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Sense-Shoot-Command on the Battlefield After Next Koblenz Symposium on Information Technology Network Centric Warfare 28 August 2008 COL (ret) Kevin Cogan U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership Contractor: Booz Allen Hamilton Tenets of Network-Centric Warfare • A networked force improves information sharing • Information sharing and collaboration enhance the quality of information and shared situational awareness • Shared situational awareness enables collaboration, self-synchronization, and speed of command • These dramatically increase mission effectiveness Quality of New Mission Information Processes Effectiveness Robustly Shared Self Networked Information Situational Synchronization Force Sharing Awareness Information Cognitive + Social Physical Collaboration Domain Domains Domain Getting the Theory Right 1999 Theory Practice 2006 Network Centric Warfare Case Study Major Combat Operations in Iraq - 2003 NCW Theory Case Practice Studies Volume I Operations OIF: Southern Iraq • Controlled by V Corps / 1 MEF • Traditional land battle w/heavy joint & coalition flavor – Very high operational tempo • Networking of distributed ground force commanders via SATCOM • Common Operational Picture - Unprecedented in military history - From lowest tactical level (Co) to strategic - Enabled by Blue Force Tracking Volume III Network Centric Warfare Insights Battle Stories Vignette Enablers NCW Insights Tallil LRAS3 ↑ Quality of Info ↑ Fires Effects (OBJ Firebird) ↑ Force SA ↑ Cbt Effectiveness As Samawah FBCB2-BFT ↑ Quality of Info ↑ Cbt Effectiveness ↑ SA from COP ↓ Complexity ↑ Info sharing 5 Simultaneous Attacks UAV ↑ Quality of Info ↑ Collaboration ADOCS ↑ Btlfld Visualization ↑ Speed of Tgting ↑ Shared SA ↑ Effects Logistics MTS ↑ Quality of Info ↑ Self-coordination DTRACS ↑ Shared SA OBJ PEACH BFT/FBCB2 ↑ Quality of Info ↑ Collaboration TeleEngineer ↑ Shared SA ↑ Cbt Effectiveness ↑ Self-coordination Thunder Runs FBCB2-BFT ↑ Quality of Info ↑ Synchronization TACSAT ↑ Shared SA ↑ Battlefield ↑ Decision Cycle Visualization Selected Case Study Findings • Increased connectivity and the flow of information at the brigade level and above provided freedom to command regardless of location - “Battle Command on the Move.” • Information systems are not a substitute for leadership; they help good leaders make better decisions quicker. Volume II – Iraq 2003 A View of C4 Architectures at the Dawn of Network Centric Warfare Mobile Subscriber Equipment Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) The NCW Tactical Communications Architecture for Corps and below A good communications architecture first fielded 20 years ago in the 1980s Based on telephony routing paradigms Mounted on “Cold War” era platforms Failed to keep pace in the 1991 Gulf War Predicted to be obsolete in 1998 Went to the war in Iraq in 2003 (OIF-1) Failed to keep pace in Operation Iraqi Freedom Division System Fielding and Capacities - MSE DIVISION FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 1998 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 4th ID 1st CAV 82nd ABN 101st ABN 10th MTN 3rd ID 2nd ID Traffic Rates 25th ID < 80% Traffic Capacity 80% Traffic 1st ID Capacity 100% Traffic 1st AD Capacity Rising Bandwidth Requirements Brigade Tactical Operations Center Needs 2000 2000 1800 1600 Kbs 1400 1200 1000 1000 800 600 400 200 0 1996 97 96 98 MSE 99 2001 00 01 02 03 04 4 ID 05 2006 06 07 08 09 10 MSE Bandwidth today Bandwidth required by Fielding Schedule Relative growth rate of Growth - Interagency Management Council Study voice, video, 6and data Growth Doubles in years outstrips voice for MSE Video and data unpredictably Prepared for the Services Future Communications Working Group of the Interagency Management Council “As you know, you go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you want.” -- Donald Rumsfeld Former U.S. Secretary of Defense The Army We Had - 2003 MSE could not provide “on the move” Command & Control Communications OIF-1 was fought with Blue Force Tracker and Tactical Satellite Radios “The nice thing about standards is that there are so many to choose from.” -- Andrew S. Tanenbaum Computer Scientist, c.1980 The same can be said about C4 architectures • Army Battle Command System (ABCS) • Legacy force and system architectures Architecture • Joint Operational Architecture (JOA) • Army Intelligence Operational and Systems • Joint Command and Control (JC2) Architecture Architecture • Army Knowledge Enterprise Architecture • Joint Tactical Radio Systems (JTRS) (AKEA) • Mission Information Management • Army Space Operational Architecture Communications Architecture • Battle Command System (BCS) Architecture • Multilateral Interoperability Programme • Battle Management Command and Control (MIP) Architecture (BMC2) Architecture • NATO C3 Technical Architecture • DoD C4ISR Architecture • Net-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES) • Combined Enterprise Regional Information • Objective Force Architecture Exchange System (CENTRIXS) • Software Blocking (SW B) Architecture • Deployable Joint Command and Control • Single Integrated Ground Picture (DJC2) Architecture • Family of Interoperable Operational Picture • Situational Awareness Data Interoperability Architecture (SADI) Architecture • Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA) • Space Communications Architecture • Future Combat System (FCS) Architecture • Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) • Global Information Grid (GIG) Architecture Architecture • GIG Enterprise Services • Transformational Communications • Global Reach Interactive Fully Functional Architecture Information Network • Unit of Employment (UE) Architecture • Intelligence Community Communications • Unit of Action (UA) Manuever Architecture Architecture • Warfighter Information Network-Tactical • Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) (W IN-T) “We can’t have programs of record that are measured in decades; we have to have some agility in our capability cycle times.” -- Terry J. Pudas Acting Director, Office of Force Transformation U.S. Department of Defense WIN-Tactical Operational Concept with Strict Adherence to Standards Post/Camp Base/Station DISA HQ DISN STEP/TELEPORT AFFOR Allied/Coalition Non-DoD SECOMP-I NAVFOR XXXX MARFOR TAACOM Joint WIN-T JSOTF Corps Main XXX TUAV WIN-T ARFOR Marine RECON II Battalion Mvr Bn DMain JTRS II Mvr Bde XX JTRS WIN-T ABCS X WIN-Tactical Proposed Acquisition Schedule Now Delayed to 2013!!! FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 AAE/DAE BLOCK I BLOCK II OIPT MS B OIPT IPR MS C AWARD AWARD FRP JROC JROC OPTION SSEB AWARD Best Valve Down Selects SYSTEM Integrating Contractor INTEGRATION FDT&E RFP RELEASE SYSTEM DEMONSTRATION RFP RELEASE DT&E Dual Contractor Teams Deliver : SSEB NET IOT&E PROD • Objective System Architecture, • Technology Demonstrations, Operational Test Unit • Modeling & Simulations SYSTEM DEMO AAE - Army Acquisition Executive JROC - Joint Requirements Oversight Council DAE - Defense Acquisition Executive MS - Milestone DT&E - Developmental Test & Evaluation NET - New Equipment Training FDT&E - Force Development Test & Evaluation OIPT - Overarching Integrated Process Team FRP - Full Rate Production Phase SSEB - Source Selection Evaluation Board IOT&E - Initial Operational Test & Evaluation “The time to fix bandwidth is now, before the next fight.” -- GEN William S. Wallace before the House Armed Services Committee, October 21, 2003 2003 Joint Network Node The warfighter gets an interim capability after OIF-1 before fielding WIN-T Commercial equipment as switch called for by the NC3TA VG228 gateway Redcom Switch Cisco Router “Everything should be made as simple as possible … but not simpler.” -- Albert Einstein geboren 14 March 1879 Ulm, Wurttemberg, Germany Ideal Communications Architectures (Homogeneous) Communications Architectures (Heterogeneous) JNN MSE Pre-OIF WIN-T OIF FCS U.S. ARMY TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE Pre-OIF OIF Future Today Capability GIG LandWarNet FCS Spirals OIF-1 WIN-T Technologies MSE Continues D MSE E WIN-T WIN-T JNN L A 5-YEAR DELAY (notional) Y 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 A Look at NATO Architectures NATO Architecture Framework (NAF) EAPC (AC/322-SC/2) N (2004) 002 12 January 2004 NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) … Technology to increase the quantity of information exchanged, improve the richness of information, and increase speed of transfer … at the heart of transformation … The NC3TA will be required to support the NNEC initiative by identifying appropriate architectural models, services, profiles, standards, and commercial products that will be used to implement technological aspects of NNEC. from NC3TA 3.1 NATO Approach to Standardization Strict adherence to standards can inhibit the effective exploitation of Information Technology, whilst in the meantime overlooking potential advantages offered by commercial products which may effectively meet user requirements and reduce complexity . NC3TA 2.2.1(8) NATO Approach to Standardization Strict adherence to standards can inhibit the effective exploitation of Information Technology, whilst in the meantime overlooking potential advantages offered by commercial products which may effectively meet user requirements and reduce complexity . NC3TA 2.2.1(8) GE/US Defense Posture - 1988 III GE V US VII US II GE TORN TAPE RELAY circa 1988 How good are we at predicting? What was your e-mail address in 1985? What was your organization’s web address in 1990? In what year did you anticipate owning a cell phone? 1945 ENIAC University of Pennsylvania circa - 1945 Prediction after invention of the ENIAC computer - 1943 “I think there is a world market for maybe five computers.” Prediction after invention of the ENIAC computer - 1943 “I think there is a world market for maybe five computers.” -- T.J. Watson Founder and Chairman, IBM If we could have … ENIAC Mounted on a WW II M-24 Tank Now that we can … ENIAC on a chip, 1997 Size: 7.44mm x 5.29mm; 174,569 transistors; 0.5 um CMOS technology (triple metal layer). Ubiquitous Fiber Optics Spanning the Globe Satellite Geostationary Orbit - 22,300 miles Human Reaction Time Studies Reaction times for college-age individuals have been about 190 msec (0.19 sec) for light stimuli and about 160 msec for sound stimuli Laming (1968) concluded that simple reaction times averaged 220 msec but recognition reaction times averaged 384 msec. Source: http://biae.clemson.edu/bpc/bp/Lab/110/reaction.htm#Mean%20Times The Math for roundtrip earth communications Ground only (fiber): 26,000mi / 186,000mi/sec = 139 milliseconds Geostationary Satellite only: 89,200mi / 186,000mi/sec = 479 milliseconds Observation The earth is about the right size for human biology in a universe whose physics is constrained by the speed of light. 300 milliseconds is the limit for human command and control in Colonel John Boyd’s OODA Loop How Fast Are We Now? How Fast Are We Growth: Historical View The wheel = tens of thousands of years Year 1000 = paradigm shift is 100-200 years 1800’s = progress from 1000 to 1799 1900 to 1920 = 1800 to 1900 progress 21st Century will be equal to 200 centuries or 1000 times that of 20th century The Power of Exponentiation 20 = 1 21 = 2 2 2= 4 2 3=8 24 = 16 25 = 32 … 231 = 2.147 x 109 (2.147 billion) The Power of Exponentiation 20 = 1 30 = 1 21 = 2 31 = 3 2 2= 4 3 2=9 2 3=8 3 3 = 27 24 = 16 34 = 81 25 = 32 35 = 243 … 231 = 2.147 x 109 (2.147 billion) The Power of Exponentiation 20 = 1 30 = 1 21 = 2 31 = 3 2 2= 4 3 2=9 2 3=8 3 3 = 27 24 = 16 34 = 81 25 = 32 35 = 243 … … 231 = 2.147 x 109 331 = 6.1767 x 1014 (2.147 billion) (30 thousand times greater) Evolutionary Growth Changing the base of the exponent represents a paradigm shift to a new technology Evolutionary growth which shifts to new paradigms results in exponential growth in the long term Exponential Internet Growth 2008 Today Twenty Years Ago 1988 Courtesy of Ray Kurzweil, “The Singularity is Near” Whatever is coming next … is coming at us FASTER We live in world of … The OODA Loop is Shrinking Time sensitive target execution has gone from 6 hours in Kosovo (1999) to 10 minutes in Iraq (2003) -- Lt Gen Michael Peterson, USAF 97% Reduction In 5 years Iraq Nellis AFB, NM Disruptive Technologies Come at unpredictable times Come at unpredictable intervals Guided by Moore’s Law (for now) Moore’s Law plots as an exponential curve which shows a doubling of capability (or decrease in size) every 18 to 24 months The S-Curve Performance denotes a paradigm shift 5 4 3 2 1 Time Phases of technology innovations: (1) rupture, (2) early development, (3) expansion, (4) maturation, and (5) saturation Major S-Curve Minor S-curves Performance 30 words/minute 60 wpm 100 wpm 20 Mbps 800 Mbps Vacuum Tubes Transistor Integrated Circuits Dual Processor Computer Chip Large Electronic Computers Personal Computer Handhelds Radio Radar Satellites Fiber Optics Internet/WorldWideWeb WWII Korea Vietnam Desert Storm OIF 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 Vulnerability Gap War Technology Capability Growth Curve 2-year Off- the-shelf Cycles Vulnerability Gap Time Vulnerability Gap Dangers The enemy cycle times take advantage of “commercial off-the-shelf” cycles (2 years) The U.S. manages programs of record with 10-year cycle times War erupts prior to fielding best technology available Potentially, the enemy can field better technology at a given point in time Science Fiction Becomes Science Fact Exponentially Faster over Time Leonardo DaVinci (1452-1519) Helicopter, tank, calculator 400 years later Jules Verne (1828-1905) Submarines, space travel 50 years later Sir Arthur C. Clarke (1917-2008) Geosynchronous satellite communications 20 years later Performance War Game Scenario - 2028 60 wpm 100 wpm 20 Mbps 800 Mbps Transistor Integrated Circuits Dual Processor Computer Chip Large Electronic Computers Personal Computer Handhelds Today Dessert Korea Storm OIF War Game 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 We Must Meet This Challenge “The best way to predict the future is to invent it.” -- Alan Kay American Computer Scientist Battlefield After Next - 2028 60 wpm 100 wpm 20 Mbps 800 Mbps 100 Terabytes /sec Performance Integrated Circuits Dual Processor Moore’s Law Computer Chip Limit Large Electronic Computers Personal Computer Handhelds Quantum Computer 20 years 20 years Desert OIF Next After Korea Storm Next Today 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 Imagination Gap Filler "Within our lifetimes we may fight a war in which information dominance wins the conflict without a force-on-force battle." General Charles A. Horner U.S. Space Command April 1994 2020 Technology Trends Trends enabling real-time, embedded systems Information explosion Simulation / Visualization Nanoscale processes Parallel computer architectures, data fusion, sensitive radars, and signal processing for automatic target recognition Faster, smaller, and cheaper will be the hallmarks of 2020 technologies. They will enable the real-time, embedded, and highly integrated weapon systems NNEC Emerging Technologies (from NNEC Chapter 2. Emerging Technologies) 2.1. Windows Security 2.2. Wireless Networking 2.3. Ad Hoc Networking 2.4. Grid Computing 2.5. Power over Ethernet (PoE) - 802.3af Explored 2.6. NATO TACOM Post-2000 2.7. Open Source 2.8. Nanotechnology 2.9. Software Defined Radio 2.10. Radio Frequency Identification (RFISD) 2.11. Fiber Intrusion Detection 2.12. Identity Management 2.13. Web Services The Robotic Battlefield Authors Shaker and Wise defined criteria when robotic and teleoperated systems would be advantageous over manned systems as follows: 1. When the lethality of the mission is too great or cultural norms prohibit suicidal missions. 2. When human resources need to be diverted to other priorities. 3. When overall efficiency and effectiveness can be better accomplished through automation. Use Robots for Dull, Dirty, or Dangerous Tasks The Automated Battlefield Frank Barnaby - The Automated Battlefield, 1986 Questions whether societies are willing to fight in highly lethal environments. (Alvin Toeffler’s War and Anti-War) Lethality is a catalyst for the transformation of the nature of combat operations. The human brain cannot sort the vast amount of information from future surveillance and target acquisition systems. Computers and autonomous weapons are central to the automated battlefield. Where highly trained soldiers that are costly to train and too short in supply to lose in large numbers. Half-life of humans on the automated battlefield – measured in milliseconds? "Soldiers who enter the Army in the next few years will probably feel like they've been transported aboard the Enterprise on 'Star Trek,' as they train for war in a facility not unlike the 'Holodeck'.” General Gordon R. Sullivan former U.S. Army Chief of Staff circa 1995 The End Game "To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." -- Sun-Tzu The Art of War Can NNEC Enable this Future? Expect Battlefield Dominance Dominant Sensors Dominant Weapons Dominant Command and Control Sense Better Removing the Fog of War Sense with Robotic Swarms Small and mobile Massive distribution throughout the battlespace Lots of Small Stuff Lots of Small Stuff Networked Shoot Better Unmanned Shooters COMMAND Evolving Tactical C2 Command Post of the Future Deployed Now in Iraq Command Post of the Future after Next We Are Imagining This Future Now Building Enterprise Networks Today National Electric Grid, UK Kabel Deutschland JMO Brno, Czech Republic TV Master Control, Reuters1 Is Automated C2 Possible ?? COL John Boyd’s OODA Loop The NNEC Concept Model NNEC Concept Model, Figure 3.1., from the NATO C3 Technical Architecture The 300 Millisecond Human in the Loop It Might Not Be Fast Enough 20 Years from Now Orientation No two humans A 500 millisecond are the same cognative process The Battlefield After Next Loop OBSERVE DECIDE ACT Automated Decision Rules in Hundreds of Picoseconds (10-12 seconds) a priori Rules of Engagement Final Thoughts on Net-Centric War NCW “is about human and organizational behavior.” (Alberts, et.al.) The human nature of warfare is not eliminated by NCW …but NCW-enabled commanders conduct better combat Insights for future NCW can be logically gleaned from analysis of ongoing major combat operations in Southwest Asia NATO NEC focused case studies are needed NCW is no longer transformational … ... it is here now! Fragen? firstname.lastname@example.org http://www.us.army.mil/usacsl/Studies.asp Our Self-imposed Limits We have made more progress than we realize over the last 20 years because technology growth is exponential. But humans tend to think linearly and would only expect an equal amount of progress in the next 20 years. We are usually wrong. To envision the future 20 years from now, we need to train ourselves to think exponentially. A historical perspective can teach us this. We need to internalize the lessons from Moore’s Law and other histories of technological growth to recognize how and why paradigm shifts occur. Doing so will make our predictions more accurate and think of a future world which is vastly more probable than we would expect to be humanly possible. We should free ourselves from self-imposed limits about our inventiveness and ingenuity and cast a wide net in order to anticipate what we cannot yet imagine.
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