Fear and Futility:
U.S. Civil Defense during the Cold War
The international symbol of Civil Defense.
Ben Elron April 28th, 2008
On August 6th, 1945, President Harry Truman ordered that a nuclear bomb be dropped on the city of Hiroshima, Japan, making one of the most controversial decisions of the 20 th century and forever changing the concept of war.1 No longer were the worst atrocities of the battlefield limited to guns and conventional bombs – no, a new weapon, one with the power to destroy nations and even end the human race, was now a harsh reality. Fifteen years after Hiroshima, two powerful nations again found themselves in a conflict, only this time each side possessed ‘the bomb’. Cold War tensions between Soviet Union and the United States fluctuated, but during a few events, such the Cuban Missile Crisis, they rose to the point that it was a near certainty that there would be an exchange of nuclear weapons between the two powers2; for the citizens of these countries, it was only a question of when. This excruciating tension – the idea that, at any time, without any notice, the world around you could cease to exist – was by some accounts the scariest and most depressing feeling imaginable and was one of the driving forces behind the U.S. Civil Defense program. Officials believed that if citizens believed they had a chance to survive an attack they would be less fearful of it.3 The logic was sound; the implementation was anything but: botched public relations programs, pointless policies and public indifference led to a program that caused public outcry and generated unnecessary anguish. Instead of calming fear, the program instead highlighted the suicidal
1
Rose, Kenneth D. One Nation Underground: The Fallout Shelter in American Culture. New York: New York Univeristy Press, 2001, page 15.
2
Rose, 15.
1
nature of a nuclear exchange4 and caused controversy, unrest and, in some cases, even riots. While it may have helped in deterring Soviet use of the bomb, it was at the cost of government credibility: the Civil Defense policies were considered by some to be deceitful and preposterous. In addition, there is little doubt that had an actual attack occurred, the Civil Defense program would have fallen far short of its promises. The United States Cold War Civil Defense program was generally a failure: while it did contribute to deterrence, it was poorly conceived and implemented, unnecessarily instigated fear and anxiety, and probably would have failed had it ever been tested. The U.S. Civil Defense program was created for three fundamental reasons: to reduce public fear of a nuclear war, to protect the public in the event of a nuclear war and to deter the Soviet Union from dropping a nuclear bomb on the U.S. in the first place. As mentioned in the introduction, U.S. citizens spent several years terrified that the world around them would soon cease to exist. As one survivor stated, “Those who did not live through [the Cold War] find it hard to imagine the atmosphere of fear and anxiety created by the constant threat of nuclear war.”5 The responsibility to quell this understandable anxiety fell to its source: the U.S. government. On December 16th, 1950, the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) was created by Executive Order at the request of President Truman.6 A month later the Federal Civil Defense
4
Garrison, Dee. Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, inside cover.
5 6
Garrison, 127; this is a quote from a Cold War survivor. (Primary Source) Davis, Tracy C. Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007, page 340. 2
Administration (FCDA) was created.7 The first action of these agencies was to focus on a massive public relations campaign, the purpose of which was to “convince the public that civil defense was not just necessary, but actually possible.”8 As one propaganda poster so optimistically proclaimed, “You can survive. You can survive through an atomic bomb raid and you won’t have to have a Geiger counter, protective clothing or special training to do it.”9 Unfortunately, as this paper will discuss later, this was proven not to be the case. However, the FCDA and the ODM, in full knowledge that the programs they were promoting would do little to no good during an actual attack, still worked aggressively to persuade the U.S. public (and the Soviet Union) that the attacks were survivable. One reason for their continued promotion of a program they discovered to be flawed was the concept of deterrence. It was critical that the United States maintain the impression that its citizens and society would not be easily obliterated by a nuclear war; by reducing the perceived power of the bomb, the U.S. was undermining the significance of nuclear weaponry and thus deterring its use by the Soviet Union. A Stanford professor observed that the United States without Civil Defense would have to “either invite an attack or give into the Kremlin without a struggle.” 10 In fact, Civil Defense was actually an active defense technique that was part of a layered defense strategy which included weaponry and intelligence.11 The Federal Civil Defense Administration led a widespread public education program designed to teach nuclear survival techniques and instill confidence in the public. Public
7 8
Garrison, 35. Garrison, 36. 9 Rose, 23; direct quotation from a Cold War propaganda poster. (Primary Source) 10 Rose, 87. 11 Davis, 13. 3
education was perhaps the most memorable effort of the FCDA; throughout the ‘60s and the ‘70s, they produced posters, pamphlets, books, videos and even comic books for children. The media provided advice concerning warning systems, shelter preparation, fallout protection and immediate cover techniques. Adults were ominously warned that “Civilians [were] Enemy Target Number One!”12 They were encouraged to stock emergency food supplies with the slogan “Grandma’s pantry was ready, is your ‘pantry’ ready in event of emergency?”13 A campaign called “Alert America,” a convoy of traveling civil defense exhibits and events, intended to “awaken American men and women, boys and girls, no matter who they are, what they are, or what their station in life may be, to the urgency of their participation in Civil Defense.”14 Called the “most far-reaching public education project of its kind,” the program had thirty tractor-trailer trucks travel 36,000 miles throughout America and had a total audience of over 1.1 million people.15 It was “blatantly pressed on children” as well.16 In fact, the FCDA had several programs directed at children; the most famous (and perhaps the best known of all FCDA public education programs) was the “Bert the Turtle” campaign. Produced as an animated film and booklet in 1951, the lovable turtle character instructed children to “Duck and Cover” following the flash of light from a nuclear explosion.17 These programs, while well-produced and distributed, were highly controversial and were ineffective in galvanizing the population into embracing civil defense. On the one hand,
12 13
Rose, 6. Rose, 142; direct quote from a Cold War era propaganda poster. (Primary Source) 14 Davis, 23. 15 Davis, 24. 16 Davis, 25. 17 Rose, 128; from Cold War Civil Defense public education materials. (Primary Source) 4
officials were accused of fear-mongering. A 1960 Chicago Tribune article complained that “Civil defense officials painstakingly heighten our fears of Russia and then refer to someone’s “pushing the wrong button,” thus showing the danger of accidental warfare.” 18 On the other hand, the programs seemed to only heighten awareness of the massive destruction a nuclear strike would cause, and the futility in preparing for one. “A surprise attack would kill 50 per cent [sic] of us, regardless of whether or not we had bomb shelters… ‘The shelters would merely serve as our tombs.’”19 One prominent physician dismissed Civil Defense planning as an ‘illusion’: “Even the simplest thinking leads you to see that it is an illusion…” 20 In terms of preparation, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, unquestionably the climax of Cold War Tensions, 40% of Americans took no Civil Defense preparations whatsoever.21 When sirens sounded during an accidental activation of civil defense procedures in Oakland, California, only 10% of city occupants turned on the radio to find out if anything was happening, and far fewer took the ‘correct’ action of sheltering in place.22 Researchers later concluded that even if the siren had sounded a second time, 75% of the occupants would have ignored the warning completely. 23 Even in Washington, D.C., a prime target for a nuclear attack, the response to an accidental siren activation in federal buildings was abysmal: when the sirens went off, 34% of federal employees reported they were “curious,” 18% were “confused,” 16% were “uneasy,” 6% were
18
Bryant, Alice Franklin. "Contradictions in Civil Defense." Chicago Daily Tribune 27 Apr. 1960: 18. ProQuest Platinum. ProQuest. 27 Apr. 2008 . (Primary Source) 19 Bryant. (Primary Source) 20 Baldwin, Hanson W. "THE CASE AGAINST FALLOUT SHELTERS." Saturday Evening Post 31 Mar. 1962: 8-9. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. 27 Apr. 2008 . (Primary Source) 21 Davis, 31. 22 Davis, 33. 23 Davis, 33. 5
“irritated,” and 2% were “excited or scared.”24 Not a single person took shelter. Among federal employees working in Washington, D.C., not a single one responded to the sirens as they were supposed to, virtually proving that the advance warning system would have been ignored during an actual nuclear attack. According to New England Civil Defense officials, “A $2 billion warning and protection network designed to save Americans in the event of nuclear war is almost useless…”25 Even if citizens had heeded the warnings of a nuclear attack, the recommended policies were poorly received and adopted. The first recommendation of the FCDA was to evacuate target cities before the bomb actually exploded. However, this was quickly proven impractical – a large scale test of the idea in Chicago indicated that, in a real surprise attack, there would not be sufficient warning time. In addition, “the unpredictable dispersion of fallout ‘[would] not support the policy of pre-attack evacuation.’”26 The second and enduring idea was that of ‘Shelter-in-Place.’ This included sheltering at home, in school or at the workplace for a period lasting anywhere from 2-6 weeks, until the fallout had dispersed. This elaborate plan obviously required the widespread construction of blast-resistant fallout shelters, the stocking of food and medical supplies and warning systems to get everyone into the shelters in time. Unfortunately, completing this was even harder than it sounds. For one thing, many experts believed such a program was useless. One physician went so far as to call it dangerous: “it is extremely dangerous to give the impression to the public that the building of fallout shelters
24 25
Davis, 34. Schneider, Andrew. "CIVIL DEFENSE IN A SHAMBLES; [FIRST Edition]." Boston Globe, 20 Apr. 1980: 1. ProQuest Platinum. ProQuest. 27 Apr. 2008 . (Primary Source) 26 Rose, 28. 6
will enable the average citizen to survive a nuclear war.”27 Aside from that, a 1958 report estimated the cost of such a widespread program at anywhere from $20 to $150 billion.28 In place of this prohibitively expensive ‘national shelter construction program,’ the government created a ‘national shelter plan’ which placed the onus on homeowners and business to construct and maintain their own shelters.29 This so-called “do-it-yourself” shelter policy was accompanied by posters, pamphlets and purchase programs to help homeowners with their new shelter. Of all U.S. households, 0.4% actually constructed a shelter.30 Many were probably influenced by the general opinion that shelters were, as one 1962 magazine article put it, “limited and unreliable in usefulness, and … generally dependent on variables and unknowns.”31 Others were simply confused: “the confusion and cross purposes [surrounding the shelter debate] do little credit to a government which has appeared as mixed up as its citizens.”32 Indeed, the perceived program inadequacies led many to distrust the government and its programs during a critical period in history. However, whether they were decidedly against the government program, ambivalent or simply confused, the vast majority of Americans spent the Cold War out of reach of a fallout shelter. Even if every single American family had constructed their own shelter, stocked it with six weeks of food and moved into it immediately when the sirens sounded, the question of the aftermath was as troubling as the anticipation. In a special issue on fallout shelters, complete
27 28
Baldwin. (Primary Source) Rose, 30; information taken directly from 1958 report. (Primary source) 29 Rose, 34. 30 Rose, 187. 31 Baldwin. (Primary Source) 32 Baldwin. (Primary Source) 7
with an introductory letter by President Roosevelt, Life magazine claimed that fallout shelters could save 97% of the U.S. population, a claim that most Americans viewed as a blatant lie.33 However, even if the preposterous 97% survival rate was true, what would be the fate of the survivors? George Kennan asked “Are we to flee like haunted creatures from one defensive device to another, each more costly than the one before, cowering underground one day, breaking up our cities the next, attempting to surround ourselves with elaborate electronic shields on the third, concerned only to prolong our life while sacrificing all the values for which it might be worth while [sic] to live at all?”34 Indeed, the ethical dilemma surrounding the aftermath of a nuclear attack was heated35 and grim, and may well have contributed to decreased morale and decreased participation in the Civil Defense program. Civil Defense may not have been a complete failure; in fact, despite all its short comings, some may argue that it was a success in that it may have helped prevent nuclear war from ever occurring. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were ready to launch a devastating attack at any moment. However, neither did. Deterrence was partially responsible for this. The most notable deterrence policy during the Cold War was that of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).36 This policy took into account the fact that, if either nation launched an attack on the other, the other would have enough warning to launch a fullscale retaliatory attack, thus resulting in the obliteration of both nations. Because this was a (particularly gruesome) lose-lose scenario, it is fair to say that both nations were deterred from
33 34
Rose, 81; information from Cold War Life magazine issue. (Primary Source) Rose, 86; direct quote from George Kennan. (Primary Source) 35 Rose, 86-7. 36 Garrison, 6. 8
using the bomb because of MAD.37 However, the policy was a bit more complex; it is dependent on the vulnerability of each population being equal; if a population had a better chance of surviving a nuclear attack (such as with the protection theoretically given by the Civil Defense program), they might be considered to have a competitive advantage, thus rendering MAD irrelevant and deterring the use of the bomb by one country more than the other.38 “Holding populations hostage is the essence of MAD,” writes Dee Garrison, author of Bracing for Armageddon. “Deterrence will prevent war only if it rests on the certainty of mutual suicide.”39 In disrupting the ‘certainty of mutual suicide,’ Civil Defense, however ineffective it was, was recognized as vital; a 1955 ‘Letter to the Editor’ in the New York Times reflects this: “Deterrence of war is the world’s best hope. An instantly ready offensive is the best deterrent, but as an atomic stand-off approaches, military and civil defense assume new proportions in building a flexible shield around our freedom.”40 However, as Garrison points out, this attempted advantage could be dangerous as well: “… civil defense breaks a key MAD rule: each nuclear power must accept mutual vulnerability if deterrence is to work. Any really serious attempt to defend one’s population from certain destruction sends a dangerous message that the country with a massive civil defense program might even be planning a first strike.”41 However, as Leon Gouré, a Civil War Sovietologist and Soviet Civil Defense expert, pointed out to the Washington Post in 1984, “Soviet civil defense was ‘extremely comprehensive’… Civil defense, …, was a key
37 38
Garrison, 6-7. Garrison, 6-7. 39 Garrison, 6. 40 Halaby, N. E. "Organizing for Survival." New York Times 22 Mar. 1955: 30. ProQuest Platinum. ProQuest. 27 Apr. 2008 . (Primary Source) 41 Garrison, 7. 9
component of the Soviet Union's nuclear war doctrine.”42 In addition, Gouré believed that the Soviet Union placed just as much, if not more, importance than the U.S. on Civil Defense as a deterrent. In his 1973 book "War Survival in Soviet Strategy,” he explained: "The fundamental Soviet view is that the better the USSR is prepared for war, the greater and more credible is its ability to deter its adversary from risking military confrontation. This is the main reason why Moscow categorically rejects any concept of security based on a balance of 'mutual assured destruction.' " 43 Then- U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown disagreed, writing “I don't think massive civil defense programs are going to succeed in protecting the population of countries that try it. I think that the Soviet civil defense program, although it probably is 10 times as big as ours, would not, in my judgment prevent Soviet industry or a great fraction of the Soviet population from being destroyed in an all-out thermonuclear war...In a limited (nuclear) war if you target cities they're not going to be saved by civil defense.”43 Ironically, this statement (that Civil Defense could not save cities) by a top government official completely contradicted the official position of the ODM, FCDA and FEMA, all U.S. government agencies. The U.S. Cold War Civil Defense program may have contributed to nuclear deterrence. However, it was poorly executed, created an unnecessary fear that lasted for generations, was virtually ignored by the vast majority of the population, and wounded the credibility of our government at a critical time. Its policies were expensive, pointless and often
42
Holley, Joe. "Leon Gouré, 84; Sovietologist and Civil Defense Expert." Washington Post 5 Apr. 2007: B08. washingtonpost.com. 27 Apr. 2008 . (Primary Source) 43 Cox, Arthur Macy. "WHY THE U.S.,SINCE 1977,HAS BEEN MISPERCEVING SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH; [op-ed]." New York Times 20 Oct. 1980: A19. ProQuest Platinum. ProQuest. 27 Apr. 2008 .(verbatim from the Washington Post). (Primary Source) 10
preposterous. In short, the U.S. Civil Defense program was, for the most part, an exercise in futility. Unfortunately, the failures of the Office of Defense Management and the Federal Civil Defense Administration were omens of disaster for their successor, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Fifty years after the introduction of an agency designed to cope with disaster, the U.S. government fell far short of an effective response to the disasters created by Hurricane Katrina. Will our government ever be able to effectively plan for disaster? It is not without precedent. As Gouré pointed out, the Soviet Civil defense program was considered by many to have been successful.44 We can only hope that our government continues to learn from its mistakes, and that if a disaster as terrible as nuclear war were to befall the United States, our government would have made preparations better than those made during the Cold War.
44
Holley. (Primary Source) 11
Works Cited
Primary: “Assume Every U. S. City Can Be Attacked.” Science News Letter 7 July 1956: 3. JSTOR. 10 Apr. 2008 . This source lists some commonly accepted facts about nuclear war during the Cold War. While these facts seemed obvious at the time, they are not so now, and may help in learning more about the assumptions used in designing civil defense procedures. “ATOM DEFENSE CENTER :Civil Unit Opens in Illinois -- To Give Help in Raids.” New York Times 20 Oct. 1958. ProQuest Platinum. ProQuest. 11 Apr. 2008 . This short article provides information on the nation’s first Hydrogen Bomb shelter in Chicago. This primary source uses phrases such as “the nuclear age” and “civil defense control center”, reflecting on the attitude of the era and providing information on the creation of nuclear bunkers in the United States. Baldwin, Hanson W. "THE CASE AGAINST FALLOUT SHELTERS." Saturday Evening Post 31 Mar. 1962: 89. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. 27 Apr. 2008 . This article provides a well-justified argument against fallout shelters. It focuses on the best and worst-case scenarios, the ethics and the price of shelter programs. Betts, Charles A. “Expense of Civil Defense.” Science News Letter 30 Oct. 1965: 282-283. JSTOR. 10 Apr. 2008 . In listing the prices of various civil defense items, this article actually contains some very useful information on how families adopted civil defense recommendations. 12
Bryant, Alice Franklin. "Contradictions in Civil Defense." Chicago Daily Tribune 27 Apr. 1960: 18. ProQuest Platinum. ProQuest. 27 Apr. 2008 . This 1960 newspaper article provides a glimpse into the controversy surrounding Civil Defense during the Cold War. The author brings up several points regarding the futility and deterrence. Cox, Arthur Macy. “WHY THE U.S.,SINCE 1977,HAS BEEN MISPERCEVING SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH; [op-ed].” New York Times 20 Oct. 1980: A19. ProQuest Platinum. ProQuest. 27 Apr. 2008 . A very interesting discussion on the U.S. government perception of Soviet Civil Defense preparations. Cox reveals stubbornness and dissent within U.S. Civil Defense leadership. Halaby, N. E. “Organizing for Survival.” New York Times 22 Mar. 1955: 30. ProQuest Platinum. ProQuest. 27 Apr. 2008 . This 1955 New York TImes “Letter to the Editor” comments on a proposed Civil Defense program in New York. Of particular interest, it praises the deterrence value of such a program. Holley, Joe. "Leon Gouré, 84; Sovietologist and Civil Defense Expert." Washington Post 5 Apr. 2007: B08. washingtonpost.com. 27 Apr. 2008 . This obituary for Civil War Sovietologist Leon Goure provides primary source material in the form of quotes and opinions given during the Cold War. He comments on the deterrence effect of Soviet Civil Defense, and argues that it played a key role in determining U.S.-Soviet relations. Schneider, Andrew. “CIVIL DEFENSE IN A SHAMBLES; [FIRST Edition].” Boston Globe 20 Apr. 1980: 1. ProQuest Platinum. ProQuest. 27 Apr. 2008 . 13
Schneider comments on the Civil Defense siren network in Boston, and quotes key government officials. Many believe the sirens would have no effect if sounded, others think they would cause panic.
Secondary: Davis, Tracy C. Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007. This source covers every aspect of U.S. Cold War civil defense, from “duck and cover” to continuity of government operations- it appears to comprehensively explain U.S. preparations for nuclear Armageddon. This source will provide a cultural context to the nuclear bunkers. Garrison, Dee. Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. This controversial book argues that civil defense programs, instead of calming the public and preparing them for an attack, worsened the fear of nuclear annihilation by highlighting the nearsuicidal nature of a nuclear exchange. This contrasting opinion is an important addition to my paper because it challenges the popular view that civil defense was well organized and theoretically effective. Jacobs, Robert A. “’’There Are No Civilians; We Are All at War’: Nuclear War Shelter and Survival Narratives during the Early Cold War.” Journal of American Culture 30.4 (2007): 401-416. ProQuest Platinum. ProQuest. Class of 1945 Lib., Phillips Exeter Acad., Exeter, NH. 10 Apr. 2008 .
14
Recounted in this five page article are stories from cold-war era civil defense classes, pamphlets and from civilians who lived during that time. They illustrate in detail the perception of the imminence of a nuclear strike, and the civil defense preparations instituted by the U.S. government Plamar, Norman, and John D. Gresham. DEFCON-2: Standing on the Brink off Nuclear War During the Cuban Missile Crisis. Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2006. The Cuban Missile Crisis is examined in detail, including the effect it had on U.S. society and on Civil Defense preparations- I think these particular areas will be useful in my research. Rose, Kenneth D. One Nation Underground: The Fallout Shelter in American Culture. New York: New York Univeristy Press, 2001. Mr. Rose writes a very detailed account of the role of the nuclear fallout shelter in American culture during the cold war, including its role in “schools, film, government bureaucracies, civil defense and literature.” He also details a few bunkers themselves and examines the world that would exist were they to have been used. The information contained in this book is incredibly relevant to my thesis, and I expect to focus a large part of my research on this novel. Swoboda, Ron. “Spelunking through the Cold War: What to Do with a Bomb Shelter.” New Orleans Magazine Nov. 2000: 36-37. ProQuest Platinum. ProQuest. Class of 1945 Lib., Phillips Exeter Acad., Exeter, NH. 10 Apr. 2008 . This article provides a fun and unique perspective on historical cold war bunkers. It will be useful in determining the current status of the bunkers I will discuss in my paper.
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Reference: "civil defense intelligence" The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military. Berkley Books, 2001. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. Phillips Exeter Academy. 12 April 2008 http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t63.e1674. This dictionary entry provided very basic information on military applications of civil defense and was a starting point for my research. "civil defense" The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military. Berkley Books, 2001. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. Phillips Exeter Academy. 12 April 2008 http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t63.e1673. This dictionary entry provided very basic information on civilian applications of civil defense and was a starting point for my research. “bunker” Wikipedia.org. Multiple authors. 12 April 2008. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bunker. This Wikipedia article, while not a source for any facts or data, did provide a comprehensive explanation and analysis of bunkers in general. It is also a source for several other internet sites that I will visit later in the research process.
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