Democracy Lost: A Review of Thomas P.M. Barnett’s The Pentagon’s New Map

-1- Democracy Lost: A Review of Thomas P.M. Barnett’s The Pentagon’s New Map Joseph J. Steinberg IR 6635 National Security Policy Farkasch 14 December 2007 -2Democracy Lost: A Review of Thomas P.M. Barnett’s The Pentagon’s New Map ―My message is that if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad. In short, based on my experience serving seven presidents, as a former Director of CIA and now as Secretary of Defense, I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use ―soft‖ power and for better integrating it with ―hard‖ power.‖1 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates discussed ―looking back‖ to the 1940s, and, specifically, he argued for a new National Security Act. Nostalgia and re-framing are popular, because Thomas P.M. Barnett, in The Pentagon’s New Map (PNM), does it, too. Where Benjamin Barber offers democracy as an alternative to a bifurcated world, 1 Robert M. Gates, ―Landon Lecture‖ (Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, Monday, November 26, 2007). -3McWorld and Jihad, Barnett offers a strategic vision predicated on expanding the West with the Rest in one, interconnected world. ―If the global future is to pit Jihad‘s centrifugal whirlwind against McWorld‘s centripetal black hole, the outcome is unlikely to be democratic…‖2 Between them, Barber and Barnett offer two competing paths to democracy. I will review Barnett‘s attempt to prepare the foundations by creating a network of globalizing and geopolitical currents buttressed by American military force. I will argue that Barnett‘s glib exposition, part-memoir, part-lexicon, takes the straightest, least convincing path through some thorny debates on globalization and political philosophy, yet obscures what is a very important question: just how much military force does the U.S. need to do business with the world? ―My own sense is that Barnett is on to something, and probably something really big.‖3 That ―big something‖ is Barnett‘s ―military-market nexus‖, or ―the underlying reality that the warrior culture of the military both supports and is supported by the merchant culture of the business world.‖ Barnett also offers ―ten commandments for globalization‖, the second of which is ―no stability, no markets‖.4 Mackubin T. Owens also praises Barnett for this aspect of PNM: From my standpoint, the most important contribution of The Pentagon’s New Map is its implications for future US military force structure. If the Gap truly constitutes the "expeditionary theater" of US foreign policy, are the military services focusing on the right issues and investing in the right 2 Benjamin Barber, ―Jihad vs. McWorld,‖ in Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century: A Reader, Ed by Patrick O‘Meara et al (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), p. 24. 3 Michael Barone, ―The Pentagon's New Map,‖ US News and World Report (May 20, 2004). Available from: http://www.usnews.com/usnews/opinion/baroneweb/mb_040520.htm (Accessed on December 8, 2007). 4 Thomas P.M. Barnett, Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), p. xvii. -4things? Heretofore, the services have preferred to prepare for high-end, state-centric conflict. The Pentagon’s New Map suggests that they might want to rethink their priorities.5 Owens‘ appraisal alludes to the one portion of his detours into memoir, the intradepartmental debates at Defense about the significance of the fall of the Soviet Union for the U.S. military during the Clinton administration, that I found appropriate to Barnett‘s original argument about the military-market nexus. It is not as if Barnett‘s narrative of his experiences with Cantor Fitzgerald and the Department of Defense are not informative, only that the retelling is too pat for anything but a demonstration of how the militarymarket nexus should work. Although Barnett is versed in the realist-idealist debate in international relations, his vision of ―a future worth creating‖ does not transcend it. ―Connectivity‖ is the name of a strategic vision–also labeled ―a future worth creating‖– and the defining characteristic of globalization that Barnett argues the United States is most fittingly capable of creating. ―Connectivity‖ is the ―enormous changes brought on by the information revolution, including the emerging financial, technological, and logistical architecture of the global economy (i.e., the movement of money, services accompanied by content, and people and materials).‖6 This optimistic vision does have a darker side, as Barnett acknowledges within the definition of connectivity itself. ―That connectivity, while a profoundly transforming force, could not by itself maintain global security, primarily because a substantial rise in connectivity between any nation and the 5 Mackubin T. Owens, ―Review of The Pentagon’s New Map,‖ (2004). Available from: Ashland University http://www.ashbrook.org/tools/printerpage.asp (Accessed on December 8, 2007). 6 Barnett, BFA, p. xiv-xv. -5outside world typically leads to a host of tumultuous reactions, including heightened nationalism.‖7 The condition connectivity remedies is ―disconnectedness‖: In this century it is disconnectedness that defines danger…allows bad actors to flourish by keeping entire societies detached from the global community, and under their dictatorial control, or in the case of failed states, it allows dangerous trans-national actors to exploit the resulting chaos to their own dangerous ends. Eradicating disconnectedness is the defining security task of our age, as well as a supreme moral cause in the cases of those who suffer it against their will. Just as important, however, by expanding the connectivity of globalization, we increase peace and prosperity planet-wide.‖8 Barnett‘s vision is not original, except to the degree to which he, in his definition of ―globalization‖ acknowledges ―…thanks to the global war on terrorism, we now understand that it likewise demands the clear enunciation and enforcement of a security rule-set as well.‖9 Barnett draws an analogy between the globalization of the 1990s (Globalization III) and that of the 1920s (Globalization I), and warns about a repeat of depression and world war. ―In effect, we let the world get too connected too fast…we got too lazy, counted a little too much on the market to sort it all out, and then woke up shocked and amazed on 9/11 to find ourselves invited to a global war.‖10 Barnett argues 7 8 Barnett, BFA, p. xv. Barnett, BFA, p. xv. 9 Barnett, BFA, p. xvi-xvii. 10 Thomas P.M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Berkley Books, 2003), p. 197-198. -6that ―It‘s not about revenge and it‘s not about making ourselves feel good. It‘s about doing the right thing because we can.‖11 Barnett, however, within the definitions of connectivity and disconnectedness contradicts himself. Is disconnectedness a necessary consequence of connectivity and fostered by deliberate policy, or its opposite created by geostrategic factors? ―The global conflict between the forces of disconnectedness and connectedness is here and it is not going to go away anytime soon.‖12 For young men, women, and the masses, disconnectedness is a condition defined by negative qualities, of isolation, deprivation, repression, and ignorance.13 Resistance to connectivity comes from both rulers that resent constraints upon setting their own rules, and non-state actors defending their ―homeland‖ against ―Western‖ globalization.14 Unstable, misogynistic, autocratic regimes, including theocracies and monarchies, as well as states prone to war, limited to a single natural resource, or land-locked are all susceptible to disconnectedness.15 Yet, after World War I, Barnett argues that Russia succumbed to disconnectedness because of an ―exclusionary ideology‖.16 Barnett also characterizes disconnectedness as Hobbesian, with ―forces whose desire to achieve disconnectedness is so profound.‖17 Barnett apparently postulates a logical disjunction between disconnectedness as condition and as policy. 11 12 Barnett, PNM, p. 990. Barnett, PNM, p. 302. 13 Barnett, PNM, p. 321-322. 14 Barnett, PNM, p. 526-528. 15 Barnett, PNM, p. 827. 16 Barnett, PNM, p. 898. 17 Barnett, PNM, p. 1609-1610. -7This disjunction recurs when Barnett offers his geostrategic definitions of the ―Functioning Core‖ and the ―Non-Integrating Gap‖. This distinction is not based upon economic factors alone, because Barnett‘s definition of connectivity bridges the full panoply of globalizations, from economic and financial to immigration and culture. The ―Functioning Core‖ is comprised of states ―actively integrating their national economies into a global economy and that adhere to globalization‘s emerging security rule-set.‖18 The Core is divided into two parts, ―Old‖, (America, Europe, and Japan), and ―New‖ (China, India, Brazil, and Russia, et al). The ―Non-Integrating Gap‖ is defined as the regions (sometimes within states), excluding North America and Western Europe (although urban areas might approach Gap conditions), that ―are largely disconnected from the global economy and the rule sets that define its stability [and] constitute globalization‘s ‗ozone-hole‘ where connectivity remains thin or absent.‖19 However, Barnett also argues that states might be ―losing out to globalization or rejecting much of its cultural flows.‖20 Additionally, ―Seam‖ states are either Core states or achieving Core status, but whose geographical location provides access points for terrorists into the Core from the Gap. Again, protecting globalization requires these states to adjust their security rule sets. Within both the Core and the Gap, again Barnett conflates geostrategic conditions and globalizing policies. Although characterizing connectedness and disconnectedness within both the Core and Gap is confusing, Barnett does draw two further important and striking conclusions from the distinction. Firstly, ―shrinking the Gap‖, or increasing globalization, is a bipartisan 18 19 Barnett, BFA, p. xvi. Barnett, BFA, p. xvii-xviii. 20 Barnett, PNM, p. 51. -8task that both Democratic and Republican administrations will need to accomplish over many decades, because of how security relates to economic globalization. Barnett criticizes the Clinton administration for not adapting its policies when resistance arose to the Washington Consensus; the Bush administration for not enunciating a long-term vision that goes beyond the short-term prosecution of the general war on terrorism.21 Secondly, and more importantly, the Core-Gap distinction also allows Barnett to postulate two different sets of security strategy to deal with two fundamentally divergent geostrategic situations. The Core, which Barnett characterizes as a Kantian zone, has effectively abolished interstate warfare due to globalization and the stability provided by the nuclear doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and the Cold War policy of containment22; the Hobbesian Gap, against whom Barnett supports the Bush administration policy of preemption, is where exist ―…actors and regimes…that we must prudently assume might be undeterrable, simply because they do not live in the same world or adhere to the same security rule sets that we do. Our goal…is not to destroy the Core‘s security rule set but to extend it. Barnett illustrates this point with the example of a beat-cop whose is legally privileged to use preemptive force, but rarely does.23 Extending connectivity in the Gap requires the bifurcation of the current American military into ―Leviathan‖, or ―the U.S. military‘s warfighting capacity and the highperformance combat troops, weapon systems, aircraft, armor, and ships associated with the all-out war against traditionally-defined opponents (i.e. other militaries)‖ and ―System Administrator‖ (SysAdmin), or ―a force optimized for…stability and support operations 21 22 Barnett, PNM, p. 1047. Barnett, PNM, p. 1058. 23 Barnett, PNM, p. 1067. -9(SASO), postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations, ‗military operations other than war‘ (MOOTW), humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), and any and all operations associated with low-intensity conflict (LIC), counterinsurgency operations, and small-scale crisis response.‖24 Leviathan does not need to operate in the Core, because security and the rule of law are internalized.25 And, only the U.S. should provide this role in the Gap, because only the U.S. military can.26 Yet, Barnett believes American voters have no objection to this enforcer role, as long as the goal is well defined and costeffective.27 Barnett‘s connectivity vision is disputable, even if misinterpreted. ―The great limitation of The Pentagon’s New Map was that it argued for a grand national strategy to change the world but did so from the initial perspective of the U.S. military. It was the inside-out argument that began within the Pentagon but only seemed plausible once you extended its logic beyond war and into the everything else. The great misinterpretation of the book, much like that of George Kennan‘s original enunciation of the containment strategy for dealing with the Soviet threat after World War II, was that it proposed a military-only solution to the security problems engendered by globalization‘s progressive advance around the globe. (…) Using the military to enable the spread of globalization is about unlocking the Gap‘s potential for self-development, and that economic development, in conjunction with the connectivity it creates between societies there and the world outside, is what ultimately wins a global war on terrorism. This war on terrorism must be viewed as just one small aspect of that larger 24 25 Barnett, BFA, p. xvii-xix. Barnett, PNM, p. 825. 26 Barnett, PNM, p. 896. 27 Barnett, PNM, p. 1037. - 10 grand strategy, the most important elements of which should involve the Core helping the Gap states to unlock their own, internal potential for economic development.‖28 As mentioned above, Barnett‘s military-market nexus concept is the essential part of his argument I support. However, Barnett‘s conception of economic development is flawed. Barnett offers three ―essential building blocks‖ for economic development.29 Firstly, there needs to be good government. ―A good government enables broadband economic and network connectivity to arise between its public and the outside world.‖ Secondly, ―women are central to the social order in their role as mothers, and that the strength of any society can be traced back to how women both provide, and are provided for, in that most essential of all futures worth creating—namely, the next generation of humanity.‖ Lastly, Barnett criticizes mercantilist states in the Gap starve their economies of capital because they fail to ―foster entrepreneurial opportunities by recognizing property rights and expanding contract case law.‖ Barnett explicitly argues that connectivity provides of minimal condition for development and rejects both democratization and rapid industrialization as optimal alternatives. ―Democracy is not a means but an end.‖ Barnett blunts criticism of his views on economic development by extolling his optimism on the future of Gap economies, but Barnett, as Dani Rodrik argues, needs to be ―humble‖. ―Turning away from world markets is surely not a good way to alleviate domestic poverty—but countries that have scored the most impressive gains are those 28 29 Barnett, BFA, p. 250-251. Barnett, BFA, p. 251-259. - 11 that have developed their own version of the rulebook while taking advantage of world markets.‖30 Rodrik points out how ―Peacefully Rising China‖, as Barnett would promote it, is not a liberalizing economy, but rather protects its markets and joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) late. ―The remarkable thing about China is that it has achieved integration with the world economy despite having ignored these rules—and indeed because it did so. If China were a basket case today, rather than the stunning success that it is, officials of the WTO and the World Bank would have fewer difficulties fitting it within their worldview than they do now.‖31 Furthermore, as Rodrik points out that East Asian states, following a developmental model based upon Japanese official development assistance (ODA), foreign direct investment (FDI), and trade, achieved economic growth through export and investment-oriented growth and governance predicated upon cooperation between the public and private sectors.32 Rodrik also highlights how the U.S. and the United Kingdom (U.K.) employed protectionist policies in the 19th Century.in the same manner. ―Every country that has caught up with others has had to do so by rigging its rules: extracting extra money from its people and steering money into industrialists‘ hands.‖33 Even such a hyperglobalist as Jagdish Bhagwati views the relationship between globalization and democracy as paradoxical: ―globalization promotes democracy while constraining it at the same time.‖34 30 Dani Rodrik, ―Globalization for Whom?‖ Harvard Magazine (July-August 2002). Available from: http://harvardmagazine.com/2002/07/p-globalization-for-whom.html (Accessed on December 8, 2007). 31 Rodrik, ibid. 32 Glenn D. Hook, et al., Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, Second Edition (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 234. 33 James Fallows, ―How the World Works,‖ The Atlantic Monthly (December 1993), 34 Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 93. - 12 Paradox is a logical relationship Barnett abolishes from the world, and not recognizing its existence is the supreme flaw of PNM. Characteristically, Barnett invokes the authority of two political philosophers, Thomas Hobbes–with an assist from John Locke–and Immanuel Kant, and their distinct arguments, to represent the Gap and the Core, respectively. Aside from the humanitarian issue of describing a common humanity in different geographical locations in two divergent ways, Barnett eschews the prickly criticisms of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Torbjørn Knutsen credits Rousseau with two important insights applicable to a post-Cold War discussion of international relations that transcends both realism and idealism: a philosophy of history, and, a theory of the social division of labor.35 Using Table 1, Barnett‘s arguments conform solely to the idealist pattern as drawn in Knutsen‘s scheme. Table 1.36 Idealism Nature of Rational Humanity Character of Progress Human History Interdependence; Interdependence; Human Relations Harmony of Interest Conflict of Interest Exploitation; Conflict of Interest Inequality; Constancy Historical Change Passionate Actually Alienated Realism Rousseau Potentially Rational; 35 Torbjørn Knutsen, ―Re-Reading Rousseau in the Post-Cold War World,‖ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 31, No. 3. (Aug., 1994), p. 248. 36 Knutsen, p. 251. - 13 Nature of the Freedom Human Condition Determinism Paradox Examining Rousseau‘s conception of human relations, Barnett‘s division of the Core and Gap into idealist and realist traditions, respectively, is clear. However, according to Rousseau‘s conclusion, human relations exhibit both realist and idealist tendencies: ―It follows from this account that inequality, being almost nonexistent in the state of Nature, owes its force and growth to the development of faculties and the progress of the human Mind, and that it finally becomes stable and legitimate by the establishment of property and Laws. It follows, further, that moral inequality, authorized by positive right alone, is contrary to Natural Right whenever it is not directly proportional to Physical inequality, a distinction which sufficiently determines what one ought to think in this respect of the sort of inequality that prevails among all civilized Peoples, since it is manifestly against the law of Nature, however defined, that a child command an old man, an imbecile lead a wise man, and a handful of people abound in superfluities while the starving multitude lacks in necessities.‖37 For Rousseau, at every stage of human development, played out in regions divided by mountains, rivers, and oceans, as well as by climate, human society has evolved by fits and starts to overcome the paradoxical collision created by love and jealousy, cooperation and discord, and freedom and slavery. Barnett‘s framing of the world into a Hobbesian and a Kantian enclave is unnecessary; indeed it undermines the political task of limiting 37 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality Among Men, in The First and Second Discourses, Ed by Victor Gourevitch (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), p. 199. - 14 enmity and promoting cooperation. Instead of increasing interdependence, or connectivity, government is overwhelmed in connectness that only undermines its delicate balancing act between physical protection and moral authority. And, at some point even human ingenuity has to confront the geostrategic barriers of land and water, and climate. Barnett‘s idealistic binary opposition of network connectness and disconnectness frames both the defense of his theory against anti-imperialist critics and his advocacy of the Department of Defense as the agent of spreading connectivity. On the subject of imperialism, Barnett resorts to binaries again, forcing a choice between connectivity and isolationism. ―Empires involve enforcing maximum rule sets…We enforce minimum rule sets…We push connectivity above all else.‖38 Barnett, for whom the Internet serves as a model, associates disconnectedness with non-state actors like al-Qaeda, allotting the U.S. the privilege of removing the obstacle frustrating innocent people in the Gap from the means to enjoy the benefits of globalization. Yet, Barnett argues that the Defense Department policies Chalmers Johnson criticizes, when he calls America an ―empire of bases‖39, actually vindicate his advocacy of confronting the Gap‘s threat to connectivity.40 Barnett also sounds remarkably like a neo-conservative, as Max Boot 38 Barnett, PNM, p. 1771-1772. Chalmers Johnson, ―America's Empire of Bases‖, TomDispatch.com (January 2004). 39 Available from: http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/print/1181/Tomgram%253A%2520%2520Chalmers%2520Johnso n%2520on%2520garrisoning%2520the%2520planet (Accessed on December 8, 2007) 40 Barnett, PNM, p. 1809. - 15 describes it. ―Neocons believe the United States should use force when necessary to champion its ideals as well as its interests, not only out of sheer humanitarianism but also because the spread of liberal democracy improves U.S. security, while crimes against humanity inevitably make the world a more dangerous place.‖41 This comes, however, with the caveat that Barnett, as mentioned above, criticizes establishing democracy, even the Neo-conservatives‘ minimum emphasis upon elections. Even with this endearing support for liberal democracy, Barnett believes American leaders have not competently offered American voters a convincing vision, comparable to President Harry S, Truman‘s policies in the immediate Cold War. This framing, of comparing connectivity to containment, and then comparing opponents‘ inchoate criticisms to Republican isolationists in the late 1940s, is convenient, yet shows Barnett at his most megalomaniacal. The Cold War rule sets might no longer be operable in a post-9/11 world, but its non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and regional institutions still exist. Barnett would salvage perhaps the WTO, NATO, and perhaps some remnant of the United Nations, but he seems conveniently ignorant of the non-governmental organizations that have arisen during the Cold War and particularly during the 1990s. Although Barnett is an idealist, he seems to have conveniently returned to an academic period when all realists and idealists both accepted the nation-state as a level of analysis. In the wake of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, various schools of thought have transcended the realist-idealist debate. 41 Max Boot, ―Neocons,‖ Foreign Policy (January-February 2004), p. 23. - 16 Most notably, I would underscore the contributions of the Interdependence school. AnneMarie Slaughter explains the nature of the globalization paradox: ―We need more government on a global and regional scale, but we don‘t want the centralization of decision-making power and coercive authority so far from the people actually to be governed.‖42 Slaughter also enunciates her task as not establishing government networks, but rather exposing the fact of their ―proliferation‖, both horizontally and vertically throughout the world.43 Finally, she offers the concept of the ―disaggregated state‖: ―It is simply the rising need for and capacity of different domestic government institutions to engage in activities beyond their borders, often with their foreign counterparts. It is regulators pursuing the subjects of their regulation across borders; judges negotiating minitreaties with their foreign brethren to resolve complex transnational cases, and legislators consulting on the best ways to frame and pass legislation affecting human rights or the environment.‖44 For Slaughter, the goal is promoting sovereignty throughout these layers of government. To be fair, Barnett would argue that what Slaughter is describing is the Core only. And, Barnett does mention Cold War NGOs and the International Red Cross. Finally, Slaughter herself neglects the issue of security. The issue, though, is one of framing. Do we need to recreate the world anew, with the U.S. Defense Department leading the way, as the U.S. did in the 1940s (Barnett)? Or, what is the proper balance between sovereignty and security when creating transnational government policy? 42 43 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 8. Slaughter, p. 11. 44 Slaughter, p. 12. - 17 - In this context, it is also salient to point out the role of conflict resolution, humanitarian, and human rights NGOs, as Pamela Aall classifies them. After admitting that assessing NGO effectiveness is difficult, she points out that NGOs can ―provide early warning of impending conflict, act as channels of communication between parties in communication, serve as mediators or facilitators in nonofficial–and occasional in official–negotiations, work at the grassroots level to effect reconciliation at the local level, and train postconflict administrators in the intricacies of civil society.‖45 In other words, is it costeffective to train an entire government and military organization to do what NGOs, sovereign states, and private companies already do? From the context of American foreign policy, I associate Barnett‘s connectivity project with what Francis Fukuyama called ―benevolent hegemony‖.46 Instead of militarizing the framing of the war on terrorism, as Barnett does, Fukuyama emphasizes a ―hearts and minds‖ approach, including security coalitions of the willing and enhancing multilateral frameworks. More importantly, Fukuyama emphasizes the concept of good governance, specifically ―…the reform, reorganization and proper financing of those institutions of the United States government that actually promote democracy, development and the rule of law around the world, organizations like the State Department, U.S.A.I.D., the National Endowment for Democracy and the like.‖ But, that still leaves 9/11. 45 Pamela Aall, ―What Do NGOs Bring to Peacemaking?‖ in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, Fourth Edition, ed by Chester A. Crocker et al. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), p. 379. 46 Francis Fukuyama, ―After Neoconservatism,‖ New York Times Magazine (February 19, 2006). - 18 ―The secret to confounding asymmetrical warriors is anticipating and preparing for what they will do before they can do it.‖47 Barnett is surely right when he argues that responding to asymmetrical attacks like al-Qaeda‘s is ―…going to involve a whole lot more than just the Defense Department.‖48 Mancur Olson‘s ―logic of collective‖ action would make that Herculean task, confounding the unknown, even more hopeless. The logic ―…predicts that those groups that have access to selective incentives will be more likely to act collectively to obtain collective goods than those that do not, and that smaller groups will have a greater likelihood of engaging in collective action than larger ones.‖49 The ―vision thing‖ cannot stand up to interest-group politics, which, in the end, will dictate political strategy and the military with which America enters the next fight. Barnett‘s ―big something‖, the ―military-market nexus‖ is his major contribution to the response to the asymmetrical attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. However, then he divides humanity into two conditions based on geopolitical, cultural, and economic factors, the Hobbesian and Kantian, where Rousseau‘s contribution is sufficient. Barnett also offers globalization as a panacea for the ―lesser-includeds‖, when Dani Rodrik and even a hyperglobalist such as Jagdish Bhagwati are far less certain. Barnett assigns the U.S. Defense Department the largest role when even he criticizes two administrations‘ responses to the tough issues facing this country following the fall of the Soviet Union and the 9/11 attacks. Diagnosing those debacles is another singular service his book renders. Abjuring any pretensions in that 47 Donald M. Snow, National Security for a New Era: Globalization and Geopolitics, Second Edition (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), p. 270. 48 Barnett, PNM, p. 500. 49 Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 34. - 19 vein, he rejects imperialism for ―benevolent hegemony‖, by framing 9/11 as a second Pearl Harbor fit for a second Truman. In the process he discounts the one of the Cold War‘s unsung achievements, layers of multilateral global non-governmental networks. Indeed, Barnett‘s optimism sits atop a foundation of unnecessary re-framing, glib memoir, and ugly political and economic philosophy. It takes a more ―realistic‖ Secretary of Defense to address just how much security America needs with its business. - 20 Bibliography Aall, Pamela ―What Do NGOs Bring to Peacemaking?‖ in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, Fourth Edition, ed by Chester A. Crocker et al. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006). Barber, Benjamin. ―Jihad vs. McWorld.‖ in Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century: A Reader, Ed by Patrick O‘Meara et al. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. Barnett, Thomas P.M. Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating. New York: Penguin Books, 2005. Barnett, Thomas P.M. The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Berkley Books, 2003. Barone, Michael. ―The Pentagon's New Map.‖ US News and World Report (May 20, 2004). Bhagwati, Jagdish. In Defense of Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Boot, Max. ―Neocons.‖ Foreign Policy (January-February 2004). Fallows, James. ―How the World Works.‖ The Atlantic Monthly (December 1993). Fukuyama, Francis. ―After Neoconservatism,‖ New York Times Magazine (February 19, 2006). Gates, Robert M. ―Landon Lecture‖. Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, Monday, November 26, 2007. Hook, Glenn D., et al. Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, Second Edition. New York: Routledge, 2001. Johnson, Chalmers. ―America's Empire of Bases‖, TomDispatch.com (January 2004). Knutsen, Torbjørn. ―Re-Reading Rousseau in the Post-Cold War World,‖ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 31, No. 3. (Aug., 1994). Olson, Mancur. The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982. Owens, Mackubin T. ―Review of The Pentagon’s New Map.‖ (2004). Rodrik, Dani. ―Globalization for Whom?‖ Harvard Magazine (July-August 2002). - 21 - Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 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