1 The Dog, the Wall, and the Protesters: A Critique of Jag dish Bhagwati’s Defense of Economic Globalization Joseph Steinberg IR 6627: Seminar on Globalization Farkasch 15 December 2005 The Dog, the Wall, and the Protesters: A Critique of Jagdish Bha 2 gwati’s Defense of Economic Globalization A tiny dog threatened to delay the transit of the South Korean president‟s motorc ade to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) venue at Haeundae Beach in Busan in November 2005. The comic spectacle unfolded within a scripted disp lay of authority, where two columns of police conscripts bused from the far corn ers of the country faced each at attention across one of the busiest thoroughfares in the city center. Where no bus, taxi, or car dared enter, one little dog advanced unhindered in its daily routine. Finally, inevitably, almost as a farcical denoueme nt, the most senior officer commanded a subordinate to chase down the unwitting canine on the next crossing, or else the motorcade might be halted. Captured aft er some difficulty, the little dog was imprisoned within his master‟s store, yelping as people applauded the motorcade zooming through the honor guard unimpeded. Meanwhile a barrier separated the APEC venue from the general public, who we re required to produce special identification loaded with biometric technology, to gain access. On the streets farming lobbies orchestrated protests rebuffed by the d eployment of water cannon and parked trailers, effectively blocking transit throug h the coastal road. The dog, the barrier, and the protests symbolize the character of globalization more fully than the evangelic faith in a politically and economica lly integrated world. When Jagdish Bhagwati advocates, that reason deserves as much of a place as the passions, he overestimates the opposition between the two human forces. “Reason and analysis require that we abandon the conviction that globalization lacks a human face, an assertion that is tantamount to a false alarm, 3 and embrace the view that it has one.”i Accepting Bhagwati‟s singular “convictio n”, though, is as unappealing as championing the dog, the barrier, or the protests. As Stuart Hampshire argues, Rationality, prudential and moral, as a common human pos session or potentiality, is most plausibly identified, as argu ment and counter-argument, with the just and fair weighing of conflicts of evidence, and of conflicts of desires. Every individual person has used procedures for resolving contra ry pulls and contrary impulses: political conflicts and their resolution are strictly analogous. ii I will argue that Jagdish Bhagwati‟s In Defense of Globalization is an excellent, hyperglobalist defense of economic liberalization, and that it also judiciously rebu ts anti-globalization arguments. Bhagwati‟s argument is most persuasive when dis cussing specific agendas within the overall globalization debate, such as environm ental impact and labor standards. But, even disseminated in the most favorable m anner, there is no electoral constituency for Bhagwati‟s defense. There is a sympo sium quality to Bhagwati‟s exposition, where opponents are portrayed as foils to Bhagwati as the trump-wielding Socrates. But, every opponent is actually, in term s of Mancur Olson‟s “logic of collective action“iii, composed of many political an d economic interests, which Amy Chua, in World On Fire, identified as ethnic gr oups. Bhagwati, addressing governance, recognizes the influences of “powerful lo bbies that capture the political process to the exclusion of the adversely affected but marginalized group”iv, but emphasizes multinational corporations (MNCs), inte rnational governmental organizations (INGOs), non-governmental organizations (N GOs), and policies as a corrective. Instead of reinforcing the deadlock wrought b y these various constituencies in the political arena, Bhagwati should emphasize t 4 he creation and evolution of national and international institutions, not to “acceler ate” pro-globalization policiesv, but to mediate efficiently between constituencies without marginalizing them. The vision of humanity I favor is not a prediction vi, but a sense of contributing to a continuing project where are all voices are repres ented fairly through mutually acknowledged procedures. Bhagwati believes globalization, which he characterizes as an economic phenome non “…which embraces diverse forms of international integration, including forei gn trade, multinational direct foreign investment, movements of short-term portfoli o funds, technological diffusion, and cross-border migration…“ vii, has the right ag enda for any country, but advocates a “tripod” of broad policies customizable for each countryviii. Firstly, there is “appropriate governance“, requiring “institutional mechanisms to cope with the occasional downsides…” of globalization. Secondly , Bhagwati argues against the linkage of economic and social agendas. Thirdly, B hagwati offers the maxim, “Optimal, Not Maximal, Speed“, regarding the transitio n from underdeveloped v.1 to globalized v.2. For any given country, change is ex ogenous, from NGOs, MNCs, foreign governments, or INGOs, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and endogenous, from civil society organizations. As a matter of fact, Bhagwati is “confident”ix of the positive impact NGOs and MN Cs have, but recognizes there are good and bad ones. I would characterize Bhag wati as a hyperglobalist, halfway between hyperglobalists like Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss in “Toward Global Parliament” and skepticsx, such as Kenneth N . Waltz in “Globalization and Governance”. All four authors share a concern for governance. Compared to Bhagwati„s measur 5 ed optimism about NGOs, Falk and Strauss are quixotic. Bhagwati amplifies conc erns about transparency, biases resulting from nationality and culture, and the poo r-rich divide among NGOs. xi Falk and Strauss‟s discussion is a brochure for resol utions passed by the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan‟s May 2000 Millennium NGO Forum supporting the creation of a “permanent assembly of civ il society organizations”xii, but offer no further concrete proposals. Specifically, th ey never address the logistical demands such an assembly would place upon its membership and host country (or countries), nor do they consider the sovereignty compromises such a constitutional nightmare would require. Bhagwati, on the ot her hand, advocates a key role for global institutions, such as the World Bank, to provide worker adjustment assistance xiii and short-term aid following adverse dec isions resulting from trade disputes. xiv Bhagwati broadly argues, that poor domesti c governance historically has resulted from their own culpable refusal to liberalize when developed countries first did. xv Finally, Waltz posits the continuing importa nce of the nation-state in a post-Cold War, interdependent world. National politics determines the adaptability of a state to international economics. Waltz observes two problems: inequalities among states; and the disproportionate influence of str onger states unconstrained by global laws or institutions. In support, Waltz repeat s the perception, that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the “enforcement arm” of the United States. xvi Waltz argues, however, that states adapt to the globa l system in various ways, of which economics is just one component xvii Bhagwati ‟s global and economic perspective offers states a Hobson‟s choice between good governance, that is open to the good medicine offered by MNCs, NGOs, and IN GOs, and bad governance, that results in economic debacle. This presumptuousne ss is both abetted and ameliorated by what is the most persuasive part of Bhagwa 6 ti‟s argument, that economic globalization does good work even without institutio nal guidance. Bhagwati disagrees with Paehlke‟s assumptions about democratizati on and markets. For Paehlke, there are values more important than economic one s, namely the social and environmental, which, secondly, stubbornly refuse politic al guidance. xviii Nowhere is Bhagwati‟s disagreement with Paehlke‟s and the antiglobalization movements‟ criticisms more apparent than when he confronts the iss ue of social agendas. Bhagwati insists the anti-globalization movements‟ emphases on social agendas, s uch as poverty, child labor, women‟s rights, labor standards, and the environment, because MNCs on the whole do good work. On poverty reduction, Bhagwati dist inguishes between absolute poverty and growth resulting from trade liberalization. Arguing against a global perspective that considers poverty as measured by hous ehold income, Bhagwati, “…since societies are diverse on relevant dimensions an d therefore inequality cannot be measured outside particular contexts”xix, supports the liberal thesis “…that trade enhances growth, and that growth reduces poverty. ”xx As David Dollar and Art Kraay, whose research Bhagwati quotes as proof of the benefits of trade liberalization, argue: If globalization proceeds, its potential to be an equalizing f orce will depend upon whether poor countries manage to in tegrate themselves into the international system. True integr ation requires not just trade liberalization but wide-ranging institutional reform. xxi On women‟s issues and labor standards, Bhagwati offers several arguments conce rning selected anti-globalizes‟ self-interested and erroneous perspectives. Despite t 7 hese arguments, Bhagwati continues, like Dollar and Kraay above, to allow his tr ansform list arguments to do the work, but does not draw the conclusion, that the soundness of his arguments will not convince even the most contrite lobbyist to change behaviors. Discussing both feminist NGO‟s opposition to WTO decisions (and other organizations in extension), Bhagwati argues, that …Rather than setting up roadblocks on every policy chang e, big and small, and demanding that each policy change b e made conditional on an examination of its impact on wo men…it is more useful to think of policies that alleviate th e totality of distress to women from the multitude of polic y changes…. Women, as a class, are not destined to lose fr om progress any more than other group‟s are. xxii And, when discussing labor standards and the “race to the bottom”, Bhagwati off ers two reasons why labor standards in developing countries have not plunged as a result of the MNCs: the MNCs‟ interest in promoting their own self-interest; an d the politics of regulation initiated by environmental groups and labor unions in the developed countries. xxiii Paehlke supports this “California effect” and regulatio n in general, because he believes that saving the ecosystem and social values are values more important than economic interest. xxiv Bhagwati, though, continues to discuss how the “race to the bottom” becomes the “race to the top”, pitting free-t rade legislators against corporations, unions, and environmental groups seeking pr otection against foreign industries. xxv One can feel the author‟s voice rising stride ntly, if only the road-blocking miscreants would listen to him and not their own constituents. On environmental issues, Bhagwati‟s three-pronged approach to defending globali 8 zation is most apparent. Firstly, there is the dizzying display of bedrock economic analysis refuting the anti-globalization campaigners‟ contention, that MNCs harm domestic environments. Secondly, there is the benefit that accrues from any parti cular nation‟s correct policy response to the facts. Thirdly, there are the road-bloc kers. In short, the environmentalists need to remember that their preferred use of muscle and lobbying, always justified in te rms of images of their righteousness arrayed against the wi cked corporate interests, is not always in defense of the be st policies in cases between trade and the environment. xxvi This three-pronged virtuoso display still cannot convince the road-blockers, but B hagwati‟s general point is confirmed. MNCs, as the “B-52s” of globalization have a human face. But, just as nations can respond to globalization well, or refuse it, MNCs can do even more than just business. Bhagwati supports corporate social responsibility, social norming, voluntary codes, and mandatory codes. xxvii These la st strategies publicize MNCs‟ beneficial role and “…. emerge even more effective ly in global economy and society as institutions that truly advance the economic and social good in the countries they invest in.”xxviii Even though the restraint and social responsibility Bhagwati advocates is commendable, it still does not dispel the criticism, that economic globalization is not really interested in LDCs or ethni c groups so much as a “one-size-fits-all” agenda. Bhagwati tries to ameliorate the harsh edges of economic globalization by advoca ting optimal, not maximal development. Bhagwati outlines the litany of failures in LDCs transitioning from bad governance to WTO and IMF conditionality, includ 9 ing Russia and Argentina in the early 1990s. Bhagwati ridicules critics, specificall y Joseph Stiglitz, for arguing that conditionality is “stifling”, because of his exper iences with the World Bank. Bhagwati contends, firstly, that conditionality was w elcomed by pro-globalization reformers within LDC governments. xxix Secondly, be cause the World Bank needs to spend money, to justify future budget increases, a nd LDCs have an interest in ensuring World Bank loans, the World Bank will ac cept even the most rudimentary reforms to satisfy its conditions, even if those ref orms prove unsustainable. xxx Finally, Bhagwati argues directly, that the “one-size-f its-all” criticism is unwarranted, because, even though reforms in Russia and Arg entina continued beyond the point of viability, the IMF did learn a valuable lesso n during the 1997 East Asian currency crisis. xxxi Bhagwati punctuates his defense of the Bretton Woods INGOs, by blaming developed country lobbies. Particularly onerous problems arise for the poor countries… not over opening their markets through trade concessions, b ut when the pressures are applied on them to consent to ex traneous and harmful demands aimed at appealing domestic lobbies in the rich countries on trade-related issues such a s intellectual-property protection and labor issues… xxxii It is in this context, that Amy Chua‟s theory of market-dominant minorities is rel evant. Chua‟s emphasis in “Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward A New Paradig m for Law and Development” is “…the site of massive Western legal interventio n in the developing world.”, marketization and democratization. xxxiii As “romantic” Western legal experts have written constitutions and transplanted social and polit 10 ical institutions, Chua argues, that they have ignored “distinctive and potentially s ubversive relationship” between “entrenched ethnic divisions” and marketization a nd democratization. xxxiv Whereas in World On Fire, Chua emphasizes “market-do minant minorities as the Achilles‟ heel of free-market democracyxxxv, in “Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity”, Chua squarely blames marketization and democratiza tion “…as likely to catalyze ethnic tensions, with potentially catastrophic results …”.xxxvi The nebulous actor Chua refused to identify in World On Fire, and wron gfully adjudged as “globalization”, is more concretely isolated as a particular acad emic legal paradigm, the law and development school, and a long list of INGO a nd NGO followers, including the World Bank and IMF, the Ford Foundation, and the Soros Foundation. xxxvii Chua draws three conclusions from what ignorant la wyers and academics have wrought. Firstly, markets favor certain minorities in th e developing world. Secondly, since the minorities favored by marketization often differ from the majority, the reforms advocated by lawyers and academics pit et hnic groups against one another. Finally, marketization and democratization “…wi ll aggravate, in appearance and probably in reality, the existing maldistribution of wealth, and democracy “…will more likely foster the emergence of ethnic politic al entrepreneurs…and active ethno-nationalist movements.”xxxviii Chua is much mo re persuasive and useful when she does not try to disguise her jabs, as she did in World On Fire. Using Chua‟s legal analysis, there is a line running from globali zation skeptics, like Waltz, to Stiglitz, passing unscathed through Bhagwati‟s acc umulated dispersions on developed world interest groups to Chua‟s excoriation of the academic foundations of laissez-faire advocacy by developed world lawyers. George Soros, though, in “Toward A Global Society”, identified five deficiencies 11 of the global capitalist system. xxxix Firstly, capital is more mobile than labor. Seco ndly, financial markets are inherently unstable. Thirdly, monopolies and oligopolie s are occurring with increasing frequency, necessitating regulation. Fourthly, the s tate‟s ability to provide social welfare is compromised by capital‟s enhanced fluid ity due to globalization. Finally, the rise of a global society based on common po litical values has lagged behind a global economy based on economic theories pr ovided by developed countries. It is the last two points that are relevant to Chua‟ s attack on marketization and democratization, Bhagwati‟s isolated comments ab out developed countries‟ lobbies, and Waltz‟s skeptical defense of state power. C hua‟s beleaguered LDC ethnic groups and Soros‟ beleaguered LDC governments struggling to provide social welfare in the teeth of MNCs, INGOs, and NGOs ad vocating laissez-faire policies are two sides of the same problem. Developed coun try lobbies support and compel the popularization of selfish political agendas dire cted not at the interests of LDC ethnic groups, but at the exigencies of their own national predicament. It is at this point, that the implications of developed countr y interest-group lobbying should be addressed more fully, which Bhagwati has no t done, but not as Chua would argue. Mancur Olson, in The Rise and Decline of Nations, lists nine implications of his “logic of collective action.”xl The logic “…predicts that those groups that have ac cess to selective incentives will be more likely to act collectively to obtain collect ive goods than those that do not, and that smaller groups will have a greater likel ihood of engaging in collective action than larger ones.”xli Examples of selective i ncentives include taxes, insurance deductions, and labor union dues. Olson conclu des, that interest-groups, among other consequences enumerated in the nine implic 12 ations, can frustrate symmetrical organization through collective bargaining, reduc e efficiency, aggregate income, and make societies more divisive, employ large, c omplicated agendas, reduce economic growth by retarding technological innovatio n and reallocation of resources, and can exclude members of other groups effectiv ely, Finally, interest groups increase the “…complexity of regulation, the role of government, and the complexity of understandings, and [change] the direction of social evolution.” Olson applies these implications to the historical record of both developed and LDC governments and the benefits of free trade. Olson reviews the historical records of both developed governments, such as Fran ce, Japan, and the United States. Olson concludes, “…countries that have had de mocratic freedom of organization without upheaval or invasion the longest will su ffer the most from growth-repressing organizations and combinations.”xlii France a nd Japan represent the winner and loser, respectively, of this implication. On the other hand, the United States‟ unique political structure and relatively brief histori cal existence has (at least at the time Olson wrote this book) undermined the corr osive effects of the logic‟s implications. xliii More importantly, though, Olson attrib utes to free trade the continued growth the implications of the logic of collective action would deny. After denying that the gains from free trade result from comp arative advantage, Olson concludes that “…the gains are not direct gains of those who take part in the international transactions that the liberalization permitted, b ut other gains from increases in efficiency in the importing country…that are disti nct from and additional to any that arise because of comparative advantage.”xliv Y et, free trade is not a panacea: 13 Freedom of trade and of factor mobility have to be used in combination with other policies to reduce or countervail c artelization or lobbying, there are no total or permanent cur es. This is because the distributional coalitions have the inc entive and often also the power to prevent changes that wo uld deprive them of their enlarged share of the social outp ut. xlv Considering the LDCs, too, Olson concludes that, since evidence of obstruction b y distributional coalitions exist in China, Japan, India, South Africa, and the form er Soviet satellite states, the argument that markets cause inequality is not true. xlvi Olson‟s conclusion that not markets, rather distributional coalitions, cause inequali ty, contradicts the letter, but not the spirit of Chua‟s contention that marketization aggravates inequality in the LDCs. If one views, using Olson‟s thesis, Chua‟s lai ssez-faire-espousing lawyers and academics as members of developed country inte rest groups seeking advantages through a self-interested advocacy of limited free t rade in the LDCs, then it is possible to interpret Chua‟s theory of market-domina nt minorities as a pro-globalization conclusion consonant with Bhagwati‟s isolated criticisms of interest group obstructions in the developed world. The final questi on involves how to allocate responsibility for trade liberalization and democratizat ion, upon INGOs and NGOs, or states? Bhagwati argues that democracy and globalization are not inimical because of dir ect and indirect causes. Bhagwati broadly concurs with Olson, that “…rural farme rs are now able to bypass the dominant classes and castes by taking their produce directly to the market thanks to modern information technology, thereby loosenin 14 g the control of these traditionally hegemonic groups.” Indirectly, and opposing S oros, Bhagwati argues that social development fostered by trade liberalization resu lts in the form of education, equality, and changes in class structure. xlvii Soros has seemingly observed the same historical facts as Olson about Japan, without draw ing the conclusion that autocracy is strengthened by the lack of an intervening for ce, such as free trade. Bhagwati also criticizes developed country lobbies and inte llectuals for tarnishing free trade‟s reformist image because they advocate protecti onism. xlviii Finally, Bhagwati, discussing the WTO‟s structure, lauds the benefits r esulting from the Dispute Settlement Mechanism and the secretariat of lobbies an d NGOs. xlix But, Bhagwati does not follow his own conclusions to the end. He a dvocates that NGOs be allowed to submit amicus curiae briefs during trade disput esl, but does not consider, that WTO reform has now created the same conditions within the WTO, that exist within national legislatures, namely Olson‟s obfuscati ng distributional coalitions. Historically, the current situation is analogous to the n eed in 19th Century American federal jurisprudence for circuit courts, instead of r equiring seven Supreme Court justices to ride circuit across an expanding nation. li Bhagwati‟s Socratic exhortations never appear so impotent as when even he admi ts any reformist agenda‟s powerlessness before the onslaught of interest group pre ssure. What is really demonstrated, though, is the ironic fallacy within the pro-glo balization movement, that one good idea deserves action from one direction. All r eform arguments are directed at one locus, the market, the WTO, a global parlia ment. But concentrating attention and resources at one point allows interest group s to focus overwhelming, countervailing force at that one point, with predictable r esults. The war against the interest groups must be waged on numerous, low-key 15 fronts, preferably on the level of 182 separate battlefields where interest groups c annot hope to amass sufficient, offsetting resources. Furthermore, since every cou ntry is unique, each government should be treated specially, and the INGOs and NGOs need to amass resources for such multiple scenarios. What has to be aband oned is the fear, that, if Country A reforms in Manner A, and Country B in Man ner B, globalization‟s opportunity to unify the globe will be compromised. Martin Wolf argues that globalization “…is not destined, it is chosen.“ lii And, since coal itional linkages are fragmenting into endless repetitions of G-type organizations, c ould a world full of single actors be any more confusing? Allowing each LDC th e opportunity to research its own needs and solutions would also dispel the anim osity directed at the developed world‟s imposition of both a self-interested globali zation agenda and INGO structure. Finally, returning to Hampshire‟s insight about conflict, what is needed is not a single moral vision about globalization with one fast-tracked round of global talks, but a fairer framework that allows countries to voice their objections and agendas concerning what kinds of liberalization each o ne wants, to develop the institutions and treasuries adequate enough to dictate lib eralization as each dictates, and for NGOs, INGOs, and MNCs to be the servants of liberalized nationalism, not Kantian political integration. This is not an invitati on to regionalization, such as NAFTA or ASEAN, but a fairer, more democratic, much more complicated, slower, and enduring structure for states to take control of liberalization from smaller distributional coalitions. Although I both learned from and enjoyed Jagdish Bhagwati‟s In Defense of Glob alization, his attempt at defending globalization exemplifies the problem confronti ng globalization proponents. Every opinion, invites a refutation, and every dog ha 16 s his day, but structure dictates the conclusion. The deadlock observed at the curr ent WTO talks in Hong Kong results from a structural flaw allowing the current alphabet soup of domestic interest groups, INGOs, NGOs, and states to complicat e and stall resolution. There are probably both pro-and-anti-globalization interests present, but each are offsetting each other and confusing the issues. Bhagwati hi mself describes situations where interest groups are responsible for such obstructi on, but all he does is the publishing equivalent of talking louder and slower whe n confronting opposition. His command of the literature is impressive and his arg uments are compelling, but his support for the structural status quo is disappointi ng. And, in the end, such a conservative (in the sense of a status quo thinker, an academician, and a platonic philosopher) voice does not further the goals of libe ralization. i Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). ii Stuart Hampshire, Justice Is Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 17 iii Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). iv Bhagwati, 224. Bhagwati, 240. (Waltz 1999) Bhagwati, ix. Bhagwati, 221-222. v vi vii viii ix Bhagwati, 48. x David Held and Anthony McGrew, The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). xi Bhagwati, 43-47. xii Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, “Toward Global Parliament” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No.1: 214. xiii Bhagwati, 233. Bhagwati, 235. Bhagwati, 231. (Waltz 1999) (Waltz 1999) xiv xv xvi xvii xviii Robert C. Paehlke, Democracy’s Dilemma (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003). xix Bhagwati, 67. xx Bhagwati, 53. xxi David Dollar and Art Kraay, “Spreading the Wealth” Foreign Affairs, No.1: 131. xxii Bhagwati, 87. Bhagwati, 130-131. Paehlke, 20-21, 24. xxiii xxiv 18 xxv Bhagwati, 132. Bhagwati, 158. Bhagwati, 190-5. Bhagwati, 195. xxvi xxvii xxviii xxix Bhagwati, 258-9. Bhagwati, 259-261. Bhagwati, 260-1. xxx xxxi xxxii Bhagwati, 262. xxxiii Amy L. Chua, “Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 108, No.1: 4. xxxiv Chua, 5. xxxv Amy L. Chua, World On Fire (New York: Anchor Books, 2003). xxxvi Chua, 6. Chua, 17-8. Chua, 106. xxxvii xxxviii xxxix George Soros, “Toward A Global Society” Atlantic Monthly, January 1998: 22-3. xl Olson, 74. Olson, 34. Olson, 77. Olson, 93. Olson, 137. Olson, 144-5. Olson, 173. xli xlii xliii xliv xlv xlvi 19 xlvii Bhagwati, 93. Bhagwati, 103. xlviii xlix Bhagwati, 104. l Bhagwati, 105. li Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). lii Martin Wolf, “Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 1: 182. Sources 1. Bhagwati, Jagdish, In Defense of Globalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 20 2. Chua, Amy L., “Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity.” The Yale Law Journal (1998): 1-107. 3. Chua, Amy L., World On Fire. New York: Anchor Books, 2003. 4. Dollar, David and Art Kraay, “Spreading the Wealth.” Foreign Affairs (2002): 120-133. 5. Falk, Richard and Andrew Strauss, “Toward Global Parliament.” Foreign Affairs (2001): 212-220. 6. Hampshire, Stuart, Justice Is Conflict. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. 7. Held, David and Anthony McGrew, The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 8. Olson, Mancur, The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982. 9. Paehlke, Robert C., Democracy’s Dilemma. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003. 10. Schwartz, Bernard, A History of the Supreme Court. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 11. Soros, George, “Toward A Global Society.” Atlantic Monthly (1998): 22-24, 32. 12. Wolf, Martin, “Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?” Foreign Affairs (2001): 178-190.