SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN SUMMARY

SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN SUDAN: COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN 1. SUMMARY This paper sets out our objectives for DFID’s engagement in the Sudan over the short to medium term as part of the UK Government’s Sudan policy framework. Sudan has been beset by conflict for most of its history since independence in 1956. The latest round of civil war started in 1983 after the failure of the 1972 Addis Ababa accords. It has resulted in the death of over two million people and the largest internally displaced population in the world (some four mi llion). The current conflict in Darfur, Western Sudan has displaced over 1.5 million and left over 2 million in need of humanitarian assistance and up to 70,000 dead since April 2004. In turn, the war has devastated infrastructure and social services, exacerbating the poor state of development in a country of around 35 million people. As a result, Sudan is one of the poorest countries in the world. International attention was focused on Sudan in 2004, mainly due to the conflict in Darfur. There is a risk that so much attention on one part of the country means problems elsewhere are not addressed. The comprehensive peace agreement between North and South offers the prospect of a solution for problems in other parts of Sudan, including Darfur and the East. The UN and World Bank are working with the parties to the agreement to determine future needs in Sudan. International assistance will now need to be expanded and donors are planning how to build up their programmes to help meet these needs. There is a high premium on a harmonised approach between donors. The UK has been a lead donor in the Sudan since independence. In 2002, the UK - along with the US and Norway - strengthened its engagement in Sudan, particularly around fresh hopes for the peace process led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The UK has contributed substantially to the humanitarian effort in Darfur. The UK Government’s goals are to work with others in the international community to support Sudan to reach a just and lasting peace, lay the foundations for sustained poverty reduction, and thus begin to make progress towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. We will provide support under four headings. First, we will continue our work in helping to meet humanitarian, recovery and reintegration needs to benefit the poorest people and communities. Second , we will provide assistance to implement the peace agreement, for example support for monitoring missions; assistance with demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of combatants; and local-level peace-building work. Third, we will support the development of effective governance, including work with the justice and security sectors and public administration. Fourth, we will work with the Sudanese to develop and implement policies that will benefit poor people – a sound Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, strong macroeconomic management and reorienting the budget and sector policies towards poor people. 1 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN DFID intends to expand its programme in Sudan if the peace agreement is implemented and with progress to resolve the conflict in Darfur. Initially, the majority of our resources will continue to go towards humanitarian needs, but over time there will be a shift in emphasis towards longer-term development. We will retain strong involvement in Darfur, while seeking over the mediumterm to re-integrate that element of our work back into our broad programme and approach. Work on implementation of the peace agreement will require early funding. We will gradually increase the amount we can put towards the longer-term objectives of improved governance and policies. In addition, we expect to pay our share of the costs of debt relief. Wherever possible we will seek joint or complementary programmes with other donors. We announced in October 2004 that the UK would commit £100 million for Sudan the following year, provided that a Comprehensive Peace Agreement is concluded and there is progress in Darfur. As well as increasing our financial resources, we will also increase our staff resources in the region, and aim to devolve responsibility for the programme to an office in Sudan during 2006. We will actively pursue options of joint offices or staffing with other donors. A risk matrix, facts about Sudan and a list of acronyms are annexed from page 24. 2 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN 2. 2.1 CONTEXT AND CHALLENGES Recent History The Sudanese civil war is Africa’s longest-running conflict. The war is often simplified into a North-South divide – or, more erroneously, a clash of Muslim and Christian civilisations. In reality, the causes of the conflict are complex and have been fuelled by persistent underdevelopment of marginalised areas of Sudan and competition for access to political and economic power, dominated by a Northern, Nile Valley-centred Arab, Muslim elite. Local conflict (e.g. over grazing, water), control of humanitarian aid and ethnic/religious mobilisation have also played significant roles. The current conflict in Darfur, which started in early 2003, results from many of the same problems, although in Darfur the warring factions are all Muslim. 2004 also saw an upsurge in the conflict in the East of Sudan, such as Malakal and Red Sea State. Following independence in 1956, Southern discontent with the political order evolved into guerrilla warfare across the South, led by the Southern ‘Anyanya’ movement. The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which devolved some powers to the South, provided a decade of respite. By 1983, this had been fatally undermined by the Nimeiri Government’s centralising and Islamising policies, and by disagreement among Southern politicians. Southern rebels and mutineers coalesced into what became the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), led by Dr John Garang. Nimeiri’s overthrow in 1985 and the subsequent transition to a democratically elected government under Sadiq al-Mahdi failed to end the war. As negotiations were promising progress in 1989, an alliance of military officers and Islamists led by Omar al-Bashir seized power. The National Islamic Front (later restyled the National Congress) has retained power to the present. There has long been unrest in Darfur. The latest phase begain in February 2003 as a conflict between farmers and pastoralists over access to land and water. It quickly escalated following an attack on El Fasher, North Darfur, by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A). Against a backdrop of the failure of both the Khartoum government and the traditional leadership to address the region’s problems, the political ground for rebellion was fertile. There are two principal rebel movements: the SLM and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The SLM and JEM recruited fighters from the disenchanted populace of Darfur, drawing principally on the ‘African’ Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes. In spite of two ceasefire agreements and an African Union (AU) monitoring mission, all parties continue to violate the cease-fire, and proxy militias (loosely referred to as ‘Janjaweed’) still operate with apparent impunity. For a sustainable solution, the political causes of the crisis must be addressed. Civil conflict in Sudan has been characterised by the following:- 3 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN - Guerrilla conflict across much of the South, with major garrison towns held by the Government of Sudan (GoS) army and its allies, and the SPLA holding territory between. Internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees from the North-South conflict are estimated to total over four million. - Southern disunity, with SPLA splinters and other Southern factions allying with the Government in return for weaponry to fight the SPLA. The 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement formalised many of these alliances. Much fighting is between Southerners, rather than between Southerners and the Sudanese army. - Conflict in the North. The Northern opposition joined the SPLA in the National Democratic Alliance, reaching a limited political consensus in the 1995 Asmara Declaration. SPLA-led forces stepped up resistance activity in the North-east. Government repression in marginalised areas of the North – the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile – prompted local resistance, which the SPLA backed. More recently, marginalisation of Darfur has sparked a new uprising in the West, which has led to a crisis affecting over two million people. Many Darfurians are now living in camps in Darfur or across the border in Chad, unable to return to their homes due to widespread insecurity, and dependent on international humanitarian assistance. - Fighting for control of the oilfields which lie near the North-South boundary in Bahr-el-Ghazal and Upper Nile. Since the Government began exploration and exploitation here in the 1990s, there has been vicious fighting in this area between the Government army, the SPLA and their respective allies. - Peace efforts failed to bear fruit because both principal parties remained in a sufficiently strong position, and international commitment to ending the conflict through negotiation was limited. Only in the last three years, with the Government’s power-base weakened, the low prospect of outright victory by either side and a favourable combination of external factors, has the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process been able to make progress. Peace talks for the Darfur conflict, mediated by the AU are ongoing. 2.2 Poverty in Sudan Sudan is one of the poorest countries in the world. It ranks 138th out of 175 in the UN Development Programme Human Development Index. The World Bank estimates Sudan’s Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in 2001 at US$340, which is the median value for Sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank statistics suggest better life expectancy and infant mortality in Sudan than the Sub-Saharan average. These figures should be treated with some caution. The 1993 census was compromised because of difficulty in accessing large parts of the country: statistics on poverty in Sudan are patchy and information on SPLM-controlled areas from a variety of surveys and studies tends to be omitted from GoS data. Overall, the evidence suggests a high level of inequality, which would suggest high numbers of poor people, both North and South. One estimate of GNI in the South suggests a level of just $80 per 4 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN capita, although this may reflect a very low level of monetisation and a lack of any official data. Better data will start to emerge once peace is established. The majority of poor people in Sudan live in rural areas. An indication of the North-South discrepancy is that the average under-5 mortality rate was 105 per 1000 in the late 1990s in the North but 145 in the South. However, even within the North, there are wide variations in the prevalence of poverty. Women tend to be poorer than men and have more limited opportunities; in government controlled areas, adult literacy in 2001 was 60% for men and 42% for women. An estimated 4 million people have been displaced internally by the North-South conflict, many of whom face particularly difficult long-term living conditions in camps. The conflict in Darfur has displaced over 1.5 million people, many of whom do not wish to return to their homes until security improves. Although official figures suggest water and sanitation coverage in Sudan (62%) is slightly above sub-Saharan averages (60%), some estimates suggest only 30% coverage of safe water in Southern Sudan, and in some areas as low as 5-10%. Access to water is a particular problem in Darfur. Disputes over the right of access to water wells and grazing land are common, traditionally resolved by recourse to local tribal and religious authorities, but they sometimes contribute to a wider conflict, notably in Darfur. Humanitarian indicators in Darfur and Southern Sudan also suggest widespread malnutrition. Years of drought in Darfur have preceded the current crisis, which has caused two years of harvest to be missed. As a result, the population will suffer from high food insecurity throughout 2005. As well as poverty, the people of Sudan face a number of challenges. These include:- Civil conflict. Belligerents on all sides have, as a matter of policy, targeted civilian populations as a military policy resulting in death, injury, forced displacement, destruction of infrastructure and a less effective humanitarian response. In Darfur, villages have been wiped out and up to 70,000 have died since April 2004. Currently 2.3 million people are estimated to be dependent on humanitarian assistance. Over the longer term, military spending by the belligerents in Sudan has also diverted resources away from social expenditure. - Inadequate access to systems of justice, and personal insecurity. Access to justice is neither readily available nor widely understood by poor people in Sudan. Women and children suffer particular exclusion. In GoS areas there is a formal justice system, based on Sharia law. However many people choose to use unofficial local courts, as they dispense traditional or common-law justice more quickly or cheaply. In SPLM-areas customary law is given a privileged place in the rural administration, but very little has yet been achieved in committing customary law to paper, drafting legislation, or disseminating written versions of laws widely. Chiefs are still the main dispensers of justice. 5 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN - Widespread human rights abuses. Belligerents on all sides have committed human rights abuses. The current conflict in Darfur is no different, with widespread violations of human rights and targeting of civilians. A disturbing feature of the conflict in Darfur is the prevalence of sexual violence as a weapon of war. Even in relatively stable areas of Sudan, rights are regularly undermined in relation to treatment of prisoners, lack of accountability by enforcement agencies and little application of social and economic rights. - Weak civil society. Potentially, civil society organisations could give poor people access to health and education in the absence of government services, and also hold governments to account for their actions and policies. However, there are few strong civil society groups in Sudan. Although some are beginning to find their voice, many are still in an embryonic state. The relationship between civil society and authority is often uncomfortable and at worst oppressive. - Lack of policies to benefit poor people and high inequality. Sudan’s economy has been growing considerably in recent years, but this growth has not benefited the poor as much as it should. In addition, GoS spending, both on delivering services and improving infrastructure, has been low by international standards and has not been concentrated geographically or sectorally in the areas which would improve conditions most for poor people. This is in part because of high military expenditure, but also because the systems of governance currently channel the majority of resources to elite groups. Territorially, this has meant exploitation of resources by state-owned or state-sponsored companies, with control of those resources assured by military or security agencies. Political relations between the centre and the periphery have been used to maintain control from the capital. GoS and SPLM started discussions in September 2004 on a joint Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) – known as the Poverty Eradication Strategy (PES). The paper concentrates on reducing inequality and tackling exclusion and marginalisation through decentralisation and community-led development. However, the paper contains little about how the parties will implement the strategy or probable timing and mechanisms for implementation. Previous attempts did not cover SPLM-controlled areas and were unlikely to meet the standards required for effective country-wide poverty reduction, nor the international standards required for PRSPs to be considered under international processes such as the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. - Strong economic reform, but low social spending. Statistics on the Sudanese economy (which do not adequately reflect the situation in the South) indicate important improvements in macroeconomic management since the mid1990s. Growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has averaged over 6% annually since 1997, reflecting expansion in agriculture, industry and, particularly, oil sectors. Inflation was reduced from over 100% in 1996 to single digit levels by 2000. This reduction was achieved through cutting public expenditure to around 11% of GDP (1999-2001) - which is very low compared with an average in Sub-Saharan Africa of over 27%. Within total public expenditure, defence is equivalent to 2-3% of GDP, yet social services is around 1.5% of GDP, much lower than many other African countries. 6 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN Moreover, social sector spending lacks a strong emphasis on the primary level in either health or education. - Massive and unsustainable external debt. Sudan’s external debt of $24bn ($20bn of which is in arrears) is owed to commercial and bilateral (Paris Club and Arab) creditors as well as multilateral agencies. Normalisation of relationships with international creditors, followed by debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, would open the way to renewed lending from the international financial institutions, and so is an important incentive for peace. However, resolving the problem will require exceptional effort from the international community. In particular, the international community will find it hard to agree debt relief while there is still conflict in Darfur. Financing of HIPC will require some large cash injections from the international community to multilateral agencies, spread over about 5 years. - Lack of investment. Apart from the oil sector, there has been little investment in Sudan in recent years. Yet such investment would broaden Sudan’s economic base, and provide another source of employment for the country’s population. Investors have been put off by the continuing conflict, the immense debt overhang, and inadequate protection provided by legislation or by the courts. - Agricultural dependency. The economy is predominantly agricultural, contributing about 46% of GDP in 2000 but since then its share has declined as oil revenues have increased. About 70% of the population either live in rural areas or are nomadic, with the agricultural sector accounting for 70% of employment. Sudan is potentially self sufficient in basic foods, albeit with inter-annual and geographical variations. About 60% of all crop production is irrigated, highlighting the importance of sustainable management of water resources. The destruction of the limited social and economic infrastructure has disrupted agricultural and trading activity, especially in the South. This has had serious impact on the livelihoods of the rural poor, traditionally dependent on rain fed farming and livestock. - Climate, terrain and size. These factors also complicate governance and the delivery of services. The country is prone to natural disasters such as floods and droughts. The sheer size of Sudan also makes it difficult to govern, even at a state level. Infrastructure throughout the country is poor due to lack of investment and the war. The road network presents logistical challenges for humanitarian and development interventions, especially in the rainy season. Sudan is the meeting point of the Nile river tributaries: the Blue Nile from the Ethiopian plateau and the White Nile from the equatorial lakes region. Most of the latter is lost to evaporation in the vast swamps of the Sudd. Yet much of Sudan is arid and not suitable for cultivation, and water scarcity limits development in many parts of the country. 2.3 International Involvement in Sudan 7 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN International attention has focused on Sudan in 2004, mainly due to the conflict in Darfur. The UN has passed three resolutions (as at end 2004), and Sudan has been on the agenda of the AU, EU and G8 discussions. Many donors and agencies that were not previously involved in Sudan have rallied to the call of support to the humanitarian response. The AU has sent ceasefire monitors and troops to Darfur – the first operation of its kind for the AU. This has been, and is, very important but there is a risk that so much attention on one part of the country means problems elsewhere are not addressed. At the regional level many states are concerned with Sudan for a variety of political and economic reasons. For example Egypt, has placed much emphasis on the use of Sudan’s Nile waters. Sudan has also gained attention due to the profile of its Islamist government, its association with terror networks (from the failed assassination attempt on the Egyptian President in 1995 onwards), and the portrayal of the North-South conflict as a fight between Christianity and Islam (which has had particular resonance with some Christian groups in the USA). Since 1991, most western governments have suspended long-term aid and development programmes in Sudan and simply provided assistance through Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the longest running humanitarian programme in the world, as well as more recently to the Darfur crisis. OLS is led by the UN, with the participation of local and international NGOs, and is based on a negotiated access agreement with the principal belligerents in the NorthSouth conflict, allowing operations in territory held by either side. Since 2000, three western nations – USA, UK and Norway – have been working together in support of the IGAD-led peace process to encourage the two principal parties (GoS and SPLM) to reach a ceasefire and work toward a lasting solution to Africa’s longest running war. Peace talks on Darfur have been supported by a number of international actors, including AU, EU, UK, France, USA, Arab League, Chad and Libya. 2.4 The IGAD-led Peace Process In June 2002 a combination of war weariness and international pressure finally bought GoS and the SPLM back to the negotiating table and a new round of talks under IGAD, an organisation of countries in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, and chaired by Kenya. A comprehensive peace agreement was signed in January 2005, if implemented, means a permanent end to the civil war. The agreement, in allowing for devolution of power and resources, and democratisation, offer solutions for problems in other parts of Sudan, including Darfur and the East. During the IGAD-mediated talks, GoS and the SPLM reached an agreement on the key issues of self-determination of the South and application of Islamic law in July 2002 (the Machakos Protocol), on wealth-sharing, power-sharing, security arrangements, the “three areas” on the border between North and South (Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei). These agreements 8 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN allow for, amongst other things, a regional Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), power-sharing in a Government of National Unity (GNU), and a six and a half year period after which a referendum will be held under which the South will vote for or against secession. A settlement between the SPLM and GoS is only the start of the process as many other groups and factions will have to be accommodated in the political transition to bring about a just and lasting peace. In particular, a political solution to the crisis in Darfur will need to be found. International pressure has been instrumental in moving towards a peace agreement and this will need to be maintained, and substantial resources provided, if it is to be successfully implemented. 2.5 Other Political negotiations in Sudan Outside the IGAD Peace Process, other political negotiations continue in parallel, but will be heavily influenced by the conclusion of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the IGAD talks. In relation to Darfur, the AU is sponsoring talks in Abuja between GoS and the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) as well as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Libya is also pursuing an initiative for reconciliation within Darfur by bringing together many of the Darfurian traditional leaders. Humanitarian and Security Protocols for Darfur were signed in Abuja on 9 November 2004, but these still need to be implemented. The National Democratic Alliance – an umbrella group of opposition groups - is pursuing talks with GoS in Cairo. 2.6 Post-Settlement Programme The comprehensive peace agreement should allow greater engagement by the international community in supporting the process toward lasting peace. Such international support should be predicated on the commitments made by the two parties in the final agreement, and in particular on making progress along the necessary security, political/legal and socio-economic transitions. The international community is also likely to look for progress towards resolving the crisis in Darfur before significantly scaling up the volume of their assistance. Transition is needed in the following three areas: security, political/legal, and socio-economic. The peace agreement provides the blueprint for these transitions and must be implemented. Steps needed for successful security transition include disengaging armed forces and maintaining a ceasefire, and undertaking a process of demilitarising the state apparatus. International partners can support this through monitoring missions, and providing funding and policy advice for demobilising, disarming and reintegrating fighters within a context of longerterm transformation of the security sector. Political/legal transition will require the Sudanese to take forward elections and other steps towards democratisation; protection of human rights; decentralisation of power, as well as a more inclusive political process at the centre; and reconciliation between the various groups towards a more united 9 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN Sudan. International support can come through facilitation of initiatives aimed at building the peace and strengthening capacity at all levels of government. In particular, support can be channelled towards electoral processes and bodies that uphold human rights. In order to achieve socio-economic transition, Sudanese authorities will need to share wealth and revenues, and reform macroeconomic policy. Policies and budgets that target the poor will be particularly important, on which international organisations can assist. They can also undertake a process of debt relief for Sudan. 2.7 Post-Settlement Planning As the parties have approached a settlement, key donors have talked to each other and encouraged a coherent and coordinated programme of support for multilateral (UN and World Bank) national framework. The UK has been one of the lead donors in such coordination (with the USA, Netherlands, EC and Norway). The UN and World Bank have been undertaking a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) to determine the needs in Sudan over the preinterim and interim periods (6 and a half years from a peace agreement). This process has led to much stronger coordination between donors at a sectoral level, and between the parties to the peace talks at a strategic level. Relationships between donors and Sudan will undergo profound changes in the coming years. Many donors will be increasing their assistance but have limited knowledge of the country. There will also be increasing engagement with government systems, but the GoS and SPLM (as the emerging Government of Southern Sudan – GoSS) are unfamiliar with most donors’ procedures and practices. In these circumstances, transaction costs are likely to be high on both sides. High priority should therefore be placed on donors working together, sharing their knowledge and building common approaches and joint mechanisms for their relationships with government; and on helping government systems to evolve in ways which will make good use of development assistance. It will take at least a year or two before Sudan becomes eligible to borrow again from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (because of current debt arrears), and it will take some time for the government to reallocate spending away from the military. So initially most of the resources for poverty reduction related activities will need to come from bilateral, EC and UN sources. The absorptive capacity of Sudanese institutions in respect of greatly increased donor financing has yet to be tested, but is likely to be limited. The table below lists some key donors’ planned areas of activity and roughly how much is available for Sudan after a peace agreement. Donor Approxim- Sectors ate annual Geographical area 10 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN Netherlands Humanitarian assistance in Darfur and South Sudan, security (demining), peace-keeping, governance and rule of law, local administration, gender, education, health, HIV/AIDS US At least Humanitarian assistance = $593m $500m (food aid = $320m, health/water/food security/livelihoods = $180m); transitional and development assistance in South Sudan = $93m (infrastructure, governance, primary health care, education, economic recovery, civil society, media, grassroots peace) EC At least Humanitarian, food security, €100m education, health, peace building, (approxima human rights, democratisation, tely rule of law, governance, security $131m) Norway At least Humanitarian, capacity building, $46m community reintegration, security, peace monitoring and support, education and infrastructure UK £100m Humanitarian/recovery/reintegrati ($187m) on, implementation of peace agreement, public administration/security/judicial systems, policies for poverty reduction resource At least €40m (approxima tely $52m) Focus on Darfur, South Sudan and conflict areas Also a regional programme Focus on South, Darfur, transition zone, east Sudan War-affected areas Focus on South and Darfur All areas are possible 11 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN 3. 3.1 UK PROGRAMME AND RESOURCES 2003 – 2006 History of UK Engagement In 1991, alongside other donors, the UK stopped its long-term development assistance programme to Sudan. Since then, the UK has maintained a humanitarian programme of about £7 million per year, depending on needs within the country. In 2002 and 2003, in line with progress towards peace, the DFID programme was broadened to include direct support for the peace process and its monitoring mechanisms, confidence building measures such as support for the education system and support to get ourselves and others prepared for peace. Funds disbursed to Sudan in financial year 2003/4 totalled approximately £24.5 million. Between April 2002 and March 2004, humanitarian activities included: • • • • • £9.6m to international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) for humanitarian work across Sudan; £8.5m to International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) including work with internally displaced people and others affected by conflict; £7.8m to UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) for rehabilitation of schools, basic education and water/sanitation; £7.5m to World Food Programme (WFP) for food aid; £3.0m to UN Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF and Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for humanitarian security operations and coordination; £4.0m for UN mine clearance programmes (half of which was funded by DFID’s Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department); £0.4m to UNDP for the ‘Juba Plus’ initiative on HIV/AIDS. • • To support the peace process we have been providing funding for the IGAD Secretariat; input into monitoring missions; and experts (for example on demobilisation, demilitarisation and reintegration - DDR) to the talks. We are also supporting activities that underpin the peace process through local peace-building initiatives, DDR and support for human rights. As a peace agreement drew closer and the parties became more involved in planning for government after a peace agreement, we started some further preparatory work. This has included support for the Joint Assessment Missions (see section 2.7 above), for a Capacity Building Trust Fund for the SPLM, for road rehabilitation in the South, for debt management, for police training and for the UN plan for the return of internally displaced people. We have also agreed support for a number of cross-cutting programmes with international NGOs. 12 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN There are also regional programmes supported by DFID that cover Sudan: the Nile Basin I itiative, which aims to achieve sustainable socio-economic n development through the equitable utilisation of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources; and the Catalysing Access to ICTs in Africa (CATIA) programme, which aims to enable poor people in Africa to gain maximum benefit from the opportunities offered by Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and to act as a strong catalyst for reform. Sudan has been supported through our institutional partnerships with UN agencies and the Red Cross movement, as well as by our Civil Society Challenge Fund. DFID also contributes 12.5% of EC development assistance in Sudan and 17% of EC humanitarian assistance. 3.2 UK Humanitarian Response to Darfur The UK response to the crisis in Darfur has been to use political, diplomatic and humanitarian channels, and work with the international community to stop the conflict and stabilise the humanitarian crisis faced by the war-affected people of Darfur; and, in the medium term, to return people to safety and security. The humanitarian crisis has mainly been caused by displacement from the conflict, so throughout we have maintained political pressure on the parties to stop the fighting, and have been at the forefront of international support for the African Union ceasefire monitors. We have also pressed for conclusion of the comprehensive peace agreement between GoS and SPLM, which offers solutions for the problems in Darfur. In the early stages of the crisis, when very few agencies were engaged in Darfur, we worked with other donors to bolster the UN’s capacity to respond, by supporting the UN Disaster and Assessment Co-ordination team, and seconding humanitarian expertise to OCHA to enable co-ordination. We have consistently combined early funding for UN agencies with additional capacity in the form of technical support, ie personnel and equipment. Our early NGO funding was directed at those agencies already working in Darfur. To enable the operation to build up from this low base, we put significant support behind the provision of common logistics and services, which all agencies needed in order to work effectively. We supported UN security, and WFP logistics, operations, including air operations and also flew in directly significant contributions of humanitarian goods for the common pipeline. We provided NGOs with start-up costs, and encouraged them to become operational quickly, complementing our funding with pressure on the GoS to ease bureaucratic restrictions. We also provided airlifts for NGOs to enable quick delivery of humanitarian goods. We pressed the UN to deploy senior personnel to provide effective leadership and direction, and have consistently lobbied other donors to increase their volume of humanitarian assistance. Before August 2004, the USA, EC and UK had provided about 75% of the total funding for the crisis. Even at the end of 2004 these three donors accounted for over 60% of the response. Once more agencies were engaged, we continued to support expansion of the operation, encouraging agencies to push out to more outlying areas. We 13 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN provided funding to UN agencies to consolidate their operations, engaging in operational and high level dialogue to improve the quality of the response. We have been in regular contact with the Heads of UNICEF, WFP, ICRC, World Health Organisation (WHO), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). 3.3 Objectives and approach The UK Government’s overall goal in Sudan is to help the Sudanese reach and implement a sustainable peace agreement, which will both lead to and be supported by the reduction of poverty. Goal: To support Sudan to reach a just and lasting peace and so lay the foundations for sustained poverty reduction. Objective 1: meet life-saving and life-sustaining humanitarian, recovery and reintegration needs. Objective 2: assist parties to implement the peace agreement, including military/ political arrangements, and to build the consensus for peace more widely. Objective 3: support the development of effective public administration, security and judicial systems throughout Sudan. Objective 4: support the development and implementation of policies for poverty reduction. To achieve these objectives, we will focus our activities on those areas where the UK can offer comparative advantage in relation to other donors, particularly in terms of our speed of response, flexibility and preparedness to work in difficult policy areas. We place a high premium on harmonisation between donors in Sudan. We are therefore keen to agree an appropriate division of labour between donors, including which donor should lead in which sector. The UK will only take the lead on a few of the areas of interest outlined below. Our initial thinking is that we could take the lead on: rule of law / safety, security and access to justice; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, leading to security sector reform in the medium/longer term; debt relief (and poverty reduction strategy paper); and possibly certain issues relating to delivery of basic services (please see sections below for more detail on our plans in these areas). We will continue to prioritise our support for humanitarian activities based on assessed need. The outcome of the Joint Assessment Missions, and later, the Poverty Eradication Strategy, should provide donors with a framework within which to provide assistance. It is particularly important that these processes are Sudanese-led. We would like to establish good joint working with other donors, including joint offices. Objective 1: meet life-saving and life-sustaining humanitarian, recovery and reintegration needs. 14 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN DFID will match its humanitarian programme across Sudan to assessed need, recognising that improved access to vulnerable populations will allow a stronger response, and that needs are not likely to reduce in the near future. History shows that Sudan is often vulnerable to food shortages, even famine, requiring external donors to provide resources for large-scale relief programmes. In addition, for the time being, a substantial part of the burden of providing basic services (food, water, shelter, health, education), particularly in the South and in central conflict affected areas, falls to the humanitarian agencies. A high level of humanitarian need is likely to continue in Darfur at least for the next 18-24 months. We intend to maintain our funding for as long as is necessary, including to support a process of voluntary returns, which will lead to the restoration of livelihoods for those affected by conflict. Fundamental to our approach to humanitarian needs in Sudan in 2005 will be an early indication of substantial support to the 2005 UN Workplan, which outlines the enormous needs to be met across the country. Early indications of support will allow UN agencies to plan interventions more effectively and be better prepared for the added logistical challenges that will arise with the rainy season. While maintaining the level of support required by Darfur, the international community must not allow the current, justified, attention there to divert resources away from other areas of Sudan where there are also acute needs. The provision of humanitarian services can go beyond saving lives and include longer-term, developmental activities such as institutional support and training. As the operating environment becomes more stable and local institutions are strengthened, we will aim to make the delivery of services more sustainable by building on current successful models and resources. Our programme in the North will focus on poor communities in marginalised areas, on linking delivery of services to peace building efforts, and on generating sustainable systems for delivery of services at state level. In the South our initial focus will be guiding the transition from humanitarian relief to more sustainable, community-led and -maintained services. We expect this to involve the new Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), local authorities and NGOs, and INGOs, and to build on the experiences of local peace building work. We will work through other donors in the delivery of basic services. DFID will focus on interventions that are designed to provide benefits to the poorest people and communities. In particular it will be important to contribute to improved basic services in areas where Sudanese people displaced by war may wish to return. These inputs should contribute to, and not undermine, longer-term plans for sustainable development. We will support the UN returns programme, with an emphasis on the reintegration of displaced people into communities. We may also provide support for co-ordination, research, logistics, infrastructure or security, where these enable a more effective overall response. Given the limited capacity to absorb and use aid effectively, we will consider supporting interventions to alleviate these constraints. We will 15 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN continue to work by preference through fewer, larger grants to agencies working on the ground in order to keep our and their transaction costs down and to maximise efficiency. Where possible, we will use a programmatic approach: providing funding to key partners up-front against a jointly agreed set of objectives. This will enable agencies to be more flexible and responsive to a quickly evolving situation on the ground. Our main implementing partners will continue to be the UN system, the Red Cross movement and INGOs. DFID also intends to provide support for HIV/AIDS surveillance, prevention and treatment to help strengthen the capacity of the GoS/GoSS to plan and implement an effective response to the epidemic. Objective 2: assist parties to implement the peace agreement, including military/ political arrangements, and to build the consensus for peace more widely. Comprehensive ceasefire and security arrangements are being negotiated by the parties as part of a final peace agreement. Furthermore, the conflict in Darfur will also require international efforts to support peace there. We have made some assumptions about the likely shape of a peace support-operation and peacebuilding needs: • there will be an international peace support operation, probably with a focus on monitoring the peace, rather than enforcing it. The international community will need to share the burden of funding and staffing this operation. Opportunities to build African capacity for peacesupport should be taken; the Joint Military Commission (JMC) in the Nuba Mountains, AU Mission in Darfur, and Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT) and the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) in the South may be subsumed into the overall international operation. But the lessons learned from their establishment should be transferred to the larger operation; it will be important to strengthen civil society participation in consolidating peace. Media, information dissemination and confidence building measures related to the peace will be needed. However, locallevel peace building is complex work and not well understood by most donors and agencies. There is a need to build on analysis and common understanding so that donors and agencies do not exacerbate these conflicts; development of a community-based demobilisation, disarmament and re-integration (DDR) strategy and programme will be necessary. The parties will need to set the parameters for this programme within the peace agreement. The UN will offer to take a lead role in co-ordinating the implementation of the programme with other agencies. This will need to feed into a security sector reform programme as set out under objective 3 below; • • • 16 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN • • work with the militia groups will be key – both in local-level peacebuilding work and in plans for demobilisation of combatants; official capacity for human rights monitoring needs to be strengthened either within the international system or within the authorities - to significantly improve national ability to monitor needs and therefore provide a quicker response. Working with other donors, we will consider support for the Human Rights Commission and other relevant institutions to be established as part of the peace agreement as well as other mechanisms for improving respect for human rights. So far, the UK has supported the ceasefire and security discussions at the talks through provision of experts and through organising workshops to raise awareness of the issues with Government forces and the SPLA. We have also supported the DDR planning process and contributed significant funding and personnel to the JMC, VMT, and AU Darfur operations and played a lead role in their development. We intend to remain engaged at the political and programme levels in all these areas. Key areas for support include the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the security protocols. It is difficult at this stage to define exactly what support we will need to give but the following are indicative areas: • developing options for support on issues related to army integration and force reduction in the interim period through the provision of technical assistance; assisting the JMC, VMT and AU mission in Darfur and the future UN Mission in Sudan with personnel and running costs; the provision of Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) expertise to the parties and to the UN system in co-ordinating the development of a DDR programme. In turn, we will consider funding for a DDR programme and support for reintegration activities; the funding of an evaluation of local peace-building processes to contribute to a common understanding of the issues ensuring our longer term development programme (particularly the service delivery programme) is informed by good understanding of conflict dynamics; cooperation with others on the potential for developing effective media structures and outlets, working in coordination with other donors, including the US and EC. We will discuss this in the context of the DFID Africa-wide CATIA project; work with Sudanese civil society organisations to develop capabilities in advocating for peace at the local and national levels; • • • • • 17 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN • in collaboration with the UN and other partners, continue to support demining in Sudan. Objective 3: support the development of effective public administration, state security and judicial systems throughout Sudan. Safety, security and access to justice, and security sector reform Justice, legal and personal security systems in Sudan, North and South, have been perceived as oppressive by many, and widely condemned by the international community. The current justice and security systems in Sudan do not deliver adequate access to justice to people in all parts of Sudan, and especially to the poor and vulnerable who suffer most from injustice. Successful implementation of the peace agreement will depend to a considerable extent on remedying these omissions according to the commitments included in the peace protocols. Restoration of peace and stability in Darfur, as much as in other parts of the country, will depend on combating the climate of impunity prevalent throughout the crisis. It is important to ensure access to effective, objective justice and to the protection of life and property by the security authorities. The drafting of constitutions and legal codes that respect human rights, and the creation of top-level judicial structures that ensure fair and equitable treatment for all citizens will have to be undertaken at national and Southern regional levels. The reintegration of trained legal personnel into the judicial system of the South, and the further training of justices and lawyers, too, are projects that will have to be undertaken at a governmental level. In the North, the sharia justice system needs considerable reform in its resourcing and functioning in order to ensure the government’s constitutional and international commitments are respected. The poorest are also the least aware of their rights. The system is strongly biased against women – who are treated as property – and children, who are vulnerable to abuse and violence. The new authorities will need to be able to guarantee personal security, principally through effective accessible and impartial police forces. If they cannot, they will in all likelihood see the growth of vigilante and other armed groups, with the potential for further conflict. We will engage in a process of support for the justice and personal security sectors. This will be shaped under the leadership of the ministries and agencies concerned in the GoS (and subsequently the Government of National Unity - GNU) and in the SPLM/GoSS. Co-operation with other donors such as UNDP will be essential, both as part of donor harmonisation and because UNDP has identified “Rule of Law Capacity Building” as a major priority. Redevelopment and effectiveness will take a considerable period to achieve and be very much an incremental process. Initial activities are likely to be in the following areas: • confidence-building and lesson-learning activities with Sudanese authorities, North and South, to help them to understand where they 18 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN stand in relation to relevant international good practice after many years of isolation; • support for UNDP in both North and South Sudan to develop its own legal expertise and prepare a co-ordinated justice sector reform strategy for governments and donors; programmes of capacity building for justice sector institutions in the North and South, again administered by UNDP; creation of improved training capacity for the National Police College in Khartoum and funding for initial training and equipment for the police force being created by SPLM/GoSS; funding for human rights sensitisation and awareness programmes implemented by UN High Commission for Human Rights over the whole of Sudan; development of the capacity of civil society in the fields of human and child rights, gender and legal awareness, so that they are able to engage with donors as partners, and critically engage with Government; • • • • A £7.2 million two to three year Justice Sector Development Programme for National and Regional Governments was approved by the Secretary of State for International Development in October 2004. This first phase of UK support includes rule of law capacity building, police development, human rights support, UNDP legal sector strategy and co-ordination development, and funds to support the initial operations of commissions to be set up under the peace agreement protocols. In addition we are considering what the UK’s role should be in providing support to a framework for security sector reform, including oversight, accountability and linkages between different parts of the sector. Governance and public administration The development of a functioning and effective system of public administration, North and South, will be crucial for building a sustainable peace. Capacity needs are great, particularly within the South, but weaknesses are inherent at every level - local, state and regional/national - in all areas of the country. With other donor partners, we will provide assistance to planning, start-up activity and institutional strengthening in national/regional and state administrations and in local government in both North and South. Initially, we are likely to work in the following areas: • strengthening central management agencies of the GoS Civil Service which will become the GNU Civil Service and receive a substantial influx of Southern officials; 19 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN • • building up state administrations where UK support for improved service delivery is likely to be concentrated; funding operational costs and initial capacity building activities in the newly created SPLM/GoSS Administration, through the UNICEF administered Capacity Building Trust Fund for the South; financing part of the Local Government Development Programme for the South, on which the lead in donor support is being taken by UNDP; providing support for in-service training – in country and abroad – for key officials in government, paying particular attention to gender balance and the special development needs of ex-SPLA who will join the Southern Administration. • • Democracy Sudan's prospects for successful and sustained pro-poor development will depend on its capacity to operate political systems which provide opportunities for all people, including the poor and disadvantaged, to organise and influence state policy and practice. This has been a significant failure of the Sudanese state in the past, contributing to the causes of conflict. We will seek to ensure that the international community works with the Sudanese people to improve the political systems to realise the aspirations set out in the peace agreement. Where there are gaps, we will consider whether the UK can help fill them. While assessment of needs is at an early stage, two possibilities have already been identified: pre-election political party strengthening and development within the print and electronic media. Objective 4: support development and implementation of policies for poverty reduction. To lay sound foundations for poverty reduction will require profound changes to policy in many key areas: management of the economy, the development process and the public sector. Macroeconomic management There will be new macroeconomic challenges as the economy is reunified and the forms in which aid is delivered changes. The Sudanese authorities in Khartoum have worked well with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in recent years, and the Fund can be expected to support macroeconomic management effectively. The main challenge will be incorporating the South and its new government structures into existing macroeconomic management structures and practices. There are particular challenges on the conduct of monetary policy, which will arise as the Wealth Sharing protocol is implemented. 20 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN During 2005, DFID, in liaison with the IMF and World Bank, will explore whether the Sudan would be willing to participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiati ve process to improve the transparency of management of revenues from the oil sector. Transparent revenue receipt and use will be essential in underpinning the Wealth Sharing protocol. Debt Resolution of Sudan’s debt problems is an integral part of the process of normalising relations with the international community, and presents a major incentive for peace because of the flows of international finance it should unlock. The UK has agreed to chair a Support Group of key international creditors and donors to help ensure coordinated action over 5-6 years after a peace agreement for clearance of debt arrears and subsequent implementation of debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. However, the international community will fi nd it hard to agree debt relief while there is still conflict in Darfur and establishment of an effective Support Group will depend upon an improvement in the situation there. Throughout 2004 DFID has undertaken informal preparatory activities, but the intensity of effort will increase once the Support Group has been formally established. We also intend to provide capacity building support for debt management to the GoS. This support will focus on the External Debt Unit within the Central Bank of Sudan but should also include links to the Ministry of Finance and other ministries over time. PRSP International experience suggests that implementation of a sound Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) would help Sudan to make progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. A sound PRSP process is also needed to allow IMF and World Bank concessional lending and HIPC debt relief; and for DFID to move towards a full development partnership with Sudan. The Sudanese parties have made progress during 2004 in preparing an interim Poverty Eradication Strategy (PES), and a draft interim PRSP was prepared earlier, covering the North. A priority after the comprehensive peace agreement will be to ensure planning for the South is integrated into the existing work. DFID may play a leading role in galvanising coordinated donor support for developing the Sudanese PES, ensuring it draws from relevant experience elsewhere but also fits with other policy developments in Sudan. Apart from DFID advisory inputs, we could provide funding, possibly through multi-donor channels, for consultation processes, technical assistance and building capacity in government and civil society to understand and manage the PRSP process. Joint Assessment Mission 21 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN A Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) was undertaken in 2004 under the leadership of the World Bank and UN. The JAM attempts to bring together and prioritise a wide range of needs in reconstruction and development in one document. There has been strong interest and participation by the Sudanese parties. The intended outcome of the JAM is a results/action matrix prioritising needs in the first 2–3 years following a peace agreement across a range of sectors. If a high-quality, realistic and Sudanese-owned report is prepared this would allo w donors to coordinate their support within its framework. The final JAM report will be presented to a planned Donor Conference in Oslo following the comprehensive peace agreement. DFID has been a core contributor to the JAM process. We hope that it will inform both our own sector choices in support of the peace agreement and how we can work most effectively with others. Budget Policy and Management It is important that budget allocations are in line with the policies and that budget management systems ensure money is effectively spent. In the recent past, GoS has spent more on defence than social services. Although there may be modest reductions in defence spending over the medium term as a result of peace, the main sources of additional finance for delivering services that benefit poor people is likely to have to be increased international aid reflected in the budget, as well as better use of domestic revenues. Budgets that benefit the poor are likely to require a larger share of spending to take place at the state or sub -state levels of government. Completely new systems will have to be developed in the South. DFID strongly promotes the strengthening of government budgetary systems and, over time, channelling more and more aid directly through them ( s a Poverty Reduction Budget Support, PRBS). DFID policies would preclude PRBS for Sudan at present, given current budgetary allocations and budget management systems, but DFID should aspire to use PRBS as the instrument to deliver most of its financial aid to Sudan in the longer term. In countries where DFID and other donors provide PRBS in the context of long-term development partnerships, processes have evolved for regular dialogue between the donor community and the government about policies and systems for achieving poverty reduction. These dialogue mechanisms have provided important opportunities for building a common understanding among donors about how the country is tackling poverty and how donors can best support these efforts. We will therefore work where required with both the GoS and the GoSS to improve public financial management in coordination with the international financial institutions and other donors. Given the lack of any systems in South Sudan at present, the new government faces a huge challenge in establishing appropriate systems. A key challenge for the donor community will be in ensuring that they work closely together, with common systems and processes wherever possible. The GoS has committed to converting its 22 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN current budget systems to international standards, and we will seek to support them in making this transition. 3.4 Future Resources If peace is achieved and maintained, the UK intends to increase its assistance for Sudan considerably. The DFID aid framework for Sudan is £94m for 2004/5 (£35m for Sudan, £55.5m for Darfur humanitarian and £3.5m from the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool). We announced in October 2004 that the UK would commit £100 million for Sudan next year, providing that a Comprehensive Peace Agreement is concluded and there is progress in Darfur. We will also increase our staff resources in the region and aim to devolve responsibility for the programme to an office in Sudan during 2006. 23 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN Annex 1 – risks to peace and poverty reduction The table below identifies some of the key risks to reaching a sustained peace agreement and poverty reduction in Sudan, along with some activities that Sudan and its partners can undertake to mitigate those risks. Key Risk Likeli hood Potential Impact (on poverty reduction) Mitigation Activity Peace Process and Pre-Interim Period Peace Agreement MedHigh Capacity building for peace signed but not ium agreement institutions implemented (eg Maintain international engagement agreeing a constitution, Encourage joint working between forming GNU, establishing peace agreement GoS and GoSS commissions, setting up Coordinated donor response ceasefire monitoring mechanisms) Interim Period - Security Transition Resumption of Low - High SPLA/GoS conflict Medium Peace support operation Implementation of commitments Well-managed demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration Properly implement wealth-sharing agreement Well-managed military reorganisation Peace dividend/ incentives Regional and MedMedium Political Inclusion localised Conflict ium Conflict management Access to land Improved policing Local reconciliation Peace dividend/ incentives Interim Period – Political/Legal Transition No move toward Low Medium Implementation of peace process political inclusivity commitments Build appropriate legal frameworks Build political institutions Policies for poverty reduction Decentralisation Democratisation / elections Enhance media and civil society No elections after 4 Low High Begin preparations in time years Support preparations Human Rights MedMedium Peace support operation/ Violations ium monitoring Access to justice Improved policing 24 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN Enhance media and civil society Interim Period - Socio-Economic Transition Insufficient funds MedHigh Careful macro-economic for poverty ium management reduction State capture of oil revenues Policies for non-oil sector growth and revenue generation Clear debt arrears Mobilise donor funding Reduce military expenditure Restructure budget towards poor Weak poverty MedHigh Planning and implementation reduction policies ium capacity Policy advice Sound PRSP process Weak absorptive MedMedium Institutional building capacity ium Weak public MedMedium Country Financial Accountability expenditure ium/ assessment management High Follow up action plan Humanitarian MedMedium Disaster response/preparedness disaster (flooding, ium HIV programme drought, HIV, Livelihoods support disease) Interim Period - International Intervention Donor funding not MedMedium Donor mobilisation for 10 year post sustained ium conflict plan Weak coordination High Medium Strengthen donor coordination and and management UN/ multilateral mechanisms of international Build capacity in Sudanese assistance administrations for aid management Approach that is MedLow/Med- Strengthen government sector short-term, ium ium planning/coordination capacity unsustainable and generates dependency Aid reinforces MedMedium Aid targeted at poorest structural inequality ium Use of analysis of causes of conflict Geographical spread 25 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN Annex 2 – Sudan facts at a glance Geography The largest country in Africa - 2.5 million sq km (as large as Western Europe). Dominated by the Nile and its tributaries Tropical in South; arid desert in North Libya, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central Africa Republic and Chad. 853km of coastline to the Red Sea Petroleum, agriculture, small reserves of iron ore, copper, chromium ore, zinc, tungsten, mica, silver, gold, hydropower 35 million (est. 2004); growing at 2.5% a year Black African 52%, Arab 39%, Beja 6%, other 3% Arabic (official), Nubian, Ta Bedawie, diverse dialects of Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic, Sudanic languages, English Estimated to be 4 million from the North-South Conflict; plus over 1.5 million in Darfur 58.4 years US$340 US$24bn, 85%of which is in arrears Climate Borders Natural Resources Population Ethnic Groups Languages Internally displaced people Life expectancy GNI per capita External Debt 26 SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN Annex 3 – acronyms AU CPMT DDR DFID EC EU G8 GDP GNI GNU GoS GoSS HIPC ICRC IDPs IGAD IMF INGOs JAM JEM JMM/JMC JNTT OCHA OLS PES PRBS PRSP SLM/A SPLM/A UK UN UNDP UNHCR UNICEF USA VMT WFP WHO African Union Civilian Protection and Monitoring Team Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration Department for International Development European Commission European Union Group of 8 Gross Domestic Product Gross National Income Government of National Unity Government of Sudan Government of Southern Sudan Heavily Indebted Poor Countries International Committee of the Red Cross Internally displaced people Intergovernmental Authority on Development International Monetary Fund International non-governmental organisations Joint Assessment Mission Justice and Equality Movement Joint Monitoring Mission / Joint Military Commission Joint National Transition Team Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Operation Lifeline Sudan Poverty Eradication Strategy Poverty Reduction Budget Support Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Sudan Liberation Movement/Army Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United Nations United Nations Development Programme United Nations High Commission for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund United States of America Verification and Monitoring Team World Food Programme World Health Organisation 27