3 is responsible for issuing the approved
  overlays.                                             OPLAN (OPORD) to subordinate units.

FM 100-30

               SUPERVISION                             • Monitors the effects of nuclear weapons on the
                                                         terrain and coordinates with engineers.
    Both the commander and his staff supervise the
 execution of the nuclear operation. To ensure that     The G1 maintains casualty statuses, replace-
 options follow the intent of the nuclear portion of   ments, OEG, and RES. His staff-
 toe campaign plan, command supervision is con-        • Maintains BNW-related personnel operations
 tinuous. Command supervision afso-                      data on information displays.
• Continuously assesses the situation and updates      • Monitors the casualty situation and coordinates
  the mission analysis and the concept of operations     BNW-related combat health support and mortu-
  with respect to nuclear operations.                    ary operations.
• Assimilates nuclear nominations information and        The G4 maintains BNW-related logistic data on
  instructions from higher headquarters.               information displays.
• Updates nuclear guidance to commanders and
  staffs.                                                 The G5 maintains up-to-date information on ci-
                                                       vilian locations and status. His staff-
• Facilitates nuclear-planning coordination.
                                                       • Maintains data on noncombatant information dis-
  Staff supervision occurs at each staff level and       plays.
each staff member supervises nuclear operations
within his own area. The G2 maintains the status of    • Updates and coordinates population density in-
an enemy's nuclear systems and updates target            formation with respect to collateral-damage
nominations for potential inclusion in the nuclear       parameters.
option. He coordinates and tasks intelligence-col-     • The FSCOORD updates targets. His staff-
lection assets to provide BDAs. His staff-
• Coordinates nuclear-specific intelligence-collec-    • Coordinates options planning efforts.
  tion efforts.                                        • Coordinates with the BCE and NALE to receive
• Develops and publishes intelligence summaries          information concerning the nuclear weapons to
  on the enemy's nuclear capabilities.                   be delivered.
• Provides detailed intelligence on nuclear target     • Coordinates with the G2 to recommend poststrike
  parameters.                                            target analyses.
• Updates vulnerability assessments.                     The NBCC staff-
• Maintains nuclear data on intelligence overlays.     • Maintains records concerning the RES of units
                                                         and coordinates with the G1.
  The G3 supervises the dissemination of strike
warnings by NBC elements. His staff-                   • Receives, collates, evaluates, prepares, and dis-
                                                         tributes NBC reports.
• Coordinates nuclear planning.
                                                       • Reviews the poststrike analysis damage
• Assimilates and integrates all BNW data into           assessment.
  information displays, including the radiation
  status, the effects of nuclear weapons on signal       The signal officer advises the commander on
  operations, mass casualty information, reconsti-     protective measures taken against EMP effects.
  tution efforts, and NBC reporting and dissemina-
  tion data.                                             The surgeon advises the commander on the medi-
                                                       cal effects of the nuclear weapons environment. He
 • Coordinates BNW situation updates.                  recommends initial nuclear triage criteria. The sur-
 • Synchronizes nuclear command and control.           geon provides information to the G1 on CHS
                                                       personnel requirements to maintain the support
 • Monitors an enemy's BNW activity.                   mission.

                                                                                                FM 100-30

  MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT                              at any time. Both the commander and the staff have
        AND FEEDBACK                                  responsibilities to accomplish and procedures to
                                                      foHow. Their responsibilities range from target
   Mission accomplishment is the successful em-       nomination to force protection. The framework the
ployment by sister services of nuclear weapons in     commander and staff use to accom~lish the mission
support of Army operations. It is based on command    is the decision-making process. Each staff officer
and staff actions leading to the nomination of        has certain considerations in the initial mission
targets.                                              analysis.
   The commander and staff action process is con-        Once the commander receives or deduces his
tinuous., B.ased on current operations and the com-   ~ission he condu.cts his mission analysis and issues
mander s mtent, the commander and staff refine the    h1s command gU1dance. Based on the guidance for
nuclear-weapons nomination process to ensure its      nuclear planning, each staff agency conducts its
optimal use. The commander s primary means of         own estimate ancf participates in COA development.
monitoring the battle is the feedback he receives     After developing and analyzing each COA toe staff
from forces in contact with the enemy and from        identifies wnich to recommend to the commander.
intelligence-gathering capabilities.                  Based on the staff's recommendation, the com-
                                                      mander decides if the situation warrants nuclear-
   The command and staff action sequence ensures      weapons nomination. He then approves the nuclear
that the commander has the necessary up-to-date       option to be submitted to the CINe.
information to make sound judgments on nuclear-
weapons operations. The Key 1S the feedback re-          These procedures result in the preparation of
ceived from the BCE for nominated targets and the     plans and orders. The commander approves the
NBC defense reports received from adjacent and        OPLAN (OPORD) and the G3 issues the OPLAN
subordinate units.                                    (OPORD) to subordinates.

  The Army commander must be prepared to inte-
grate nuclear nominations into his planning process

                                                  Chapter 5

            TENETS OF ARMY                                 Because targets and operational or tactical consid-
                                                           erations or both vary with each operation, com-
              OPERATIONS                                   manders must consider nuclear-weapons operations
   The Army's success depends on its ability to            throughout the depth of the battlefield.
operate within five fundamental tenets: initiative,           Forces in immediate contact with the enemy, in
agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility. (See     the offense or defense, are conducting close opera-
FM 100-5). In nuclear operations these tenets take         tions. In corps close operations, as with other opera-
on added meaning. Isolation of units, mass casual-         tions, the theater CINC controls nuclear weapons.
ties, and loss of C2 capabilities will necessitate         Close coordination by' the corps commander, with
semiindependent operations and decentralized con-          the CINC, is essential to ensure successful execu-
trol. Therefore, unit commanders must fully under-         tion. If required, the corps commander recommends
stand the higher commander's intent.                       a yield that fits within troop-safety criteria and
                                                           nominates the target with the highest payoff.
    Continuing the mission under adverse circum-
stances requires initiative. When units can no longer      NOTE: See Chapter 3. (Although nuclear-weapons
adequately perform their traditional roles, leaders        use in close operations is not the norm, it cannot be
must have agility; that is, they must have the ability     totally ruled out.)
to quickly: adapt to a new situation in order to              Commanders direct deep operations at all levels
accomplish combat tasks without changing task              with fires and maneuver against enemy forces and
organization. Adding depth to a battlefield gives all      functions beyond close operations. Deep operations
forces the space in wbich to disperse. Depth enables       affect the enemy through either attack. or threat of
forces to take actions to minimize vulnerability to        attack. They expand the battlefield in space and time
nuclear attack and nuclear effects. Commanders at          to the full extent of friendly capabilities. Effective
corps and above synchronize nuclear operations by          deep operations further overall mission success and
deconflicting targets, maneuver forces, and nuclear        enhance force protection.
weapons to prevent collateral damage (fratricide)
and to enable commanders to determine, through a              In a nuclear environment, a corps commander
trade-off analysis, whether or not to nominate nu-         nominates targets to be struck with nuclear weapons
clear targets. Loss of digital communications links        in support of corps deep operations according to
because of EMP damage places stress on CSS units           campaign plans. Doing so-
and will affect their ability to provide adequate          • Creates a window for future offensive action.
support functions. Therefore, CS5 units must retain
as much versatility as possible to continue the mission.   • Destroys, slows, or reduces reinforcing forces.
                                                           • Creates the time and space for maneuver against
                                                              attacking echelons.
                                                           • Destroys high-payoff targets.
   Three closely related sets of activities-deep,          • Forces dispersal of enemy units.
close, and rear operations-are characteristic of an
area of operations. Commanders conduct opera-              • Creates obstacles which canalize, delay, and dis-
tions in AOs simultaneously throughout the depth              rupt enemy forces.
of the battlefield and mass both effects and forces        • Destroys enemy staging areas.
when and where necessary to accomplish the
mission.                                                      A variety of systems deliver nuclear strikes in
                                                           support of aeep operations. Corps- and operational-
  United States operations must appear to the en-          level commanders integrate these nuclear strikes
emy to be one continuous operation against him.            with other deep attacks tmaneuver, fires, or both).

FM 100-30

   The importance of near-real time target acquisi-
tion in deep operations dominates tire planning. It         Characteristics   Effects

calls for speed from target acquisition to target           Surprise          "A large amount of fire power
                                                                               with minimal warning.
                                                                              ·Confusion and shock.
Rear operations help provide freedom of action and
continuity of operations, logistics, and battle com-        Concentration     "Massing nuclear effects without
                                                                               massing troops.
mand. Their primary purposes are to sustain the
current close, as well as deep, fights and to position                        • Protecting forces by not con-
                                                                                centrating units.
the force for future operations. Therefore, com-
manders operating in a nuclear environment must             Tempo             "Increasing the tempo of
make every effort to reduce the effects of an en-
emy's use of nuclear weapons by implementing                                  • Decreasing our tempo because
                                                                                of an enemy attack.
actions to ensure dispersal, survivability, and force
protection.                                                 Audacity          "Putting the enemy on the def-
                                                                               ense psychologically and phy-
NOTE: See Chapter 2 for discussion of rear opera-
tions mitigation techniques.
                                                         Figure 5-1. Effects of nuclear weapons on the
                                                               four characteristics of the offense
      OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS                               highest priority normally are those which are most
   The main feature of an offensive battle is out-       liKely to affect the campaign's outcome. Nuclear
flanking or bypassing the defender; that is, taking      weapons quickly break down enemy resistance and
the initiative. Surprise, concentration, tempo, and      help the attacking force achieve maximum
audacity characterize offensive operations and are       penetration.
components of initiative. While strategic, opera-        NOTE: See FM 100-15.
tional, or tactical considerations may require de-
fense, the defeat of an enemy force at any level may        In the offense, the corps commander can nomi-
require shifting to the offense.                         nate nuclear targets-
   NOTE: See Figure 5-1 to determine the effects of      • To create opportunities for deep attacks.
nuclear weapons on the four characteristics of the       • To weight the main effort.
                                                         • To destroy or neutralize supporting forces.
   The offense is the decisive form of war-the
commander's ultimate means of imposing his will          • To sustain the fight.
on the enemy. Nuclear weapons can help the com-          • To protect exposed flanks.
mander achIeve his aim and can greatfy enhance
offensive operations. They help achieve surprise,
create confusion, and enable a commander to exe-                         Forms of Tactical
cute his attack vigorously while minimizing risks                              Offense
elsewhere. Operational-level and corps command-
ers may nominate nuclear weapons to seize the               The four general forms of tactical offense are
initiative, maintain the momentum, attack                movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pur-
strengths, and destroy threats. Maneuver forces can      suit. Different forms of attack tsimultaneously oc-
then exploit the shock the nuclear attack causes.        curring throughout the operational area in closely
 However, a nuclear environment increases the risks      aligned phases that shift back and forth) take new
to attacking forces as well, and requires enhanced       forms and offer increasing options for development.
security ana survivability projections.                  For example, as part of an offensive campaign, the
                                                         corps might be given a mission which cou1d require
   The lowest level of offensive theater nuclear         integrating theater nuclear fires with maneuver to
 nomination occurs at the corps level. Targets of        achieve success. When the corps commander rec-

                                                                                                                       FM 100-30

    Forms                 Probability of Nomination                     Form              Effect

    Movement to contact   • Very low probability of Initial use.        Frontal attack     o Reduces     the need for nuclear
                                                                                               weapons when attacking across
    Attack                                                                                     the entire fro nt.
    -Hasty                • Low probability in close opera-
                            tions.                                      Penetration        o   Enhances penetration when
                                                                                               using low-yieid nuclear weapons.
                          • High probability in deep opera-
                            tions                                       Envelopment        o   Fixes the defender in place
                                                                                               while maneuver units envelop his
    -Deliberate           • Low probability in close opera-                                    flanks or rear
                                                                        Turning movement °Protects maneuver forces and
                          • High probability in deep opera-                               attacks the enemy rear by using
                            tions.                                                        nuclear weapons as deep fires.
                          • Higher probability of destroying            Infiltratio n          °Not applicable to this form of
                            and/or disrupting enemy nuclear
                            delivery units. chemical. and/or
                            biological facilities, C'. logi"tics.
                            and armored formations.

    Exploitation          • High probability in deep opera-             Figure 5-3. Nuclear-weapons effects on
                            tions to block withdrawal routes                      forms of maneuver
                            or avenues of approach for

    Pursuit               • High probability of blocking
                            routes of retreat.
                          o   Low probability of nominating
                                                                      In a nuclear environment, as in conventional
                              targets by the corps.                 combat, the commander can achieve advantages
                                                                    in maneuver only through continuous planniQg
                                                                    and swift execution. The considerations of MSIT,
    Figure 5-2. Probability of nomination of                        CDD, and crossing NIGA-contaminated areas
       nuclear weapons in various forms                             dictate the placement of the DGZ. Figure 5-3
               of tactical offense                                  depicts various nuclear-weapons effects on the
                                                                    forms of maneuver.

ommends nuclear weapons to support the offense,
                                                                                        PLANNING THE
he must consider-                                                                         OFFENSE
• Nominating the highest payoff targets.                               Planning for nuclear-weapons use in support of
• The minimum safe distance for troop safety.                       corps operations is continuous and congruent with
                                                                    all other planning; it does not depend on the quantity
• The least separation distance for key man-made                    of nuclear weapons nominated. The planning con-
  features.                                                         siderations are appropriate to offensive operations.
                                                                    The commander and his staff must consider
• The collateral-damage distance for the protection                 METT -T factors when nominating nuclear targets.
  of civilians.
The effects of nuclear weapons on forms of tactical
offense affect each differently (Figure 5-2).                                             Mission
                                                                      Offensive operations normally allow subordinate
              Forms of Maneuver                                     commanders the greatest possible freedom. They
                                                                    focus on their mission and the commander's intent
   The forms of maneuver are frontal attack, pene-                  and make appropriate preparations for anticipated
tration, envelopment, infiltration, and turning                     actions, incluaing likely developments and oppor-
movement. Commanders use these to orient on the                     tunities for nuclear-weapons use. However, when
enemy, not the terrain. The commander's concept                     nominating nuclear weapons, the commander as-
of operations details how he will use fires to support              sumes greater control over subordinate command-
whatever form of maneuver he selects.                               ers to ensure adequate coordination.

FM 100-30

                       Enemy                                 CONDUCTING OFFENSIVE
   Anticipating and planning against the effects of              OPERATIONS
enemy nuclear-weapons use against friendly forces
is critical to campaign design. Commanders must            The commander plans and coordinates force
ask, "Does the enemy have nuclear capability?" If       movement in detail to avoid confusion and delay
the answer is no, the question is moot. If the answer   and to gain surprise. He concentrates his forces
is yes, commanders must address issues such as          quickly, making maximum use of cover and con-
dispersion, type, yield, delivery means, availability   cealment, signal security, and deception while
of weapons, doctrine, tactics, and the likelihood of    avoiding or masking actions that would alert the
use.                                                    enemy to the coming attack. He then conducts the
                                                        attack rapidly and vlOlently with concentrated fire-
                                                        power to disrupt enemy positions and hit deep in the
                        Troops                          enemy rear. Nuclear weapons can enhance and sup-
   The number and type of troops available could        port such plans by provining-
greatly affect the tactical plan. Nuclear weapons can   • Destructive firepower. Nuclear weapons, even
rapidly and decisively enhance combat power.              when limited, can help friendly forces cause great
Smaller forces possessing nuclear weapons can ac-         destruction of enemy positions with a minimum
complish the mission of rarger forces not possessing      concentration of forces.
nucIear weapons. The unit's RES determines its
fitness for duty. The lower the RES, the healthier      • Surprise. Because delivery of nuclear fires re-
the soldiers.                                             quires little visible unit preparation, surprise can
                                                          be complete. However, OPSEC within the stock-
NOTE: See FM 3-3-1.                                       pile-to-target sequence is essential. Forces must
                                                          avoid a great display of preparation before nu-
             Terrain and Weather                          clear strikes to prevent the loss of surprise.
   Terrain and weather can affect nuclear-weapons       • Shock. Nuclear-weapons use disorganizes, de-
operations and influence offensive maneuver. For          moralizes, and freezes enemy forces in place.
example, tree blowdown in a heavily forested area         However, these effects will only be temporary;
wouln obstruct the forward movement of friendly           exploitation must be immediate.
                                                        • Flexibility. As maneuver forces develop the situ-
   Normally, tactical fallout will not be significant     ation, the commander can nominate nuclear
in a low air burst. However, weather conditions           weapons to develop a major operation. He might
could cause rainout in the area of operations. There-     also substitute nuclear weapons for maneuver
fore, if rain or snow falls through a nuclear cloud,      forces, allowing a smaller force to succeed in its
significant tactical fallout may occur. Rain and fog      attack against a stronger force.
can also lessen the blast wave as it travels througn
dense air.                                              • Obstacles. A nuclear weapon can alter terrain to
                                                          create obstacles such as fa11en trees, fires, craters,
                                                          rubble, and radiation. This nearly instant creation
                 Time Available                           of massive obstacles will allow a smaller force to
                                                          succeed where a larger force might ordinarily be
   Offensive actions become harder to conduct             required. Creation of obstacles Slows and canal-
when the enemy has had time to organize his de-           izes counterattacks and denies terrain to the
fense. The friendly commander can nominate nu-            threat. But, like shock and surprise, obstacles are
clear weapons to effect surprise, prolong confusion,      temporary. Conversely, obstacles can impede
and sustam disorganization. Conversely, the nomi-         forward maneuver if the commander has not con-
nation process can erode friendly units' available        sidered least-separation distances.
time because of the necessity of having to relay
information and requests up through the chain of         Nuclear weapons can provide the commander
command and back Gown again.                            with a unique advantage. However, he equally

                                                                                                    FM 100-30

realizes that the advantages of surprise and shock          Commanders must consider the enemy's poten-
are fleeting and only initially effective.               tial nuclear-weapons use and Rrotect tneir forces
                                                         accordingly. The possible use of US nuclear weap-
NOTE: The trade-off matrix in Figure 5-4, page 5-6,      ons can also strongly influence a commander's al-
is a decision-making tool to help commanders de-         ternate plans and fielp strengthen the usefulness of
termine whether or not to nominate nuclear weap-         reserve forces. The senior Army commander can
ons in the offense.                                      nominate nuclear targets without shifting maneuver
                                                         forces. Since he retains a reserve of forces to allow
                                                         for flexibility in responding to an attack, using
      CHARACTERISTICS OF                                 nuclear weapons in support of or in lieu of a reserve
     DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS                                provides adaitional combat power to enhance con-
                                                         tingency plans.
  Nuclear weapons are significant force multipli-
ers. Their primary roles are to significantly defeat        Time is the basic ingredient of a successful de-
enemy forces and help friendly forces seize the          fense. The corps commander can integrate nuclear
initiative and transition to offensive operations, as    targets into the defense-
previously discussed. The most effective use of          • To destroy assault forces and echelons before
nuclear weapons in the defense is to destroy the            they penetrate the main battle area (MBA).
enemy's synchronization by-
                                                         • To blunt or stop a penetration.
• Breaking the tempo of his operation.
                                                         • To destroy forces in a penetration.
• Preventing him from concentrating his strength
   against key portions of the defense.                  • To disrupt enemy C.
• Separating his forces.                                 • To destroy or disrupt enemy logistic support for-
• Attacking and neutralizing his artillery.
                                                         • To protect forces during counterattacks
• Interdicting routes and disrupting or destroying
   critical deep facilities.                             • To create opportunities for offensive actions.
• Interrupting his fire support, logistic support, or       The corps' defensive pattern depends on
   C 2•                                                  METT-T. There are two defense patterns--mobile
                                                         defense and area defense. Regardless of which de-
   The defender can nominate nuclear weapons to          fense a commander chooses, fie uses nuclear-option
enhance combat power and to reduce his risks in          methodology to nominate nuclear targets.
sectors which require economy of force operations.
In addition, the threat of or actual use of nuclear
weapons puts amassed enemy attacking force at risk                         Mobile Defense
and presents him with a dilemma. For example, the           Mobile defense is the defense of an area or posi-
purpose of corps and JFLCC-nominated nuclear-            tion in which maneuver is used with organization of
weapons use would be to disrl!P.~ an enemy's con-        fires and utilization of terrain to seize the initiative
centration and flexibility. lWhether nuclear             from the enemy. That is, it orients on the enemy
weapons are nominated or not, the possibility of         (either his defeat or his destruction) by employing
their use will significantly influence how the enemy     a combination of fire and maneuver, offense, de-
operates.) As enemy units advance toward the             fense, and delay tactics. Characteristics of mobile
FLOT, they become committed to specific attack           defense are that it-
avenues, leaving fewer maneuver alternatives. The
threat of nuclear-weapons use can force an aggres-       • Orients on the enemy's defeat or destruction.
sor to stay dispersed, inviting defeat in detail lthat   • Reguires allocation of the minimum force to the
is, units can engage these smaller individual units         defense.
by conventional means nearer the FLOT). When
used in this way, threatening to use nuclear weapons     • Requires maximum combat power to the mobile
becomes a deterrent.                                        striking force (MSF).

FM 100-30

• Strikes at the decisive moment.                              the striking force and on the location of nuclear
                                                               DGZs. In addition, the strking force may have to
• Occurs simultaneously throughout the depth of                cross areas contaminated by fallout and initial radia-
  the battlefield.                                             tion. (See FM 3-3- 1.) The commander uses the
• Uses lethal and nonlethal systems.                           trade-off matrix in Figure 5-4 to recommend the
                                                               final delivery time.
• Requires greater mobility than the enemy's.
                                                               NOTE: The trade-off matrix is a decision-making
• Requires considerable depth of terrain.                      tool to help commanders determine GO or NO-GO
                                                               when nominating targets in either mobile or area
• Trades terrain for maximum effect in order to                defense.
  overextend the enemy that the striking force is
  to attack.
• Sets up large-scale counterattacks.
                                                                                   Area Defense
   In a mobile defense, timing the execution of nu-
clear weapons by EAC and the execution of the                     Commanders conduct area defense to deny the
striking force is critical. Nuclear weapons can sig-           enemy access to designated terrain or facilities for
nificantly offset the size of the striking force if            a specified time. Commanders, seeking to destroy
nuclear weapons are employed on the enemy just                 enemy forces with interlocking fires, organize an
before the mobile striking force crosses the line of           area defense around a static framework tnat defen-
departure (LD). Specific Ctechniques (such as                  sive positions (forward and/or in depth) provide. In
gr~phically depicting the minimum-safe distance                some cases an area defense can be part of a larger
(MSD), the least-separation distance (LSD), and the            mobile defense. Commanders employ local coun-
collateral-damage distance (CDD) on the opera-                 terattacks against enemy units penetrating between
tions overlay) can deconflict planned movements of             defensive positions.

         Effects                                       Distances
                                                      Air Movement         Ground Movement
                       MSO      loSO       COD        Distance (AMO)        Distance (GMO)          = Results
                                                     GomO-GO (note)
         Resolution:              MSD-Make troops safer or move DGZ.
                                  LSD-Move DGZ.
                                  COD-Make civilian safer or move DGL
                                  AMD-Ground aircraft.
                                  GMD-Change ground pian or use mitigation techniques
         NOTE: Place a GO/NO-GO in each blank. The commander must resolve all NO-GOs or the decision is a

                                        Figure 5-4. The trade-off matrix

                                                                                                   FM 100-30

   The depth of the defense varies according to the                            Enemy
situation. Commanders position their forces on
suitable terrain with specific orientation and direc-     The commander must determine if the enemy
tion of fire or in sectors. Positioning of nuclear      does or does not have nuclear capability. Because
targets allows the commander to deploy his forces       of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, this deter-
in greater depth and compels the enemy to retard        mination becomes increasingly cntical to all com-
mass to achieve a penetration. After an enemy at-       manders. When planning the defense, the
tack, defending forces can use mobility to exploit      commander analyzes the enemy's doctrine, equip-
the effects of nuclear weapons on the enemy to seize    ment, recent or past tendencies, mtent, and prooaole
the initiative and transition to the defense.           COAs. From this information he determines critical
                                                        points in time and space for enemy and friendly
                                                        vulnerabilities during the battle.
             PLANNING THE                                  The foundation of a defensive ~lan is locating,
               DEFENSE                                  containing, and defeating the enemy s main and sup-
                                                        porting efforts. In particular, commanders must antici-
                                                        pate tfie enemy's use of indirect approaches and his
  Planning the defense begins when commanders           ability to project combat power into the rear area by
receive a mission or perceive a requirement to de-      long-range fires, infiltration, air mobility, unconven-
fend. The results of tbe defense snould satisfy the     tional warfare, and WMD, especially nuclear weap-
intent of the next two higher commanders and set        ons. Based on this anticipation, the force can employ
the terms for future operations. The planning proc-     mitigation techniques to enhance survivability.
ess begins while the target is still deep.
   Commanders may need to modify original plans                               Troops
as the situation changes. Therefore, tactical forma-
tions must be able to modify their direction of            When assigning missions during planning, com-
movement or reorient defenses during operations.        manders should consider their forces' composition,
                                                        the level of teamwork, the state of training, and their
  The defense, no less than the offense, should         leaders' experience. The mobility, protection, mo-
achieve surprise. Commanders must consider              rale, and training of troops determine to some extent
METT-T factors when conducting their estimates          how they will perform.
of how to meet mission requirements.
                                                           On the nuclear battlefield, corps and lower com-
                                                        manders must also consider subordinate units' RES
                     Mission                            levels when determining which units will be avail-
                                                        able for defense operations. Commanders must also
   The mission is the first consideration in planning   consider troop-safety levels for defending units and
the defense. Is the mission an area or a mobile         troop-safety criteria for forces left in place.
defense? If it is an area defense, nuclear weapons
can help attrit and defeat the enemy's main effort.
If it is a mobile defense, nuclear weapons can en-                   Terrain and Weather
hance the striking force's combat power.                   The defender must decide where he can best stop
                                                        the enemy, then plan accordingly. Studying the
  The commander must make his intent clear as to        terrain the enemy must traverse gives valuabIe in-
the type of defense he will conduct and for the         formation and may decisively influence the posi-
nuclear targets he plans to nominate. He must make      tioning of defense forces. The defending force must
his intent known as early as possible in order to       exploit any aspect of terrain that would impair en-
integrate nuclear nominations into either defense.      emy momentum or make it difficult for him to
Nuclear-weapons use would stop the momentum of          achieve mass or to conduct maneuver.
the attacker or shock and confuse him, making him
susceptible to an attack by the reserve.                  Defenders can use the effects of nuclear weapons
                                                        to take advantage of the terrain-tree blowdown,
NOTE: See also Chapter 4.                               rubble, and fires. Such obstacles, when combined

FM 100-30

with poor weather, can isolate the battlefield or slow      The corps commander normally nominates nu-
or canalize enemy movement or protect friendly           clear targets in deep-operations areas and as excep-
positions and maneuver.                                  tions in close operations. The results of rear
                                                         operations must ensure the corps' freedom of action.
  Terrain effects can also complicate exploitation       The corps reserve operates in Doth area and mobile
of a counterattack by reserve forces. The defender       defenses.
can modify terrain to provide protection from nu-
clear-weapons effects to his advantage. For exam-
ple, a fortifying rear-slope position of company- or                     Deep Operations
platoon-size units can mitigate initial nuclear-weap-
ons effects.                                               Deep operations-
  Weather and visibility affect how a defender or-       • Can disrupt the enemy's preparation and move-
ganizes his forces on the terrain. Commanders must         ment.
anticipate and plan for the impact of adverse
weather or limited visibility on weapons systems         • Destroy high-payoff targets.
and optical devices. However, a defensive plan that      • Inhibit or deny vital enemy operating systems
succeeds in clear conditions may be less effective         (C, logistics, air defense).
in periods of bad weather. Contingencies to the
basic plan should address necessary modifications        • Create windows of opportunity for future ma-
to the defense during periods of reduced visibility.       neuver operations.
NOTE: See also Chapter 2.                                  The commander can nominate nuclear targets to
                                                         achieve these ends, concentrating on destroying,
                                                         delaying, and disrupting high-payoff targets.
                  Time Available                         Massed units, headquarters, ana logistics areas are
   The amount of time to allot for preparation is        lucrative enemy targets. Corps commanders may
crucial. The defense is far more effective when time     include transportation networks and LOCs as high-
is available to conduct necessary planning. Small        payoff targets because their destruction would slow
units train to defend with minimal preparation; how-     the forward movement of armored forces.
ever, strong defenses take time to organize and
prepare. For example, the CINC and the opera-               The corps fights the deep operation while it
tional-level commander must provide enough time          monitors and supports the corps' close operation.
to the corps commander for proper preparation.           The division's deep and close operations consti-
Tactical commanders must nave enough time to             tute the corps' close operation. The deep opera-
prepare defensive plans. Corps commanders must           tion isolates the battlefield and allows the corps
have time to conduct the decision-making process         to deal with a larger force than if nuclear weapons
to nominate targets.                                     were not used.
   Lack of time may compel commanders to main-
tain a larger than normaf reserve force or to accept                     Close Operations
greater risks than usual. They must avoid this. They
and their battle staffs shouli:l take advantage of all     The corps commander positions forces in the
available time in preparing the defense.                 MBA to control or repel penetration. The most
                                                         demanding missions will be against enemy units
                                                         close to US ground forces because those missions
                                                         require effective strikes against mobile targets with-
      CONDUCTING DEFENSIVE                               out causing nuclear-induced friendly casualties.
          OPERATIONS                                     The ability to deliver nuclear weapons close to the
                                                         FLOT contributes to-
   Commanders should use all available combat
Rower in a unified and synchronized plan for con-        • The deterrence of nuclear strikes against US and
i:lucting defensive operatlOns. The plan should also       allied ground forces because of the assured capa-
include nuclear planning considerations.                   bilities to answer in kind.

                                                                                                   FM 100-30

• Creating a nuclear shield for US and/or allied                          SUMMARY
   theater buildup.
• A hedge against conventional failure.                      The tenents of Army operations, combined with
                                                         the activities in the area of operations, express
   Commanders must anticipate the need to nomi-          where nuclear support applies to combat operations
nate nuclear weapons no less than 96 hours away          in both the offense and the defense. The nomination
from the delivery time. The overriding factor will       of nuclear weapons enhances the characteristics of
be troop safety and preclusion of collateral damage.     offensive weapons. Weafons effects influence the
Therefore, nuclear weapons delivered in the close        various characteristics 0 the offense. In the forms
battle, by necessity, will be in the lower yield         of tactical offense, the probability of the nomination
spectrum. Weapons with low circular-error prob-          of nuclear weapons ranges from very low to high.
abilities (CEPs) ensure higher accuracy.                 The discussion also incfudes nuclear-weapons ef-
                                                         fects on forms of maneuver. Such effects range from
                                                         fixing the defender during an envelopment to having
                Rear Operations                          little to no applicability during infiltration.
   The corps commander must plan rear operations             Nuclear characteristics of defensive operations
to retain freedom of action and to sustain the force.    focus on target nomination against attacking enemy
Unit and individual nuclear mitigation techniques        forces and compare application of nuclear weapons
help maintain this freedom of action.                    in both the mobile and the area defense. Planning
NOTE: See FM 100-15 for more information on              for either defense must include consideration of
rear operations.                                         METT-T factors. Planners can use a trade-off ma-
                                                         trix to determine the feasibility of nominating nu-
                                                         clear targets when compared to the basic effects
               Reserve Operations                        such weapons emit. This process leads to how the
   Nuclear weapons can greatly enhance the flexi-        force will conduct defensive operations. This chap-
bility of reserve units for both mobile and area         ter discusses them in terms of deep, close, and rear
defenses. The commander can use the reserves to-         as well as reserve operations.
• Exploit vulnerabilities to counterattack.                  The threat tying the defense discussion together
                                                         is the nomination of nuclear targets. The objective
• Create opportunities for a counterattack.              of defensive operations is to defend only until the
• Destroy isolated threat forces.                        defending force has gained sufficient strength be-
                                                         fore it attacks.
• Prevent enemy counterattacks against his flanks.
                                                             This chapter also discusses planning for offensive
   At the corps level and above, small counterattack-    operations in terms of METT:f factors. Finally, the
ing forces supported by nuclear weapons can              trade-off matrix is used to determine the feasIbility
acfiieve the results of a much larger conventional       of conducting offensive operations.
force. This leads to a transition to conduct offensive

                                                 Chapter 6
                        COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN
                         A NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT

       THE COMBAT SERVICE                                    COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
         SUPPORT PROCESS                                          OPERATIONS
   Combat service support is the essential capabili-        The destructiveness of nuclear weapons will
ties, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to      IJlace an extremely high value on CSS operations.
sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at   Consequently, successful CSS operations must be
all levels of war. It includes the functional areas of   effective and efficient. There are live characteristics
supply, transportation, maintenance, combat health       of effective, efficient CSS operations: anticipation,
support, personnel, support, and field services.         integration, continuity, responsiveness, and
   In a nuclear environment large CSS facilities (less   improvisation.
 medical facilities) and activities are prime targets.
Therefore, CSS commanders must integrate protec-                            Anticipation
tive measures and procedures into daily operations
to ensure CSS functions will continue. To maintain          Anticipation means developing versatile and mo-
 combat capability, commanders must sustain their        bile CSS capabilities that can accommodate events
 forces with self-sufficient and well-trained CSS        in a nuclear environment. Combat service support
units.                                                   planners must consider the impact of nuclear-weap-
                                                         ons use by either enemy or friendly forces.
   With the dramatic changes nuclear warfare will
cause, the CSS process will become more difficult           Protective measures and procedures to mitigate
to execute and even more critical to mission accom-      nuclear-weapons effects must be a routine part of
plishment. In a nuclear environment-                     operations. Even though the other effects of a nu-
                                                         dear detonation may not affect CSS logistic units,
• Combat service support techniques and proce-           EMP effects could destroy digital and communica-
   dures will require changes.                           tions equipment. Combat service support com-
• The depth of the operational area will increase.       manders must ensure their units are welf-trained and
                                                         know how to protect themselves and their equip-
• The CSS system will become more widely dis-            ment.
   persed, forcing support units farther away from
   supported units.
• Lines of communications will become long and                               Integration
   erratic.                                                 Tactical and operational success depends on fully
• Equipment and supply stockpiles will have to be        integrated support. However, integrating CSS ac-
   smaller and more widely dispersed.                    tivities will be more difficult after nuclear-weapons
                                                         use by either enemy or friendly forces because-
• Digital and communications equipment used for
   managing CSS functions will be vulnerable to          •   The tempo of battle will increase.
   EMP effects.                                          •   Response times may be shorter.
• Training of CSS personnel will need to include         •   Support requirements may be greater.
   how to construct overhead cover and how to
   monitor, decontaminate, and coordinate obstacle       •   There will be greater than normal losses of per-
   clearance.                                                sonnel and equipment.
NOTE: See FM 3-3 and FM 3-3-1 for specific               • Distances will be greater because of the disper-
techniques.                                                sion of the force.

FM 100-30

                   Continuity                           changing situations. Combat service support per-
                                                        s?~nel .must be able to react to emergencies, impro-
  Continuity of support is the lifeblood of combat      vIsmg If necessary to continue operations.
~perations. Forces on the battlefield require con-
tmuous CSS to sustain fighting strength and agility.       Improvisation methods and supply sources can
                                                        help maintain CSS continuity when standard proce-
  T? maintain continuous operations in a nuclear        dures fa~l. For example, planners and operators may
envIro~me~t, ~SS    units m~st avoid radiological       h~ve to Improve a support system after it has been
contammatIOn, mcrease theIr mobility with more          dIsrupted by an enemy nuclear detonation. How
tr~n~portation, and mitigate initial and residual ra-
                                                        well they react to such a challenge will be key to the
dI~t10n effects. Mitigation techniques include
                                                        force's survival.
• U~it dispersio~ consistent with operational re-
  qUIrements to mcrease nuclear survivability.             COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
• Overhead shelter, shielding materials, nuclear-                FUNCTIONS
  hardened materials and shelters, and protective
  covers to lessen initial and residual radiation
  effects.                                                            Personnel Support
• Nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance         The systems of personnel readiness management,
  assets.                                               casualty management, ,replacement management,
                                                        and personnel accountmg and strength reporting
• Adequate decontamination capabilities.                meet Army personnel requirements from mobiliza-
NOTE: Contaminated units must faithfully follow         tion and deployment through redeployment and
decontamination procedures to ensure Hie maxi-          demobilization.
mum effectiveness of available assets. See also          . Per~onnel readiness managers prepare requisi-
FM 3-5 and FM 3-100.                                    t10ns I~ advance of hostilities based on projected
                                                        l~sses hnked to the command's vulnerability analy-
                                                        SIS. The commander updates battlefield require-
                  Responsiveness                        ments and casualty reports during hostilities.
   The CSS system must rapidly react to crises. As         Casualty operations managers require increased
a rule, CSS commanders and staffs tailor and adapt      support to be able to accurately report the large
uni.ts to fit mission requirements, often on short      n~mbers of immedi~te casualties nuclear weapons
~otIce. Th~ CSS response requires units to reestab-
hsh an unmterrupted support system or redirect an       wIll cause and the Increased casualties that will
entire operational effort as a result of enemy WMD      occur from intermediate and long-term radiation
use. Combat and combat support (CS) units that          effects. There will be extremely high losses of man-
perform high-priority missions receive priority CSS     power and materiel; rapid replacement will be
support.                                                essential.
   Criti~al suppli~s.will be temporarily prestocked
                                                           Replacement management provides replacement
near pomts of antIcIpated consumption to aid ongo-      personnel (individuals, crews, and teams) based on
ing operations. However, planners must emphasIze        existing and projected losses. The theater replace-
the need ~o reduce excessive buildup of stocks in       ment system must be responsive to the Army service
areas subject ~o nuclear attack. When possible, re-     component commander's (ASCC) priorities in or-
supply operatlOns should occur at night.                der to provide replacements for soldiers most se-
                                                        verely Ciisabled by nuclear effects.
                   Improvisation                          To sustain the force, CSS planners must carefully
                                                        coordinate with maneuver and fire support planners
   Improvisation is the talent to make invent ar-       to locate, prestock, and stage supplies and equip-
range, or fabricate what is needed out ~f what is at    ment well forward. They must be prepared to relo-
hand. Successful logistic operations adapt to           cate unused supplies and support, or if this is not

                                                                                                   FM 100-30

possible, destroy them (except medical supplies) to      wide discretionary authority to repair, cannibalize,
prevent their capture. It is vital to return critical    evacuate, or destroy unserviceable equipment.
equipment to units as rapidly as possible.
                                                           Performing maintenance in a contaminated envi-
   When the commander decentralizes tactical units,      ronment requires balancing several conflicting re-
CSS units must also assume dispersed, decentral-         quirements. The prime objective will be to rapidly
ized, and possibly forward positions to increase         return equipment to the user in a mission-capable
their capaoility to support the force. However, this     condition.
decentralization must be balanced with the ability
to provide responsive, uninterrupted support to the        The commander issues guidance as to whether to
force.                                                   repair or abandon damaged equipment or to recover
                                                         and evacuate it to an uncontaminated area. He bases
   Class VI, personal demand items, are normally         his guidance on-
sold througn the exchange system. Combat service
support units issue only essential Class VI items        • The tactical situation.
along with Class I supplies in an active nuclear         • How critical the equipment is.
                                                         • The type and extent of contamination.
                  Maintenance                            • The time and resources available.
   Maximizing equipment availability is a necessity         Maintenance units in contaminated areas use col-
in supporting a force-projection army. The differ-       lective protection shelters and existing fixed facili-
ence between success and failure may be in-              ties to provide as much protection as possible for
                                                         critical personnel and work areas. As soon as the
• Having sound maintenance practices in all units.       tactical situation permits, units decontaminate inop-
• Positioning maintenance capabilities forward.          erable equipment before it is recovered or evacuated
                                                         to the support maintenance unit. If units cannot
• Ensuring that units well-understand priorities for     determine the degree of contamination, they mark
  recovery and repair.                                   the materiel using appropriate NBC markers.
• Having quickly accessible repair parts.                   To operate in the same environment as combat
• Overcoming the absence of repair parts normally        elements, maintenance elements in the forward
   requisitioned from CONUS depots via digital           combat area use maintenance element vehicles
   communications.                                       whose mobility, protection, survivability, and com-
                                                         munications are compatible with those of the sup-
   The commander may restrict maintenance sup-           ported force. Maintenance units are to salvage only
port to emergency or short-term repairs because of       critical items in short supply. Upon command ap-
the high volume of vehicles a nuclear detonation         proval, they might possibly need to salvage critical
would damage. When battle conditions permit,             contaminated items in order to return major weap-
maintenance support teams (MST) can perform              ons systems to operation.
more thorough on-site maintenance. Decontamina-
tion teams must assist MSTs before repair. The              Class IX, repair parts and components, includes
MST's performance will be degraded and repair            kits and assemblies and items required for mainte-
times may increase when performing maintenance           nance supyort of all equipment. Units store and
on contaminated vehicles.                                transport Class IX repair parts in specially designed
                                                         transporters for ease of movement and to reduce
   In the initial stages of nuclear conflict, maneuver   exposure to contamination. Combat service support
elements must rely on organic maintenance capa-          units issue contaminated Class IX items only during
bilities. They will need to Rerform battle damage        emergencies.
assessment and repair (BDAR). They must separate
vehicles into categories such as light damage, mod-         Supply units widely disperse repair parts in the
erate damage, or severe damage even though they          corps rear area to reduce vulnerability to nuclear
might not nave access to testmg, measuring, and          weapons. Units store critical items in repair parts
diagnostic equipment. The commander should grant         vans to reduce contamination and to ease

FM 100-30

decontamination. Combat service support units is-      cies. Army and Air Force aviation units conduct
sue repair parts in containers to protect the parts    emergency resupply of isolated units.
from becoming contaminated in transit. They issue
all uncontaminated items before issuing decontami-        Combat service support units should disperse pe-
nated items. They check repair parts, especially       troleum storage locations and activities to reduce
sensitive electronic parts, for damage before issue.   vulnerability and to prevent catastrophic losses.
                                                       They must protect back-up equipment to the same
                                                       degree as primary equipment and regularly practice
                 Transportation                        fire-fighting and other safety procedures.
   Soldiers, patients, equipment, and supplies must       Whether performing combat, CS, or CSS func-
be moved rapidly and in sufficient quantities to       tions, all units require uninterrupted fueling to per-
support comtiat operations. Tactical actions require   form effectively. Commanders must ensure the
timely concentration of units and materiel and often   protection of fuel-storage facilities because such are
demand short-notice movement of large forces and       extremely vulnerable to blast and thermal effects.
major shifts in direction of movement.
                                                         Units making survivability moves or exploiting
  There are a large number of factors which hinder     nuclear-weapons effects will consume more fue1
efficient operations in a nuclear environment (tree    than anticipated. This, coupled with the possible
blowdown, supply route closings, contamination         loss of large amounts of fuel, makes the CSS
avoidance, EMP effects on vehicle ignition systems     function key.
and aircraft electrical components and systems, and
refugee movements). Therefore, all plans and op-       NOTE: See FM 3-4 for mitigation techniques.
erations must be flexible enough to allow successful
execution in a nuclear environment. Transportation
units will require greater flexibility in selecting           Combat Health Support (CHS)
routes, marslialing areas, convoy configurations,
and, particularly, designating communications             Although combat health support on the nuclear
means.                                                 battlefielcffollows the basic principles of field medi-
                                                       cine, the independent, dispersed nature of combat
  Alternative route planning is essential. Move-       complicates this effort. Nuclear-weapons use will
ment control elements in a nuclear environment are     cause delays in treatment and increases in mortality
an important link to effective transport operations.   and morbidity. The principles in appropriate medI-
                                                       cal field manuals wi1l still be valid out will need to
   Class III, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL),    be modified for specific situations.
includes petroleum fuels, hydraulic and insulating
oils, chemical products, antifreeze compounds,            Centralized command with decentralized execu-
compressed gases, and coal. These items are highly     tion characterizes medical operations. Medical or-
critical in a nuclear environment. Frequently con-     ganizations must establish CHS away from
ducting survivability movements increases con-         potential nuclear targets and anticipate extreme
sumption of petroleum products and delivery            surges in patient workload from mass casualty
requirements. This need may require an increase in     situations.
bulk-fuel storage capacity in the corps area and the
addition of more petroleum companies. Storage             Triage is the medical process of classifying pa-
tanks and storage Bladders used for bulk petroleum     tients into four priority groups in which patients
are vulnerable to the effects of thermal and blast.    receive medical treatment: immediate, minimal, de-
Units must take special care to reduce or prevent      layed, and expectant. Triage ensures the maximum
contamination of tanks and bladders.                   benefit to the largest numoer of patients. Medical
                                                       personnel use different triage priorities for patients
  When situations allow, corps petroleum units         with radiation, conventiona1, or combined injuries.
may provide throughput support to the forward          The consequences of radiation injury are potentially
support battalion lFSB). The units can deliver         severe. Medical personnel use radiation dose infor-
supplies directly to tactical units and to forward     mation during the triage process if it is available.
arming and refueling points (FARPs) in emergen-        Also, commanders and leaders monitor their

                                                                                                    FM 100-30

soldiers' radiation levels and provide that informa-         Combat health logistic personnel ensure that
tion to medical personnel upon evacuation.                medical sURplies are protected from contamination
    Commanders, leaders, and soldiers can help            and are as free of contamination as possible before
medical personnel as much as possible to ensure the       issue to user units.
best care possible for the mass casualties expected          Class VIII, medical material, includes medicine,
from nuclear-weapons use. They can identify radia-        stretchers, surgical instruments, and soon. Resistant
tion casualties, decontaminate and evacuate casual-       coatings, pacKaging material, or protective cover-
ties, and perform self-aid, buddy-aid, and combat         ings protect medical supplies ancf equipment from
lifesaver (CLS) procedures.                               radiological contamination. Combat health support
    Commanders should use medical advice and in-          personnel pre-position selected critical supply items
formation to weigh the options of keeping soldiers        and provide them on a preplanned resupply basis.
with radiation injuries in the field or sending them        Medical personnel issue all uncontaminated
to CHS facilities. As well as handling radiation          medical supplies and equipment first. They issue
injured patients, the nuclear medical science officer,    contaminateaitems to a medical facility only after
a staff officer of the medical brigade, and a staff       decontamination. They disperse stocks of medical
officer of the medical group help aetermine radia-        supplies to prevent or reduce the damage or con-
tion exposure levels.                                     tammation nuclear weapons cause.
    Dose rate information is valuable in determining
who can return to duty. For example, soldiers who                           Field Services
have transient, initiaf symptoms that are not life
threatening or too disabling or who have minor               Field service support (FSS) consists of food
injuries and low RES can return to duty. This main-       preparation and water purification, laundry and
tains the force's capabilities while ensuring that        shower services and clothing exchange and repair;
soldiers only enter the medical system when neces-        mortuary operations; and airdrop services. Combat
sary or when they become ineffective.                     service support units in a nuclear environment ~ro­
                                                          vide FSS according to existing doctrine, with mmor
   Medical units do not have special hardened pro-        changes. In a nuc1ear environment, FSS generally
tection from blast, thermal, or radiation effects.        consists of only those services which directly affect
They also do not have an organic decontamination          health and samtation as well as such critical services
capability. Therefore, unit commanders must pro-          as airdrop and mortuary operations.
vide this support to preserve and extend medical
capabilities.                                               Changes in Army doctrine require more mobility,
   Commanders cannot hold medical units in re-            responsIveness, and flexibility in Army field feed-
serve. They must plan and continue operations even        ing operations. The new Army Field Feeding Sys-
after medical support is lost, relying only on self-aid   tem-Future (AFFS-F) improves Army field feedmg
and buddy-aid. Therefore, commanders must en-             operations; provides efficiency in laBor, water, and
sure soldiers have proper training.                       fuel requests; and increases mobility.
   Mental health and/or combat stress control person-        Elements organic to the corps support command
nel help soldiers cope with the increased stress of       (COSCOM) and the division support command
operating in a nuclear environment. Preventive medi-      (DISCOM) provide water purification for the corps
cine (PVNTMED) personnel help commanders and              and divisions. The supply company (in direct sup-
quartermaster water production personnel evaluate         port (DS)) provides water purification for nondivi-
the effects of nuclear contamination on drinking-water    sional elements at the tactical and operational levels
supplies. PVNTMED personnel determine if the              on an area basis. These DS capabilities are normally
water is safe for consumption and provide guidance        sufficient for providing the requisite water. How-
on disposal of contaminated water.                        ever, a general support (GS) capability, in the form
                                                          of quartermaster water purification detachments,
   Veterinary personnel inspect and evaluate the          may be necessary in a nuclear environment. Water
safety of food supplies. They also determine when         demands will be high and the likelihood of contami-
it is safe to slaughter animals for consumption.          nation great.

FM 100-30

   Laundry and shower services and clothing ex-                                      Supply
change and repair units may not be available in an
active nuclear environment. However, if units are                General supply support encompasses the provi-
available they will be as close to affected areas as         sion of clothing, water, barrier material, and major
possible. Unit NBC teams and medical specialists             end items in support of the force. These classes of
will conduct radiological monitoring of an person-           supply include all the systems that support the
nel before they shower to detect and segregate con-          solaier.
taminated personnel. Contaminated personnel                      Combat service support units conduct supply op-
follow the decontamination procedures m FM 3-5.              erations according to current doctrine wilen the
The unit will also check clotfiing for contamination         potential for nuclear-weapons use is not likely. As
before it is laundered and monitor waste water for           nuclear risk increases, supply stockage for non-
radiological contamination.                                  essential items will dwindle. This improves mobil-
                                                             ity and lessens the division's vulnerability to nu-
    On a nuclear battlefield all units, when author-         clear attacks. In an active nuclear environment, CSS
ized' will perform hasty burials of contaminated             units will reduce stockage to a level sufficient for
remains at an interim site as close to the place of          mission accomplishment. Units must reduce stock-
death as possible. They are to mark the entire site          ages by the most expedient means in order to en-
with the standard NATO NBC markers. Recovery                 hance mobility and dispersion and to avoid
and decontamination of remains occurs after hos-             contamination.
tilities end (earlier if the tactical situation, time, and
other resources permit). Decontamination of re-                  Combat service support units should issue the
mains is a last priority.                                    most critical supply items on an automatic basis
                                                             using the position locator reference system (PLRS)
  Airdrop requirements significantly increase in a           or a similar system. Forward units ensure that full
nuclear environment. Aircfrop expeaites resupply             basic loads of supplies are on hand and protected
and allows swift bypass of contaminated areas.               against contamination so they can accomjJlish their
Units and airlift assets must consider the following         missions until CSS can resupply them. (Command-
when planning air movements or airlifts in a nuclear         ers should consider emergency resupply by air.)
                                                                 Combat service support units should disperse
• Protective NBC clothing degrades aircrew per-              their stocks to avoid presenting lucrative targets and
  formance and increases misslOn time.                       to minimize risks ofdestruction or contammation.
                                                             They should always issue uncontaminated stocks
• Navigators may have to rely on their own vision            first so they can decontaminate stocks without in-
  if they lose air and ground navigational aids.             terrupting supply support. (Using containers with
• Avoiding contaminated areas requires planning              protective overwrap enhances decontamination.)
  air corridors on alternate routes.                             Combat service support units do not normally
• Loss of available airfields, aviation maintenance          issue contaminated stocks. Units keep contamI-
  facilities and/or stores, and refueling facilities          nated stocks segregated from clean stocKS until they
  will reduce aircraft available for CSS missions.           can be fully decontaminated. However, units may
                                                              issue certain contaminated supplies in emergency
• Off-loading cargo and servicing aircraft under              situations when insufficient uncontaminated sup-
  contaminated conditions will increase mission               plies are available, but only if the supplies will
  time.                                                       provide a decisive tactical advantage to the receiv-
                                                              ing unit.
• Contaminated aircraft, cargo, and personnel will
  require special handling procedures in uncon-                  If units must use contaminated supplies, CSS
  taminatea locations. Icfeally, only uncontami-              units should first issue such supplies to similarly
  nated aircraft will support uncontaminated units.           contaminated units. Only under the most dire cir-
                                                              cumstances should commanders issue contami-
• Air movement operations may require the use of              nated stocks to uncontaminated units. In such dire
  alternate airfields and landing sites to avoid              cases, the issuing and receiving commanders must
  contamination.                                             jointly decide to use contaminated items, basing

                                                                                                      FM 100-30

their decision on the tactical situation, the criticality      Class V, ammunition, includes small-arms
of the items, the type and extent of contamination,         rounds, artillery rounds, hand grenades, explosives,
and the resources available for decontamination.            mines, fuzes, detonators, missiles, and bombs.
                                                            Combat service support units store ammunition at
   Class I, subsistence items, includes gratuitous          dispersed sites to minimize nuclear vulnerability
issue health and welfare items. Upon issue, units           and to complicate the enemy's target -acquisition
should store rations under protective covering or in        efforts. Class V supplies are as mooile as circum-
containers to prevent or reduce contamination.              stances permit.
Combat service support units do not normally pro-
vide preplanned Class I resupply to units in or near           Large-scale decontamination operations may re-
radi010gically contaminated areas. Combat service           quire additional support. If the situation requires
supply personnel replace contaminated stocks on a           units to use contaminated stocks, CSS personnel
priority basis up to authorized levels.                     affix standard NATO NBC markers to the items.
                                                            After issue, the user completes decontamination
   Class II, items of equipment other than princi-          procedures, if required.
pal items, includes indiviaual equipment, clothing,
tents, tools, and administrative and housekeeping             Ammunition support elements at every echelon
supplies. Selected Class 11 items, such as NBC de-          take appropriate defensive measures to minimize
fense equipment, receive priority of issue to se-           the effects of and exposure to nuclear hazards.
lected units. Combat service support units give the         Using protective covers lessens exposure.
highest priority support to--
                                                               Class VII, major end items, includes such things
• Units in contaminated areas.                              as vehicles, self-propelled artillery pieces, miss He
• Units that have recently departed contaminated            launchers, and major weapons systems. Heavy ma-
  areas.                                                    teriel supply companies maintain stockage of Class
                                                            VII items and, with assistance, are responsible for
• Units in forward areas.                                   decontamination and affixing standard NBC mark-
                                                            ers before issue. If at all possible, they must not
  Combat service support personnel-                         abandon radiologically contaminated Class VII
• Pack protective clothing in consolidated pack-            items.
  ages to expedite shipment, reduce handling, and             Class X, material required to support nonmili-
  protect it from nuclear contamination.                    tary programs, includes items such as agricultural
• Pre-position decontamination items at all DS unit         and economic-development project supplies.
  supply locations for resupply of stock held at the        NOTE: See also FM 10-1.
  unit level.
• Issue preconfigured push packages to all units               Miscellaneous items do not fit into any of the
  requiring decontamination supplies.                       other classes. Items include bulk water (as a field
                                                            service item), classified maps, captured enemy ma-
   Class IV, construction and barrier materials,            teriel, salvage material, and so on. Water is the most
includes lumber, sand bags, barbed wire, and so on.         important. Large quantities of water are likely to be
In an active nuclear environment, the DISCOM and            required for decontamination operations. Personnel
other units stock only high-demand, mission-essen-          must not issue or use radiologically contaminated
tial, Class IV items in the division area. The corps        water.
provides all other Class IV support.
                                                               Water from local sources, such as lakes, ponds,
   Combat service support provides selected high-           and water systems, can become contaminated. It is
usage Class TV items. They issue contaminated or            essential to test local water sources for contaminates
partially decontaminated Class IV items only after          before use. Frequent testing is required and continu-
they properly mark and identify them. The user              ous testing is recommended. If quartermaster units
completes decontamination, if required. Large-              suspect a water source is contaminated, they mark
scale decontamination operations may require ad-            it with appropriate NATO NBC contamination
ditional support.                                           markers. Units must not use water until

FM 100-30

quartermaster units test it; treat it, if necessary; and   grate protective measures and procedures into
medical specialists determine that it is safe to use.      aaily operations to ensure necessary functions are
                                                           capable of continuing their missions. The five
   When water becomes contaminated and cannot              characteristics of logistic operations are anticipa-
be treated for drinking, quartermaster or unit per-        tion, integration, continuity, responsiveness, and
sonnel dispose of it In a way that will prevent            improvisation.
secondary contamination. They also mark the area
appropriately. Quartermaster units monitor all                Sustaining soldiers and their equipment takes on
water treatment, storage, distribution, and associ-        additional meaning in a nuclear environment. Of all
ated equipment, such as pumps and filters, for pos-        the PSS functions, chaplain activities will be one of
sible contamination.                                       the most critical. However, the most important sus-
                                                           taining function will be combat health support. Tri-
   Large-scale purification of water from contami-         age wlll be the most demanding. Injuries ranging
nated water sources to supply drinking water and           from severe wounds, loss of limbs, burns to radia-
other purposes is limited to units equipped with           tion sickness will clog the medical facilities.
reverse-osmosis water purification units
(ROWPU). A standard contamination-level system                Field service support will also be critical. There-
allows flexibility in purification operations. Units       fore, the morale ana the quality of life of the indi-
must only drink uncontaminated water but can use           vidual soldier must be maintained at as high a level
water decontaminated to an acceptable level of risk        as possible. Relief from the tension of combat and
for external purposes.                                     the ravages of war rejuvenates a soldier's ability to
                                                           continue to fight. To that end, general supply sup-
                                                           port provides clothing, protective equipment, water,
                                                           barrier material, and major end items in support of
                  SUMMARY                                  the force.
  The logistic process in a nuclear environment               The classes of supply are the various items con-
changes arastically from how it is normally con-           sumed on the battlefield. In a nuclear environment
ducted. Logistic commanders will have to inte-             the consumption of each class will be amplified.


           ACRONYMS AND                              CDD collateral damage distance
           ABBREVIATIONS                             CEP circular-error probability
                                                     cGy centiGray
                                                     CHS combat health support
NC Army airspace command and control
                                                     CINC commander in chief
AAP allied administrative publication
                                                     CJTF commander, joint task force
ACA airspace control authority
                                                     CLS combat lifesaver
ACC air component commander
                                                     CMO civil-military operations
AD air defense
                                                     COA course of action
ADA air defense artillery
                                                     COM SEC communications security
ADP automated data processing                        CONPLAN concept plan
AFSCC Air Force service component commander          CONUS Continental United States
AFFS-F Army Field Feeding System-Future              COSCOM corps support command
AMD air movement distance                            CP command post
AMedP Army medical publication                       CS combat support
AO area of operations                                CSS combat service support
AOR area of responsibility                           CTOC corps tactical operations center
ARFOR Army Force
ASCC Army service component command                  DA Department of the Army
                                                     D3A decide, detect, deliver, and assess
ATO air tasking order
ATP allied tactical publication                      DF Department of the Army form
ATTN attention                                       DGZ desired ground zero
                                                     DISCOM division support command
BCE battlefield coordination element                 DNA Defense Nuclear Agency
BDA battle damage assessment                         DOD Department of Defense
BDAR battle damage assessment and repair             DP decision point
BNW battlefield nuclear warfare                      DS direct support
BOS battlefield operating system                     DST decision support template
                                                     DSWA Defense Special Weapons Agency
(C) classified
CAC Combined Arms Center                             EAC echelons above corps
C2 command and control                               ELSEC electronic security
CI command, control, commmications, and intelli-     EM effects manual
    gence                                            EMP electromagnetic pulse
CI command, control, communications, comput-         ESM electronic warfare support measures
    ers' and intelligence
CCIR commander's critical information requirements   FARP forward arming and refueling point

FM 100-30

FLOT forward line of own troops                           LD line of departure
FM field manual                                           LOC lines of communication
FSB forward support battalion                             LOS line of sight
FSCL fire support coordination line                       LRSU long-range surveillance unit
FSCM fire support coordination measures                   LSD least separation distance
FSCOORD fire support coordinator                          MACOM major Army command
FSE fire support element                                  MARFOR Marine forces
G1 assistant chief of staff, personnel                    MBA main battle area
G2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence                 METT-T mission, enemy, terrain (and weather),
                                                            troops, and time available
G3 assistant chief of staff, operations and plans
                                                          MSD minimum safe distance
G4 assistant chief of staff, logistics
                                                          MSF mobile striking force
G5 assistant chief of staff, civil-military operations
                                                          MST maintenance support team
G6 assistant chief of staff, communications
GMD ground movement distance                              NALE Navy amphibious liaison element
GS general support                                        NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
GSS general supply support                                NBCC nuclear, biological, and chemical center
                                                          NCA National Command Authorities
HF high frequency                                         NEAT nuclear employment augmentation team
HOB height of burst                                       NIGA neutron-induced gamma activity
HPT high-payoff target                                    NSCC Navy service component command
HQ headquarters
HVT high-value target                                     OEG operational exposure guide
                                                          OPLAN operation plan
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield           OPORD operation order
J3 joint assistant chief of staff, operations and plans   OPSEC operations security
JAOC joint air operations center                          pam pamphlet
JCS joint Chiefs of Staff                                 PLRS position locator reference system
JFACC joint force air component command                   PNI Presidential Nuclear Initiative
JFLCC joint force land component command                  PSS personnel services support
JFMCC joint force maritime component                      PSYOP psychological operations
     command                                              PVNTMED preventive medicine
JOPES joint Operations Planning and Execution
     System                                               RAD radiation dose
JP joint publication                                      REM roentgen equivalent man (mammal)
JSCP joint Strategic Capabilities Plan                    RES radiation exposure state
 ]TCB joint targeting coordination board                  ROWPU reverse-osmosis water purification unit
JTF joint task force                                      RSOP resource and selection of positions

                                                                                                FM 100-30

SEAD suppression of enemy air defense                      required for the actual deployment of allocated
SGEMP system-generated electromagnetic pulse               weapons to locations desired by the commander
                                                            to support his war plans. Expenditures of these
SIGSEC signal security                                      weapons are not authorized until released by
SO signal operations/signal officer                         proper authority.)
SOCOORD special operations coordinator                  Battlefield Nuclear Warfare (BNW): (As used in
SOF special operations force                                this manual.) The requirement to conduct con-
SOLE special operations liaison element                    tinuous combat operations in the environment
                                                            created by the presence of any nuclear capable
SOP standing operating procedures                          systems before, during, or after nuclear weap-
(SRD) secret restricted data                               ons employment.
STANAG standardization agreement                        Combat Health Support (CHS): Replaces Health
STRATLAT strategic liaison assistance team                  Service Support.
STRIKWARN strike warning                                Coup de main: (As used in this manual.) An
                                                           offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise
TM technical manual                                        and simultaneous execution of supporting op-
TNT trinitrotoluene                                        erations to achieve success in one swift stroke.
TO theater of operations                                Counterproliferation: (As used in this manual.)
TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data                 Military measures centering both on how to
                                                            deter or discourage, as well as attack and de-
TRADOC US Army Training and Doctrine                        fend, against the possible use of weapons of
    Command                                                 mass destruction.
TREE transient radiation effects on electronics
                                                        Deconfliction: (As used in this manual.) The pro-
(TS) top secret                                             cedure to prevent interference of one weapon's
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures                     effects with another. The desired DGZs of nu-
TVA target-value analysis                                   clear weapons are separated in time or distance.
                                                        Degree of Risk: (From JP 1-02.) As specified by
(U) unclassified                                            the commander, the risk to which friendly
US United States                                            forces may be subjected to the effects of the
USANCA United States Army Nuclear and                       detonation of a nuclear weapons used in the
    Chemical Agency                                         attack of a close-in enemy target; acceptable
                                                            degrees of risk under differing tactical condi-
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command                  tions are classified as emergency, moderate,
                                                            and negligible. See also Emergency Risk (Nu-
vol volume                                                  clear); Moderate Risk (Nuclear); Negligible
WMD weapons of mass destruction                             Risk (Nuclear).
WSRO weapons system replacement operations                NOTE: JP 3-12.2 (SRD) does not include mod-
                                                          erate risk tables. The user can compute moder-
                    Definitions                           ate risk by using JP 3-12.2.
Allocation (Nuclear): (From JP 1-02.) The appor-        Emergency Risk (Nuclear): (From JP 1-02.) A
    tionment of specific numbers and types of nu-         degree of risk where anticipated effects may
    clear weapons to a commander for a stated time        cause some temporary shock and casualties and
    period as a planning factor for use in the devel-     may significantly reduce the unit's combat ef-
    opment of war plans. (Additional authority is         ficiency. See also Degree of Risk; Moderate

FM 100-30

     Risk (Nuclear); Negligible Risk (Nuclear); and        Minimum Safe Distance (MSD): (As used in this
    Troop Safety.                                              manual.) The minimum distance in meters from
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP): (From JP 1-02.)                   the DGZ at which a specific degree of personnel
    The electromagnetic radiation from a nuclear              risk and vulnerability will not be exceeded with
    explosion caused by Compton-recoil electrons               a 99-percent assurance. The sum of the radius
    and photoelectrons from photons scattered in              of safety and the buffer distance.
    the materials of the nuclear device or in a sur-       Mitigation Techniques: (As used in this manual.)
    rounding medium. The resulting electric and               Mitigation techniques are procedures to lessen
    magnetic fields may couple with electri-                  the vulnerability of personnel and equipment to
    cal/ electronic systems to produce damaging               nuclear weapons effects. These techniques are
    current and voltage surges. It may also be                intended to be field expedients that can be ac-
    caused by nonnuclear means.                               complished readily by individuals and units
Executing Commander (Nuclear Weapons):                        using only such equipment and material that are
     (From JP 1 -02.) A commander to whom nuclear             available on the battlefield.
    weapons are released for delivery against spe-         Moderate Risk (Nuclear): (From JP 1-02.) A de-
    cific targets or in accordance with approved              gree of risk where anticipated effects are toler-
    plans. See also Releasing Commander (Nuclear              able or, at worst, a minor nuisance. NOTE: JP
    Weapons). (For the purpose of this manual the             3-12.3 does not include moderate risk.
    executing commander is either the Air Force
    service component commander (AFSCC) or                 Negligible Risk (Nuclear): (From JP 1-02.) A
    the Navy service component commander                      degree of risk where personnel are reasonably
     (NSCC).)                                                 safe, with the exception of dazzle or temporary
                                                              loss of night vision. (For this manual, negligible
Fallout: (From JP 1-02.) The precipitation to earth           risk should not be exceeded unless significant
    of radioactive particulate matter from a nuclear          tactical advantage will be gained. Expressed in
    cloud; also applied to the particulate matter
                                                              terms of risk to unwarned exposed personnel
    itself.                                                   and/ or warned protected personnel.)
Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL): (From
    JP 1-02.) A line established by the appropriate        Noncontiguous Battlefield: (As used in this man-
    ground commander to ensure coordination of                ual.) An area of operations subdivided by
    fire not under the commander's control but                boundaries which delineate responsibility and
    which might affect current tactical operations.           facilitate control. The area of operations is non-
    The FSCL is used to coordinate fires of air,              linear; therefore, the intermingling of opposing
    ground, or sea weapons systems using any type             forces is likely.
    ammunition against surface targets. The FSCL           Nonproliferation: (As used in this manual.) Efforts
    should follow well-defined terrain features. Es-          focused on preventing the spread of missiles
    tablishing the FSCL must be coordinated with              and weapons of mass destruction and arms con-
    the appropriate tactical air commander and                trol and export control.
    other supporting elements. Supporting elements
    may attack targets forward of the FSCL without         Nuclear Damage: (From JP 1-02.)
    prior coordination with the ground force com-              1. Light Damage: Damage which does not
    mander provided the attack will not produce ad-           prevent the immediate use of equipment or
    verse surface effects on or to the rear of the line.      installations for which it was intended. Some
    Attacks against surface targets behind this line          repair by the user may be required to make full
    must be coordinated with the appropriate ground           use of the equipment or installations.
    force commander.                                          2. Moderate Damage: Damage which pre-
                                                              vents the use of equipment or installations until
                                                              extensive repairs are made.

                                                                                                FM 100-30

    3. Severe Damage: Damage which prevents                headquarters affected by the attack. The NBCC
    use of equipment or installations permanently.         also sends the STRIKWARN to the next higher
Nuclear Operations: (As used in this manual.) See          headquarters when units not under the control
    Battlefield Nuclear Warfare.                           of the executing commander may be affected
                                                           by the attack. STRIKWARNs are disseminated
Nuclear Weapon Option: (As used in this man-               as rapidly as possible and, insofar as possible,
    ual. ) A discrete grouping of a specific number        over secure networks.
    of nuclear weapons by specific yield planned
    for employment in a specific area for a desig-      Thermal Radiation: (From JP 1-02)
    nated time for a specific purpose employed at           1. The heat and light produced by a nuclear
    corps level and higher.                                explosion.
                                                           2. Electromagnetic radiations emitted from a
Nuclear Yield: (From JP 1-02.) The energy re-              heat or light source as a consequence of its
    leased in the detonation of a nuclear weapon           temperature; it consists essentially of ultravio-
    measured in kilotons or megatons of trinitro-          let, visible, and infrared radiations.
    toluene (TNT) required to produce the same
    energy release. Yields are categorized as-          Time on Target: (From JP 1-02, as modified for
       Very low: less than one kiloton.                    this manual.) The time at which a nuclear deto-
       Low: 1 kiloton to 10 kilotons.                      nation is planned at a specific DGZ.
       Medium: over 10 kilotons to 50 kilotons.         Transient Radiation Effects on Equipment
       High: over 50 kilotons to 500 kilotons.             (TREE): (From TM 39-4-1, as modified for
      Very high: Over 500 kilotons.                        this manual.) The effect of initial radiation,
Operational Exposure Guide (OEG): (As used in              neutron and gamma, on material. The effects
    this manual. j The maximum amount of nuclear           can be either temporary or permanent. Semi-
    radiation which the commander considers his            conductors and other electronic components are
    unit may be permitted to receive while perform-        especially sensitive to transient radiation ef-
    ing a particular mission or missions.                  fects.
Radiation Dose Rate: (From JP 1-02.) The radia-         Troop Safety (Nuclear): (From JP 1-02.) An ele-
    tion dose (dosage) absorbed per unit of time. A        ment which defines a distance from the pro-
    radiation dose rate can be set at some particular      posed burst locator beyond which personnel
    unit of time (for example, H + 1 hour) and             meeting the criteria described under degree of
    would be called H + 1 radiation dose rate.             risk will be safe to the degree prescribed. (As
System-Generated Electromagnetic Pulse                     used in this manual, it includes the com-
    (SGEMP): (As used in this manual.) The                 mander's guidance and is divided into three
    gamma rays and, in some instances, x-rays from         degrees of risk: negligible, moderate, and emer-
    a nuclear burst that may interact with materials       gency. Degree of risk is used to express person-
    in systems and produce free electrons and elec-        nel vulnerability as unwarned exposed
    trical current that generate an electromagnetic        personnel and warned protected personnel.
    pulse in the system itself.                         Weapons of Mass Destruction: (From JP 1 -02.) In
Strike Warning (STRIKWARN): (As used in                    arms control usage, weapons that are capable of
    this manual.) Warning given in advance of a            a high order of destruction and/or of being used
    friendly nuclear attack to ensure that friendly        to destroy large numbers of people. They can
    forces are able to protect themselves from its         be nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiologi-
    effects. The nuclear, biological, and chemical         cal weapons, but the means of transporting or
    center (NBCC) transmits the message to subor-          propelling the weapons is excluded where such
    dinate units likely to be affected by the attack.      means are separable and divisible parts of the
    It also sends it to adjacent land, air, and naval      weapons.

FM 100-30

Weapons System Replacement Operations                   •   Nuclear Collateral Damage.
  (WSRO): The integration of personnel, equip-          •   Nuclear Damage Assessment.
  ment, and training to maximize the number of
  operational weapons systems. Weapons sys-             •   Nuclear Safety Line.
  tems managers coordinate with the operations          •   Nuclear Surface Burst.
  staff, materiel managers, Class VII supply
  units, transportation managers, maintenance           •   Nuclear Underground Burst.
  elements, and personnel managers to replace           •   Nuclear Vulnerability Assessment.
  lost weapons systems.
                                                        •   Nuclear Warning Message.
NOTES:                                                  •   Nuclear Weapon.
   1. See JP 1-02 for the complete definitions of the
following terms:                                        •   Overpressure.
• Collateral Damage Distance.                           •   Planned Target (Nuclear).
• Contamination.                                        •   Proliferation (Nuclear Weapons).
• Decontamination.                                      •  Radiation Dose.
• Desired Effects.                                      •  Radiation Exposure State.
• Electronic Security (ELSEC).                          •  Radiation Sickness.
• Flash Blindness.                                      •  Rainout.
• Heights of Burst (HOB).                               •  Releasing Commander.
• Immediate Permanent Ineffectiveness.                  •  Residual Radiation.
• Immediate Transient Ineffectiveness.                  •  Unwarned Exposed.
• induced Radiation.                                    •  Warned Exposed.
• Initial Radiation.                                    •  Warned Protected.
• Latent Ineffectiveness.                               •  Weapon Debris (Nuclear).
• Least Separation Distance.                               2. The following publications contain specific
• Nuclear Air Burst.                                    nuclear definitions tnat should be used in conjunc-
                                                        tion with this manual: JP 1-02, JP 3-12, JP 3-12.1,
• Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense.            JP 3-12.2 (SRD) , JP 3-12.3, DA Pam 50-3, and
• Nuclear Bonus Effects.                                TM 39-4-1.


                                REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

    Required publications are sources that users must read in order to understand or to comply with this

                         Department of the Army Pamphlets (DA Pam)
50-3            The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.

                                         Field Manuals (FM)
3-Series        Includes all FM 3-series manuals.
3-3             Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance. This manual discusses in detail the
                four stages of contamination avoidance: implementation of passive defensive measures,
                oral reporting of attacks, location and identification of hazards, and limitation of exposure
                to hazards.
3-3-1           Nuclear Contamination Avoidance. This is the tactics, techniques, and procedures manual
                for nuclear contamination avoidance.
3-4             NBC Protection. This manual addresses unit and individual protection measures. See
                Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of individual protection.
3-5             NBC Decontamination. This manual defines and clarifies the entire process of NBC
                decontamination. It shows how contaminated forces can survive, sustain, or restore their
                combat potential.
3-15            Nuclear Accident and Incident Response and Assistance. This manual contains guidance
                for training, equipping, and utilizing emergency teams for contamination control. It covers
                procedures and techniques for limiting radiation hazards.
3-100           NBC Operations. This manual provides leaders with the basic information they will need
                to help units survive and accomplish their missions on a nuclear battlefield.
6-20-10          Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process. This manual describes D3A
                targeting processes.
10-1             Quartermaster Principles.
12-6            Personnel Doctrine.
25-50           Nuclear Survivability Training.
63-3             Corps Support Command.
100-5            Operations. This is the Army's keystone operations manual.
100-7            The Army in Theater Operations.
100-9           Reconstitution.
100-10           Combat Service Support.

FM 100-30

100-15               Corps Operations. This manual contains operational-level doctrine to corps command-
                     ers and staffs.
100-16              Army Operational Support.
100-17              Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization.

                                      Joint Publications QP)
1-02                Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
3-12                 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear ORerations. This publication sets forth doctrine for the
                     combatant commander to use for the conduct of joint nuclear operations. It guides the
                    joint planning and employment of US nuclear forces.
3-12.1               Doctrine for Joint Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons Employment. This publication pro-
                     vides guidance for nuclear-weapons employment. Doctrine and guidance apply to the
                     commander of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces,
                     and subordinate components of these commands.
3-12.2 (SRD)         Nuclear Weapons EmplQyment and Effects Data (U). This publication sets forth
                     doctrine and selectedlTP for joint operations and training. It is the accepted joint
                     standard for nuclear target analysis, employment procedures, and the source for nuclear
                     effects data.
3-12.3              Nuclear Weapons Employment and Effects Data.

            Department of Defense Nuclear Agency Effects Manuals (DNA EM)
1 (SRD) Chapter 10 Electromagnetic Pulse.
 Chapter 14        Effects of Personnel.
 Chapter 15        Damage to Structures.
 Chapter 17        Damage to Military Field Equipment.
 Chapter 21        Damage to Missiles.

NOTE: DNA is now known as the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DWA).

                                   RELATED PUBLICATIONS

     Related publications are sources of additional information. They are not required in order to understand
this publication.

                                  Allied Tactical Publications (ATP)
35A                  Land Force Tactical Doctrine. This publication establishes common NATO doctrine
                     for the use of land force commanders in military operations when NATO forces are
                     placed under their command.

                                                                                                 FM 100-30

45              Reporting Nuclear Detonation, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and Predicting and
                Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazard Areas. This publication contains proceaures
                for reporting nuclear detonations, radioactive fallout, biological and chemical attacks, and
                for predicting associated hazards.

                           Army Medical Publications (AMedP)
6               NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations.
7               Concept of Operations of Medical Support in an NBC Environment.
8               Planning Guide for the Estimation of Battle Casualties (Nuclear).

                                         Field Manuals (FM)
3-7             NBC Handbook. This manual provides information on the NBC warning and reporting
                system, contamination avoidance, and protection and decontamination.
5-103           Survivability. This manual integrates survivability into overall operations. It is for com-
                bined arms and engineer commanders.
8-9             NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations.
8-10-7          Health Service Support in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment.

                                       Joint Publications UP)
5-03.1, Vol I   Joint Operations Planning and Execution SystemQOPES).
6, Vol II (SRD) Standing Operating Procedures for the Coordination of Atomic Operations (U).

                               (TS) Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans
Annex C         Nuclear Operations.

                                      Technical Manuals (TM)
39-4-1          Glossary of Nuclear Weapons Material and Related Terms.

                                   OTHER PUBLICATIONS
                             Allied Administrative Publications (AAP)
                NATO Standardization Agreements and Allied Publications. This publication lists
                STANAGs and other publications of interest to NATO.

                               Department of the Army Forms (DF)
2028            Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

FM 100-30

                                           Field Manuals (FM)
6-20               Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations. This is the keystone manual containing
                   the prinCIples of fire support.
34-1               Intelligence Electronic Warfare Operations.
34-40              Electronic Warfare Operations.
44-100             Air Defense Operations.
71-100             Division Operations. This manual describes how armored and mechanized divisions
                   and brigades are organized and how they fight.
100-1              The Army. This manual covers the roles, principles, and precepts governing the
                   employment of Army forces in support of national security oDjectives.

                                  SUGGESTED READINGS

   Suggested readings are significant works for additional study and reflection.

                           Standardization Agreements (STANAG)
2002               Warning Signs for Marking of Contaminated or Dangerous Land Areas, Complete
                   Equipment, Supplies, and Stores.
2047               Emergency Alarms of Hazard or Attack (NBC and Air Attack only).
2083               Commander's Guide on Radiation Exposure of Groups.
2103               Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and Predicting and
                   Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazard Areas. (See also ATP-45.)
2104               Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning.
2111               Target Analysis-Nuclear Weapons.
2112               NBC Reconnaissance.
2150               NATO Standards of Proficiency for NBC Defense.
2352               NBC Defense Equipment Operational Guidelines.
2353               Evaluation of NBC Defense Capabilities.
2358                First Aid and Hygiene Training in NBC Operations.
2367               NATO Glossary of NBC Terms and Definitions.
2435                NBC Protection Measures for Commodities Within Supply Channels.
2500                NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defense Operations.
2874                Planning Guide for Estimation of Battle Casualties (Nuclear).
2910                Nuclear Casualties and Damage Assessment for Exercises.

                          A                                  Approval. 3-9, 4-9, 6-3.
 Accuracy data, 3-8, 3-14.                                       and issuance ofOPLAN (OPORD), 3-2, 4-7.
 Acronyms, 01-1                                                 by NC A. See National Command Authorities (NCA);
 Acquisition                                                          Commander's approval.
     ofWMD,I-3,                                                 command, 3-18, 6-4.
     strategy, 1-3.                                             for targets, 3-6,
     systems, 3-1, 3-2.                                         request for, 3-7.
Active                                                      Area(s)
     defense. See Defense.                                      contamination. See Contamination.
     protection measures. See Protection.                       defense, 5-5-5-9.
Aerial radiation survey. See Radiation.                         of employment. 3-1,3-13,3-16.
Agility, 5-1, 6-2.                                              of interest, 4-5.
Aiming points, 3-17.                                            of operations, 3-10, 3-1 I, 3-16, 4-5, 5-1. 5-4, 5-C}, 01-1.
Air                                                             of responsibility (AOR), 1-1,3-10,01-1.
    blast. See Blast.                                       Arms
     burst. Sec Burst.                                          and export controls, 1-2, 1-3.
    component commander (ACC), 3-7, 01-1.                       control agreements, 1-2, 1-3, 3- 11.
    corridors, 6-6.                                         Army, 3-S, 3-16.
    defense (AD), iii, 3-8, 3-14, 3-17-3-19,5-8.               airspace command and control (A2C2), 3-8, 01- I.
    defense artillery (ADA), 3-8.                              aviation units. See Units.
        See also Suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD).      commander. See Commanders.
    density, 2-1,2-2,5-4.                                      Field Feeding System-Future (AFFS-F), 6-5, OJ-I.
    fields, loss of, 6-6.                                       force (ARFOR), v, 3-3, 3-6, 01-1.
    Force, 1-4,3-2,3-8.                                        nuclear operations characteristics, 3-1.
        aviation units. See Units.                             operations. See Operations.
    mobility,5-7.                                              service component commander (ASCC), 3-19, 6-2, 01-1.
    movement, 2-2, 6-6.                                     Arrival times, 2-7.
        distance (AM D), 5-6, G1-1.                         Assessment, 3-14, 3-15, 3-1<).
        operations, 6-6.                                       See also Decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) targeting
    operations center (AOC), 3-8.                                    process; Threat assessment.
    tasking order (ATO), 3-9, Ol-I.                         Attack, 5-2, 5-3.
Aircraft, 3-8, 3-13, 5-6, 6-4, 6-6.                            avenues, 5-5.
    contamination. Scc Contamination.                          deliherate,5-3.
Airdrop                                                        frontal, 5-3.
    requirements, 6-6.                                         hasty, 5-3.
    services, 6-5.                                          Audacity, 5-2,
Airhead, 3-4.                                               Automated data processing (ADP), loss of, 4-7, 01-1.
Airlift, 6-6.                                               Avenues of approach, 5-3.
Airspace                                                    Aviation
   control authority (ACA), 3-8, 3-13, Gl-I.                   maintenance. See Maintenance.
   control measures, 3-13.                                     units. See Units.
   coordination, 3- 13.
Alert                                                                                   B
   posturing, 3-12.                                         Barrier material, 6-6, 6-7.
   status, 1-4.                                             Basic effects. See Effects.
Allies/Alliances, 1-2, 1-3,3-11,3-12, 5-S.                  Battalion task force, 4-4.
Allocation, 01-3.                                           Battle,
Ammunition (Class V). See Classes of supply.                   command, 5-2.
Anticipation, 6-1, 6-8.                                        damage assessment (BDA), 3-3, 3-6, 3-15, 3-17,4-8, Gl-J.

FM 100-30

   damage assessment and repair (BDAR), 6-3, Gl-l.                 design, 5-3.
Battlefield, 3-13.                                                 objective, 3-4,
   circulation, 3-I 8.                                             plan/planning, 1-1,3-1,3-7,3-8,3-13,3-14,3-16,4-2,4-6,
   coordination clement (BCE) 3-6-3-8 3-10 4-1 4-8 4-9                  4-8,5-1.
         GI-1.               '"                ,   ,   ,
                                                               Canalize, 5-1, 5-4, 5-8.
   linear, 3-10,                                               Casualty/Casualties, 1-4, 1-5, 2-8, 3-4, 3-8, 3-16, 3-18, 4-1,
    noncontinguous, 3-10, 3-11, GI-4.                                   4-3,4-4,4-7,4-8, 5-1, 5-8, 6-2, 6-4, 6-5, 6-8.
   nuclear warfare (BNW), v, 4-1, 4-4, 4-7, 4-8, Gl-l, Gl-3.      management, 6-2.
   operating systems (BOS), 3-17, GI-l.                           reports, 6-2.
   planning, 3-15.                                                See also Combat health support (CHS).
   requirements, 6-2.                                          Chaplain activities, 6-8.
   stress, 1-4.                                                Circular-error probability (CEP), 5-9, Gl-l.
Below-surface burst. See Burst.                                Civilian
Biological and chemical                                           casualties. See Casualties.
   attack, 1-2,                                                   preclusion criteria, 3- 12.
   casualties. See Casualties.                                    protection. See Protection.
Beachhead,3-4.                                                    safety, 3-4, 5-6.
Blackout, 2-3, 2-7.                                            Civilian population, 4-2.
Blast, 2-1, 3-15, 4-1, 5-6.                                       centers, 3-15, 3-16, 4-3.
   air, 2-1, 2-7.                                                 location, 3-15, 3-16,4-2,4-5,4-8.
   effects, 2-1, 2-2, 2-5, 3-19, 6-4, 6-5.                        overlays, 3-16, 4-3.
   initial, 2-8.                                               Civil-military operations (CMO), 4-4, GI-1.
   injuries, 2-8.                                              Classes of supply, 6-3-6-8.
   wave, 2-1, 2-6, 5-4.                                        Close operations. See Operations.
Slowdown. See Tree blowdown.                                   Clothing, 6-7, 6-8.
Breaching. See Obstacles.                                         exchange and repair, 6-5, 6-6.
Bridging, 3-18.                                                Coalition, 3-11.
Broadcast traffic, 4-3.                                           ad hoc, 3-11.
Buddy aid. 6-5.                                                   forces, 3-1, 3-11, 3-12.
Built-up areas. See Urban structures.                          Cold War, 1-2,
Burials,                                                       Collateral damage, 3-4, 3-10, 3-12, 4-3, 4-4, 4-6-4-8, 5-1,
                                                                  avoidance, 3-14.
   marking of. See Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
         markers.                                                 constraints, 3-13.
Burnout, 2-3.                                                     criteria, 4-2, 4-3.
Burns, 2-1, 2-8.                                                  distance (CDD), 3-10, 3-11, 5-3, 5-6, Gl-l, Gl-6.
   retinal,2-2.                                                   factors, 4-4, 4-5.
   See also Dazzle.                                               guidance, 3-16.
Burst, 2-2.                                                       overlays, 3-17, 4-3, 4-5, 4-8.
   air, 1-3, 2-1, GI-6.                                           preclusion, 3-19, 5-9.
   high-altitude, 2-3.                                                criteria, 3-12, 3-16, 3-17.
   low-altitude (low air), 2-3, 2-8, 3-12,3-14,3-16,5-4.              data, 3-4.
   options. See Options.                                          prevention, 3-16.
   space, 1-3.                                                    See also Damage preclusion criteria.
   subsurface (underground), 1-3,2-1, 2-2, GI-6.               Combatant
   surface, 1-3,2-1,2-2,3-12,3-14,4-2, Gl-6.                      commandeers), 3-3, 3-5, 3-11, 3-13.
Bypassing, 5-2.                                                   command staff, 3-3.
                        C                                         effectiveness, 3-19.
Campaign(s), 1-1,3-3,3-13.                                        elements, 6-3.
  area, 3-16.                                                     environment, 2-1.
  coordination meeting, 3-9.                                      functions, 6-1-6-4.

                                                                                                                           FM 100-30

    health support (CHS), 2-5, 4-3, 4-4,4-8,6-1 6-4 6-5 6-8                   digital, 5-1, 6-1, 6-2.
         GI-I, GI-3.                           '   ,   ,    ,
                                                                              electronic, 1-4.
    lifesaver (CLS) procedures, 6-5, GI-I.                                    equipment, 2-3, 2-4, 4-2.
    operations, 3-4, 3-11, 5-1, 6-2, 6-4.                                     satellite relay, 2-3.
    power, 1-4,2-7,2-8,3-7,3-18,4-5,5-4,5-5,5-7.                              security (COMSEC), 2-6, GI-l
    service support (CSS), 3-17, 3-18, 5-1 6-1 6-2 6-4-6-7                    See also Equipment; Lines of communications (LOC).
           r'!1   1                            '    "              ,
                                                                          Concentration, 5-2, 6-4.
      operations characteristics, 6-1.
  stress control, 6-5.
                                                                              of operations, 3-5, 3-8, 3-13, 3-18,4-7,4-8,5-3.
  support (CS), 6-2, GI-I.
                                                                              plan (CONPLAN), 3-2-3-4, 4-1, GI-1.
  units. See Units.
                                                                         Confusion, 1-4,
Command approval. See Approval.
                                                                         Constraints, 3-2,3-5,3-7,3-16,3-17,4-1,4-2,4-6.
  and control (C2), 1-3,1-4,2-5, 2-S, 3-17-3-19,4-7, 4-S,
                                                                             See also Co~trols and constraints; Nuclear policy
        5-1,5-4-5-6, 5-S, GI-1.
      See also Enemy C2 facilities.
                                                                         Construction and barrier materials (Class IV). See Classes of
  control, communications, and intelligence (C3J)' 1-3 , 3-14,
       f""!1 t                                                                     supply.
         \ ..11-1.
                                                                         Contamination, 2-3, 4-1,4-7, 6-2-6-8, GI-6.
   control, communications, computers, and intelligence                      area, 2-5, 3-15, 3-17, 4-2,5-3,5-6,6-6,6-7.
         (C4I), 2-3, 3-5, GI-I.
                                                                             avoidance, 2~3, 2-6, 6-3, 6-4, 6-6, 6-7.
   guidance. See Guidance.
                                                                             handling of contaminated material, 6-6, 6-7.
   post (CP), 3-IS, GI-I.
                                                                             of personnel. See Personnel.
   supervision. See Supervision.
                                                                             of water supply, 6-5.
   surgeon. See Surgeon.
                                                                             levels. See Radiation exposure states (RES).
   See also Army airspace command and control (A2C2).
                                                                             radioiogicai, 2-3,6-2,6-7.
Command and staff
   responsibilities and procedures, 4-1.
                                                                             use of contaminated supplies, 6-6, 6-7.
  action process, 4- i , 4-9.
                                                                             See also Radiation.
Commander(s), 6-4, 6-5.
                                                                         Continental United States (CONUS), 3-3, 6-3, 01-1.
  Army, 4-1, 4-6, 4-9.
                                                                         Contingency(ies), 4-3, 4-7, 5-8.
   in chief(CINC), 1-1,3-1-3-4,3-6,3-7,3-10-3-14,3-19,
        4-7, 4-9, 5-1, 5-8. GI-l.                                            force, 3-10. 3-11.
  joint task force (GiTF). 3- i 0, 3- i i.                                  operations, 3-3, 3-10, 3-! 4.
  nominating. 3-17.                                                         plans/planning 3-2, 3-12, 3-16. 5-5. 5-8.
  of the joint task force (CJTP), 3-5, GI-I.                                 regional. 3-5.
  operational-level. 4-7.                                                   tactical, 4-2.
  senior Army. 5-5.                                                      Continuity, 6-1. 6-2.6-8.
  tactical, 5-8.                                                            See also Logistics operations.
  unit. 5-1. 5-7.                                                        Continuous operations. See Operations.
Commander's                                                              Control, 1-3, 1-5,3-18,5-1.
  approval, 4-7.                                                            agreements, 3-10.
  concept, 1-1,3-8.                                                         centralized, 1-4.
  critical information requirements (CCIR), 1-3, GI-I.                      of nuclear weapons employment, 3-16.
  decision, 4-5.                                                            See also Controls and constraints.
  estimate~ See Estimate.
                                                                         Controls and constraints, 3-1, 3-7, 3-10, 3-12, 3-17, 4-1, 4-4.
  guidance, 3-5,3-7,3-12,3-16,4-1-4-3.                                      See also Nuclear policy constraints.
      See also Guidance.                                                 Conventional
  intent, I-I, 3-S, 3-12, 3-18, 4-1 ' 4-2 , 4-5, 4-6, 4-9, 5-1 , 5-3 ,      fires, 3-12, 4-6.
        5-7.                                                                forces, 3-1, 5-9.
                                                                            operations, 3-14, 4-2, 5-3, 5-5.
Commands. See Subordinate commands.                                        plans. See Plans.
Communications, 3-5, 3-6,3-8,3-13,3-15,3-18,4-2,4-7,6-                     support, 3-8.
       1,6-3,6-4.                                                          target. See Target(s).
  blackout. See Blackout.                                                   threat, v, 1-3,2-6.

FM 100-30

  warfare, 3- J7.                                                See also Targeting process.
  weapons employment, 3- I 1,4-3.                              Decision, 4-5-4-7.
  See alw Combat power.                                          brief, 3-10.
Convoy configuration, 6-4.                                       -making process, 3-3, 4-1, 4-9,5-8.
Coordination, 2-5, 3-8,3-18,3-19,4-1,4-8,5-1,5-3,6-1.              points (DP), 3-12, 4-3, 4-4, 4-6, GI-I.
    airspace, 3-8.                                                 support template (DST), 4-4, GI-I.
    lateral,3-1O.                                              Deconfliction, 3-7, 3-8, 3-10, 3-12-3-15, 5-6, GI-3.
    management, 3-8.                                               of targets, 3-14.
    meeting. See Campaign.                                     Decontamination, 2-5, 4-7, 6-1, 6-4-6-7, GI-6
    of fires, 3-10, 3-17.                                          capabilities, 4-5, 6-2, 6-5.
    vertical, 3-10.                                                items, 6-7.
Corps, 3-2, 3-4, 3-9.                                             of equipment, 6-3.
    commander, 1-1,3-5,3-8,3-10,3-14-3-16,3-18,4-7.               of personnel, 6-6.
    rear area. See Rear area.                                     operations, 6-7.
    support command (COSCOM), 6-5, GI-I.                          procedures, 6-6.
   tactical operations center (CTOC), 3-9, GI-I.                  teams, 6-3.
   targeting officer. See Targeting officer.                      techniques, 1-5.
Counterattack, 5-4-5-6, 5-8, 5-9.                                 See also Recovery.
   See ul,'o Enemy counterattack.                              Deep
Countcrforcc                                                      attack, 5- I, 5-2.
   operations, 1-3,                                               attack cell, 3-9.
   targeting strategy, 3-13.                                      operations. See Operations.
Countermeasures, 2-5.                                             targets. See Targets.
Counterproliferation, 1-3, 1-5, GI-3.                          Defeat
   initiative, 1-3.                                               criteria, 3-15, 4-4.
   targets, 3- I 5.                                               in detail, 2-5, 5-5.
Sec also Nonproliferation; Proliferation.                         mechanism, 3-15.
Countcrstrike target considerations. 3-12.                     Defend and attack, 1-3.
Coup de main, 3-4, GI-1.                                       Defense, 1-2, 1-3,3-1,5-5,5-7,5-9.
Course of action (COA), 1-3,3-14,4-5,4-6, GI-I.                   active, 1-3.
   analysis, 4-3, 4-4.                                            Nuclear Agency (DNA) Effeets Manual (EM), 2-7, GI-I
   comparison, 4-4, 4-5.                                          passive, 1-3.
   development, analysis, and decision, 4-1, 4-2, 4-9.            planning, 5-7, 5-8.
Cover and concealment, 2-12,5-4,6-1,6-2.                          system, 1-2,
Cratcr/Cratcring, 2-1, 2-5,2-7,5-4.                            See also Air defense; Air defense artillery; Mobile defense;
Crisis                                                                  Transition to the defense.
   -action planning (CAP) process, 3-3, 3-4.                   Defensive
   situation, 3-3, 3-19.                                          operations, 3-16, 4-3, 5-1, 5-5, 5-7-5-9.
                                                                  planning, 5-7.
                           D                                      positions, 5-6.
Damage, 3-1,4-2,4-3, GI-4.                                     Definitions, Gl-3.
   as,essmcnt 3-12, 4-4, 4-6, 4-8, G1-6.                       Degree of risk, GI-3.
   limitation measures, 3-12.                                     See Risk.
   preclusion criteria, 3-16.                                  Delay, disrupt, or destroy, 3-18, 5-1, 5-5, 5-8.
  Set' also Battle damage assessment; Collateral-damage        Deliberate-planning process, 3-2, 3-3.
         distance.                                             Delivery, v, 3-1, 4-5,5-4.
Dazzle, 2-2.                                                      data, 3-8 .
  .'Ice alm Burns; Flash blindness.                               of weapons 3-14.
Decentralization, 6-3.                                            means, 3-8, 5-4.
Deception, 2-5. 2-6, 5-4.                                         of fires, 3-5.
Decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) targeting process,      platform, 3-13.
         3-13-3-15, 3-17, GI-I.                                   systems, 1-3,1-5,3-1,3-8,3-12,3-17,4-1,5-1.

                                                                                                            FM 100-30

     time, 5-6, 5-9.                                          below the CINC, 3-3.
Demobilization, 3-3, 3-5, 6-2.                                of command, 3-16.
Department of Defense (DOD), 1-3, GI-I.                   Economy offorce, 5-5.
Deployable defense system, 1-2.                           Effects, 1-2-1-5,2-1-2-3,2-6,2-7,3-1,3-2,3-12,4-1-4-3,
Deploying forces, 1-5.                                             4-5-4-8,5-1-5-3,5-8,5-9,6-1,6-2,6-4.
Deployment, I-I, 3-3, 3-6, 6-2.                               basic, 2-1, 2-7,2-8,3-14,5-6,5-9.
    of forces, 5-7.                                           medical. See Medical effects.
    of nuclear weapons, I-I, 1-4.                             on terrain. See Terrain.
    plan, 3-6.                                                reduction of, 5-2.
    See also Predeployment activities.                        See also. Arrival times; Blast effects; Desired effects;
Depth, 5-1, 5-6, 5-7,6-1.                                          Electromagnetic pulse (EMP); Oamma rays; Mass
                                                                   effects: Mitig:ation techniaues: Neutron(s): Protec-
Desired                                                            tion; P~ychological and physi~logica1 st~~~s; Radia-
    effects, 01-6.                                                 tion effects; Shielding; Thermal effects; Weapons
        See also Effects.                                          effects; X-rays.
    ground zero (DGZ), 3-8, 3-11, 3-16, 5-3, 5-6, 01-1.   Electromagnetic pulse (EMP), 2-1, 2-3, 2-4, 2-7, 2-8, 3-18,
    target effects, 3-16.                                           3-19,4-2,4-5, 4-8, 5-1, 5-6, 6-1, 6-4, 01-1,01-4.
Deterrence, v, 1-2-1-5,3-1,3-11,5-5,5-8.                  Electronic
Detonation, 2-1, 2-2,2-3,2-7,3-2,3-18,4-4,6-1,6-3.           communications. See Communications.
   effects, 2-/'                                             security (ELSEC), 2-6, 01-1, Gl-6.
Digital                                                      warfare support measures (ESM), 3-17, 01-1.
   communications. See Communications.                    Emergency risk, GI-3.
   support, 4-5.                                             See also Risk.
Direct support (DS), 6-5, 6-7, 01-1.                      Employment. 1-1,3-1,3-4,3-12,3-13,4-4,4-7.
Discipline, 1-4,                                             considerations, 2-1, 3-8.
Dispersal                                                    constraints. See Constraints; Control and constraints.
   of equipment, 6-1, 6-4.                                   coordination, 3-10.
   of units, 1-4, 5-1, 5-2, 6-2.                             doctrine. See Doctrine
Dispersion, 2-5, 5-4, 6-1-6-3, 6-6.                          of nuclear weapons, I-I, 1-2,3-5,3-16.
   See also Mass versus dispersion.                          planning, 3-5, 3-17, 3-18.
Distances, 5-6.                                              support, 3-6.
Division                                                     taskings, 3-7.
   commander, 4- i.                                          See also t.Jomination for employment; Timing.
   scheme of maneuver. See Scheme of maneuver.            Energy, 2-2.
   support command (DISCOM), 6-5, 6-7, Gl-I.                 See also Reflected energy.
Doctrinal                                                 Enemy, 3-16, 5-4, 5-7.
   guidance, 2-8.                                            C2 facility, 3-4.
   transition, 3- i 7.
Doctrine, v, vi, 1-3-1-5,3-12,3-13,3-19,5-4,6-5,6-6.         employment methodology, 1-3.
   employment, 1-4,                                          facilities, 5-3, 5-7.
Dose                                                         intent, 4-4.
   rate, 3-19.                                               useofWMD,I-1.
   rate information, 6-4, 6-5.                            Engineers, 4~8.
Dust. See Effects.                                        Entry operations, 3-3, 3-4.
Dynamic pressure. See Blast wave.                            See also Opposed entry operations; Unopposed entry
Dynamics of combat power. See Combat power.
                                                          Envelopment, 5-3, 5-9.
                          E                               Environment. See Nuclear environment.
Eardrum rupture, 2-1.                                     Environmental impact, 3-12,4-8.
Early warning, 3-15.                                      Equipment, 1-3,3-11,3-19,6-1-6-4,6-8.
Echelons                                                     avaiiability, 4-2,6-3.
   above corps (EAC), v, 1-3,3-5,3-6,5-6, Gl-l.              backup, 6-4.
      commander, 1=1,                                        destruction of, 2-8.

FM 100-30

   hardened, 2-6,3-18.                                             Army lack of organic nuclear, 3-2.
   readiness. See Readiness.                                       cell, 3-10.
   survivability, 2-6.                                             coordination line (FSCL), 3-10, 01-2, 01-4.
   See also Battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR);            coordination measures (FSCM), 3-5, 01-2.
         Classes of supply; Communications; Mission-               coordinator (FSCOORD), 3-16, 4-1-4-3, 4-5-4-8, 01-2.
         csscntial equipment; Signatures; Supply.
                                                                   element (FSE), 3-9, 3-16,4-5,01-2.
Escalation, 1-2, 1-3,
                                                                   officers, 3-\5.
   "signal," 3-13.
                                                                   planning. See Planning.
                                                                   reduced, \-4.
   commander's, 4-5,5-7.                                       First usc, 1-3.
   ofthe situation, 4-3.                                       Fixing, 5-3, 5-9.
Evacuation, 6-3, 6-5.                                          Flash blindness, 2-1, 2-2. 2-8, 5-6, G\-6.
Event templates, 4-2.                                              See also Bums; Dazzle.
Executing commander, 01-4.                                    Flexibility, 5-4, 5-9, 6-4, 6-5.
   See also Commander(s).                                     Food
Execution, 3-3, 3-6-3-8, 3-14, 4-8,5-1,5-3,6-4.                    preparation, 6-5.
   decentralized, 6-4.                                             supplies, See Veterinary personnel.
   planning, 3-3, 3-8.                                        Force(s), 1-2, 1-4,3-5.
   units, 3-6.                                                     allied. See Allies.
Exercises, 1-4.                                                   coalition. See Coalition forces.
Exploitation, 5-2-5-4, 5-8, 6-4.                                  contingency. See Contingency force.
                                                                  locations. See Deconfliction.
                            F                                     movement, 5-4.
Fallout, 2-3, 2-7, 2-8, 4-7, 5-4, 01-4.
                                                                  multinational. See Multinational forces.
    hazards, 4-2.
                                                                  multipliers, 5-5.
   militarily significant, 3-14.                                  projection, 3-3, 3-6,3-19,6-3.
   prediction, 4-1, 4-2,4-5,4-7.                                  protection, 4-\,4-7,4-9,5-1,5-2.
   restrictions of, 3-12, 4-2.                                         See also Nuclear-force protection; Protection.
   See also Monitoring.                                           reorganization. See Reorganization.
Feedback,4-9.                                                     reserve, 5-3, 5-5, 5-8.
Field                                                             supported,6-3.
   artillery, v.                                                  See also Economy of force; Movement.
   fceding operations. See Army Field Feeding System-Future   Forest fires. See Fires.
    services, 6-1, 6-S.
                                                                  arming and refueling point (FARP). 6·4. 01-2.
    services support (FSS). 6-S, 6-8.
                                                                  combat area, 6-3. 6-7.
Final delivery time. See Delivery time.
                                                                  line of own troops (FLOT). 3-4. 3-15. 3-16, 5-5.5-8.01-2.
Fireball, 2-1. 2-3.
                                                                  support battalion (FSB). 6-4. 0\-2.
Firepower, 1-1,2-7,2-8,3-17.5-4.
                                                              Fratricide, 3-12, 5-1.
Firc(s), 3-15, 5-1, 5-3, 5-4.
                                                              Freedom of action, 5-2, 5-3, 5-9.
    control                                                   Friction, 3-\6.
        instruments, 2-8.                                     Frontal attack. See Attack.
        systems, 3-15.                                        Fuel storagelFueling protection, 6-4.
    forest, 2-1, 5-7.                                         Functional areas, 6-1.
    interlocking, 5-6.                                        Future operations, 3-12, 3-15, 4-1, 5-2,5-7,5-8.
    organization of, 5-5.
    planning, 3-15, 5-2.                                                                  G
    See alw Coordination of fires; Synchronization.           G I and staff, 4-1, 4-3, 4-4, 4-7, 4-8, G\-2.
Fire-fighting, 6-4.                                           G2 and s1.1ff, 3-3, 4-1-4-8, 01-2.
Fircstorms, 2-7.                                              G3 and staff, 3-12, 4-1, 4-3-4-8, 01-2.
Fire support, 3-10, 3-17, 3-18,4-5,4-6.                       04 and staff, 4-1, 4-3, 4-4, 4-7, 4-8, 01-2.
   activitics,3-5.                                            05 and staff, 3-16, 4-1,4-3,4-4,4-7,4-8,01-2.

                                                                                                                FM 100-30

G6 and staff, 4-2, 4-3, 4-5, 4-7, GI-2.                               See also Blast; Contamination; Radiation.
Gamma rays, 2-2, 2-3,2-7.                                         Initiative, 3-15, 5-1, 5-2, 5-5, 5-7.
General supply support (GSS), 6-6, 6-8.                           Injuries. See Casualties.
General support (GS), 6-5, 6-6, GI-2.                             Inspection of nuclear materials, 1-3, 1-6.
Ground                                                            Integration, viii, 1-1,3-14,4-9,6-1,6-8.
   forces, 5-8.                                                   Intelligence, 1-3,2-5,2-8,3-1,3-8,3-17,4-2,4-7,4-8.
   movement distance (GMD), 5-6, GI-2.                                assets, 3-14.
   operations, 3-13.                                                  collection, 3-15, 3-17, 4-8.
      plan, 5-6.                                                      plan, 3-15.
   shock, 2-7.                                                        estimate, 3-15,4-3.
   zero. See Desired ground zero (DGZ).                               officer, 3-11, 3-15, 3-17.
Guidance, 3-5, 3-9, 3-11, 3-12, 3-19,4-2,4-8,4-9.                     operations, 2-6, 3-17, 4-9.
  commander's, 3-8.                                                   overlays, 4-8.
  See also Collateral-damage guidance; Commander's guid-             preparation of the battlefield (lPB), 3-17, GI-2.
        ance; Targeting guidance; Theater guidance.                  readiness. See Readiness.
                                                                     sensors, 3-15.
                                                                     systems, 2-5.
Hardened equipment. See Equipment. See also                      Items of equipment (Class II). See Classes of supply.
        Vulnerability .
                                                                 Intent. See Commander's intent.
   and sanitation services, 6-5.
                                                                     of routes, 5-5.
   and welfare items, 6-7.
                                                                     of shipments, 1-3,
Height of burst (HOB), 2-2, GI-2, GI-6.
                                                                     procedures, 3-8.
High-payoff target (HPT), 3-1, 3-4, 3-9, 3-14, 3-15, 5-1, 5-3,
        5-8, GI-2.                                               Isolation, 1-4,
High-value targets (HVT), 3-14, 4-1, GI-2.                       Interference. See Communications.
                                                                 Intent. See Commander's intent.
Immediate nuclear support, 1-1.
    See also Preplanned nuclear support.                         13,3-12, Gl-2.
Immediate permanent ineffeciveness, Gl-6.                        Joint
                                                                    air operations center (JAOC), 3-6, GI-2.
Immediate transient ineffectiveness, Gl-6.
                                                                    assessment group, 3-9.
Improvisation, 6-1, 6-2, 6-8.
                                                                    environment, 3-1.
    See also Logistics operations.
                                                                    forces, 1-4,3-6,3-13,3-19.
                                                                    nuclear operations, 3-1, 3-12.
    aiming points, 3- J 7.
                                                                    nuclear support, 3-5.
    protection. See Protection.
                                                                    operations, 3-1, 3-13.
    target, 3-12, 3- J7.
                                                                    procedures, 3-10.
Induced radiation, GI-6.
                                                                    service nuclear planning coordination requirements, 4-7.
Infiltration, 2-4, 2-5, 5-3, 5-7, 5-9.
                                                                    tactical force, 3-13.
Information, 4-1.
                                                                    task force, (JTF), v, 3-3, 3-5, 3-6, 3-19, 4-1, GI-2.
    analysis, 3-17,4-5, 4-8.
                                                                    task force commander. See Commander, joint task force
    collection, 3-17.
    displays, 4-8.
                                                                 Joint Chiefs of Staffs review, 3-2.
    sharing, 3-8.
                                                                 Joint force
    security, 2-5.
                                                                    air component command( er) (JFACC), 3-2, 3-3, 3-8-3-10,
    See also Lateral troop-safety information.                             3-13, GI-2.
Infrared. See Radiation; Wavelengths.                               commander, I-I,
Initial                                                             land component commandeer) (JFLCC), v, 3-2-3-4, 3-6-3-
    effects. See Effects.                                                 10,3-13,3-14,4-1,5-5, GI-2.
    radiation, GI-6.                                                    nuclear-weapons nomination cycle, 3-10.
        See also Radiation.                                         maritime component commandeer) (JFMCC), v, 3-2, 3-3,
    thermal radiation. See Radiation.                                      3-6, 3-8, 3-9, Gl-2.

 FM 100-30

   task organization, 3-5.                                                                 M
Joint nuclear                                                  Main
   doctrine. See Doctrine.                                         battle area (MBA), 5-5, 5-8, 01-2.
   resources, 3-1.                                                 effort, 3-5, 3-18, 5-2, 5-7.
Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES)         Maintenance, 6-1, 6-3.
          3-2, 3-4, 01-2.                                          aviation, 6-6.
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), 3-2, 01-2.               elements, 6-3.
Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB), 3-5, 3-14, 01-2.        support teams (MST), 6-3, 01-2.
                                                                  units. See Units.
                           L                                   Major end items (Class VII). See Classes of supply.
Land forces, 3-8.                                              Maneuver, I-I, 1-5,2-7,2-8,3-4,3-13-3-15,3-17,4-6,5-1,
Latent ineffectiveness, 2-8, 01-6.                                       5-4,5-5,5-7,5-8,6-3.
   criteria, 3-3l.                                                control, 3-5.
Lateral                                                           enemy, 4-5, 4-6.
   coordination. See Coordination.                                forces, 3-18, 5-1, 5-2, 5-4, 5-5.
                                                                  forms of, 5-3, 5-9.
   troop-safety information, 3-10.
                                                                  planners. See PlanslPlanning.
                                                                  scheme of. See Scheme of maneuver.
Laundry and shower services, 6-5, 6-6.
                                                                  units, 3-15.
Lead time. See Time.
                                                               Man-made structures, 2-1,2-6,5-3.
Leadcrs/Leadership, 1-4, 1-5,2-7,2-8,5-1,5-7,6-4,6-5.
                                                               Map(s). See Operations map(s).
Least separation distance (LSD), 5-3, 5-4, 5-6, 01-2, 01-6.    Marine
Level(s)                                                          components, 3-8.
   of command, 3-16.                                              force (MARFOR), 3-2, 01-2.
   of damage. See Damage.                                      Marshaling areas, 6-4.
   of exposure. See Operational exposure guide (OEO).          Mass,
   of war, I-I, 1-5,                                             attack, 3-1.
       See also Operational level of war; Strategic level of     casualties. See Casualties.
         war; Tacticallcvel of war.                              effects, 3-8, 5-1, 5-2.
Liaison officers (LO), 3-11.                                     forces, 5-1.
   See alw Special operations liaison element (SOLE).            versus dispersion, 2-5, 4-4.
Limits/Restrictions, 3-12, 3-13,4-3.                             versus dispersion dilemma, 2-5.
Linear battlefield. See Battlefield.                             See also Combat power; Dispersion.
Line-of-sight (LOS) shielding. See Shielding.                  Massed
Line(s)                                                          nuclear strikes, 1-3.
   of communications (LOC), 1-4, 1-7, 5-8, 6-1, 01-2.            units, 1-3.
   of departure (LD), 5-6, 01-2.                               Material required to support nonmilitary programs (Class X).
                                                                        See Classes of supply.
Local protection. See Protection.
                                                               Materiel-acquisition process, 2-6.
Locations, 3-8.
Lodgement, 3-4.
                                                                 brigade or group, 4-1, 4-3, 4-4, 4-7, 6-4.
Logistics, 2-8, 5-2, 5-8, 6-1, 6-8.
                                                                 effects, 4-8.
   considerations, 3-14, 4-4, 4-7.                               facilities, 6-8.
   data, 4-8.                                                    material (Class VIII). See Classes of supply.
   operations, 6-2, 6-8.                                         operations. See Combat health support (CHS).
   personnel, 6-9.                                               personnel, 6-4, 6-5.
   process, 6-1, 6-8.                                            requirements, 1-4.
  support, 3-5, 3-6, 5-5, 6-5.                                   science officer, 6-5.
  systems, 2-5.                                                  specialist, 6-6.
  units, 6-1.                                                    staff officers, 6-5.
Long-range surveillance unit (LRSU), 3-15, 01-2.                 supplies, 6-3, 6-5.
Low air burst. See Burst.                                        support, 6-5.

                                                                                                                FM 100-30

    treatment, 1-3.                                          Multiservice military forces, 3-13.
    units. See Units.                                        Munitions, 4-1.
    See also Preventive medicine (PVN1MED).
Mental health personnel, 6-5.                                                           N
METT-T. See Mission, enemy, troops, terrain (and             NALE. See Navy amphibious liaison element (NALE).
          weather), and time available.                      National
Militarily significant fallout. See Fallout.                     Command Authorities (NCA), I-I, 1-4,3-1,3-2,3-4,
Minimum safe distance (MSD), 3-4, 3-10, 3-11, 3-15, 5-3,              3-6-3-9,3-11,3-12,3-16,4-7, GI-2.
         5-6, GI-2, GI-4.                                        objectives, 3-5.
Miscellaneous items. See Classes of supply.                  Navigational aids, loss of, 6-6.
Missiles, 1-2, 1-3,3-8,3-13,3-18,4-1.                        Navy, v, 1-4,3-2.
   See also Weapons systems.                                     amphibious liaison element (NALE), 3-6, 3-8, 4-8, GI-2.
Mission, 1-5,3-5,3-16,4-2,4-5-4-7,5-1,5-3,5-7,5-8,6-6,           components, 3-8.
         6-8.                                                Near-real time. See Time.
   accomplishment, 3-4,4-9,6-1,6-2,6-6.                      Negligible risk. See Risk.
   analysis, 3-15, 4-1, 4-2, 4-8, 4-9.                       Neutron(s), 2-2, 2-3, 2-7.
   enemy, troops, terrain (and weather),and time available      -induced gamma activity (NIGA), 2-8, 5-3, GI-2.
         (METT-T), 3-16, 5-3, 5-5, 5-7, 5-9, GI-2.
                                                                See also Effects.
   -essential equipment, 2-6.                                Nominating commander. See Commander.
   -essential training. See Training.                        Nomination, 3-7, 3-8, 3-14, 4-2, 5-1.
   receipt, 3-8, 3-16, 4-9.                                     corps, 3-10.
Mitigation, 2-6,4-3,4-4.
                                                                cycle, 3-9.
   measures, 3-18, 4-2.
                                                                denial, 3-1.
   requirements, 2-8.                                           for employment, v, 3-7.
   techniques, 1-4, 1-5,2-3,2-5,2-6,3-19,5-2,5-6,5-7,5-9,       of nuclear targets, 1-1, 1-5, 3-2, 3-5, 3-7, 3-8, 4-1, 4-4, 4-6,
          6-1, 6-2, 6-4, GI-4.                                        4-8,4-9,5-5, 5-9.
Mobile                                                          of nuclear weapons, 3-4, 3-14, 3-17, 3-18, 4-8, 5-5.
  defense, 5-5-5-9.                                             plans, 4-2.
   land battle targets, 3-14, 3-15.                             probability, 5-3.
  striking force (MSF), 5-5-5-7, GI-2.                          process, 3-3, 3-17, 4-1, 4-4, 4-9,5-4.
   targets, 5-8.                                                See also Options; Target nomination.
Mobility, 2-6, 5-6, 5-7, 6-2, 6-3, 6-5, 6-6.                 Noncombatant(s)
  and survivability, 3-17, 3-18.                                casualties. See Casualties.
  See also Flexibility.                                         demographic data and overlays, 4-7.
Mobilization, 3-3, 6-2.                                         information displays, 4-8.
Moderate risk. See Risk.                                        status, 4-2.
Monitoring, 4-7-4-9, 6-1, 6-4, 6-5.                          Noncontiguous battlefield. See Battlefield.
  communications, 2-5.                                       Nondivisional elements, 6-5.
  movement of nuclear materials, I-I.                        Nonnuclear fires, 3-17.
  radiological, 1-5,6-5.                                     Nonproliferation, 1-3, 1-5, GI-4.
  See also Fallout.                                          North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 6-6,6-7.
Morale, 5-7, 6-8.                                            Nuclear
Mortuary operations, 4-3, 4-8, 6-5.                            annex, 3-2.
Movement, 3-15, 3-17, 5-6, 5-7, 6-4.                           appendix of the OPORD, 3-2, 3-3.
  control elements, 6-4.                                       bonus effects, GI-6.
  of equipment, 2-5.                                                See also Effects.
  to contact, 5-2, 5-3.                                        employment augmentation teams (NEAT), 3-5, 3-6, 3-16,
  See also Force movement; Unit movement, employment,                 3-19,4-1-4-3,4-5, GI-2.
         and protection.                                       environment, v, 1-1, 1-4, 1-5,2-1,2-3,3-19,5-2,5-3,6-1,
Multinational                                                        6-3-6-6, 6-8.
  command, 3-11.                                               operations, v, 1-1, 1-5,3-8,4-5, GI-5.
  forces, 3-13, 3-19.                                          See also Operations planning.
  operations, 3-1, 3-8, 3-11, 3-12.                            policy constraints, 3-2.

FM 100-30

   safety line, GI-6.                                            close, 5-1, 5-3, 5-8, 5-9.
   support, 1-1, 1-4,3-2,3-3,3-16,5-1.                           concept of. See Concept of operations.
   See also Immediate nuclear support; Preplanned nuclear        contingency. See Contingency operations.
         support.                                                continuous, 3-2, 6-2.
   warfare, 3-17.                                                deep, 5-1-5-3, 5-8, 5-9.
   weapons, 1-2,2-1,3-16,4-3.                                    defensive. See Defensive operations.
Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC), GI-2.                   entry. See Entry operations.
   capabilities, 3-14.                                           estimate, 4-3.
  center (NBCC), 3- 10,4-2, 4-5, Gl-2.                           future, 2-4.
  clothing, 6-6.                                                 map(s), 3-4, 3-10.
  contamination. See Survivability.                              officer, 3-15, 3-16.
  defense, 1-1,3-5,3-11,4-1,4-3,4-9,6-7, Gl-6.                  order (OPORD), 3-3, 3-4, 4-1, 4-7, 4-9, GI-2.
  elements, 4-8.                                                overlay, 5-6,
  estimate, 4-3.                                                plan (OPLAN), 3-2-3-7, 3-12, 3-15,4-1,4-7, GI-2.
  markers, 6-3, 6-6-6-8.                                             annex, 3-2, 3-3.
  protection process, I-I, 1-4, 2-7.                                 appendix, 3-15.
      See also Protection.                                      planning. See Planning.
  reconnaissance assets. See Reconnaissance.                    post-conflict,
  reports, 4-8.                                                 psychological. See Psychological operations (pSYOP).
  staff, 4-3,4-7,4-8.                                           rear, 5-1, 5-2,5-8,5-9.
  teams, 6-6.                                                   reserve, 5-9.
  warning and reporting system, 4-3.                            security (OPSEC), 2-5, 5-4, Gl-2.
  weapons, 3-1.                                                 See also Combat service support (CSS); Nuclear
                                                                      operations; Tenets of Army operations.
                        o                                    Opposed entry operations, 3-3, 3-4.
Objectives, 1-3, 1-4,3-1,3-5,3-9,3-13,3-14,3-16-3-18.        Option(s), 3-3,3-6,3-7,3-12,3-16,3-19,4-2,4-3,4-6-4-9,
Obstacle(s), 2-1, 2-5, 2-8,3-12,5-1,5-4,5-7.                          GI-5.
   breaching of, 3-18.                                          area, 3-34.
   clearance, 6-1.                                              burst, 1-3.
   creation, 3-15.                                              methodology, 5-5.
Offensive operations, 1-2,3-4,3-16,4-3,5-1-5-5,5-9.             parameters, 3-17.
Offense, 5-3, 5-5, 5-9.                                         planning, 3-7, 3-16,4-2,4-8.
   See also Planning.                                               criteria, 4-2.
Operational                                                     strategic, 3-1.
   analysis, 4-4.                                               See also Planning; Response options; Warfighting options.
   area, 6-1.                                                Orders, 4-7, 4-9.
   considerations, 4-3,5-1,5-2.                                 preparation, 3-6.
   data, 3-8.                                                   See also Air tasking order (ATO); Operations order
   effectiveness, 2-5,
                                                             Overlay. See Noncombatant demographic data and overlay;
   exposure guide (OEG), 2-2, 2-3,2-5,4-4,4-8, GI-2, Gl-5.            Operations overlay.
   guidance, 3-14.                                           Overpressure, GI-6.
   information, 4-3.
   level, 1-2,6-5.                                                                       P
       commander, 3-15,3-16,3-18,4-6,5-8.                    Passive
       of war, v, 1-1,3-1,3-12-3-14,3-16,4-6.                   defense. See Defense.
       commanders. See Commander.                               protection measures. See Protection.
   objectives. See Objectives.                               Penetration, 5-2, 5-3, 5-5, 5-8.
   overlay, 3-10.                                            Personal demand items (Class VI). See Classes of supply.
   plans/planning, 2-7, 3-1, 3-13, 3-17, 4-3.                Personnel, 6-1.
   situation, 3-8.                                              accounting and strength reporting, 6-2.
   targets, 3-14.                                               combat service support, 6- I, 6-2, 6-7.
Operation(s), 3-2, 3-10, 3-18, 4-9, 5-1, 5-2, 6-4.              combat stress control, 6-5.

                                                                                                                 FM 100-30

    contaminated, 6-5.                                           Positioning approval document, 3-2.
    issues, 4-3, 4-4.                                               See also Dispersion.
    mental health. See Mental health.                            Post-conflict operations, 3-3, 3-4.
    operations, 4-8.                                             Post -strike
    readiness. See Readiness.                                       damage assessment. See Damage assessment.
    readiness management, 6-2.                                      target analysis. See Target analysis.
    replacement. See Reconstitution.                             Preclusion
    safety, 3- I 4.                                                 damage avoidance, 3-14, 4-2.
        See also Troop safety.                                      data, 4-1, 4-3.
    services support (PSS), 6-8, GI-2.                              -oriented nuclear target analysis, 3-7.
    strengths, 4- 1.                                                overlays, 3-16, 4-3.
    See also Reconstitution; Replacements.                          requirements, 3-7.
Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) (Class III). See Classes     Predeployment activities, 3-3.
          of supply.
                                                                      See also Deployment.
Phases, 1-3, 3-10.
                                                                  Preparedness, 1-4, 1-5, 2-1, 3-8, 5-4, 5-8.
Physical security, 2-5.
Planned target, Gl-6.
                                                                      nuclear support, I-I.
    See also Target planning.
                                                                         See also Immediate nuclear support.
Planners, 3-2, 3-3, 3-16, 6-2.
                                                                      resupply, 6-6, 6-7.
Planning, 3-1, 3-3, 3-8, 3-12-3-14, 3-16, 3-17, 3-19, 4-2-4-6,
          4-8,4-9,5-3,5-7-5-9,6-6.                               Presidential
   See also Campaign plan; Operations planning.                      approval and release, v, 1-1,3-1,3-7.
   and execution cycle, 3-5,3-19.                                    Nuclear Initiative (PNI), v, 1-2, GI-2.
   cycle, 3-8.                                                   Preventive medicine (PVNTMED), 6-5, Gl-2.
   guidance, 3-2, 3-3, 3-16.                                         See also Medical support.
   methodology, 3-5.                                             Pre-wartime contingency planning. See Contingency plan.
   peacetime, 3-16.                                              Procedures. See Staff procedures.
   process, 1-4, 3-13. 4-9.                                      Proliferation, 1-3, 1-5, GI-6.
   route, 6-4.                                                       of nuclear weapons, 5-7.
   staff, 3-6.                                                       of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 1-2,3-11.
   the defence, 5-7.                                                 See also Counterproliferation; Nonproliferation.
   the offense, 5-7.                                             Protection, v, 1-3,2-2,2-6-2-8,3-2,3-11,3-14,5-3,5-5,
   wartime, 3-16.                                                          5-7, 5-8,6-2,6-3.
   See also Campaign plan; Concept plan (CONPLAN);                   force, 3-12, 4-1, 5-2.
         Crisis-action planning process; Deliberate-planning         individual,2-5.
         process, Employment planning; Executive planning;           local,2-1.
         Joint Operations Planning and Execution System
                                                                     measures, 2-4, 3-15, 4-3, 4-8, 6- I, 6-3, 6-6-6-8.
         (JOPES); Operations plan (OPLAN); Options plan-
         ning; Option planning criteria; Reconstitution plan-        of civilian popUlation, 4-2, 5-3.
         ning.                                                       of medical facilities, 6-5.
Plan(s), 1-4, 1-5,3-10,4-2,4-7,4-9,6-4.                              oflogistic facilities, 6-1.
   contingency. See Contingency plans.                               planning, 4-5.
   operational, 4-2.                                                 See also Mitigation techniques; Protection; Shielding.
   synchronized, 5-R.                                            Psychological and physiological
   unified, 5-R.                                                     effects, 1-4, 2-8.
   See also Campaign plan; Concept plan (CONPLAN); De-               environment, 2- I.
         ployment plan; Radiological monitoring and survey-          impact, 1-4,
         ing plan; Reconnaissance, selection, and occupation
         of position (RSOP) plan; Support plans; Synchroni-          preparedness. See Preparedness.
         zation plan.                                               stress, I -4.
Population                                                       Psychological operations (pSYOP), 4-2, 4-7, GI-2.
   centers, 3-X, 4-1, 4-R.                                       Publications for reference. See Reference section.
   characteristics, 3-16.                                        Pursuit, 5-2, 5-3.
Position locator reference system (PLRS), 6-6, GI-2.             Push packages, 6-7.

FM 100-30

                          Q                                     References, References-I.
Quality oflife, 6-8.                                            Refinements, 3-16, 3-17.
Quartermaster                                                       to approved options, 3-16.
  personnel, 6-5, 6-7, 6-8.                                         to wartime planning, 3-16.
  water purification detachments. See Water.                    Reflected energy, 2-1, 2-2.
                                                                Refueling facilities, 6-6.
                            R                                   Regeneration. See Reconstitution.
Radar blackout. See Blackout.                                   Regional
Radiation, 2-8, 4-2, 4-3,5-4.                                       conflicts, 1-4,
   aerial survey, 4-7.                                              crisis, 3-1.
   dose, Gl-6.                                                      instabilities, v, 1-2, 1-5.
   information, 6-4.                                                threats, 1-3,
   rate, Gl-5.                                                  Rehearsals, 3-8, 4-6.
   effects, 1-4,2-5,2-6, 6-2, 6-5.                              Reinforcing forces, 5-1.
   infrared, 2-1.                                               Release, 1-1,3-1,3-13.
   initial, 2-1-2-3, 2-6, 2-7, 3-15, 5-6.                          rate of, 2-2.
   levels, 6-4, 6-5.                                               See also Presidential approval and release.
   residual ionizing, 2-1, 2-2, 2-6-2-8, 5-6.                   Releasing commander, 01-6.
   sickness, 2-1, 6-8, 01-6.                                    Reorganization, 3-19.
   status, 2-8, 4-8.                                            Repair parts and components (Class IX). See Classes of
   thermal, 2-1, 2-6, 2-8, 3-15, 3-19, 5-6.                               supply.
   ultraviolet, 2-1.                                            Replacement(s), 3-18, 4-3, 6-2.
   See also Casualties; Effects; Radiological monitoring and       management, 6-2.
         surveying plan.                                           operations, 3-19.
Radiation exposure                                                 system, 6-2.
   control, 2-3.                                                Reserve forces. See Forces.
   levels, 2-3, 2-5, 6-5.                                       Residual ionizing radiation, Gl-6.
   states (RES), 3-19, 4-1, 4-8,5-4,5-7,01-2, Gl-6.                See also Radiation.
Radiological                                                    Resources, apportionment and allocation of, 3-5, 6-6.
   contamination. See Contamination.                            Response
   monitoring and surveying plan, 4-2.                             options, 1-2, 3-16.
Raids, 3-4.                                                        rapid, 3-10.
Rainout, 2-2, 5-4, Gl-6.                                        Responsiveness, 1-3, 1-4,6-1,6-2,6-5,6-8.
Rapid response. See Response.                                   Restraint; restrictions, 1-2, 3-13.
Reaction time(s), 1-4, 1-8, 3-8.                                Resupply and reconstitution, 4-1, 6-2, 6-5, 6-6, 6-7.
Readiness, 3-10, 4-5.                                           Retaliation, 1-3.
Rear                                                            Retinal bums. See Bums.
   area, 6-3.                                                   Reverse-osmosis water purification units (ROWPU), 6-8,
   operations. See Operations.                                           01-2.
Reconnaissance,                                                 Risk, 1-2, 3-1, 4-2, 4-5, 5-8.
   assets, 6-2.                                                    assessment,4-4,4-6.
   selection, and occupation of position (RSOP) plan, 3-6.         criteria, 2-3.
   See also Route reconnaissance.                                  moderate, 01-4.
ReconstitutioniRegeneration, 2-6, 3-3, 3-5, 3-12, 3-18, 3-19,      negligible, 3-4, 3-15, 4-2, 01-4.
         4-1,4-4,4-5,4-7,4-8.                                      nuclear, 6-6.
   planning, 3-18, 4-4.                                            reduction, 5-2, 5-5.
   See also Resupply and reconstitution.                           unacceptable, 2-5.
Recovery                                                           See also Degree of risk; Troop safety.
   and decontamination. See Decontamination.                    Route, 3-18, 5-5, 6-4, 6-6.
   and repair, 1-5,6-3.                                            planning. See Planning.
Redeployment, 3-3, 3-5, 6-2.                                       reconnaissance, 3-8.
Redundancy, 2-6.                                                   withdrawal, 5-3.

                                                                                                               FM 100-30

Rubble, J- 15, 5-4, 5-7.                                          Standardization agreement (STANAG), 3-11, GI-3.
                                                                  Standing operating procedures (SOP), 2-3, 4-1, 4-2, 4-6,
                           s                                                 GI-3.
Safety                                                            Statement of the commander's intent. See Commander's
    criteria, 4-3.                                                           intent.
    data, 3-4.                                                    Static overpressure. See Blast wave.
    infonnation,3-10.                                             Stockage
    procedures, 3-10, 6-4.                                            contamination and dccontamination of, 6-6, 6-7.
    See also Civilian safety; Lateral troop-safety infonnation;       levels, 6-6.
          Troop safety.                                               of supplies. See Classes of supply.
Salvage, 6-3.                                                         reduction. 6-6.
Scheme of maneuver, 3-12, 3-16, 3-18, 4-1, 4-2, 4-5.              Stockpile-to-target sequence, 5-4.
Security, 3-4, 5-2.                                               Strategic
    See also Communications security (COMSEC); Electronic             considerations, v, 5-2.
         security (ELSEC); Infonnation security; Operations           level
         security (OPSEC); Physical security; Signals secu-               commander, 3-16.
          rity (SIGSEC).
                                                                          of war, v, 1-1.
                                                                          operations, 3-13.
Shelter. See Shielding.
                                                                          planning, 3-1.
Shielding, 2-1-2-3, 2-6, 5-8, 6-2.
                                                                      liaison assistance team (STRATLAT), 3-5,3-6,3-19, GI-3.
    See a/so Protection.
                                                                      objectives, 3-3, 3-4.
Shock, 1-4, 5-4, 5-5.
                                                                      plan/planning, 3-1.
                                                                      theater, v, I-I.
    annex, 4-7.
                                                                  STRATCOM. See United States Strategic Command (US-
    operations (SO), 2-3, 4-8, GI-3.                                        STRATCOM).
    officer, 2-3, 4-8, GI-3.                                      Stress, 1-4.
    security (SIGSEC) 2-5, 5-4, GI-3.                             Strike(s), 1-2, 1-3,2-5,3-1,3-8,3-10,3-14,5-1,5-4,5-6,5-
    support, 4-3.                                                           8.
Signatures, 2-5, 3-10.                                                force. See Mobile strike force (MSF).
Sister services, 3-2, 3-8, 3-13-3-15, 3-18, 4-5, 4-9.                 warning (STRIKWARN), 3-6, 3-7, 3-12, 4-7, 4-8, GI-3, GI-5.
    support, 3-1.                                                 Subordinate
Situation. 4-5.                                                       commander(s), 3-3, 3-5,3-8,3-13,5-3.
    assessment, 4-8.                                                  commands, 3-3.
   development, 5-4.                                                  plans, 3-2.
   estimate. 4-3.                                                     staff(s), 3-8.
    updates, 4-8.                                                    units. See units.
Small units. See Units.                                           Subsistence items (Class I). See Classes of supply.
Space burst. See Burst; Options.                                  Supervision. 4-8.
Special operations                                                Supply/Supplies, 6-1,6-2,6-6,6-7.
   coordination detachment (SOCOORD), 3-8, GI-3.                     company, 6-5.
   liaison element (SOLE), 3-6. 3-8, GI-3.                           critical, 6-3, 6-6.
   force(s) (SOF), 3-8,3-15,01-3.                                    locations, 6-7.
Spoiling attack, 2-4.                                                 operations, 6-6.
Staff, 4-8, 4-9.                                                     routes. See Routes.
   analysis, 4-6.                                                    See also General supply support (GSS); General support
   assistance, 3-5, 3-6.                                                    (GS).
   elements, 4-1.                                                 Support, 6-1-6-3, 6-6, 6-7.
   estimate, 4-4, 4-5.                                               characteristics, 6-1.
   procedurcs, 4-1, 4-7.                                             functions, 5-1, 6- I.
   supervision, 4-8.                                                 mission, 4-8.
   See also Fire support coordinator (FSCOORD); G I, G2,             maintenance unit. See Units.
         G3, G4, G5, and G6; Planning staff.                         mutual, 1-4.
Staging areas, 5- 1.                                                 nuclear weapons employment, 3-5.

 FM 100-30

    plans, 3-2, 3-13, 4-7.                                          board, 3-9.
    reduced, 1-4,                                                   considerations, 3-14.
    requirements, 6-1, 6-2.                                         guidance, 3-2, 3-8.
    See also Conventional support; Electronic warfare support       nuclear, 3-13, 3-14,
         measures (ESM); Employment support; Fire sup-              officer, 3-15, 4-3, 4-5.
         port; Nuclear support.
                                                                    priorities, 3-14.
Supportability, 2-5.
                                                                    process, 3-13-3-15, 3-17.
                                                                Target(s), 3-1, 3-5-3-7, 3-10, 3-12, 4-6, 4-8, 5-1, 5-4, 5-5,
    commander, 3-7.                                                        6-1.
    commands, 3-2.                                                  acquisition, 5-2, 6-7.
    forces, 5-2.                                                    analysis, 2-1, 3-1, 3-4, 3-9, 4-5, 4-6, 4-8.
Suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), 3-8, GI-3.                 nomination sequence, 3-7.
   See also Air defense (AD); Air defense artillery (ADA);          array, 3-15.
         Defense.                                                   collection plan, 4-3.
Surface                                                             conventional, 3-7.
   areas, 3- 13.
                                                                    critical, 1-3.
   burst. See Burst.                                               deconfliction of, 3-5, 3-10, 5-1.
   conditions, 2-1.                                                deep, 2-8.
   ground, 2-1.                                                    defeat criteria, 4-3.
   targets, 3-14.                                                  engagement, 5-2.
Surgeon, 4-3, 4-4, 4-7, 4-8.                                       evaluation, 3-7.
Surprise, 1-3,3-4,5-2,5-4,5-5,5-7.                                 identifying, 3-13, 3-14.
Survival/Survivability, vi, 1-4, 1-5,2-4-2-7,3-2,3-17-3-19,        lists, 3-5.
         5-2, 5-7, 6-2, 6-3.
                                                                   military, 3-13.
   measures, 1-4.
                                                                   nomination, v, 1-1,2-8,3-2-3-8,3-10,3-14,3-16,3-17,
   movements, 6-4.                                                         3-19,4-2,4-5,4-9,5-3,5-6,5-8,5-9.
   operations, 2-5, 3-18.                                          positioning of, 5-7.
   techniques, 1-4, 2-6, 2-7, 3-18, 3-19.                          priorities, 3-12, 3-14, 3-15.
   unit, 2-4, 2-5,                                                 selection, 3-11.
   See also Contamination; Equipment survivability;                tracking, 3-15.
                                                                   -value analysis (TVA), 3-15, 4-5, 4-6, GI-3.
Sustaining the force, 5-2.
                                                                   vulnerability. See Vulnerability.
Sustainment, 5-9, 6-1, 6-8.
                                                                   See also High-payoff target (HPT); High-value target
Synchronization, 3-12, 3-14, 3-16, 5-1, 5-5.                              (HVT); Planning.
   plan, 3-8.                                                   Task organization, 3-5, 5-1.
System-generated electromagnetic pulse (SGEMP), GI-5.           Tempo, 1-1,5-2,5-5, 6-\.
                                                                Tenets of Army operations, 5-1, 5-9.
                                                                Terrain, 2-1-2-3, 3-14, 3-16, 3-18, 4-5, 4-8, 5-3, 5-5-5-8.
                                                                   analysis of, 4-4.
   considerations, 5-1, 5-2.
                                                                   shielding. See Shielding. See also Weather.
   employment of forces, 3-13.
                                                                Terrorism, 1-2, 1-3.
   level, 1-2,6-5.
                                                                Theater, 1-5.
       commanders, 3-16.
                                                                   CINe. See Commander-in-Chief.
       of war, v, 1-1,3-3,3-14.
                                                                   guidance. See Guidance.
   nuclear weapons, v.
                                                                   headquarters, 3-10.
   objectives, 3-4.
                                                                   level, 1-2, 3-13
   offense, 5-3, 5-9.
                                                                   movement of nuclear weapons within, 3-1.
   operations center. See Corps tactical operations center
                                                                   nuclear weapons nomination sequence, 3-8, 3-9.
                                                                   of operations (TO), v, 1-1,3-1,3-11,3-13, G1-3.
   plan/planning, 3-1, 5-4.
                                                                   of war, 3-13.
   units. See Units.
                                                                   operations plan, 3-3.
Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), 2-5, 2-6, 5-4.
                                                                       See also Operations plan (OPLAN).
Targeting, 3-3, 5-4.

                                                                                                                  FM 100-30

    -strategic, v, 1-2.                                             See also Lateral troop-safety information; Safety,
        intents, conccpts, and objectivcs, 3-13,                 Turning moveIllent, 5-3.
        objectives, 1-1, 3-4.
        results, v.                                                                          u
    See alsu Campaign planning.                                  Ultraviolet. See Radiation.
 Thermal                                                            See also Wavelengths.
    absorption ljualities, 2-1.                                  Unconventional warfarc, 5-7.
    effects, 2-1, 2-2, 4-2, 6-4, 6-5                             Underground facilities, 3-14.
    energy. SCI' Energy.                                         Unified
    radiation, GI-5.                                               command(s),3-13.
    See also Effects; Radiation.                                   commander, 3-11.
Threat, v, 1-2, 1-3, 1-5, 3-1.                                  Unilateral initiatives, I-I.
   arrays, 3-8.                                                 United States, GI-3.
   assessment, 3-11,4-2.                                           Anny Nuclear and Chcmical Agency (USANCA), 3-5,
                                                                         3-16,3-19,4-1-4-3,4-5, GI-3.
   conventional, 2-6.
                                                                   Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). 3-2-3-4, 3-6, 3-7,
   intelligence. 3- Jo.
                                                                         3-19, GI-3.
   operations, 1-3.
                                                                Unites), 1-4,5-8, 6-2,6-3.
Time, 2-7, 6-6.
                                                                    Air Force, 6-4.
    after detonation. Scc Arrival times.                           ArnlY, 6-4.
   and space, 4-S, 4-9,5- I.                                       Aviation, 6-6.
   avaiiahie, 5-4, 5-X.                                            adjacent, 4-9.
   employment, 3-6.                                                cohesion, 3-19.
   frame, 3-16                                                     cotnbat service support, 6-1-6-7.
   lead, 3-1 'i                                                    contaminated, 6-6, 6-7.
   near-real, 5-2.                                                 deployment plan, 3-10.
   on target, (;1-5.                                               dispersion. Sec Dispersal of units,
-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), 3-2-3-4, 3-10,          field service support, 6-5, 6-6.
                                                                   isolated, 5-1. 0-4.
   rcquireIlll'nts, 3-14.
                                                                   locations, 3-8.
   See also Delivery time; Lead time.
                                                                   logistics, 6-1. 6-2.
Timing, 3-1. <-R, 3-10,3-13-3-15, 5-6.
                                                                   maintenance, 6-3.
                                                                   medical, 6-5.
   analysis. 5-1.                                                  movement, employment, and protection, 2 1.
   matrix, 5-5, 5-6, 5-9.
                                                                   preparation, See Preparedness.
Training, \, 1-4, 1-5,2-1,2-7,3-11, 3-19, 5-7, 5-8, 6-1, 6-5,
                                                                   quartermaster, 6-7. 6-8.
Transient radiation effects on electronics (TREE), 2-3, 2-4,       radiation cxpooure state (RES). Sec' Radiation exposure
        GI-3, GI-5.                                                     state (RES).
Transition to the offense,   5~5.
                                                                   replacement. Sec Replacement.
Transportation, 6-1, 6-2, 6-4.                                     small, 1-4, 1-5, 5-1').
   networks, 5-8,                                                  subordinate, 4- 7, 4-9.
   opcrations, h-,-l.                                              supply, 6-3.
   units. See Units.                                               support, 6-1 .
Transition( s), 3-10.                                              supported, 3-10, 6-11.
   to the defense, 5-7.                                            survivability. See Survivability.
TREE. See Transient radiation effects on electronics              tactical, 6-3, 6-4.
                                                                  transportation, 6-4.
Tree blowdown, 2-1, 3-15, 5-4, 5-7,6-4.
                                                                  uncontaminated, 6-6.
                                                                  See also Combat service support (CSS); Commanders;
Troop(s), 5-4,5-7.                                                      Massed units; Medical units; Reconnaissance, selec-
   concentrations, 3-14,                                                tion, and occupation of position (RSOP) plan; Re-
   safety, 3-4, 3-10, 3-12, 3-14, 3-17, 4-2,4-4,4-6,4-7,5-1,            serve forces; Survivability.
        5-3, 5-6, 5-7, 5-9, GI-5,                               Unopposed entry operations, 3-3.

FM 100-30

Unwarned exposed, 3-4, 3-15,4-2, Gl-6.                         production personnel, 6-5.
Urban structures, 2-1.                                         purification, 6-5.
                                                               treatment, 6-S.
                         v                                     See also Reverse-osmosis water purification units (ROWPU).
Vehicle( s), 6-4, 6-7.
                                                           Wavelengths, 2-1.
   maintenance unit, 6-3.
   recovery and repair, 6-3.
                                                             data, 3-8.
Vertical coordination. See Coordination.
                                                              debris, GI-6.
Versatility, 5-1.
                                                              effects, 2-1.
Veterinary personnel, 6-5.
Visibility, 5-8.                                              See also Effects.
Vision, 6-6.                                                  enemy use of, 3-1.
   loss of, 2-2.                                              environment, 1-3.
   See also Dazzle; Retinal burns.                            of mass destruction (WMD), v, 1-1-1-5,3-1,3-3,3-4,3-14,
Vulnerability, 2-4-2-6, 3-12, 3-17, 4-2-4-4,4-6,4-7,5-1,           4-1-4-4,4-7,5-7,6-2, GI-3, Gl-5.
         5-7, 5-9, 6-2-6-4, 6-6, 6-7.                             See also Proliferation.
   analyses/assessment, 4-2, 4-3, 4-S, 6-2, GI-6.             system replacement operations (WSRO), GI-6.
                                                              systems, 3-8,3-15, 3-19, 5-8, 6-3, 6-7.
                         w                                    templates, 3-17.
Warfighting.2-7                                               types, 3-12.
  options, 1-2, 1-4,
                                                              yields. See Yields.
  tasks, 4-1.
                                                              See also Counterproliferation; Delivery means; Effects;
War                                                                 Employment; Nomination; Nomination cycle; Non-
  -gaming, 3-15, 4-4-4-6.                                         proliferation; Presidential approval and release; Pro-
  -termination, 3-3, 3-4.                                         liferation.
  -timc planning, 3-16.                                    Weather, 2-1,3-16,4-1,4-4,4-5,5-4,5-7, 5-8.
Warned exposed, GI-6.                                        See also Terrain.
Warned protected, 4-2, GI-6.                               Windows of opportunity, 5-8.
  See also Risk.                                           Worldwide regional instability. See Regional instabilities.
Warning system, 1-2.
  See also Early warning.                                                             x
Warning                                                    X-rays, 2-2.
  message, Gl-o.
  system, 1-2.                                                                        y
  See also Early warning.                                  Yield(s), 2-2, 2-3, 2-5, 3-1, 3-6, 3-12, 3-14-3-17, 4-1, 4-6,
Watcr,6-5-6-S.                                                      5- 1,5-4,5-9, Gl-5.
  bulk, 6-7.                                                   limitation, 3-13.
  contamination. See Contamination.


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