Terrorism Systematic use of violence to create a general climate of fear in a population and thereby to bring about a particular political objective. It has been used throughout history by political organizations of both the left and the right, by nationalist and ethnic groups, and by revolutionaries. Although usually thought of as a means of destabilizing or overthrowing existing political institutions, terror also has been employed by governments against their own people to suppress dissent; examples include the reigns of certain Roman emperors, the French Revolution, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union under Stalin, and Argentina during the "dirty war" of the 1970s. Terrorism's impact has been magnified by the deadliness and technological sophistication of modern-day weapons and the capability of the media to disseminate news of such attacks instantaneously throughout the world. The deadliest terrorist attack ever occurred in the United States on Sept. 11, 2001 (see September 11 attacks), when members of al-Qaeda terrorist network hijacked four commercial airplanes and crashed two of them into the twin towers of the World Trade Center complex in New York City and one into the Pentagon building near Washington, D.C.; the fourth plane crashed near Pittsburgh, Pa. The crashes resulted in the collapse of much of the World Trade Center complex, the destruction of part of the southwest side of the Pentagon, and the deaths of some 3,000 people. Terrorism refers here to the public health consequences and the methods for prevention of the purposeful use of violence or threats of violence by groups or individuals in order to serve political or personal agendas. This article does not include what has been termed "state terrorism," the use of violence by a nation-state without clear necessity for self-defense and without the authorization of the United Nations. Examples of Terrorism Use or threat of use of violence has long caused concern among those responsible for public health. Examples include indiscriminate violence, such as the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City and the 1995 bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, and targeted violence, such as attacks on facilities for the termination of pregnancy or on those who work in such facilities. The primary responsibility for response to the health consequences of such violence has resided largely in emergency medical services and the primary responsibility for prevention in agencies concerned with public order and safety, such as the police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Recent instances of use or threatened use of biological or chemical agents in terrorism have raised interest in the role of public health agencies and public health personnel in primary or secondary prevention. Documented episodes, although extremely rare, have been dramatic. In Japan, the chemical warfare agent Sarin was released by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Matsumoto in 1994 and in the Tokyo subway in 1995. In 1984, an Oregon cult allegedly contaminated salad bars with a biological agent, salmonella. These episodes, and recent hoaxes concerning anthrax release, have led to well publicized, costly responses by public health and public safety officials. Chemical terrorism could include the purposeful contamination of water and food supplies or the aerosolization of toxicants within enclosed public spaces. Biological terrorist actions could include purposeful contamination with infectious materials, as well as the purposeful release of insects or other vectors infected with a transmissible disease. Availability of Chemical and Biological Weapons Underlying concern about bioterrorism is the long history of use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) in war. Since World War II, worldwide military forces have built up major stockpiles of such weapons and tested them at a number of sites around the world. Although the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) outlawed the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of these weapons, large stockpiles of chemical weapons still await destruction in several nations, and it is alleged that stockpiles of biological weapons are still maintained in a few nations. Although the technical knowledge and materials needed to produce CBW are relatively available, the ability to "weaponize" and target these materials remains extremely limited. The risk of their use appears to be small, but any use constitutes a threat to public health. Types of Biological Agents There are at least seventy types of bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, and fungi that can be weaponized, including tularemia, anthrax, Q fever, epidemic typhus, smallpox, brucellosis, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, botulinum toxin, dengue fever, Russian spring-summer encephalitis, Lassa fever, Marburg, Ebola, Bolivian hemorrhagic fever (Machupo), and Argentinean hemorrhagic fever (Junin). Antibiotic resistant strains of anthrax, plague, tularemia, and glanders have allegedly been developed. Viruses and toxins can be genetically altered to heighten their infectiousness, permitting the development of pathogens capable of overcoming existing vaccines. It is estimated that no more than 20 to 30 percent of the diseases the aforementioned agents cause can be effectively treated. Recent History of Control In 1994 U.S. president Bill Clinton issued an Executive Order asserting that the potential use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons "by terrorist groups or rogue states" represents "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States." This Order, renewed annually, makes it illegal for anyone in the United States to help anyone to acquire, design, produce, or stockpile CBW. The Order was amended in 1998 to include penalties for trafficking in equipment that could indirectly contribute to a foreign biological warfare program. In 1995 President Clinton announced a new policy against "superterrorism"—terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. The Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, together with the FBI and the CIA, were to oversee a wide network of military and civilian agencies, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, dedicated to identifying CBW attacks and to coping with their consequences. In 1997, a $52.6 million Domestic Preparedness Program was authorized for emergency response teams in 120 selected cities, whereby police, fire departments, and public health officials were to receive special training and equipment to help them combat biological and chemical terrorism. In 1998 President Clinton announced new initiatives to address bioterrorism. Hearings before a committee of the U.S. Senate in 1998 included witnesses who stated that such proposals were misguided because so many resources were being assigned to military rather than to medical or public health authorities. Ethical questions raised include whether such funds could be better spent on providing adequate public health measures, preventive medicine, and treatment for endemic illness to the population. Limitations of Counter-Terrorism Measures Overall, there is little evidence that specific vaccine programs or other technical defensive programs are effective or ethical preventive measures against the use or threat of use of biologic weapons. Many public health experts argue that the best defenses against use of biological weapons lie in ethical proscription of work on them by health professionals and scientists and protection of the global population against all serious infectious disease, not just diseases caused intentionally, by ameliorating poverty and inadequate nutrition, housing, and education. As part of this effort, it is argued, industrialized countries should enable developing countries to build capacity for detection, diagnosis, and treatment of all disease by providing technical information and needed resources. Article X of the BWC, encouraging the exchange of information and materials for peaceful purposes, should be strengthened. Research organizations, professional societies, and individual scientists should pledge not to engage knowingly in research or teaching that furthers the development and use of biological weapons. Furthermore, all countries could prohibit the development of novel biological agents that do not have an unambiguously peaceful purpose, even if these activities are promoted for defensive purposes. An important reason that a few nations, groups, or individuals may continue to develop or stockpile chemical or biological weapons, known as "the poor nation's nuclear weapons," lies in the massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons maintained by the United States and other nuclear powers. As long as these nations fail to recognize their obligations under the 1970 Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty to move expeditiously toward nuclear weapons abolition, biological and chemical weapons will remain a threat. Terrorism is the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or its threat. Although ancient, it has become a common feature of the late 20th century, when it has raised a host of complex moral and practical issues. Terror, inflicted by the wholesale slaughter of populations who resisted, was used by Assyrians and Mongols alike to achieve the rapid collapse of enemy resolve, and was embodied in the practice (defended by Wellington even after the Napoleonic wars) of butchering the garrisons of fortresses which held out to the last extremity. Although terrorism is generally seen in the context of being employed against a government or its agencies, its use is not necessarily anti-governmental. The French Revolutionary ‘Reign of Terror’ was exactly that, and many subsequent regimes—like those of Stalin in Russia, Hitler in Germany, and Pol Pot's Cambodia—have used terror against their own citizens. The use of coercive power by governments—‘state terrorism’—has itself been used by terrorists to justify their own activities, even when the level of repression used by the government in question might appear to fall well short of terrorism. Albert Camus's 1949 play Les Justes, set in late 19th-century Russia—whose regime was indeed repressive—turns on the relationship between the damage terrorists necessarily inflict on the innocent and the greater political goal that they pursue. It underlines the point that the whole issue is extraordinarily subjective: one man's bomber-pilot is another's terror-flier, one man's freedom fighter another's terrorist. One of the first recorded doctrinaire terrorists was Carlo Pisacane, Duke of San Giovanni, who renounced his aristocratic birthright to further the cause of Italian nationalism. Employing the revolutionary language of a century later, he argued that ‘ideas result from deeds, not the latter from the former and the people will not be free when they are educated but educated when they are free’. Pisacane was killed in 1857, but his ideas were taken up in Russia twenty years later by the revolutionary organization Narodnaya Volya (The People's Will), a group dedicated to achieving political change by the assassination of high-profile individuals associated with the state. Their adherence to the principle of committing acts of violence only against specific individuals contrasts with the relatively random acts of violence perpetrated by many modern terrorist groups, for whom society itself has become the target. That terrorist groups began to emerge in late 19th-century Europe was no accident. The era was characterized by the growing pains of a new and often disadvantaged urban class, and by new weaponry such as breech-loading pistols and rifles, and the invention of dynamite by Nobel in 1862. This malleable form of high explosive was relatively safe to carry and plant, while the contemporary invention of mercury detonators enabled a charge to be set off at will. Similar social change, in this case the shift of populations from the countryside to the towns, and the ready availability of plastic explosive, had similar effects in South America a century later. The relationship between the terrorist and the guerrilla is complex. Not all guerrillas are terrorists: many have striven to represent themselves as irregular forces fighting a regular war, while their opponents have consistently sought to portray them as terrorists in order to deprive them of legitimacy. Yet the guerrilla's military weakness and his dependence on popular support both tend to drive him towards terrorism. The former encourages him to get the maximum publicity—especially in and beyond the media-rich 1960s—from the meagre means at his disposal, and the latter drives him to use both stick and carrot in his dealings with the population. The communists in China and the Vietcong in Vietnam both dealt harshly with civilian supporters of the hostile regime. Vietcong attacks on the civil service and local administration during the Tet offensive, often exemplified by the brutal murder of whole family groups, did much to destabilize South Vietnam. Independence campaigns against colonial rulers, like those in Cyprus and Algeria, usually embodied elements of terrorism. It is profoundly ironic, in view of Israel's subsequent experience of terrorism, that some of the groups who pursued Israeli independence used some of the very methods their successors now condemn. Urban guerrillas, like the Brazilian Carlos Marighela, argued that gangster actions like bank raids and kidnappings would provoke the government into action which would turn the population against the government, rather than against the perpetrators of the original violence, but the process rarely worked that way. In Uruguay the Tupamaros—as judicious and responsible in their actions as any urban guerrillas can hope to be—simply polarized opinion against them and were duly crushed. Although there had been connections between national anarchist groups in the 19th century, the internationalization of terrorism really occurred after 1945, as the Soviet bloc and its clients actively supported terrorist groups with training, equipment, and safe havens; the role of Libya has been particularly suspect. International terrorism took a new turn in 1968. The PLO had been founded in 1964 from Palestinian pressure groups who wished to recover their homeland. Israeli victory in the Six Day War of June 1967 resulted in the Jordanians losing Jerusalem and the West Bank of the Jordan, swelling the number of Arab refugees. The more radical elements of the PLO reacted violently, beginning in July 1968 with the hijacking of an El Al airliner. The Israelis released sixteen Arab prisoners, but this only encouraged more hijacks, and the PLO (and its splinter groups) mounted ever more daring and bloody attacks. These culminated with the kidnapping of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics, where all eleven hostages and five terrorists were killed. It is arguable whether the latter act caused an invitation to be issued to Yasser Arafat to address the UN General Assembly, but within eighteen months Arafat had spoken to the UN, and his PLO had been awarded ‘Special Observer Status’. Despite the success of the Israeli commando raid at Entebbe in 1976, which released over 100 hostages held by German and Palestinian hijackers, it is hard to resist the conclusion that it was the use of terrorism that brought the PLO to its prominent position on the world's stage. The spread and sophistication of modern communications has ensured that modern terrorists have an effect out of all proportion to their numbers, a factor which has been crucial to late 20th-century terrorists for whom publicity is indeed oxygen. In Europe, the IRA in the UK and the Basque separatists ETA in Spain both generated publicity out of all proportion to the number of activists engaged. The nationalist splinter group that detonated the bomb at Omagh in Northern Ireland in 1998 probably killed more people than it had activists. Similarly, although the terrorist groups of the 1970s, like the Baader-Meinhof gang in West Germany, the Italian Red Brigades, and the Japanese Red Army Faction, consisted of very few individuals with little popular support, their activities were nothing if not headline-grabbing. They saw themselves as ‘class warriors’, directing their venom at international businessmen, national government, or representatives of the US military. In a similar nihilistic vein are the Japanese religious cult behind the Sarin gas attack in Tokyo (March 1995) and the perpetrators of the Oklahoma City federal office block attack of just one month later, which resulted in 168 deaths. Other extremist groups, such as animal rights campaigners, anti-abortionists, and some extreme ecologists, have also used terrorism, justifying it with the familiar ‘state terrorism’ arguments already described. Though there is little evidence that 1990s terrorist groups are as interlinked as those of the 1970s and 1980s, their rise may be due in part to widely published studies of the techniques of terrorism and its effectiveness. Modern crime gangs and drug barons—‘non-state actors’—have also acquired the resources to wage terrorist-type campaigns. Though the methods may be identical, the motivation is financial, not political—in this sense they are merely imitators, ‘quasi-terrorists’. The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and the resultant numbers of automatic weapons and explosives in circulation are partly responsible for this development. The portrayal of destruction and terror by the media underlines the core function of terrorism, which continues to be achieved by a tiny minority of zealots. Some commentators have now identified ‘cyber terrorism’, where no physical violence is threatened (or implied) to humans, but rather information systems themselves are the target. A computer virus circulated via the Internet is, in its way, as newsworthy as a traditional terrorist bomb. Terrorism has caused many nations to develop specialist anti-terrorist units in the military or police, though the distinctions between the traditional functions of each sometimes became blurred in the process. In the British model, troops were used in support of the civil power, well demonstrated in 1980 with the storming by the SAS of the terrorist-held Iranian Embassy in London. The internationalization of terrorism generated an international response, particularly in terms of the pooling of police intelligence, although the old question of value judgements continues to enable one state's terrorists to emerge as another's political refugees. Most visibly, terrorism has resulted in the tightening-up of security at ports, airports, and public buildings, with concomitant delays and frustrations. In this respect its consequences may prove more enduring than those of many aspects of conventional warfare, for they will remain with us. Term with no agreed definition among governments or academic analysts, but almost invariably used in a pejorative sense, most frequently to describe life-threatening actions perpetrated by politically motivated self-appointed sub-state groups. But if such actions are carried out on behalf of a widely approved cause, say the Maquis seeking to destabilize the Government of Vichy France, then the term ‘terrorism’ is usually avoided and something more friendly is substituted. In short, one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter. Terrorism as a pejorative term is sometimes applied, however, to the deeds of governments rather than to those of sub-state actors. The term ‘state terror’ is, for example, frequently applied to the actions of officially appointed groups such as the Gestapo, the KGB, the Stasi of East Germany, and the like, against dissidents or ethnic minorities among their own fellow citizens. And the term ‘state-sponsored terrorism’ is often used to describe the conduct of various governments in directly organizing or indirectly assisting perpetrators of violent acts in other states. But in practice this might be said to be simply a form of low-intensity undeclared warfare among sovereign states. In recent times many countries of divergent ideological persuasion have engaged in this kind of activity while in some cases strictly condemning others for the same practices. For example, the United States during the Presidency of Ronald Reagan denounced many regimes, most notably that of Libya, in this connection while simultaneously openly sponsoring sub-state violence against Nicaragua with whose government it had full diplomatic relations. Such apparent inconsistency should not perhaps surprise us when we recall that many US dollar bills carry the portrait of a well-known perpetrator of politically motivated sub-state violence, or ‘terrorist’, or ‘freedom fighter’, namely, George Washington. Public interest in these matters grew massively as a result of the assault by hijacked airliners on the World Trade Center in New York City and on the Pentagon in Washington DC on 11 September 2001. For it was now widely acknowledged that the world was a facing a so-called ‘new terrorism’ whose first clear manifestations lay only in the early 1990s. By contrast, ‘old terrorism’ had had its heyday during the 1960s and 1970s. Then the emphasis had frequently been on territorial grievances involving demands for independence from imperialists or for revision of allegedly unjust frontiers. Sometimes such terrorism was successful—for example when the French were driven from Algeria and the British from Cyprus. On other occasions terrorists obtained compromise concessions that usually failed to resolve the dispute but nevertheless kept the level of violence contained. The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Basque terrorists Euzkadi ta Askatasuma (ETA) come into this category. But some terrorist groups, like Baader-Meinhof in West Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy, simply failed unambiguously and so faded away: typically these were motivated by ideology rather than by ethnic or cultural identity and had a tendency to misread the amount of popular support they commanded. What all these various ‘old terrorists’ had in common, however, was that their operations tended to focus on limited geographical areas and their methods, though certainly ruthless, were not intended to maximize bloodshed without any regard to the impression given to the constituencies they claimed to represent. In short, they wanted many people watching rather then many people dead; they usually had aims that were rationally defensible; and they pursued such aims with some sense of proportionality. So-called ‘new terrorists’, on the other hand, are nihilistic, are inspired by fanatical religious beliefs, and are willing to seek martyrdom through suicide. They rarely set out aims that appear remotely attainable; they give no warnings; they do not engage in bargaining; they find compromise solutions to problems unappealing; they are willing and even eager to carry out the mass slaughter of non-combatants; and they frequently do not even claim responsibility for their deeds—presumably because they feel ultimately accountable only to a deity. The ‘new terrorism’ was maybe first seen 1993 when an attempt was made to bring about the collapse of the World Trade Center in New York. The desire to kill thousands was clear even though in the event relatively few casualties resulted as the basement-based bombs proved insufficiently powerful to topple a tower. The US authorities blamed Islamic extremism and eventually a number of Muslims were brought to trial for the outrage. In the next major US manifestation of the ‘new terrorism’ it was Christian fundamentalism's turn to be involved: 1995 168 people were killed when a US Government building in Oklahoma City was blown up—with an American White Supremacist, Timothy McVeigh, being found guilty of the attack. Even more alarming was the use of weapons of mass destruction, both biological and chemical, in Tokyo during the early and mid-1990s. Actual deaths amounted only to twelve as several attempts were made to spread botulism and anthrax in the streets and sarin in the subway. The desire to kill many thousands was undoubted but technological incompetence prevented a catastrophe. Those responsible were again motivated by religion—in this case that of the obscure Aum Shinriko sect. The unambiguous emergence of a ‘new terrorism’ was finally put beyond question as a result of the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. Al-Qaida, an Islamic fundamentalist network, was immediately blamed by the US Government. And, after much imprecise rhetoric about the intention to create a global coalition to wage ‘War against Terrorism’, US-led military action was taken against Afghanistan, whose Taliban- controlled regime was held to have harboured at least parts of the al-Qaida network and, in particular, Osama Bin Laden In the early 21st cent. there were indications that terrorism, which had previously taken the form of isolated assassinations or bombings, was becoming endemic and had acquired a formidable international dimension. On 11 September 2001 two hi-jacked aircraft destroyed the World Trade Centre in New York, with the loss of nearly 3000 lives. The immediate result was an economic crisis, particularly in air travel, heightened security precautions, a search for Osama bin Laden who had encouraged the strike, and an American-led attack upon the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, to root out members of al-Qa'eda. This was followed in 2003 by a three-week campaign in Iraq which overthrew Saddam Hussain. Disagreements on policy produced severe strains within the United Nations and NATO. In July 2005, a coordinated terrorist attack upon London killed more than fifty people. Terrorism is a political tactic that uses threat or violence, usually against civilians, to frighten a target group into conceding to certain political demands. The term "terrorism" was first used to describe the state terrorism practiced by the French revolutionaries of 1789–1795. Through kangaroo courts, executions by guillotine, and violent repression of political opponents, the revolutionaries tried to frighten the population into submission. Two great terrorist states of the twentieth century, Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, also practiced the threat and use of violence to keep their own citizens in line. In the nineteenth century, terrorist tactics were adopted by individuals and groups that used assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings to undermine popular support for what the terrorists saw as unjust policies or tyrannical governments. Terrorist acts were first committed on a wide scale in the United States during the latter part of the nineteenth century. On 4 May 1886, an anarchist bomb killed eight policemen during a demonstration in Chicago's Haymarket Square, and on 16 September 1920, an anarchist bomb hidden in a wagon on Wall Street killed thirty people and seriously injured more than two hundred. Although anarchist violence received the most newspaper coverage during this period, the white supremacist Ku Klux Klan (KKK) was the most important terrorist group in the United States from 1850 to the 1960s. The KKK used marches, beatings, and lynchings to intimidate African Americans who wished to vote or otherwise participate in the political process. Beginning in the late 1960s, extreme-left groups like the Weathermen engaged in kidnapping and bombings to protest the Vietnam War, while groups like the Symbionese Liberation Army engaged in armed actions against civilians or the police, hoping thereby to provoke a "people's revolution." These groups disappeared in the 1970s and 1980s only to be replaced by extreme-right terrorist organizations. On 19 April 1995 a truck bomb exploded outside the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City, destroying the building and killing 168 people. An act of domestic terrorism, the Oklahoma City Bombing was the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history at the time. Testifying before the U.S. Senate in 1998, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh stated that, "The current domestic terrorist threat primarily comes from right-wing extremist groups, including radical paramilitary [militia] groups, Puerto Rican terrorist groups, and special interest groups." The period after 1960 saw the rise of international terrorist attacks on Americans in the Middle East and in Latin America. The most dramatic instance of terrorism during this period was the 4 November 1979 attack by Iranian students on the United States Embassy in Teheran, when sixty-six diplomats were held hostage until their release on 20 January 1981. According to the U.S. State Department, seventy-seven U.S. citizens were killed and 651 injured in international terrorist attacks between 1995 and 2000. By the mid-1970s, international terrorists began to carry out operations on American soil. On 24 January 1975, the Puerto Rican Armed National Liberation Front killed four people when bombs exploded at the Fraunces Tavern in New York City. Eleven months later, on 29 December 1975, a bomb exploded in the TWA terminal at La Guardia Airport, killing eleven. No group ever claimed responsibility. The next major incident occurred on 26 February 1993, when a truck bomb exploded in the basement of New York's World Trade Center, killing six and wounding thousands. At his 1997trial, bombing mastermind Ramzi Yousef stated, "I support terrorism so long as it was against the United States government and against Israel." On 11 September 2001, in the most murderous terrorist attack American history had yet witnessed, almost three thousand people were killed. Nineteen Middle Eastern terrorists hijacked four airplanes; one crashed into the Pentagon, two destroyed the twin towers of New York City's World Trade Center, and one, possibly headed for the White House, crashed in a wooded area of Pennsylvania. Although the hijackers left no message, they were clearly motivated by hatred of the United States and by a desire to force a change in American policy in the Middle East. The enormity of the attack pushed terrorism to the top of the American political agenda, with President George W. Bush declaring "war on terror" in his 20 September 2001 address to a joint session of Congress. President Bush predicted that this new war could last for years or even decades. The World Trade Center attack also led to a major change in the way the United States deals with terrorism. Before 11 September 2001, the United States followed a police-justice model whereby police and intelligence agencies identified and apprehended terrorists and then turned them over to the justice system. After those attacks, however, the Bush Administration adopted a preemptive-war model, whereby the United States intends to strike at individual terrorists or terrorist groups anywhere in the world and has threatened to use all means necessary, from special forces to massive military force, to attack what it identifies as "terrorist states" that support international terrorism. The adoption of this model led President Bush in his 29 January 2002 State of the Union address to talk about Iran, Iraq, and North Korea together as an "axis of evil" and to threaten military action against Iraq. This statement led to much uneasiness among allies of the United States, who feared that the administration's war on terrorism signaled a move toward unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy and the destabilization of international relations. A half-century of Russian history was bloodstained by revolutionary terrorism. Its first outburst was the abortive April 1866 assassination attempt against Tsar Alexander II by Dmitry Karakozov. From then on, extremists of different ideological persuasions, with varying degrees of success, resorted to acts of terror as part of their struggle against the contemporary sociopolitical order. Terrorist activity had a particularly strong impact on the country's life during two distinct periods. The first was the so-called heroic period, between 1878 and 1881, when the Party of the People's Will (Narodnaya Volya) - the first modern terrorist organization in the world - dominated the radical camp. Its campaign against the autocracy culminated in the assassination of Alexander II on March 1, 1881. Alexander III's government succeeded in disintegrating the People's Will; yet, after a twenty-year period of relative and deceptive calm, a new wave of terrorism erupted during the reign of Russia's last tsar, Nicholas II (1894 - 1917). Its perpetrators were members of various newly formed left-wing organizations, who implicated themselves in terrorist acts even when their parties in theory rejected terrorism as a suitable tactic. As radical activity reached its peak during the 1905 - 1907 crisis, terrorism became an all-pervasive phenomenon, affecting not only the elite civil and military circles but every layer of society. During the first decade of the twentieth century, the terrorists were responsible for approximately 17,000 casualties throughout the empire. Their attacks were indiscriminate, directed at a broad category of alleged "watchdogs of the old regime" and "oppressors of the poor." Although terrorism subsided by late 1907, largely as a result of severe repressive measures employed by Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin, until the collapse of the imperial order in 1917 it remained a threatening weapon in the hands of extremists seeking the demise of the tsarist regime. terrorism, the threat or use of violence, often against the civilian population, to achieve political or social ends, to intimidate opponents, or to publicize grievances. The term dates from the Reign of Terror (1793-94) in the French Revolution but has taken on additional meaning in the 20th cent. Terrorism involves activities such as assassinations, bombings, random killings, and hijackings. Used for political, not military, purposes, and most typically by groups too weak to mount open assaults, it is a modern tool of the alienated, and its psychological impact on the public has increased because of extensive coverage by the media. Political terrorism also may be part of a government campaign to eliminate the opposition, as under Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, and others, or may be part of a revolutionary effort to overthrow a regime. Terrorist attacks also are now a common tactic in guerrilla warfare. Governments find attacks by terrorist groups difficult to prevent; international agreements to tighten borders or return terrorists for trial may offer some deterrence. Terrorism reaches back to ancient Greece and has occurred throughout history. Terrorism by radicals (of both the left and right) and by nationalists became widespread after World War II. Since the late 20th cent. acts of terrorism have been associated with the Italian Red Brigades, the Irish Republican Army, the Palestine Liberation Organization, Peru's Shining Path, Sri Lanka's Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Weathermen and some members of U.S. "militia" organizations, among many groups. Religiously inspired terrrorism has also occurred, such as that of extremist Christian opponents of abortion in the United States; of extremist Muslims associated with Hamas, Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda, and other organizations; of extremist Sikhs in India; and of Japan's Aum Shinrikyo, who released nerve gas in Tokyo's subway system (1995). In 1999 the UN Security Council unanimously called for better international cooperation in fighting terrorism and asked governments not to aid terrorists. The Sept. 11, 2001, attacks by Al Qaeda on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon-the most devastating terrorist attacks in history-prompted calls by U.S. political leaders for a world "war on terrorism." Although the U.S. effort to destroy Al Qaeda and overthrow the Afghani government that hosted it was initially successful, terrorism is not a movement but a tactic used by a wide variety of groups, some of which are regarded (and supported) as "freedom fighters" in various countries or by various peoples. So-called state-sponsored terrorism, in which governments provide support or protection to terrorist groups that carry out proxy attacks against other countries, also complicates international efforts to end terror attacks, but financial sanctions have been placed by many countries on organizations that directly or indirectly support terrorists. The 2001 bioterror attacks in which anthrax spores were mailed to various U.S. media and government offices may not be linked to the events of September 11, but they raised specter of biological and chemical terrorism and revealed the difficulty of dealing with such attacks. Violence directed primarily and randomly against civilians with the aim of intimidating them, achieving political goals, or exacting revenge for perceived grievances. Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks that destroyed the twin World Trade Center skyscrapers in New York City and killed nearly 2,800 persons, terrorism arising out of conflicts in the Middle East has been a focus of international media attention. Concern about violence undertaken by groups and states it considered to be terrorists prompted the United States to declare a war on terrorism, two manifestations of which have been the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite this close association of terrorism with the Middle East, with the notable exception of the year 2001, the majority of terrorist incidents committed worldwide and the majority of victims of terrorism have been outside of or unrelated to political conflicts in the Middle East. Nevertheless, it is true that civilians somewhere in the Middle East have been victims of politically motivated violence every year since at least 1992. Defining Terrorism In trying to assess the significance of terrorism, the most difficult problem is the lack of an agreed-upon understanding of what the word terrorism means. Political scientists tend to restrict terrorism to acts of violence carried out by nonstate actors against civilians. Historians, sociologists, and experts in international humanitarian law, however, tend to use a broader definition that includes all premeditated acts of violence against civilians, whether carried out by nonstate political groups or by states. Governments - especially those confronting armed opposition groups - and the media generally use the political-science definition of terrorism, often expanding it to include violent acts against military as well as civilian victims. In contrast, the nonstate perpetrators of violence consider their actions to be legitimate forms of resistance to state terrorism aimed at suppressing self- determination, even though they may be directed against civilians (Kimmerling, p. 23). The notion of a legitimate right to resist state oppression is controversial, and no international legal convention addresses this matter. Nonstate groups generally cite the 1960 United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as recognizing their right of resistance. Indeed, that resolution declares, "forcible resistance to forcible denial of self-determination . . . is legitimate," and it says that nonstate groups may receive external support from other governments. Giving a measure of international legitimacy to resistance struggles has complicated the problem of defining terrorism because it essentially has become a political decision whether a nonstate actor is deemed a terrorist or a genuine national liberation movement fighting for independence from foreign control or occupation. During the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States (1947 - 1991), such decisions tended to be based more on ideological factors than on objective assessments of the goals and motives of particular nonstate groups. For example, the Soviet Union provided clandestine support for the South Yemen independence movement (1963 - 1967) and for the Dhufar liberation movement in Oman (1965 - 1971) primarily because both areas at the time were under the control of Britain, a major U.S. ally. Similarly, the United States provided covert assistance to the Kurds in Iraq (1970 - 1975) and the Mojahedin in Afghanistan (1979 - 1989) primarily because in both cases the nonstate groups were fighting for independence from Soviet client regimes. The Soviet Union and the United States condemned as terrorists those nonstate groups that were fighting against regimes the other country favored, and they praised as national resistance heroes those groups fighting against governments they opposed. Over time, a special vocabulary of terrorism emerged. For instance, the term state terrorism came to be used for violent acts used by disfavored states to suppress resistance movements. The Soviet Union used this term to describe the policies of two U.S. allies: Israel, for the repression of Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip after 1967; and Turkey, for the repression of its Kurdish minority after 1984. The United States, in turn, used state terrorism as early as the mid-1970s to describe the repressive domestic policies of states it considered to be Soviet allies, such as Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen. During the 1980s another term, state sponsor of terrorism, emerged to describe the support for nonstate groups provided by countries that clearly were not allied to either the Soviet Union or the United States. Iran and Libya were identified as the main state sponsors of terrorism, the former because of its assistance after 1982 to Hizbullah in Lebanon. In the case of Libya, the United States accused that country of supporting Palestinian groups that targeted U.S. and Israeli interests in Europe and of assisting several terrorist groups operating in north and central Africa. Origins of Terrorism in the Arab - Israel Conflict The superpower rivalry in and rhetoric about the Middle East tended both to obscure the local origins of terrorism and to frustrate efforts to address the multifaceted consequences of violence. This problem is best revealed in the Arab - Israel conflict, which began in 1948 separately from but in tandem with the Cold War and still continues unresolved even though the superpower conflict has ended. One significant legacy of the Cold War relationship to the Arab - Israel conflict has been a great volume of partisan literature, especially in the years after the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964. The Israeli - Palestinian struggle over pre-1948 Palestine (which became Israel plus the territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1948) is the core of the Arab - Israel conflict. The literature on this aspect of the conflict illustrates the controversies in trying to achieve any relatively objective consensus on what groups merit designation as terrorists and what kinds of violent acts constitute terrorism. For this reason, it is a useful case to study. For nearly thirty years prior to the signing of the Oslo Accord in September 1993, the State of Israel proclaimed the PLO and the various Palestinian resistance groups that comprised its membership to be terrorist organizations. Inevitably, there emerged a body of writings that supported the Israeli position, not just in Israel but also in Europe and North America. Although some of these studies were sophisticated and scholarly analyses of the PLO's goals and methods, other accounts were merely polemical denunciations of PLO tactics. Beginning in 1968 and continuing for more than a decade, armed Palestinian groups known as fidaʾiyyun (guerrillas) carried out numerous, violent operations that resulted in the deaths of civilians. Many of their actions were sensational incidents that attracted considerable media attention - a PLO objective, as the guerrillas hoped publicity would further their cause. The several international airplane hijackings, for example, culminated in September 1970 (known as Black September) with the hijacking of four planes in as many days, precipitating a civil war between the PLO and the army of Jordan. Attacks on Israeli interests abroad culminated in the seizing of Israeli athletes as hostages at the 1972 Olympic games in Munich, an incident that left eleven athletes dead. Sporadic cross-border raids into Israel (from Jordan and Lebanon) culminated in the temporary seizure of buildings in the northern Israeli towns of Kiryat Shmona and Maʿalot (April and May 1974) and the deaths of thirty-eight civilians, including many children. Rather than winning sympathy for the Palestinians as the perpetrators expected, such incidents created and reinforced a public image of the PLO as a terrorist organization. In contrast to the official Israeli and U.S. views, the PLO saw itself as a national liberation movement dedicated to achieving Palestinian rights and resisting what it termed Israeli state terrorism. Its fighters were lauded as heroes and martyrs, and its operations against Israeli civilians were justified as defense of, or reprisals for, Israeli attacks on Palestinian refugee camps and assassinations of PLO leaders. The Soviet Union, the primary international backer of the PLO after 1968, tended to remain silent about many of the more sensational acts of violence by Palestinian guerrillas, but it continued to promote the PLO as a national liberation movement. Soviet support was especially significant after 1974 when Moscow encouraged diplomatic recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Quite separate from the Soviet backing for the PLO, a few academic studies and advocacy articles appeared that were sympathetic to Palestinian claims and rights. Although these writings were scarcer than the volumes of pro-Israeli literature and never achieved a similar impact on the mainstream U.S. media, they did have some influence on intellectuals in Africa, Asia, and Europe. The Israeli - PLO conflict affected both regional and international politics by the late 1970s. This is because the PLO used Lebanon, where a large number of Palestinian refugees had lived since 1948, as a base for operations against Israel throughout the 1970s, and Israel responded with retaliatory raids against what it termed "terrorist nests" - suspected PLO facilities in refugee camps. Many Lebanese and Palestinian civilians died in these raids, and their deaths were described officially as "collateral damage" in a larger operation against "terrorist infrastructure." The PLO condemned Israeli air strikes as further evidence of state terror and also cited them as justification for its own continuing attacks across the Lebanon-Israel border. The escalating cycle of attacks and reprisals contributed to the civil war in Lebanon (1975 - 1989) and also led to an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 1978. Israeli forces occupied a 6-mile-wide security strip, ostensibly to prevent attacks into Israel; this occupation lasted until 2000. A second Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 resulted in a war with the PLO, its forced withdrawal from Lebanon under international protection, and the Israeli occupation of Beirut and all of southern Lebanon. However, almost as soon as the threat from the PLO seemed to be contained, Israel faced a new source of terrorism that stemmed directly from its occupation of Lebanon (which lasted until 1985). A Lebanese group, Hizbullah, was formed in late 1982 with the initial aim of expelling Israeli forces from Lebanon. Hizbullah's tactics, which included suicide bombings against French and U.S. military forces in 1983 and, beginning in 1984, the kidnapping of European civilians to use as hostages for the release of its members held in Israeli jails, earned it an international reputation as a terrorist organization. Hizbullah, however, neither sought nor received any support from the Soviet Union. Like the revolutionary government that assumed power in Iran in 1979, Hizbullah was equally hostile to Soviet and U.S. policies in the Middle East. Although its objectives were first and foremost political, Hizbullah also was inspired by its own interpretation of Shiʿite Islam. Its frequent use of religious rhetoric to explain or to justify its actions tended to alienate the Soviet Union even more than its direct criticisms did. Thus, Hizbullah became one of the first major nonstate groups in the Middle East to lack a superpower patron. Despite or perhaps because of this status, Hizbullah succeeded in establishing a permanent presence in Lebanon's politics and in becoming a nonstate group whose actions Israel neither could control nor ignore. Meanwhile, the removal of the PLO to Tunisia did not end its political influence among Palestinians, and when an intifada (uprising) erupted in December 1987 among Palestinians living under Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the PLO gradually emerged as a main coordinating force for the resistance. New groups unaffiliated with the PLO also emerged during the intifada, principally HAMAS and Islamic Jihad. Unlike the PLO, which claimed to be inspired by secular ideas, HAMAS and Islamic Jihad cited religious ideals and percepts as at least partial justification for their resistance against Israeli rule. Concern about the increasing influence of groups such as HAMAS and Islamic Jihad may have prompted the leaders of Israel's Labor Party to begin negotiations with the PLO to end the long conflict. The political rapprochement between Israel and the PLO in 1993 not only was unexpected, but it also necessitated a re- evaluation of the negative ways each side had depicted the other. However, the years of intellectual and emotional investment in the terrorism paradigm made it difficult for some people on both sides to view formerly hated terrorists as legitimate partners in peace negotiations. Thus, from the outset of the Oslo peace process, some Israelis and Palestinians were skeptical of the agreement and even were determined to overturn it. The assassination of Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 (by an Israeli opposed to the Oslo Accord) and the first suicide bombings undertaken in 1996 by HAMAS were significant terrorist incidents that led to multiple actions and reprisals that cumulatively undermined popular support for the peace process among both Israelis and Palestinians. It was in this increasingly tense atmosphere that Israeli politician Ariel Sharon intervened in a manner that would have the effect (albeit at the time, unforeseen) of overturning the peace process. Sharon was one of those Israelis who distrusted and even opposed the Oslo Accord, and it is plausible that he never had changed his conviction that the PLO was a terrorist organization. When in September 2000 he led a group of Knesset members, under armed escort, into the Muslim religious complex in Jerusalem known as al-Haram al-Sharif, his intention was to assert Israeli sovereignty over a site that Jews claim is the Temple Mount - the location of their ancient temple destroyed by the Romans more than 2,000 years ago - and thus to prevent its possible return to Palestinian sovereignty, which had been proposed by some members of the Labor Party. The incident provoked clashes with Palestinian worshipers, and the next day Israeli police killed four protesting Palestinians as they emerged from Friday prayers at the al- Aqsa Mosque in al-Haram al-Sharif complex. The situation escalated rapidly as Palestinian policemen, in an effort to protect civilians, clashed with Israeli soldiers at checkpoints in the West Bank. The al-Aqsa intifada thus began, and subsequently its characteristic features included targeted assassinations of suspected Palestinian resistance leaders by Israel and retaliatory Palestinian suicide bombings at crowded civilian sites inside Israeli cities. By early 2001, Israel and its supporters were labeling all acts of violence from the Palestinian side as terrorism. The U.S. "War on Terrorism" Middle East terrorism, except for incidents such as the attack at the Munich Olympic games in 1972, generally has stayed within the region. However, Middle East - related terrorism acquired a global dimension with the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States by nineteen members of the al- Qaʿida network. Al Qaʿida is a political organization founded by Saudi - Arabian national Osama bin Ladin, and its objectives after 1991 were to attack the United States and its interests because it viewed the U.S. government as the main sponsor of regimes that it defined as "unjust," oppressive, and illegitimate. Ironically, bin Ladin collaborated with U.S. officials during the 1980s when he and the United States shared the same goal of forcing the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. But when the United States dispatched troops to Saudi Arabia in 1990, bin Ladin viewed this development as being no different from the situation of Soviet troops in Afghanistan - in both cases the army of an "imperialist" superpower occupying a weaker and Muslim country. Furthermore, the presence of U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia meant that a non-Muslim army for the first time in more than 1,400 years was occupying the religiously sacred land in which were located Islam's two holiest sites, the cities of Mecca and Medina. Even though bin Ladin believed and practiced a very conservative interpretation of Sunni Islam, his primary objectives vis-à- vis the United States are political, not religious. Beginning with the bombing in the underground parking garage of the World Trade Center in 1993, persons close to his al-Qaʿida organization were implicated in several terrorist attacks. The most sensational incidents included suicide bombings outside the barracks housing U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia in 1996 and outside two U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998. The 2001 attacks prompted the United States to declare a "war on terrorism," and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan became the first target because it provided sanctuary to al-Qaʿida and rejected requests for the extradition of bin Ladin and other leaders. Its war on terrorism policy led the United States to focus on groups it designated as terrorist to an unprecedented extent. One consequence of this new preoccupation was that after 2001 Washington accepted the argument of Israeli prime minister Sharon that PLO chairman and Palestinian Authority president Yasir Arafat was condoning terrorist actions by groups such as HAMAS, Islamic Jihad, and his own Al-Fatah movement. When in spring 2002 the Israeli army reoccupied West Bank towns and villages that were supposed to be under the control of the Palestinian Authority, the United States effectively did not protest. Thus, the peace process between Israel and the PLO, seriously ailing since fall 2000, became an indirect but fatal casualty of the war on terrorism. The war on terrorism is cause for concern among legal experts in the field of international humanitarian law, especially because states identified as sponsors of terrorism, such as Iraq, become legitimate targets for attack because they are thought to possess weapons of mass destruction that they might provide to terrorist groups. The experts believe that civilians, who have been the primary victims of violent conflicts since the early 1990s, will be the main victims again, and they cite statistics that demonstrate that this has been the case in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The phenomenon of terrorism has prompted the drafting of several conventions, most notably the Rome Statute, that would make the intentional killing of civilians a war crime, no matter who is responsible (i.e., a government or a nonstate group). The intent is to criminalize violence against civilians so that individuals can be prosecuted. The European Union generally, and its member states such as Belgium specifically, have made the most progress in terms of accepting the idea that violence against civilians, whether undertaken by a state or nonstate organization, is terrorism and needs to be punished. Other states, including major countries such as China, Israel, Russia, and the United States, reject categorically the notion of state terrorism and insist that international laws pertaining to terrorism must limit definitions to nonstate groups that target civilians. Ultimately, one of the most effective ways of reducing terrorism is for states to identify and remove the causes that motivates terrorists, such as the denial of freedom and political participation, repressive political occupation, and poverty and despair. The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property in order to coerce or intimidate a government or the civilian population in furtherance of political or social objectives. Terrorism is the systematic use of terror or violence to achieve political goals. The targets of terrorism include government officials, identified individuals or groups, and innocent bystanders. In most cases terrorists seek to overthrow or destabilize an existing political regime, but totalitarian and dictatorial governments use terror to maintain their power. In the United States, a series of terrorist actions in the 1990s led to the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No. 104- 132). This act sought to combat and prevent terrorism through the development of antiterrorism programs and the strengthening of procedures and penalties. Terrorism has been used throughout human history and in every part of the world. Roman emperors practiced terror to maintain their regimes, the Spanish Inquisition used it to root out religious heretics, the French Revolution went through a period called the Reign of Terror, and in the post- Civil War southern United States, the Ku Klux Klan used illegal threats and violence to intimidate supporters of Reconstruction. In the late twentieth century, terrorism became a tool of political groups in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. The growth of international terrorism led to kidnappings, hijacking of airplanes, bombing of airplanes and buildings, and armed attacks on government and public facilities. In the 1980s several countries including Libya, Iran, and Iraq were identified as supporting international terrorism by providing training, weapons, and safe havens. In February 1993 the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City, New York, killed six people and injured more than a thousand others. The bomb left a crater 200 by 100 feet wide and five stories deep. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Joint Terrorist Task Force identified and helped bring to trial twenty-two Islamic fundamentalist conspirators. The trial revealed extensive plans for terrorist acts in the United States, including attacks on government facilities. In the 1990s the United States also became more concerned about domestic terrorist activities carried out by U.S. citizens without any foreign involvement. Beginning in 1978, a person who came to be known as the Unabomber targeted university scientists, airline employees, and other persons he associated with a dehumanized, technology driven society. The suspect killed three people and injured twenty-three others with package bombs. At his insistence major newspapers published his 35,000-word manifesto describing his antitechnology philosophy. In April 1996 a suspect, Theodore Kaczynski, was arrested for crimes associated with the Unabomber. More than the Unabomber, however, the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on April 19, 1995, galvanized concerns about domestic terrorism. The bombing killed 168 people and injured more than 500 others. The FBI arrested Timothy J. McVeigh and Terry Nichols, who were charged with murder and conspiracy. McVeigh and Nichols have been connected to the right-wing militia movement, which opposes the powers held by the federal government and believes that its members' right to bear arms is threatened. In June 1997 McVeigh was found guilty of murder and conspiracy and sentenced to death. In the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, President Bill Clinton and members of Congress proposed measures to address terrorism. The Antiterrorism Act was signed into law in April 1996. The law allocated $1 billion to fund federal programs to combat terrorism. The act also established a federal death penalty for terrorist murders and strengthened penalties for crimes committed against federal employees while performing their official duties. In addition, the act increased the penalties for conspiracies involving explosives and for the possession of nuclear materials, criminalized the use of chemical weapons, and required plastic explosives to contain "tagging" elements in the explosive materials for detection and identification purposes. Under the law, the U.S. secretary of state can designate groups as terrorist organizations and prohibit fund-raising on behalf of these groups in the United States. The secretary of the treasury is authorized to freeze assets of these terrorist organizations and forbid U.S. citizens from conducting financial transactions with known terrorist states. In addition, any person who is a representative or member of a designated terrorist organization can be denied entry to the United States, and the U.S. attorney general can deny asylum to suspected terrorists.
Pages to are hidden for
"terrorism"Please download to view full document