Sense-Shoot-Command on the Battlefield After Next by wio18411


         on the
 Battlefield After Next
Koblenz Symposium on Information Technology
          Network Centric Warfare
              28 August 2008

       COL (ret) Kevin Cogan
      U.S. Army War College
   Center for Strategic Leadership
         Contractor: Booz Allen Hamilton
       Tenets of Network-Centric Warfare
•   A networked force improves information sharing

•   Information sharing and collaboration enhance the
    quality of information and shared situational

•   Shared situational awareness enables collaboration,
    self-synchronization, and speed of command
•   These dramatically increase mission effectiveness
                   Quality of                      New                  Mission
                  Information                   Processes            Effectiveness

     Robustly                       Shared             Self
    Networked     Information     Situational     Synchronization
      Force         Sharing       Awareness

          Information                           Cognitive + Social   Physical
            Domain                                 Domains           Domain
   Getting the Theory Right

            Theory             Practice

2006   Network Centric Warfare Case Study
         Major Combat Operations in Iraq - 2003

              Theory Case Practice
 Volume I

            OIF: Southern Iraq
• Controlled by V Corps / 1 MEF
• Traditional land battle w/heavy joint
& coalition flavor
   – Very high operational tempo
• Networking of distributed ground
force commanders via SATCOM
• Common Operational Picture
    - Unprecedented in military history
    - From lowest tactical level (Co) to
    - Enabled by Blue Force Tracking
          Volume III

Network Centric Warfare Insights
                     Battle Stories
      Vignette            Enablers                     NCW Insights
Tallil                     LRAS3        ↑ Quality of Info   ↑ Fires Effects
(OBJ Firebird)                          ↑ Force SA          ↑ Cbt Effectiveness

As Samawah               FBCB2-BFT      ↑ Quality of Info   ↑ Cbt Effectiveness
                                        ↑ SA from COP       ↓ Complexity
                                        ↑ Info sharing
5 Simultaneous Attacks      UAV         ↑ Quality of Info      ↑ Collaboration
                           ADOCS        ↑ Btlfld Visualization ↑ Speed of Tgting
                                        ↑ Shared SA            ↑ Effects
Logistics                   MTS         ↑ Quality of Info    ↑ Self-coordination
                           DTRACS       ↑ Shared SA

OBJ PEACH                 BFT/FBCB2     ↑ Quality of Info   ↑ Collaboration
                         TeleEngineer   ↑ Shared SA         ↑ Cbt Effectiveness
                                        ↑ Self-coordination
Thunder Runs             FBCB2-BFT      ↑ Quality of Info    ↑ Synchronization
                          TACSAT        ↑ Shared SA          ↑ Battlefield
                                        ↑ Decision Cycle       Visualization
    Selected Case Study Findings
•    Increased connectivity and the flow of
     information at the brigade level and
     above provided freedom to command
     regardless of location - “Battle Command
     on the Move.”
•    Information systems are not a substitute
     for leadership; they help good leaders
     make better decisions quicker.
  Volume II – Iraq 2003
  A View of C4 Architectures
            at the
Dawn of Network Centric Warfare
Mobile Subscriber Equipment
    Mobile Subscriber Equipment
   The NCW Tactical Communications
    Architecture for Corps and below
   A good communications architecture first
    fielded 20 years ago in the 1980s
   Based on telephony routing paradigms
   Mounted on “Cold War” era platforms
   Failed to keep pace in the 1991 Gulf War
   Predicted to be obsolete in 1998
   Went to the war in Iraq in 2003 (OIF-1)
   Failed to keep pace in Operation Iraqi Freedom
Division System Fielding and
      Capacities - MSE
      DIVISION   FY96   FY97   FY98   FY99   FY00   1998
                                                    FY01   FY02 FY03   FY04   FY05   FY06   FY07   FY08   FY09    FY10

 4th ID

 1st CAV

 82nd ABN

 101st ABN

 10th MTN

 3rd ID

 2nd ID
                                                                                                          Traffic Rates

 25th ID                                                                                                         < 80% Traffic
                                                                                                                 80% Traffic
 1st ID

                                                                                                                 100% Traffic
 1st AD                                                                                                            Capacity
  Rising Bandwidth Requirements
                          Brigade Tactical Operations Center Needs









      1996 97
                     98                                                                         MSE
                                 00    01   02    03    04                                   4 ID
                                                                    06   07   08   09
               MSE Bandwidth today
              Bandwidth required by Fielding Schedule
    Relative growth rate of
Growth - Interagency Management Council Study
      voice, video, 6and data
          Growth Doubles in years

                             outstrips voice for MSE
Video and data unpredictably Prepared for the Services
                             Future Communications
                             Working Group of the Interagency Management Council
“As you know, you go to war
with the Army you have, not
    the Army you want.”

              -- Donald Rumsfeld
            Former U.S. Secretary of Defense
      The Army We Had - 2003

   MSE could not provide “on the move”
    Command & Control Communications
   OIF-1 was fought with Blue Force
    Tracker and Tactical Satellite Radios
    “The nice thing about
standards is that there are so
   many to choose from.”
               -- Andrew S. Tanenbaum
             Computer Scientist, c.1980
     The same can be said about
           C4 architectures
•   Army Battle Command System (ABCS)             •   Legacy force and system architectures
    Architecture                                  •   Joint Operational Architecture (JOA)
•   Army Intelligence Operational and Systems     •   Joint Command and Control (JC2)
    Architecture                                      Architecture
•   Army Knowledge Enterprise Architecture        •   Joint Tactical Radio Systems (JTRS)
    (AKEA)                                        •   Mission Information Management
•   Army Space Operational Architecture               Communications Architecture
•   Battle Command System (BCS) Architecture      •   Multilateral Interoperability Programme
•   Battle Management Command and Control             (MIP) Architecture
    (BMC2) Architecture                           •   NATO C3 Technical Architecture
•   DoD C4ISR Architecture                        •   Net-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES)
•   Combined Enterprise Regional Information      •   Objective Force Architecture
    Exchange System (CENTRIXS)                    •   Software Blocking (SW B) Architecture
•   Deployable Joint Command and Control          •   Single Integrated Ground Picture
    (DJC2)                                            Architecture
•   Family of Interoperable Operational Picture   •   Situational Awareness Data Interoperability
    Architecture                                      (SADI) Architecture
•   Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA)         •   Space Communications Architecture
•   Future Combat System (FCS) Architecture       •   Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)
•   Global Information Grid (GIG) Architecture        Architecture
•   GIG Enterprise Services                       •   Transformational Communications
•   Global Reach Interactive Fully Functional         Architecture
    Information Network                           •   Unit of Employment (UE) Architecture
•   Intelligence Community Communications         •   Unit of Action (UA) Manuever Architecture
    Architecture                                  •   Warfighter Information Network-Tactical
•   Joint Technical Architecture (JTA)                (W IN-T)
“We can’t have programs of
record that are measured in
decades; we have to have
some agility in our
capability cycle times.”
                       -- Terry J. Pudas
                             Acting Director,
              Office of Force Transformation
                 U.S. Department of Defense
      WIN-Tactical Operational Concept
      with Strict Adherence to Standards
Base/Station       DISA
  STEP/TELEPORT                             AFFOR

   XXXX                                                             MARFOR
  TAACOM                             Joint

                                                            Main XXX
                                     TUAV               WIN-T

  RECON                                                                II
                          Mvr Bn                                                  DMain
    JTRS                    II
                                                        Mvr Bde                    XX
                                   JTRS                             WIN-T
                   ABCS                                    X
 WIN-Tactical Proposed Acquisition
  Schedule Now Delayed to 2013!!!
          FY01                 FY02            FY03            FY04              FY05                 FY06             FY07             FY08
      1       2    3   4   1   2   3   4   1   2   3   4   1   2    3   4    1   2    3   4       1    2   3   4   1   2    3   4   1    2   3   4

              AAE/DAE                                                       BLOCK I                                                     BLOCK II
                               MS B                        OIPT IPR
                                                                                                                           MS C

                                AWARD                            AWARD                                                                    FRP
      JROC                                                                                                                 JROC         OPTION
                           SSEB                                                                                                         AWARD
                                                                    Best Valve Down Selects
                                             SYSTEM                  Integrating Contractor

                           RELEASE                                           SYSTEM
Dual Contractor Teams Deliver :                                    SSEB
                                                                                                        NET                IOT&E          PROD
• Objective System Architecture,
• Technology Demonstrations,                                                         Operational Test Unit
• Modeling & Simulations                                                                                                                SYSTEM

  AAE     -       Army Acquisition Executive                                      JROC        -       Joint Requirements Oversight Council
  DAE     -       Defense Acquisition Executive                                   MS          -       Milestone
  DT&E    -       Developmental Test & Evaluation                                 NET         -       New Equipment Training
  FDT&E   -       Force Development Test & Evaluation                             OIPT        -       Overarching Integrated Process Team
  FRP     -       Full Rate Production Phase                                      SSEB        -       Source Selection Evaluation Board
  IOT&E   -       Initial Operational Test & Evaluation
“The time to fix bandwidth is
 now, before the next fight.”

              -- GEN William S. Wallace
                before the House Armed Services
                    Committee, October 21, 2003
Joint Network Node

The warfighter gets
an interim capability
after OIF-1 before
fielding WIN-T
                         Commercial equipment as
                         called for by the NC3TA

                                VG228 gateway

         Redcom Switch          Cisco Router
“Everything should be made
as simple as possible …
        but not simpler.”

               -- Albert Einstein
              geboren 14 March 1879
          Ulm, Wurttemberg, Germany
Ideal Communications Architectures
 Communications Architectures


Pre-OIF                     WIN-T

      OIF               FCS
                    Pre-OIF                  OIF                     Future


                                                                             FCS Spirals

                                         MSE Continues
             MSE                                          E
                        WIN-T                  JNN        L
                                                          A       5-YEAR DELAY

             98    99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
A Look at NATO Architectures
NATO Architecture Framework

EAPC (AC/322-SC/2) N (2004) 002

       12 January 2004
          NATO Network
     Enabled Capability (NNEC)
… Technology to increase the quantity of
information exchanged, improve the richness
of information, and increase speed of transfer

… at the heart of transformation

… The NC3TA will be required to support the NNEC
initiative by identifying appropriate architectural
models, services, profiles, standards, and
commercial products that will be used to
implement technological aspects of NNEC.

                                   from NC3TA 3.1
NATO Approach to Standardization

 Strict adherence to standards can inhibit the effective
 exploitation of Information Technology, whilst in the
 meantime overlooking potential advantages offered by
 commercial products which may effectively meet user
 requirements and reduce complexity .
                                          NC3TA 2.2.1(8)
NATO Approach to Standardization

 Strict adherence to standards can inhibit the effective
 exploitation of Information Technology, whilst in the
 meantime overlooking potential advantages offered by
 commercial products which may effectively meet user
 requirements and reduce complexity .
                                          NC3TA 2.2.1(8)
GE/US Defense Posture - 1988
     III GE

         V US

                VII US

                     II GE
    circa 1988
How good are we at predicting?
   What was your e-mail address in 1985?

   What was your organization’s web
    address in 1990?

   In what year did you anticipate owning
    a cell phone?
University of Pennsylvania
                circa - 1945
Prediction after invention of
the ENIAC computer - 1943

“I think there is a world market
  for maybe five computers.”
Prediction after invention of
the ENIAC computer - 1943

“I think there is a world market
  for maybe five computers.”

                     -- T.J. Watson
          Founder and Chairman, IBM
If we could have …
ENIAC Mounted on a WW II M-24 Tank
Now that we can …
ENIAC on a chip, 1997

 Size: 7.44mm x 5.29mm; 174,569 transistors;
 0.5 um CMOS technology (triple metal layer).
Ubiquitous Fiber Optics Spanning the Globe
Satellite Geostationary Orbit - 22,300   miles
Human Reaction Time Studies
   Reaction times for college-age individuals have
    been about 190 msec (0.19 sec) for light stimuli
    and about 160 msec for sound stimuli

   Laming (1968) concluded that simple reaction
    times averaged 220 msec but recognition
    reaction times averaged 384 msec.

                The Math
    for roundtrip earth communications

Ground only (fiber):
26,000mi / 186,000mi/sec = 139 milliseconds

Geostationary Satellite only:
89,200mi / 186,000mi/sec = 479 milliseconds
   The earth is about the right size for human
    biology in a universe whose physics is
    constrained by the speed of light.

   300 milliseconds is the
    limit for human command
    and control in Colonel John
    Boyd’s OODA Loop
How Fast Are We Now?

 How Fast Are We
Growth: Historical View
The wheel = tens of thousands of years

Year 1000 = paradigm shift is 100-200 years

1800’s = progress from 1000 to 1799

1900 to 1920 = 1800 to 1900 progress

21st Century will be equal to 200 centuries
   or 1000 times that of 20th century
   The Power of Exponentiation
20 = 1
21 = 2
2 2= 4

2 3=8

24 = 16
25 = 32
231 = 2.147 x 109
 (2.147 billion)
   The Power of Exponentiation
20 = 1            30 = 1
21 = 2            31 = 3
2 2= 4            3 2=9

2 3=8             3 3 = 27

24 = 16           34 = 81
25 = 32           35 = 243
231 = 2.147 x 109
 (2.147 billion)
   The Power of Exponentiation
20 = 1            30 = 1
21 = 2            31 = 3
2 2= 4            3 2=9

2 3=8             3 3 = 27

24 = 16           34 = 81
25 = 32           35 = 243
…                 …
231 = 2.147 x 109   331 = 6.1767 x 1014
 (2.147 billion)    (30 thousand times greater)
        Evolutionary Growth
   Changing the base of the exponent
    represents a paradigm shift to a new

   Evolutionary growth which shifts to
    new paradigms results in exponential
    growth in the long term
Exponential Internet Growth                            2008


       Twenty Years Ago


 Courtesy of Ray Kurzweil, “The Singularity is Near”
Whatever is coming next …
 is coming at us FASTER
We live in world of …
 The OODA Loop is Shrinking
    Time sensitive target execution has gone from 6
  hours in Kosovo (1999) to 10 minutes in Iraq (2003)
                            -- Lt Gen Michael Peterson, USAF

97% Reduction                             In 5 years
 Nellis AFB, NM
      Disruptive Technologies
   Come at unpredictable times
   Come at unpredictable intervals
   Guided by Moore’s Law (for now)
   Moore’s Law plots as an exponential
    curve which shows a doubling of
    capability (or decrease in size) every 18
    to 24 months
                   The S-Curve
              denotes a paradigm shift




          Phases of technology innovations: (1) rupture, (2) early development,
          (3) expansion, (4) maturation, and (5) saturation
                                                                            Major S-Curve

                                                                  Minor S-curves

              30 words/minute 60 wpm                     100 wpm                           20 Mbps        800 Mbps

              Vacuum Tubes             Transistor           Integrated Circuits                  Dual Processor
                                                                                                 Computer Chip

                             Large Electronic Computers                         Personal Computer        Handhelds

                     Radio     Radar                Satellites             Fiber Optics   Internet/WorldWideWeb

                                 WWII     Korea                  Vietnam                  Desert Storm        OIF

        1920                 1940                    1960                       1980                 2000
                       Vulnerability Gap


                             Growth Curve

             2-year Off- the-shelf Cycles                Vulnerability

    Vulnerability Gap Dangers
   The enemy cycle times take advantage
    of “commercial off-the-shelf” cycles (2
   The U.S. manages programs of record
    with 10-year cycle times
   War erupts prior to fielding best
    technology available
   Potentially, the enemy can field better
    technology at a given point in time
 Science Fiction Becomes Science
Fact Exponentially Faster over Time
   Leonardo DaVinci (1452-1519)
      Helicopter, tank, calculator   400 years later

   Jules Verne (1828-1905)
       Submarines, space travel      50 years later

   Sir Arthur C. Clarke (1917-2008)
       Geosynchronous satellite
        communications                20 years later
Performance   War Game Scenario - 2028

                          60 wpm          100 wpm           20 Mbps      800 Mbps

                       Transistor     Integrated Circuits             Dual Processor
                                                                      Computer Chip

               Large Electronic Computers      Personal Computer        Handhelds

                       Korea                                      Storm          OIF           War Game

        1940                   1960                   1980                    2000              2020
We Must Meet This Challenge

“The best way to predict the
   future is to invent it.”
                      -- Alan Kay
         American Computer Scientist
              Battlefield After Next - 2028

                           60 wpm       100 wpm     20 Mbps       800 Mbps       100 Terabytes

               Integrated Circuits            Dual Processor                      Moore’s Law
                                              Computer Chip                           Limit

               Large Electronic Computers   Personal Computer    Handhelds              Quantum

                                                                  20 years            20 years
                                                              Desert     OIF      Next      After
                       Korea                                  Storm                         Next

        1940                    1960              1980                 2000                 2020
     Imagination Gap Filler

"Within our lifetimes we may fight a war
 in which information dominance wins
 the conflict without a force-on-force

                       General Charles A. Horner
                          U.S. Space Command
                                      April 1994
      2020 Technology Trends
   Trends enabling real-time, embedded systems
      Information explosion
      Simulation / Visualization
      Nanoscale processes

   Parallel computer architectures, data fusion,
    sensitive radars, and signal processing for
    automatic target recognition

   Faster, smaller, and cheaper will be the hallmarks of
    2020 technologies. They will enable the real-time,
    embedded, and highly integrated weapon systems
    NNEC Emerging Technologies
    (from NNEC Chapter 2. Emerging Technologies)

   2.1. Windows Security
   2.2. Wireless Networking
   2.3. Ad Hoc Networking
   2.4. Grid Computing
   2.5. Power over Ethernet (PoE) - 802.3af Explored
   2.6. NATO TACOM Post-2000
   2.7. Open Source
   2.8. Nanotechnology
   2.9. Software Defined Radio
   2.10. Radio Frequency Identification (RFISD)
   2.11. Fiber Intrusion Detection
   2.12. Identity Management
   2.13. Web Services
     The Robotic Battlefield
Authors Shaker and Wise defined criteria when
robotic and teleoperated systems would be
advantageous over manned systems as follows:

1. When the lethality of the mission is too great
   or cultural norms prohibit suicidal missions.
2. When human resources need to be diverted
   to other priorities.
3. When overall efficiency and effectiveness can
   be better accomplished through automation.

  Use Robots for Dull, Dirty, or Dangerous Tasks
     The Automated Battlefield
   Frank Barnaby - The Automated Battlefield, 1986
   Questions whether societies are willing to fight in highly
    lethal environments. (Alvin Toeffler’s War and Anti-War)
   Lethality is a catalyst for the transformation of the nature
    of combat operations.
   The human brain cannot sort the vast amount of
    information from future surveillance and target
    acquisition systems.
   Computers and autonomous weapons are central to the
    automated battlefield.
   Where highly trained soldiers that are costly to train and
    too short in supply to lose in large numbers.
   Half-life of humans on the automated battlefield –
                                measured in milliseconds?
"Soldiers who enter the Army in the next
few years will probably feel like they've
been transported aboard the Enterprise
on 'Star Trek,' as they train for war in a
facility not unlike the 'Holodeck'.”
                        General Gordon R. Sullivan
                        former U.S. Army Chief of Staff
                                          circa 1995
          The End Game

"To win one hundred victories in one
 hundred battles is not the acme of
 skill. To subdue the enemy without
 fighting is the acme of skill."

                        -- Sun-Tzu
                        The Art of War
Can NNEC Enable this Future?
Expect Battlefield Dominance

   Dominant Sensors

   Dominant Weapons

   Dominant Command
     and Control
Sense Better
Removing the Fog of War
    Sense with Robotic Swarms
   Small and mobile
   Massive distribution throughout the
Lots of Small Stuff
Lots of Small Stuff Networked
Shoot Better
Unmanned Shooters
Evolving Tactical C2
Command Post of the Future
   Deployed Now in Iraq
Command Post of the Future after Next
We Are Imagining This Future Now
Building Enterprise Networks Today

National Electric Grid, UK       Kabel Deutschland

JMO Brno, Czech Republic     TV Master Control, Reuters1
Is Automated C2 Possible ??
COL John Boyd’s OODA Loop
The NNEC Concept Model

    NNEC Concept Model, Figure 3.1., from the
    NATO C3 Technical Architecture
The 300 Millisecond Human in the Loop

     It Might Not Be Fast Enough
          20 Years from Now

No two humans                 A 500 millisecond
 are the same                 cognative process
The Battlefield After Next Loop
OBSERVE         DECIDE            ACT

          Decision Rules
          in Hundreds of
             (10-12 seconds)

                   a priori
            Rules of Engagement
    Final Thoughts on Net-Centric War
   NCW “is about human and organizational
    behavior.” (Alberts,
      The human nature of warfare is not eliminated
       by NCW
      …but NCW-enabled commanders conduct better
   Insights for future NCW can be logically
    gleaned from analysis of ongoing major
    combat operations in Southwest Asia
       NATO NEC focused case studies are needed

   NCW is no longer transformational …
               ... it is here now!
     Our Self-imposed Limits
We have made more progress than we realize over
the last 20 years because technology growth is
exponential. But humans tend to think linearly and
would only expect an equal amount of progress in the
next 20 years. We are usually wrong. To envision the
future 20 years from now, we need to train ourselves to
think exponentially. A historical perspective can teach
us this. We need to internalize the lessons from Moore’s
Law and other histories of technological growth to
recognize how and why paradigm shifts occur. Doing so
will make our predictions more accurate and think of a
future world which is vastly more probable than we
would expect to be humanly possible. We should free
ourselves from self-imposed limits about our
inventiveness and ingenuity and cast a wide net in order
to anticipate what we cannot yet imagine.

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