Job Loss Didn’t Make the Underclass by John H

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							Job Loss Didn’t Make the Underclass by John H. McWhorter                                                    Page 1 of 8



                                              Autumn 2002 | Vol. 12, No. 4




 Job Loss Didn’t
 Make the Underclass                                                          The history of Indianapolis
 John H. McWhorter                                                            shows that culture is
                                                                              mightier than economics.
       t’s summer 1993 in Indianapolis, and we’re at SoulFest, an
       annual event supposedly celebrating black culture and black
       enterprise. But a taint hangs in the air. Since the first SoulFest
       back in the early seventies, too many of the young blacks who’ve
       shown up to “celebrate” seem to equate black culture and
       enterprise with nasty scuffles and petty theft. This year, though,
       disorder turns to tragedy: young black hoodlums shoot to death
 an 18-year-old black boy. City officials, fearing more violence, cancel
 SoulFest the following year. It reopens in 1995, but now with a heavy
 police presence hard to square with a sense of community
 achievement. Three years later, another black-on-black homicide mars
 the festival, prompting its cancellation again in 1999. In 2000, the event
 is back on, but in a scaled-down version, renamed “Family Fun Fest”
 and moved to a new location.

 The SoulFest episodes grew out of a dysfunctional inner-city culture—a
 culture of violence, illegitimacy, substance abuse, and non-work—that
 took root in Indianapolis over the past few decades, as it did in other
 American cities. But what caused that pathological culture in the first
 place? Delinquency and crime are age-old problems, but the savagery
 on display at SoulFest and the desolation of the city’s poor minority
 neighborhoods —these are things we’ve only had to endure since the
 sixties. How had a segment of Indianapolis ’s black community gone so
 wrong?

 The conventional explanation on the Left (and among many blacks) is
 economic and social. The dogma—it began to take hold among
 sociologists as far back as the sixties but became a verity among elites
 in the eighties with the publication of Harvard professor William Julius
 Wilson’s The Truly Disadvantaged and various papers by social thinker
 John Kasarda—runs like this. In the sixties, the blue-collar jobs that
 supported previous generations of urban blacks moved out of town,
 beyond the reach of public transit. Left behind by this
 “deindustrialization” was a core of ill-educated young blacks. With little
 hope of finding employment, these young people understandably
 became skeptical of the value of work. With an attitude problem
 imposed upon them by forces beyond their control, they then frightened
 off any potential employers who might be willing to set up shop in the
 inner city, thus completing the vicious circle.

 Those who hold this view see the self-destructive behavior of today’s
 black underclass as a natural response to an economically unjust and
 institutionally racist society. The only humane—or realistic—solution: a
 radical restructuring of society.

 But the influence of an idea can result as much from its repetition as
 from its validity. We need to verify a theory before we accept it, and the

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 from its validity. We need to verify a theory before we accept it, and the
 history of black Indianapolis radically undermines the
 deindustrialization hypothesis. In fact, that history makes it painfully
 clear that what really did in the city’s poor blacks was not a dearth of
 jobs but instead a destructive cultural mix: equal measures of the
 blame game and the formulaic rage that goes along with it, the welfare
 dependency that a sense of black grievance fostered, and the
 condescending “benevolence” of white liberals who championed rage
 as admirable and dependency as justice.


 Blacks began moving to Indiana from the South right after the Civil War
 put an end to slavery, but it wasn’t until the Great Migration of the teens
 that their ranks in the state really swelled. By 1920, Indiana was home
 to more than 80,000 blacks, up from 11,000 or so in 1860. The black
 immigrants flocked into the cities: by 1930, fully 90 percent of the state’s
 black population lived either in Indianapolis or in Gary, concentrated in
 overwhelmingly black neighborhoods.

 Virulent racism was a fact of life for the newcomers. Despite the
 passage of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1869, black suffrage didn’t
 become a reality in Indiana until the 1880s; blacks couldn’t join the
 state militia until the late 1930s. In the 1920s, the Ku Klux Klan was
 Indiana’s largest and most powerful social organization, with 40
 percent of the native-born white adult male population belonging to it.
 Indianapolis ’s mayor was a Klansman, and the Klan controlled the
 legislature and the governor’s office—the Democratic party was
 essentially the Klan at the polls. In 1924, 6,500 Klansmen paraded
 through downtown Indianapolis to a cheering crowd of 75,000
 onlookers after Klan election victories. For good reason, black
 Indianapolis became home to an anti-lynching league. One of the last
 recorded lynchings north of the Mason-Dixon line occurred in nearby
 Marion in 1930.

 Indianapolis ’s migrant blacks confronted in-your-face job
 discrimination. They could join few unions and only rarely found open
 paths that might take them beyond low-skilled jobs. Typical black
 workers in Indianapolis were laborers, shelf-stockers, custodians, and
 domestics, not doctors or diplomats. In factories, blacks usually found
 themselves in low-level, poorly paid positions and indefensibly
 underrepresented as craftsmen. The occasional promotion of a
 talented black into higher positions sometimes ignited revolts among
 white factory workers.


 Yet despite this hard-edged injustice, Indianapolis ’s black migrants
 didn’t sit on their hands or become an underclass. Their response to
 racism and discrimination wasn’t to lash out or to become passive
 victims but to push ahead.

 Indianapolis ’s blacks worked, taking whatever jobs were available.
 While the unemployment rate was higher among the city’s blacks than
 whites, most blacks managed to find enough work to get by. Black
 employment steadily increased after World War II—in unskilled but
 solid jobs —thanks to new federal fair employment requirements that
 civil rights leaders had sought as just compensation for blacks ’
 services during the war. By the early 1960s, whatever employment gap
 remained between blacks and whites was closing.

 Despite the overt racism they faced a century ago, Indianapolis’s blacks
 created a flourishing world-within-a-world. An energetic black business


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Job Loss Didn’t Make the Underclass by John H. McWhorter                      Page 3 of 8

 created a flourishing world-within-a-world. An energetic black business
 district grew up on Indiana Avenue—the “Grand Ol’ Street” as locals
 called it. Madame C. J. Walker, whose hair-care empire made her
 America’s first self-made female millionaire, moved her vast operation
 to the district in 1910, employing 3,000 people. Her yellow-brick Walker
 building, boasting a theater, a fancy restaurant, and ample office space,
 anchored the Grand Ol’ Street.

 A small but growing black bourgeoisie peopled the elegant six square
 blocks of Ransom Place. Among Ransom Place’s residents were
 accomplished individuals like Henry W. Furniss, an African-American
 doctor and onetime U.S. ambassador to Haiti. As early as June 1901,
 the Recorder, a black-owned newspaper, could publish a surprisingly
 long list of Indianapolis ’s blacks worth $5,000 or more—a comfortable
 sum at the time.

 Civil society flourished in this enterprising community. Branches of the
 National Association of Colored Women, the National Negro Business
 League, and various lodges thrived; churches were ubiquitous. Indiana
 Avenue played host to a crackling-hot music scene. Old black
 Indianapolis also enjoyed four lively African-American newspapers. In
 addition to the Recorder (now in its 107th year), you could read the
 fiercely Republican Leader, the Freeman (probably America’s first
 illustrated black paper), and the World. The Recorder focused on local
 affairs, publicizing black-owned businesses and urging readers not to
 patronize white stores that refused to advertise in black newspapers.
 The paper often ran contrasting front-page stories, one highlighting the
 latest example of black progress, the other lambasting a remaining
 racial inequity.

 Reflecting its hardworking, striving spirit, old black Indianapolis
 hungered for education. In 1927, when the segregated school system
 opened the brand-new, all-black Crispus Attucks High School— staffed
 by rigorous, often college-educated African-American instructors, for
 whom teaching was one of the few challenging careers available—
 demand was so high that 1,300 students showed up for instruction in a
 school built for 1,000. Night school became popular among
 Indianapolis blacks unable to attend classes during the day.


 By the late sixties, at the very moment that blacks were winning political
 victories ensuring their civil rights, this enterprising, hardworking
 community was rapidly coming undone. One could now see the
 stirrings of a new black Indianapolis —a place where, three decades
 later, the SoulFest murders would be regarded more as same-old,
 same-old than as aberrations. Indianapolis had its first race riot in
 1969, set off by a clash between black radicals and white cops on—
 ironically—Indiana Avenue. By 1973, central Indianapolis’s black
 neighborhoods were so threatening that special escorts now ushered
 black kids to and from school.

 Out of the shadows crawled black “leaders ” whom the old black
 Indianapolis would have run out of town in a week. Even before the
 1969 riot, a petty crook, Snookie Hendricks, got the ear of a local white
 establishment jittery from seeing the race violence engulfing other
 American cities. Claiming that he was uniquely well placed to “maintain
 stability” among blacks, he won from city officials a municipal
 position—only to lose it for dealing drugs on the side. Fred Crawford, a
 Black Panther from Oakland, set up shop in Indianapolis, spouting
 regulation Panther rhetoric: “I don’t feel we can gain our freedom
 without a revolution. This could only happen if the white man raised his


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 without a revolution. This could only happen if the white man raised his
 fist off the black man’s neck, but I don’t think he’ll ever do that.”

 The old, go-getting black Indianapolis hadn’t completely vanished. Its
 spirit motivated schoolteacher Mattie Coney to found the Citizens Forum
 in 1966, just as things began to go bad. The Forum helped blacks
 clean up their increasingly disordered neighborhoods and point their
 children toward success. It established more than 3,000 block clubs
 over the years to sweep up trash and “de-rat-ify” vermin-infested
 buildings. It distributed a pamphlet urging black parents to teach their
 kids about cleanliness and polite conduct, and to take pride in
 themselves. Coney came from a solid working-class family that taught
 her that blacks’ road to salvation was to “quit feeling sorry for ourselves
 and take advantage of opportunities.” Lyndon B. Johnson granted her a
 special award for her efforts, and she won accolades from Presidents
 Eisenhower and Ford.

 But in the new black Indianapolis, the Snookie Hendrickses seemed to
 outweigh the Mattie Coneys. The efforts of Coney and those like her
 weren’t enough to prevent inner-city breakdown. By the early nineties,
 the damage was inescapable and catastrophic. Blacks, just 21 percent
 of Indianapolis ’s population, now committed 56 percent of its rapidly
 increasing violent crimes. Roughly one in ten of the city’s black males
 aged 16 to 24 was in jail; black boys were 43 percent of those in
 juvenile detention. In 1989, the city had 68 homicides; in 1991, 101; in
 1998, 160. The majority of these were black-on-black murders.

 Lax parenting grew common in a community that once held its children
 on a short tether. Indianapolis now had the highest rate of infant
 mortality of any big city in America. The percentage of black children
 living in one-parent homes was three times the white rate. In contrast
 with the stampede on Crispus Attucks High School in the twenties,
 dropping out was now commonplace. The black unemployment rate
 was three times the rate among whites. Drug use was stratospheric.

 All this is wretchedly familiar today. But blacks in Indianapolis in 1950—
 to say nothing of blacks of Madame Walker’s era—would be staggered
 to see what had befallen their community.


 On the “deindustrialization” view, this swift slide downhill resulted from
 two intertwined developments. First, a second Great Migration of
 southern blacks settled in Indianapolis during the 1960s. Two-thirds of
 these migrants were under 25, and three-quarters were women, many
 of them fleeing failed marriages with their children. These newcomers
 naturally settled in the low-rent inner city. Second, right at this time low-
 skilled manufacturing jobs —the only ones the new arrivals were
 qualified for—began leaving the city, primarily, in Indianapolis’s case, to
 the nearby suburbs. Black rage and hopelessness multiplied.

 Yet is it really plausible to blame the alienation and brutality that gave
 rise to the black Indianapolis of SoulFest on factories moving a few
 miles away? And that’s how far it was: a study documented that, in
 1972, the average distance of manufacturing jobs from the inner city
 was a mere 3.2 miles!

 Granted, the transportation situation was far from perfect. Only 15
 percent of the sixties migrants had cars to get to the new suburban
 plants, while the local bus system, designed for the more centralized
 city of yore, ran lines to the suburbs only infrequently, and often not late
 enough to serve the night shift adequately. But then ask: if blacks had


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 enough to serve the night shift adequately. But then ask: if blacks had
 for decades been picking up stakes and moving thousands of miles
 from their homes in search of work, why did some of them suddenly
 lapse into criminality and dysfunction when work moved a few miles
 away? Maybe they didn’t have many cars, but what about carpooling?
 What about the community combining its resources and buying a few
 vehicles at least viable enough to make it to the suburbs to work? What
 about some entrepreneur buying a jalopy and ferrying his neighbors for
 a small fee? Ordinarily, people make do: today, in Indiana’s third-
 poorest county—the mostly white, rural Crawford—nearly 60 percent of
 its workers commute to jobs outside the county. What made
 Indianapolis ’s inner-city blacks so different?

 And if factory relocation really did cause an epidemic of poverty in inner-
 city Indianapolis, wouldn’t people living there have engaged in a
 constant, agonizing search for work, even agitating publicly for it—at
 least for a few years, until hopelessness set in? Wouldn’t this be true
 even if, as John Kasarda might say, there was a geographical
 “mismatch” between a growing number of uneducated blacks and the
 region’s low-skilled jobs? But no community activist, scholar, or
 resident attests that this kind of hustle was much in evidence.


 Punching even bigger holes in the factory-jobs-moved-away
 explanation is that, in Indianapolis, lots of them didn’t. Scholars Shane
 Davies and Melvin Albaum found that, by the late sixties, center-city
 Indianapolis had lost 43 percent of its blue-collar jobs, and that 228 of
 922 factories had moved to suburbia. But that left 57 percent of the jobs
 and 694 factories still in place. By the eighties, UPS, GM, Stokely–Van
 Camp, International Harvester, Chevrolet Truck and Body, and many
 other businesses offered jobs in the city for people of little skill.
 Stephen Goldsmith, Indianapolis ’s mayor from 1992 to 2002, says:
 “Anyone who wanted a job could work.”

 Moreover, inner-city neighborhoods across the country fell apart,
 whether the deindustrialization was moderate, as in Indianapolis, or
 more extensive, as in Chicago or Philadelphia. This would force the
 deindustrialization theorist to argue that even some factory flight is
 enough to trigger a collapse of civilization among a segment of the
 black population—a dubious contention.

 Aware of how weak the deindustrialization argument really is in
 Indianapolis ’s case, scholars have groped for supplemental
 explanations. The 3.2 miles subjected poor Indianapolis blacks to “lack
 of job information,” says one. Or maybe there’s a “hard-core
 unemployed’s conception of distance,” different from yours and mine,
 says another. But obviously, the second Great Migration leaves these
 speculations dead in the water. The person who gleans job information
 from across state lines would have little trouble honing in on it from a
 few miles off; the person who negotiates the distance from Mississippi
 to Indiana presumably shouldn’t be stymied by the three miles from city
 to suburb.


 Nor can we blame racism. Sure, even after the 1960s, discrimination
 existed in Indianapolis. But the limits on black aspiration were fast
 falling away. To compare this era with the days when the Klan ran the
 state and blacks were completely marginalized is an insult to the
 achievements of old black Indianapolis. In the early seventies,
 aggressive efforts to help poor blacks multiplied. The Indiana Chamber
 of Commerce began affirmative action in hiring and called for
 businesses to sign a pledge to start on-the-job training programs for


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 businesses to sign a pledge to start on-the-job training programs for
 people with limited skills. Similar state and federal programs followed.

 Residual racism certainly didn’t hold back the large numbers of blacks
 who established prosperous businesses in Indianapolis during the
 1970s. William G. Mays, to take one, founded the Mays Chemical
 Company and later became head of the Indiana Chamber of
 Commerce. Walter Blackburn’s architectural firm specialized in building
 churches, schools, and low-income housing. Informed movers and
 shakers in Indianapolis, white and black, stress the high degree of
 cooperation between white and black community leaders over the past
 decades.

 Racial discrimination may not have expired completely in Indianapolis,
 but by no stretch of the imagination has it been a sentence for failure.


 Strip away the jargon of “industrial dispersion,” and what you’re left with
 is an argument that poor Indianapolis blacks turned their
 neighborhoods into war zones because there weren’t enough buses to
 take them up the road a piece. A constructive black history needs a
 more plausible explanation for black failure in Indianapolis.

 And that explanation is cultural. At the same moment in the sixties when
 Indianapolis experienced a moderate degree of deindustrialization, the
 black street began to embrace the entitlement-seeking, guilt-
 mongering, society-is-to-blame worldview now so drearily familiar
 among black leaders. This resentment-based ideology has dissuaded
 legions of blacks from seeking the American Dream out of the
 wrongheaded belief that the country is too racist and morally corrupt for
 them to embrace it.

 The new black ideology taught that dressing down whitey for the sins of
 the past was “blacker” than facing what needed doing in the present.
 Under this new mind-set, someone like Mattie Coney, tirelessly
 seeking the uplift of the black community, was inauthentic—an “Aunt
 Jemima,” working for the racist establishment. Mmoja Ajabu, who
 during the nineties set up an Indianapolis branch of the New Black
 Panthers and tried to assemble a “militia” to overthrow the government,
 exemplified the authentic approach. “We know we are talking about
 death and destruction and grief in a whole lot of people’s families,” he
 said of his plans for social improvement. “But only then will they come
 to the negotiating table and talk candidly about getting something
 done.” Ajabu became embroiled in an arson case and then spent a
 year behind bars for threatening a prosecutor in another case. Some
 leader.

 In Indianapolis, one could already see a symbol of this shift in values in
 a booth display at the 1971 Black Expo, a showcase of black enterprise.
 Called “Dignity Unlimited,” the display depicted a jail stockade in front of
 a painting of a black man and boy in chains. The self-pitying defeatism
 of the exhibit, at a time of such vaulting new opportunities for blacks,
 would have baffled Attucks High’s principal Russell Lane back in the
 thirties. To celebrate the school’s opening, John Wesley Hardrick, a
 local black portraitist, presented Lane with a painting of black laborers
 to hang in the school. Lane refused to mount it in the lobby, for fear of
 discouraging his students ’ highest ambitions.

 But as the new black ideology seduced many black educators, men like
 Lane became a vanishing breed. Back in 1922, a letter from “16


http://www.city-journal.org/html/12_4_job_loss.html                              4/17/2003
Job Loss Didn’t Make the Underclass by John H. McWhorter                       Page 7 of 8

 Lane became a vanishing breed. Back in 1922, a letter from “16
 progressive colored citizens” of the Better Indianapolis League insisted
 that: “No one section of the population can be isolated and segregated
 without taking from it the advantage of the common culture.” In the
 nineties, by contrast, several of Indianapolis’s predominantly black
 schools were using historically dubious “Afrocentric” curricula,
 stressing blacks ’ radical separateness from other Americans. And the
 most vocal of the city’s black clergymen were spreading an anti-white
 gospel, calling indignantly for “payback” and insisting that black
 pathology is a legacy of slavery and segregation—a proposition that the
 existence of self-reliant old black Indianapolis flat-out refutes.


 The cultural change that undermined inner-city neighborhoods also led
 to a vast expansion of the welfare rolls—a development that
 accelerated urban black America’s downward spiral. Nationally, the
 rolls swelled 107 percent from 1960 to 1970, after increasing just 17
 percent over the previous decade. In Indiana, the rise in welfare
 dependency between 1964 and 1977 was greatest in the three
 counties (including Indianapolis) where blacks were concentrated. For
 a segment of the black population, welfare became a dysfunctional,
 dependent way of life—in particular, for the single-parent families that
 became the inner-city norm.

 In 1967 Indianapolis, a disturbed Mattie Coney was already warning:
 “The idea of expecting a ‘great white father’ to hand one something for
 nothing has created a class of irresponsible welfare slaves.”
 Goldsmith, who worked in child support in Indianapolis during the
 1980s, lost count of how many welfare recipients told him that life on
 the dole simply paid better than holding down a job: “ ‘Give me a job
 that pays better than welfare, and sure I’ll go to work,’ they’d say.”

 Such a demoralized and dependent life -style would have shocked the
 residents of old black Indianapolis. Back then, the black community
 took care of its own. But black private charities such as Alpha Home
 and Flanner House tirelessly conveyed the ideal of self-sufficiency to
 those they helped. The ideal clearly resonated. Self-respecting people
 worked to support themselves, however low their wages. Most blacks
 sought charity only under truly pressing circumstances and generally
 sought immediate provisions in a pinch rather than open-ended
 support. Nor was this assumption that charity was a last-ditch choice
 the result of a sense that blacks weren’t likely to get help. From 1894 to
 1920, fully 96 percent of black applicants to the city’s private charities,
 grouped under the umbrella of the Charity Organization Society, had
 their applications approved. It’s just that it wasn’t right to become
 dependent on others ’ charity.

 In the sixties, though, such attitudes became passé. For the blame-
 game crowd among blacks, the nation was too racist to allow blacks
 opportunity, and anyway blacks deserved such reparations for the
 injustices of the past. So where was the shame in open-ended
 government dependency? By contrast, to find a way to make that 3.2-
 mile trip to the suburbs to work a job that paid “chump change” was just
 to conspire in one’s own oppression by an unjust system.

 For many “concerned” whites, in turn, maintaining black people on the
 dole became a substitute for true moral engagement—a cheap way of
 showing “compassion” for the eternally piteous people so wronged by
 the nation. Both blacks and whites pushed to reform welfare laws,
 increasing benefits and loosening eligibility rules. The old one-year
 state-residency requirement went out the window, for example, so
 people could move from a less to a more generous state and sign right

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 people could move from a less to a more generous state and sign right
 up. Neighborhood service centers opened across the country to
 encourage people to go on welfare who in the past would have steered
 clear.

 The deindustrialization theorist would blame the rapid expansion of
 welfare on those same old vanishing manufacturing jobs. But in
 feminist Katherine Rosier’s 1990 study of women on welfare in
 Indianapolis, no welfare client speaks of “the factories moving away.”
 Rosier’s interview subjects readily admit that the downward trajectory of
 their lives began in the seventies with periods of drug abuse and
 sleeping around—behavior that elite culture had largely de-stigmatized.
 Culture matters.


 We have a choice, then, between two factors that might explain the
 descent of a previously dignified people into a violent, feckless
 underclass. Choice one: a new culture emerged of dependency and
 self-destructive hostility toward mainstream culture. Choice two: it got a
 little harder to get to work. A black history that endorses the second
 choice while dismissing the first substitutes playing the underdog for
 common sense.

 If we could play the tape again but keep all the factories where they
 were in 1960, the inner city would have undergone the same sad
 transformation.




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http://www.city-journal.org/html/12_4_job_loss.html                            4/17/2003

						
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