Lost In Eurasian Land Lust: A Critique of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard

1 Lost In Eurasian Land Lust: A Critique of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard Joseph Steinberg IR 6602 Geostrategic Studies Farkasch 10 February 2006 2 Lost In Eurasian Land Lust: A Critique of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard In George Orwell‟s Nineteen Eighty-Four, Winston Smith experiences an epiphany during a war rally when he realizes, that “…the speaker had switched from one line to the other actually in midsentence, not only without a pause, but without even breaking the syntax…. Oceania was at war with Eastasia: Oceania had always been at war with Eastasia. A large part of the political literature of five years was now completely obsolete.”i During the commotion, Smith receives a copy of an illegal, secret tome, “The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism“, written by a member of the Brotherhood, Emmanuel Goldstein. Nestled in an armchair, Smith reads about the geopolitical reality underlying the continuous wars in a chapter entitled, “War is Peace”. Three super-states, Oceania, Eurasia, and Eastasia are locked in a cycle of warfare for control of cheap labor in a western Asian and African shatter zone and to mobilize their respective citizens in perpetual mobilization. The strategy that all three powers are following, or pretend to themselves that they are following, is the same. The plan is, by a combination of 3 fighting, bargaining, and well-timed strokes of treachery, to acquire a ring of bases completely encircling one or other of the rival states, and then to sign a pact of friendship with that rival and remain on peaceful terms for so many years as to lull suspicion to sleep. During this time rockets loaded with atomic bombs can be assembled at all the strategic spots; finally they will all be fired simultaneously, with effects so devastating as to make retaliation impossible. It will then be time to sign a pact of friendship with the remaining world-power, in preparation for another attack.ii In an Orwellian world, regional super-states maintain a crude balance of power by conspiring to keep their respective citizens ignorant of the truth, that there is a common humanity. In Zbigniew Brzezinski‟s The Grand Chessboard, the author argues, that the remaining, yet waning “world-power”, America, battles its opponents on the Eurasian super-continent, to create a “functional structure of global cooperation”.iii Although far less insidious and earnestly expository, Brzezinski and Orwell share a common genealogical perspective centered around geo-strategic arguments, comprising Sir Halford Mackinder‟s “Heartland” theory and Karl Haushofer„s Geopolitik. Where Orwell emphasizes geo-economics, particularly in the regionalization of labor exploitation, Brzezinski uses geopolitical arguments, but in both war and peace, as in Big Brother‟s slogan, rely more upon changing, partisan political perspectives on international relations reacting to current affairs during their respective careers. One day it‟s Eurasia, the next day it‟s Eastasia. I will argue that Brzezinski‟s The Grand Chessboard is too ambitious and too impracticable a scheme for American public and elite opinion and tradition not to degenerate over a succession of executive administrations into Orwell‟s bizarre 4 balance of power structure, where alliances oscillate with random rapidity. I will characterize Brzezinski‟s three-pronged scheme to establish a multilateral Eurasian security structure as part of the land power theories most prominently espoused by Mackinder and Haushofer, criticize aspects of each relating to Brzezinski‟s recommendations, and contrast it with Mahan‟s sea power theory. Finally, I will argue that geostrategy is a pragmatic, limited leadership vocation not fit for Brzezinski‟s grand scheme. The goal of Brzezinski‟s The Grand Chessboard is an “integrated, comprehensive, and long-term geostrategy for all of Eurasia.”iv Brzezinski begins with three assumptions.v Firstly, America is the world‟s sole hegemon. Secondly, and for the first time in world history, America is an non-Eurasian hegemon that dominates, thirdly, the world‟s central arena, Eurasia. Furthermore, America is Eurasia‟s “arbiter”vi between security and “international anarchy“.vii For Brzezinski, there are three sets of anarchical threats to Eurasian security. Firstly, there are the demographical menaces of “population explosion, poverty-driven migration, radicalizing urbanization, ethnic and religious hostilities, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”viii Secondly, there are the fruits of globalization, “Congestion…modern communications…global migrations…likely to serve as a vehicle for the transcontinental conveyance of ethnic and social conflicts.”ix Lastly, there is nationalism, particularly in Europe. On the Eurasian chessboard, Brzezinski argues for a careful placement of pieces, beginning with European integration on one end of the super-continent and a more prominent regional role for China on the other end, working inward from the European Union‟s eastern expansion as a bridgehead to Russia‟s eventual inclusion. Undermining this juggling act is a fractious Eurasian 5 Balkans, East European fears of a resurgent Russia, and Japan. Amazingly, America needs to perform this service as its influence weakens even beyond the limited impact it has a non-Eurasian state.x The service America, as the last hegemon, can perform Brzezinski breaks down into short-, medium-, and long-term goals.xi In the short-term, America should “consolidate and perpetuate the prevailing pluralism on the on the map of Eurasia” by “maneuver or manipulation in order to prevent the emergence of a hostile coalition” or “one particular state” that could undermine American hegemony. Brzezinski adds that domestic pressure in America and regional sensitivities make it imperative, that America not try to retain its hegemony for too long.xii In the medium-term, America should put “greater emphasis on the emergence of increasingly important but strategically compatible partners who, prompted by American leadership might help to create a more cooperative trans-Eurasian security system.” These immediate partners should be the European Union (EU), China, Russia, and India. Finally, in the long-term, America should establish a permanent Trans-Eurasian Security System (TESS). Presumably, at this point, America;‟s hegemony would manifestly exhaust itself in the laurels of a breathtaking diplomatic ceremony, no doubt with strict security to shield the affair from the expansive, anarchical hordes ready to pour out of the Eurasian Balkans. Between the pragmatic search for Eurasian partners and the foundations of yet another international bureaucracy comes a staggering agenda of diplomatic triumphs Brzezinski lays out with precise management. It is during this medium-term preparatory stage where Brzezinski‟s chessboard metaphor begins to break under the strain of reality. The maintenance of a 6 balance-of-power system, or even that of a new talking shop, in Eurasia is not such a Herculean task, but pursuing the medium-term agenda on a schedule-how many presidents, diplomats, legislators, and foreign potentates would this task consume? -is just quixotic. Firstly, and foremost, for every incremental, bilateral adjustment Brzezinski envisions, such as EU expansion or an alliance with Iran, there are a host of other states set to benefit or loose that will expand the number of contestants in the chess match beyond the limits of neatly manageable diplomacy and change the contours of the board. Secondly, there is no recognition of the fact, that Eurasian actors have non-Eurasian interests, or that the Eurasian Balkans sits like a third player at every turn. Lastly, Brzezinski„s vision is almost contemptuous of the democratic succession of power and the influence of vested interests, when policy goals can mutate or lose support entirely. It is not as if many of Brzezinski‟s policy suggestions are not perceptive, or even beneficial, but they are just impracticable.xiii Ultimately, the chessboard metaphor indicates exactly the worst posture, namely, the obsession to unify, to adopt on the Eurasian super-continent. If we approach Eurasia as if it were a chessboard, then we will be met by opponents, and cooperation and mutual benefit would be removed from our calculations. If the leaders of the most powerful nation on earth were to conceptualize foreign policy as a chess game, it would virtually ensure that other nations would as well. A Eurasian alliance to counteract growing US influence would be virtually inevitable.xiv Brzezinski commits this error, because he continues the errors of two prominent geopoliticians, Sir Halford Mackinder and Karl Haushofer. 7 One of the most remarkable aspects of The Grand Chessboard is the names, Mackinder, Haushofer, and Demangeon, as well as scores of foreign politicians, living and dead, he drops, and the one, Alfred Thayer Mahan, he omits.xv Mackinder‟s “Pivot/Heartland” theory looms very large in Brzezinski‟s scheme, as the “fourth assumption” Brzezinski pays homage to Haushofer only by stressing the importance of the far eastern anchor, but also by implicit acceptance of his theory of Panregions. Demangeon gets cursory credit for advocating “…greater unity among the European states even before World War Two.”xvi Although he identifies Mackinder and Haushofer with a geopolitical trend favoring land power over sea power, Brzezinski does not mention Mahan, the preeminent geopolitical advocate of sea power. By narrowly identifying Demangeon by his conclusions, and not from his theoretical assumptions, and entirely omitting Mahan, Brzezinski both undercuts even his tepid argument, that “Economic prowess, and its translation into technological innovation, can also be a key criterion of power.”xvii, and reinforces Mackinder‟s and Haushofer‟s errors. Even if Brzezinski had not quoted Mackinder‟s “Heartland” dictum, Mackinder‟s ghost would haunt The Grand Chessboard. Mackinder‟s dictum opines: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:/Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island:/Who rules the World-Island commands the World.” As Christopher J. Fettweis contends, Mackinder‟s “Heartland” theory is far from authoritative. Listing five reasons (impregnability, mobility, interior lines, productivity, centrality) Eurasia is still crucial for world hegemonyxviii, Fettweis proceeds to debunk each one. If the Heartland is an impregnable fortress, that also means its offensive abilities are severely limited. Any advantages accruing to military strategists resulting from the 8 invention of railroads is negated by strategic air power that can move around the globe. Having shorter interior lines only means the Heartland is vulnerable to attack from all sides. Geoffrey Kemp and Robert Harkavy, in “Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East”, err similarly: Russian control or dominance of the Caspian Sea and Basin will ensure Moscow's control of the key oil and gas distribution systems from the region to the outside world and give it great leverage over supply. Continued instability in the North Caucasus and Transcaucasus, Turkey, and Afghanistan poses serious potential threats to the various pipelines that have been proposed for transporting oil and gas to the international markets. Any deployment of significant Russian forces in Iran, Turkmenistan, or Afghanistan could resurrect concerns about Russian ambitions in regard to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.xix The Heartland‟s harsh geography and climate also undermines the extraction of resources that are at any rate located amid vast stretches of wasteland. Finally, possessing the Heartland, particularly without sea power assets, is more of a disadvantage for any Eurasian hegemon bent on global hegemony. From the perspective of a non-Eurasian state like America, then it is more pragmatic to limit the disadvantages of dealing with Eurasia than trying to produce advantages from such a low base. Brzezinski is trapped in a 19th-Century mindset in the same way Mackinder, and many Cold War geopoliticians, feared the consequences of a Eurasian power that could somehow make the Heartland advantageous. That prospect has seemingly returned with Russia‟s new natural gas offensives against Ukraine in January 2006. 9 Frederico Bordonaro argued in “Russian Gas Dispute”, that state ownership of over 50% of the Russian economy, including Gazprom, gives Russia the ability “…to recreate a Russian sphere of influence from Belarus to Crimea, and from the Caucasus to Kyrgyzstan.xx This geo-economic stratagem, however, proved as flawed as the notion, that the Heartland offered a controlling state irresistible opportunities for continental domination. As Joseph S. Nye, in “The Chimera of Gas Power”, argues: Some economists argue that there is little power in relationships where buyers and sellers consent to a price that clears a market. However, in cases where buyers and sellers are not equally dependent upon the relationship, the greater vulnerability of the more dependent party can be used as a source of coercive power by the less dependent party. Russia thought it was less dependent than Ukraine, and decided to exercise that power…Russia quickly discovered that its threats against Ukraine were too costly to its reputation as a reliable supplier for Europe. When considered in this wider European context, there was more symmetry in the Russia-Ukraine energy relationship than the simple numbers on energy dependence implied at first glance…In the end, the next decade will be marked by a delicate balance in which Europe remains dependent on Russian gas, but Russia's need for export revenues will also make it dependent on Europe.xxi Just as the Heartland is geographically vulnerable from all directions, Russia is more dependent economically upon European buyers. Furthermore, as Harkavy and Kemp 10 point out, the need to protect oil and gas pipelines in adjacent, sovereign countries could compel Russia to entertain, for Moscow, risky and economically debilitating military adventures certain to receive unanimous disapproval from energy-dependent states on the periphery. In such a tense environment Russia can neither earn remuneration nor defend itself without great expenditure and loss of territory. Brzezinski boldly underlines his fixation with Eurasia by including Haushofer, another geopolitician impressed by Mackinder‟s “Heartland” theory. The inclusion of Karl Haushofer in Brzezinski‟s geopolitical canon is doubly significant beyond Haushofer‟s support for Mackinder‟s “Heartland” dictum and for land power in general because of Haushofer„s theory of panregions and the example of Haushofer„s own career. Without explicitly mentioning it, the geographical demarcations displayed by the chapter divisions in The Grand Chessboard is reminiscent of Haushofer‟s theory of panregions. Holger H. Herwig encapsulated Haushofer‟s understanding of this concept of global organization as “no nation is a region unto itself; hence the necessity to extend its area (space) to include first, people of similar speech and culture, and second, people of related speech and culture.”xxii The assignment of regional representatives, such as France and Germany or China, is a consequence of this pseudo-scientific simplification. Rather than an uncontroversial triviality, dividing the Eurasian super-continent into discrete regional entities makes complex arguments about the relationship of culture, language, ethnicity and politics and about the relationships of those groups to each other. Three regional units, Europe, Central Asia, and the Far East, assume a matter-of-fact coherence in Brzezinski‟s argument that is unwarranted. 11 Brzezinski quickly passes over a claim, that America and Europe share values, history, and ethnicity.xxiii Such claims about a “European culture”, not to mention American-European solidarity, are rife for satire. Joseph S. Nye, stressing the economic ties binding “Europe” to America, nonetheless concluded, that “…while some differences exist between Europe and America, at the fundamental level of democracy and human rights, no other two parts of the globe share more.“xxiv In a February 2, 2006 editorial, The Economist ridiculed such claims, that there is a distinctive European identity, that European culture is something more inspiring than the Anglo-American fixation with economics, and that institutions embody European culture.xxv Running through lists of examples, the article could only identify the idea of a common European culture as a means of excluding Muslims, globalization, and American sitcoms. Even more importantly, considering the value of EU institutions, Brzezinski does not distinguish between the utility of disparate organizations, such as NATO, OSCE, and the EU, in the yawn-inducing alphabet soup of official European acronyms. Another interpretation of the difference between European and American values appears in a conversation between Robert D. Kaplan and Romania‟s president, Emil Constantinescu, in Eastward To Tartary: “But for Romania and Bulgaria, NATO is their only hope, for their leaders knew very well that they had no chance of imminent and full European Union membership. In the poorer and more isolated Balkans-threatened by violence spilling over from the former Yugoslavia-NATO membership loomed as the ultimate, totemic symbol of Western civilization…”xxvi Possibly, European culture, centered in Paris and Berlin, is also a means to exclude 12 the modern descendants of Central Asian nomads from the benefits of EU membership. The sense of exclusion perceived by Romanian and Bulgarian officials is remarkable given the sentimental attachment, significantly proclaimed in the term, “heartland”, itself, of Eurasia‟s central regions, overlapping, depending upon cartographical conventions, the Balkans shatterbelt, Russia, and Central Asia. Recently, Christian Jung announced a research project to evaluate the veracity of two competing ethnological theories concerning the identity of Central Asian peoples. “Zur Erklarung dieser "Mittelstellung" existieren in der Forschung zurzeit zwei alternative Ansatze: Wahrend die "Heartland"-Hypothese besagt, dass die meisten Bewohner Asiens und Europas gemeinsam von einem zentralasiatischen Genpool abstammen, besteht nach der "Admixture"-Hypothese die Bevolkerung Zentralasiens aus einer "Mischung" von Europaern und Asiaten, die zu verschiedenen Zeitpunkten in diese Region eingewandert sind”xxvii It seems, that not even the biological impregnability of the “Heartland” is assured. From the center to the Far Eastern periphery, Haushofer‟s concern, and Brzezinski‟s fears, is unfounded, and the threats from Eurasia are disintegration and vulnerability. Haushofer‟s Panregion theory is especially thin concerning the Far East, and the influence upon Brzezinski leads to an examination of Haushofer‟s career as a geo-politician and the American domestic vested interests Mahan opined would undermine American hegemony. Like the idea of “Europe”, “East Asia”, or the “Far East”, is a convenient, political illusion unsupported by ethnic or linguistic fact. Furthermore, Haushofer‟s election of Japan as the regional hegemon, and Brzezinski‟s 13 of China, underscores the central defining geopolitical reality in the region, Sino-Japanese rivalry. This rivalry, that includes elements of both peaceful competition and barely-disguised hostility, is a microcosm of the land-sea power dichotomy itself. Historically, China and Japan alternate in the regional hegemonic role, and that probably accounts for most of the reason, why Haushofer and Brzezinski anoint one over the other in their respective works. Yet, each country, and that includes Korea, possesses geopolitical liabilities even more distinctive than cultural similarities would lead one to believe. Furthermore, like the “Heartland”, China‟s geographical girth and demographical preponderance is a result of the Chinese perception, that the central area surrounding Beijing is vulnerable. The Chinese threat perceived by adjacent states and America occurs from this insecurity, not from any inherent advantages. But what is most salient about Haushofer‟s research in Japan is the political use he made of that research during his tenure as a Nazi advisor. Japan‟s regional hegemony at that time allowed Haushofer to lobby for Tokyo‟s inclusion, with Russia, in a diplomatic stratagem to control Eurasia. Beijing‟s current economic hegemony, and its previous role of the third player in a triangular relationship between the former Soviet Union, America, and China, allows Brzezinski to anoint China as his regional hegemon. Geopolitically, it makes little sense to simplify regional dynamics in this way, because the region is not nearly as uniform as required, and historical shifts in military or economic hegemony could occur within the time frame of Brzezinski‟s medium-term goals. Furthermore, given the region‟s uniform economic value to conflicting American vested interests, it seems unlikely, that Washington could bravely weather the damage caused by using diplomatic 14 capital solely to deal with China. The precedent created by the 50-year postwar alliances with Japan and South Korea makes that policy decision extremely difficult. Victor D. Cha has analyzed the American diplomatic relationships with South Korea and Japan as a concept of realist alliance theory called quasi-alliances.xxviii The distinguishing feature of the triangular relationship between America, Japan, and South Korea is, that, while both Japan and South Korea are formally allied to America, Japan and South Korea are not allies themselves. Nonetheless, and even considering the centuries of mutual antagonism between the two, the economic and political relationships between Japan and South Korea are quite resilient. At least since the arrival of Nixon administration in 1969, the two neighbors‟ relationship has endured recessions, America‟s normalization with China, nuclear crisis, North Korea, and nuclear crises. Measuring what causes levels of cooperation and conflict to fluctuate between the two, Cha concludes, that either a symmetrical or asymmetrical structure of entrapment/abandonment concerns is responsible.xxix In other words, America‟s level of engagement in each of its alliances is a producer of the way that each country perceives threats to its security.xxx One such perceived threat for both Seoul and Tokyo is China. The most remarkable opinion concerning China and Japan Brzezinski offers is, that as China is offered the opportunity to become the regional hegemon, Japan would be offered the same chance to become a global player.xxxi Aside from the vested interests opposed to China‟s economic heft, sympathetic to Taiwan, and concerned by Beijing‟s military modernization, as Cha would have it, China, Japan, and South Korea each perceive the other as more or less a threat, but China‟s only ally is Russia 15 (and then, a very reluctant, wary one). The diplomatic deftness required to minimize the perception amongst any one of the three, that either Washington is not abandoning or forcing it into a relationship it does not want, is beyond the ability of even a global hegemon, especially one that has never expended in East Asia diplomatic capital sufficient enough to earn any surplus credit. Downgrading two historically successful alliances with Japan and South Korea, to anoint Beijing the regional hegemon would excite tension, no matter how many global plaudits Tokyo earned. What Brzezinski does not account for, is the perception, that for as long as America is Japan‟s ally, Japan will not act unilaterally in East Asia. Downgrading the US-Japan alliance and simultaneously allowing China more heft in the region would unleash exactly those nationalist forces held in check by the recognition received by Washington‟s partnership and increase military tensions in the region. Brzezinski just does not seem to appreciate, how events occurring within the geographical confines of the region have an immediate effect upon the diplomatic dynamics of the region, and that making distinctions between global and regional roles will not cause either China or Japan to change that scrutiny. It is a choice between China and Japan, with South Korea as a flexible given. Japan, as a more stable, more developed, more powerful state right now with fewer insecurities, is a better choice. That Japan is traditionally a sea power, and a long-standing ally with institutional support in both Japan and America makes this choice even more attractive. One aspect generally of the land power theory tradition, shared by Mackinder, and Haushofer, is the fact, that it was developed in response to Mahan‟s sea power theory, and all land power theories share a certain insecurity to compensate for the strengths of Mahan‟s sea power thesis. And, despite Brzezinski‟s appreciation of the modern 16 world‟s anarchical tendencies, his mercantilist focus does no admit of the geo-economic value of Mahan‟s thesis in a globalized world. According to Jon Sumida‟s revisionist reading, Mahan‟s work stresses leadership and contingency over geographical determinism and trans-national consortia and free trade over the state and autarky.xxxii Mahan‟s six factors, geographical position, physical configuration, size and character of the population, national character and aptitudes, and character of the government provide useful scientific criteria by which to judge the relationships between states.xxxiii Brzezinski‟s adjustment from short-term balance of power diplomacy to a long-term consortium is untenable by means of the autarkic and organic state theory employed by Mackinder and Haushofer. Finally, Mahan‟s insight into the capacity for leadership and contingency to trump geopolitical theories and conditions, punctuated by his example of the defeat of the British fleet by the French Admiral De Grasse at the entrance to the Chesapeake Bay during the Revolutionary War more instructive than Haushofer‟s romantic odes to German leadership. This leads to an examination of the American domestic political viability of Brzezinski‟s The Grand Chessboard. Action, however, to be consistent and well proportioned, must depend upon well-settled conviction; and conviction, if it is to be reasonable, and to find expression in a sound and continuous national policy, must result from a careful consideration of present conditions in the light of past experiences. Here, unquestionably, strong differences of opinion will be manifested at first, both as to the true significance of the lessons of the past, and the manner of applying them to the present. Such differences need not cause regret. Their appearance is a sign of attention aroused; and 17 when discussion has become general and animated, we may hope to see the gradual emergence of a sound and operative public sentiment. What is to be deprecated and feared is indolent drifting, in wilful blindness to the approaching moment when action must be taken; careless delay to remove fetters, if such there be in the Constitution or in traditional prejudice, which may prevent our seizing opportunity when it occurs.xxxiv The most important factor concerning Brzezinski‟s recommendations is practicability. In “After the Bush Doctrine”, Joshua Kurlantzick argues that there are three foreign policy “camps” battling for the right to influence a post-Bush American foreign policy.xxxv Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice has adopted a position midway between realism and President Bush‟s democratic transformationalist. Senator Chuck Hagel is “…a classical realist…doesn't shy away from couching ideas in moral rhetoric, calling for an American "commitment to principle" overseas while also insisting that alliances and international institutions can bolster U.S. influence, not degrade it….also believes that losing the trust of the world only erodes America's moral force.” Finally, Senator Sam Brownback “…evangelical background and current conservative Catholicism…leads him to focus more specifically on promoting religious freedom abroad…preserving religious freedom and addressing suffering so horrific that truly moral people cannot ignore it, including the suffering caused by HIV and other infectious diseases, human trafficking, and sex trafficking…focusing on some of the problems raised by globalization, Brownback implicitly questions whether capitalism, absent other policy initiatives, can resolve certain moral challenges.” While clearly a Brownback administration foreign policy would find it difficult to execute Brzezinski‟s short-term recommendations, it is unclear whether a Rice or Hagel administration foreign policy would have the commitment to complete 18 the long-term project. The Republican resistance to accommodating international organizations , like the United Nations, highlights another aspect of Brzezinski‟s long-term project, the establishment of the TESS left unanswered: what happens to the other international organizations? Will the jurisdictional relationship become one of supremacy or cohabitation? Will American popular and elite opinion stomach another grand international edifice? However much a Mahanian statesman should embrace unconventional visions, the establishment of TESS is unnecessary within the dictates of a foreign policy based on free trade, secure sea lanes and airspace, and ready sea-based access to energy sources. Dean Acheson, according to James Chace, criticized his successor, John Foster Dulles, for his rhetoric of employing unlimited force for unlimited objectives.xxxvi Acheson, although employing universalistic language to obtain aid for Greece and Turkey from a skeptical Congress, denied that it was part of a long-term strategy.xxxvii Dulles‟ rollback strategy and Truman‟s postwar architecture set a bad precedent for expansive vision and profligate expenditure that Brzezinski‟s three-pronged scheme to establish a Trans-Eurasian Security System feeds upon for its moral legitimacy. Brzezinski pays homage to Mackinder and Haushofer, ignores Mahan, and ignores the post World War Two institutional architecture devised by the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. But, like the theory of secession, even if his recommendations were logically cogent (and they are not), by the possibilities available in the American diplomatic traditions and current foreign policy options, Brzezinski‟s scheme would be impracticable to implement, especially in East Asia. Land power geostrategies suffer genetically from an insecurity to compensate for the inherent advantages of sea-based commerce and naval power. But geography humbles by its sheer existence 19 and immutability, both of which counsel restraint. There is a homegrown familiarity with sea based power that America should continue to exploit, instead of losing itself in the topography of another continent. Another islander, Orwell, realized the disorientation resulting from too heavy a dose of Eurasian land lust. Brzezinski‟s is a game America never needs to start. 20 i George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (New York: Plume Books, 2003). (Orwell, 2003) Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 215. Brzezinski, p. 194. Brzezinski, p. 197. Brzezinski, p. 194. Brzezinski, p. 195. Brzezinski, p. 195. ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix Brzezinski, p. 196. Brzezinski, p. 197. Brzezinski, p. 198. Brzezinski, p. 199. x xi xii xiii Quoting a conversion recorded by Jefferson Davis‟ wife, Varina, between the two during the c ompilation of his Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government: “He spoke of his object …the att empt to prove the right of secession…further that „…it has not been my wish to incite violence. I recognize the fact that the war showed it to be impracticable.‟ But „…this did not prove it to b e wrong‟ ” William C. Davis, Jefferson Davis: The Man and His Hour (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), pp. 675-6. xiv Christopher J. Fettweis, “Sir Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics, and Policymaking in the 21st Century” Parameters, Summer 2000, p. 67. xv Brzezinski, pp. 38-9. xvi Brzezinski, p. 39. 21 xvii Brzezinski, p. 38. Fettweis, pp. 62-5. xviii xix Robert Harkavy and Geoffrey Kemp, “Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East: Strategic Access to Middle East Resources: Lesson From History,” in Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East (Brookings Press, 1997), http://arabworld.nitle.org/texts.php?module_id=4&reading_id=202&print=1 xx Federico Bordonaro, “Russian Gas Dispute,” Power and Interest Report (January 3, 2006), http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=418&language_id=1 xxi Joseph S. Nye, “The Chimera of Gas Power,” Project Syndicate (2006), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nye29/English xxii Holger H. Herwig, “Geopolitik: Haushofer; Hitler and Lebensraum,” in Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy, by Gray, Colin S. and Sloan, Geoffrey (London: Frank Kass, 1999), pp. 227-8. xxiii Brzezinski, p. 57. xxiv Joseph S. Nye, “America Confronts Old and New Europe,” Project Syndicate (2004), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/1569/1 xxv “Culture Wars”, The Economist, February 6, 2006. Robert D. Kaplan, Eastward to Tartary (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), p. 47. xxvi xxvii “While the "Heartland"-hypothesis holds that most inhabitants of Asia and Europe descend from a mutual Central Asian gene pool, the "Admixture"-hypothesis states that the Central Asians are a 'mixture' of Europeans and Asians, who migrated into the region at different times.“ Christian Jung, “Woher Stammen Die Menschen in Mittelasien?” Informationsdienst Wissenschaft (2006), http://www.idw-online.de/pages/de/news145647 xxviii Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 2-3. xxix Cha, pp. 199-200. Cha, p. 204. Brzezinski, p. 193. xxx xxxi xxxii Jon Sumida, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: Geopolitician,“ in Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy, by Gray, Colin S. and Sloan, Geoffrey (London: Frank Kass, 1999), p. 40. 22 xxxiii Margaret Tuttle Sprout, "Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power." In Makers of Modern Strateg y, ed. Edward Mead Earle, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), pp. 419-420. xxxiv Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The Isthmus and Sea Power,” in The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, Ltd., 1897). http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15749/15749-h/15749-h.htm xxxv Joshua Kurlantzick, “After the Bush Doctrine” The New Republic, February 6, 2006. James Chace, Acheson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), p. 373. 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