Footnote 23: The Sociological Agenda of Amy Chua’s World On Fire The notorious third scene of the first act of William Shakespeare‟s The Merchant of Venice introduced a “pound of flesh” into the English language as a byword f or debt.i Anyone signing a credit card chit or a mortgage contract would wince, i f the lender endorsed Shylock‟s business practices. But then, too, there is a pathet ic poignancy and honesty in the Jewish banker Shylock‟s teasing tirade concernin g his outcast status and plaint for Antonio‟s “friendship”, made all the more insid ious when Bassanio realizes how much his “necessity” will test Antonio‟s “friend ship” for him. For the fact is, that this young aristocrat‟s bid for marriage cannot proceed without money he himself cannot raise, nor whose lender he would not even consider inviting to his wedding. And, for all his skills and connections as a goods merchant and his liberal, Christian generosity, Antonio is embarrassed to i nclude Shylock, a member of a market-dominant minority, in an intimate relation ship between two male members of the elite of the majority, in terms of Amy Ch ua‟s World On Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatr ed and Global Instability. The Merchant of Venice, for all its dark, ugly passages, has a doubly happy ending: Bassanio finds his soul mate; and, Shylock becomes a respectable Christian. Amy Chua‟s perspective is as diametrically disturbing, se cular, and violent as The Merchant of Venice is in the end so moralizing (in a C hristian manner), cathartic, and, for Shakespeare at least, bloodless. Shakespeare, t hough, portrays the salient element, “necessity”, Chua neglects to mention. Shyloc k‟s redemption is foreshadowed by the symbiotic nature of the relationship betwe en his trade and Bassanio‟s matrimonial design. Bassanio‟s Venice is erected upo n Jewish greed, and all players get what each deserves when appearances are sati sfied. It takes the full weight of the State, as personified by the Venetian Duke, r elying upon law and religion, to end the dispute. But, for Chua, there is no neces sity and no symbiosis, and, therefore, no happy ending. For Chua, the play is unf inished, but heading for a breach, because there is no poignant scene to nudge th e quarrelling parties, globalization and developing countries, into a cathartic endin g. I will argue, that Amy Chua‟s World On Fire, even though generally making a p ro-globalization argument, is deceptively constructed. Firstly, condensed and hidde n within Chua‟s concept of “ethnicity” is an entire dialogue and adaptation of a d ebate between sociologists on the relationship between ethnic identity, conflict, an d globalization. Secondly, her description of globalization is anemic, because the historical scope of her investigation is myopic, or too narrowly focused on the s econd wave of globalization.. Although Chua engages Thomas Friedman and Rob ert Kaplan on globalization, her perspective is primarily sociological, not political or economic. Thirdly, Chua‟s treatment of individual country test cases is one-di mensional, or too limited in theory and too cursory in application. Finally, given her sociological perspective on ethnic identity and conflict, Chua„s political prescr iptions are incongruent with her perspective. Generally, Chua‟s habit of bracketin g her argument with caveats limits its prescriptive and descriptive applicability, b ut, ironically, by arguing that globalization, markets, or democracy do not cause e thnic conflict, but merely “aggravate” a pre-existing condition, she limits the opp ortunities for globalization to ameliorate, not to mention defuse, ethnic violence. What is left then is a pastiche of individual country cases, each worthy of volumi nous treatment, starkly and broadly depicted through secondary sources, analogies, and anecdotes. Finally, after decrying the prejudicial treatment of the non-weste rn world by westerners advocating laissez-faire policies to address distinctive loca l problems, Chua‟s focus on market-dominant minorities alone and her universalis tic recommendation for developing world governments to adopt western-style redi stributive policies is equally hollow. Ultimately, what Chua‟s argument lacks is b oth descriptive and prescriptive authority. Chua begins her investigation by asking, what is the connection between revenge killings of Chinese businesspeople in the Philippines, genocide in Serbia and Rwa nda in the 1990s, anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia in the 1990s, suicide bombings i n Israel in the 1990s, and the September 11, 2001 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York? The first part of Chua‟s argument is already heavily bracke ted: “…the global spread of markets and democracy is the princ ipal, aggravating cause of group hatred and ethnic violence throughout the non-western world. In the numerous societi es around the world that have a market dominant minority, markets and democracy are not mutually reinforcing. Beca use markets and democracy benefit different ethnic groups, in such societies, the pursuit of free market democracy pr oduces highly unstable and combustible conditions. Markets concentrate enormous wealth in the hands of an “outsider” minority, fomenting ethnic envy and hatred among often c hronically poor majorities. In absolute terms the majority m ay or may not be better off --- a dispute that much of the globalization debate fixates upon ---- but any sense of impr ovement is overwhelmed by their continuing poverty and th e hated minority‟s extraordinary economic success. More h umiliating still, market dominant minorities, along with thei r foreign-investor partners, invariably come to control the c rown jewels of the economy, often symbolic of the nation‟ s patrimony and identity…”ii Second, Chua argues that free market democracy in countries where market-domi nant minorities exist creates three kinds of backlash: against the market-dominant minority‟s wealth; against the majority by “…forces favorable to the market-domi nant minority”; and, violence directed at the market-dominant minority. iii Next, it‟ s important to understand Chua‟s definitions, many of which are more like Wittg enstein‟s theory of “family resemblance“.. A “market-dominant minority” is a “phenomenon…that turns free market democr acy into an engine of ethnic conflagration…that…tend under marke t condition to dominate economically, often to a startling extent, the „indigenous‟ majorities around them.” iv Globalization “consists of, and is fueled by, the unpr ecedented worldwide spread of markets and democracy. For over two decades no w, the American government, along with American consultants, business interests , and foundations, has been vigorously promoting free market democracy through out the developing and post-socialist worlds.” v A “market economy/system“ is “a broad spectrum of economic systems based primarily on private property and co mpetition, with government regulation and redistribution…”vi “Marketization/mark ets/market reforms” are “…kinds of pro-capitalism measures actually being imple mented today outside the West….privatization, elimination of state subsidies and controls, free trade and pro-foreign investment initiatives…rarely, if ever, include any substantial redistribution measures.”vii Democratization is “political reforms ac tually being promoted and implemented in the non-western world today….concert ed efforts, heavily US-driven, to implement immediate elections with universal su ffrage,”viii Finally, and most controversially, “ethnicity” is “not a scientifically det erminable status…a kind of group identification, a sense of belonging to a people , that is experienced „as a greatly extended form of kinship‟…very broad, acknow ledging the importance of subjective perceptions….encompasses differences along racial lines… of geographic origin…as well as linguistic, religious, tribal, or other cultural lines…shifting and highly malleable.”ix It is the paraphrasing of this last concept, “ethnicity“, apparently so important to Chua‟s general argument that req uires more discussion than a footnote, 23 x, pointing to texts outside political scien ce and economics. It also explains why Chua‟s terminology lacks concrete referen ce to most political and economic concepts. Although I am not well versed in the secondary, sociological sources Chua suppli es in Footnote 23 in the “Introduction“, to support this conception, at face value, the definition is flawed. Ethnicity, language, and religion are three distinct pheno mena. Identifying a phenomenon that is not “scientifically determinable” sounds suspiciously fuzzy and self-servingly elastic, especially if the emphasis is on subj ective testimony. The questionable value of these testimonies is reinforced by ho w often Chua offers racial epithets for proof of ethnic resentment. I am reminded of anecdotes relating to accident victims pleading their cases as innocent victims to police officers forced to rely upon partisan eyewitnesses who subsequently de mand a cut of the insurance settlement as reward for their false testimony. Althou gh sociologically intriguing, from a legal, economic, and political perspective of t rying to address the best way to handle insurance claims, limit medical costs, and improve safety, such anecdotes are disturbing. In the same way, I am skeptical o f someone claiming persecution. Within her highly compact conception of “ethnic ity” lies an entire dialogue between scholars discussing the relationship between e thnicity and nationalism, and the theoretical framework for the opus. Chua‟s Footnote 23 specifically mentions five authors, Donald L. Horowitz, Harold R. Isaacs, Anthony D. Smith, John Breuilly, and John Hutchinson. Phrases within Chua‟s pithy and seemingly nonsensical definition of “ethnicity” resonate with arguments and phrases offered by these authors. Horowitz, in “Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict”xi, offers ten mutually incompatible theories of ethnic conflict (the sum total of which exceeds my previous acquaintance with sociology), based upon “hard” and “soft” conceptions of ethnic identity. “Soft” conceptions emphasize “…entities whose boundaries are problematic and malleable whose solidarity is based on the material rewards they provide their members rather than on diffuse affection; whose behavior, based on the interests of their members, is vulnerable to strategic manipulation; whose apparent affect can often be reduced to calculation; and whose severe conflicts with others often result less from irreconcilable objectives than from strategic dilemmas.” Chua‟s “shifting and malleable” view of “ethnicity” bears striking resemblance to Horowitz‟s categorization of “soft” conceptions of ethnic identity. On the other hand, in “hard” conceptions “…ethnic groups are ascriptive, firmly bounded entities that are based on a strong sense of commonality, engender considerable loyalty, persist over time, provide large affective rewards to group members, incline toward ethnocentrism, are hostile to and desire to dominate outsiders, are liable to pursue conflict behavior based on passion (even to the exclusion of calculation), and engender a great willingness on the part of group members to sacrifice for collective welfare.” Horowitz also argues, that “Personal dispositions play a role”, because of the “soft” conception of ethnic identity. Chua‟s “importance of subjective perceptions is related to this argument. Using Horowitz‟s theories of ethnic conflict as templates, and nations as test cases, Chua can evaluate the effect of globalization upon ethnic identity. Next, Harold R. Isaacs, in “Nationality: The End of the Road?”xii offers two different conceptions of nationalism, based, respectively on culture or politics. A cultural conception of nationalism refers to a “…Volk formed around a common language as keeper and carrier of a common heritage.”xiii. A political conception emphasizes “…passport-holding citizenship in the state regardless of the person‟s country of birth or origin.”xivThe cultural conception of nationalism tends to dominate geographically in nations that developed after during or after the 19 th Century in Eastern Europe and Asia. Isaacs also emphasizes the malleable character of nationalism, and the variety of sources from which individuals can derive a bond. xv “We are fragmenting and globalizing at the same time.”xvi Isaacs ultimately expresses impotence before the baser, cultural forms of identity tearing apart the religious notion of a single world community. But, finally, Isaacs optimistically perceives a horizon of limitless possibilities for human communities that will occur when political conceptions of community based on force become unpopular. The tenor of Chua‟s juxtaposition of simplistic notions of market capitalism and democracy, with bifurcated ethnic communities shares Isaacs‟ conflict between cultural and political conceptions of nationalism. There is also quite a bit of the West versus the Rest dichotomy in those competing nationalisms. Finally, for Anthony D. Smith, “Nationalism…does not require that members of a "nation" should all be alike, only that they should feel an intense bond of solidarity to the nation and other members of their nation. xvii A sense of nationalism can inhabit and be produced from whatever dominant ideology exists in a given locale. Nationalism builds on pre-existing kinship, religious and belief systems., but it is, however, real, not socially constructed from illusory elements. Between Smith‟s realist view of identity and social constructivist perspectives, it is uncertain from her conception of “ethnicity” where Chua‟s orientation lies, but “undeterminable scientific status” indicates more of a social constructivist perspective than a realist one. Chua‟s World On Fire should be situated within a sociological debate about how ethnic groups develop and interact with each other in a national context. Chua‟s contribution to this debate is to add an external factor, globalization, and to analyze globalization‟s effect upon disparate, discrete national test cases, such as the Philippines, Russia, or Indonesia. There are two ways to criticize Chua‟s argument, by, first, analyzing her argument about globalization‟s “aggravating” influence upon countries where market-dominant minorities exist, and, second, by analyzing her descriptions of individual nations and the type of ethnic conflict present there. But, even more importantly, Chua‟s sociological emphasis upon ethnic groups, identity, and conflict slants her perspective towards a prescriptive perspective that posits the primacy of ethnic groups over political or economic perspectives and solutions. Chua offers three caveats concerning the book„s argument. xviii Firstly, she did not offer a universal theory, only a broad one. Secondly, she did not offer a theory of ethnic conflict. Thirdly, Chua argued, that she did not blame the occurrence of ethnic conflict upon markets, democracy, or globalization. She continued to elaborate, that her argument was “not about blame, but unintended consequences.“ Chua only advocates ameliorating ethnic conflict, and does not offer a cathartic political or economic solution that will unite all groups within a given geographical area under a legitimate, multicultural authority. The book‟s sociological orientation limits its value in the globalization debate, but only because Chua‟s engagement with other contributions in the globalization literature from divergent social science disciplines is minimal. Chua‟s description of globalization is also anemic, because the historical scope of her analysis is limited to the period of intensified globalization coinciding with the political ramifications of the fall of the Berlin Wall, and because she cynically and half-heartedly engages arguments within the globalization literature, only specifically referencing Friedman, Chomsky, and Kaplan. As mentioned above, Chua‟s definition of “globalization” is vague, depending upon definitions of “markets” and “democracy” even vaguer and ignorant of even the most general features of the major paradigms within the economics, political science, and international relations disciplines. This stunning failure fully to engage the dominant perspective in the globalization debate also limit‟s the value of Chua‟s sociological approach to ethnic conflict, effectively rendering the book a cursory contribution to one discipline with a nod to the more marketable section of the stacks. As a matter of fact, Chua seems to include Friedman, Kaplan, or Chomsky, not for any theoretical contribution, but as straw man representatives to provide a semblance of coverage. In the process, Chua handicaps her thesis by not providing historical and theoretical depth. Chua specifically mentions few prominent commentators within the broader globalization debate, and none who are not American. Thomas Friedman, probably the most prolific American popularizer extolling the benefits of globalization‟s economic aspects, is also the easiest one to lampoon. Because of his proselytizing optimism, Friedman‟s glib prose is fair game for any critic. Chua provides a synopsis of Friedman principally as spokesperson for proponents, who view globalization as a .“…universal prescription for the multiple ills of underdevelopment…Market capitalism is the most efficient economic system the world has ever known. Democracy is the fairest political system the world has ever known and the one most respectful of individual liberty…will gradually transform the world into a community of prosperous, war-sunning nations, and individuals into liberal, civic-minded citizens and consumers. In the process, ethnic hatred, religious zealotry, and other backward aspects of „underdevelopment‟ will be swept away.”xix John Gray, reviewing Friedman‟s last book, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century, criticizes this rosy view, emphasizing those elements upon which Chua refuses to assign blame. xx Gray characterizes Friedman‟s optimistic view in The World Is Flat as “…a prescient guide to future American policy.” Gray also challenges Friedman‟s contention, that “…democracy in Saudi Arabia would produce a liberal, pro-Western regime?” Criticizing conservative trends in popular and academic opinion, Gray ridicules the view “…that governments can be reengineered to adapt to it in much the same way as corporations.” Finally, Gray is refreshingly honest about the relationship between globalization and ethnic conflict. “…it is inflaming nationalist and religious passions and triggering a struggle for natural resources. In Friedman's sub-Marxian, neoliberal worldview these conflicts are recognized only as forms of friction —grit in the workings of an unstoppable machine. In truth they are integral to the process itself, whose future course cannot be known. We would be better off accepting this fact, and doing what we can to cope with it.” As spokesperson for the critics of globalization, Chua elects Noam Chomsky, em phasizing four points. Firstly, markets produce imbalances. Secondly, critics emph asize class conflict, not ethnic conflict. Thirdly, critics emphasize, that globalizati on is dangerous to non-western countries. Lastly, critics advocate more democrac y as a solution for non-western victims of globalization. Chua, particularly, in the caveats bracketing her main theory, absolves globalization of any blame for caus ing ethnic conflict, which she seems to regard as a given, and in anecdote and ar gument does not discuss the political and economic aspects of globalization, such as class conflict. Her main thesis regarding the value of democratic reforms is ja rringly critical of globalization critics‟ support for democratization as a cure for t he economic problems of globalization. This criticism surfaces again when Chua discusses her disagreement with Robert Kaplan about the sequencing of market re form and democratization. Of all the prominent arguments Chua singles out for discussion, her opposition to Robert Kaplan‟s seems the most deliberately aggrandizing. Not only is Kaplan a popular commentator on ethnic conflict, but also because of his reputation as me ntor to prominent conservative leaders, Chua‟s engagement could be dismissed as a liberal vendetta. But both authors share a globetrotting familiarity with the mo st unfortunate regions of the world, a prosaic flair, a propensity for self-promotio n, and a reputation as a pundit on ethnic violence. Kaplan‟s aims, in “The Comin g Anarchy“, though, could not be more different: “…one must understand environ mental scarcity, cultural and racial clash, geographic destiny, and the transformati on of war.“xxi Chua argues, that Kaplan “overlooks the global problem of marketdominant minorities…blames too much of the world‟s violence and anarchy on d emocracy.”xxii Rather than an ideological charge, Chua‟s disagreement with Kapla n relates to her sociological presupposition, that ethnic conflict is a given. Not on ly does Kaplan fail to distinguish between democracy and markets, in Chua‟s vie w, but also he identifies a causal link between democracy and ethnic conflict. Fro m this perspective, Chua most absolves ethnic groups for expressing a “hard” ide ntity the unintended consequences of which tends detrimentally to render relations with other ethnic groups problematic. Kaplan‟s emphasis is on political stability, not ethnic identity. Decidedly, Kaplan is a political writer, in both the sense, that he is a mentor and by the disciplinary pedigree of his arguments and the argume nts he engages. This clash of titans is more like pouring oil on water. Beyond he r cursory engagement with these three commentators, though, Chua‟s engagement with globalization literature is non-existent. Chua‟s failure to respond to both the vast number of academic and professional p roponents and opponents of globalization leads to the next two problems with her thesis, historical myopia and the one-dimensional quality of her analysis of ethni c conflict within nations. It is remarkable, that by just a quick search of the text, Chua‟s book contains no references to any of the academic and professional auth ors contained in the course syllabus, with the exception of George Soros. And, ev en on that puzzling coincidence, Soros is identified, not as a cautious theoretical critic of globalization, but as an insider warning about the dangers of the Americ an trade and budget deficits. Completing missing from The World on Fire is eith er an historical discussion of globalization as an economic phenomenon, as Gilpin provides in The Challenge of Global Capitalism, or a discussion of paradigms w ithin either the Political Economy and International Relations (IR) disciplines, as i n The Political Economy of International Relations. Often when discussing a parti cular market-dominant minority, such as the Chinese in the Philippines or Indones ia, or Jews in Russia, Chua glances back at a historical period before the fall of t he Berlin Wall. Avowing not to offer a universal theory, Chua, though, does not even espouse, or mention a universal theory of political economy or international relational, such as realism, liberalism, constructivism, feminism, or Marxism. Deci dedly, Chua is not a liberal, in her policy recommendations. Chua‟s protestations emphasizing her pro-globalization stance and her negative analogy of the United States as the world market-dominant minority makes it improbable she is an econ omic nationalist or a Marxian, although her selection of nations, not economic pr ocesses, suggests at least a way to bridge the gap between her pro-globalization r ecommendations and a focus on government policy Chua never provides. Overall, Chua is a collector and arranger of facts, but not an analyst. Chua‟s voracious appetite for facts renders her analyses one-dimensional as well as ahistorical. Chua‟s secondary sources are loaded with newspaper articles and te stimonials. Although her colorful quotes facilitate a certain familiarity and prolixit y, they also enter the argument without any critical attention. Racial epithets are j ust as useful as an interview with some foreign government official. Chua also us es seeming circumlocutions, like “as perceived by” or “viewed”, which highlight problems, but also obfuscate analytical issues. For instance, there is Chua‟s analo gy of America as a world market-dominant minority. First, what is the relationshi p between this perception of America and the reality of, say, the Chinese in the Philippines, as market-dominant minorities? Also, when in certain markets, the Ja panese or the Indians dominate as foreign investors, what is the relationship betw een foreign investment and the homegrown market-dominant minority? Finally, w here is the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, World Trade Organi zation (WTO, United Nations (UN), and countless other foreign and domestic non -governmental agencies (NGOs) in this menacing perception of a world market-do minant America? They appear in disparate footnotes, commissioning reports and p roviding anecdotes, but not in the theoretical construction of Chua‟s thesis. This ad hoc quality renders Chua‟s discussion of Russia‟s failed liberalization dri ve in the 1990s particularly one-dimensional. Even though it is trivially fascinatin g, that a Jewish minority incited so much animosity in Russia, Stiglitz‟s criticism s of the manner in which the IMF failed to understand and adapt to local conditi ons in Russia in the wake of Yeltsin‟s troubled presidency is more concrete and plausible, especially in a post-imperial nation full of minorities living on the peri phery of an embittered ethnic minority. Stiglitz concentrates on “…how the IMF and the Treasury laid the groundwork for the oligarchs‟ plundering…“ by their “ …faith in the market…unmatched by an appreciation of the subtleties of its under pinnings…” and by “…paying insufficient attention to the institutional infrastructu re that would allow a market economy to flourish…”xxiii Chua provides the small est description of one aspect of the Russian debacle. Again, Stiglitz can make an accusation with the authority Chua cannot. Chua‟ entire thesis lacks Stiglitz‟s institutional critique. Chua can quote when the IMF or World Bank intervenes, in Sierra Leone or Bolivia, for instance, but she does not assign blame. As she states as a caveat, Chua is more concerned about the “unintended consequences” of IMF intervention. Even when discussing the b acklash against democracy scenario in general terms xxiv, where the IMF and Worl d Bank provide loans to the government, the role of such foreign and domestic in stitutions is understated and Chua‟s tone hardly accusatory. For Chua, ethnic grou p behavior is more important than domestic or foreign institutions. That ethnic co nflict occurs, as part of an ethnic group‟s expression, is a given, but it is the effe ct upon other groups, whether disastrous or beneficial, that is the concern. Chua i s not concerned about the stability of governments, as Kaplan is, or global institu tions, as is Stiglitz. Governments can create a medium where ethnic groups intera ct either beneficially or destructively. This is further reinforced by Chua‟s disagre ement with Kaplan about the sequencing of market and democratic reform. As Pa ul Craig Roberts argues: Certainly the U.S. government and the IMF should take care not to export policies that worsen ethnic conflicts, but the more powerful conclusion to be drawn from Chua‟s material---a conclusion that Chua studiously avoids---is that the U.S., Europe, the U.K., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand should immediately cease and desist from reconstructing themselves as multi-ethnic societies. Accentuating ethnic conflict abroad is stupid, even criminal, but it is insane to import inassimilable ethnic groups into Western countries, thus replicating in the West the Third World conflicts that Chua so terrifyingly describes. xxv With a nod toward Isaacs‟ discussion of the cultural and political conceptions of nationalism, Chua is closer a critique of the multicultural nation than a political or economic model of globalization. From this analytical position, Chua takes a prescriptive stance that is incongruent with her sociological emphasis on ethnic identity. Chua‟s prescriptive argument is political. She urges the United States not to advocate laissez-faire capitalism or unbridled majority rule in countries where market-dominant minorities exist. Placing her hopes with market-dominant minorities, she advocated behaviors designed not to induce violence between ethnic groups as an unintended consequence. These macroeconomic policies encouraging assimilation are incongruent with her sociological analysis of countries inhabited by divergent ethnic groups. The one way to ensure that violence does not occur as an unintended consequence of a government policy error is to liberalize domestic immigration policies. Congruent with her pro-globalization stance, as Rodrik argues, immigration liberalization is the one reform seldom advocated, but most likely to ameliorate the problem of labor immobility and level the plying field between capital and labor. xxvi Immigration liberalization will also defuse ethnic conflict by undercutting the despair of an intractable geographical inheritance in parts of the world where resources are scarce. That Chua does not follow through with her pro-globalization perspective, and does not recognize the correlation between geography and ethnic conflict goes a long way to explain her half-hearted, cynical advocacy for assimilative government policies. I did not like Chua‟s World On Fire. I sensed in her book a victory of marketing over a potentially controversial sociological theory. The book‟s strength lies in its analysis of the interaction of ethnic groups with globalization as an external factor. However, Chua does not give any of her individual national test cases sufficient treatment. Her simplifies and condensed version of backlash into three scenarios is a shadow of Horowitz‟s ten theories of ethnic conflict. Furthermore, although she broadly covers every continent, except Australasia (where there is a market-dominant majority), she ignores geographical factors, simplifies populations into a single minority and majority, ignores universal theories from the IR and Political Economy disciplines, and her sources are weak. But, most importantly, because she sides with Isaac‟s cultural conception of nationalism, she cannot provide a cathartic solution for a serious problem. One can quibble with the prospect of a Shylock, shunned by his co-religionists and without a livelihood or daughter, but Shylock is responsible for his own conversion by his vengefulness. For the benefits all the other characters and Venice receive, his punishment is just. i William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice (New York: Crown Publishers, 1979), 398. ii Amy Chua, World On Fire (New York: Anchor Books, 2003), 9-10. iii Chua, 10. iv Chua, 6. v Chua, 7-8. vi Chua, 13. vii Chua, 14. viii Chua, 14. ix Chua, 14-15. x Chua, 297. (Horowitz, 1998) xi xii (Isaacs, 2001) xiii (Isaacs, p. 437) xiv (Isaacs, p. 438) xv (Isaacs, p. 441) xvi (Isaacs, p. 446) xvii Smith, Anthony D. “Chosen People: Why Ethnic Groups Survive” Ethnic and Racial Studies (1992) : 438. xviii Chua, 15-16. xix Chua, 8-9. xx (Gray 2005) xxi Robert D. Kaplan, “ The Coming Anarchy” The Atlantic Monthly (1994) : 42. xxii Chua, 263. xxiii Joseph Stiglitz, “The Insider” The New Republic (2000) : 59-60. xxiv Chua, 147. xxv (Roberts 2003) xxvi (Rodrik 2002) Bibliography Chua, Amy. World On Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Eth nic Hatred and Global Instability. New York: Anchor Books, 2003. Gray, John. “The World Is Round” New York Times Review of Books (2005). Horowitz, Donald L. “Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict“. Presented at Wo rld Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., 1998. Avail able online: http://www.tamilnation.org/conflictresolution/horowitz.htm. Isaacs, Harold R. “Nationality: „End of the Road‟?” Foreign Affairs. (1975). Available online: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19750401faessay10140/haro ld-r-isaacs/nationality-end-of-the-road.html. O‟Meara, Patrick, et. al. Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century: A Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. Roberts, Paul Craig. “Globalization‟s Many Discontents” American Conservative (2003). Available online: http://www.amconmag.com/2003/01_13_03/review7.html. Shakespeare, William. 2000. The Merchant of Venice New York: Crown Publishers, 1979. Smith, Anthony D. “Chosen Peoples: Why Ethnic Groups Survive” Ethnic and Racial Studies (1992): 436-456.