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Government of Afghanistan
Ministry of Counter Narcotics
Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009
Summary Findings
September 2009
ABBREVIATIONS
ANP Afghan National Police
CNPA Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
GLE Governor-led eradication
ICMP Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme (UNODC)
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
MCN Ministry of Counter-Narcotics
PEF Poppy Eradication Force
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The following organizations and individuals contributed to the implementation of the 2009
Afghanistan Opium Survey and to the preparation of this report:
Ministry of Counter-Narcotics:
Dr. Mohammad Zafar (Deputy Minister), Mohammad Ibrahim Azhar (Deputy Minister)
Dr. Mohammad Nabi Hussaini (Director General), Policy &Coordination,
Mir Abdullah (Deputy Director of Survey and Monitoring Directorate)
Survey Coordinators: Eshaq Masumi (Central Region), Abdul Mateen (Eastern Region), Abdul Latif
Ehsan (Western Region), Fida Mohammad (Northern Region), Mohammed Ishaq Anderabi (North-
Eastern Region), Hashmatullah Asek (Southern Region)
Mohammad Khyber Wardak (Data entry supervisor), Mohammad Ajmal (Data entry), Sahar (Data
entry), Mohammad Hakim Hayat (Data entry).
Remote sensing analysts: Ahmad Jawid Ghiasee and Sayed Sadat Mehdi
Eradication reporters: Ramin Sobhi and Zia Ulhaq.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Kabul)
Jean-Luc Lemahieu (Country Representative), Elisabeth Bayer (Deputy Representative), Devashish
Dhar (International Project Coordinator), Ziauddin Zaki (National Project Coordinator), Abdul
Mannan Ahmadzai (Survey Officer), Noor Mohammad Sadiq (Database Developer)
Survey Coordinators: Abdul Basir Basiret (Eastern Region), Abdul Jalil (Northern Region), Abdul
Qadir Palwal (Southern Region), Fawad Alahi (Western Region), Mohammad Rafi (North-eastern
Region), Rahimullah Omar (Central Region), Sayed Ahmad (Southern Region), Abdul Rahim Marikh
(Eastern Region), Fardin Osmani (Northern Region)
Provincial Coordinators: Fazal Mohammad Fazli (Southern Region), Mohammad Alam Ghalib
(Eastern Region), Altaf Hussain Joya (Western Region), Mohammed Alem Yaqubi (North-eastern
Region), Lutfurhaman Lutfi (Northern Region)
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Vienna)
Sandeep Chawla (Chief, Policy Analysis and Research Branch), Angela Me (Chief, Statistics and
Surveys Section-SASS), Shirish Ravan (Programme Officer), Martin Raithelhuber (Programme
Officer), Patrick Seramy (Database management), Javier Teran (Statistician), Coen Bussink (GIS
Expert) (all SASS/ICMP), Kristina Kuttnig (Public Information Assistant, Studies and Threat Analysis
Section), Andrea Mancini (Project Coordinator, Technical Cooperation Section 2)
The implementation of the survey would not have been possible without the dedicated work of the
field surveyors, who often faced difficult security conditions.
The UNODC Illicit Crop Monitoring activities in Afghanistan were made possible by financial
contributions from the Governments of Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States
of America.
Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009
Summary Findings
September 2009
COMMENTARY BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
The bottom is starting to fall out of the Afghan opium market. For the second year in a
row, cultivation, production, work-force, prices, revenues, exports and its GDP share are
all down, while the number of poppy-free provinces and drug seizures continue to rise.
Yet, Afghan drugs still have catastrophic consequences. They fund criminals, insurgents,
and terrorists in Afghanistan and abroad. Collusion with corrupt government officials
keeps undermining public trust, security, and the law. The taint of money-laundering is
harming the reputation of banks in the Gulf, and farther afield.
The vulnerable are most at risk: drug use in Afghanistan is a growing problem,
particularly among refugees. Drug addiction and HIV are spreading death and misery
along opiate trafficking routes, particularly in Central Asia and Russia. Around the world,
but especially in Europe, once again tens of thousands will die this year from heroin
overdoses.
It is therefore essential to use this time of political change in Afghanistan to analyze the
forces that are shrinking the opium market, and those needed to push further this process
which is vulnerable to relapse.
The opium market plummets
In 2009, opium cultivation in Afghanistan decreased by 22%, from 157,000 hectares (ha)
in 2008 to 123,000 ha today. In Helmand alone, cultivation declined by a third, to less
than 70,000 ha. Indeed, the major drop in Helmand corresponds to the entire national
decline this year: -34,000 ha. The dramatic turn-around in Helmand can be attributed to
an effective mix of sticks and carrots: governor leadership; a more aggressive counter-
narcotics offensive; terms of trade more favourable to legal crops; and the (related)
successful introduction of food zones to promote licit farming.
Around the country, the number of poppy-free provinces has increased from 18 to 20.
Opium cultivation in four other provinces (Kabul at 132 ha, Kunar at 164 ha, Laghman at
135 ha and Nangarhar at 294 ha) is marginal. In three others (Badakhshan, Hirat and
Nimroz) poppy-free status is within reach in the next farming season. At that point, more
than two-thirds of the country would be poppy-free. Today, about a third is.
Production has dropped less dramatically because farmers have extracted more opium per
bulb. Whereas in the Golden Triangle, poppies yield about 10 kg of opium per hectare,
this year Afghan poppies (grown in the most fertile and best irrigated part of the country)
yielded a record 56 kg/ha – a 15% increase over last year’s already high figure of 49 kg.
As a result, while cultivation decreased by 22%, in 2009 opium production was down by
10% to 6,900 tons. Still, to put this in perspective, the expected 800 ton decline is
equivalent to roughly twice the amount currently supplied by the Golden Triangle, with a
retail value of around $8 billion in consuming nations.
Over-supply at the source and lower market penetration (in Europe) are pushing opium
prices down. Wholesale (farm gate) prices in Afghanistan have fallen by a third in the
past year: from $70/kg to $48/kg for fresh opium; from $95/kg to $64/kg for the dry
variety. In Afghanistan, opium values (in nominal terms) have not been this low since the
late 1990s, when the Taliban were in power, and the opium harvest was half the size of
today.
This year opium farmers saw their (gross) earnings per hectare shrink by one quarter, to
$3,562/ha down from $4,662/ha in 2008. Falling prices and lower cultivation this year
caused a 40% collapse in the total farm-gate value of opium production in Afghanistan,
for a total of $438 million. This is equivalent to 4% of the country’s (licit) GDP, down
from 12% in 2007, and an unprecedented 27% in 2002. The fact that 800,000 fewer
people are involved in opium production, compared to 2008, is another indication that the
drug industry is becoming less attractive.
Afghan and NATO forces are compounding the pressure caused by market forces. After
some reticence, the link between drugs and insurgency is now under attack, literally. In
the first half of 2009, military operations destroyed over 90 tons of precursor chemicals,
450t of seeds, 50t of opium, 7t of morphine, 1.5t of heroin, 19t of cannabis resin and 27
labs. While this has knocked out only a fraction of the Afghan drug economy, it has
increased the risks of drug trafficking, and created a deterrent for the future. Indeed, our
Survey shows that farmers are increasingly wary of retaliation, trading has become more
discreet, and stocks are now buried underground. The impunity enjoyed thus far by the
Afghan drug economy is under threat. The risks/rewards balance is starting to tilt against
drugs.
The birth of Afghan narco-cartels
Despite the progress, opium remains a major source of income in one of the world’s
poorest and most unstable countries. Farmers may grow it to stave off poverty.
Criminals, insurgents and corrupt officials surely engage in its trade in the common
pursuit of greed and power.
There is growing evidence – from tougher counter-narcotics and improved intelligence –
that some anti-government elements in Afghanistan are turning into narco-cartels. It has
happened elsewhere in the world. In Colombia, for example, drug trafficking (by FARC
and ELN) started as a means to a political end – a way of funding an ideologically
motivated guerrilla movement. Yet, the world over, drug money eventually trumps
ideology, and becomes as addictive as the dope itself. Afghanistan is approaching this
point. After years of collusion with criminal gangs and corrupt officials, some insurgents
are now opportunistically moving up the value chain: not just taxing supply, but getting
involved in producing, processing, stocking and exporting drugs. The impact this has on
the stability of Afghanistan, and the ways and means to oppose it, require attention.
Avoiding a relapse
Progress in Afghanistan should not be measured only by the rising number of opium free
provinces or by the declining size of poppy fields. Counter-narcotics must be a growing
part of national efforts to improve living standards and governance and, therefore, should
be a higher priority in international assistance programmes.
Eradicate poverty, not just poppies. The world over, development is the most powerful
means to contain the twin threats of drugs and insurgency. In Afghanistan, many farmers
grow opium because they depend on loans provided by traders as a down payment for the
subsequent drug harvest. Historically this has trapped farmers in debt bondage. Micro-
credits can free farmers from their drug masters. Infrastructures, storage facilities and
access to markets can help them market their (licit) crops. This has happened, but in an
inadequate and fragmented way. In post-election Afghanistan, the rural development
push must be as robust as the current military offensive – to feed and employ farmers, not
just to search and destroy their drugs. There is no need to bribe farmers to stay away
from drugs: market forces are already doing this. The new terms of trade caused by an
over-supply of drugs and an under-supply of food are already convincing farmers that it
pays not to grow poppies – especially if/once the climate of impunity starts fading. Two
corollaries follow. (i) Just as the military are preparing for a surge, an assistance leap in
the countryside is needed. Aid has been generous, but is choked by high costs of
intermediation. (ii) Just as the military are reducing their operational caveats,
development assistance needs fewer restrictions. The combination of individual foreign-
sponsored projects around each PRT (understandably, to protect the fighting boys), does
not amount to a coherent assistance program for Afghanistan. In short, what is needed to
consolidate recent gains, and to push the process forward are more assistance, greater
coherence, and fewer bottlenecks at delivery.
Target rich criminals, not poor farmers. In the past the focus was on eradication, rather
than interdiction. It didn’t work. Over the past two years, only 10,000 hectares of opium
were eradicated: less than 4% of the amount planted, with an enormous human and
economic cost. Interdiction, not a priority, suffered. As a result, although 90% of the
world’s opium comes from Afghanistan, less than 2% is seized there (more than 20% of
global cocaine supply is seized by its main producer, Colombia). Afghan and NATO
forces have started to disrupt the drug trade by dismantling high value assets. More is
needed, for example going after the handful of drug kingpins who control the bulk of the
trade. Security Council Resolution 1735 of December 2007 called for them to be listed,
their travels banned, their assets seized. So far no names have been submitted to the
Council. Major traffickers should be reported to the Security Council and brought to
justice – not executed in violation of international law or pardoned for political
expediency.
Missing stocks a threat. Annual world demand for illicit opium has never exceeded 5,000
tons. Yet, over the past few years, including in 2009, Afghan supply has well-exceeded
this amount. Illicit drug stockpiles may have now reached 10,000 tons – enough to
satisfy two years of world (heroin) addiction, or three years of medical (morphine)
prescription. At a time of declining prices, commercial traders would not hold on to
devaluing assets. So the opium stocks are probably in the hands of people who are not
motivated solely by commercial interests. After all, opium ages well; it is a means of
payment easily transported, with a world-wide market. Intelligence agencies should
defuse the ticking-bomb of opium stock-piles, before these become the source of
potential sinister scenarios.
A truly regional approach. In southern Afghanistan, for years insurgents and drug
traffickers alike have taken advantage of the strategic depth in Pakistan to regroup and
strike again, moving opium, equipment, arms and foot soldiers back and forth, in reaction
to law enforcement pressure. At present, under combined NATO/Afghan pressure the
business is being pushed south and east. Yet, although a quarter of all Afghan narcotics is
smuggled through Pakistan, there are no seizures in Pakistan’s Federally Administered
Tribal (border) Areas. The recent Af/Pak focus is welcome, yet too narrow. Yearly, as
much as half of Afghanistan’s opium is exported through Iran, threatening border
security and spreading addiction. This is why UNODC has brokered a Trilateral Platform
among Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan to share counter-narcotics intelligence and run
joint operations. It is working, with results operationally small but symbolically big. The
northern axis is also crucial. Drugs moving north (along the Silk Road) through Central
Asia into Russia and China are spreading addiction, HIV and insurgency. Expectations
are high regarding the impact the UNODC-brokered Central Asia Intelligence Centre
(CARICC) will have.
An historical error
Controlling drugs in Afghanistan will not solve all of the country’s problems, but the
country’s problems can not be solved without controlling drugs. A second consecutive
year of much lower opium cultivation and production is welcome news. The major
decrease in Helmand demonstrates that progress is possible, even under the toughest
conditions.
Does this biennium represent a market correction, or a downward trend? It is too early to
tell, but progress very much depends on improved security. Like never before, the fates
of counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency are inextricably linked.
So much has been invested to contain the drug economy in Afghanistan, that it would be
an historical error to allow this undeniable progress to be undermined not in the opium
fields of poor farmers, but in the killing fields of suicide bombers.
Antonio Maria Costa
Executive Director
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Fact Sheet Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009
Change on
2008 2009
2008
Net opium cultivation (after eradication) 157,000 ha -22% 123,000 ha
1
in % of agricultural land 2.1% 1.6%
in % of cultivation in major opium
82% NA
cultivating countries
Number of poppy free provinces2 18 +2 provinces 20
Number of provinces affected by opium
16 -2 provinces 14
cultivation
Eradication 5,480 ha -2% 5,351
Weighted average opium yield 48.8 kg/ha +15% 56.1 kg/ha
Potential production of opium 7,700 mt -10% 6,900 mt
in % of production in major opium
94% NA
producing countries
No. of household involved in opium cultivation3 366,500 245,200
No. of persons involved in opium cultivation3 2.4 million 1.6 million
in % of total population3 9.8% 6.4%
Average farm-gate price (weighted by production)
US$ 70/kg -31% US$ 48/kg
of fresh opium at harvest time4
Average farm-gate price (weighted by production)
US$ 95/kg -34% US$ 64/kg
of dry opium at harvest time4
Current GDP5 US$ 10.2 billion +5% US$ 10.7 billion
Total farm gate value of opium production US$ 730 million -40% US$ 438 million
in % of GDP 7% 4%
Potential export value of opium, morphine and
US$ 3.4 billion NA
heroin (border areas of neighbouring countries)
Average yearly gross income from opium of
US$ 1,997 -10% US$ 1,786
opium growing households
Current GDP per capita5 US$ 415 +3% US$ 426
Gross income from opium per ha US$ 4,662 -24% US$ 3,562
Gross income from wheat per ha US$ 1,625 -32% US$ 1,101
1
The area available for agriculture was updated from 76,235 km2 in 2008 to 77,217 km2 in 2009.
2
Poppy free provinces are those which are estimated to have less than 100 ha of opium cultivation.
3
Due to a change in methodology and new information available on village population size, the figures
from 2008 and 2009 are not directly comparable. Estimates are based on a population of 25.5 million and
an average household size of 6.5 persons for 2009 (Afghan year 1387) and a population of 24.5 million for
2008 (Afghan year 1386). Source: Government of Afghanistan, Central Statistical Office.
4
In 2008, the fresh and dry opium prices at harvest time were based on farmers responses collected through
the Annual Opium Survey, which was conducted slightly before the opium harvest. In 2009, prices at
harvest time were derived from the opium price monitoring system and refer to the month when opium
harvest actually took place in the different regions of the country.
5
Source: Government of Afghanistan, Central Statistical Office.
SUMMARY FINDINGS
The total opium poppy cultivation estimated for Afghanistan in 2009 was 123,000
hectares (ha), a 22% reduction compared to the level in 2008. Ninety nine per cent of the
total cultivation took place in seven provinces in the Southern and Western regions 6 ,
including the most insecure provinces in the country. This further substantiates the link
between insecurity and opium cultivation observed since 2007.
Total opium production in 2009 was estimated at 6,900 metric tons (mt), a 10% decrease
from 2008. Virtually all the production (99%) took place in the same provinces where
cultivation is concentrated. The other provinces produced only 1% of the country’s total
opium in 2009.
The seven main opium cultivating and producing provinces were Hilmand, Kandahar,
Uruzgan, Day Kundi, Zabul, Farah and Badghis. The province of Nimroz is not on this
list because its main opium cultivating area, located in Khash Rod district, was
administratively re-defined as part of Farah province. The Northern region was poppy
free for the first time in a decade.
Among the 34 provinces in the country, 20 were poppy free in 2009, compared to 18 in
2008. With the exception of Nangarhar, all provinces that were poppy free in 2008
remained so in 2009. The new poppy free provinces are Kapisa, Baghlan and Faryab.
The total estimated farm-gate income of opium growing farmers amounted to US$ 438
million. This is a significant decrease from 2008, when farm-gate income for opium was
estimated at US$ 730 million.
Figure 1: Opium cultivation in Afghanistan (ha), 1994-2009
200,000
175,000
150,000
125,000
Hectares
100,000
75,000
50,000
25,000
0
1994 1
1 95 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Cultivatio n 71,000 54,000 57,000 58,000 64,000 91,000 82,000 8,000 74,000 80,000 31
1 ,000 104,000 165,000 193,000 157,000 123,000
6
Regions as designated by UNODC for analytical purposes. Please refer to Table 1 for a full list.
1
Table 1: Opium cultivation (2005-2009) and eradication (2008-2009) in Afghanistan
Change
Cultivation Cultivation Cultivation Cultivation Cultivation Change 2008- Eradication Eradication in
PROVINCE 2008-2009
2005 (ha) 2006 (ha) 2007 (ha) 2008 (ha) 2009 (ha) 2009 (ha) in 2008 (ha) 2009 (ha)
(%)
Kabul Poppy free 80 500 310 132 -178 -57% 20 1.35
Khost Poppy free 133 Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free NA NA 0 0
Logar Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free NA NA 0 0
Paktya Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free NA NA 0 0
Panjshir Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free NA NA 0 0
Parwan Poppy free 124 Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free NA NA 0 0
Wardak 106 Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free NA NA 0 0
Ghazni Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free NA NA 0 0
Paktika Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free NA NA 0 0
Central Region 106 337 500 310 132 -178 -57% 20 1.35
Kapisa 115 282 835 436 Poppy free NA NA 59 31
Kunar 1,059 932 446 290 164 -126 -43% 103 11
Laghman 274 710 561 425 135 -290 -68% 26 0
Nangarhar 1,093 4,872 18,739 Poppy free 294 NA NA 26 226
Nuristan 1,554 1,516 Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free NA NA 3 0
Eastern Region 4,095 8,312 20,581 1,151 593 -558 -48% 217 269.05
Badakhshan 7,370 13,056 3,642 200 557 357 179% 774 420
Takhar 1,364 2,178 1,211 Poppy free Poppy free NA NA 0 0
Kunduz 275 102 Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free NA NA 0 0
North-eastern Region 9,009 15,336 4,853 200 557 357 179% 774 420.36
Baghlan 2,563 2,742 671 475 Poppy free NA NA 85 0
Balkh 10,837 7,232 Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free NA NA 0 0
Bamyan 126 17 Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free NA NA 0 0
Faryab 2,665 3,040 2,866 291 Poppy free NA NA 0 261
Jawzjan 1,748 2,024 1,085 Poppy free Poppy free NA NA 0 0
Samangan 3,874 1,960 Poppy free Poppy free Poppy free NA NA 0 0
Sari Pul 3,227 2,252 260 Poppy free Poppy free NA NA 0 0
Northern Region 25,040 19,267 4,882 766 Poppy free NA NA 85 261.24
Hilmand 26,500 69,324 102,770 103,590 69,833 -33,757 -33% 2,537 4119
Kandahar 12,989 12,619 16,615 14,623 19,811 5,188 35% 1,222 69
Uruzgan 2,024 9,703 9,204 9,939 9,224 -715 -7% 113 74
Zabul 2,053 3,210 1,611 2,335 1,144 -1,191 -51% 0 0
Day Kundi 2,581 7,044 3,346 2,273 3,002 729 32% 0 27
Southern Region 46,147 101,900 133,546 132,760 103,014 -29,746 -22% 3,872 4289.06
Badghis 2,967 3,205 4,219 587 5,411 4,824 822% 0 0
Farah 10,240 7,694 14,865 15,010 12,405* -2,605* (-17%) 9 43
Ghor 2,689 4,679 1,503 Poppy free Poppy free NA NA 38 0
Hirat 1,924 2,287 1,525 266 556 290 109% 352 67
Nimroz 1,690 1,955 6,507 6,203 428* -5,775* (-93%) 113 0
Western Region 19,510 19,820 28,619 22,066 18,800 -3,266 -15% 511 109.86
Total (rounded) 104,000 165,000 193,000 157,000 123,000 -34,000 -22% 5,480 5,351
* Due to administrative boundary changes, the 2009 estimates for Farah and Nimroz were calculated
considering parts of Khash Rod district, the main opium cultivating district in Nimroz, as being in Farah
province. The 2008 figures include all of Khash Rod district in Nimroz province.
A province is defined as poppy free when it is estimated to have less then 100 ha of opium cultivation.
2
Opium cultivation decreases by 22% in 2009
The area under opium cultivation in Afghanistan decreased by 22% in 2009, from
157,000 ha in 2008 to 123,000 ha, 99% of which was concentrated in the Southern and
Western regions. Opium poppy cultivation decreased in all regions except the North-
eastern region, where in any case very little cultivation remained.
The regional divide of opium cultivation between the south and rest of the country
continued to deepen in 2009. Most of the opium cultivation is confined to the south and
west, which are dominated by insurgency and organized criminal networks. This mirrors
the sharper polarization of the security situation between the lawless south and relatively
stable north of the country.
The major differences between opium cultivation patterns in 2009 compared to 2008
were a drastic decrease in cultivation in Hilmand province, which contributed the bulk of
the overall decrease; a significant increase in opium cultivation in Badghis and Kandahar
provinces; and mixed signals from the Eastern region, where Kapisa became poppy free
for the first time. Nangarhar, however, could not retain the poppy free status it had
achieved in 2008, but the level of opium cultivation remained low.
Number of poppy free provinces increases to 20 in 2009
The number of poppy free provinces7 increased to 20 in 2009, compared to 18 in 2008
and 13 in 2007. Kapisa (Eastern region), Baghlan and Faryab (both Northern region)
provinces became poppy free for the first time.
Table 2: Provinces with poppy free status in 2009 (<100 ha poppy cultivation)
Region Province
Central region Ghazni, Khost, Logar, Paktika, Paktya, Panjshir, Parwan, Wardak, Kapisa*
Northern region Balkh, Bamyan, Jawzjan, Samangan, Sari Pul, Faryab*, Baghlan*
North-Eastern region Kunduz, Takhar
Eastern region Nuristan
Western region Ghor
* Provinces which were not poppy free in 2008 but became poppy free in 2009.
Almost all provinces free of poppy in 2008 remained poppy free in 2009, with exception
of Nangarhar. Campaigns against poppy cultivation and effective law enforcement by the
Government contributed to maintaining the provinces’ poppy free status. Efforts were
made in the remaining poppy cultivating provinces in the Eastern (Kunar, Laghman,
Nangarhar), Central (Kabul) and Northern regions (Badakhshan) to considerably reduce
cultivation, but despite the low levels remaining in 2009, they did not drop under the 100
ha poppy free threshold.
7
A province is defined as poppy free when it is estimated to have less then 100 ha of opium cultivation.
3
Opium cultivation in Afghanistan, 2007-2009
65°E 70°E 75°E
UZBEKISTAN TAJIKISTAN
557
TURKMENISTAN
Badakhshan
Jawzjan Kunduz
Balkh Takhar
Samangan
Faryab Sari Pul Baghlan
Panjshir
Nuristan
5,411
164
Badghis Bamyan
35°N
35°N
135
Parwan Kapisa Kunar
Kabul Laghman
132
556
Cultivation Year
Wardak 294
Ghor Nangarhar
Hirat Logar 2007
4
3,002
Day Kundi Paktya
2008
Khost
Ghazni 2009
9,224
Uruzgan Provincial boundary
12,405
1,144
Farah Paktika International boundary
Zabul
PAKISTAN
19,811
428
IRAN Kandahar
Nimroz
69,833
0 50 100 200
30°N
30°N
Hilmand
km
Geographic projection: WGS 84
65°E 70°E 75°E
Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Opium Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009 (at province level)
65°E 70°E 75°E
UZBEKISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
Fayzabad
TURKMENISTAN
Badakhshan
Jawzjan Mazari Sharif
Kunduz
Takhar
Balkh
Faryab
Samangan Baghlan
Sari Pul
Panjshir Nuristan
Badghis
Parwan Kapisa
35°N
35°N
Bamyan Laghman Kunar
Jalalabad
Hirat Kabul Legend
Wardak
Hirat Nangarhar
Logar Opium cultivation (ha)
Ghor
5
Day Kundi Poppy free
Paktya
Ghazni Khost Less than 1000
Farah Uruzgan 1000 - 10000 ha
Farah Paktika 10000 - 20000 ha
Zabul
More than 20000 ha
Kandahar Provincial boundary
PAKISTAN International boundary
Hilmand Kandahar
IRAN Nimroz
30°N
30°N
0 50 100 200
km
Geographic projection: WGS 84
65°E 70°E 75°E
Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
All provinces of the Northern region are poppy free for the first time in almost a
decade
The Northern region consists of Baghlan, Balkh, Bamyan, Faryab, Jawzjan, Samangan
and Sari Pul provinces. In 2009, for the first time in almost a decade, all the provinces in
this region were poppy free. Most of these provinces sustained moderate levels of opium
cultivation in the past except Balkh. This province emerged as a major opium cultivating
province in 2005 and 2006 (10,837 ha and 7,232 ha respectively), whereas the rest of the
provinces contributed in the range of 2,000 to 3,000 ha each. The decline in opium
cultivation in the Northern region started with strict law enforcement and counter-
narcotic initiatives. In 2008, poppy cultivation in these provinces was already negligible
and Balkh has remained poppy free since 2007.
Figure 2: Opium poppy cultivation in Badakhshan province (ha), 2004-2009
18,000
16,000
14,000
12,000
Hectares
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Badakhshan 15,607 7,370 13,056 3,642 200 557
In the North-eastern region, Kunduz has been poppy free since 2007 and Takhar since
2008. In 2009, Badakhshan remained the only opium cultivating province in this region.
However, despite a large proportional increase of 179%, poppy cultivation remained
comparatively low at 557 ha, all of which happened in rain-fed areas. The increase
happened in spite of 420 ha being eradicated.
Nangarhar maintains low level of cultivation
Nangarhar province became poppy free for the first time in 2008. In 2009, however, 294
ha of opium poppy were detected, despite 226 ha being eradicated. Nangarhar,
traditionally a large opium growing province, was the only province that lost its poppy
free status in 2009.
6
Figure 3: Opium cultivation in Nangarhar province (ha), 2004-2009
30,000
25,000
Hectares
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Nangarhar 28,213 1,093 4,872 18,739 Poppy free 294
In the last six years, the level of opium cultivation in Nangarhar has been erratic. In 2004,
cultivation was at 28,213 ha, the following year it dropped drastically to 1,093 ha and
was confined to remote parts of the province. In 2006, it increased to 4,872 ha and in
2007 again increased to 18,739, before becoming poppy free in 2008.
In 2009, Laghman and Kunar provinces of the Eastern region were virtually poppy free
with negligible amounts of cultivation (135 ha and 164 ha respectively).
Badghis emerges as major opium cultivating province
Opium cultivation level in Badghis province has been rising steadily since 2004. In 2008,
cultivation was expected to be high, but the total failure of rain-fed crops contributed to
the drop in opium cultivation. In 2009, good rainfall resulted in extensive cultivation in
rain-fed areas of this province, enabling farmers to grow more poppy. This contributed to
a strong increase in opium cultivation from only 587 ha in 2008 to 5,411 ha in 2009, most
of which was in areas that are difficult to access. With the exception of the drought year
2008, Badghis has experienced a continuous increase in the area under opium cultivation
since 2004. In 2009, it emerged as one of the major opium cultivating provinces.
7
Figure 4: Opium cultivation in Badghis province (ha), 2004-2009
6,000
5,000
4,000
Hectares
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Badghis 614 2,967 3,205 4,219 587 5,411
Opium cultivation in Hilmand decreases by 33%
In 2009, opium cultivation in Hilmand went down by 33,757 ha (33%) compared to
2008. Despite this considerable reduction, Hilmand remained the largest opium
cultivating province with 69,833 ha (57% of total cultivation in Afghanistan). The overall
22% reduction in opium cultivation in Afghanistan in 2009 was mainly due to reductions
in Hilmand.
Independent figures from a study done by Cranfield University (UK) showed that opium
cultivation in the so-called “food zone” in Hilmand decreased by 37%, and was mainly
replaced by cereal crops. Outside the food zone, however, poppy cultivation increased by
8%. The food zone programme comprised anti-poppy awareness raising campaigns, the
distribution of wheat seed and fertilizer to farmers, and law enforcement activities
including eradication. It covered the districts of Lashkar Gah, Nad Ali, Gereshk, Garm
Seir, Sangin Qala and Musa Qala in Hilmand. The programme was implemented by
Hilmand’s Governor with financial and technical support from the UK and USA.
8
Hilmand food zone, 2009
63° E 64° E 65° E
33° N
Baghran
33° N
ala
Musa Q
Kajaki
Nowzad
Washer Sangin Qala
j
ara
e r-i-S
Nah
Nad Ali
Lashkargah
31° N
31° N
Nawa-i-Barukzai
Garm Ser
Legend
Food Zone
Reg-i-Khan Nishin
Agricultural Area
30° N
30° N
River
Dishu
District boundary
Provincial boundary
Afghanistan
0 25 50 100
d
Hilman
km
Geographic projection: WGS 84
63° E 64° E 65° E
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement
or acceptance by the United Nations.
99% of opium cultivation is concentrated in the Southern and Western regions
In 2009, 84% of opium cultivation was concentrated in the Southern region. Kandahar
was the only province in this region that showed a significant increase in opium
cultivation, from 14,623 ha in 2008 to 19,811 ha in 2009 (35%). In 2009, Kandahar was
the second largest opium cultivating province after Hilmand, which, in spite of a strong
decrease over 2008, still had over three times more area under opium cultivation than
Kandahar.
9
Figure 5: Opium cultivation in Hilmand and Kandahar provinces (ha), 2004-2009
120,000
100,000
80,000
Hectares
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Hilmand 29,353 26,500 69,324 102,770 103,590 69,833
Kandahar 4,959 12,989 12,619 16,615 14,623 19,811
In 2009, Nimroz province in the Western region ceased to be a major opium cultivating
province as parts of its main opium cultivating district, Khash Rod, were shifted into the
neighbouring Farah province. Khash Rod district had contributed over 95% of opium
cultivation in Nimroz province in the past. Despite this shift, opium cultivation in Farah
decreased from 15,010 ha in 2008 to 12,405 ha in 2009. In absolute terms, both provinces
have shown a significant reduction in opium cultivation.
Security has been a major problem in the Southern and Western regions. Because the lack
of security compromises the rule of law from the legitimate Government, counter-
narcotic interventions are limited and these regions consistently show very high opium
cultivation levels.
Figure 6: Opium cultivation in Farah and Nimroz provinces (ha), 2004-2009
16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
Hectares
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Farah 2,288 10,240 7,694 14,865 15,010 12,405
Nimroz 115 1,690 1,955 6,507 6,203 428
10
Table 3: Regional distribution of opium cultivation, 2008-2009
Change 2009 (ha) as
Region 2008 (ha) 2009 (ha)
2008-2009 % of total
Southern 132,760 103,014 -22% 84%
Western 22,066 18,800 -15% 15%
Eastern 1,151 593 -48% 0.5%
North-eastern 200 557 179% 0.5%
Central 310 132 -82% 0.1%
Northern 766 Poppy free NA NA
Rounded Total 157,000 123,000 -22% 100%
Table 4: Main opium cultivating provinces in Afghanistan (ha), 2009
Change
Province 2007 2008 2009
2008-2009
Hilmand 102,770 103,590 69,833 -33%
Kandahar 16,615 14,623 19,811 35%
Farah* 14,865 15,010 12,405 (-17%)
Uruzgan 9,204 9,939 9,224 -7%
Badghis 4,219 587 5,411 822%
Day Kundi 3,346 2,273 3,002 32%
Nimroz* 6,507 6,203 428 (-93%)
Rest of the country 43,020 7,888 2,982 -62%
Total 193,000 157,000 123,000 -22%
* Due to administrative boundary changes, the 2009 estimates for Farah and Nimroz were calculated
considering parts of Khash Rod district, the main opium cultivating district in Nimroz, as part of Farah
province. The 2008 figures include all of Khash Rod district in Nimroz province.
11
Figure 7: Airborne collection of ground reference information over Hilmand, 2009
False colour satellite image of the same area acquired on 11 April 2009
showing poppy and wheat fields in different shades of red.
12
Potential opium production in Afghanistan declines to 6,900 mt in 2009
The average yield (weighted by production) for Afghanistan in 2009 was 56.1 kg/ha,
compared to 48.8 kg/ha in 2008. Overall, weather conditions were favorable for
agricultural crops in 2009 and there were no reports of damages caused by unfavorable
weather, diseases or pests. As a consequence, potential opium production decreased by
only 10% to 6,900 mt, despite opium cultivation dropping by 22%.
In the last two years, unusually high opium yields have been estimated for Afghanistan.
This is the result of many different factors, among which are good climatic conditions,
low levels of plant diseases and pests, and the shift of the opium cultivation to the fertile
southern lowlands where irrigation and improved farming techniques are more
widespread than in other parts of the country. Opium yield is estimated using a
correlation between poppy capsule sizes (volumes) and numbers on the one hand and the
harvested opium gum on the other. This correlation was established in scientific harvest
trials in Thailand, Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1990s and early 2000s. However, the
capsule sizes and numbers observed in recent years in Afghanistan, mainly in the
Southern region, are much higher than those observed during these trials and exceed the
range of values for which the correlation was established. It is uncertain how opium yield
and capsule size and numbers correlate when these numbers are as high as those observed
in Afghanistan during the last two years. Further research into opium yield is therefore
necessary. The findings of this research may well lead to a revision of opium yield
estimates in Afghanistan.
Table 5: Average opium yield by region in Afghanistan, 2008-2009
2008 Average yield 2009 Average yield
Region Change
(kg/ha) (kg/ha)
Central (Parwan, Paktya, Wardak, Khost,
36.2 NA* NA
Kabul, Logar, Ghazni, Paktika, Panjshir)
Eastern (Nangarhar, Kunar, Laghman,
39.3 36.2 -8%
Nuristan, Kapisa)
North-east (Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz) 31.4 34.3 9%
Northern (Bamyan, Jawzjan, Sari Pul,
54.6 NA* NA
Baghlan, Faryab, Balkh, Samangan)
Southern (Hilmand, Uruzgan, Kandahar,
52.1 58.5 12%
Zabul, Day Kundi)
Western (Ghor, Hirat, Farah, Nimroz,
29.7 43.9 48%
Badghis)
Weighted national average 48.8 56.1 15%
* For the Central region, no regional yield figure was calculated due to a low number of yield
measurements in this region. The Northern region was poppy free.
13
Opium production in Afghanistan by province (mt), 2009
65°E 70°E 75°E
UZBEKISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
Fayzabad
19
Jawzjan Mazari Sharif Kunduz
Takhar Badakhshan
Balkh
Baghlan
Samangan
Faryab Sari Pul Legend
Badghis
Panjshir Nuristan
ParwanKapisa Kunar 1,000 Opium production
35°N
35°N
Laghman (metric ton)
238 Bamyan 6
Kabul
Kabul 5 Jalalabad
Hirat
Wardak N/A 11 Main city
Hirat Day Kundi Nangarhar
24 Ghor Logar Provincial boundary
Paktya International boundary
14
176 Khost
Ghazni
Uruzgan
540
545 Farah Zabul Paktika
Farah
Hilmand
67
Kandahar
Kandahar
Nimroz 4,085
IRAN 1,159
PAKISTAN
19
30°N
30°N
0 50 100 200
km
Geographic projection: WGS 84
65°E 70°E 75°E
Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Regional opium cultivation and production in Afghanistan, 2009
60°E 65°E 70°E 75°E
UZBEKISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
557
19
TURKMENISTAN
North-eastern
0
0
Northern
21
35°N 35°N
593
North Eastern
Legend
Eastern INDIA
Central Cultivation (ha)
825
Western
15
132
18,800
20581
6,026
Production (mt)
Eastern
Southern
PAKISTAN
103,014
Provincial boundary
International boundary
IRAN
0 50 100 200
Km
30°N Geographic projection, Datum WGS 84 30°N
60°E 65°E 70°E 75°E
Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Figure 8: Potential opium production in Afghanistan (mt), 1994-2009
8,000
7,000
6,000
Metric tons
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Production 3,416 2,335 2,248 2,804 2,693 4,565 3,278 185 3,400 3,600 4,200 4,100 6,100 8,200 7,700 6,900
About 87% of total opium production took place in the Southern region (6,026 mt) and
12% took place in the Western region (825 mt) in 2009.
Table 6: Potential opium production by region (mt), 2008-2009
Change Change
Production 2008 Production 2009
PROVINCE 2008-2009 2008-2009
(mt) (mt)
(mt) (%)
Central Region* 11 NA* NA NA
Eastern Region 45 21 -24 -53%
North-eastern Region 6 19 13 204%
Northern Region 42 0 -42 -100%
Southern Region 6,917 6,026 -890 -13%
Western Region 655 825 170 26%
Total (rounded) 7,700 6,900 -800 -10%
* For the Central region, no specific regional production figure was calculated due to a low number of yield
measurements in this region.
Opium production in Hilmand (4,085 mt) dropped by 24% compared to 2008 but was
still close to Afghanistan’s total production in 2005 (4,100 mt). The highest increase in
production was estimated in Badghis province with 238 mt (14 times more than in 2008).
Opium production in Kandahar (1,159 mt) almost doubled due to the increase in opium
cultivation. The province remained the second largest producer of opium in Afghanistan
16
in 2009. Other provinces that contributed significantly to production were Farah (545
mt), Uruzgan (540 mt) and Day Kundi (176 mt) and Zabul (67 mt).
Table 7: Potential opium production in main opium producing provinces (mt), 2008-2009
Change Change
Production 2008 Production 2009
PROVINCE 2008-2009 2008-2009
(mt) (mt)
(mt) (%)
Hilmand 5,397 4,085 -1,312 -24%
Kandahar 762 1,159 397 52%
Farah 446 545 99 22%
Uruzgan 518 540 22 4%
Badghis 17 238 220 1263%
Day Kundi 118 176 57 48%
Zabul 122 67 -55 -45%
Eradication remains at low level of 2008
A total of 5,351 ha of eradicated poppy fields were verified by MCN/UNODC including
Governor-led eradication (GLE) (2,687 ha) and eradication executed by the Poppy
Eradication Force (PEF) (2,663 ha). GLE was carried out in 12 provinces whereas PEF
conducted eradication only in Hilmand and Badakhshan provinces. The final figures of
eradication in Hilmand and Badakhshan provinces were adjusted after verification using
satellite images since cases of over-reporting were observed in the preliminary reports
received from these provinces.
Table 8: Eradication and cultivation in Afghanistan (ha) 2005-2009
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
GLE (ha) 4,000 13,050 15,898 4,306 2,687
PEF (ha) 210 2,250 3,149 1,174 2,663
Total (ha) 4,210 15,300 19,510 5,480 5,351
Opium cultivation (ha)* 104,000 165,000 193,000 157,000 123,000
Eradication as % of opium
4% 9% 10% 3% 4%
cultivation
* Net opium cultivation after eradication
Points of note regarding eradication carried out in 2009 were:
o Total eradication was around 4% of the total opium cultivation.
o Eradication was insignificant in major opium growing provinces like Kandahar,
Farah and Uruzgan.
o Timely eradication could have made Kunar, Laghman, Kabul, Badakhshan,
Nangarhar, Hirat and Nimroz province poppy free considering the low level of
cultivation in these provinces.
o Eradication took place in 12 provinces in 2009 compared to 17 in 2008. Unlike
last year, eradication did not take place in Ghor, Baghlan, Jawzjan and Nuristan
because of negligible opium cultivation in these provinces. However, eradication
17
did not take place in Laghman, Nimroz and Zabul due to lack of planning and will
to eradicate.
o The security situation continued to be unfavorable for eradication campaigns in
2009, since most of the opium cultivation was confined to the Southern and
Western provinces, which are affected by insurgency and organized crime groups.
o In 2009, there were 21 deaths related to eradication compared to 78 deaths in
2008. GLE and PEF teams were attacked 34 times during eradication in
Badakhshan, Faryab, Hilmand, Kandahar, Kunar, Hirat, Nangarhar, Uruzgan and
Zabul provinces.
o Most of the security related incidents were reported in Hilmand province. In 2008,
most incidents took place in Nangarhar and Nimroz provinces.
o In 2009, resistance by farmers to eradication was far less than in 2008.
Table 9: Security incidents during GLE and PEF eradication, 2008-2009
2008 2009 % change
Persons injured >100 52 -48% or more
Fatalities 78 21 -73%
As reported by eradication verification surveyors.
Table 10: Governor-led eradication by province (ha), 2009
No. of No. of villages
Eradication eradicated with
Province
verified (ha) fields eradication
reported reported
Badakhshan 401 1598 158
Day Kundi 27 113 24
Farah 43 75 8
Faryab 261 236 10
Hilmand 1,475 2,275 54
Hirat 67 247 31
Kabul 1 9 3
Kandahar 69 154 28
Kapisa 31 224 25
Kunar 11 152 12
Nangarhar 226 808 33
Uruzgan 74 371 26
Total 2,687 6,262 412
18
Afghanistan: Verified GLE and PEF eradication in 2009 (by province)
65°E 70°E 75°E
UZBEKISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN Jawzjan Takhar
Badakhshan
Balkh Kunduz
Sari Pul Samangan
Faryab Baghlan
Panjshir Nuristan
Kapisa
Badghis Bamyan Parwan
35°N
35°N
Laghman Kunar
Kabul Legend
Wardak
Ghor Nangarhar
Logar Eradication (ha)
Hirat
19
Day Kundi No eradication INDIA
Ghazni Paktya
Khost Negligible
11 - 100
Uruzgan
Farah Paktika 101 - 500
Zabul 501 - 4119
PAKISTAN Province boundary
International boundary
IRAN Kandahar
Hilmand
Nimroz
0 75 150 300
km
30°N
30°N
Geographic Projection Datum: WGS 84
65°E 70°E 75°E
Source: G overnment o f Afghan istan - Na tion al mo nito ring syste m implemen ted by UNO DC
Note: The bo undar ies an d n ames shown and th e d esignations used on this ma p do not imply official endo rse me nt or acce pta nce b y th e United Nations.
Afghanistan: Verified GLE and PEF eradication in 2009 (by district)
60°E 65°E 70°E 75°E
UZBEKISTAN
ShikiDarwaz-i Payin (mamay)
Darwaz-i- Bala (nesay)
Khwahan
Kuf Ab TAJIKISTAN
Raghistan Shighnan
Yaw an
Darqad Chahab Kohistan
Khamyab Qarqin Yangi Qala Shahri Buzurg
ShorTepa Shahrak-i-Hairatan DashtiQala Yaftal-i-SuflaArghanj Khwah
Khani ChaharBagh Kaldar Hazrati Imam Sahib Rustaq
Mingajik Dowlat abad Argo Baharak Shuhada Wakhan
TURKMENISTAN Qurghan
Khwajah DuKoh MardyanChahar Bolak Dashti-i-ArchiKhwaja Ghar Khash
Qala-i-Z al Darayim Eshkashim
Qaram QulAndkhoy Khanaqa BalkhNahr-i-Shahi Khulm Taloqan (Provincial Center)Kalafgan Kishim Tashkan Jurm Wardooj
Sheberghan (Provincial Center) Faizabad Chahar Darah
DehdadiMarmul Khanabad BangiChal
Dowlat abad Chimtal Ali Abad Farkhar Tagab Yamgan Zaybak
Chahar KentFayroz Nakhcheer
Hazrat-i-Sultan Baghlan-i-Jadeed EshkamishNamak Ab
Shirin Tagab Sari Pul (Provincial Center) Sholgarah
Aybak (Provincial Center) Burka Khwajah Hijran (Jalgah)
Qush TepahSayyad Darah-i-Suf-i-Payin
Khwajah Sabz Poshi Wali Gozargah-i-NoorWarsaj
Sar-i-Pol Sozma Qala Kishindeh Khuram wa Sar Bagh Nahreen
Almar Maimanah Kiran wa Munjan
Bil Chiragh Sangcharak Zari Khost wa Firing Eradication (ha)
Pashtun Kot Dahana-i- Ghuri Barg-i-Matal
Ghormach Gosfandi Deh Salah
Darah-i-Soof-i-Bala Roi-Do-Ab
Qaisar Gurziwan Andarab Paryan Nuristan Paroon (Provincial Center)
Dushi Pul-i-Hisar
Kohistanat Balkhab Kamdesh No eradication
Bala Murghab Khinjan Hissa-i-Awal(Khinj)
Mandol
Kohistan Kahmard
Talah wa Barfak Salang Shutul Darah Nari
Gulran Muqur Unaba Du Ab Wama Waygal
Ghazi Abad
Chahar Sadah Saighan Syahgird (Ghorband)Shinwari
Kushk (Rabat-i-Sangi) Jawand
Yakawlang
NijrabAlaSai Noor Gram Dara-i-PechShigal wa Sheltan Negligible
ShebarShaykh Ali Bagram Dowlat Shah Chapa Dara Watahpoor
35°N
35°N
Kusk-i-Kohnah Ab Kamari
Qala-i-Now (Provincial Center) Qadis Bamyan (Provincial Center)Surkh-i-Parsa Alisheng Alingar Chowkey
Chaghcharan (Provincial Center) Koh-i-Safi Tagab Sar Kani
Noor gal 12-100
Kohsan Lal wa Sarjangal Paghman DehSabz Kuzkunar
Dowlatyar Hisah-i-Awal BehsudJalrez Khas Kunar
Karrukh Kabul Surubi Qarghayee Kama
Enjil Chiisht-i-Sharif Panjab Behsud Goshta
Obe Markaz-i- Behsud Khak-i-Jabar
Zendah JanHirat Nerkh Hesarak Lalpoor 101-200
Ghoryan Pashtun Zarghun Sang-i-Takht Daimirdad Khugyani Rodat Shinwar Mohmand Dara
Do Lainah Waras Chak-i-Wardak Azra Sherzad Kot
Shahrak AchinDur Baba
Niizam-i-Shahid (Guzarah) Tulak Ishtarlay Khoshi Jaji Deh Bala
SayyidabadPul-i-Alam Nazyan
Khedir 201-300
Fersi Jaghatu
Nili (Provincial Center) MirAmor Nawur Charkh AhmadabadSamkani
Adraskan Shahristan Rashidan Kharwar Sayyid Karam
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu) Jaji Maidan
20
Saghar Pasaband Kiti Zanakhan
Taywara Ajristan Sabari (Yaqubi) Bak 301-1000
Gizab Waghaz Deh Yak Zurmat Woza Jadran NadirShah Kot
Malistan Andar Mata Khan Terayzai (Ali Sher)
Shindand Kajran Qara Bagh
Pur Chaman Jaghuri Yosuf Khel
Ziruk SperaTanay Gurbuz
1001-2569
Sar Rowza
Anar Darah Baghran Giro UrgunGiyan
Shahidi Hasas Chorah Khas Uruzgan Muqur
Kakar Kak-e Afghan Ab Band Omna
Khak-i-Safed Bala Buluk Tirin Kot (Provincial Center) Gelan Surubi Barmal International boundary
Gulistan Dihrawud Jani Khel
Daychopan
Musa Qala Dilah wa Khwoshamand
PushtRod Nowzad Arghandab Shah Joi Provincial boundary
Qala-i-Kah Kajaki Gomal
Nesh Miya Neshin
Nawa
Farah (Provincial Center)Bakwah Naw Bahar Wazahkhwah
Mizan District boundary
Shib Koh Washer Sangin Qala Shah Wali Kot Qalat (Provincial Center)
Delaram Ghorak Khakrez
Tarnak wa Jaldak Shinkai Turwo Wor Mamay Kiran wa Munjan
Naher-i-Saraj Shemel zai Hissa-i-Awal(Khinj) Kamdesh
Lash-i-Juwayn Arghandab Atghar Nuristan Paroon (Provincial Center)
Khash Rod Nad Ali Zhire Eastern Region Mandol
Maiwand
Lashkargah (Provincial Center) Kandahar (Provinclal Center)Arghistan Rukhah Darah Waygal Ghazi Abad Nari
Maruf Du Ab
Wama
Kang Nawa-i-Barukzai
Koh Band Bar Kunar (Asmar)
Asl-i-Chakhansur Nijrab Dowlat Shah Noor Gram Shigal wa Sheltan
Panjwayee
Spin Boldak Chapa DaraDara-i-PechWatahpoorDangam
Zaranj (Provincial Center) AlaSai
IRAN Garm Ser Daman Bagram Asad Abad (Provincial C enter) Mara warah
Alisheng Alingar Narang wa Badil
Tagab
Koh-i-Safi Chowkey Sar Kani
Darah-i- Noor Noor gal
DehSabz Mehtar Lam (Provincial Center) Khas Kunar
Chahar Burjak Reg-i-Khan Nishin Shorabak Kuzkunar
Reg Surubi Qarghayee
PAKISTAN Bagrami
Behsud Kama Goshta
30°N
30°N
Dishu
Khak-i-Jabar Surkh Rud Jalalabad
Hesarak Lalpoor
Chaparhar Rodat Bati Kot
Khugyani
Sherzad Shinwar Mohmand Dara
Azra Kot INDIA
Pachir wagamDeh Bala Dur Baba
Achin Nazyan
Jaji
Laja Ahmad Khel
60°E 65°E 70°E Samkani Dand Patan 75°E
Jaji Maidan
Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Afghanistan: Eradication locations - GLE and PEF, 2009
65°E 70°E 75°E
UZBEKISTAN ShikiDarwaz-i Payin (mamay)
Darwaz-i- Bala (nesay)
Kuf Ab
Khwahan TAJIKISTAN
Raghistan Shighnan
Yangi Qala Yaw an
Darqad Chahab Kohistan
Khamyab Qarqin Shahri Buzurg
ShorTepa Shahrak-i-Hairatan DashtiQala Yaftal-i-SuflaArghanj Khwah
Khani ChaharBagh Mingajik Kaldar Hazrati Imam Sahib
Dowlat abad Rustaq
TURKMENISTAN Qurghan Qala-i-Z al Dashti-i-Archi
Argo Baharak Shuhada
Badakhshan
Khwajah DuKoh Jawzjan Mardyan Chahar Bolak Khash Wakhan
BaharakKalafgan Darayim Eshkashim
Qaram Qul Andkhoy Khanaqa BalkhNahr-i-Shahi Khulm Kunduz KishimTashkan Jurm Wardooj
Sheberghan (Provincial Center)Faizabad Marmul Chahar Darah Takhar
Balkh Khanabad
Dowlat abad Chimtal Bangi
Chahar Kent Fayroz Nakhcheer Ali Abad Farkhar Tagab Yamgan Zaybak
EshkamishNamak Ab
Shirin Tagab Sari Pul (Provincial Center) Sholgarah Hazrat-i-SultanBaghlan-i-Jadeed
Burka Khwajah Hijran (Jalgah)
Sar-i-Pol Sayyad Darah-i-Suf-i-Payin Khuram wa Sar Bagh
Faryab Qush Tepah Sozma Qala Warsaj
Almar Kishindeh Nahreen
Bil Chiragh Sangcharak Zari Samangan Khost wa Firing Kiran wa Munjan
Pashtun Kot Gosfandi Dahana-i- Ghuri Barg-i-Matal
Ghormach Baghlan
Qaisar Gurziwan Darah-i-Soof-i-Bala Roi-Do-Ab
Andarab Paryan Nuristan Paroon (Provincial Center)
Sari Pul Dushi
Kamdesh
Kohistanat Balkhab Khinjan Mandol
Bala Murghab Kohistan Kahmard Panjshir
Talah wa Barfak Salang
Nuristan Darah Waygal Nari
Gulran Muqur Chahar Sadah Shinwari Nijrab Ghazi Abad
Badghis Yakawlang Saighan Du Ab
Kushk (Rabat-i-Sangi) Shigal wa Sheltan
35°N Jawand Shebar
Parwan Kapisa Kunar Alingar 35°N
Kusk-i-Kohnah Ab Kamari Bamyan Dangam
Qadis Shaykh Ali Tagab Chapa Dara Mara warah
Qala-i-Now (Provincial Center) Chaghcharan (Provincial Center) Bamyan (Provincial Center) Surkh-i-Parsa Koh-i-Safi
Laghman Noor gal Sar Kani
Kohsan Lal wa Sarjangal
Karrukh Dowlatyar Hisah-i-Awal Behsud Jalrez Kabul
Kabul Surubi Qarghayee Behsud Khas Kunar
Enjil Chiisht-i-Sharif Panjab Goshta
Zendah Jan Hirat Obe Wardak Nerkh Khak-i-Jabar Lalpoor
Markaz-i- Behsud Hesarak Legend INDIA
Ghoryan Pashtun Zarghun Shahrak Do Lainah Sang-i-Takht Waras
Nangarhar
Daimirdad
Azra
Mohmand Dara
Hirat Tulak
Ishtarlay Chak-i-Wardak Khugyani AchinDur Baba
Logar Sayyidabad Jaji
21
Niizam-i-Shahid (Guzarah) Ghor Deh Bala Nazyan
Khedir Pul-i-Alam Khoshi
Fersi MirAmor Jaghatu Poppy eradication force (PEF)
Nili (Provincial Center) Day kundi Nawur Samkani
Adraskan Rashidan Kharwar Jaji Maidan Governor-led eradication (GLE)
Saghar Pasaband Shahristan Paktiya Bak
Taywara Kiti Ajristan Waghaz Deh Yak
Zurmat Shwak District boundary
Gizab Malistan Terayzai (Ali Sher)
Andar Mata Khan Nika
Khost
Shindand Kajran
Ghazni Ziruk
Pur Chaman Spera TanayGurbuz Provincial boundary
Jaghuri Qara BaghGiro Sar Rowza
Anar Darah Baghran Shahidi Hasas Chorah Khas Uruzgan
UrgunGiyan
Muqur
Kakar Kak-e Afghan Omna
Ab Band
Khak-i-Safed Bala Buluk Uruzgan Gelan Surubi Barmal
Gulistan Jani Khel
Musa Qala Dihrawud Daychopan
PushtRod Farah Nowzad Kajaki ArghandabShah Joi
Qala-i-Kah Nesh Miya Neshin Paktika
Farah (Provincial Center) Nawa Gomal
Bakw ah Naw Bahar Wazahkhwah
Shib Koh Washer Sangin Qala Shah Wali Kot
Mizan Zabul Qalat (Provincial Center)
Delaram Ghorak Khakrez Shinkai
PAKISTAN
Tarnak wa Jaldak Turwo Wor Mamay
Naher-i-Saraj Shemel zai
Lash-i-Juwayn Arghandab Atghar
Khash Rod Nad Ali Zhire
Maiwand
Lashkargah (Provincial Center) Kandahar (Provinclal Center) Arghistan
Maruf
Kang Nawa-i-Barukzai
Panjwayee Spin Boldak
Asl-i-Chakhansur
Hilmand Kandahar
IRAN Zaranj (Provincial Center)
Garm Ser Daman
Nimroz 0 50 100 200
Km
GCS_WGS_84
Chahar Burjak Shorabak
Reg-i-Khan Nishin Reg
30°N 30°N
Dishu
65°E 70°E 75°E
Source: MCN - UNO DC Afghani stan Erad ica tion Su rve y 200 9
Note: The bo undari es and na me s shown and th e d esi gnations u se d o n this ma p d o n ot imply o ffici al e ndorsement or accep tan ce by the United Na tio ns.
Afghanistan: Security incidents during eradication, 2009
60°E 65°E 70°E 75°E
UZBEKISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
Badakhshan
Yaftal-i-Sufla
TURKMENISTAN Argo
Kunduz Darayim
Jawzjan Balkh Takhar Kish imTashkan
Faryab Samangan
Ghorm ach Baghlan
Sari Pul Panjsher
Nijrab
Nuristan
Badghis
35°N Kushk (Rabat-i-Sang i) Parwan Kapisa Shig al wa Sheltan 35°N
Kunar
Bamyan Laghman Noor galDangam
Kabul Suru bi Khas Kunar Legend
Wardak Khugyani Lalpoor INDIA
Hirat Logar Sherzad
Nangarhar
Ghor AchinNazyan
Attack
Daykundi
22
Adraskan Paktya Demonstration
Ghazni Khost
Shin dand Mine explosion + Attack
Bala Bu luk
Dihrawud Tirin Kot (Pr ovincial Center)
No incidence
Paktika Province No of incidents Injured Dead Eradication
Farah Zabul (Ha)
Uruzgan
Badakhshan 3 5 420
Naher-i-Saraj Arghandab Day Kundi 0 27
Nad Ali Zhire Farah 0 43
Kandahar (Provinclal Center)
Nawa-i-Barukzai Faryab 2 1 1 261
Spin Boldak Hilmand 16 25 9 4,119
Hilmand Panjwayee
IRAN Hirat 1 1 1 67
Nimroz PAKISTAN Kabul 0 1
Kandahar 6 8 7 69
Kandahar Kapisa 0 31
Kunar 1 11
30°N Nangarhar 3 5 1 30°N
226
Uruzgan 1 3 74
0 50 100 200 Zabul 1 4 2 0
Km
GCS_WGS_84
60°E 65°E 70°E 75°E
Source: MCN - UNO DC Afghani stan Erad ica tion Su rve y 200 9
Note: The bo undari es and na me s shown and th e d esi gnations u se d o n this ma p d o n ot imply o ffici al e ndorsement or accep tan ce by the United Na tio ns.
Although the highest eradication of 4,119 ha was reported from Hilmand (1,475 ha GLE
and 2,644 PEF eradication), this amount is very low (6%) considering the amount of
opium cultivation in this province (69,833 ha). Eradication in Kandahar (69 ha) was
negligible in comparison to the total cultivation of 19,811 ha in this province. Eradication
in Badakhshan and Nangarhar, however, were 50% and 43% respectively of the total area
under opium cultivation in these provinces.
Figure 9: Distribution of GLE and PEF total eradication by province, 2009
Hilmand 55.1% 99%
Badakhshan 15.0% 1%
Faryab 9.8%
Nangarhar 8.5%
Uruzgan 2.8%
Kandahar 2.6%
Hirat 2.5%
Farah 1.6%
Kapisa 1.2%
Day Kundi 1.0%
Kunar 0.4%
Kabul 0.1%
0% 50% 100%
GLE PEF
PEF eradication activities started already in January 2009. The main part of the GLE
eradication was carried out in the month of March and efforts continued until June 2009.
Manual eradication using sticks was carried out during late flowering to capsule stage in
Nangarhar and Badakhshan provinces.
Opium prices continue to fall in 2009
In 2009, the average farm-gate price of dry opium at harvest time (weighted by
production) was US$ 64/kg; 34% lower than in 2008. For the same period, farm-gate
prices of fresh opium fell by 31% to US$ 48/kg (weighted price) at harvest time.8 These
were the lowest prices recorded since 2001.
MCN/UNODC has monitored opium prices on a monthly basis in various provinces of
Afghanistan since 1994. Monthly prices have shown a decreasing trend since 2005 in all
regions. Since mid-2007, opium prices at the trading level in the Western and Eastern
8
In 2008, the fresh and dry opium prices at harvest time were based on farmers responses collected through
the Annual Opium Survey, which was conducted slightly before the opium harvest. In 2009, prices at
harvest time were derived from the opium price monitoring system and refer to the month when opium
harvest actually took place in the different regions of the country.
23
regions tend to be higher than prices in other regions. Since 2005, opium prices have
been converging across the different regions of Afghanistan.
Figure 10: Afghanistan, dry opium prices reported by traders, by region (US$/kg), January 2005
to July 2009
300
200
US$/kg
100
0
Apr-05
Apr-06
Apr-07
Apr-08
Apr-09
Jan-05
Jul-05
Oct-05
Jan-06
Jul-06
Oct-06
Jan-07
Jul-07
Oct-07
Jan-08
Jul-08
Oct-08
Jan-09
Jul-09
Eastern Southern Western North-eastern Northern
Table 11: Regional farm-gate prices of dry opium at harvest time (US$/kg), 2008-2009
Average Dry Average Dry
Region Opium Price Opium Price Change
(US$/kg) 2008 (US$/kg) 2009
Central 171 160* -6%
Eastern 105 90 -14%
North-eastern 85 75 -12%
Northern 97 64 -34%
Southern 70 62 -11%
Western 103 72 -30%
National average
price weighted by 95 64 -33%
production**
* Prices for the Central region were taken from the annual village survey as there is no monthly opium
price monitoring in the Central region.
** In 2008, the dry opium prices at harvest time were based on farmers responses collected through the
Annual Opium Survey, which was conducted slightly before the opium harvest. In 2009, prices at harvest
time were derived from the opium price monitoring system and refer to the month when opium harvest
actually took place in the different regions of the country.
24
Lower opium prices in Afghanistan reflect the continuing high levels of opium
production, which is thought to exceed global demand for opium and its derivatives in the
illicit market. Lower prices were also one of the reasons why some farmers stopped
cultivating opium in 2009. Thus, the decrease in opium cultivation in 2009 can be
interpreted as a market correction. A 33% drop in the national average opium price is in
fact a drastic fall, which makes opium poppy a much less lucrative crop compared to the
previous years.
Total farm-gate value of opium drops by 40% to US$ 438 million
Based on potential opium production and reported opium prices, the farm-gate value of
the 2009 opium harvest amounted to US$ 438 million. The farm-gate value of opium as a
proportion of GDP decreased in 2009 to 4% compared to 7% in 2008 and 13% in 2007.
Gross income from opium decreases by 24% to US$ 3,562 per ha
Due to the low price of opium in 2009, the gross income for farmers per hectare
decreased by 24% to US$ 3,562. This was the lowest per hectare income from opium
since 2004. At the same time, the per hectare income of wheat was at a relatively high
level, albeit lower than in 2008, when wheat prices reached record levels worldwide.
Over the last years, the discrepancy between (illicit) gross income from opium and (licit)
income from wheat has shrunk considerably, driven by decreasing farm-gate prices for
opium and, more recently, by higher wheat prices.
Table 12: Gross income from opium and wheat (US$/ha), 2003-2009
Income in US$/ha Ratio
Year opium/wheat
Opium Wheat income
2003 12,700 470 27:1
2004 4,600 390 12:1
2005 5,400 550 10:1
2006 4,600 530 9:1
2007 5,200 546 10:1
2008 4,662 1,625 3:1
2009 3,562 1,101 3:1
In prices of the reporting year, not adjusted for inflation. Income from poppy stalks and seeds and from
wheat straw is not considered in this calculation.
25
Figure 11: Reasons for stopping opium cultivation in or before 2009 (n=1,877 farmers)
It was banned by government 33%
Low sale price of opium 18%
It is against Islam 16%
Not enough yield 6%
Lack of experience 4%
Land/climate conditions not suitable 4%
Elders and shura decision 4%
High price of wheat 3%
No response/No data 3%
It is harmful for human beings 2%
Lack of water 2%
Fear of government 2%
Fear of eradication 1%
Other 1%
High cost of inputs (fertilizer, labours etc) 1%
It is not the custom 0.1%
0% 20% 40%
Reasons for cultivating and/or stopping cultivation
In 2009, farmers who stopped cultivating opium in 2009 or before were asked about their
major reason for doing so. The Government ban on opium cultivation was mentioned by
about 33% of the respondents, making it the most frequently cited reason for stopping.
Low sale prices of opium were the second main reason. In previous years, low opium
prices were mentioned by only a very small percentage of farmers. This provides some
evidence for the argument that reduction in opium cultivation is partly a response to
market changes.
The high sale price was the most important reason cited by farmers (61%) for cultivating
opium poppy in 2009. Provision of basic food and shelter for the family, high demand for
opium and the fact that it was an easy way to earn money were other important reasons
given.
26
Figure 12: Reasons for cultivating opium in 2009 (n=508 farmers in 2009)
High sale price of opium 61%
Poverty (provision of basic food and shelter) 11%
High demand for opium 8%
Easy way to earn more money 7%
High income from little land 5%
Possibility of getting loan 2%
Other 2%
It is a custom 2%
To improve living condition 1%
No response/No data 1%
Climate conditions suitable 1%
Low cost of inputs (seeds, fertilizer, labour) 1%
0% 35% 70%
Strong correlation between lack of security and opium cultivation
Eighty four per cent of the opium cultivated in 2009 was concentrated in Hilmand,
Kandahar, Uruzgan, Day Kundi, and Zabul provinces of the Southern region. These are
the most insecure provinces where security conditions are classified as high or extreme
risk by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). Most of the
districts in this region were not accessible to the UN and NGOs.
Farah, Nimroz and Badghis, which are insecure province in the Western region,
contributed to 15% of cultivation, thus 99% of the total opium cultivation came from the
Southern and Western regions. Anti-government elements (AGE) as well as drug traders
are very active in the Western region. Provinces in the south are the strongholds of
AGEs, while provinces in the west (Farah, Badghis and Nimroz) are known to have
organized criminal networks. The link between lack of security and opium cultivation
was also evident in Nangarhar province (Eastern region), where cultivation was located
in districts classified as having high or extreme security risk.
Security incidents in Afghanistan have been on the rise every year since 2003, especially
in the south and south-western provinces. The number of security incidents increased
sharply in 2006, in parallel with the increase of opium cultivation. 2009 shows further
sharp increase in the security incidents.
27
Security level (as of 16 July 2009) and opium cultivation in Nangarhar, 2009
70° E 70° E 71° E 71° E
Kapisa
Parwan Kunar
Darah-i- Noor
Laghman
Kuzkunar
35° N
35° N
Kabul
Behsud Kama Goshta
Jalalabad
Surkh Rud
Lalpoor
Hesarak
Chaparhar Rodat Bati Kot
Nangarhar
Khugyani
Mohmand Dara
Sherzad Shinwar
Kot
Logar
Pachir wagam Deh Bala Dur Baba
Nazyan
Achin
34° N
34° N
Legend
Cultivation
Opium poppy field locations
Paktiya Agricultural area
Security
PAKISTAN
Extreme Risk
0 10 20 40
km High Risk
Geographic projection: WGS 84
Medium Risk
Khost
70° E 70° E 71° E 71° E Low Risk
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement
or acceptance by the United Nations. Source security map: United Nations Department of Safety and
Security.
Figure 13: Number of security incidents by month, January 2003 to June 2009
1200
1000
2003
800 2004
2005
600 2006
2007
400 2008
2009
200
0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Source: United Nations Department of Safety and Security
28
Security map (as of 16 July 2009) and opium cultivation in Afghanistan by province, 2009
60°E 65°E 70°E 75°E
UZBEKISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
Badakhshan
Balkh 557
Jawzjan Kunduz Takhar
Faryab Samangan
Baghlan
Sari Pul Security
5,411 Panjshir
Nuristan
Extreme Risk
Parwan Kapisa 164 High Risk
35°N
35°N
Badghis Bamyan
135 Kunar
Kabul Laghman Medium Risk
132 Low Risk
556 Wardak
294
Day Kundi Nangarhar
Ghor Logar
Hirat Opium cultivation
10,000
(ha) by province
29
Ghazni Paktya
3,002 Khost
District boundary
Provincial boundary
Farah Uruzgan 9,224 International boundary
12,405 Paktika
1,144 Panjshir
Hilmand Nuristan
Parwan
Zabul Kapisa
Kunar
Kandahar 164
Laghman
69,833 Kabul 135
Nimroz 132
19,811
IRAN Wardak Nangarhar
428 PAKISTAN 294
Logar
30°N
30°N
Paktiya
0 45 90 180 Ghazni
Khost
km
Geographic projection: WGS 84
60°E 65°E 70°E Paktika 75°E
Source security map: UNDSS
Source cultivation :Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
Note: The boundries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations
Role of counter-narcotic activities
The last few months have seen a rise in the number of counter-narcotics activities
conducted by national authorities and ISAF. The survey was not specifically designed to
estimate the impact of counter-narcotics activities on opium cultivation. It is nonetheless
interesting to note that although relatively few of the farmers interviewed had reportedly
heard of counter-narcotics activities in their village area, most of those who had were
farmers who had stopped growing poppy. Almost none of the poppy farmers, on the other
hand, reported they knew of counter-narcotics activities in their area.
Interviews with key informants revealed that it seems to be a rather common occurrence
for drug traders to lose a shipment due to counter-narcotics activities. Over half of the
informants interviewed had themselves lost a shipment in the last 12 months, and an even
higher proportion knew of others who had. Many knew about clandestine laboratories
having been destroyed, and often they could recall several instances when laboratories
were destroyed by NATO/ISAF and/or ANP. While some thought that the risk of losing a
shipment had remained the same in the past 12 months, a large majority of the informants
thought it had indeed increased.
In October 2008, based on the request of the Afghan Government, consistent with UN
Security Council Resolutions and under ISAF's existing operational plan, NATO Defence
Ministers agreed that ISAF could act in concert with Afghan police and army against
narcotics facilities and facilitators who support the insurgency. Narcotics
facilities/facilitators were defined as all facilities associated with the narcotics industry
and those individuals involved in the processing, storing and transporting of illegal
narcotics or precursor chemicals that directly support the insurgency.
Figure 14: Results of counter-narcotics operations as reported by NATO/ISAF and CNPA
500
459
400
338
295
300
200
134
98
100 74
61
50
36 27
19
2 5 7 2
0
Opium (wet Poppy seeds Heroin (mt) Morphine Cannabis Precursors Labs (no.) Guns (no.)
and dry) (mt) (mt) (mt) resin (mt) (mt)
NATO/ISAF (January - July 2009) CNPA (April 2008 - March 2009)
Source: Statistics compiled by ISAF Headquarters, CNPA Annual Report 2008.
30
Against this background, over the period from April 2008 to July 2009, ISAF/NATO, the
Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and other Afghan forces together
seized considerable volumes of opiates, poppy seeds, cannabis, precursors and labs (see
Figure 14 and Table 13).
Table 13: Results of counter-narcotics operations as reported by ISAF/NATO, January to July
2009
Other
Mor- Canna- Canna- Acetic precur-
Poppy Opium Heroin
Province phine bis seed bis resin Anhyd- sors/ Labs
Seed (mt) (mt)* (mt)
(mt) (mt) (mt) ride (lt) chemi-
cals (mt)
Badakhshan 0.03
Farah 0.60 2.27 0.02 1
Hilmand 456.28 42.81 0.46 0.59 10.95 4,180 91.10 17
Hirat 0.14
Kandahar 2.03 1.28 0.85 3.99 8.23 900 1.40 1
Nangarhar 0.13 2.67 6.81 0.12 0.18 400 1.41 8
Uruzgan 0.76
Total 459 50 7 2 4 19 5,480 94 27
* 80% of the total weight of the seized amount was wet and 20% dry opium.
Source: Statistics compiled by ISAF Headquarters.
Combined ISAF/NATO and Afghan forces conducted counter narcotics operations in 7
provinces (namely Badakhshan, Farah, Hilmand, Hirat, Kandahar, Nangarhar, and
Uruzgan), mainly focusing on Hilmand and Nangarhar (especially the district of Achin).
They destroyed a total of 27 labs, 17 of them in Hilmand and 8 in Nangarhar,
corroborating the assumption that a large proportion of the morphine/heroin
manufacturing is taking place within Afghanistan.
Twelve laboratories were seized in Sangin district of Hilmand alone, suggesting that this
district is crucial for drug traffickers. In addition, large opium seizures at the border of
Hilmand with Pakistan indicate high volumes of opium trafficking in this area. The
location of laboratories in the most insecure areas of Afghanistan further substantiates the
link between insurgency and opiates trade.
Despite this recent success, seizure levels in Afghanistan in terms of proportion of opium
production are still very low. Between 2002 and 2007, the proportion of opiates seized in
Afghanistan, expressed in opium equivalents and measured as a proportion of annual
production in Afghanistan, was usually in the range of 1% or 2 % and never higher than
4%. Preliminary figures for 2008 show a similar picture. The steep increase in opium
production in 2006 and 2007 did not lead to correspondingly higher seizures in
Afghanistan and Pakistan but did in the I. R. of Iran.
31
Figure 15: Opiates seizures in Afghanistan, I. R. of Iran and Pakistan as proportion of Afghan
annual opium production, 2002-2007
25% 9,000
As % of opium production in Afghanistan
8,000
20% 7,000
Opium production (mt)
6,000
15%
5,000
4,000
10%
3,000
5% 2,000
1,000
0% 0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Afghanistan opium production Pakistan seizures (as % of production)
Afghanistan seizures (as % of production) Iran seizures (as % of production)
Combined seizures (as % of production)
Opium, morphine and heroin seizures of unknown purity of opium equivalents. Conversion of
morphine/heroin to opium equivalents 1:10.
Source: UNODC, World Drug Report 2009.
32
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