Pechorin’s Ghost: A Critique of Kaplan’s Eastward To Tartary

1 Pechorin’s Ghost: A Critique of Kaplan’s Eastward To Tartary Joseph Steinberg IR 6602 Geostrategic Studies Farkasch 10 March 2006 2 Pechorin’s Ghost: A Critique of Kaplan’s Eastward To Tartary “Why did fate have to throw me into the peaceful lives of honest smugglers? Like a stone hurled into the placid surface of a pond I had disturbed their tranquility, and like a stone had nearly gone to the bottom myself!”i Like Mikhail Lermontov‟s fictional account of Pechorin‟s encounter with smugglers in “Taman” in A Hero of Our Time, I am not certain if one could legitimately label Robert D. Kaplan in Eastward to Tartary: Travels in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus, or any number of politicians, border guards, and professors he interviews, a victim. In Lermontov„s “Taman”, the seducer, Pechorin, unwittingly becomes the pawn and victim of a “supple”, singing smuggler, and then a boy thief steals his saber and dagger. Kaplan might lose a little cash obtaining a visa on his running interview from Hungary to Armenia, but his interviewees always steal an opportunity to tell their respective tales. I would like to believe Kaplan orchestrated his interviews as cunningly as he organized his itinerary from one storied city to another, but like Lermontov, whose realistic portrait of the depraved Pechorin is nearly lost among his sordidly colorful characters and the enchanting Caucasus itself, Kaplan reveals a cramped world full of crooks and despots. You say that morality will gain nothing by it. Excuse me. People have been fed so much candy they are sick to their stomachs. Now bitter medicine and acid truths are needed. But don't ever think that the author of this book was ever ambitious enough to dream about reforming human vices. May God preserve him from such foolishness! It simply amused 3 him to picture the modern man as he sees him and as he so often--to his own and your own misfortune--has found him to be. It's enough that the disease has been diagnosed--how to cure it only the Lord knows!ii Reading Kaplan‟s Eastward to Tartary as a novel full of characters and ideas is like reading the account of an epidemic outbreak, the geostrategic notion that states should possess land to secure its resources, offering themselves as victims “…at the gate of the only brick building, which stood at the entrance to the town.”iii I will argue that Kaplan‟s Eastward to Tartary is stylistically constructed in a form, a travelogue that introduces theories and leaders as characters, most likely to create popular support for a unique region that most readers would not consider, or at least would not conceive of in the way Kaplan frames it, as an important foreign policy objective. Kaplan presents a Mackinderesque theory based on the technological impact of Trans-Caspian pipelines to support a policy of intervention, to protect what Kaplan perceives is American energy security. Kaplan also advocates a policy privileging geostrategy over globalization based upon a mercantilist view of political economy. I will argue that Kaplan is hyperbolic and never considers the advisability of other geostrategic theories, such as Mahan‟s sea based power theory. Kaplan‟s Eastward to Tartary is a “realist‟s picaresque”iv, a travelogue through the shatterzone between Hungary, Central Asia, and the Arabian Peninsula. Kaplan also treads over the fault line between geostrategy and economic and cultural globalization. Stylistically, Kaplan abruptly punctuates lavishly realistic descriptions of people, structures, and vistas and insider interviews with blunt, simplistic conclusions. Each observation or conversation becomes the epicenter of a provisional perspective marked and stored for comparison with Kaplan‟s vision of a “Herodotean 4 landscape”. Like his overall philosophical perspective, Kaplan‟s empirical accretion of quotes and snapshots as he races forward on trains, taxis, and buses convey the paradoxical catharsis of a Bildungsroman‟s progression into the past. “Eastward to Tartary returns to many of Kaplan's pet themes--indeed, one of the troublesome aspects of the book is that it sometimes seems like a not-altogether-comfortable imposition of old ideas on new geography.”v The hero is Robert D. Kaplan, talking with seedy politicians and dealing with border guards, so the reader does not have to risk life or limb. “Always aware of historical precedent, Kaplan describes passing through the ghosts of the Hapsburg, Ottoman, and Soviet empires, subtly hinting that what was once history is, and will become, news.”vi This emphasis upon history is the travelogue‟s most rewarding aspect, albeit in a negative sense, and Kaplan‟s trademark. “History shows that only states with the unity and strength to preserve themselves remain sovereign, and I had seen few of those in my travels.”vii Roaming through deserts and across the Caspian Sea might make web-surfing or searching through stacks impossible, but the above-mentioned quote is a good example of an academic controversy reduced to a one-line profession of faith. A reader could reconstruct the academic debate, but could never challenge Kaplan on his experiences or his connections. Kaplan‟s observations and interlocutors also consistently convey the argument, that the multi-ethnic and religious policies of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, and the Soviet Union offer a solution to the problems of the divisive, regional political economy. “Poor people hate each other more passionately than rich ones do, I thought perhaps because they fear they will remain an underclass if they do not dominate others. There may be no solution to ethnic nationalism, only sedation of it through gradual economic growth.”viii Such an 5 opiate is a blunt instrument when economic growth pits one economic sector, ethnic group, or geographic region against others. Then too, I thought, only rich people resort to mythology when they lose their privileged status. If only I could interview hundreds of working class farmers and laborers, I could write a picaresque, Dos Passos-esque novel. Ultimately, Kaplan offers not an argument, but a travelogue with passing arguments. The major historiographical limitation of Kaplan‟s genre writing is, that geography overdetermines history, which becomes incapable of becoming an independent component of geostrategy, along with political economy. “History and geography, of course, are only blueprints upon which humankind superimposes the details.“ix Not only is a given regime determined by its topographical features and specific geographical position on the Eurasian landmass, but also the political geographical accretion of cultural layers created by successive, impermanent imperial regimes. Only “extraordinary individuals” can trump “history, culture, and geography.“x When discussing Romania, the “pivot state”, Kaplan‟s conversations with Romanian officials reveal unanimity about why Romania needs to be a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Romanian dictator, Nicolae Ceaucescu, unlike the former pro-Nazi Germany dictator, Ion Antonescu, who “…kept the state together…” according to military officials, had on December 16, 1989 tasked the Romanian army with defending him from riots in Timisoara and Bucharest instead of seizing an opportunity to wrest Transylvania from the Hungarians and Bessarabia from the Russians.xi An avowed Stalinist, Sylviu Brucan, castigates the West for both capitulating to Hitler and abandoning Romania to Russia, not at Yalta, but at Munich.xii Regardless of ideological affiliation or ethnic identification, a series of 6 politicians and academicians agree nonetheless on the political boundaries of the historic Romanian state, and on the certainty, most passionately expressed by President Emil Constantinescu, that NATO will not make another mistake and let Romania be reduced by Yugoslavia or Greece to a rump state again.xiii The discussion of Romania‟s bid to attract NATO‟s interest sets a pattern for Kaplan‟s manipulation of interviews (by those trying to manipulate NATO to their purposes) and historical episodes: the impermanence of national unity undone by leaders too inept to maintain it, the call of an eternal, autochthonous nation, and a foreign savior. Kaplan can only ignore the chaos and dissension for the order of imperial regimes. Kaplan forgets, according to Colin S. Gray‟s “four working propositions”, about the lure of “imagined spatial relations”xiv Kaplan personifies the post-Cold War ascendancy of a type of geostrategist working outside of the diplomatic establishment, but who nonetheless understands, and is read by those who understand, the intersection of political and military power.xv However, and perhaps because of the first credential, Kaplan has developed a unique style dependent upon historical allusions. Two motifs are imperium and the spice road. Because of the progressive episodic flow of the travelogue form, Kaplan in one book can in three separate sections convey a strongly autocratic and nostalgic, yet humane argument for the Habsburg and Byzantine-Ottoman empires (“Jews, Gypsies, Kurds, and other minorities were generally safe within autocratic regimes such as Habsburg Austria and Ottoman Turkey but were killed or oppressed when these autocracies began giving birth to independent states dominated by ethnic majorities…”xvi) and the Soviet Union (Stalin saw the world anthropologically: For him a Jew was a Jew; a Turk, a Turk; a Chechen, a Chechen; and so on.xvii), with passing wistful glances at 7 vanquished empires, like the Assyrian and Persian. The other motif, the “new spice road“, or the oil and gas pipelines stretching across the Caucasus and Central Asian regions, is a catchy amalgam of geo-economic and military elements. Even more than mnemonic devices for Kaplan‟s agenda of political and military control by any means necessary, imperium and the new spice road are two kinds of “imagined spatial relations” that obscure the fault line, as fractured as any topographical feature, between globalization and geostrategy Kaplan straddles. Geoffrey Parker addresses the present-day contest in geostrategy between an untidy collection of geopolitical entities, from the “stability, order, and purpose” of the nation-state and the “diverse and ramshackle empires of the past” to the “…other levels of organizations which lie above and below…”xviii Kaplan presents all three geopolitical entities in his discussion of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Firstly, I will address how Kaplan understands the tension between economic and cultural liberalization and geostrategy. Kaplan primarily employs description and interviews, to compare the cities of Caucasus and Central Asian region with his recollections of the same places during previous trips in the early 1990s. In interviews, expatriate workers are Kaplan‟s chief representatives of western influence and economic liberalization. The effects of Turkish and Russian culture upon cities in the Caucasus are recorded through historical allusions and observation of prominent landmarks. Kaplan concludes that there is no progressive change related to economic liberalization, and that extraction of petroleum resources requires the presence of strong national institutions buttressed by foreign military support. Generally, Kaplan‟s depiction of globalization is unfavorable. 8 Leaving Turkey to enter the Caucasus region, Kaplan first visits Trabzon, an ancient city with Byzantine, Ottoman, Crusader, and Habsburg influences. Kaplan compares the conservative, “…Moslem call to prayer-louder, I recalled, than a few years earlier…” with the “…backlash against the „Natashas‟-Russian and Ukrainian prostitutes whop had arrived in the 1990s…”xix There is also the juxtaposition of historical edifices and modern sprawl, first in downtown Trabzon and later on a road leading to the Armenian monastery of Kaymakh. “A monoethnic Turkish nation blanketing Anatolia with its cartographic imprint had not occurred naturally or peacefully, and was not therefore necessarily permanent…The kingdom of Trebizond could be reborn, I thought, in dreary, working class hues.”xx Merely crossing the Turkish-Georgian border, “…from a free-market society” to “a society recovering from civil war and…Communism”,xxi on the way to Batumi, Kaplan is forced to reset his watch two hours ahead. Whereas Kaplan only laments the collision of Turkish Islam and modern, Russian capitalism, in Batumi Georgian culture needs Western assistance. On one hand, in a “primitive capitalist economy, storekeepers sold whatever they could get their hands on“, including weapons; on the other hand, “States in the former Soviet Union were so corrupt that the only way to bring honesty to…their own frontiers was, literally, to sell them off”xxii to Western companies. But, when a local politician “…packed the local bureaucracy with Moslem officials and built several new mosques…”, Kaplan concludes that “this was a clear case of a modern politician inventing hatreds retrospectively.”xxiii What the Turks did within their borders was legitimate, but not for a petty hack in Georgia. Even more startling as a comparison of political leadership than his portrait of Stalin 9 is Kaplan‟s comparison of Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Eduard Shevardnadze, where he concludes that when “…an idealistic dissident all but destroyed his country, while an old secret policeman rescued it…Shakespeare is a better guide to politics than political science.”xxiv Gamsakhurdia is brutally psychoanalyzed down to his problems with his father, his literary reputation and his wifexxv, but Shevardnadze knew how to rule by “trial and error” and the mystique created by surviving repeated assassination attempts.xxvi Shevardnadze also had Machiavelli‟s The Prince “in his genes”.xxvii If a leader is successful, one‟s mistakes are wiped clean by the subsequent triumphs, but failed leaders have their laundry aired for international consumption. Then again, though, according to Kaplan‟s Georgia expert, Levan Alexidze (who also provides the inside gossip on Gamsakhurdia) the cause was “our medievalness”xxviii, or the “hydra-headed gangland regime“.xxix.Extraordinary leadership, as evaluated by success, is not as crucial as culture, unless the leader is a mass murderer like Stalin. Crossing another political fault line between Orthodox Christianity and Turkic Islam, Kaplan‟s depiction of Azerbaijan, particularly Baku, prominently features Western expatriates. Poor highways, hideous apartment buildings, and donkeys suddenly appear beyond the border with Georgia, which so enchanted Kaplan. In Baku, there is a new infrastructure exploding out of the “dimly exotic place-name”. Again, Kaplan compares the multi-ethnic Alexandrian empire of the first oil boom with the nationalist state of the second one, as well as recalling the anarchy created by Azerbaijan‟s first attempt at democratization in the early 1990s.xxx An avuncular, Kiplingesque expatriate rationalizes the choice between reformist democrats and a dictator, like Aliyev, because “…only a dictator can start the process.”xxxi But what really stands out, for Kaplan as well, is the depiction of the annual oil show, because 10 the narrowly episodic travelogue format Kaplan employs fails to convince right where there needs to be a solid argument. It is not impressive enough to quote statistics about Trans-Caspian petroleum without reference to world markets. Kaplan loads the stakes in the regional; “geostrategic poker” by arguing in favor of autocratic control with allusive hyperbole. “Gibbon wrote that the mantle of Roman imperialism protected immature states from themselves. I knew from my travels that much of the territory through which this New Silk Road passed was no less immaturely governed; but now there was no Rome to guarantee tranquility.”xxxii A “knowledgeable foreigner”, Igor Effimoff, Pennzoil‟s point man in the Caspian, rationalizes staying in Azerbaijan for 3 per cent of the world‟s global oil reserves, because the United States went to war in Iraq for less.xxxiii Besides, without American intervention, he adds, the Turks, Russians, and Iranians have already built infrastructure in the country. Unlike Saudi Arabia at the start of its oil boom, Azerbaijan lacks a royal family to guarantee its sovereignty.xxxiv Brzezinski, Kaplan, and Klare offer opposing conclusions concerning this new silk road. The astounding realization about the Trans-Caspian petroleum question is not, that there is near unanimity about the political and military estimates and ramifications of American involvement in the Caucasus and Central Asia, but that there is no clear estimate of the economic stakes involved. Estimates of total resources vary and do not take into account either the cost of extracting remote resource or the price tag for military deployments, diplomatic tensions, infrastructure-building, or corruption. And, regardless of those costs, the United States will still have to buy petroleum products on an oligopolistic market controlled by the Organization of Petroleum 11 Exporting Countries (OPEC). Also revealing is the perspectival differences between Brzezinski, Kaplan, and Klare about the relationship between globalization and geostrategy in the region. Brzezinski argues in The Grand Chessboard, that the United States‟ “…primary interest is to help ensure that no single power comes to control this geopolitical space and that the global community has unhindered financial and economic access to it.”xxxv Kaplan and Klare, in Resource Wars, are at loggerheads, the first advocating what the second views with alarm. For Kaplan, sending troops is a blunt instrument, especially if the estimates of a Caspian bonanza are exaggerated, but “elite military units and more powerful intelligence services are needed to provide us with more options.”xxxvi On globalization itself, Kaplan is skeptical. “In many quarters of the West, free markets are seen as a solution in and of themselves. But from Romania to Turkmenistan, I had seen how a wave of unrestrained capitalism, along with the absence of institutions and safety nets…had opened up dangerous gaps between a rapacious oligarchical class and the working poor.”xxxvii Klare warns that the consequence of such nimble intervention as Kaplan advocates would be “…the outbreak of proxy conflicts involving local governments and insurgent groups backed by one major power.”xxxviii On one hand, Brzezinski and Kaplan privilege geopolitical over geo-economic factors (and very limited, regional goals), while Klare‟s notion of an econocentric security policy highlights a global geo-economic perspective. Kaplan‟s accent on geopolitical themes also marks him more as a student of Halford Mackinder, while Klare‟s econocentric perspective fits into Alfred Thayer Mahan‟s geostrategic theory. Kaplan‟s travelogue reveals the salient implications of the central geostrategic choice leaders have to make, that between Mackinder‟s land power thesis and Mahan‟s sea 12 power thesis. In “The Geographical Pivot of History”, Mackinder warned of the likelihood of Russia harnessing the power of railroads to control the Eurasian landmass.xxxix Kaplan calls the Trans-Caspian pipelines “the new silk road“, but the pipelines are not technological enablers in the same sense as railroads. The unique qualities of transnational pipelines recall the military vulnerabilities Parker points out. “The other facet of the vast size, impenetrability and immense natural resources and strategic location of the Heartland is its remoteness, inaccessibility, environmental harshness and vulnerability to attack over extensive land boundaries. What thus appears from one perspective to be a fortress, from another may appear to be a prison.”xl Kaplan is also quick to warn of Russian efforts to support corrupt, local politicians and maintain troops in strategically located bases isolated from Russian territory. But, a corollary of Mackinder‟s land thesis is, that land powers will use their technological prowess to acquire access to warm-water ports, to project sea power. As Joseph S, Nye points out, because petroleum products are fungible or rely upon processes that privilege the consumer over the producer on world markets, it is difficult for any single player to control prices.xli A passage describing just some of the difficulties facing the Imperial Russian army during the war with Japan in 1904 are not unimaginable in 2006. Apart from the immense technical difficulties in building the railway through the cliffs at the southern end of Lake Baikal, there were further problems in the course followed by the Amur River, which sweeps to the northeast, thereby necessitating a similar prolongation of the railway if the line was to be laid entirely in Russian territory. Witte therefore proposed that the railway should be built across Chinese territory in Manchuria to Vladivostok, thus saving 230 miles in construction, and a substantial sum of money. Since both the French and the Germans had already demanded 13 new concessions from much-weakened China, the Chinese were chary.xlii Not only do railroads and pipelines require capital and military protection to maintain, but also sovereign governments habitually do not allow foreign military units to police their territory without some degree of trust. Instead of enhancing land power, pipelines contain land power. Railroads and pipelines are notoriously labor-intensive and technologically difficult to maintain without the proper personnel and equipment. Brzezinski and Kaplan both apparently ignore these aspects of the land power thesis. Mahan, on the other hand, and the sea power thesis are not mentioned enough. Klare highlights the U. S. Navy‟s emphasis on keeping the maritime sea routes safe.xliii Mahan‟s conception of naval power was predicated on the need to protect free trade, not to possess land. Douglas E. Streusand repeats this this priority when he concludes, “…there is no opposition between geopolitics and globalization.” “At present, the United States guarantees free and safe access to petroleum and natural gas from the Persian Gulf through our presence in the Persian Gulf and our unchallenged global maritime supremacy. For this reason, Asia, including China, depends on the United States, not merely on the actual sellers of the petroleum and natural gas, for its energy and thus for its economic prosperity and growth. The leverage of energy access control can counterbalance the leverage of China‟s size and proximity on the Pacific Rim. It also offers significant leverage over China itself. From this perspective, the U.S. commitments in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean protect not only our own energy supplies but also our status as a global power.”xliv A land power geostrategy incurs excessive costs even before resources reach the market. Not only that, but excessive attention upon one region interferes with a global 14 perspective based upon securing sea-lanes. And, the diplomatic capital lost through military misadventures and support for corrupt leaders affects the maximal degree of trust needed to maintain free trade and secure sea-lanes. The other component of Kaplan‟s support for nimble military support to act as a bulwark against anarchy in an ungovernable region is Kaplan‟s view of the nation-state. Kaplan‟s geo-economic perspective is intuitively mercantilist. Aside from historical allusions to state projects, such as the Kara Kum Canal in Turkmenistan, and President Suparamad “Turkmenbashi”‟s vanity projects, Kaplan ideologically associates markets and democracy with anarchy and instability. The purpose of politics is to protect the instruments of economic power, like pipelines, which is not a distinctive activity that lends power. Caught in a chicken and egg dilemma between power and liberty, Kaplan advocates state power at any cost. But resigning an Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan to such a fate is different from concluding that the United States should adopt a costly geostrategic strategy completely unsuited for an American econocentric security policy or for the security of a crumbling international regime based on free trade and law. There is a strange extremist aspect to Kaplan‟s consideration of geostrategy and globalization that puts him into a strained alliance with liberal integrationists, like Ohmae and those predicting the eclipse of national sovereignty. Both Kaplan and Ohmae share the insight that local economic conditions do not always fit into a national mould. Ohmae views the nation-state as a victim of economic liberalization, which has made a mockery of political boundaries. “The nation-state has become an unnatural, even dysfunctional, unit for organizing human 15 activity and managing economic endeavor in a borderless world.”xlv Kaplan also documents the inability of immature states to persuade ethnic and religious groups not to switch allegiances with sibling or more powerful states. However, where Ohmae advocates the creation of regional entities to reflect the economic realities, Kaplan hyperbolically advocates support for immature states, presumably the ones currently existing, with no consideration of how another arrangement might bring greater stability. It is one of the most unnerving ironies of Kaplan‟s argument in general, that he advocates such romantic and unrealistic support for modern regimes, when he spends most of his travels rhapsodizing about fallen empires, evil, inept rulers, and the impermanence of power. Pechorin‟s ghost haunts the government‟s chambers where the urge to control oil-soaked territory is most rampant. It is fashionable to label the opposite of an interventionist policy an isolationist stance. There is a hint of baiting, ridiculing such disagreement as unrealistic. But realism is more than a litany of despondent, grotesque images and hopeless situations. If anything, a realist policy should reflect national capabilities and priorities. More importantly, it should be based on timely, non-controversial facts, like the real amount and cost of extracting Trans-Caspian petroleum resources. Fundamentally, a national policy should not be based on fear of a future without the thrill of the open highway. And, of course, a policy to solve problems should not create more and different problems. In Eastward to Tartary, Robert D. Kaplan is an “incorrigible didact”.xlvi Like Brzezinski, for Kaplan globalization is a negative phenomenon even more fragile and ephemeral than the endless procession of imperial political powers. That is, where, 16 like in Turkmenistan, Kaplan extols state control of the economy. Even more daunting a force than political power is geography, unless one is an “extraordinary individual”. Aside from this rare animal, that is nonetheless difficult to distinguish from a despot, a border, a mountain, or the lack of a river says more about what a country or a city will become than its political and economic life. But, most revealingly, Tartary is a battled fortress surrounded by wasteland; it‟s a geostrategic trap. Globalization and other dynamic forces will continue to rid the world of dictatorships. Political change is nothing we need to force upon people; it's something that will happen anyway. What we have to work toward -for which peoples with historical experiences different from ours will be grateful -- is not democracy but normality. Stabilizing newly democratic regimes, and easing the development path of undemocratic ones, should be the goal for our military and diplomatic establishments. The more cautious we are in a world already in the throes of tumultuous upheaval, the more we'll achieve.xlvii Keep a boat moored at the dock for the occasional emigrant, trade and barter, and encourage regional peace, but don‟t follow Pechorin to the brick building at the entrance of town. 17 i Richard Parker, trans., A Hero of Our Time (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1947). (Parker, 1947) (Parker, 1947) ii iii iv Laura Secor, “A Realist's Picaresque,” review of Eastward to Tartary, by Robert D. Kaplan, New York Times Review of Books, December 10, 2000. v Akash Kapur, “To Hell in His Handbasket,” review of Eastward to Tartary, by Robert D. Kaplan, The Nation, December 18, 2000. vi Rick McGinnis, “Lacking Amenities,” review of Eastward to Tartary, by Robert D. Kaplan, 2001. vii Robert D. Kaplan, Eastward to Tartary (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), p. 304. Kaplan, p. 327. viii 18 ix Kaplan, p. 6. Kaplan, p. 231. Kaplan, p. 50. Kaplan, p. 41. Kaplan, p. 51. x xi xii xiii xiv Colin S. Gray, “Inescapable Geography,” in Geopolitics, Geography, and Strategy, ed. Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (London: Frank Kass, 1999), p. 163. Gray, p. 169. Kaplan, p. 10. Kaplan, p. 226. Geoffrey Parker, Geopolitics: Past, Present, and Future (London: Pinter Pub Ltd., 1998), p. 5 xv xvi xvii xviii 6. xix Kaplan, p. 217. Kaplan, p. 218. Kaplan, p. 256. Kaplan, p. 223. Kaplan, p. 224. Kaplan, p. 232. Kaplan, p. 233. xx xxi xxii xxiii xxiv xxv xxvi Kaplan, p. 236. Kaplan, p. 250. Kaplan, p. 235. xxvii xxviii xxix Kaplan, p. 236. Kaplan, p. 269. Kaplan, p. 279. xxx xxxi 19 xxxii Kaplan, p. 271. Kaplan, p. 272. Kaplan, p. 273. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 148. Kaplan, p. 329. Kaplan, p. 305. Michael Klare, Resource Wars (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001), p. 107. xxxiii xxxiv xxxv xxxvi xxxvii xxxviii xxxix Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History, “ Geographical Journal (1904), p. 30. xl Parker, p. 112. xli Joseph S. Nye, “The Chimera of Gas Power,” Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nye29/English xlii Denis and Peggy Warner, The Tide at Sunrise (London: Angus and Robertson, 1974), p. 140. Klare, p. 7. xliii xliv Douglas E. Streusand, “Geopolitics Versus Globalization,“ in Globalization and Maritime Pow er, ed. Sam J. Tangredi (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2002), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/04_ch03.ht m xlv Kenichi Ohmae, “The Rise of the Region State,” in Globalization and the Challenges of the N ew Century, ed. Patrick O‟Meara, Howard D. Mehlinger, and Matthew Krain (Bloomington: India na University Press, 2000), p. 93. xlvi (Kapur, 2000) Robert D. Kaplan, “We Can‟t Force Democracy,” Washington Post, March 2, 2006, xlvii http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/01/AR20060301019 37.html 20 Bibliography Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Grand Chessboard (New York: Basic Books, 1997). Gray, Colin S., “Inescapable Geography,” in Geopolitics, Geography, and Strategy, ed. Colin S. G ray and Geoffrey Sloan (London: Frank Kass, 1999). Kaplan, Robert D. , Eastward to Tartary (New York: Vintage Books, 2000). Kaplan, Robert D., “We Can‟t Force Democracy,” Washington Post, March 2, 2006. Also available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/0 1/AR2006030101937.html. Kapur, Akash, “To Hell in His Handbasket,” review of Eastward to Tartary, by Robert D. Kaplan , The Nation, December 18, 2000. Klare, Michael, Resource Wars (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001). Mackinder, Halford J., “The Geographical Pivot of History, “ Geographical Journal (1904). McGinnis, Rick, “Lacking Amenities,” review of Eastward to Tartary, by Robert D. Kaplan, 20 01. Also available at http://www.rickmcginnis.com/books/kaplan.htm. Nye, Joseph S. , “The Chimera of Gas Power,” Project Syndicate (2006). Also available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nye29/English Ohmae, Kenichi, “The Rise of the Region State,” in Globalization and the Challenges of the New Century, ed. Patrick O‟Meara, Howard D. Mehlinger, and Matthew Krain (Bloomington: Indiana 21 University Press, 2000). Parker, Geoffrey, Geopolitics: Past, Present, and Future (London: Pinter Pub Ltd., 1998), Parker, Richard, trans., A Hero of Our Time (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1947). Secor, Laura, “A Realist's Picaresque,” review of Eastward to Tartary, by Robert D. Kaplan, New York Times Review of Books, December 10, 2000. Streusand, Douglas E., “Geopolitics Versus Globalization,“ in Globalization and Maritime Power, ed. Sam J. Tangredi (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2002). Also available at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/04_ch03.ht m Warner, Denis and Peggy, The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905 (London: Angus and Robertson, 1974).