The Ways Some Japanese Live Now: Three Problematic Age Groups Symposium The University of Michigan January 11-13, 2002
Statements and Data from Conference Participants for
The Young: Jobs and Relationships
Economic Recession, Social Change, and Japanese Youth Mary C. Brinton The deep and prolonged economic recession in Japan has produced dramatic changes in labor market conditions, especially in the past 5 years. The Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare reported that the job opening-applicant ratio in 2000 fell to its lowest level in the post-WWII period. The prospect of fewer job openings has heavily affected university graduates, but somewhat less recognized is the effect that it has had on less-educated workers— those with a high school education. With relatively high labor supply compared to demand, many companies are now able to hire university graduates over high school graduates for some positions that were previously targeted for the latter. This has meant that high schools with large numbers of work-bound graduates face a much harder time placing their students than previously. Up until the early 1990s, high school-employer networks in Japan and the system of jobmatching for new graduates performed by high schools were highly touted internationally as constituting an effective school-work system. Now that system appears to be in jeopardy, as many students cannot receive any placement from their schools due to the lack of available jobs. I postulate that three factors currently act in combination to put this system in crisis: 1) the reduction in numbers of jobs open to new high school graduates; 2) young people’ preference for non-“3k” (kitanai, kiken, kitsui) jobs, which s originated in the high labor-demand conditions of the mid-late 80s; 3) employers’ increasing reliance on part-time labor, including youth who are still enrolled in high school and are willing to work in the evenings and at night (e.g. in convenience stores). The first and third of these factors are primarily the result of the economic downturn. The second represents a preference shift on the part of less-educated youth, and is important because it means that some of the job offers (i.e. from small manufacturing firms) received by high schools are now snubbed by potential recruits and that instead, youth may prefer to begin their worklife in the service sector while they are still in school. These phenomena give rise to several important research questions. First, given that working while in high school is a relatively new phenomenon in Japan, what does it mean for graduates’ future earnings and work trajectory? This is a question that is heavily researched (and debated) by sociologists and labor economists for American youth. But we know virtually nothing about the implications for Japanese youth of working while in school. A likely scenario for many Japanese youth is that early entry of this sort into the workforce, rather than providing them with valuable work experience, sets them on a track of job-shifting from enterprise to enterprise within the service sector. This leads to a second question: On-the-job training and the duration of work experience with one firm have traditionally been very important in predicting an individual’ lifetime earnings and economic welfare in s Japanese society. If experience in a series of low-level service sector jobs, coupled with possible discontinuous work experience (in conjunction with the furiitaa phenomenon), becomes a more commonplace, normative pattern for the less-educated segment of Japan’ youth, what implications does s this have for the degree of social class inequality down the road, when the current generation enters their 30s and 40s? Third, what is the relationship between Japanese youths’ delayed entry into stable employment and the current extremely high mean age at marriage? Is there a relationship between social class/educational background and age at marriage (and does this relationship differ by sex)? These are just three of the many questions that changes in early work experience in Japan raise for the future lives of the current generation and for overall social stratification patterns.
Parasite Singles Aya Ezawa ‘ Parasite singles’ are conventionally known as unmarried men and women in their 30’ s, who are often working in irregular or temporary jobs (e.g. freelance writers), and continue to live with their parents as adults. Beyond enjoying low housing expenses, and little to no demands with regards to housework, cooking, and laundry, they are generally conceived as enjoying a life of high consumption, and little pressure regarding work, income, or the demands of family life. First named ‘ parasite singles’ by the Nikkei newspaper in 1994, parasite singles seem to have become a social trend. According existing statistics, the ratio of unmarried men and women aged 30-34 has significantly increased over the past decades (figure1), and a large majority of single women, as well as more than half of single men remain resident with their parents during this age period (figure 2). Are parasite singles the free-riding children of affluence? Discussions surrounding parasite singles seem to center on their lifestyle and high levels of consumption. Yet, it seems that parasite singles as a social phenomenon may also relate to other social changes affecting particularly women’ life course in contemporary Japan. Due to lack of space, I will limit my speculations here s to the situation of women. Working women’ residence at home seems to have increased during the years of the s Bubble Economy (figure 3). In such period of high consumption, residence at home might have been a strategy for women, which enabled them to purchase luxury goods despite comparatively low salaries (cf. figure 6). But the reasons for staying resident at home may also be more complex. For example, making consumption central to their lifestyle could also constitute an alternative to finding meaning in work and career. In other words, some women might have recognized their limited career prospects and turned to consumption as a source of meaning and status. In addition, it might be important to consider to what extent parasite singles are a class-specific phenomenon. While class consciousness (figure 4) may be a weak indicator of class status in Japan, it appears that unmarried women’ residence at home might be more common among the middle to upper classes. Some s women from lower class backgrounds may have similar salaries, but less opportunity to stay at home because of crammed housing conditions. Does the continued residence of middle class women at home perhaps symbolize their class status rather than attraction to consumption per se? Beyond the meanings of work and consumption, parasite singles may also reflect on changes in women’ perspectives on marriage. Are they postponing or resisting marriage? As s women are marrying later on average, it does not seem unusual that women of middle or upper class backgrounds reside at home prior to marriage. Viewed from this perspective, parasite singles may simply reflect continued guardianship of parents over their daughters’ lifestyle and chastity until marriage. Another possibility is that women resist conventional marriage. Enthusiasm for the role of a full-time wife and mother has clearly declined in the past decade (figure 5). There has also been a significant increase in unmarried mothers in the recent years (table 7), and lone parenthood often seems to be a lifetime identity. In remaining at home, women seem to have more freedom in working in low wage or even demanding jobs, as they have the ‘ wife’ (mother), who seems so necessary to build a career. Is women’ alternative to traditional marriage continued residence at s home?
Table 7 Summary of the 1993 national survey of mother and child and other households Heisei 5 nen zenkoku boshisetai to chosa no gaiyo Ministry of Health and Welfare, Children and Families Bureau Koseisho jido katei kyoku 1993
Trends of numbers and composition of mother and child households by marital status Boshi setai ni natta riyu betsu boshisetaisu oyobi kosei wariai no suii Year 1952 1956 1961 1967 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 *1998 1952 1956 1961 1967 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 *1998 Estimated number of households Total Widowed Subtotal all number separated Divorced Unmarried Other 694,700 590,900 103,700 52,400 11,200 40,100 1,150,000 896,000 254,000 168,000 22,000 64,000 1,029,000 793,000 236,000 173,000 20,000 43,000 515,300 351,100 164,200 122,100 9,400 32,800 626,200 387,300 238,900 165,100 15,300 58,500 633,700 316,100 317,500 240,100 30,300 47,100 718,100 259,300 458,700 352,500 38,300 67,900 849,200 252,300 596,900 529,100 30,400 37,300 789,900 194,400 578,400 507,600 37,500 33,400 954,900 178,800 763,100 653,600 40,200 69,300 Composition (%) 100.0 85.1 14.9 7.5 1.6 5.8 100.0 77.9 22.1 14.6 1.9 5.6 100.0 77.1 22.9 16.8 1.9 4.2 100.0 68.1 31.9 23.7 1.8 6.4 100.0 61.9 38.2 26.4 2.4 9.4 100.0 49.9 50.1 37.9 4.8 7.4 100.0 36.1 63.9 49.1 5.3 9.5 100.0 29.7 70.3 62.3 3.6 4.4 100.0 24.6 73.2 64.3 4.7 4.2 100.0 18.7 79.9 68.4 4.2 7.3
* Figures are taken from the 1998 version of the survey.
Off-Track: Negotiating careers in Japan Heidi Gottfried Bursting of the economic bubble has fueled the search for flexible alternatives to the standard employment contract with its implicit and explicit guarantees. As a result one of the former pillars of the Japanese employment system is undergoing change. By 1999 over 27 percent of the labor force was employed in non-standard work arrangements (Sato 2001). This trend has implications for ways of working, the construction of the ‘ normal’work biography, and collective-based standards and rights. Less obviously, while non-standard work relationships impact one generation, it has cross-generational spillover effects. There is a unique gender and age composition of non-standard labor in Japan. Male students (15-24) have the highest likelihood of occupying a particular form of temporary part-time work (arubaito), growing from 15.3 percent to 18.3 percent between 1987-92. More striking, agency temporary employment is largely a female-domain at 80 percent as compared to 57 percent in the US (Houseman and Osawa 2000). The Japanese Ministry of Labor (1998, 47) estimates that women 25 to 35 years old are three times as likely as women less than 25 years old and five-times as likely as women older than 35 years old to be agency temporary employees. When they reach the age of 35 women are no longer deemed suitable for this employment status. The increasing inability to secure employment in stable career-tracks limits access to long and broad internal labor markets. As a result many fall outside the systems of protections as established as part of the post-war social contract. Non-standard employment contracts do not offer workers compensatory wages or benefits earned by core regular workers. Whereas regular full-time employees receive universal health care coverage, only 66 percent of temporary agency workers enjoy the benefit, albeit higher than the 33 percent of part-time workers in Japan and 43.0 for agency temporaries in the US, which is the lowest rate of coverage of any employment category in the US. While two-thirds of agency temporary workers have access to employment insurance and pension insurance, a small percentage enjoys private enterprise annuities (9.6 percent), bonus payments (28.8 percent), and lump sum retirement payments (15.4 percent) (Houseman and Osawa 2000). Non-standard work arrangements are associated with more individualized employment contracts and create more fluid relationships between employers and employees, as work and workers no longer occupy a relatively stable location in an organizational space. Non-standard employment relations are not configured around the organizationally based career-track and do not fit around the image of “organization man.” Cumulative time no longer accords with linear progression for the constitution of a career path. For example, years of service and employment experience do not accumulate to place non-standard employees in line for in-house promotion or on the- job training. Weakened reciprocal rights and obligations make non-standard forms of employment more precarious than permanent full-time work, subject to easier termination and less certainty, and more unpredictable earnings. However, non-standard employment may offer a route to gain flexibility in the face of rigid expectations that bind permanent employees to organizations. It frees workers to move from workplace to workplace in search of opportunities. Benefits of such ‘ flexibility’may outweigh some costs of opting out of regular employment. What are the implications of increasing individualization of employment relationships and diversification of employment contracts? Will shifting employment statuses lead to permanent disadvantages and greater inequalities? How will the lack of formal belonging to an organization and tenuous job attachments affect identities? In particular, how will discontinuities and shifting career paths affect the meaning of work in young people’ lives? What effect will non-standard employment relationships have on social security systems and the s distribution of risks?
Data on employment patterns Contributions of part -time and full-time employment to overall employment change 1987-97, by gender (percentage of total employment in initial year) Country
Japan
1
Women Part-time 0.43 0.09 0.55 0.18
Full-time 0.07 0.70 -0.10 0.35
Part-time 0.34 0.04 0.13 0.17
Men Full-time 0.24 0.60 -0.02 -0.04
US2 Germany3 UK
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1999 (table 1.A.1 36) Incidence and composition of part -time employment of short-hours 4 and total parttime 5 employment by gender, 1997 Men’ Parts time employment as a % of total male employment Men’ total s part-time employment Germany6 Japan 3 Sweden UK US Short hours part-time employment for men Men’ s Share of short hours part-time employment in total male part-time employment 1997 (1987 in brackets) Women’ s Part-time employment as a % of total female employment Women’ s total parttime employment 29.9 36.1 24.9 40.9 19.5 14.2 7.2 7.6 23.9 8.0 Short hours part-time employment for women Women’ s Share of short hours part-time employment in total female parttime employment 1997 (1987 in brackets) 47.5 (32.0) 20.1 (21.1) 30.5 58.3 (60.2) 40.8 (44.8)
3.7 11.5 8.1 8.2 8.3
2.2 1.8 3.9 5.1 3.5
59.7 (51.6) 15.8 (18.9) 48.2 63.0 (55.6) 42.3 (45.4)
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1999 (table 1.A.4, 39)
1
actual hours instead of usual hours and 1986-96 this includes wage earners and salaried employees only. 1986-96 instead of 1987-97 and data for western Germany up to 1991 and unified Germany since 1992. 4 usual hours of work less than 20 hours per week 5 Usual hours of work less than 30 hours per week, except Japan, less than 35 hours 6 1996, 1986 brackets
2 3
NON-AGRICULTURAL SELFEMPLOYMENT COUNTRY GERMANY JAPAN SWEDEN UNITED KINGDOM UNITED STATES 1973 1979 1983 1989 1990 1994 1996 9.1 8.2 7.4 7.8 7.7 8.5 9.0 14.0 14.0 13.3 12.0 11.5 10.1 9.7 4.8 4.5 4.8 7.1 7.3 9.0 9.1 7.3 6.6 8.6 12.4 12.4 12.0 11.7 6.7 7.1 7.1 7.7 7.5 7.5 7.3 1997 1998 9.0 9.4 9.7 9.7 9.0 9.0 11.7 11.4 7.2 7.0
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (OECD 2000, table 5.1, p. 158)
PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT IN JAPAN, 1965-1998 (%)
1965 6.2 Source: Japanese Ministry of Labour (1999)
1970 6.7
1975 9.9
1985 11.1
1990 15.2
1995 17.4
1998 21.2
AGENCY TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES IN JAPAN, 1986-1996 (‘ 000) 1986 1989 1995 1996 87 317 630 720
Source: Brodsky 1994: 57
NON-STANDARD EMPLOYMENT IN JAPAN BY GENDER, 1982-1992 1982-1992
GENDER MALE FEMALE
Source: Sako 1997, 9-10
1982 8 31
1987 10 38
1992 13 39
In Japan, agency temporary jobs exhibit distinct characteristics. Such jobs demand both routinized and specialized skills. A minimum two years of on-the-job experience required by some temporary help agencies guarantees a more skilled and somewhat older agency temporary labor force than either their US counterparts or Japanese part -timers who may have no previous work experience and who may work in low skilled jobs. Japanese agency temporary employees tend to work for longer periods at any one assignment than their US counterparts, their overall job tenure at the temporary help agency lasts for three to five years on average, well below the rate among part-timers in Japan. More than 2/3 of agency temporary employees remain longer than one-year at the same client in contrast to the US where most remain less than one-year (Kojima and Fujikawa 2000).
Changes in the Transition from School to Work in Japan Hiroshi Ishida The transition from school to work in Japan has historically been considered an orderly sequence. However, there are recent changes which suggest that people are less likely to follow the traditional path from school to employment. The proportion of high school graduates who neither advance to higher levels of education nor take up full-time employment (the category labeled “no full-time employment” in official statistics) has increased steadily in the late 1990s reaching about ten percent of all graduates in 2000. The same proportion among university graduates is 23 percent in 2000 (see Figure 1). These graduates are believed to constitute the core of “freeter” population who are estimated to be 1.5 million according to the 2000 White Paper of Labor. The argument of “deregulat ion” has attracted a lot of attention of policy makers, the media, and the general public in recent Japan. The advocates of the “deregulation” claim that high schools and public employment offices not only are ineffective and but also interfere with the activities of the “free labor market,” and should no longer play the intermediating role of matching students to jobs. The transition from high school to work in Japan has historically been characterized by the heavy involvement of schools and public employment offices in the process of matching students to jobs. However, recently schools and public employment offices have often been criticized for not effectively assisting school graduates with finding appropriate employment. One of my research projects addressed the question of whether the declining proportion of school graduates who enter labor market directly after school graduation and the corresponding increase in the proportion of those who are classified into the category of “no full-time employment” are associated with the weakening of career guidance activities in schools. The analyses of the surveys of high schools in 1983 and 2000 show (1) that labor market conditions faced by the graduates in 2000 were worse than those in 1983, (2) that the re were a wide range of career guidance activities offered in schools both in 1983 and 2000 and that there was no evidence of weakening of these activities in 2000. If anything, the trend was reverse: more active involvement of schools in 2000 (see Tables). Furthermore, multivariate analyses of the two surveys suggest that industrial and commercial high schools (as opposed to academic high schools) and schools which had more explicit goals of career guidance were more likely to have better placement records and less likely to have students who neither go on to further education nor get full-time jobs. The results of the 2000 survey also report the attitudes of students, the lack of concern of the parents, and the unfavorable labor market conditions as the three main sources of the emergence of “freeter” population in Japan. Although the change in the attitudes of the young people is often singled out as the main factor in accounting for the increasing “freeter” population, the results of recent surveys are not always consistent with this hypothesis (see Figure 2 & 3). It is open to an empirical investigation whether the apparent shift away from the permanent form of employment prevails in the future and whether there are long-term consequences of engaging in non-regular employment.
Fi gure 1a D esti ons of hi schoolstudents after graduati nati gh on
100% other no f l m e ul-ti em pl ent oym f l me ul-ti em pl ent oym attendi ng vocati onal school s attendi ng uni versi i t es/coleg l e
80%
60%
40%
20%
0% 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Fi gure 1b Desti ons of j or-colege students after graduati nati uni l on
other
100%
no f l m e ul-ti em pl ent oym
80%
tem porary em pl ent oym
60% 40% 20% 0% 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
attendi ng uni versi i whie t es l worki ng full-tim e em pl ent oym attendi ng uni t es vesi i
Fi gure 1c D esti ons of uni nati versi students after graduati ty on
100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
other
no f l m e ul-ti em pl ent oym tem porary em pl ent oym attendi ng graduate school s whie working l full-tim e em pl ent oym attendi ng graduate school s
Source: Basic Survey of Schools, Ministry of Education, various years
Fi 2 P roporti of those w ho w ant to w ork as a regul em pl g. on ar oyee am ong j obseekers
70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 total 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-59 60-64 65 and over 1979 1987 1997
Source: Employment Status Surveys, various years
Fi 3 Reasons for not w orki as a regul w orker ri after graduati g. ng ar ght on
100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 graduati year on 1995 1996 1997 no i ntenti to on w ork as a regul worker ar j of ered di ob f d not fit m y needs no j of er ob f other
Source: Kurosawa and Genda, “From School to Work, ” The Journal of Labor Studies (May 2001), Figure 2
.Table 1 Job-related characteristics of schools by type of high school 1983 survey (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) total 2000 survey (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) total .all academic 807.3 854.1 336.3 320.3 58.30% 53.30% 73.80% 71.60% 63.80% 57.60% 14.40% 8.10% 10.40% 7.00% 40.8 17.7 34.20% 24.50%
726 155
Type of high school .all academic 1445.63 1410.12 682.09 583.50 74.11% 64.52% 67.41% 64.05% 66.24% 64.27% 27.04% 24.51% 28.28% 27.78% 77.61 50.08 49.97% 44.23%
1408 473
industrial commercial agricultural 1695.02 1480.89 1171.73 892.81 722.75 505.09 80.76% 78.89% 75.47% 64.89% 72.33% 73.64% 68.14% 66.57% 66.03% 33.50% 28.69% 16.94% 29.54% 31.28% 22.38% 115.90 96.51 48.55 52.26% 57.44% 45.82%
328 369 168
. home eonomics 1115.69 601.54 76.69% 71.11% 71.44% 24.73% 22.44% 44.09 51.09%
35
other 691.72 369.76 81.54% 50.77% 66.66% 22.55% 29.92% 47.84 44.50%
35
Type of high school industrial commercial agricultural 672.0 852.1 960.5 366.8 329.6 307.4 62.00% 54.70% 60.30% 72.20% 76.90% 80.30% 67.80% 66.10% 57.70% 18.40% 19.00% 8.80% 12.50% 12.40% 9.60% 57.8 53.2 21 39.00% 40.50% 28.80%
273 147 98
. home eonomics 1064.7 294.9 60.40% 63.50% 70.80% 6.90% 8.40% 7 22.60%
15
other 995.1 291.9 60.20% 67.40% 62.90% 7.50% 6.40% 27.4 32.00%
38
(1) total number of job openings per school (2) total number of firms which had job openings (3) percentage of those who found jobs among all job- seekers (4) percentage of those who found jobs in the same prefecture (5) percentage of those who were hired by their first choice employer (6) percentage of those who were hired by large firms (male) (7) percentage of those who were hired by large firms (female) (8) total number of firms with long-term relationship (9) percentage of those who were hired by firms with long-term relationship (10) total number of schools
.Table 2 Frequencies of activities to assist students .Q. How many times during the three years do you offer the following activities to students? 1983 survey 2000 survey mean st. dev. mean st. dev. A. Guidance meeting to all students 4.09 3.08 4.41 2.94 B. Talks by recent graduates C. Visits to employers D. Individual consultations E. Mock exams 0.85 1.19 4.94 4.06 0.95 1.28 3.91 3.14 1.12 1.91 5.37 3.70 1.05 2.02 4.61 3.81
.Table 3 Importance of various goals of career guidance .Q How much importance do you place on the following goals? A. to place students where they can use their specialty 1983 2000 1. Not important at all 8.6% 2.7% 2. Not so important 23.4% 24.8% 3. Somewhat important 46.5% 55.7% 4. Very important 21.6% 16.9% B. to place students in firms which have good wage and working conditions 1983 2000 1. Not important at all 0.8% 2.0% 2. Not so important 23.4% 36.7% 3. Somewhat important 61.6% 55.1% 4. Very important 14.7% 6.3% C. to maintain and expand the long- term relationships with firms 1983 2000 1. Not important at all 1.2% 0.3% 2. Not so important 15.9% 3.7% 3. Somewhat important 55.2% 40.9% 4. Very important 27.8% 55.2% D. to increase the proportion of those who are hired by their first choice 1983 2000 1. Not important at all 4.7% 3.2% 2. Not so important 27.4% 20.1% 3. Somewhat important 43.9% 44.6% 4. Very important 24.0% 32.0% E. to place students in a firm of their choice 1983 2000 1. Not important at all 0.3% 0.1% 2. Not so important 4.4% 2.1% 3. Somewhat important 48.8% 44.7% 4. Very important 46.5% 53.1% F. to raise the reputation of the school 1983 1. Not important at all 7.8% 2. Not so important 33.3% 3. Somewhat important 42.0% 4. Very important 16.9% 2000 3.7% 23.2% 47.7% 25.4%
Table 4 Presence of activities relat ed t o select ion and recommendat ion 1983 survey 1. Yes 2. No 83.4% 16.6% 2000 survey 1. Yes 2. No 93.0% 7.0%
A. We have a select ion commit t ee in order t o det ermine who is recommended B. We do not show job opening to students when labor condit ions are not f avorable C. We allocat e st udent s first to good firms
18.5%
81.5%
14.8%
85.2%
22.3%
77.7% 25.4% 59.8%
9.6% 81.7% 35.6%
90.4% 18.3% 64.4%
D. We do not r ecommend more 74.6% st udent s t han we are asked for E. We seldom have students who cannot apply for t heir first choice 40.2%
Note: Tables derive from the author’ calculation based on the school surveys (1983 and 2000). s Please do not cite without the author ’ permission. s
Later Marriage in Japan – The Role of Premarital Living Arrangements Jim Raymo Until recently, marriage in Japan was nearly universal and concentrated in a very narrow range of “appropriate” ages. Since the mid-1970s, however, marriage has become a much less predictable life course transition. First marriage is taking place at progressively later ages and it also appears that, despite little evidence of a decline in the desire to marry, a substantial proportion of the currently unmarried will never marry. With cohabitation and non- marital fertility remaining at negligibly low levels, the trend toward later marriage has translated directly into a steady decline in the Japanese Total Fertility Rate, from 2.14 in 1973 to 1.35 in 2000. In the context of unprecedentedly rapid population aging, this direct impact on period fertility has made delayed marriage a subject of great interest in Japan. A vast array of explanations for changing marriage behavior have been offered in the academic, government, and popular literature, the most prominent of which emphasize the importance of: increases in women’ labor force participation, increases in women’ educational attainment, sex s s ratio imbalances, mismatches in the marriage market, increases in the attractiveness of single life, and a growing gender gap in attitudes toward marriage and gender rol es. During the past few years, delayed nest- leaving has also received a great deal of media attention as an important reason for later marriage. Proponents of this explanation (e.g., Masahiro Yamada and colleagues) suggest that the trend toward later mar riage reflects an increased ability and willingness on the part of parents to provide their children with goods and services that make extended coresidence an attractive alternative to early marriage. This change in parent-child relations is, in turn, thought to reflect: increasing relative economic wellbeing of fathers vis-à-vis their sons; weakening labor force attachment of mothers; and declining sibship size. Although much has been published in the popular press, empirical research on the relationship between the nest leaving patterns of young Japanese and their transition to adult roles (especially entry into first marriage) is quite limited. In my current research, I am seeking to fill this gap in our understanding of the transition to first marriage by using nationally-representative survey data to empirically evaluate hypotheses derived from the so-called “parasite single” argument. In one paper (currently under review), I use data from the 10th National Fertility Survey (conducted in 1992) to examine (a) the relationship between premarital living arrangements and the risk of marriage and (b) how this relationship may be conditional upon characteristics central to the extended coresidence argument (e.g., number of siblings). Results are uniformly inconsistent with hypotheses. Not only is coresidence associated with a higher likelihood of marriage (i.e., earlier age at marriage), but it also appears that, among coresident young adults, those least likely to enjoy a “parasitic” existence have the lowest risk of marriage. In a second paper (coauthored with Hiromi Ono), data from the first five waves of the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumer Life enable us to improve upon the first paper by (a) observing living arrangements at yearly intervals and (b) more precisely measuring theoretically important variables such as financial contribution to household and time spent doing housework. Initial results confirm findings from the first paper - coresidence is associated with an increased risk of marriage and parental provision of goods and services does not appear to reduce the risk of marriage for those young adults living at home.
Notes on Affiliation and Responsibility among Young Adults: Hitori-ko in Love Corky White When the “material children” of a decade ago were trending and spending, media and marketing seemed to define the state of youth. Those material children are now young adults, and in the workforce, but the transition from youth to adulthood is different from that of their elders. Robert Jay Lifton’ description of the 1960's tenko, (from radical student to corporate s warrior) may be used now to describe the “conversion” from the stresses of sarariiman life to datsu-sara and non-normative lifestyles. Some may see this “turn” as presaging the end of postwar socio-economic successes. It is no surprise to see again the perennial view that youth (especially those hitoriko, single young people rising to adulthood, the result of women’s “selfishness”)are going to hell in a handbasket; but the particular cluster of problems laid at their feet is of interest: the shrinking birthrate (shoushika, and women’ perfidious birth s strike), the shrinking tax base, and the ballooning population of elderly. The gyaku piramido’ threatening overhang is laid at the feet of parasite singles and late, unreproductive s marriages. Conservative critiques fail to see that young people do undertake a variety of commitments in serious, future-oriented ways, and in doing so, involve themselves responsibly in relationships with others. Not the least of these is contained in the word “love.” Discussions of young people tend to focus on significant relationships emerging from education, work and family. Thus friendships (and the sempai/kohai relationships) in school perdure, as do the quasi-primary groups of the white-collar workplace. Within the family, support and sustenance provide ballast – or at least, that is what we are led to believe. And each of these, we hear, carries its own set of pathologies: ijime, school avoidance, and violence; stress, and karoshi; kateinai rikon and parent abuse. For now I would set aside amae, “separate spheres” households, “absent fathers” and “abandoned grannies” and – attempt a new look at lusts, loves and ties that bind. By looking at post-material children’s ways of attaching and relating, we might rethink standard understandings of responsibility and adulthood as well - within and without family, school and workplace. Over the past fifty years and more, representations of “love” assail young people in broadcast and print media. Torendi durama, hoomu durama, manga and other influences create a set of expectations for marital and extramarital hetero- and homosexual love, as well as for “correct” and “incorrect” kinds of familial love that represent both choices and responsibilities. I would like to open a discussion about affect including sexuality, “love” in all its forms, and attachment and commitment. Among questions we might discuss are: How are love, sexuality and family responsibility configured in popular media and how do these correspond to people’ experiences? What do the much discussed “Narita rikon,” the long list s of pejorative terms for husbands, the emotional independence of women from men, and the apparently offhand “use” of boyfriends by young women indicate, if anything? Are sexual and romantic attachments related in any way to marriage? What changes in expectations are there for young men and women in terms of sexual experience and enjoyment as part of a committed relationship? What differences are there in these experiences and meanings by gender, class, region, urban and rural contexts? What is this thing called love?