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					SPS NEG                                                                                                                                                                            WHEELER
Novice Evidence                                                                                                                                                       Westminster Tournament

                                                                       Satellites Negative                                                                                                                 0

Satellites Negative ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 0
Strategy Sheet ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 1

1NC T-Increase = Pre-Existing .................................................................................................................................................................. 2
2NC Pre-existing – Overview .................................................................................................................................................................... 3
2NC Pre-existing – Limits Debate ............................................................................................................................................................. 4
2NC Pre-existing – Literature Debate ........................................................................................................................................................ 5

1NC Solvency Frontline ............................................................................................................................................................................ 6
1NC Solvency Frontline ............................................................................................................................................................................ 7
1NC Solvency Frontline ............................................................................................................................................................................ 8
Solvency – ext 1 – lack of launch .............................................................................................................................................................. 9
Solvency – ext 2 – backlash ..................................................................................................................................................................... 10
Solvency – ext 2 – backlash ..................................................................................................................................................................... 11
Solvency – ext 3 – tech barriers ............................................................................................................................................................... 12
Solvency – ext 3 – tech barriers ............................................................................................................................................................... 13
Solvency – ext 3 – years away ................................................................................................................................................................. 14

1NC Aerospace Frontline ........................................................................................................................................................................ 15
1NC Aerospace Frontline ........................................................................................................................................................................ 16
Aerospace – ext 1 – ITAR ....................................................................................................................................................................... 17
Aerospace – ext 2 – EU subsidies ............................................................................................................................................................ 18
Aerospace – ext 3 – workforce crisis ....................................................................................................................................................... 19
Aerospace – ext 5 – trade barriers ............................................................................................................................................................ 20

1NC China Frontline ................................................................................................................................................................................ 21
1NC China Frontline ................................................................................................................................................................................ 22
China – ext 2 – won’t happen .................................................................................................................................................................. 23
China – ext 3 – military would survive .................................................................................................................................................... 24




                                                                        Operation: Space Takedown                                                                                                        0
SPS NEG                                              WHEELER
Novice Evidence                               Westminster Tournament

                    Strategy Sheet                                1




                  Operation: Space Takedown                       1
SPS NEG                                                                                                                                        WHEELER
Novice Evidence                                                                                                                     Westminster Tournament

                                          1NC T-Increase = Pre-Existing                                                                                           2

   A. Interpretation: the incentive increased must be pre-existing
    Ripple, 87 (Circuit Judge, Emmlee K. Cameron, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frances Slocum Bank & Trust Company, State Automobile Insurance Association,
     and Glassley Agency of Whitley, Indiana, Defendants-Appellees, 824 F.2d 570; 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 9816, 9/24, lexis)

     Also related to the waiver issue is appellees' defense relying on a provision of the insurance policy that suspends coverage where the risk is increased by any
     means within the knowledge or control of the insured. However, the term "increase" connotes change. To show change, appellees would have
     been required to present evidence of the condition of the building at the time the policy was issued. See 5 J. Appleman & J.
     Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 2941 at 4-5 (1970). Because no such evidence was presented, this court cannot
     determine, on this record, whether the risk has, in fact, been increased. Indeed, the answer to this question may depend on Mr. Glassley's
     knowledge of the condition of the building at the time the policy was issued, see 17 J. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 9602 at 515-16
     (1981), since the fundamental issue is whether the appellees contemplated insuring the risk which incurred the loss.


 B. Violation: Affirmative provides new incentives – isn’t an increase of pre-existing incentives

 C. Standards
      1. Limits: requiring the use of pre-existing incentives is key to reduce the massive size of the topic
         and limit to predictable solvency mechanisms—without increase to modify, literally anything is
         topical
      Incentive means ANY factor that motivates a course of action
      Answers.com, no date given, http://www.answers.com/topic/incentive
         In economics, an incentive is any factor (financial or non-financial) that provides a motive for a particular course of action,
         or counts as a reason for preferring one choice to the alternatives. Since human beings are purposeful creatures, the study of
         incentive structures is central to the study of all economic activity (both in terms of individual decision-making and in terms
         of co-operation and competition within a larger institutional structure). Economic analysis, then, of the differences between
         societies (and between different organizations within a society) largely amounts to characterizing the differences in incentive
         structures faced by individuals involved in these collective efforts.

         2. Lit base—the core of literature discusses effectiveness of incentives that have been used in the
            past—predictable ground depends on access to this literature. We still allow for things like tax
            credits, rebates, grants, loans, leasing, sales, production, and industrial incentives

 D. If our interpretation is preferable in a framework of competing interpretations vote neg to set a precedent for a better
    world of debate and to rectify damage done before this round started




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SPS NEG                                                                                                       WHEELER
Novice Evidence                                                                                       Westminster Tournament

                                  2NC Pre-existing – Overview                                                               3

Our interpretation is that the incentive increased must already exist in the status quo. Our Ripple 87 Evidence indicates
that increase means change, and thus to increase something you must be changing something that already exists. The plan
creates a new incentive—that isn’t an increase.




                                            Operation: Space Takedown                                                       3
SPS NEG                                                                                           WHEELER
Novice Evidence                                                                           Westminster Tournament

                           2NC Pre-existing – Limits Debate                                                   4

They massively unlimit the topic—literally any incentive becomes topical if they can create new incentives. Our
Answers.com evidence indicates that ANY factor motivating action is an incentive, meaning that it would be
topical for them to change interest rates or ban fossil fuels since that could make renewables more economically
viable. Increase is key to check the research burden.




                                       Operation: Space Takedown                                              4
SPS NEG                                                                                               WHEELER
Novice Evidence                                                                                Westminster Tournament

                          2NC Pre-existing – Literature Debate                                                       5


Our interpretation is the best way to access the core literature base that discusses the effectiveness of existing
incentives that have been used before—this is crucial for predictable ground. We provide plenty of good aff
ground as well—tax credits, rebates, grants, loans, leasing, sales, production, and industrial incentives are all
topical.




                                         Operation: Space Takedown                                                   5
SPS NEG                                                                                                                  WHEELER
Novice Evidence                                                                                                 Westminster Tournament

                                           1NC Solvency Frontline                                                                        6

 1.    Their own evidence goes neg – SPS isn’t even close to being developed.
      NSSO, 7 (National Security Space Office, Report to the Director, ―Space-Based Solar Power As an Opportunity for Strategic
      Security; Phase 0 Architecture Feasibility Study‖ October 10, 2007, http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/final-sbsp-interim-
      assessment-release-01.pdf)

      The SBSP Study Group found that even with the DoD as an anchor tenant customer at a price of $1‐2 per kilowatt hour for 5‐50
      megawatts continuous power for the warfighter, when considering the risks of implementing a new unproven space technology a
      nd other major business risks, the business case for SBSP still does not appear to close in 2007 with current capabilities (primaril
      y launch costs).


 2.   Their final NSSO evidence is bad and just mentions the Domestic Advance Purchase Agreement as one option – loan
      guarantees and other options still exist, and could potentially solve better. At the point where these other options exist,
      this is a solvency deficit to the affirmative. Vote negative on presumption.

 3.   Technology fails – it’s 40 years away
      Day, 08 (Dwayne, ―Knights in shining armor,‖ The Space Review, 6/9,
      http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1147/1)

      The NSSO study is remarkably sensible and even-handed and states that we are nowhere near developing practical SSP and that
      it is not a viable solution for even the military’s limited requirements. It states that the technology to implement space solar
      power does not currently exist… and is unlikely to exist for the next forty years. Substantial technology development must occur
      before it is even feasible. Furthermore, the report makes clear that the key technology requirement is cheap access to space,
      which no longer seems as achievable as it did three decades ago (perhaps why SSP advocates tend to skip this part of the
      discussion and hope others solve it for them). The activists have ignored the message and fallen in love with the messenger.

 4.   UV rays will destroy satellites – gutting solvency
      Taylor, 7 – Chief of the Space and International Law Division at Headquarters United States Air Force Space Command; B.A,
      Berry College; J.D. University of Georgia; LL.M. (Air and Space Law), McGill University (Michael W. ―Trashing the Solar
      System One Planet at a Time: Earth’s Orbital Debris Problem,‖ Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, Fall,
      2007, Gale) // DCM

      <Without Earth's atmosphere to protect them, satellites are exposed to the full force of solar radiation, including ultraviolet rays,
      X-rays, positively charged protons and negatively charged electrons. n16 Ultraviolet rays and X-rays can damage satellites by
      degrading solar panels, which many satellites use as a source of energy, thus shortening their useful life. n17 When solar activity
      increases, the number of damaging rays also increases. The charged particles can cause even [*5] more damage than the rays
      because the particles penetrate the outer layers of the satellite and directly degrade its electronic systems. Unlike the rays, which
      are generally evenly distributed around Earth, the particles become trapped in Earth's magnetic field and concentrate in two
      doughnut-shaped (torus) areas around the equator. n18 These regions are called the Van Allen radiation belts. n19 The Van Allen
      radiation belts significantly limit the operation of satellites.>




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SPS NEG                                                                                                                                       WHEELER
Novice Evidence                                                                                                                    Westminster Tournament

                                                  1NC Solvency Frontline                                                                                        7

 5.   Turn - SPS development violates the Outer Space Treaty because it’s a WMD
      Pop, 2k – PhD Student, University of Glasgow Law School (Virgiliu, ―SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF NON-TERRESTRIAL
      RESOURCE EXPLOITATION‖, http://www.geocities.com/virgiliu_pop/publications/security.pdf)

      2.1. Mass Destruction Capabilities
      Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty outlaws placement “in orbit around the Earth” of “any (...) kinds of
      weapons of mass destruction (...).” Weapons of mass destruction were defined in 1948 by the UN Commission for Conventional Armaments as
      “those which include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future
      which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above” [UN document S/C.3/32/Rev.1,
      August 1948].
      Given the “evolution” of the means of warfare since 1948, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 51/37 of 7 January 1997 [A/RES/51/37] in which it
      expresses its determination
      “to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction that have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of weapons of mass
      destruction identified in the definition of weapons of mass destruction adopted by the United Nations in 1948” and it
      “[r]eaffirms that effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass
      destruction”.
      As seen from above, there is no exclusivedefinition of weapons of mass destruction; in 1996, the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher classified the
      landmines as “weapons of mass destruction in slow motion”5.
      Given the lack of a precise definition, the
      Office of Technology Assessment of the United States Congress considers that it is unclear “[w]hether an SPS’s microwave or
      laser capabilities would class it as a weapon of
      “mass destruction” and hence make it illegal under the 1967 treaty”, but “it is very likely that such charges would be made in
      the event of SPS deployment”6. In order to analyse their (dis)qualification as weapons of mass destruction, one must examine
      the possible destructive effects of the SPS technology.

 6.    If we violate the OST, then other countries can use it as a justification. This causes proliferation which causes extinction.
      Victor A Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis, Summer 20 02,
      Survival, p.87-90
      In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot outs will
      have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear
      proliferation is stopped, we are headed towards a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if
      not all, nations wearing nuclear ―six shooters‖ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every
      once in a while we will all gather together on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.




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SPS NEG                                                                                                                WHEELER
Novice Evidence                                                                                               Westminster Tournament

                                          1NC Solvency Frontline                                                                       8

 7. Perception the US is militarizing space destroys international cooperation – undermining all space
    exploration goals
    George Abbey, former director of Johnson Space Center, and Neal Lane, Physicist at Rice, 2005, ―Space Policy,‖
     http://www.amacad.org/publications/spacepolicy.pdf
   Whatever path the United States chooses to follow with its policies, America does not have a future in space—human
   exploration, space science, or commercial space activities—without considerable international cooperation. The degree of
   cooperation that will be necessary will not be possible under current export control and other restrictive policies. The
   International Space Station and the Space Shuttle programs, as well as many of the most successful robotic science missions,
   were accomplished with considerable international involvement and the free exchange of data and technical information.
   Neither of these programs could have been successful under any other conditions. The creation of complex systems, which
   operate in an integrated fashion in order to support human life in a hostile environment, requires an international partnership,
   with open discussions and sharing of information and technology. As important a role as these matters play in discouraging
   cooperation with the United States in space, the issue most threatening to cooperation may well be a growing international
   perception that the United States intends to control space militarily. Although it is not the subject of this paper, military
   space policy is a matter of profound importance to the future of U.S. civilian space programs and the space programs of other
   nations.24 In recent years, the United States has accelerated its efforts to put in place a primitive missile-defense system. The
   decision was made apparently without any international consultation and before adequate R&D and testing had shown the
   feasibility of such a system. This action suggested that the United States is impatient to signal to the rest of the world that
   it intends to treat space differently in the future than it has in the past. Many members of Congress who have been
   advocating for a missile-defense system for several decades heartily endorsed the decision. Powerful industrial interests are
   also at stake. Missile defense is only one aspect of the increased military use of space. ―The Report of the Commission to
   Assess the United States National Security Space Management and Organization,‖ published in 2001, identifies the importance
   of space to national security and outlines a series of recommendations for the future of military space activities.25 The report
   proposes, among other things, that the military vigorously pursue capabilities that would enable the President to deploy
   weapons in space ―to deter threats to and, if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests.‖26 This proposal represents a
   departure from President Kennedy’s vision of 1962, when he vowed, ―We shall not see space filled with weapons of mass
   destruction but with instruments of knowledge and understanding.‖27 Placing offensive weapons in space would be a cause
   for alarm throughout the world and, in the context of the issues addressed in this paper, would create a major obstacle to
   international cooperation in space. American companies could expect an even more restrictive U.S. export control
   policy. Such restrictions could further damage commercial space activities and preclude the willingness of other nations
   to join U.S.-led programs for both human and robotic space science and exploration missions. The placement of weapons
   in space would reinforce in the world community the feeling that the United States increasingly is basing its foreign policy on
   unilateral initiatives. As such, it would severely impact the progress that has been made over the last fifty years towards
   multilateral international cooperation.




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SPS NEG                                                                                                                  WHEELER
Novice Evidence                                                                                                 Westminster Tournament

                                  Solvency – ext 1 – lack of launch                                                                     9

Lack of space launch services inhibit space solar power
    Mankins, 8 - president of the Space Power Association, and former Manager, Advanced Concepts Studies, Office of Space
    Flight at NASA (John, Ad Astra, ―Inexhaustible Energy from Orbit‖ Spring 2008, pg. 20, http://www.nss.org/adastra/AdAstra-
    SBSP-2008.pdf)

     A major barrier to all space endeavors also applies to space solar power, and that is affordable access to space. This barrier is one
     of compelling importance. The problem of space access includes both low-cost and highly-reliable Earth-to-orbit transportation,
     and in-space transporta- tion. (Fortunately, one of the key ingredients in overcoming this barrier is having a market that requires
     many flights. It’s hard to imagine how air travel between continents would be affordable if the aircraft were used once or twice
     per year rather than once or twice per day!)
     Advances that drive down the cost of space operations present signifi- cant hurdles, too. These hurdles involve a range of
     capabilities, most of which have never been demonstrated in space—but all of which are entirely taken for granted here on Earth.
     The kinds of capabilities in question include the highly-autonomous assembly of large structures, the deployment and integration
     of modular electronic systems, refu-eling, and repair and maintenance. (The key ingredient is to perform such operations without
     large numbers of operators and sustaining engineers on Earth—which drive the high cost of contemporary space operations.)


Lack of low-cost space access blocks SSP
    Mankins, 8 - president of the Space Power Association, and former Manager, Advanced Concepts Studies, Office of Space
    Flight at NASA (John, Ad Astra, ―Inexhaustible Energy from Orbit‖ Spring 2008, pg. 20, http://www.nss.org/adastra/AdAstra-
    SBSP-2008.pdf)

     Lower-Cost Space Access. Space launch is a well-known and clas- sic case of the ―chicken-and-egg‖ problem, and one that has
     provenextremely hard to overcome. For many concepts, very low recurring costs per pound of payload can be achieved only with
     high launch rates (so that the cost of fixed initial investments and annual overhead costs can be spread across many launches).
     Achieving high launch rates depends upon the actual revenue-generating traffic to be carried, which depends significantly on
     earlier investments in space-utilizing enterprises (for example, investments related to in-space manufacturing capacity). And, as a
     result, increased investments in space-utilizing enterprises (government or commercial) will depend upon the prior existence of
     assured availability of reliable launch services at the lower prices.
     So, in order to make space solar power possible, what has to be done about space transportation? In the case of conventional
     transportation infrastructures, low cost has always been achieved through reuse of vehicles and the deployment of general-
     purpose infrastructures that can be used many times by multiple customers, such as canals, rail- ways, roads, and airports. It is
     hard to imagine how automobiles, air- craft, ships, or any other modern transportation system might somehow be produced so
     cheaply that the transport could somehow be ―dispos- able‖ after each use. In order for space solar power systems to be eco-
     nomically viable, reusable Earth-to-orbit launchers will be essential. In-space transportation advances are also needed. In-space
     trans- portation systems must be very fuel-efficient. Also, transport hardware costs must be dramatically reduced through the
     development of reus- able, rather than expendable, systems. Finally, the personnel costs for the transport infrastructure must be
     drastically reduced: the system must be largely autonomous, involving neither ―marching armies‖ of operators or maintenance
     engineers.




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SPS NEG                                                                                                                 WHEELER
Novice Evidence                                                                                                Westminster Tournament

                                       Solvency – ext 2 – backlash                                                                      10

Unilateral U.S. action in space undermines soft power and international cooperation
     Sadeh, 08 - an Associate Director for the Center for Space and Defense Studies at the United States Air Force Academy (Eligar,
     The Space Review, ―Space policy questions and decisions facing a new administration‖, 6/9,
     http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1146/1)

     Issue

     United States government leadership in space is not seen as productive by others. The United States government cannot be a
     leader if no one will follow. Today, the United States is not seen as a good partner in space.
     Discussion
     •The position of the United States in world affairs is influenced by leadership in space. Given the many issues and challenges the
     space community faces, leadership is by no means assured.
     •In order to identify and meet the challenges in security, commercial, and civil space productive United States government space
     leadership is indispensable.
     •Leadership requires that the United States develop a strategic vision for space to guide space policy decisions, which is
     supported by strong executive leadership, and effective interagency and government-industry partnerships.
     •International participation in security space is important. There is a need for the United States to think more about international
     engagement in the strategic response to the domain of space. It is not a ―go-it-alone problem.‖ The United States government has
     not given sufficient indication that the strategy is to include allies in national space policy.
     •Space represents a ―soft power‖ foreign policy tool. Space is an international drawing card that engenders national prestige,
     prevents conflict, and is a domain for international cooperation.

Cooperation is key to make SPS cost effective
    Scientific American 8, (Tim Hornyak ―Farming Solar Energy in Space: Shrugging off massive costs, Japan pursues space-based
    solar arrays‖ July 2008, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=farming-solar-energy-in-space) // CCH

     The total project cost would be enormous—perhaps in the tens of billions of dollars—but Suzuki and his colleagues say they are
     not considering the price tag. ―We can’t know whether this is feasible or not if we don’t have the basic technology first,‖ he says.
     ―We’re aiming to produce stable, cheap power and hydrogen at a target price of 6.5 cents per kilowatt-hour.‖ That would be in
     line with conventional power generation costs of today and might make it more economically attractive. Given current
     technology, transporting large-scale structures into space may be feasible only through the cooperation of space agencies on
     different continents. Suzuki, though, says countries in the space race are trying to develop their technologies independently while
     the potential militarization of space grows. ―If JAXA, NASA and the European Space Agency can work together, it would be
     best,‖ he adds.




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SPS NEG                                                                                                                                      WHEELER
Novice Evidence                                                                                                                   Westminster Tournament

                                             Solvency – ext 2 – backlash                                                                                       11


SPS unilateral development risks international conflict
    Nansen 2000 - President Solar Space Industries, (Ralph, Statement to the United States Congress Subcommittee on Space
    Science ―The Technical Feasibility of Space Solar Power‖ Before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, United States
    House of Representatives Committee on Science September 7, 2000, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=2571) //
    CCH

     An inherent feature of solar power satellites is their location in space outside the borders of any individual nation with their
     energy delivered to the earth by way of some form of wireless power transmission that must be compatible with other uses of the
     radio frequency spectrum. They must also be transported to space. Government involvement to coordinate international
     agreements covering frequency assignments, satellite locations, space traffic control and many other features of space operations
     is mandatory in order to prevent international conflicts. Solar power satellites will ultimately become part of the commercial
     electric utility industry and as such, that industry could be expected to shoulder the majority of the burden of development.
     However, the utility industry is not the only one that will benefit from the development of solar power satellites. All of the
     people of the world will eventually be the benefactors, through reduced atmospheric pollution and the availability of ample
     energy in the future. As a result it makes sense that the development of solar power satellites be accomplished through a
     partnership of industries and governments of all the nations that wish to participate.


SPS development violates the Outer Space Treaty – it will be treated as a weapon of mass destruction
    Pop, 2k – PhD Student, University of Glasgow Law School (Virgiliu, ―SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF NON-TERRESTRIAL
    RESOURCE EXPLOITATION‖, http://www.geocities.com/virgiliu_pop/publications/security.pdf)

     2.1. Mass Destruction Capabilities
     Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty outlaws placement “in orbit around the Earth” of “any (...) kinds of
     weapons of mass destruction (...).” Weapons of mass destruction were defined in 1948 by the UN Commission for Conventional Armaments as
     “those which include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future
     which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above” [UN document S/C.3/32/Rev.1,
     August 1948].
     Given the “evolution” of the means of warfare since 1948, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 51/37 of 7 January 1997 [A/RES/51/37] in which it
     expresses its determination
     “to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction that have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of weapons of mass
     destruction identified in the definition of weapons of mass destruction adopted by the United Nations in 1948” and it
     “[r]eaffirms that effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass
     destruction”.
     As seen from above, there is no exclusivedefinition of weapons of mass destruction; in 1996, the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher classified the
     landmines as “weapons of mass destruction in slow motion”5.
     Given the lack of a precise definition, the
     Office of Technology Assessment of the United States Congress considers that it is unclear “[w]hether an SPS’s microwave or
     laser capabilities would class it as a weapon of
     “mass destruction” and hence make it illegal under the 1967 treaty”, but “it is very likely that such charges would be made in
     the event of SPS deployment”6. In order to analyse their (dis)qualification as weapons of mass destruction, one must examine
     the possible destructive effects of the SPS technology.




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SPS NEG                                                                                                                 WHEELER
Novice Evidence                                                                                                Westminster Tournament

                                    Solvency – ext 3 – tech barriers                                                                       12

Prior space solar projects prove the technology will fail
     Spencer, 08 (Roy, ―Reality Deniers‖, National Review, 1/15, lexis)

     And now the space-based solar power crowd has returned. These "experts" point to the increase in efficiency that could be
     achieved by putting solar collectors in Earth's orbit and beaming the energy down to the ground.
     And indeed you probably could get several times the amount of energy from a solar collector in space versus on the ground. Too
     bad it would be insanely expensive.
     You might have heard of the problems NASA has had with relatively tiny solar collectors attached to the Space Station and
     Space Telescope. Now imagine putting a one-square mile collector in space. Even if we could get such a thing designed, built,
     launched, and working, it would replace only 1 of the 1,000 one-gigawatt plants I mentioned earlier that the U.S. alone needs.


Incentives for SSP don’t make sense – other technologies have to be developed prior to its competitiveness
     Macauley, 2k - analyst with Resources for the Future (Molly, ―Can power from space compete?,‖ Space Policy, November,
     science direct)

     Our second set of observations pertains specifically to challenges facing SSP:
     • The relative immaturity of the technologies required for SSP makes it difficult to assess the validity of estimated costs and the
     likely competitiveness of SSP. For this reason, as in many space development initiatives, orders-of-magnitude reductions in the
     costs of space launch and deployment and other key technologies are critical. As these reductions occur, the economic viability
     of SSP may become more promising. Until then, it is premature for the US government to make commitments such as loan
     guarantees or tax incentives specifically for SSP.


Solar power satellites will be impossible in the near future: 10 to 1 technology improvements are needed in several areas.
     Mankins 98 – manager at NASA (John C. Mankins, ―The Space Solar Power Option,‖ Ad Astra Vol 10 No 1 January/February
     1008)

      <Throughout the systems concepts that emerged from the "Fresh Look" study, however, the common theme is that these
     systems cannot be built today. Very aggressive--and successful--technology advances would first be needed if SSP were to
     become technically and economically viable in the future. Such advances would have to address a variety of areas, ranging from
     exceptionally low-cost space launch (about $400 per kilogram to low Earth orbit) to very low mass solar arrays (about 500 watts
     per kilogram) and other areas. Overall, factors of 2:1 to 10:1 improvements would be needed in a number of technologies. Still,
     far fewer new technologies appear to be required than were called for in the 1970s and, if those advances were made, the systems
     concepts that would be enabled by them appear to hold far greater promise of economic viability.>




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SPS NEG                                                                                                                WHEELER
Novice Evidence                                                                                               Westminster Tournament

                                   Solvency – ext 3 – tech barriers                                                                      13

SPS is not cost effective or technologically feasible
     David 2000, (Leonard, Senior Science Writer, ―Space-Based Power System Needed to Solve Earth’s Energy Woes‖
     http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/solar_power_satellite_000421.html , 4-21-00) // CCH

     WASHINGTON -- Solar power satellites beaming energy to Earth could present daunting technological challenges and offer
     questionable economic potential, a NASA-funded study has found. But, the report also recommended that the federal
     government should continue to study the concept and put more emphasis on creating a power plant in space that might support
     Earth-orbiting spacecraft and deep-space missions. Those are the key points from a study on 21st-century power-beaming
     satellites released Friday by a Washington think tank called Resources for the Future. Satellite solar power has been suggested as
     an alternative to terrestrial energy resources for electrical generation. The nine-month-long study looked at the market for
     electricity from the present to the year 2020, roughly the year when many experts believe satellite solar power actually could be
     possible. Included were comments from the Electric Power Research Institute and Texaco.
     Among the findings:
     • Conventional electricity generation in both developed and developing countries may be more than adequate in terms of cost,
     supply and environmental factors.
     •Satellite solar power is relatively immature technology. That makes it difficult to estimate costs and the likely competitiveness
     of such an idea measured against other energy systems.
     •Lower launch costs could help make satellite solar power more promising. But until those costs go down, it is too early for the
     U.S. government to commit to related loan guarantees or tax incentives.
     •Health risks associated with exposure to electric and magnetic fields generated by satellite solar power are likely to be of
     significant public concern.
     •Such power may be useful for the International Space Station, moon bases or other space missions.
     However, Molly Macauley, an economist who led the study, said the findings should not preclude NASA working on such a
     concept.
     "But … it's going to be very difficult to make it competitive with terrestrial power," she told SPACE.com. "It's a very hard sell."
     "My concern with satellite-solar-power advocates is that they aren't looking over their shoulders to realize that technological
     change and innovation in markets is happening within conventional approaches."


SSP technology doesn’t work – it would require major breakthroughs
     Day, 08 (Dwayne, ―Knights in shining armor,‖ The Space Review, 6/9,
     http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1147/1)

     You may not have noticed, but the space activist community is all worked up about space solar power (see ―A renaissance for
     space solar power?‖, The Space Review, August 13, 2007). It is now the topic of much conversation whenever a group of space
     enthusiasts get together. It was recently on the cover of the National Space Society’s magazine Ad Astra. The upcoming
     NewSpace 2008 conference will feature a panel on it. The International Space Development Conference in Washington, DC
     featured no less than three—yes, three—sessions on space solar power, or SSP, to use the shorthand term, plus a dinner speaker
     who addressed the same subject. With all of this attention, one would suspect that there has been a fundamental technological
     breakthrough that now makes SSP possible, or a major private or government initiative to begin at least preliminary work on a
     demonstration project. But there has been none of this. In fact, from a technological standpoint, we are not much closer to space
     solar power today than we were when NASA conducted a big study of it in the 1970s.




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Novice Evidence                                                                                               Westminster Tournament

                                    Solvency – ext 3 – years away                                                                     14

SSP is decades away
     Foust, 08 - editor of the Space Review (Jeff, ―Energy vs. space‖, The Space Review, 7/14,
     http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1169/1)

     Another common response, of course, is to cite the promise of space solar power (SSP). And, indeed, SSP could go a long way
     towards solving the nation’s energy woes—in theory. The problem is that even supporters of SSP acknowledge turning that
     theory into reality is still decades away, assuming that technological and financial obstacles can be overcome: little comfort for
     those feeling pain at the pump today. Moreover, others are less sanguine about SSP’s prospects (see ―Knights in shining armor‖,
     The Space Review, June 9, 2008).




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Novice Evidence                                                                                                                                          Westminster Tournament

                                                        1NC Aerospace Frontline                                                                                                             15

 1.    Turn – unilateral U.S. construction causes an international backlash against hegemony: This means they can’t solve for
       their huge hegemony impacts and this is a disad against the case.
      Glaser, 08 - aerospace engineer, vice president at Arthur D. Little, consulting on consulting projects in aerospace, solar energy,
      and materials science (Peter, Ad Astra, Interview, ―An energy pioneer looks back‖, Spring, http://www.nss.org/adastra/AdAstra-
      SBSP-2008.pdf) //DH

      Glaser: Since it would be such a huge undertaking, I think it would be best accom- plished at an international level, perhaps even
      managed by the United Nations. Each country could contribute their best effort, and then each country would reap the ben- efit
      of cheap and plentiful power from the sun. We could utilize the knowledge of all the nations that have been researching space-
      based solar power. If only one country has the satellites, the international community will worry that the technology will be
      misused. With every nation taking part in the planning, building, and operation of the system, there would be inherent
      transparency, oversight, and equality. There would be no secrets, and no country would be left in the dark.
      On the other hand, if one nation decides to build the system, all hell may break loose. There would be distrust and a huge shift in
      the balance of power. Any nation with such a system would not only have an advantage in space, but they would have economic
      and military advantages on the ground as well. And there are many countries taking the ideaof solar power from space much
      more seriously that we are in the United States. I would prefer to see a network of power satellites built by an international effort.

 2.   Non unique- other countries are more advanced in the space race then us – their impacts would have already happened.

 3.   No Brink – one space policy won’t make us a space hegemon. China is ahead of is so many more categories.

 4.   Turn – look at the Iraq war – we were hegemonic then, and we caused preemptive wars. When we become the space
      hegemon, we will inherently use these satellites to start preemptive space wars—causing their own impacts

 5.   No Impact – hegemony doesn’t solve the big wars- their evidence doesn’t assume big wars. Prefer our comparative
      evidence.
         Eland 02 Director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute
         (Ivan,, The Empire Strikes Out The ―New Imperialism‖ and Its Fatal Flaws‖, Cato policy analysis no 459, nov 26)


      Some advocates of an expansive U.S. foreign policy have argued that actual expenditures on a worldwide U.S. military presence
      are less than the potential costs to the United States of future wars resulting from the absence of such U.S. global policing. Two
      academics, Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, debunk this myth by using empirical data from major wars —World War I and the Iran- Iraq War—to
      demonstrate that neutral countries incur only small costs, or actually profit, from even large conflicts. Because the world
      economy—especially in an age of globalization of trade and investment—is flexible and resilient, neutral countries can profit
      from war by selling to belligerents, by taking over markets that warring nations have previously served, by lending money at
      high rates of return to the fighting countries, and by buying up assets cheaply that have been liquidated by belligerents to fight
      the war. In addition, Gholz and Press found that the United States pays much more attempting to ensure global security than it would
      lose from instability and war (and that even with the generous implicit assumption that all U.S. military interventions promote rather than detract from global stability). In
      short, Gholz and Press demonstrate that the current U.S. policy of being the world’s policeman does not pass the cost/benefit
      test.84 Such empirical data confirm the conclusions of the much earlier intuitive cost/benefit analysis done by Earl Ravenal, a former distinguished research professor of international
      affairs at Georgetown University.85




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Novice Evidence                                                                                                  Westminster Tournament

                                          1NC Aerospace Frontline                                                                        16

 6.    Turn- ITAR blocks U.S. space competitiveness and SSP development
      NSSO, 7 (National Security Space Office, Report to the Director, ―Space-Based Solar Power As an Opportunity for Strategic
      Security; Phase 0 Architecture Feasibility Study‖ October 10, 2007, http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/final-sbsp-interim-
      assessment-release-01.pdf)

      FINDING: The SBSP Study Group found in order to successfully address major world problems in energy,
      environmental and national security, the U.S. needs to identify and then reduce or eliminate all
      unnecessary barriers to effective international cooperation on, and private industry investment in, the
      development of SBSP. Regardless of the form of international cooperation, Space‐Based Solar Power
      will require modification or special treatment under International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
      • Partnerships between U.S. and foreign corporations are often much easier to create and
      implement than government to government level partnerships, and more effective when the
      purpose is fostering economically affordable goods and services.
      • Application of the International Traffic Arms Regulations (ITAR) may constitute a major barrier
      to effective partnerships in SBSP and negatively impact national security. Right now ITAR
      greatly restricts and complicates all space‐related business, as it treats all launch and satellite
      technologies as arms. This has had the effect of causing America’s competitors to develop
      ITAR‐free products, and had a negative impact on our domestic space industries, which can no
      longer compete on level ground. Many participants in the feasibility study were very vocal that
      including satellite and launch technology in ITAR has had a counterproductive and detrimental
      effect on the U.S.’s national security and competitiveness—losing control and market share,
      and closing our eyes and ears to the innovations of the competition while selling ourselves on a
      national illusion of unassailable space superiority. Effective collaboration, even with allies on
      something of this level, could not take place effectively without some special consideration or
      modification.
      o Recommendation: The SBSP Study Group recommends the early inclusion of global
      corporations from America’s allies as partners in the development of this new strategic
      energy resource. U.S. corporations should be encouraged to develop partnerships with
      foreign‐owned corporations of America’s closest and most‐trusted allies. In order to
      achieve this objective, U.S. industry should be exempt from ITAR when working with our
      closest and most‐trusted allies on SBSP systems. U.S. government funded SBSP
      technology maturation efforts should not include “buy America” clauses prohibiting
      participation of foreign companies as suppliers to U.S. bidders.

 7.   Global trade barriers in aerospace are increasing- this will cause a huge solvency deficit.
      Walker et al, 02 - Chair of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners (Robert, Final
      Report of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners, November,
      http://www.trade.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf)

      We are greatly concerned, however, where the rise inforeign competition has been aided by persistentgovernment intervention.
      We see concerted strate-gies by other governmentsto unseat U.S. companiesfrom their position of world
      leadership.Interventionist policies are being used as tools toestablish and support ―national champions‖ protect-ing them from
      market forces at the expense of U.S.industry. These policies are described in the ―International Playing Field‖ section later in this
      chapter.

 8.   No timeframe – if we win our long timeframe arugment on the solvency flow, that means we’ll win that China will be
      first to develop the technology – their impacts still happen.




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Novice Evidence                                                                                                Westminster Tournament

                                        Aerospace – ext 1 – ITAR                                                                         17

ITAR restrictions kill aerospace
    Sadeh, 08 - an Associate Director for the Center for Space and Defense Studies at the United States Air Force Academy (Eligar,
    The Space Review, ―Space policy questions and decisions facing a new administration‖, 6/9,
    http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1146/1)

     The United States government’s approach to export control of commercial space technologies places political, legal, and
     bureaucratic restrictions on the aerospace industry in the United States. These restrictions posit a cost to the United States
     satellite industry and the space industrial base.
     Discussion
     •Export controls of commercial space technologies are governed through the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR),
     which is administered by the Department of State. These Regulations prevent international partnerships in commercial space by
     making it more difficult and bureaucratic to implement.
     •As a result of ITAR, domestic manufacturing capabilities for vital space-related hardware and components are reduced. The
     regulations, in contrast to the intended goal of retaining preeminence for the United States in the aerospace and defense fields,
     brings about the opposite effect.
     •The United States has fallen behind and has lost leadership status in global space commerce competition due to its export
     control regime.
     •Export controls are an impediment to United States competition in the international marketplace. International competition in
     space commerce is stiff and growing, and ITAR harms United States industry and limit the ability to access and make use of the
     best capabilities. Globalization of space is desirable and ITAR is a barrier.
     •ITAR damages national security by placing legal and bureaucratic restrictions on the United States military use of commercial
     space assets that rely on a robust satellite industry and space industrial base. The fact is that the United States military is
     dependent on commercial space services.
     •ITAR directly impacts approaches to national security space whereby the United States is denying allies access to warfighting
     and space protection capabilities.

U.S. export controls block aerospace competitiveness
     Walker et al, 02 - Chair of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners (Robert, Final
     Report of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners, November,
     http://www.trade.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf)

     Restrictive Export Controls. One of the primary obstacles to the health and competitiveness of the U.S. aerospace industry is our
     own export control regime. Export controls have been and should be an important component of America’s national security. We
     believe, however, current export controls are increas- ingly counterproductive to our national security inter- ests in their current
     form and under current practices of implementation. In our judgment, export control reform is crucial to provide better security
     in the future and to insure the health and vitality of our aerospace industry.

Export controls undermine U.S. aerospace joint ventures
    Walker et al, 02 - Chair of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners (Robert, Final
    Report of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners, November,
    http://www.trade.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf)

     More importantly, U.S. export controls are under- mining one of the central goals of military planning during the past 30 years—
     alliance interoperability. We actively try to get allies to buy American military equipment to improve our ability to fight as an
     alliance, yet we bog down that process through net- tlesome export controls. For example, during the Kosovo air war, allies were
     petitioning the DoD to intercede with the State Department to expedite license approval of weapon systems needed to arm
     combat aircraft flying side-by-side with American pilots.
     Export controls are undermin- ing the collaboration between companies in alliance countries on new system developments.
     Foreign companies have actually instructed design engineers to avoid American components because of the difficulty of
     acquiring license approval from the United States government.
     The current approach to export controls is increasingly isolating the American aerospace industry from the commercial sector in
     an unproductive cocoon of regula- tion. The defense industrial base is falling farther and farther behind the commercial market
     place because it has to cope with excessive regulation.



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Novice Evidence                                                                                              Westminster Tournament

                                 Aerospace – ext 2 – EU subsidies                                                                    18

EU subsidies crush US aerospace
    Walker et al, 02 - Chair of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners (Robert, Final
    Report of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners, November,
    http://www.trade.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf)

     To the Europeans’ credit, their funding strategy has been very successful. EU companies have developed robust commercial
     product lines that are slowly dis- placing U.S.-produced commercial aircraft and heli- copters, aircraft engines and components.
     Government subsidies have aided in this rise of European industry competitiveness.
     European subsidies to Airbus had a direct impact on the exit of McDonnell-Douglas from the market as an independent large
     civil aircraft (LCA) manufac- turer and its subsequent merger with Boeing. European government and industry officials repeat-
     edly have cited the goal of Airbus achieving a fifty percent share of the global LCA market. With Airbus surpassing Boeing in
     terms of orders and backlog in 2001 and possibly poised to exceed Boeing in deliv- eries in 2003, it appears that the Europeans
     are achieving their goal.
     Unfortunately, it appears that European officials intend to continue directly subsidizing EU compa- nies. The recently unveiled
     EU aerospace policy strategy calls for an increase in subsidies to continue building market share, largely at the expense of U.S.
     companies. If trends continue, European companies may soon gain market leadership in other products and technologies as well.
     This fundamental mis- match of declining U.S. government R&D funding for basic research and increasing European govern-
     ment funding for both basic research and product development is reaching crisis proportions for U.S. industry. This challenge
     cannot go unanswered.




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Novice Evidence                                                                                             Westminster Tournament

                              Aerospace – ext 3 – workforce crisis                                                                  19

Can’t solve competitiveness- bad science education undermines the US
    Colwell, 8- President of the University of Maryland Biotechnology Institute, Professor of Microbiology and Biotechnology at the
    University Maryland
    (Rita, Bioscience ―Silent Sputnik‖ January 2008, pg. 3, Proquest)

     A glance at statistics from the Council on Competitiveness is disconcerting: the United States is 20th in the world in broadband
     Internet penetration, just after Luxembourg; and whereas Nintendo invested more than $140 million in research and development
     in 2002, the US federal government spent less than half that sum on research and innovation in education. With the amount of
     new technical information doubling every two years, students in college today will find that much of what they are taught will be
     outdated by the time they graduate. Moreover, according to former secretary of Education Richard Riley, the top 10 jobs in
     demand in 2010 will not have existed in 2004. So not only are our students falling behind in science and technology, as measured
     by standard tests globally, but the training they are getting will be insufficient for survival in the global economy.


There will be a brain drain in the aerospace industry due to Cold War scientists retire
    Tessler, 8 (Joelle, Air Force News, ―US aerospace and defense sector braces for potential brain drain as Cold War workers
    retire‖ March 4, 2008, http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/03/ap_braindr Ain_030408/)

     The aerospace and defense sector is bracing for a potential brain drain over the next decade as a generation of Cold War
     scientists and engineers hits retirement age and not enough qualified young Americans seek to take their place.
     The problem — almost 60 percent of U.S. aerospace workers in 2007 were 45 or older — could affect national security and even
     close the door on commercial products that start out as military technology, industry officials said.
     While U.S. universities are awarding two-and-a-half times more engineering, math and computer science degrees than they did
     40 years ago, defense companies must compete with the likes of Google, Microsoft and Verizon for the best and the brightest.




                                               Operation: Space Takedown                                                         19
SPS NEG                                                                                                                  WHEELER
Novice Evidence                                                                                                 Westminster Tournament

                                  Aerospace – ext 5 – trade barriers                                                                    20

Global trade barriers in aerospace are increasing
    Walker et al, 02 - Chair of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners (Robert, Final
    Report of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners, November,
    http://www.trade.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf)

     We are greatly concerned, however, where the rise inforeign competition has been aided by persistentgovernment intervention.
     We see concerted strate-gies by other governmentsto unseat U.S. companiesfrom their position of world
     leadership.Interventionist policies are being used as tools toestablish and support ―national champions‖ protect-ing them from
     market forces at the expense of U.S.industry. These policies are described in the ―International Playing Field‖ section later in this
     chapter.




                                                Operation: Space Takedown                                                            20
SPS NEG                                                                                                                                                                                                WHEELER
Novice Evidence                                                                                                                                                                         Westminster Tournament

                                                                          1NC China Frontline                                                                                                                                    21

 1.    Turn – the fact that the risk of war exists now means once we develop the SPS we’ll still preemptively attack China so
       they don’t attack us first, still causing their huge impacts.

 2.    Empirically denied – their France and Adams evidence is powertagged – if China had the tech to destroy us now, what’s
       stopping them? Nothing… there is no brink to this advantage.

 3.  Many things prevent a Chinese attack on US satellites: targets deep in space, hitting many targets simultaneously,
     keeping the whole thing secret, and a US preemption.
Forden, 8—An M.I.T. research associate and a former UN weapons inspector and strategic weapons analyst Congressional
Budget Office
         (Geoffrey, PhD, ―How China Loses the Coming Space War‖, 1-10-08, http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/01/inside-the-chin.html#more)


      But China could not launch the massive attack required to have anything like a significant effect on US ability to utilize space
      without months of careful planning and pre-positioning of special, ASAT carrying missiles around the country. It would also
      have to utilize its satellite launch facilities to attack any US assets in deep space: the GPS navigation satellites and
      communications satellites in geostationary orbit. Most importantly, it would have to time the attack so as to hit as many US
      satellites as simultaneously as possible. And, despite all that movement, Beijing would somehow have to keep the whole thing
      secret. Failure to do so would undoubtedly result in the US attacking the large, fixed facilities China needs to wage this kind of
      war before the full blow had been struck. Even if the United States failed to do so, China would undoubtedly plan for that contingency.
      Based on the orbits of US military satellites determined by the worldwide network of amateur observers, there appears to be a large number of low Earth orbit military satellites over China several times each week.
      To hit them, China would have to preposition its ASAT-tipped missiles and their mobile launchers in remote areas of China, one position for each satellite. (If reports of low reliabilities for these missiles are correct,
      two or more missiles might be assigned to each satellite.) Furthermore, these positions are really only suitable for a particular day. If China’s political and military planners have any uncertainty at all about which
      day to launch their space war, they would need to pre-position additional launchers around the country. Thus, attacking nine low Earth orbit satellites could require as many as 36 mobile launchers—enough for two
      interceptors fired at each satellite with a contingency day if plans change—moved to remote areas of China; areas determined more by the satellite orbits than China’s network of road. (As will be discussed below,
      nine is about the maximum they could reasonably expect to hit on the first day of the space war.) Xslc_launch_pads At the same time that China would be trying to covertly move its mobile missile launchers around
                                                                                                                The more large rockets China uses for this task, the more
      the country, it would also have to assemble a fleet of large rockets -- ones normally used for launching satellites.
      deep-space satellites it can destroy. At present, however, China only has the facilities for assembling and launching a total for
      four such rockets nearly simultaneously. Two would have to be assembled out in the open where they could be observed by US
      spy satellites and two could be assembled inside a vertical assembly building during the 18 days it takes to stack and fuel the Long March rocket’s stages while preparing to launch. [See right.] Even the two
      assembled indoors would need to arrive by train and eventually would have to be moved, one after the other, to the launch pad. Each of these rockets, usually reserved for launching satellites into geostationary
      orbits, could carry three to four interceptors and their special orbital maneuver motors to attack either US navigation satellites, at about 12,000 miles altitude, or communications satellites at about 22,000 miles.
      Four days prior to the attack, China would launch the first of its Long March rockets carrying deep-space attack ASATs; the same launch pad would have to be used for the second rocket stacked inside the vertical
      assembly building. As the technicians renovated that pad, the first rocket’s payload would circle the Earth in a parking orbit at about 200 miles altitude waiting to be joined by the other deep-space ASATs. This
      would appear to be a tell-tale sign of an impending strike. But China could explain the delay to the international community by claiming that the third stage, intended to take the payload it its final altitude, had failed
      to fire and that they were working on it. Roughly six hours before the first the attack on the US’s low Earth orbit military satellites, the other three Long March rockets would have to be fired since it takes roughly
      that long to get their payloads up to their target’s orbits. Delays or failures to launch any of these rockets would strand their interceptors on the launch pad and subject them to possible retaliatory bombing by the US.


 4.    Their Forden evidence talking about nuclear retaliation doesn’t apply because it assumes that they’ll only build 5
       satellites – this means they are substantially increasing alternative energy, making them not topical. Substantially
       increasing must be a large increase, and if they aren’t increasing, we can’t garner any disad links – meaning its
       impossible to win. Topicality is a voter for reasons of fairness and education.




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SPS NEG                                                                                                                                                                   WHEELER
Novice Evidence                                                                                                                                              Westminster Tournament

                                                               1NC China Frontline                                                                                                              22

 5.   Double bind – they never impact economic decline in the 1AC – which means, we can argue that economic decline is
      good – and win the advantage. Or if they win econominc decline is bad, then the U.S. and global economy are resilient –
      new macroeconomic policies help the economy absorb shocks
      Behravesh, 6 (Nariman, most accurate economist tracked by USA Today and chief global economist and executive vice
      president for Global Insight, Newsweek, ―The Great Shock Absorber; Good macroeconomic policies and improved
      microeconomic flexibility have strengthened the global economy's 'immune system.'‖ 10-15-2006,
      www.newsweek.com/id/47483)

      The U.S. and global economies were able to withstand three body blows in 2005--one of the worst tsunamis on record (which struck
      at the very end of 2004), one of the worst hurricanes on record and the highest energy prices after Hurricane Katrina--without missing a
      beat. This resilience was especially remarkable in the case of the U nited S tates, which since 2000 has been able to shrug off the
      biggest stock-market drop since the 1930s, a major terrorist attack, corporate scandals and war.
      Does this mean that recessions are a relic of the past? No, but recent events do suggest that the global economy's "immune system" is now strong
      enough to absorb shocks that 25 years ago would probably have triggered a downturn. In fact, over the past two decades, recessions have not
      disappeared, but have become considerably milder in many parts of the world. What explains this enhanced recession resistance? The answer: a
      combination of good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility.
      Since the mid-1980s, central banks worldwide have had great success in taming inflation. This has meant that long-term interest rates are at levels not seen in more than 40 years. A
      low-inflation and low-interest-rate environment is especially conducive to sustained, robust growth. Moreover, central bankers have avoided some of the policy mistakes of the earlier
                                                                                                                          recent years
      oil shocks (in the mid-1970s and early 1980s), during which they typically did too much too late, and exacerbated the ensuing recessions. Even more important, in
      the Fed has been particularly adept at crisis management, aggressively cutting interest rates in response to stock-market crashes,
      terrorist attacks and weakness in the economy.
      The benign inflationary picture has also benefited from increasing competitive pressures, both worldwide (thanks to globalization and the rise of Asia as a manufacturing juggernaut)
      and domestically (thanks to technology and deregulation). Since the late 1970s, the United States, the United Kingdom and a handful of other countries have been especially aggressive
      in deregulating their financial and industrial sectors. This has greatly increased the flexibility of their economies and reduced their vulnerability to inflationary shocks. Looking ahead,
      what all this means is that a global or U.S. recession will likely be avoided in 2006, and probably in 2007 as well. Whether the current expansion will be able to break the record set in
      the 1990s for longevity will depend on the ability of central banks to keep the inflation dragon at bay and to avoid policy mistakes. The prospects look good. Inflation is likely to remain
                                                                                                  much of his academic career studying the
      a low-level threat for some time, and Ben Bernanke, the incoming chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, spent
      past mistakes of the Fed and has vowed not to repeat them.
      At the same time, no single shock will likely be big enough to derail the expansion. What if oil prices rise to $80 or $90 a barrel? Most estimates suggest that
      growth would be cut by about 1 percent--not good, but no recession. What if U.S. house prices fall by 5 percent in 2006 (an extreme assumption, given that house prices haven't fallen
      nationally in any given year during the past four decades)? Economic growth would slow by about 0.5 percent to 1 percent. What about another terrorist attack? Here the scenarios can
                     attack on the order of 9/11 or the Madrid or London bombings would probably have an even smaller impact on
      be pretty scary, but an
      overall GDP growth.
      So what would it take to trigger a recession in the U.S. or world economies over the next couple of years? Two or more big shocks occurring more or less simultaneously. Global
      Insight recently ran a scenario showing that a world recession could happen if the following combination of events were to take place: oil prices above $100 per barrel, inflation and
      interest rates running 3 percentage points above current levels and a 10 percent drop in home prices across many industrial nations (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain,
      Australia, Sweden). The likely timing of such a recession would be 2007. However, given the extremeness of these assumptions, the probability of such a scenario is less than 20
      percent.
      The good news is that the chances of a recession occurring in the next couple of years are low. The not-so-good news is that assertions about recessions being relegated to history's trash
      heap are still premature.




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Novice Evidence                                                                                                 Westminster Tournament

                                      China – ext 2 – won’t happen                                                                       23

Commercial space users and Chinese caution prevent a U.S.-Sino space race
   Saunders, 7- Senior Research Professor at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies
   (Dr. Phillip C., ―China’s Future In Space: Implications for U.S. Security,‖ 2007,
   http://www.space.com/adastra/china_implications_0505.html?submit.x=94&submit.y=10&submit=submit)

     There are some incentives to avoid confrontation. Proliferation of space weapons would inhibit scientific cooperation and raise
     costs of commercial satellites. (The global trend in both sectors is towards international collaboration to reduce costs.) Actual use
     of anti-satellite weapons could create space debris that might damage expensive commercial satellites. Commercial users of
     space are therefore likely to resist efforts to deploy counter-space capabilities. Beijing's strategic incentives may also change over
     time. Mindful of the Soviet Union's demise due to excessive military spending, Chinese leaders are wary of entering into an
     open-ended space race with the United States. Moreover, as Chinese military space capabilities improve and are integrated into
     PLA operations, the negative impact of losing Chinese space assets may eventually outweigh the potential advantages of
     attacking U.S. space capabilities.




                                                Operation: Space Takedown                                                             23
SPS NEG                                                                                                                  WHEELER
Novice Evidence                                                                                                 Westminster Tournament

                             China – ext 3 – military would survive                                                                      24

China could not even successfully take out all of the US Navigation satellites
    Forden, 8—An M.I.T. research associate and a former UN weapons inspector and strategic weapons analyst Congressional
    Budget Office
    (Geoffrey, PhD, ―How China Loses the Coming Space War‖, 1-10-08, http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/01/inside-the-
    chin.html#more)

     You need a launch pad to attack a target in deep space, like an American GPS satellite. China has just three of these pads. This
     really restricts China’s offensive capabilities in space. Assuming that China devotes all its deep-space ASATs on GPS satellites,
     it could destroy at most 16 satellites. At the current time, with 32 functioning navigation satellites, that would still leave 16
     satellites still working. Over a period of years, the debris from those collisions would represent a significant threat to more than
     those satellites immediately attacked. They would pass, time and time again, through the belts of debris that resulted from the
     interceptions. However, it would probably take longer than the military conflict China initiated with these attacks before
     additional satellites were destroyed by subsequent collisions. Usually, there are about nine GPS satellites over China at any
     given time. If China somehow managed to destroy all of these, it could eliminate America's use of precision-guided munitions—
     for a few hours, until the orbits of other GPS satellites take them over the Taiwan Straits. Quite quickly, the constellation’s other
     23 satellites would fill in the gap due to their normal orbital movement. Even if it destroyed 16 satellites, China could still only
     interrupt GPS over the Straits for about eight hours. During the other 16 hours there would be the four or more satellites present
     over the target area for bombing runs, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flights, and ship tracking. This pattern of eight hours off
     followed by 16 hours when GPS could be used would be repeated every day until new satellites are launched. This outage would
     certainly cause difficulties; GPS not only guides American precision bombs – it helps pilot UAV spy planes, and monitor ships.
     US casualties might increase , with air crews forced to fly missions during daylight hours – and conduct some of the "dull, dirty,
     and dangerous" missions now flown by robotic planes. It's a situation no American commander would want to face. But it would
     not be a catastrophic one. And it would not eliminate precision weaponry, UAVs, or any other American activity that depends
     on GPS. Keep in mind, this is the worst of the worst-case scenarios. It is highly unlikely that China could remove all the
     satellites over the conflict area at the same time. After all, attacking 16 satellites, all in different orbits with ASATs launched on
     just four different rockets involves some fairly complex orbital maneuvers. A much more likely scenario is that, at best, China
     could destroy four GPS satellites in the initial wave followed roughly seven hours later by four more, a third wave at roughly 45
     minutes after that, and the final wave two hours later. Thus, the GPS attack is spread over ten hours and never eliminates all the
     satellites visible over the area of conflict at the same time. This Chinese attack on US navigation satellites would not eliminate
     or even significantly degrade the US’s ability use precision-guided munitions..




                                                Operation: Space Takedown                                                             24

				
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Jun Wang Jun Wang Dr
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