HARRIMAN INSTITUTE
Catharine Theimer Nepomnyashchy, Director 420 West 118th Street, New York, NY 10027 http://www.harriman.columbia.edu
AT THE
February 2004
The Faith of a President:
Exploring the Religious Profile of Vladimir Putin
n his autobiography First Person, Vladimir Putin’ wife Lyudmila was asked to respond s to the following statement: “You’ lived ve with your husband for 20 years. You must know everything about him.” She replied, “No, you can never know everything about a person. Something remains secret in every person.” Who is Vladimir Putin? That the question is still posed in different forms on the eve of the Russian Federation President’ likely re-election s is striking. After the tumultuous eight-year presidency of the hyper-expressive Boris Yeltsin, Putin remains a somewhat enigmatic figure. The tealeaf reading of Mr. Putin’ personality and s political philosophy— reminiscent of the work of Soviet-era “Kremlinologists”— will likely continue into the Russian president’ second s four-year term. On February 10th, the Harriman Institute hosted a discussion led by Father Leonid Kishkovsky, respected Ecumenical Officer of the Orthodox Church in America, and Nikolas Gvosdev, executive editor of The National Interest and Senior Fellow of the Nixon Center. The topic was “The Faith of a President: Exploring the Religious Profile of Vladimir Putin.” Father Kishkovsky began his remarks with personal observations from a recent visit to Moscow. Russia, he believes, is today experiencing a period of “culture wars” in its religious life similar in some respects to social and cultural conflicts in America over the last two decades. He points to two recent events to dramatize his point: the recent religious funerals of three men implicated in the August 1991 coup
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attempt against the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev’ and the vandalizing of a recent art s exhibit. Interestingly, both events have connections to the life and work of the late Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov. Following the religious funerals of the three coup plotters— two were Russian Orthodox, one was Jewish— Sakharov’ widow Yelena Bonner s publicly criticized the “irrelevance” of religious funerals in— what she believes should remain— a secular society. In August 2003, an art exhibit entitled “Caution: Religion” opened at Moscow’ s Sakharov Museum. Among the featured artworks was a Russian Orthodox-style icon with a hole instead of a head, where visitors could put their faces and picture themselves as the Almighty. There was also a Coca-Cola logo against the usual red background, but with Jesus' face drawn next to it and the words, “This is my blood.” A sculpture was featured of a church made from vodka bottles. Four days after its opening, the exhibit was vandalized by six men. The group was detained and charged with hooliganism, but after a publicity campaign conducted by a Russian Orthodox priest, the charges were dropped. According to Kishkovsky, the vandals themselves were members of the Orthodox Church. A Russian anti-abortion movement— on a smaller scale and with more modest means than its American counterpart— has begun to establish a public presence. Kishkovsky suggests that the Russian Orthodox Church has taken steps to minimize the public influence of its most extreme believers. Those who publicly assert that
the U.S. and Israel are attempting to undermine Russian values— if not Russia itself— continue to play a role in the life of the Church. But most of the current Orthodox leadership has taken care in its public statements to stress the need for tolerance of all religious groups in Russia. Is Vladimir Putin a practicing Orthodox Christian? Father Kishkovsky answers from personal observation. Having attended Orthodox Church services with both Yeltsin and Putin, Kishkovsky explained what he sees as the differences in the two presidents’relationships— and levels of comfort— with religious observance. The Church Patriarch publicly blessed both of Yeltsin’ presidential inaugurations. While the s Patriarch was present for the Putin Inaugural in 2000, the ceremony did not include a public blessing. Instead, Putin participated in a private service led by the Patriarch within the Kremlin’ s walls following the official swearing-in ceremony. But while Yeltsin often seemed to Kishkovsky unfamiliar with Church ritual, Putin’ “natural s and authentic body language” in Orthodox services suggests to Father Leonid that Putin is comfortable with the physical language of Orthodox observance and experienced in its practice. Friends of Father Leonid in St. Petersburg, he noted, have spoken of Mr. Putin’ s long-standing church attendance, begun well before Putin was a recognizable figure even in Russia’ second city. s What does any of this tell us about Vladimir Putin’ political philosophy? For Kishkovsky, the s limited public role of the Patriarch in Putin’ s 2000 inauguration ceremony is telling. Putin has privately practiced his faith for many years. In his public statements, the President stresses Russia’ s multi-religious values. What day-to-day influence, if any, does the Church have on Vladimir Putin? Nikolas Gvosdev noted that the president and his wife Lyudmila each have spiritual advisors. That this fact is accepted as normal in contemporary Russian life, he believes, is significant. Gvosdev agrees with Kishkovsky that Putin has acted as president to place Russian contemporary religious practice in the context of civil society. In doing so, Putin has attempted to move Russian society beyond questions of religious versus anti-religious sentiment and to blend Russian Orthodox symbolism into the nation’ s identity, just as he blends Soviet and prerevolutionary Russian symbolism into Russia’ s political identity. At the same time, Putin has publicly stressed the importance of Russia’ multi-ethnic, multis
religious character. The President has referred to Russian Orthodox Christianity as “a cultural variant of the world’ moral and spiritual beliefs.” s Even if Putin has private religious convictions, church membership has not proven to be a “litmus test” or membership card for work in today’ Russian government. Putin has not s sought to recreate the “Tsar-Patriarch” ruling partnership of Russia’ imperial past. Nor does s Putin see his position as a pulpit from which to convert non-believers. According to Gvosdev, Putin practices “civic religion.” The president personally believes that, while religious belief and church attendance produce virtue, there may be many “true faiths.” Still, attention and curiosity have inevitably followed the man Putin identifies as his “spiritual father.” Archimandrite Tikhon Shevkunov, says Gvosdev, is a believer in “Christian economic thought,” a philosophy of social and economic responsibility for the less fortunate. Shevkunov has spoken publicly of the dangers posed by Russia’ so-called oligarchs to s moral economic principal. As a solution to this and other social and economic ills, the president’ spiritual advisor calls for “statist s reform.” Have these beliefs altered the course of Vladimir Putin’ political agenda? That is a s question only the president himself can truly answer. Reported by Willis Sparks Program Assistant, Harriman Institute