Get documents about "Proceedings and Resolutions of Pulses Meet- 2008
Shared by: Andamicrophone
Categories
Tags
-
Stats
- views:
- 22
- posted:
- 4/16/2009
- language:
- English
- pages:
- 16
Document Sample
We invite comments, feedback and suggestions in the given resolutions.
Please send your comments and suggestions at: info@nationalspotexchange.com
and research@nationalspotexchange.com
Resolutions passed in the Pulses Meet- 2008
“Pulses Meet – 2008”, jointly organized by National Spot Exchange Limited (NSEL)
and Pulses Importers Association of India (PIA), on Saturday, the 8th November,
2008 at Hotel Orchid, Vile Parle( East), Mumbai, which was attended by large
number of importers, traders, Government agencies, like MMTC, NAFED, PEC, etc.
deliberated over various issues faced by the pulses trade and industry.
After deliberation, the “ Pulses Meet – 2008” unanimously resolved to approach the
Government with a request to take suitable decision in respect of the followings
issues relating to Pulses trade:
1. To review the decision relating to Ban on Export of pulses and also to review
the Pulses Export policy
2. Review of Pulses Import Policy and suggestions for making the procurement
process more cost effective
3. Policy relating to subsidy on import of pulses
4. Review of Pulses Distribution policy or tender mechanism followed by
Government agencies and suggestions how to effectively keep the prices
under control
5. Review of Ban on futures trading in pulses and how to promote delivery based
hedging mechanism keeping speculation under control.
6. To review the policy regarding imposition of mandi cess on imported pulses
The “Pulses Meet-2008” requested the National Spot Exchange to make a
detailed paper to make out the case and to submit the same with the concerned
Government officials in association with Pulses Importers Association of India.
In view of above, a note entailing details of the resolutions passed by the Pulses
Meet 2008 and justification for the recommendations made therein is enclosed for
review by all the members of Pulses Imports Association of India.
Members of the PIA and NSEL as well as other entities associated with
Pulses trade are requested to go through the paper and to submit their
suggestions within 7 days, that is latest by Thursday, the 27 th November,
2008. After incorporating relevant suggestions, this paper will be
finalized and submitted to the concerned Government officials for their
consideration.
1
Explanatory Note
Resolution 1: To review the decision relating to Ban on Export of pulses
and also to review the Pulses Export policy
1.1. The size of Pulses economy of the world is 61.3 million MT. India is the
largest producing country with 22 % (13.50 million MT) of the world
production concentrated in India. But, as India has a large vegetarian
population, which is largely dependent upon pulses, wheat and milk as its
major source of protein, the size of consumption of pulses in India is around
16 million MT. In order to meet such demand, India is dependent upon import
of pulses to the extent of 2-3 million MT. India imports its requirements from
various countries, such as Myanmar (Urad and Tur), Canada( Yellow Peas),
Australia( Chick Peas) and various other countries.
1.2. On the other hand, the pulse processing industry in India has progressed very
well during last 1 decade, establishing its niche in the world market. Indian
processed pulses are sold at a premium in the world’s market and are hot
favorite among Indian population residing in various countries including US
and Europe. Besides, the Middle East population also prefers Indian pulses.
Therefore, Indian pulses processors are able to import pulses, process it in
India and re export processed pulses to various countries.
1.3. As a result of dedicated efforts of the pulses processing industry coupled with
their good quality product and marketing skills, India was able to make good
foreign exchange earnings by exporting processed pulses. Though India is net
importer of pulses, still through re export of processed pulses, India was able
to corner a market share in the processed pulses trade of the world.
1.4. A study of the pulses export from India reveals that :
1.4.1. The major portion of export of pulses from India is in the form of processed
(split and polished) pulses and that too especially to Middle East countries.
Though, sometimes, India does export of whole Masur, especially from MP
region.
1.4.2. Most of the exports of processed pulses are based on processing of imported
pulses. Domestic crop is mostly used for domestic consumption. Out of
imported pulses also, major portion goes for domestic consumption, while a
small part of such imported pulses goes for export after processing.
1.4.3. If we compare the size of Indian export of pulses vis a vis the total production
and import, it is insignificant in quantitative terms. The total export of pulses
has been less than 1% of total supply (production and import) as evident
from the following table:
(Figure in Million Tons)
07-08 06-07 05-06 04-05 03-04 02-03 01-02
Imports 2.47 1.88 1.40 1.09 1.35 1.51 1.83
Production 15.11 14.11 13.39 13.13 14.91 11.13 13.37
Total Supply 17.58 15.99 14.79 14.22 16.26 12.64 15.20
Total Exports 0.16 0.21 0.36 0.19 0.18 0.10 0.12
Percentage of
Exports to Total
supply 0.92 1.30 2.44 1.31 1.12 0.79 0.77
Data Source: DGFT
2
1.5. However, the Director General of Foreign Trade through its notification dated
4th July 2006 banned export of pulses for six months effective from 22nd June
2006. Such ban was further extended from time to time and continues till
further order. The genesis behind imposing such ban was the presumption
that export of pulses would create shortage of pulses in India, which in turn
will fuel the price rise. Since the prices of pulses were on the higher side, the
Government thought it expedient to ban export of pulses.
1.6. The underlying objective behind ban on export of pulses was to check price
rise. But, as a matter of fact, such rise could not be arrested because of the
fact that fundamentally the prices were driven by growing consumption
demand and static Indian and world pulses production. Hence, the
assumption that the export is responsible for price rise in pulses was not
logical.
1.7. On the other hand, the ill effects of ban on export of pulses from India are as
follows:
1.7.1. On one hand, India is the largest importer, producer and consumer of pulses.
But, on the other hand, India is also the largest pulses processor, as pulses
exporting nations such as Myanmar, Canada and Australia, do not have
adequate pulses processing facility. The reason is that these countries do not
have domestic consumption of pulses and therefore, they have never
attempted in developing domestic processing industry. Their focus has always
been to export whole pulses. This has put India in an advantageous position,
by developing its niche in processing. As a result, Indian processors have
been able to enhance their output efficiency, reduce wastage with good
quality of output. But, ban on export of pulses will kill the efficiency of Indian
processors and create room for other countries to grab its export market
during the period of export ban. After a time gap, even if export is again
opened up, India may not be able to grab such market share back from other
countries.
1.7.2. In general, India imports raw whole pulses, carries out milling process and
then export processed pulses. This is a value addition, which adds to India’s
GDP. But, now as a result of ban on export of pulses, Myanmar is encashing
this opportunity by encouraging indigenous pulses processing facility and
exporting to those countries, where India used to export earlier. This will be a
permanent damage to Indian Export market.
1.7.3. Export market of Indian Pulses may be meager in terms of total quantity, but
it involved substantial effort of Indian pulses industry to develop this market
over the years by branding and quality assurance. It has also destroyed
economic activity of pulses processing and foreign exchange earnings for the
country.
1.7.4. As a result of such ban, around 80% of pulses mills are closed either due to
bad economics or lack of milling order from the exporters. These mills are
small in size and provide employment opportunity to the workers engaged in
the operation.
1.7.5. Export market is sensitive in terms of building up relationship as well as
continuing the same. If there is a break, the damage is permanent.
3
Therefore, if the export of pulses is not restored at the earliest, it will
permanently damage pulses export industry.
1.8. Recommendation:
1.8.1. The Government should no doubt ensure that opening up export of pulses
does not disrupt the supply and availability of pulses in India. It should also
ensure that opening up export does not result into increase in prices. Subject
to this condition, the Government should take decision to open up export of
processed pulses at the earliest.
1.8.2. Before opening up export, the Government may specify a condition that only
those firms will be allowed to export, who have imported pulses during the
same financial year. Additional condition to be imposed could be that export
will be allowed only to the extent of 50 % of import of pulses carried out by
an entity. By linking the allowable quantum of export from India to the
quantum of import into India, the Government can ensure that export of
processed pulses does not result into shortage of pulses in India.
Resolution 2: Review of Pulses Import Policy and suggestions for making
the procurement process more cost effective
2.1. In respect of pulses economy, India is at a unique position. Due to its large
vegetarian population, India is the largest consumer, largest producer as well
as largest importer of pulses. The size of annual import is 2 to 3 million MT,
which is a substantial part of the international pulses trade. India is a regular
importer of pulses, mostly from Myanmar, Australia and Canada. Till 2006,
pulses import was concentrated in the hands of private importers, processors
and a few multi national companies. The commodity was under OGL and so,
there was no Government intervention. Private importers have been able to
develop good trade relations in all the exporting countries, which ensured
smooth operation.
2.2. In 2007, the domestic pulses prices started going up, which forced the
Government to intervene in the market. In order to keep prices under control,
the Government decided to import through its own agencies like MMTC, STC,
PEC, NAFED, etc. The Government fixed the target of pulses import upto 3
million tons in the year 2007-2008. It is to be noted that the total import of
pulses in the previous years by India never exceeded 2.5 million tons.
Announcement of such big size import resulted into sending strong signal in
international market. As a result, international prices of pulses went up
sharply, as announcement made by the Government regarding import of such
a large quantity had an immediate impact on demand side. Since India is the
major importer of pulses in the world, any announcement relating to huge
quantity import is bound to have spiral effect on world pulses prices. Hence,
the basic objective of keeping prices under control could not be achieved.
2.3. The Government further announced a 15 % subsidy on import bills of the
Government agencies, so that the price in the domestic market remains low.
In other words, the Government agencies were advised to import pulses in
India and to sell it at 15 % lower price, so as to keep the prices under control.
Subsequently, the Government agencies were supposed to get money from
the Government equivalent to 15 % of their import bill to meet the loss
incurred by them towards the difference between import and sale price.
4
2.4. Based on decision of the Government, the Government agencies, such as
MMTC, STC, NAFED and PEC, etc. entered into world market for procurement
and floated global tenders. In such tender process, most of the multi national
companies having operations in Myanmar, Australia and Canada, who are
otherwise also major suppliers to India, participated. Since the international
prices had already gone up by that time as a result of Government’s
announcement for bulk procurement, the procurement cost paid by the
Government agencies was substantially higher. Through such tender process,
the Government agencies, having the comfort of 15 % subsidy, bought from
the lowest bidder and imported pulses in India in huge quantity. As per official
data relating to April-December 2007 period, the Government agencies
contracted 1.1 million tons against 1.5 million Tons target, whereas the
private importers could import only 0.8 million tons of pulses. Further, the
Government made announcement for importing rest 1.5 million tons in the
period January-March 2008, which continued to provide strong signal into the
international market.
2.5. Most of such import tenders are attributable to Black Matpe and Tur, which
have been imported from Myanmar. The process involved in Myanmar is such
that the Myanmar Government agencies sell pulses to local traders, local
Myanmar traders sell it to Singapore based firms and Singapore based firms
in turn sell to Indian Government agencies. As a result, the cost of
intermediation and profit margins at all levels is in built in the final
procurement price paid by Government agencies. In some cases, it was
observed that the same multi national companies have sold to Government
agencies in international market at higher price, while their Indian counter
parts have procured the same material from such Government agencies in
India at 15 % lower price.
2.6. Though the basic objective of Government’s intervention was to stabilize the
domestic pulses price by enhancing supply, the real impact has been on the
one hand spiraling effect on global prices and on the other hand, prices still
ruling higher in Indian markets. The price chart of Chana indicates the price
scenario of pulses in the country.
5
2.7. Recommendations and suggestions:
2.7.1. In order to reduce the cost of import bill, the Government agencies may take
a policy decision to negotiate directly with the Government agencies of
Myanmar. In that case, they will be able to avoid the cost of intermediation
and profit margins in built by Myanmar traders and Singapore firms and the
final price paid by the Government agencies will reduce substantially.
2.7.2. Another impact of such Government to Government negotiation would be that
it would not have any spiraling effect on international prices. The market
would never know how much quantity is being negotiated and therefore, the
prices would not react to any such announcement. Instead of dealing with
traders, the Government agencies would be more comfortable dealing with
Government agencies in Myanmar.
Resolution 3: Policy relating to subsidy on import of pulses
3.1. In view of the fact that India is deficient in meeting its own consumption
demand of pulses, Government of India has been liberal in its import policy
regarding pulses. Pulses are under Open General License category, thus
allowing private import without the government permission. Such legal status
still continues, but the Government intervention in this trade, including the
subsidy policy has had a major impact on the pulses import trade by private
importers.
3.2. While the private parties continued to import pulses, entry of Government
agencies armed with 15 % subsidy has changed the trade dynamics
completely. Private importers, who are not entitled to claim 15 % subsidy on
pulses import, are not able to compete with Government agencies. Therefore,
even if some private importers attempted to import, they lost heavily, as the
Government agencies sold their stock at a price lower than the import parity.
As a result, most of the private importers stopped import of pulses. Lot of
6
importers went out of business. The Government intervention may be
temporary in nature, but it has impacted the pulses importers substantially
and therefore, it may take time to bring normalcy.
3.3. Recommendation and suggestion
3.3.1. If the basic objective of the Government is to ensure regular supply of pulses
in domestic price at affordable price, the same can be achieved even through
private importers with greater efficiency. For this purpose, the Government
may monitor the import bill of the importers. They can also monitor the
wholesale price realized by the importers. The Government can either fix
subsidy to be passed on to private importers on per MT basis or in terms of
percentage of import cost. This will enable the importers to remain in the
business, without affecting the basic objective of keeping the prices under
check.
3.3.2. In general, the role of the Government agencies should be to formulate
policies and to decide the macro level parameters. They should not enter into
business themselves; rather act like a facilitator and regulator. Even without
engaging themselves into trading directly, they can regulate the prices by
allowing the private importers to import, rather than importing themselves.
They can pass on the subsidy to the private importers in a transparent
manner and ensure a level playing field. At present, there is no level playing
field, because private importers cannot claim subsidy, while Government
agencies enjoy 15 % subsidy. If stabilizing the domestic price is the main
objective, then Government should offer the same subsidy to private
importers and at the same time monitor the whole sale prices to keep a
check.
Resolution 4: Review of Pulses Distribution policy or tender mechanism
followed by Government agencies and suggestions how to effectively keep
the prices under control
4.1. As per the present policy, the Government agencies invite tenders for sell of
imported pulses in domestic market. They invite bids from interested parties
and after scrutiny allocate the stock to highest bidder. Normally, the bids are
accepted only if the bid quantity is more than a threshold limit, such as 200
MT or 500 MT. The Government agencies do not sell in smaller lots of 10 -20
MT due to operational inconvenience and for various other reasons.
4.2. While the highest bidder gets the bid quantity, the bids of other interested
buyers is rejected. Hence, mostly the stock goes in the hands of a few
buyers. Such buyers subsequently sell in the domestic market in terms of 10
-20 MT and hence, the wholesale price is mostly influenced by the price at
which such successful bidders sell in the domestic market.
4.3. Sometimes, it is observed that the Indian arm of the MNC, which has supplied
pulses to Government agencies through global tender, is the buyer in the
domestic tender. In other cases, it is observed that since the stock is
allocated only to the highest bidder and to other parties, it creates a
temporary monopolistic scenario in favor of such successful bidder. In such a
case, it is possible for him to take advantage of such scenario and to jack up
7
the price for a short while to earn handsome profit. Since the Government
does not have any control on the selling price to be quoted by the successful
bidder, it goes on uninterrupted. The result is that the basic purpose of
keeping prices under control is somewhat defeated. While the Government
incurs loss in the form of passing on subsidy, still the consumer is not
benefited, as he is forced to pay a higher price for pulses. The benefit rather
goes to the companies, which are able to buy pulses through bidding process
and then quoting a higher price in domestic market enjoying the temporary
monopoly created under the circumstances.
4.4. Hence, the process of distribution of pulses through the tender mechanism
leads to accumulation of stocks in few hands. The small buyers, willing to buy
in lots of 10 -20 MT are not able to buy. As a result, the basic objective of
keeping the end price under control is defeated.
4.5. Recommendation and suggestion:
Instead of selling stock through tender process, the Government agencies
should sell entire imported stock through NSEL platform. This will ensure the
following:
4.5.1. NSEL has created a nation wide, electronic, transparent, demutualized and
institutionalized delivery based trading platform, where all trades and
settlements are guaranteed by the Exchange. This is a transparent platform,
where a complete audit trail in respect of all trades is maintained.
4.5.2. Since the trading lot is 10 MT, hence even small buyer are able to buy.
Hence, if the Government agencies are selling Urad at Rs 2500 per quintal,
the physical market price has to be around this level only. It cannot be
higher, because all the buyers located across the country will be able to see
the price at which the Government agency is selling on the NSEL platform.
4.5.3. Since the trades are guaranteed by the Exchange, delivery and payment is
fully secured, the Government agencies will be able to deal with complete
safety and guarantee.
4.5.4. This will reduce the cost of inviting tender and other administrative costs
incurred by the Government agencies.
4.5.5. Since the market is available for every small and big firm, no body can create
any monopoly in respect of such pulses stock. Hence, the physical market will
become structured. The Government will also be able to monitor the price at
which the trades happen on NSEL.
Resolution 5: Review of Ban on futures trading in pulses and how to
promote delivery based hedging mechanism keeping speculation under
control.
5.1. Futures trading in pulses began in the year 2004 through national level
commodity exchanges. A vibrant and active futures market for various pulses
was developed in a short while. Futures market enabled the various segments
of pulse trade to utilize a platform for hedging and price risk management.
The most active pulses contracts were Urad, Tur and Chana. Futures trading
also helped improve the dissemination of knowledge pertaining to pulses
industry and generated a channel for smooth flow of price and other
fundamental information among various stakeholders.
8
5.2. But, during that period, the physical market trading practices in commodities
continued to be in the same fashion. The delivery mechanism in futures
exchanges was based on pre certification of stock by professional agencies,
while in physical markets, trades take place based on visual inspection.
Similarly, futures exchanges follow strict quality norms, while physical
markets do not have any fixed quality standards. Physical trade takes place
based on either mutual trust, precedence or visual inspection. Since
structured growth of futures market is largely dependent upon a structured
physical market, absence of structured spot market created a number of
inefficeinecies in futures contracts. In absence of a sound linkage between
physical and futures market, the futures contracts were sometimes subject to
wide fluctuation. It was also observed that at the time of maturity of futures
contracts, the spot and futures were not converging at the same level. The
reason was that the process of giving delivery or taking delivery in futures
contract was complicated, discouraging the participants to use the futures
contracts for taking or giving deliveries. On one side, the arbitrageurs actively
participated in the futures contracts by buying pulses in spot and selling
futures contract to earn the difference, but on the other hand, the end users
were not comfortable in taking delivery from futures exchanges, either due to
doubts relating to quality or due to cumbersome process of demating and
remating involved. As a result, futures contracts some times gave birth to
price aberrations, affecting the basis between spot and futures, which in turn
affected the price discovery process of futures contracts.
5.3. In addition to above, FMC imposed near month open position limits, which
adversely affected the hedgers’ participants. If the futures prices are
abnormally high in near month and if a hedger in possession of physical
delivery wanted to offer large deliveries, the same was not allowed. Though
hedge policies notified by FMC enabled the hedgers to take positions beyond
the normal limits, still there were conditions applicable on quantum of
delivery which could be offered and also other conditions, such as not
allowing churning of positions discouraged the hedgers to take such hedge
limits. The combined effect of the scenario was that futures contracts were
not able to build up sound linkage with physical market of commodities, which
helped the speculators to influence the prices, knowing fully well that actual
hedgers were not able to deliver in large quantity.
5.4. In the meantime, pulses prices went up due to demand supply mismatch,
which triggered a general hue and cry against futures markets in general. The
facts relating to unorganized structure of physical pulses market were
ignored. Even the impact of strong fundamentals on prices was overlooked
and all opinions and actions to control price rise centered on banning futures
market in pulses.
5.5. A look at the pulses fundamentals reveals that price rise was inevitable.
Annexure I to XI details various factors such as production, import, export
scenario in India and the world, which exhibit a demand supply gap.
5.6. Eventually, in a desperate attempt to curb the price rise, the Government
banned futures trading of pulses such as Tur and Urad in 2007. Such ban
impacted the efficiency of pulses importers and all sectors of pulses eco
system. If an importer contracts for import of 5000 MT of Urad and by the
time his shipment arrives in India, if the prices have crashed in physical
market, he has no option other than incurring huge loss. Similarly, the pulses
mills do not have any option to hedge their inventory or take cover against
forward commitments made by them regarding supply of pulses. Today,
9
every sector in pulses complex is just dependent upon vagaries of market and
he has no way to seek price protection against fluctuating prices. Instead of
providing any subsidy or viability gap which directly dents the state
exchequer, it is desirable to provide structured futures contracts to pulses
industry to enable all such participants to protect themselves against price
fluctuation.
5.7. Recommendation and suggestion
5.7.1. The Government should recognize the economic relevance of pulses futures
trading in term of providing instrument to hedge price risk especially for those
who are in pulses import and trade. Therefore, futures trading in various
pulses should be resumed as soon as possible.
5.7.2. Since National Spot Exchange has already launched electronic spot trading in
various pulses, the deficiency of linkage between physical market and futures
market can now be tackled effectively. This linkage will encourage physical
delivery based hedging mechanism and keeping the speculation under
control. This will also remove any chance of price aberration and abnormal
fluctuation in basis between spot and futures. For this purpose, FMC should
enable fungibility of deliveries between spot and futures, by having common
warehouses and common ICIN nos in spot and futures exchanges.
5.7.3. In order to encourage delivery based trading and to attract physical market
participants, restrictions on open position limits in the near month contract
should be removed. There should be no limit on the delivery quantity, which
can be offered by the seller at maturity of a futures contract. There should be
no restriction on churning of positions by a hedger. A hedger continuously
keeps on buying futures contracts against forward sales in physical made by
him. He keeps on selling futures contracts against physical stocks in his
possession as well as new procurement of physical stocks made by him on a
day. If such buying and selling of futures contacts turns out to be churning of
positions in the eyes of FMC, then no hedger can actually operate in futures.
Therefore, the hedge policy should be formulated by FMC in consultation with
leading physical market players, so as to make it user friendly but at the
same time, should not leave any room for manipulation. The trade and
industry will provide its constructive inputs for ensuring orderly growth of
futures market. Pulses Importers Association of India and National Spot
Exchange can provide platform for such fruitful interaction.
Resolution 6: To review the policy regarding imposition of mandi cess on
imported pulses
6.1. APMC mandi cess is a service charge, which should be levied in respect of
notified agricultural produce produced by Indian farmers and sold through
APMC auction mechanism or otherwise, as they avail the infrastructure
created by the respective APMCs for conducting such auction. But, India is a
producer as well as importer of pulses. In respect of pulses imported at
Mumbai / JNPT port, the current regulation is that mandi cess and NMMC is
not applicable, if the commodity is transported to destinations other than
Mumbai. But, if the pulses are transported inside Mumbai, then mandi cess is
applicable.
10
6.2. Such dual treatment gives birth to complications in trade. Sometimes, pulses
are transported within notified area of Mumbai by Mumbai traders and
thereafter sold to their clients outside Mumbai. In that case, technically APMC
should refund the mandi cess collected by them, but practically it does not
happen. This gives birth to unnecessary confusion.
6.3. Recommendations
6.3.1. Since the pulses importers do not use the APMC infrastructure for import or
subsequent sale, the Government of Maharashtra should exempt imported
pulses from applicability of mandi cess.
11
Annexure I
Annexure II: Chana Production in India
12
Annexure III: India’s Urad Production
Annexure IV: India’s Tur Production
13
Annexure V: Import of pulse into India:
Annexure VI:
India's Import of Pulses in Lakh Tons
2007- 2006- 2005- 2004- 2003- 2002- 2001-
08 07 06 05 04 03 02
Tur 3.13 2.47 2.29 2.45 3.15 3.21 3.54
Lentil 2.31 0.59 0.36 0.27 0.38 0.67 0.87
Kidney
Beans 0.42 0.57 0.42 0.27 0.41 0.31 0.25
Chick Peas 1.46 1.27 2.82 1.33 2.59 2.18 5.17
Peas 17.38 13.89 8.10 6.55 7.00 8.70 8.49
Total 24.69 18.78 13.99 10.86 13.53 15.06 18.32
Source: DGFT
Annexure VII:
India's Export of Pulses in Lakh Tons
2007- 2006- 2005- 2004- 2003- 2002- 2001-
08 07 06 05 04 03 02
Tur 0.0024 0.2266 0.2539 0.2500 0.1199 0.0818 0.0909
Lentil 0.0005 1.2101 2.8128 1.4519 0.8305 0.8640 1.0611
Kidney
Beans 0.0002 0.0005 0.0114 0.0025 0.0052 0.0002 0.0001
Chick Peas 1.6177 0.6130 0.4406 0.1360 0.8305 0.0223 0.0143
Peas 0.0030 0.0220 0.0868 0.0226 0.0295 0.0280 0.0089
Total 1.6238 2.0723 3.6054 1.8630 1.8156 0.9962 1.1752
Source: DGFT
14
Annexure VIII: Share of export in total supply (Import + Produciton)
Percentage of Pulses Export of total pulses supply
2007- 2006- 2005- 2004- 2003- 2002- 2001-
08 07 06 05 04 03 02
Export % of
Supply 0.92 1.30 2.44 1.31 1.12 0.79 0.77
Annexure IX: Chana World Scenario:
Particulars 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Area(Million Ha) 9.46 10.39 9.66 10.56 10.36 10.85 11.67
Production(Million Tonnes)
India 3.86 5.47 4.24 5.72 5.47 5.60 5.97
Pakistan 0.40 0.36 0.68 0.61 0.87 0.48 0.84
Turkey 0.54 0.65 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.55 0.52
Australia 0.26 0.13 0.20 0.14 0.12 0.23 0.31
Iran 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.31
Myanmar 0.12 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.23
Canada 0.46 0.16 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.22
Others 1.02 1.01 0.83 0.79 0.87 0.99 0.91
Total 6.91 8.29 7.13 8.43 8.53 8.54 9.31
Imports 1.12 0.86 0.92 0.74 0.86
Annexure X: World Tur Area, Production and Yield.
15
Annexure XI: Pulses Crop Estimates;
Pulses Crop production in India-
(in lakh tonnes) (in lakh tonnes) (in lakh tonnes) (in lakh tonnes)
Pulses 2005-06 2006-07 2006-07 (revised) 2007-08 (estimated)
Kharif Rabi Total Kharif Rabi Total Kharif Rabi Total Kharif Rabi* Total
Tur 20.5 2.5 23 20.95 2.25 23.2 20.95 2.25 23.2 23.85
Moong 7.4 1.95 9.35 11.1 2.7 13.8 11.1 2.7 13.8 12.3
Urad 5.15 3.3 8.45 8.15 2.8 10.95 8.15 2.8 10.95 9.05
Masoor 0 10 10 0 10.3 10.3 0 6.85 6.85 0
Chana 0 43 43 0 57 57 0 51 51 0
Matar 0 6.5 6.5 0 7.25 7.25 0 4.5 4.5 0
Others 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.05
Total
Production 33.05 67.25 105.8 40.2 82.3 128 40.2 70.1 115.8 51.25
Details of
Others 2005-06 2006-07 2006-07 (revised) 2007-08 (estimated)
Moth 2 2 2 2.5
Chawla 2 2 2 2
Rajma 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.3
Batari 1 1 1 1
Wal 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Source: Ministry of Agriculture
16
Related docs
