Sudan Political Chronicle 2005

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 Sudan Political Chronicle 2005 Powered By Docstoc
					Sudan Political Chronicle


   Amani Mohamed El Obeid


      Etudes et documents
         n° 24 et 25/2006

         November 2006


    Introduction                                            1
                     Internal Policy
     North-South Relations                                  2
     Displaced and Refugees                                 41
     The Nuba Mountains                                     43
     Darfur Armed Conflicts                                 43
     Political Parties                                      68

                     Foreign Policy
    Sudan-U S Relations                                     80
    Sudan-European Union Relations                          82
    Sudan-United Nations Relations                          83
    Sudan-International Criminal Court (ICC) Relations      87
    Sudan-World Bank Relations                              88
    Sudan-Norway Relations                                  89
    Sudan China Relations                                   89
    Sudan-Egypt Relations                                   90
    Sudan-Ugandan Relations                                 91
    Sudan-Japan Relations                                   91
                Sudan Oil and Economy                       93
                         Defence                            104
Annex 1: The Draft Constitutional Text                      105
Annex 2:Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between   137
        the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and
        the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF)
Abbreviations                                               141

       Sudan has managed to put down the longest war in Africa. A
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was reached. More than a year after it
was signed, Sudan’s CPA is showing signs of strain. While the agreement
ended one of Africa’s longest and bloodiest civil wars, it was an agreement
between only two parties, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
(SPLM/A) and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), and continues to
lack broader support throughout the country, particularly in the North.
However, the agreement defined the democratic process and the deadline for
comprehensive elections. It created an atmosphere of political relaxation
throughout the country, though the implementation process and political
commitment of the two parties remains a main challenge to the peace process.

1.1 North–South Relations

1.1.1 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Success and Challenges
The January 2005 CPA formally ended the war between the Khartoum
government and the insurgent SPLM/A, Africa's longest civil conflict.
The CPA was the culmination of two and a half years of intense
negotiations between the government and the SPLM facilitated by the
Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD). It is premised
on a fundamental compromise: a self-determination referendum for the
South after a six-year interim period, in exchange for the continuation of
Islamic (Shari‘a) law in the North. The deal was predicated on extensive
sharing of power, wealth and security arrangements and established an
asymmetrical federal system, with the Government of South Sudan
(GoSS) existing as a buffer between the central government and
southern states but no parallel regional government in the North.1 The
CPA provides for a six-year interim period with democratic elections by
2009, and an autonomous southern government, followed by a self-
determination referendum for the South. In the interim, it mandates
power and wealth-sharing arrangements aimed at ending decades of
political and economic marginalization of the South and guaranteeing its
representation in Sudan federal government’s branches proportional to
its population.2
The power-sharing arrangements provided for fixed representation in
national institutions, including parliament, among the formerly warring
parties,3 who also agreed to conduct elections at all levels of government

1 International Crisis Group, “Khartoum-SPLA/M Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace”, Africa Report
No. 96, 25 July 2005.
2 International Crisis Group, “Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead”,

Africa Report No. 106, 31 March 2006, p.1.
3 Seats were accorded as follows: 52 per cent for the ruling National Congress Party; 28 per cent for the

SPLM, 14 per cent for other northern forces; and 6 per cent for other southern forces at the national level.

by the end of the fourth year of the interim period.4 A number of other
institutions, commissions and committees were also created, including a
new Upper House in Khartoum – the Council of States – with two
representatives from each of the 25 states.
The detailed Wealth-Sharing Agreement provided for a new national
currency, created parallel central banks for North and South, and set
specific revenue-sharing formulas for the South and the disputed areas
of South Kordofan state, Blue Nile state, and Abyei state (the so-called
Three Areas). The GoSS and the central government are to split all oil
and other revenue derived from the South evenly.
Various protocols cover security arrangements and the status and
treatment of the government-aligned armed groups in the South
gathered under the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) umbrella. The
parties agreed to establish joint integrated units with equal numbers
from the SPLA and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).5 The SPLA and SAF
are to maintain their troops in the South and North respectively. The
agreement provides, in effect, for elimination of the SSDF, since no
armed groups other than the SPLA or the SAF are permitted. However,
the SSDF is given the opportunity to qualify for integration into the
security structures or civil institutions of either party.6 The Final
Ceasefire Agreement spelled out a clear timetable for SSDF
demobilisation.7 The Sudanese military is to complete the withdrawal of its

The SPLM was granted 70 per cent of positions in the southern states and the Government of South
Sudan. The National Congress Party was granted 70 per cent of positions in the northern states.
4 The Protocol on Power Sharing actually called for local, state and national (parliamentary) elections to be

held by the end of the third year of the interim period, but the parties agreed to shift all elections to the
fourth year in the final agreement on implementation modalities, signed on 31 December, 2004.
5 There are to be 24,000 joint integrated forces in the South, 6,000 in both Southern Kordofan and

Blue Nile states, and 3,000 in Khartoum.
6 Article 7a and 7b, “Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period”, 25

September, 2003.
7 International Crisis Group, “Khartoum-SPLA/M Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace”, Africa Report

No. 96, 25 July, 2005.

forces from the South within 30 months of signing a peace deal. The daily
paper “Al-Rai Al-Aam” said a protocol that Khartoum signed with the
rebel SPLA in Kenya also calls on the SPLA to pull out its forces from areas
of North Sudan within eight months.8 The Peace Agreement requires
Sudan's government to withdraw at least 91,000 troops from the rebel-
controlled south, a rebel official said. The forces must pull out within 2 1/2
years, while a proposed government for the autonomous South Sudan will
field a separate army using its share of oil and tax revenues as well as
international aid, rebel spokesman Samson Kwaje said.9
The main points of the peace accord signed on 9 January, 2005 between
the Sudanese government and the southern rebel SPLM/A, ending
Africa's longest running conflict, are the following:
i) Protocol on the South’s Right of Self Determination
According to the protocol on the right of self-determination (known as
the "Machakos Protocol") signed in July 2002, the South will hold a
referendum after a six-year transition period to determine whether the
region will secede or be part of Sudan. During the interim period, which
starts after six months from the day a final deal is signed, the areas in the
South will be exempted from Islamic (Shari‘a) law.
ii) Protocol on Power-Sharing
According to a power-sharing protocol signed in May 2004, SPLM/A
and the current government in Khartoum will form a Government of
National Unity (GoNU) with a decentralised system of administration.
SPLM/A will also set up a separate semi-autonomous administration in
the South. John Garang will hold the post of first vice-president in the
national government and general elections at all levels of government
will be held at the end of the third year. English and Arabic will be the

8   “Sudan military to withdraw from South within 30 months”, Sudan                        Tribune
(Http://, Agence France Presse, 2 January, 2005.
9 “Details of Sudan cease-fire emerge”, Sudan Tribune, Associated Press, 2 January 2005.

official languages in the country and people from South Sudan will
make up 30 percent of the country's post-conflict civil service.
iii) Protocols on The Administration of Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue
Nile State
According to the two protocols, which were signed in May 2004,
disputed regions of Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile will each
have their own government headed by a governor directly appointed by
registered voters. An official from either SPLM/A or Khartoum will hold
the governor's post on a rotational basis until elections are held at the
end of the third year. The states will express their views in a "popular
consultation" on the final peace deal through their respective elected
parliaments. Any disagreement will be addressed by the national
government, while representation in their two assemblies will be: ruling
NPC (55 percent) and SPLM/A (45 percent).
vi) Protocol of Abyei State
According to the protocol on Abyei state, signed in May 2004, this oil-
rich region, currently part of West Kordofan, will be accorded special
status under the presidency. Its residents will be citizens of both West
Kordofan in North Sudan and Bahr el Ghazal state in South Sudan and
will be administered by a local executive council elected by the residents
of Abyei. International monitors will be deployed to monitor
implementation of these agreements in Abyei, while its residents will
hold a separate referendum, simultaneous with one in South Sudan, to
determine whether it maintains its special status in the North or will be
part of Bahr el Ghazal in the South.
v) Protocol on Wealth Sharing
According to the Protocol on Wealth-Sharing, which was signed in
January 2004, national wealth, notably the revenue from some 250,000 to
300,000 barrels of oil a day produced in South Sudan, will be shared
equally. Oil revenue from wells in the South, where most exploited
petroleum is located, is to be split on a 50-50 basis between the southern

and national governments, after at least two percent is given to the states
where the oil is produced. Communities in areas of oil production,
which are mostly found in the South, will have a say in extraction
contracts. A National Petroleum Commission, comprising officials from
both governments, is to be set up to formulate policy and negotiate
exploitation contracts. Half of the non-oil revenue, essentially taxes and
levies, collected in the South by the national government is to be
allocated to the national government, monitored by a joint commission.
A dual banking system is to be set up, an Islamic one in the North,
where charging interest is forbidden, and a conventional one in the
South, where a special branch of the central bank will be established.
The central bank is to issue a new currency with a design reflecting
Sudan's cultural diversity.
vi) Protocol on Security Arrangements
According to the Security Arrangements Protocol, which was signed in
September 2003, more than 100,000 government troops in South Sudan
and SPLM/A troops deployed in Nuba Mountains and southern Blue
Nile will withdraw under international monitoring, while respecting the
North-South boundary drawn in 1956. Coordination between and
command of the two forces will be assumed by a new Joint Defence
Board made up of top officers from both sides. Both the SAF and the
SPLA will remain separate and shall be considered and treated equally
as Sudan's National Armed Forces (SNAF). During the interim period,
the two forces will contribute an equal number of troops to form Joint
Integrated Units (JIU) to be deployed on both sides of the border. The
deployment of JIU will be as follows: 24,000 troops in South Sudan,
6,000 in Nuba Mountains, 6,000 in southern Blue Nile and 3,000 in the
capital, Khartoum.10

10   “Highlights of the Sudan Peace Accord”, Sudan Tribune, Agence France Presse, 9 January, 2005.

The CPA is different from previous peace agreements as it:
        – Provides for devolution of government functions and powers –
and fiscal revenue decentralization – to allow people at appropriate
levels to manage and direct their own affairs.
        – Makes provision for a Bill of Rights, now enshrined in the new
Interim National Constitution, which obliges all levels of government to
respect, uphold and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms.
        – Gives the people of South Sudan their first opportunity to
exercise the right of self-determination – a framework for ensuring that
the unity of the Sudan is based on the fee will of its people.
        – Has detailed implementation modalities (the ‘Global Matrix’)
with measurable and scheduled mechanisms for effective monitoring.
        – Allows for the development of solid constitution institutions.
        – Contains an agreement to create the new SNAF consisting of
the SAF and SPLA as separate, regular and not-partisan armed forces
with a mission to defend constitutional order.
        – Has detailed arrangements of revenue transfers, the lack of
which was a key reason behind the collapse of the Addis Ababa Peace
Agreement (1972). The fact that the GoSS has been allocated 50% of net
oil revenues generated from oil-fields in South Sudan provides the key
economic guarantee for effective implementation of the CPA.
        – Has a large body of institutional and national witnesses and
defenders: IGAD, the African Union, the European Union, the League of
Arab States, the UN, Kenya, Uganda, Italy, Netherlands, the UK and
USA have formally committed themselves to playing a part in making
peace a reality.
        – Has provided the international community with a major role
within the independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC):

the Commission’s main function will be to carry out a middle-term
evaluation of how the CPA is being implemented.11
After the signing of the CPA in 9 January, 2005, rebel leader John
Garang was set to become Sudan's first vice president following a peace
deal, but the job will not include standing in as army chief if the
president is out of the country or incapacitated, a top official stated.
Before his death, it was stated that Garang "cannot be commander of
two armies at the same time," said Nafie Ali Nafie, deputy secretary
general of the ruling NCP and a member of the government team during
peace talks with Garang's SPLM. Khartoum and the SPLM have agreed
on a six-year interim period for South Sudan during which it will have a
semi-autonomous administration headed by the leader of the SPLM.
Nafie said that the SPLM leader will be commander of an army in the
South and that overall command of the Sudanese armed forces would
go to the country's second vice-president in the absence of the
president.12 However, rebels from South Sudan will make up a quarter
of the personnel in Sudan's large intelligence agencies under a post-
peace government, intelligence chief Salah Gosh stated.13
The signature in Nairobi of the CPA between the Sudanese government
and the SPLM/A, gave the green light for the enforcement of the
permanent ceasefire agreement between the two parties. The agreement
consists of four majors steps. The first one, which starts at the time of
signature, lasts six months, the second one covers the first half of the
interim period, i.e. 36 months, while the third period covers the second
half. The last one starts at the end of this six-year term. The two parties
have agreed to monitor and enforce the ceasefire agreement through
various bodies: the Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC), Ceasefire

11 Luka Biong Deng, “The Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Will it Also be Dishonored?”, in Forced
Migration Review, No. 24, Refugees Studies Centre, Oxford University, November 2005, pp.15-16.
12 “Garang will not command national army as Sudan's first VP: official”, Sudan Tribune, Agence

France Presse, 6 January, 2005.
13 “Rebels to take quarter of Sudanese intelligence jobs”, Sudan Tribune, Reuters, 7 January, 2005

Joint Military Commission (CJMC), Areas Joint Military Commission
(AJMC) and Joint Military Teams (JMT). According to the signed
agreement, the border separating the North from the South (as defined
on 1 January, 1956) constitutes the deployment line of the forces.14
During the first two years, government forces will have to reduce their
military presence in the southern part of the country and every six
months, the strength of the forces will be decreased, by 17, 14, 19 and 22
per cent accordingly. In return, the SPLM will have to decrease its force
deployed in the eastern part of Sudan by 30 per cent during the four
months following the signature of the agreement, and then by 40 per
cent over the following four months. All forces will have to be
completely withdrawn from the east at the end of a 12-month period.
One of the toughest points of negotiation was the question of the SPLA’s
financing, which the Sudanese government refused to include in the
State budget. The compromise provides that the JIU – the base of the
Sudanese army under a unified command – will be financed by the
budget while the southern government will finance its own troops. The
agreement also provides that the other militias will be integrated into
either the SPLA or government troops (SAF) within the next six months.
Finally, the two sides have decided to reorganise the security and
intelligence service, which will integrate SPLA officers (representing
25% of the services strength). President Omar Bachir just enacted a law
on 12 January, 2005 and dismissed six senior officers in the security and
intelligence service, to be replaced by SPLM’s officers.
Thousands of people across towns in South Sudan celebrated the
landmark peace treaty signed between the country's main rebel group
and Khartoum. "There were celebrations all over towns in South Sudan,"
a UN official stated. In the South's provisional capital of Rumbek,
around 2,000 people gathered in the town's Freedom Square and

14   “FACTBOX: Military aspect of the Sudanese peace agreement”, Sudan Tribune, TTU, 21 January, 2005.

welcome the peace deal that ended Africa's longest-running civil war, he
said. Troops marched and local leaders gave speeches.15
The main obstacles are the old regime's lack of will to embrace genuine
power sharing and elections, to ultimately allow a southern self-
determination referendum after the six-year interim period, and the lack
of capacity in the South to establish and empower basic structures of
governance.16 According to International Crisis Group (ICG), the peace
deal poses a real threat to many groups associated with the NCP regime,
which signed the CPA under some duress both to deflect international
pressure over Darfur and to strengthen its domestic power base by
securing a partnership with the SPLM. Most members recognise that the
free and fair elections required in 2009 would likely remove them from
power. Many also fear the self-determination referendum will produce
an independent South, thus costing Khartoum much of its oil and other
mineral wealth.17 The CPA was the culmination of two and a half years
of intense negotiations between the government and the SPLM
facilitated by IGAD. It is premised on a fundamental compromise: a self-
determination referendum for the South after a six-year interim period
in exchange for the continuation of Islamic (Shari‘a) law in the North.
The deal was predicated on extensive sharing of power, wealth and
security arrangements and established an asymmetrical federal system,
with the GoSS existing as a buffer between the central government and
southern states but no parallel regional government in the North.18
According to the CPA, the South now has its own government. The
GoSS is fully independent of northern interference, has its own army, its
own resources base, access to oil revenues and control of its own branch

15 “Thousands in southern Sudan celebrate peace deal: United Nations”, Sudan Tribune, Agence
France Presse.
16 “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement Sudan’s Uncertain Peace”, International Crisis Group, Africa Report

No.96, 25 July 2005.
17 Ibid.

18 “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace”, International Crisis Group, Africa

Report No. 96, 25 July, 2005, p. 2.

of the National Bank, which unlike its northern counterpart, will adhere
to conventional – rather than Islamic – banking principles. Sudan is to
have a national foreign policy which will allow the South to develop
bilateral relations with international trade and development partners.19
According to ICG, the exclusion of the traditional political parties from
the process of peace building in the country threatens its stability and
legitimacy. The opposition groups are reluctantly prepared to put up
with the situation for the time being in the hope that free and fair
elections will eventually give them a chance to demonstrate their true
strength. But this comment from a leading Umma Party member is
representative of the sense of discrimination:
         We were supporting the talks for the good of the country,
         even though it wasn't fair but we assumed that we'd get a say
         in the formation of the national committees and commissions.
         How can we participate in commissions like the National
         Constitutional Review Commission when they [the NCP and
         SPLM] have drafted the text, they have a mechanical
         majority, and they ratify it through their own partisan
         parliaments? We are nothing more than a rubber-stamp
Accordingly, a strengthening of ties of SPLM with the NCP and a
weakening of its relations with the traditional political parties took place.
1.1.2 Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
According to the ICG, the CPA was an agreement between only two
parties, the SPLM/A and the ruling NCP, and continues to lack broader
support throughout the country, particularly in the North. The current
equation for peace in Sudan is a worrying one: the NCP has the capacity
to implement but lacks the political will, whereas the SPLM has the
commitment but is weak and disorganized. There is a real risk of
renewed conflict down the road unless the NCP begins to implement

19 Francis M. Deng, “African Renaissance: Towards a New Sudan”, in Forced Migration Review, No.
24, November 2005, p. 8.
20 Ibid, p. 4.

the CPA in good faith, and the SPLM becomes a stronger and more
effective implementing partner.21
According to the UN’s Secretary-General Report on Sudan, the
implementation of the CPA gained some momentum despite the delays
following the death of First Vice-President John Garang on 30 July, 2005.
After considerable dispute over the allocation of some ministerial
portfolios, most notably that of Energy and Mining, the GoNU was
established on 20 September. Some Sudanese observers claimed that the
refusal of the NCP to relinquish the Energy and Mining portfolio called
into question its commitment to make unity attractive to the people of
South Sudan. Other observers fear that the commitment of some SPLM
leaders to unity may be shallow. However, the establishment of both the
GoNU and the GoSS, as well as the adoption of the Interim Constitution
of South Sudan, give grounds for optimism.22
It is found that the whole process of the implementation of the CPA is
very slow. Though the President has issued dozens of new Presidential
decrees forming new commissions and committees, only a handful are
operational, and only the CJMC and the AEC have met regularly.23 Most
exist only on paper, or remain paralyzed as the parties battle over the
terms of reference or functions for the commissions. Although the
optimists point to the progress made, the pessimists appear to be closer
to the truth, for the picture that emerges is that of a pattern of NCP
attempts to systematically undermine, delay or simply ignore the
elements called for in the CPA that would fundamentally alter the status
quo and its grip on power.24

21 International Crisis Group, “Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead”,
Africa Report No. 106, 31 March, 2006, p. i.
22 “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan”, documents of the Security Council, S/2005/821,

27 December, 2005.
23 “Report of the Secretary-General on Sudan”, 14 March, 2006, S/2006/160, p. 1.

24 International Crisis Group, “Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead”,

Africa Report No. 106, 31 March, 2006, p. 2.

The CPA between Government of Sudan and SPLA faces obstacles in its
implementation from the regime hardliners and intellectuals in the
North who argue that too many concessions were made to the SPLA and
from elements within the SPLA who never trusted the regime to keep its
word and believe it has been weakened by Darfur.25 The peace deal
poses a real threat to many groups associated with the NCP regime,
which signed the CPA under some duress both to deflect international
pressure over Darfur and to strengthen its domestic power base by
securing a partnership with the SPLM. However, most members do
recognize that the free and fair elections required to be held in 2009
would likely remove them from power. Many also fear that the self-
determination referendum will produce an independent South, thus
costing Khartoum much of its oil and other mineral wealth.26 The
strategy of dealing with the SPLM, which was pushed by the NCP,
aimed at establishing a strong political partnership with the more
popular SPLM by drawing it away from its historic allies in the
opposition, so as to allow the NCP a peaceful path to continued power
and completion of its rebirth from a pariah state to an accepted member
of the international community.27 It is found that the strategy of the NCP
appears to have shifted following Garang’s death, and now seems more
intent on delaying or undermining implementation than proceeding in
good faith.28
If the SPLM is to do its part in preventing an eventual breakdown of the
CPA and a return to war, it must make fundamental shifts in the way it
operates. It has struggled, however, in its transition from a rebel
movement to a political party, indeed to the point that its lack of
inclusiveness and transparent decision-making has mirrored in some

25  International Crisis Group, “Sudan Dual Crisis: Refocusing on IGAD”, Africa Briefing
Nairobi/Brussels, October 2004.
26 International crisis Group, “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace”, Africa

Report No. 96, 25 July, 2005.
27 International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 106, 31 March, 2006, p. 1.

28 Ibid, p. 2.

ways its long-time foe's approach to governance. It is far behind its
timetable for converting its guerrillas into a new army and has made
little progress in creating institutional structures of governance and
changing overly centralized methods of taking decisions, weaknesses
that have been compounded by lack of money. There is growing
frustration as early expectations of the peace have not been met.29
Another obstacle in implementation of the CPA, is the heterogeneous
composition of the SPLA itself. For this reason, the SPLM calculations
are less clear. Most southern members consider the self-determination
referendum the end goal, so are generally supportive of a partnership
with the NCP as a means to get there. Other members, including those
from South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, would prefer to pursue
broader political alliances in the North in order to change the system of
government and ultimately end the rule of the NCP.30 In the first test –
the process of adopting the interim national constitution – the SPLM
leadership leaned toward cooperation with Khartoum.31 The weakness
of the SPLA after Garang’s death has shaped the delay and
implementation of the CPA. The bulk of the agreement was directly
negotiated by the then First Vice-President Ali Osman Taha and SPLM
Chairman Dr. John Garang, aided by a small group of trusted aides, and
the two leaders counted on their positive personal relationship to
overcome areas of disagreement during the implementation process. An
enormous amount of the power and decision making responsibility
within the CPA lies with the institution of the Presidency.32 While this
seemed an effective way at the time of moving the negotiations forward,
it left a large number of gaps to be resolved over the course of the

29 Ibid.
30  The agreements for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states did not grant self-determination
31 International crisis Group, “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace”, Africa

Report No. 96, 25 July, 2005.
32 The Presidency includes the President (President Bashir), the First Vice-President (Salva Kir

Mayardit), and the Vice-President (Ali Osman Taha).

interim period. The success of this approach was dependent on Garang’s
personal relationship with Taha, and their joint commitment as an
executive to find a way to implement the agreement. According to the ICG,
Garang’s death last July has damaged, if not killed, this partnership and the
requisite commitment from the NCP leadership. Garang’s successor, Salva
Kir Mayardit, has not yet found willing partners in the Presidency to
implement the agreement in accordance with the terms and spirit of the
Naivasha process. The result is that the President, rather than the
Presidency, has controlled the implementation schedule and agenda.33
The calculation of oil wealth and its distribution between the North and
the South is one of the major causes of distrust between the two parties
the NCP and SPLM. The oil sector continues to be a high-risk area for
the implementation of the agreement. Under the terms of the CPA, the
GoSS is to receive 50 per cent of all revenue from oil produced in South
Sudan, after 2 per cent is set aside for the relevant oil producing state
government. However, the parties do not yet agree on the parameters
for calculating the oil wealth, or on which oil fields lie in the South.
There has not yet been any progress on ascertaining the North-South
borders which will determine the division of the oilfields, to which the
SPLM does not yet have access.
According to the ICG, it is urgent to create the National Petroleum
Commission called for in the CPA's Wealth-Sharing Agreement so it can
review all contracts signed in the past year. The CPA has no mechanism,
however, for rapidly resolving disputes that have arisen over North-
South boundaries in the oil areas and that promise at least to delay
disbursement of oil revenue that the GoSS vitally needs to meet its CPA
The economic prioritizing of the Sudanese government is another
challenge to the implementation of the peace deal. In a statement of the

33   International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 106, 31 March, 2006, pp. 2-3.
34   Ibid.

World Bank, Sudan is spending more on military expenditure and on
elites. Accroding to the World Bank, “Sudan should urgently reform its
banking system and reduce military spending in favour of social
development”, an official of the World Bank said. Ishac Diwan, World
Bank Country Director for Sudan and Ethiopia, said Khartoum was
spending so much on the military, with more resources benefiting the
elite at the expense of the majority. He did not give figures, but
counselled: "Move the money away from the military and support for
the elite to the poor. We need the development of a payment system in
the South and the banking infrastructure in the North needs urgent
reforms," Diwan said in the Kenyan capital.35
Members of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) have subsequently
agreed to join the GoNU and have been allocated a number of executive
positions and seats in parliament. While other northern parties have decided
to stay in opposition, they have stated their respect for the CPA and look
forward to future elections and to a more inclusive political process. Some
southern parties, other than the SPLM, have also joined the GNU.
In another welcome development, the GoSS was established on 22
October as a care-taker government, pending the adoption of the Interim
Constitution of South Sudan, which was subsequently signed into law
on 5 December. Ten South Sudan state governors were also appointed
during this period. Although the GoSS includes a number of small
southern parties, the new cabinet, which includes many of the senior
leadership of the SPLM, has been criticized by some as lacking adequate
representation of women and not being fully representative of the South.
Some members of the South Sudan Legislative Assembly have alleged
an ethnic imbalance in the GoSS.36 However, the problem of Other
Armed Groups (OAG) remains of crucial importance in South Sudan.
Negotiations are ongoing between First Vice-President Salva Kir

35 “World Bank official urges Sudan to reform banking system”, PANA, Sudan Tribune, 9 March,
36 Report of Secretary-General on Sudan, December 2005.

and OAG leaders on their participation in GoSS. Some OAG leaders
have been offered government positions. Although the parties have
registered a sizable proportion of the OAG as having aligned with either
SAF or SPLA, in many cases, this relationship is not firm enough to meet
the CPA standard of ‘incorporation’ and a considerable number of OAG
remain completely outside the process. Those OAG remaining
‘independent’ are a source of growing concern, as the 9 January, 2006
CPA deadline for full integration approaches. Meanwhile, extortion
schemes, illegal taxation, forced recruitment, and violence attributed to
OAG still continue in some areas.37
1.1.3 Abyei as Major Challenge in Implementation of CPA
It is argued by the ICG that while most of the obstruction by the NCP has
been quite nuanced, the NCP’s actions regarding Abyei are a blatant
violation of the CPA, creating perhaps the most volatile element of the
entire agreement right now. The CPA includes a separate agreement on
Abyei, allowing the disputed territory to hold special administrative
status under the Presidency, to be followed by a referendum
simultaneous with the southern referendum, with the option of remaining
in the North or joining the South (including an independent South,
pending the outcome of the southern referendum). Abyei is the traditional
home of the Ngok Dinka, a tribe of the populous Dinka to the South, and
is also dear to the neighbouring Misseriya, Arab pastoralists who pass
through Abyei every year to graze at the river Kiir (Bahr el-Arab), and
were further displaced over the course of the second civil war; a main
intention of the agreement was to allow them to return to their homes and
villages, some of which have since been settled by the Misseriya.
The CPA defined Abyei as the traditional nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms
that were transferred from Bahr el-Ghazal to Kordofan by the British in
1905, and established a special boundary commission made up equally of
the SPLM, the NCP, and international experts appointed by the US, UK

37   Ibid.

and IGAD, to determine these boundaries as of 1905. When the SPLM and
NCP delegations failed to reach an agreement, the final decision was put
in the hands of the international experts. Irrespective of the territorial
definition, the agreement guaranteed the traditional grazing rights and
rights of passage through Abyei for the Misseriya and other nomads. It
was agreed that the decision of the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC)
would be final and binding, and the CPA sets out a number of subsequent
steps to be taken by the Presidency, such as the appointment of a local
Executive Council until local elections can be held.38
The Presidency has yet to implement the decision of the Abyei
Boundary Commission, defining the borders of the Abyei area. The
delay has contributed to a tense situation in this vital area of the country.
The situation on the ground was further complicated by a sudden
upsurge of returns, and a military build-up by the SAF, the SPLA and
the SSDF. With the start of the migration season, concern about possible
clashes between the Misseriya and Dinka tribes is growing. To respond
to these challenges, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) has
increased its presence in Abyei and completed the deployment of the
United Nations protection force there. The Mission has encouraged the
authorities to establish both the Executive Council and the JIU in Abyei
to normalize the situation and contribute to confidence building
measures in the area. UNMIS has convened meetings with the parties on
the ground to discuss areas of mutual concern including security and
migratory routes. The United Nations have also started to plan
humanitarian and developmental programs in Abyei to help promote
peaceful co-existence.39
Future prospects for Abyei seem conflicting and tense between the two
main parties of the Government of National Unity, i.e. The SPLM and
NCP. This is because there is a growing political polarization between
the Dinka and the Misseriya. The danger of Abyei is that both sides

38   International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 106, 31 March, 2006, p. 5.
39   “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan”, op. cit.

continue to see the referendum as a zero–sum game. For the Ngok
Dinka and the SPLM, anything short of a referendum, and a likely vote
to return to the South, is anunacceptable outcome. For the Misseriya,
their fears that their traditional grazing rights will be sacrificed or
compromised are understandable, but these are in fact protected in the
agreement. However, the NCP’s politicization of the issue and its
misinformation campaign appear to be exacerbating these fears. For the
NCP, its primary motivation appears to be economic, driven by a fear of
losing the huge reserves of oil in Abyei should it vote to join an
independent South. Having built up the issue, the NCP will now also
suffer political fallout with the Misseriya and others if it backs down.
Since all groups see the referendum as the key target, each step along
the way is being contested. For example, the NCP have suggested
setting up an interim administration made up of Ngok Dinka and
Misseriya, ahead of the Executive Council. The SPLM have rejected this,
demanding that the Executive Council be formed instead, as per the
agreement. The NCP are seeking Misseriya participation because
participation in the administration implies residency, and residency
implies a right to vote in the referendum. Thus the first step is seen by
the parties as influencing the outcome of the last step.40
1.1.4 Conflicting Views over Oil Revenues
The CPA has defined the share of the North as well as the share of the
South with regard to the oil revenues. However there are still some
disputes between the NCP and the SPLM with regards to the
transparency of the oil revenues. According to the ICG, though the CPA
granted a small SPLM technical team the right to see and review existing
oil contracts, this has not yet happened. The SPLM blames this on NCP
intransigence – when senior SPLM official Pagan Amum pursued
Energy Minister Awad al–Jaz over the summer to gain access to the
contracts, he was told that he had to wait until the return of the

40   International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 106, 31 March, 2006, p. 5.

Secretary-General of the Ministry. The Secretary-General only contacted
the SPLM in December, and the contracts remain unavailable to this day.
The SPLM also shares some of the blame, as it lacks trained personnel,
was slow to establish the technical committee, and has reportedly failed
to follow up since Pagan’s failed efforts over the summer. Promises of
technical support to the SPLM have been extremely slow in coming.
Despite having a State Minister in the Ministry of Energy, the SPLM still
does not have access to any of the key data regarding oil production,
such as daily production figures.41 Moreover, though the GoSS received
nearly $800 million in oil revenue from the GoNU by the end of
February 2006, and is having difficulty in absorbing and disbursing this
amount, the GoSS has no way of knowing how much it is in fact entitled
to. When the NCP refused to give the Energy Ministry to the SPLM, the
decision was ultimately accepted by Salva Kir because it was expected
that the National Petroleum Commission would act as the new
executive body for the petroleum sector, as per the terms laid out in the
CPA – thereby giving the SPLM an opportunity to oversee and regulate
all aspects of the sector. However, the National Petroleum Commission
remains deadlocked and ineffective, as the NCP Energy Minister Awad
al-Jaz seeks to maintain the ministry’s total control of the oil sector, and
pushes the Commission to be little more than a ceremonial body. Little
has been achieved in the two National Petroleum Commission meetings
to date, and al-Jaz has resisted requests from the SPLM to give the
Commission a technical mandate to deal with the negotiation of new
contracts, for example, as is provided for in the CPA.42
It is found that the delay in the oil joint coordination between the NCP
and the SPLM causes doubts and distrust between the two parties.
Without having determined the borders, the NCP claims that the South
is entitled to roughly 73 per cent of oil produced in Blocks 1, 2 and 4.
The numbers that the NCP-dominated Ministry of Energy provides

41   International Crisis Group, Africa Report No.106, 31 March, 2006, p. 8.
42   Ibid.

to the SPLM have little backing – hence the main revenue stream of the
GoSS remains at the mercy of the NCP. For 2005, the NCP claims that
the share for the South was US$ 798.4 million, of which Khartoum spent
$ 194.5 million on administrative costs for the now defunct South Sudan
Coordinating Council from 9 January to 9 July 2005, and the GoSS
received US$ 523.3 of the remaining US$ 603.9 million. In late January
2006, Salva Kir publicly complained that the GoSS was not receiving its
rightful share of the oil revenue.43 In the days immediately following
that press conference, SPLM claims that the Ministry of Finance
transferred the remainder for 2005, as well as revenue for January 2006
and the GoSS share from the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account,
bringing the total paid to the GoSS by early February to US$ 773.15
million.44 Following a meeting between the Presidency and the GoNU
and GoSS Ministers of Finance, both parties agreed that the amount
transferred by the national Ministry of Finance equaled the amount
received by the GoSS.45
1.1.5 Human Rights
According to the Secretary–General report on Sudan issued in December
2005, the CPA and Interim National Constitution constitute key
instruments for reforming laws and institutions to improve the human
rights situation in Sudan. Despite this, National Security continued to
assert its arbitrary powers of arrest and detention. Across the country,
National Security personnel physically abused detainees and continued
to enjoy the benefits of immunity laws. A true improvement in the
human rights situation will require bringing national security laws and
institutions in line with international human rights standards and the
Sudanese constitution. In another development, UNMIS continued its
human rights training and capacity and institution-building activities
and provided advisory services to civil society, the Government, legal

43 Opheera McDoom, “Sudan’s Kir slams slow peace deal process”, Reuters, 28 January, 2006.
44 “South Sudan received its proper share – official”, Sudan Tribune, 1 February, 2006.
45 International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 106, 31 March, 2006, p. 8

professionals and the judiciary. Two meetings were organized on the
establishment of an Independent Human Rights Commission in
Khartoum and Juba, and included members of the National
Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), National Assembly, South
Sudan Legislative Assembly, Council of States, and civil society. A
workshop for members of the National Assembly was organized on the
subject of the national budget and human rights. Five workshops were
organized in Khartoum, Darfur, Juba, Abyei and Port Sudan to raise
awareness of the Bill of Rights provisions of the Interim National
Constitution. In addition, workshops were conducted on international
human rights treaty obligations, on access to justice, on harmonization
of national laws with international human rights standards, and on
ensuring that the human rights of women are integrated into the
ongoing law reform process. 46
Another contradiction and violation of the CPA by the SPLM with
regard to oil in the South is taking place. Problems also exist in the
petroleum sector in the South, where the GoSS continues to recognise oil
agreements that a small group of SPLM officials signed after the CPA
was completed. These agreements, signed with White Nile Company
(which is 50 per cent owned by the SPLM) for Block Ba in January 2005,
and with the Moldovan company Ascom for Block 5b in June 2005, are a
clear violation of the CPA and will likely cause problems for the GoSS in
the longer-term. Not only were both signed after the CPA had been
signed – a right the GoSS did not have under the CPA, as all new
agreements must go through the National Petroleum Commission – but
both agreements were signed in concession areas already sold to other
The transformation of the SPLA into an organized army represents
another challenge in the implementation of the CPA. Throughout

46   Ibid.
47   Ibid.

the 21–year civil war, the SPLA functioned mostly as an unpaid army of
volunteers and conscripts. Its size varied based on the time of year and
the threat, with troops supported by the local population through
voluntary donations and taxation. Transforming the SPLA into a
professional army remains a top priority for the movement, but one that
has seen limited progress, and this is causing a new set of problems in
the South. Little was achieved on this front during the pre–interim
period,48 due to a lack of resources and a lack of trust between Garang
and then SPLA Chief of Staff Salva Kir. Garang appointed a new SPLA
command just prior to his death, selecting Salva Kir to act as the Vice-
President for the GoSS, headed by new Chief of Staff Oyai Deng Ajak.
Though the revenue problem has since largely been solved, with the
SPLM cum GoSS receiving a steady flow of oil revenue from the central
government since May 2005, the army remains a mess.49
1.1.6 Challenges of the Reconstruction of the South
Funding reconstruction is the major obstacle facing the South. The 2005
Work plan for the Sudan was revised in October and total funding
requirements in December 2005 amounted to US$ 1.98 billion. With less
than a month remaining, it is funded at only 52.5 per cent. Regionally,
assistance programs in Darfur have received 63 per cent, South Sudan 45
per cent, and Eastern Sudan and the transitional areas 22 per cent of
required funding. While there are shortfalls in all sectors, the following
have received less than 20 per cent of the required funding: rule of law
and governance (13 per cent); protection (14 per cent); shelter and non-
food items (16 per cent); and cross-sector support to return and
reintegration (19 per cent). With the start of the dry season, tens of
thousands of refugees and Internal Displaced People (IDP) have started
returning to some of the most impoverished areas in Africa. They and

48 The Peace Agreement established a six-month pre-interim period, followed by a six-year interim
period leading to the southern referendum.
49 International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 106, 31 March, 2006, pp. 10-11.

their host communities need urgent assistance, as do the millions of
Sudanese who remain displaced.50
US$ 4.5 billion were pledged at the Oslo conference for the first three
years following the signing of the CPA for humanitarian, recovery and
development activities and for support to the African Union Mission in
Sudan (AMIS). The combined total of all donor resources available for
Sudan in 2005 amounts to more than US$1.4 billion, which roughly
correspond to one third of the total amount pledged in Oslo. However,
as humanitarian needs still remain very high, it is extremely important
that donors remain fully engaged in Sudan in 2006 and that the
requirements of the 2006 Work plan are met in a timely manner. They
include US$ 1.5 billion for humanitarian priorities and $ 210 million for
recovery programming.
The construction of a road network for South Sudan will be crucial to
rebuilding a region that, after two decades of civil war, has virtually
none at all. Most of the roads that do exist are usable only in the dry
season and all are unpaved and in desperate need of repair. "Very few
people were ready to put their transport on the road," said the director
of the World Food Programme's regional sub-office, Constance
Lewanika. She said the problem had seriously hampered the UN
agency's efforts to distribute relief aid and led to inflated prices for the
few available commodities.51
The cost of Sudan's post-war reconstruction and development was
estimated at $ 12 billion by local and international experts. A report
issued by the Sudanese government, former southern rebels from the
SPLM and the United Nations said immediate needs would cost $ 5
billion and $ 7 billion is needed for infrastructure projects.52

50 UN Secretary-General Report on Sudan, S/2005/821, 27 December, 2005.
51 “Roads key to post-war reconstruction of south Sudan”, Agence France Presse, 19 January 2005.
52 “$12 billion needed for post-war Sudan”, Sudan Tribune, UPI, 1 March 2005.

As South Sudan embraces peace after decades of conflict, one of the
challenges the new government faces is that of developing a working
health care system. Years of war, poverty and natural attrition have
denied the region basic health care infrastructure. South Sudan is today
perhaps one of the most neglected regions on earth, lacking a
communication system and educated health personnel. Most of the
region's war-wounded are today treated at a Red Cross emergency
hospital in Lokichoggio in neighbouring Kenya. "By 1991, health care in
Sudan had all but disintegrated," says a report prepared by the US
government. "The civil war in South Sudan destroyed virtually all
medical facilities except those that the SPLA had rebuilt to treat their
own wounded and the hospitals in the three major towns controlled by
government forces in Malakal, Wau and Juba." According to a report
entitled “Overview of the Health Situation in Sudan 2002” prepared by
the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the damage caused by
war has over the years been aggravated by a combination of chronic
poverty and natural disasters, leading to one of the most under-
developed health systems in the world. According to the UN body, by
2002, the whole of South Sudan had only about 1,500 hospital beds less
than the capacity of Kenya's national referral hospital, Kenyatta, for the
eight million people in the rebel-controlled areas. Some estimates put
the total number of doctors in the region at just over 100. Most of South
Sudan is today served by humanitarian organisations. According to
UNICEF, some 66 odd agencies involved in healthcare spent a total of $
55 million in the region in 2002, mostly for emergency care. 53
Communications represents a big challenge to the reconstruction of the
South. Rumbek, the provisional capital of South Sudan, may lack
running water and electricity, but a boom in mobile telephony and
Internet access has given its population of 30,000 something to talk
about. Before mobiles and cyber space, Rumbek had little contact with

53   “Healthcare the Next Challenge for Sudan”, Liquid Africa, 20 January 2005

the outside world. Only a few leaders of the SPLM carried satellite
telephones, a luxury that locals could not afford. Otherwise the only
contacts were with other areas controlled by the rebels or with
neighbouring countries via commercial high frequency radio. The town
still has no regular telephones. Nevertheless, two public Internet cafes
have opened and Network of the World (NOW), a Sudanese-owned
company based in Rumbek, began operating a mobile telephone
network last year.54
South Sudan is hungry for concrete and construction materials as it
begins rebuilding homes, offices and roads in a region shattered by two
decades of civil war and neglect, a top official said. Riak Machar, deputy
chairman of the SPLM that will be running the South, said those who
return to the region, possibly millions, will need homes and offices. The
new South Sudan administration will have to build offices and homes in
eleven cities in the area, he said. "We are now talking the industry of
construction. This you can develop into areas such as the private sector
providing housing," Machar said. "I cannot tell you in tonnage how
much demand for cement there is," Machar told a news conference in
the Kenyan capital Nairobi, adding that already there is a shortage of
cement there. The SPLM is desperate to attract foreign capital needed to
rebuild a region deprived of roads, water and power by successive
cycles of conflict since independence in 1956. Donors meeting in Oslo in
April pledged US$ 4.5 billion for 2005-07 to fund projects in the South
following the peace deal between rebels and the Khartoum government,
although a separate civil war in Sudan’s western Darfur region is still
unresolved. Roughly 4 million left the region during the war, and even if
a portion of those return, they will need homes, Machar said. Another
source for increased housing demand would be former rebels from the
SPLM. "Even if we talk of just half of their number, say 150,000, the first
thing is to shelter them," Machar said.55

54   “South Sudan's mobile phone network revolutionizes”, Agence France Presse, 24 January, 2005.
55   “S. Sudan needs construction materials to rebuild”, Reuters, 27 June, 2005.

With regard to mining, to enable the return of IDPs and refugees at the
end of the rainy season, mine action teams resumed operations at full
strength in the Nuba Mountains, Juba, Rumbek, Yei, Kapoeta, Malakal,
Ed Damazin, and Darfur. In all, 373 kilometres of road have been
demined and 1.7 million square meters of suspected dangerous areas
have been cleared; 522 anti-tank mines, approximately 175,000
unexploded ordnance (UXO), and just under 700 anti-personnel mines
have been destroyed. The deteriorating security situation in South
Sudan, however, hampered demining activities, which were suspended
after the killing of two demining contractors on the Juba-Nimule road.
Prior to this suspension, the Juba-Yei road had been verified and cleared
to international standards, allowing for emergency Mission deployment
and aid delivery. Work continues to clear the road for routine United
Nations traffic, which requires an expanded width of safe passage.56
1.1.7 The Death of John Garang, Ethnic Polarization and Consequences on the
The ceremony on 9 July which also saw Colonel John Garang and his
former enemy, President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, sign a new interim
constitution, was the first big step in the setting up of a transitional
government. On 11 July, the state of emergency was lifted. As a million
and a half cheering people rushed to see John Garang de Mabior’s
triumphant return to Khartoum after 22 years at war, the National
Islamic Front (NIF) regime’s power shuddered. Sudanese of all political
colours agree that this was the biggest spontaneous gathering in the
capital since the Intifadah of April 1985, which overthrew President
Ja’afar Mohamed Numeiry. None of the government’s orchestrated
demonstrations have approached the size, let alone the enthusiasm, of
the rally on 8 July, the day before Garang, Chairman of the SPLM and
Commander-in-Chief of its Liberation Army, was installed as National

56   UN Secretary-General Report on Sudan, S/2005/821, 27 December, 2006.

First Vice-President under the CPA signed in Kenya on 9 January.57
However, many challenges appeared after the signing of the CPA. One
of these challenges was the democratization of the SPLM, i.e., the
transformation from a military into a political movement, as well as the
empowerment of the civil institutions in the South. Within the attempt
to change the nature of the SPLM, Garang on 18 July, 2005, issued a
decree to dissolve the SPLM’s leadership council. Based on the decree,
all members of the leadership council were relieved from their positions
except for the elected chairman and deputy chairman of the movement.
In the meantime, Garang also dissolved the legislative Council, National
Legislative     Council,     National    Executive     Council,    regional
administrations and the provinces of the SPLM. Garang confirmed that
he had taken the move under his authorities in accordance with the
decisions of the national conference of 1994 and the decisions of the
SPLM’s National Liberation Council of 1999 and under the framework
of the implementation of the CPA.58 The South-South Dialogue with
southern political opposition groups launched in Nairobi in April was a
positive step, but the late June negotiations with the SSDF fell short of an
agreement. The recently concluded NCRC failed to bring in most of the
main northern opposition parties – they boycotted it as rigged in favour
of the NCP and the SPLM – as well as the armed groups from the east
and west.59
In a brief visit to Uganda during which he was expected to hold talks
with President Yoweri Museveni, Sudan’s First Vice-President John
Garang asked Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels
to leave South Sudan, in order to rebuild the war-ravaged region.
Garang told Uganda’s state-owned newspaper “The New Vision”,
after arriving at Entebbe International Airport on 29th July,

57 Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series, Volume 42, No. 7, July 1-31, 2005, p. 16271.
58 “Sudan’s Garang Dissolves SPLM Leadership Council”, Sudan Tribune, 18 July, 2005.
59 “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace”, International Crisis Group, Africa

Report No. 96, 25 July, 2005, p. i.

that he was going to deal firmly with the militias operating in the
southern part of his country. The LRA rebels, based in South Sudan,
have fought the Ugandan government in their 19-year rebellion, killing
tens of thousands of civilians and displacing over 1.4 million people in
northern Uganda. "Kony won’t be hiding there for long. It is not only
Kony, but also all the militias who have been operating in the area. We
need to provide peace, security and stability, so the militias including
those that were formerly supported by the government, must be
disbanded," Garang said.60
Unexpectedly, a helicopter carrying the former Sudanese rebel leader
crash-landed in South Sudan. Ugandan army second Captain Dennis
Musitwa said the helicopter apparently went down in bad weather
during a return flight from Uganda, once a supporter of Garang’s
southern rebels. The Uganda army spokesman said Garang was on a
private visit in Uganda, which had pledged to repair relations with
Sudan now that peace had been declared in the southern war. "They left
yesterday in a Ugandan chopper," Musitwa told The Associated Press.
"What we know is that the aircraft got weather problems and crash-
landed." "We have not established where they landed. They have not
reached where they are supposed to reach, and we are trying to locate
them," he said. A spokesman for Garang’s SPLM said in Kampala that
Sudanese officials had no communication with Garang or the helicopter.
"What I’ve heard is that the plane encountered some weather problems
and the pilot failed to fly it back to Uganda," party spokesman George
Riek said. "But at this point, we don’t know what is happening on the
ground, there are no communication links, no radios, nothing. "Earlier in
Nairobi, Kenya, another party spokesman Yasir Arman said that Garang
was "safe and sound" in South Sudan. Arman declined to give further
details, and there was no immediate explanation for the apparently
conflicting report on Garang. Garang was a charismatic figure whose

60   “Sudan requires Uganda’s LRA rebels to leave”, Xinhua, 30 July, 2005.

leadership was seen as key to ensuring the deal ending 21 years of
fighting in the south holds, and who could have helped bring peace to
other volatile regions in Sudan, including Darfur.61
After the death of Garang was declared officially, thousands of southern
Sudanese took to the streets of Khartoum on the first of August, some
attacking northerners and looting shops, witnesses said. "They are
beating anybody they see who looks like they are Arab," Swayd
Abdullah, a student, told Reuters. Witnesses heard the sound of gunfire.
Some southerners looted shops and attacked cars.62 On the other hand,
riots against Arabs were sparked in South Sudan. Thousands of
southerners, alleging the Arab-dominated government in Khartoum
may have had a hand in Garang’s death, attacked shops and other
businesses in Juba owned by northern Arab Sudanese. "They burned
down all their shops," Juba resident Mary Keji told Agence France
Presse (AFP) on the phone, "We can still see smoke rising from the city’s
main market." The protesters ignored appeals by leaders of the former
southern rebel group that Garang headed, the SPLM, and ransacked the
town, vandalising property owned by Arab traders. "They only targeted
Arab businesses," Keji said, adding that government forces intervened in
a bid to restore order.63 Sudan’s capital erupted into ethnic and sectarian
conflict on 2 August, with bands of northerners and southerners staging
attacks on each other in an outpouring of anger sparked by the death of
a former rebel leader turned vice-president.
The socio-economic roots of the riots are also evident in the evolution of
the protests in Khartoum, as well as in southern towns with mixed
northern-southern communities. While the protests and banditry began
in the centre of Khartoum, they quickly spread to several displaced
persons camps outside of Khartoum proper. Residents of the largest

61 “Helicopter carrying Sudanese vice-president crash lands”, Associated Press, 31 July, 2005.
62 “Southern Sudanese rampage in Khartoum – witnesses”, Reuters, 1 August, 2005.
63 “Anti-Arab Riots Break out in South Sudan Capital after Garang Death”, Agence France Presse, 1

August, 2005.

camps of Angola and Mandela entered the nearby working-class
districts and open markets of Omdurman, burning police stations,
hospitals and local government offices. Carrying matches and cans filled
with gasoline, southern youths (both men and women) then broke into
and burned down numerous homes. A multitude of others followed in
the wake of the first group looting homes and offices and carrying off
what they could. Despite reports to the contrary, the residents of Angola
and Mandela are not exclusively southern Sudanese – and the rioters
were not exclusively southern either. Their ranks included a large
contingent from the war-torn western province of Darfur as well as of
the Nuba Mountains region. Not coincidentally, in recent years these
regions have endured the greatest suffering and displacement as a result
of the wars pursued by the regime.64
Frightened residents carried clubs and bricks for protection, fearful of
the deadly reprisal violence between Muslim Arabs and residents from
Sudan’s South enraged over the death of John Garang. In the first day, it
has been estimated that at least 49 people were killed in the violence that
started 1 August, according to a UN official. The official spoke on
condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk to
journalists. Armed gangs, said to be Arabs, broke into homes of
southerners in several parts of the capital. Television footage showed
southerners’ homes torn apart, furniture smashed and doors hanging on
hinges. At the same time, Muslim neighbourhoods came under attack by
supporters of Garang.65 At least 130 people were killed and around 350
wounded in Sudan in three days of violence, the Sudanese Red Crescent
said.66 Sudanese authorities detained some 1,640 people following
deadly riots in the capital, a human rights group said. Of those, 700 were
tried and convicted for offences including looting, theft and destruction

64 Khalid Mustafa Medani, op.cit.
65 “Sudanese clash after Garang’s death”, Associated Press, 2 August, 2005.
66 “Sudan death toll rises to 130, capital calm”, Reuters, 4 August, 2005.

of public or private property, Kamal Mohammed al-Amin, a lawyer
with the Sudanese Group for Human Rights, stated.67
According to the ICG, the loss of John Garang creates an opening for
spoilers on all sides to exploit any signs of uncertainty. The country is at
risk of eventually losing a peace agreement that was already looking
somewhat shaky.68 Garang's death sparked violence in Khartoum, Port
Sudan, and elsewhere in the North as well as the major towns of the
South that rapidly escalated and evolved into inter-ethnic fighting.
Despite early evidence suggesting the crash was an accident, many
southerners' suspicions were fuelled by the confusion surrounding the
news as well as a recent history of mysterious deaths of political
personalities.69 The government had failed to make any security
preparations, leading to chaos when the riots began. Mobs used the
confusion to loot, and criminals took advantage of the collapse of law
and order to rob private residences in several neighbourhoods at night.
Southerners similarly targeted "Arabs" and northern-owned businesses
and shops in Juba, Malakal, and Renk. The level of destruction was very
high, even for Khartoum's long history of riots and violent student
demonstrations.70 Gangs of youths from South Sudan appeared on the
street, looting cars, throwing stones and smashing office windows.
Gunfire could be heard and there were clashes with security forces as
they tried to seal off the city centre. Many of the two million southern
Sudanese living in Khartoum hoped Mr. Garang would change their
lives, and they were now venting their frustrations at his death. 71
Despite the riots’ undoubted ethnic dimension, they also reflected deep
anger at the very difficult social and economic conditions facing the

67 “1,600 detained following Khartoum riots”, Sudan Tribune, 6 August, 2005.
68  “Garang's Death: Implications for Peace in Sudan”, International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing No. 30, 9
August, 2005, p. 1.
69 Ibid.

70 Ibid, 2.

71 Africa Research Bulletin, op. cit., p. 16272.

most marginal communities in the capital. Rising social inequality,
coupled with an inflation rate of over 40 percent and the paucity of
social and health services, has fed a groundswell of resentment among
millions of Sudanese living on the urban fringe. While there are no
official figures as of yet, property damage is estimated in the millions of
dollars. These estimates include the cost of the destruction by arson of
several car dealerships belonging to Sudan’s most prominent business
families, as well as grocery stores, supermarkets, pharmacies, gold
stores, and vegetable and meat market stalls. As the general secretary of
the Khartoum Merchant Association, Muhammad al-Atiyya, put it: "The
trading sector suffered the most and paid the highest price for Garang’s
death." The protesters themselves did not loot the commercial
establishments; the robberies seem to have been committed by criminal
opportunists who followed in the protests’ wake.72
This frustration is caused by loosing a southern charismatic leader who
was able to convince the world of the just demands of the people of the
South. Central to Garang’s philosophy was the conviction that the
dichotomy between the Arab-Islamic North and the African South is
largely fictional. While the North has been labelled Arab, even those
who can trace their genealogy to Arab origins are a hybrid of Arab and
African races and even their culture is an Afro-Arab mix. Significant
portions of the country in the Nuba and Ingassana or Funj areas
bordering the South are African. The Beja in the Eastern part of the
country are also indigenously Sudanese. The Fur and several other
ethnic groups in Darfur to the far west are black African. And, in most
cases, non-Arab pockets of the North, though predominantly adherents
of Africanised Islam, have been almost as marginalized as the people of
the South. The vision of the New Sudan therefore promised to liberate
all these people and to create a country of genuine pluralism and
equality, with greater influence from the previously marginalized

 Khalid Mustafa Medani, “The Political and Economic Dimensions of Sudan’s Urban Riots”, The

Middle East Report, 16 August, 2005.

African groups.73 Over time, Garang’s constructive approach neutralized
those preaching secession in the North, Africa and the world, and rallied
support for justice in a reconstructed Sudan. Garang incrementally
challenged the whole country with the prospects of a nation enriched,
rather than ravished by its racial, ethnic, religious and cultural
The leadership of the SPLA acted quickly to fill the vacuum and has
thus far worked together to support a peaceful transfer of power. First
Deputy Chairman and interim Vice-President of the South, Cdr Salva
Kir Mayardit, called the former members of the Leadership Council to
New Site, near Rumbek, for an emergency meeting on 1 August. By that
evening, Salva Kir had been unanimously selected to replace Garang as
SPLM Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA.75 Second
Deputy Chairman Dr. Riek Machar will reportedly be appointed the
new interim Vice President for the South.76
Like the war itself, the unrest on what Sudanese term "black Monday"
has been widely depicted as driven by ethnic or religious hostility
between the "Arab" Muslim north and the "African" Christian and
animist south. But while Garang’s death was the immediate spark, the
three days of riots were not a spontaneous protest against "Arab"
northerners by southern Sudanese "Africans." Rather, the riots were
ultimately a reflection of economic and political grievances long
harboured by a wide range of poor and marginalized Sudanese –
 southerners and others – living in and around Khartoum’s urban fringe.
The disturbances, like Sudan’s civil war, are best understood

73 Francis M. Deng, “African Renaissance: Towards a New Sudan”, in Forced Migration Review, No.
24, November 2005, p. 6.
74 Ibid, p. 7

75 Katie Nguyen, “Sudan's SPLM names Salva Kir as Garang's successor”, Reuters, 1 August, 2005.

76 International Crisis Group, op. cit, p. 4. Dr. Riek's appointment has been reported in numerous

media sources and called "highly likely" by SPLM officials but has not yet been formally

as the outcome of frustration resulting from years of neglect and
political repression of the periphery by the central government.77
The early death of Garang deprived the SPLM from the capability of
continuing the process of transformation into a political entity and the
establishment of institutions that serves the interests of the people of the
South. After Garang’s death, an SPLM official described the SPLM as “in
a stage of free-fall” and incapable of maintaining a partnership with the
NCP as it struggles to build institutions in the South and deliver
services.78 The process of building institutions became slow and
leadership and decision making became fragile.
After the passing of the interim national constitution by the SPLM
National Liberation Council, the de facto parliament of the SPLM,
Garang dissolved all SPLM political structures on 18 July 2005,
appointing a ten-person interim caretaker government for the South,
and choosing Salva Kir to be the Vice-President of the GoSS.79 The NCP
also dissolved its cabinet, and President Bashir appointed a provisional
caretaker government until the creation of the new GoNU, which was to
be formed by 9 August. Garang’s plan had been to rebuild the SPLM as
a national party from the bottom up, in conjunction with the
establishment of the GoSS and the GoNU. Garang’s death came less than
two weeks later, leaving the SPLM without any functioning decision
making bodies. Salva Kir, Garang’s successor in the SPLM hierarchy,
immediately re-constituted the Leadership Council on an emergency
basis and was unanimously elected the Chairman on 1 August.
From here it is clear that the SPLM was facing a drastic and
unprecedented challenge, though it initially seemed to be coping

77 Khalid Mustafa Medani, “The Political and Economic Dimensions of Sudan’s Urban Riots”, The
Middle East Report, 16 August, 2005.
78 International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 106, 31 March, 2006, p. 18.

79 This included the National Liberation Council and the Leadership Council, a 16-person

executive body. “Garang appoints southern states administrators, advisors”, Sudan News
Agency, 18 July, 2005.

miraculously well. Within days, Riek Machar, next in line behind Salva
Kir in the SPLM hierarchy, had been approved as the new Vice-President
for the GoSS, and Garang’s wife Rebecca emerged as a voice of strength
and reason for the country and the movement, in the face of massive
unrest in Khartoum and throughout the South, and uncertainty over what
lay ahead. Salva Kir was sworn in as the new First Vice-President of the
GoNU on 11 August. Within days, grassroots consultations were
organized throughout the South to appoint the SPLM representatives to
the National Assembly, Council of States, Southern Assembly, and
southern states assemblies. Salva Kir had been critical of Garang’s
exclusive decision-making and overly-centralised leadership style.
The ICG went further to elucidate that cracks soon began to appear over
the appointments to ministerial posts at the GoNU and GoSS levels, and
over the division of ministries between the SPLM, NCP and other
political parties at the national level. Bashir and the NCP refused to give
the SPLM the Ministry of Energy, despite repeated pleas by Salva Kir.
The disagreement stalled the formation of the GoNU, and when Salva
Kir finally relented, he faced an unhappy southern public, including
many who blamed him for failing where Garang would have succeeded.
Though relations between Salva Kir and those close to Garang (and
involved in the CPA) had been relatively smooth up to that point, the
process of political appointments to the GoNU, GoSS, and commissions
re-opened the gap between the two sides. Instead of embracing those
who negotiated the CPA and were closest to Garang, Salva Kir
appointed many new faces to prominent positions in government and
on the various commissions. “Salva is a team player and listens to those
around him”, noted a senior SPLM official at the time. “The danger is
the people advising him. That’s why we need to institutionalize the
SPLM leadership and the Presidency.” Salva Kir was reportedly heavily
swayed in his appointments by a few individuals from his own area of
northern Bahr el-Ghazal, including some non-SPLM members, who
reportedly advised him to reward those who had backed him in the 2004

clash with Garang, and use this opportunity to marginalize those closest
to Garang. Most key positions in the GoNU and on some of the key
commissions were given to individuals who had not been involved in
Naivasha, though this was in part because some of the leading SPLM
figures and Garang allies, such as Nhial Deng Nhial, opted to serve in
the South rather than Khartoum after Garang’s death.
The sudden death of Garang left the SPLM without a clear political
strategy for implementation. SPLM membership is torn between
conflicting priorities and visions for the CPA. This gap existed before
Garang’s death, and persists to this day. For many southerners, both
inside and outside the SPLM, the CPA is ultimately about the southern
self-determination referendum. For this group, the agreement clearly
divided the country between North and South, with the NCP as the
northern partner that will deliver the referendum if it is not challenged
too often or too directly on issues related to its governance and behavior
in the North. The strategic arena of this group is in Juba, at the level of
the GoSS. A second group includes both northerners and southerners
committed to the New Sudan ideology, who view the CPA as a vehicle
to ultimately change the system of government.80
The absence of Garang as a charismatic leader hinders the development
of the government of South Sudan, which faces different challenges. The
GoSS is literally starting from scratch. Juba, the capital of the South, is
perhaps the most developed city in all of South Sudan, but does not yet
have electricity or running water. The ministries are housed in a handful
of run-down buildings, but there is not yet a civil service to carry out the
work of the ministries. The combination of the lack of infrastructure and
the limited capacity of the SPLM and other southern parties are making
for slow going in the South.81 Moreover, according to ICG, little was
achieved prior to the establishment of the GoSS because there was no

80   International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 106, 31 March, 2006, p. 21.
81   Ibid, p. 10.

mandated body in charge of governance in the South, and the SPLM was
poorly organized and lacked the resources to begin any significant
projects. Money has finally arrived – nearly US$ 800 million in oil
revenues so far – but the GoSS does not yet have the capacity to spend
most of it, still lacking the necessary banking, treasury and payroll
structures. This has led to delays in the payment of salaries to both the
civil service and the SPLA. There is far too little accountability and
transparency within the GoSS, and rumours of missing or misspent
millions from the first transfers of oil revenue last spring have begun to
circulate in both Juba and Khartoum.82
1.1.8 Southern Militias (South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF))
Sudan began integrating the southern militias into the ranks of its armed
forces on 5 January, 2005, fearing that their presence in parts of the South
could undermine the prospects for real peace in the country. The process
got underway with the integration of 182 officers and soldiers from the
pro-government SSDF in a ceremony in Khartoum, which included the
taking of the oath of allegiance. Many of them got promotions, with a few
becoming generals. The SSDF splintered from the rebel SPLA in the mid-
1990s and was later recruited and armed by the government to fight
alongside its regular forces against the SPLM. The move toward
integration was "in the context of the new situation created by the peace
agreement," Sudanese Defence Minister Bekri Hassan Salih said during
the ceremony.83 However, difficulties in preserving peace in South Sudan
appeared with the local-level ethnic tensions.
Armed Lou Nuer militias left their established routes and water points
from January to June to carry out aggressive acts against communities in
the Upper Nile region of south-eastern Sudan, a report by the US-
sponsored Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) said. "The Lou
Nuer conflict with other communities generated an unacceptable scale

82   Ibid.
83   “Sudanese army begins to absorb southern militias”, Agence France Presse, 5 January, 2005.

of displacement and deprivation among the general population," the
CPMT said in its June report. It documented a number of incidents from
heavy fighting and rape to cattle rustling, particularly near Duk Padiet
in western Jonglei State. The conflict continued to contravene the CPA,
which guaranteed the security of South Sudanese civilians, it added,
"These people, looking forward to peace after decades of conflict, are
losing confidence in the ‘peace’ as they continue to be killed, robbed and
looted," the CPMT warned. Traditionally, the Lou Nuer, who inhabit the
water-scarce middle Jonglei region, move with their livestock between
rainy season and dry season pastures on a seasonal basis.
During the dry season, water and pasture become limited and most
pastoralist groups move their livestock towards the so-called "toich", the
floodplains of the Nile. Despite the fragile and complex environment,
reports from Pact, an agency supporting grassroots peace efforts in
Sudan, have highlighted some positive conflict-resolution efforts also
underway in the area. When the Lou Nuer left the "toich" to return to
their home-areas in May, a full-scale conflict with a group of some 3,500
armed Gawar Nuer and Holl Dinka was prevented by a "rapid
response" initiative led by local peace actors, which opened a safe
passage for the Lou Nuer through Duk Dinka territories. According to
Pact, several Lou community leaders had led efforts in Waat and Yuai to
reconcile the divided Lou community with the hope that this would
provide a foundation for positive relationships among communities and
their neighbours. A UNICEF-sponsored report on grassroots conflicts in
Sudan said as the dry season progressed, pastoralists from various
ethnic groups tended to concentrate around the last available water and
grazing resources, increasing incidents of cattle rustling, abductions, and
violent clashes. As a result, most communities had formed their own
informal militia – known as the "Jesh Mabor" or white army – for self-
defence. However, these groups served as a pool of men and boys
periodically mobilised by actors in the wider civil war, such as the
Sudanese government, the SPLM/A and Nuer factions that split from

the SPLM/A in 1991. A humanitarian source in the region said overall,
cattle rustling and violence in the region was less prevalent than in the
past. "It has now been reduced to pockets of violence," he said. The
general opinion, he added, was that the proliferation of weapons in the
region had brought harm to the people and the arms needed to be
collected. "Almost everyone of the age of 16 and above is carrying a gun.
It creates a lot of havoc and fear among the people," he said. He also
warned against treating the Lou Nuer as a homogeneous group.84
In a recent development and as a result of long negotiations between the
SPLM and the SSDF, the later decided to join the SPLA in what is known
as the Juba Declaration. The Declaration is a remarkable development in
that the SSDF dropped all of its earlier demands for guarantees and
agreed to a loose implementation process, reliant on the SPLM/A
leadership keeping their word – exactly the type of agreement that
Garang had been promoting and which had been rejected in earlier
discussions. The agreement established a High Political Committee to be
appointed by Salva Kir and Matiep to oversee implementation, and a
joint Military Technical Committee to deal with the details of the
integration of forces, including head counts of SSDF troops, issues of
harmonisation of ranks and demobilisation.85 Salva Kir also helped
cement the agreement by appointing Matiep as the Deputy Commander-
in-Chief of the SPLA, and former South Sudan Coordinating Council
Finance Minister, Gabriel Changson Chang, a close ally of Matiep’s, as
the new Minister of Parliamentary Affairs in the GoSS.86

84 “Local Militias Causing Havoc in Southern Sudan – CPMT”, IRIN, 15 July 2005.
85  “The Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration”, 8 January, 2006. See: “The CPA Monitor:
Monthly report on the implementation of the CPA”, Annex 24, February 2006, at:
86 International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 106, 31 March 2006, p. 13.

1.2 Displaced and Refugees
"It will need some 60 million dollars for the return and reintegration of
Sudanese refugees to South Sudan this year alone, " the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said. The UNHCR
expressed its hope that a peace deal to end over 20 years of war in the
region would herald the return to the region of more than half a million
refugees.87 Within this context, the UNHCR will repatriate about 6,000
Sudanese refugees in Uganda during the second half of 2005 after a
sensitization campaign in the camps.88
Most of the IDPs have been displaced for 20 years. Many who have
grown up in Khartoum can no longer speak their native language. In
addition, potentially problematic for reintegration in their home areas,
through isolation from their communities and interaction with other
ethnic groups and cultures, they have lost knowledge of traditional
customs and have adopted new traditions and customs. One prime
example of this is food. Many IDPs returning from the North may not
have had access to foods grown in the South and no longer know how to
prepare them.89 Sudan’s civil war drove hundreds of thousands of
people from their homes to encroach on others’ resources, often
sparking conflicts within and between southern communities. At the
same time, traditional methods of governance and arbitration, that once
kept inter-ethnic and communal disputes in check, have been severely
weakened. The story of the Dinka Bor in Equatoria highlights the
challenges associated with the return of southern displaced

87 “60 million dollars needed for return of refugees to southern Sudan: UN”, Sudan Tribune, Agence
France Presse, 7 January, 2005.
88 “UNHCR to repatriate Sudanese refugees in Uganda”, Sudan Tribune, Xinhua, 1 March, 2005.

89 Judy McCallum and Gizenga Yemba Willow, “Challenges Facing Returnees in Sudan”, in Forced

Migration Review, No. 24, Refugees Studies Centre, Oxford University, November 2005, p. 42.
90 Paul Murphy, “Assisting the Return of Displaced Dinka Bor”, in Forced Migration Review, No.

24, Refugees Studies Centre, Oxford University, November 2005, p. 36.

According to the United Nations, UNMIS has held consultations with
GoNU and GoSS to develop a comprehensive returns policy, resulting in
an agreement to commence assisted returns in 2006. The parties also
agreed on priority criteria for assisted returns based on the security
situation of IDPs in their place of origin. The United Nations Work Plan
for 2006 projects the return of 680,000 IDPs and refugees during the
forthcoming year, including 200,000 assisted returns. From this figure,
UNHCR will assist 140,000 refugees. 91
The food security situation in the western Sudanese region of Darfur
and certain parts of South Sudan remains a matter of concern, the
USAID-funded Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS Net)
has warned. While calling the situation in North and West Darfur
"extremely food insecure", FEWS Net in their Greater Horn of Africa
Food Security Bulletin for January 2005, said conflicts and civil
insecurity were likely to continue to imperil the food security of
populations in the region. Peter Smerdon, senior spokesperson of the
World Food Programme (WFP), confirmed that "hostilities continue to
hamper WFP food distribution in Darfur," while the need for food
assistance remained great.92 On the other side, the Sudanese government
has placed orders for large quantities of grains in March to make up for
the shortage of foodstuff in the country, media reports quoted
humanitarian affairs minister Ibrahim Mahmoud Hamid as disclosing.
"We have ordered quantities of imported grains totalling almost half a
million tons that will meet the needs of the country," he said, adding:
"One hundred tonnes of wheat will arrive in March, in addition to 20,000
tonnes imported from India." Hamid affirmed that the government was
"able to fill the food gap," and blamed the food shortage "on little rainfall
during the last (cropping) season and the rise of grain prices."93

91 UN Secretary General Report on Sudan, S/2005/821, 27 December, 2006.
92 “North and West Darfur extremely food insecure”, IRIN, 20 January, 2005.
93 “Sudan imports grains to fill food gap”, Sudan Tribune, PANA, 1 March, 2005.

1.3 The Nuba Mountains
The population in the South Kordofan war-ravaged Nuba Mountains
area has doubled in the past three years as refugees return home
because a truce is holding, the head of the ceasefire monitoring mission
stated. But Brigadier General Jan Erik Wilhelmson said that it could take
5-10 years for all the land mines, not counting the unexploded ordnance
(UXO), to be removed from the area, which saw some of the fiercest
fighting and mass human rights abuses during the latter period of
Sudan's almost 22 years of civil war. "According to my statistics over the
last 3 years there has been a 100 percent increase in the population and
the last figure I got is 1.498 million – it used to be 750,000," he told
reporters in Khartoum. The Nuba Mountains mission, which began in
early 2002, has overseen relative calm, with no clashes between the rebel
SPLA and government forces. It will be replaced by UN peacekeeping
forces, expected to be deployed over the next six months in Sudan.94
In June 2005, the UN took over monitoring the ceasefire in Sudan's Nuba
Mountains, whose people found themselves wedged between the two
sides in the civil war that has plagued the country, the world body said.
Under the arrangements, the UN would replace Sudan's Joint Military
Commission – a body of rebel and government representatives – as a
military disengagement takes place between the two former warring
parties of the North and South. In a press statement, the UN said its
envoy to Sudan, Jan Pronk, and UN force commander Major General
Fazle Elaki Akbar attended a hand-over ceremony in Tillo.95

1.4 Darfur Armed Conflict
Increasing tensions in Sudan’s western region of Darfur escalated into
armed conflict in early 2003. In April 2003, the Sudanese government
initiated a multi-pronged strategy in response to an insurgency led

94   “Sudanese return to war-struck state, mine threat”, Sudan Tribune, Reuters, 19 January, 2005.
95   “UN takes over peace keeping in Sudan's Nuba Mountains”, Associated Press, 20 June, 2005

by two rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement
(SLA/SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The
government’s response drew upon tactics used in the civil wars in South
Sudan and the Nuba Mountains: aerial bombardment, the recruitment of
ethnic militias as proxy ground forces, forced displacement – on ethnic
basis – of rural civilians on a massive scale, and persecution of real or
perceived political opposition.96 The fact that the wrong choice was
made by the Sudanese government in dealing with the Darfur problem
was stated clearly by one of the state officials: “When the problems with
the rebels started in Darfur, we in the government of Sudan had a
number of options. We chose the wrong one. We chose the very worst
one,” said Former Governor of North Darfur Lieutenant General
Ibrahim Suleiman.97
The year 2005 saw a decline in major combat between government
forces and the two main rebel groups, SLA and JEM. Both sides sent
public and private signals that they are restraining their forces to
improve the chances for peace. It could be said that insecurity in Darfur
remains pervasive despite a decline in direct, large-scale fighting
between the government and the SLA and JEM.98 From the government
side, Vice President Ali Osman Taha has arranged high-level tribal
reconciliation conferences in Khartoum and Tripoli, as well as Darfur,
during May and June 2005.99 However, Darfur region has continued to
witness occasional ceasefire violations by the parties and a state of
insecurity because of the armed militia. The main cause of these
violations centred on issues associated with looting of livestock, creation
of road blocks, movement and build up of troops and the resolve of all

96  Human Rights Watch, “Entrenching Impunity: Government Responsibility for International
Crimes in Darfur”, Vol. 17, No. 17 (A), p. 6.
97 Ibid.

98 “Unifying Darfur Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace”, International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing,

African Briefing No. 32, 6 October, 2005, p. 1.
99 “The AU’s Mission in Darfur: Bridging The Gaps”, International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing No.

28, Nairobi/Brussels, 6 July, 2005, p. 2.

the parties, including the armed militias, to adopt a retaliatory posture
to any action taken by the other.100 The SLA, the dominant rebel force on
the ground, is increasingly an obstacle to peace. Internal divisions,
particularly among its political leadership, attacks against humanitarian
convoys, and armed clashes with JEM have undermined the peace talks
and raised questions about its legitimacy. JEM, while less important
militarily and suspect among many Darfurians for its more national and
Islamist agenda, has similar problems.101 Fighting may have died down
in Sudan’s crisis-torn Darfur region, but rampant banditry has taken its
place and is hitting key humanitarian aid convoys, the UN said. "There
has been a tremendous rise in banditry. Not a single day goes by
without two, three or four attacks on aid convoys," Keith McKenzie,
UNICEF’s representative in Darfur since 2004, told a news conference in
London. "You never know when you are going to be hit or where. They
seem to be targeting the humanitarian community and workers. If
anything, the situation there is more unstable," he added.102
According to a round of peace talks in Chad in January 2005, Sudanese
troops should immediately withdraw from areas they seized from rebels
in Darfur during the peace talks, the joint commission monitoring a
ceasefire deal in the region stated. The two main rebel groups, however,
should not seize control of the areas after government troops leave, said
the commission, which includes representatives of the rebels, Sudanese
government and mediators from Chad. The commission issued the
statement after rebels said they would only go back to the negotiating
table once government troops withdraw from areas they seized while
peace talks were underway in the Nigerian capital, Abuja. The hostilities
undermined the December 11-12, 2004 talks on a political solution to the

100  “Report of the Ceasefire Commission in Darfur Conflict at the Joint Commission Emergency
Meeting in Nigeria”, El-Fashir, December 2004.
101 “Unifying Darfur Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace”, International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing,

African Briefing No. 32, 6 October, 2005, p. 1.
102 Jeremy Lovell, “UNICEF: Bandits hit vital aid convoys in Darfur”, Sudan Tribune, 31 August, 2005.

conflict that had killed about 70,000 since March 2003, according to aid
agencies' estimates. Most of the victims died from disease, hunger and
attacks by a pro-government militia called Janjaweed.103
While violence and atrocities continued in Darfur throughout the year
2005, some grassroots reconciliation initiatives are also taking place. In
southeast Darfur, communities in El Daein have tried to reach out to each
other, leading to the reopening of several markets and some
improvements in the economic situation. Even in West Darfur, despite the
upsurge in violence, potential bloodshed was averted when traditional
leaders in the area quickly came together to investigate an incident in
which nomads in El-Geneina allowed their livestock into cultivated fields
yet to be harvested. The nomads were ordered to pay restitution.104
Therefore, according to the General-Secretary report on Darfur,
throughout 2005, an internal leadership struggle continued within the
main armed movement in Darfur, the SLM/A. Shifting loyalties among
some SLM/A field commanders created a leadership vacuum in certain
areas of Darfur, leading to considerable speculation that the SLM/A split
would spur inter-tribal clashes between the Fur and the Zaghawa, the
respective tribes of the two rival SLM/A leaders, Abdul Wahid al-Nur
and Mini Arkoy Minawi.
Moreover, a recent influx of military deserters from Chad into West
Darfur has further destabilized the complex security situation in the
region. They join Chadian armed opposition groups based in Darfur
who engage in a wide range of destructive activities, including cross-
border smuggling, cattle rustling and banditry.
In November, among the three Darfur states, South Darfur had the
highest number of reported incidents of violence, directed against both
the local population and international organizations. There were also

103 “Commission: Sudan must withdraw troops from areas it seized from Darfur rebels”, Sudan
Tribune, Associated Press, 5 January, 2005.
104 UN Secretary General Report on Sudan, 27 December, 2005.

serious inter-tribal clashes in South Darfur between the Falata and the
Massalit. Militia attacks on more than a dozen Massalit villages
southwest of Gereida occurred between 6 and 17 November, resulting in
an estimated 60 deaths, the highest figure recorded in the year 2005 for a
single incident. Huts were set on fire, fields and harvested crops were
burned, and a total of 15,000 people were displaced. An attack of this
scale, occurring over the course of more than one week in an area where
the AMIS is present, is a shocking indication of the Government’s
continuing failure to protect its own population, and of the collective
failure of the international community to prevent these horrendous
crimes from occurring.105
In North Darfur, the SLM/A’s internal difficulties translated into an
increasing number of inter-tribal incidents. For example on 11
November, 2005, intra-SLA clashes broke out between the Zaghawa and
Meidob tribes. On 13 November, confrontation between Zaghawa and
Berti members of SLA resulted in the death of at least 15 people. During
the same period, banditry and other forms of criminal violence
remained fairly low in North Darfur.
West Darfur presented the most complex security environment of the
three states, with splinters of various armed groups and significant
numbers of infiltrators from Chad engaged in criminally and politically
motivated violence. Security in the state deteriorated dramatically
during the reporting period, with a direct negative impact on the local
population, the safety of internally displaced people (IDP), and the
delivery of humanitarian assistance. Looting, break-ins, and bloody
clashes between armed militias over the division of stolen goods
continued throughout November.
On 18 November, the SAF carried out operations in the Jebel Moon area,
allegedly against Chadian deserters who had moved into the area. A
week later, an UNMIS assessment team visited the area, on a fact-

105   UN Secretary-General Report on Darfur, S/2005/825, 27 December, 2005.

finding mission. Following discussions between UNMIS personnel and
members of the community in the area, it was confirmed that the SAF
had not only attacked the area, but that helicopter gunships had been
used in the operation. Eight people were reported wounded in the area,
three of them seriously, including a thirteen year old boy. Furthermore,
there was no sign of Chadian deserters as alleged by the Government. A
group of Chadians that had arrived in Jebel Moon on 29 October
promptly left the area under pressure from the local population.
According to the UN Secretary-General, the attack by the SAF on Jebel
Moon was a violation of the Humanitarian Ceasefire of April 2004 and
in contravention of Security Council resolution 1591 (2005); and the
interruption of humanitarian activities as a result is inexcusable.
Consequently, patterns of insecurity in Darfur are dynamic and complex
and have a tendency to spiral out of control. Several armed groups,
reacting to power vacuums within the region, have begun behaving
autonomously. Cattle raiding and attacks against farmers are still a major
element of banditry. The attacks continue, despite knowledge by their
perpetrators that they will result in the deaths of many innocent women
and children. There is also a clear increase in violent incidents aimed at
acquiring logistical material and support. Thus ambush and seizure of
vehicles and attacks on fuel tankers have increased dramatically,
adversely affecting international organizations working in Darfur.106
According to the Security Council report on January 2006, December
2005 witnessed a continuation of very high levels of violence and
insecurity in Darfur, including banditry, a new round of militia attacks
on villages and camps for internally displaced persons, intensive
Government combat operations and the deliberate destruction of
significant areas of farmland. In addition, the rapid deterioration of the
situation along the Chad-Sudan border and concern about a possible
conflict between those two neighbouring countries have further

106   UN Secretary-General Report on Darfur, S/2005/825, 27 December, 2005

exacerbated the climate of insecurity. During December 2005-January
2006, both the SLM/A and the Government seriously flouted the
ceasefire agreements they had signed. On 3 December, armed militia
attacked the SLA at Um Kunva, south of Nyala, as a result of which as
many as 11 civilians were reported killed and up to 7,500 people were
displaced. On 4 December, 2005, in an apparent retaliation for the Um
Junva attack, SLA forces attacked the garrison of the Sudanese Armed
Forces at Donkey Dereaisa, while SAF attacked SLA positions in the
Masteri area, South-West of Geneina. Heavy fighting was reported and
clashes continued over a three-day period, forcing the relocation from
the area of staff of NGOs. There was also fighting between the
government forces and rebels in Masteri, Kongo Haraza and Beida,
together with militia attacks in the Jebel Moon, Silea and Kulbus areas.107
1.4.1 Division Over Leadership in Darfur’s Rebels Movements
With regard to historical background of the ethnic polarization in
Darfur, three main ethnic groups grow out in Darfur: The Arabs, The
Fur and the Zaghawa. The polarization of people in South Darfur
(Nyala) into ‘Arabs’ and ‘Zurqa’ arose during the Nimeiry regime (1969-
1985). When the same regime introduced the Regional System of
government in 1980, not only South Darfur but also the entire region
became polarized along ethic or communal lines. Communalism,
ethnicity and parochialism were all mobilized and utilized for achieving
leadership positions, particularly the position of regional governor. It is
the communal elites who mobilized their grassroots constituencies for
political support, but once the banner of communalism or ethnicity was
taken over by the illiterate people at the grassroots, it led to a revival of
ill-feeling between ethnic and communal groups that had been dying
down since 1917.108 Two Sudanese researcher-writers went on the clarify

  UN Secretary-General Report on Darfur, S/2006/59, 30 January, 2006.

108Adam Azzain Mohamed and Balgis Y. Badri, Intercommunal Conflict in Sudan: Causes,
Resolution Mechanisms and Transformation: A Case Study of the Darfur Region, Building Peace
Through Diversity Series, Ahfad University for Women, 2005, p. 50.

that three identity groups have become particularly concerned about
regional political control: The Arabs, the Fur and the Zaghawa. The
Arabs made their intentions overt when they founded the ‘Al-Tajjammu
Al-‘Arabi’, i.e., the Arab Alliance. The Zaghawa are reported to have
raised the banner of ‘Greater Zaghawa State’, implying a sphere of
control extending from Chad to Darfur. The Zaghawa deny this, but
their desire to control regional leadership position cannot be denied. The
Fur on their part, have resisted both Arab and Zaghawa endeavours to
oust them from regional leadership position, which they perceive as
being historically their own.109
The Sudan Liberation Army is basically a group of young men coming
primarily from the Fur, Zaghawa and Massalit tribes who launched the
SLA in February 2003. According to ICG, fighting against economic and
political marginalization by the central government, the SLA achieved early
military successes against government installations, which helped it bring
in thousands of recruits and rapidly expand its support base throughout
Darfur. Also contributing to its popularity was the scorched earth response,
in which government forces and government-supported Janjaweed militias
burned hundreds of villages and displaced more than a third of the
population. Yet, the SLA has become paralysed by a debilitating leadership
dispute, which has made progress in the negotiations impossible. Its weak
political structures have been unable to cope with the movement’s rapid
expansion, and personal disputes within the leadership have degenerated
into divisions along tribal lines. Efforts to unify the movement have been
unsuccessful, though they are ongoing.110
Minni’s Zaghawa branch grew quickly, receiving substantial support
from Zaghawa in the Chadian army, and soon began its remarkable
string of success against the government throughout North Darfur.

  Ibid, pp. 50-51.

  “Unifying Darfur Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace”, International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing,

African Briefing No. 32, 6 October, 2005, p. 2.

As the military prowess of the Zaghawa-wing grew, the Fur continued
to operate in the Jebel Marra area, while the Massalit, under former
SPLM Commander Adam ‘Bazooka’, conducted operations in their
tribal areas of West Darfur.111 According to ICG, rebel success caused the
government to recruit the Janjaweed militias to bolster its forces in the
region and to manipulate the ethnic divide in Darfur for political gain.
Khartoum also aimed to isolate the three branches of the SLA by
exploiting their geographical and ethnic differences. Forced to operate
relatively independently from each other, with limited interaction
between Abdel Wahid’s wing in Jebel Marra and the Zaghawa military
juggernaut under Abdallah Abakar and Minni in North Darfur, division
soon emerged. Adding to the tension was the perception that although
the Zaghawa provided the bulk of SLA military strength, Fur and
Massalit civilians bore he brunt of the government’s scorched earth
counter-insurgency campaign since the remote and difficult terrain in
Dar Zaghawa and the high mobility of Zaghawa rebels made such
attacks riskier there. As it herded hundreds of thousands of Fur and
Massalit into makeshift camps, the government intensified its
propaganda in Darfur and the country at large about an alleged design
to build a ‘Greater Zaghawa State’ stretching across other tribal areas in
Sudan and Chad. The massive government offensive in December 2003-
Feburary 2004 forced most of the Zaghawa branch of the SLA from their
stronghold in North Darfur to safer areas in South Darfur. In the
summer of 2004, a group of several hundred Zaghawa SLA troops from
Hamaraya invaded Jebel Marra, reportedly on Minni’s orders, in an
attempt to wrest political control of the movement from Abdel Wahid’s
followers. The attack ended prematurely, reportedly due to Eritrean
pressure on Minni, but the episode soured relations between Fur and
Zaghawa politicians in the diaspora, with the former accusing the latter
of having encouraged Minni.

111   Ibid, p. 2

The reconciliation meeting called in October by Darfur’s main rebel
group, the SLM/A, would fail to unite the movement after its president,
Abdel Wahid Mohamed al-Nur, refused to attend, observers feared.
"Growing rifts between both political leaders and military commanders,
as well as between the Zaghawa and Fur factions of the SLM/A have led
to a breakdown in the movement’s command structure. It has also
created a disconnection between political aspirations at the peace talks
in the Nigerian capital Abuja, and military operations on the ground,
observers noted.112
The ICG went further to state that, the rapid expansion and
intensification of the conflict overwhelmed the leaders and their nascent
structures. Over time, the animosity between Minni and Abdel Wahid
grew as they jostled for primacy. Whereas Minni considers that
Zaghawa military strength should be reflected in the leadership, Abdel
Wahid and other non-Zaghawa insist on the original tribal allocations of
positions, including a Fur as chairman. Despite the plight of their
people, the SLA leaders have been unable to resolve these divisions,
creating further openings for Khartoum to manipulate and divide their
According to the UN Secretary-General, following the adjournment of
the sixth round of the inter-Sudanese peace talks on Darfur, one element
of the SLM/A leadership led by Minni Minawi, called a conference in
Haskanita, a town in eastern Darfur. Although the conference, which
began on 29 October, was well-attended including by several field
commanders, the chairman of the SLM/A, Abdul Wahid Al-Nur, as well
as the majority of his supporters refused to participate. The conference
in Haskanita culminated in the election of Minawi as the new SLM/A
chairman. This election was rejected by Abdul Wahid.

112  “Sudan’s Darfur rebel SLM meeting might fail to unite the movement”, Sudan Tribune, 31
October, 2005.
113 Ibid, p. 3.

During the reporting period, a number of important initiatives were
undertaken to repair the SLM/A rift and help create a conducive
environment for the seventh round of Abuja talks, which resumed on 29
November. The first was a meeting of senior officials from donor
countries of the African Union (AU) and the United Nations, convened
by the United Kingdom on 1 November in London. Among other things,
the meeting discussed how to unite positions within the SLM/A ahead of
the talks; a number of proposals to end the violence in Darfur; and the
post-Abuja period. On 19 November, following the envoys meeting in
Khartoum, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi
Frazer and the Head of AMIS, Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe, co-
facilitated a meeting between Abdel Wahid and Minawi to urge them
again to participate constructively and with a united purpose in Abuja
VII, notwithstanding the disagreements within the movement.
Thereafter, another initiative, led by the Chadian Government and
assisted by Libya, Eritrea and the AU took place in N’Djamena on 25-26
November. Both Abdul Wahid and Minawi agreed to present a common
negotiating platform, to be coordinated with JEM.114
It must be stressed that SLA/M is now deeply complicit in Darfur’s
rapidly escalating insecurity. And on October 8, 2005, the SLA/M
assaulted an AU convoy in North Darfur, killing three AU soldiers and
two civilian contractors; these were the first such casualties since AU
deployment. An extraordinarily serious development, it threatened a
mission already badly under-manned and under-equipped, without an
appropriate mandate, and without operational cohesion, adequate
transport capacity, nor logistical and administrative capacities. Just as
ominous is an October 9, 2005 AU report on a large kidnapping in West
Darfur: “18 (AU) personnel including military observers, civilian police,
a US representative and a JEM representative are held hostage today”
the acting head of the AU in Sudan, Jean Baptiste Natama, told Reuters.

114   UN Secretary-General Report on Darfur, S/2005/825, 27 December, 2005.

At this time, responsibility for the kidnapping is unclear, although a BBC
report (October 9, 2005) suggests "the kidnappers were believed to be
members of a dissident faction of Darfur’s rebel JEM" [i.e., the National
Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD)]. But even beyond the
unforgivable attack on the AU monitory force, elements of the SLA/M are
increasingly threatening or assaulting humanitarian operations, engaging
in opportunistic ‘banditry’ and generally ignoring the urgent need to
create a coherent diplomatic position for Darfurians in Abuja. Tensions
between SLA/M. Chairman Abdel Wahid Mohammed al-Nur and
Secretary-General Minni Arkua Minnawi have only intensified, as have
strains between Minnawi and SLA/M field commanders in Darfur and
ethnic polarization (Abdel Wahid is a Fur, Minnawi is a Zaghawa).
Members of the Zaghawa ethnic group in the Shearia area have been
subjected to human rights violations by Birgid tribe members with the
involvement of the military. Documented violations committed against
the Zaghawa include targeted beatings, systematic looting and closure of
schools. Those actions resulted in 2,500 Zaghawa being forcibly displaced
from the town into the African Union (AU) base and neighbouring
villages. Eight detainees arrested in relation to the SLA attack on Shearia
in September 2005 reported that they had been held for prolonged periods
without charge or trial and physically abused while in the joint custody of
National Security and Military intelligence. Those arrests form part of a
boarder pattern of harassment of the Zaghawa in South Darfur over the
past six months. The arrests targeted wealthy Zaghawa businessmen,
teachers, students and religious figures, who are frequently accused of
providing support to SLA.115
1.4.2 Darfur and the African Union
In April 2004, the Sudanese government and the two movements signed
a humanitarian ceasefire agreement mediated by the Chadian
government with support from the African Union (AU). To monitor the

115   UN Secretary-General Report on Darfur, S/2006/59, 30 January, 2006.

agreement, the parties agreed to an AU observer mission (AMIS). AMIS
established a military observer presence in July 2004, which included
some three hundred soldiers to protect the observers. As of October
2005, AMIS had increased its forces to approximately seven thousand
personnel including 686 military observers, 4,890 troops and 1,176
civilian police. Its mandate was expanded beyond ceasefire monitoring
to include contributing “to secure the environment for the delivery of
humanitarian relief and, beyond that, the return of IDPs and refugees to
their homes, as well as protection of civilians under ‘imminent
threat’”.116 At the end of December 2006, AMIS had a total of 6,848
personnel in Darfur, comprised of 700 Military Observers (MILOBS),
1,211 civilian police, 47 international civilian staff, 11 Ceasefire
Commission personnel and a protection force of 4,879 troops. UN
Mission in Sudan continued to liaise closely with the AMIS, through
regular contacts with the Khartoum based Head of AMIS, AMIS
personnel in Darfur, and through periodic meetings between the United
Nations Assistance Cell and the AU Commission in Addis Ababa. The
United Nations Assistance Cell also continued its assistance to the AU in
the areas of operational planning and management.117
The African Union force in Darfur is beginning to bring a modicum of
stability to parts of this war-torn region. Though small and slow to
deploy, the force has successfully headed off attacks; negotiated the
release of hostages; and provided enough security for some displaced
villagers to return home. These successes in the face of huge obstacles
highlight the need for a bigger force with more logistical and financial
support from the donors who are financing the AU deployment. It
seems improbable that a pick-up multinational force operating below its
full strength could bring even pockets of stability to an area the size of
Texas, where lack of roads, airfields and other infrastructure, plus vast

116 “Entrenching Impunity: Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur”, Human
Rights Watch, Vol. 17, No. 17 (A), December 2005, p. 7.
117 UN Secretary General Report on Darfur, S/2005/825, 27 December, 2005.

deserts, high temperatures and a summer rainy season that turns
everything to mud, make operations difficult.118 The AU believes its
relatively small force could largely stabilise the situation and that it might
then need to go up to 12,300 by the second quarter of 2006 in order also to
facilitate the eventual return of the displaced to their homes.119
According to Human Rights Watch, the pervasive pattern of
government-militia coordinated attacks on villages has declined in 2005
in comparison with previous years, but this is largely because most of
the targeted population has already been displaced from the most fertile,
desirable rural areas. Two million displaced civilians survive in a
climate of fear, intimidation and violence, unable to return to their
homes and restricted to displaced persons camps due to continuing
arbitrary arrest or rape, assault and murder when they leave the relative
security of the camps. More than one million additional conflict-affected
civilians require food and other assistance to survive. The continuing
violence and the pervasive climate of fear within the traumatized,
displaced communities means that the security required for voluntary
and safe return of the displaced persons – an important condition for the
reversal of ethnic cleansing – does not exist.120
However, in December 2005, violence escalated in Darfur. It now
included at least four different patterns of violence: 1) military
operations by government forces and rebel groups; 2) ethnic clashes
linked to traditional tension over resources such as land and water; 3)
banditry and opportunistic crime; and 4) cross-border tensions linked to
Chadian internal politics. Sometimes the parties to the conflict are
involved in all of these patterns. Human Rights Watch went further to
state that, escalating attacks on international and Sudanese aid workers

118 Ken Bacon, “AU Peace Monitors creating pockets of security in Darfur”, Refugees International,
Sudan Tribune, 25 February, 2005.
119 “The AU’s Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps”, International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing No.

28, 6 July, 2005, p. 2.
120 Human Rights Watch, op. cit., p. 8.

and AU personnel demonstrate that these groups are increasingly
viewed by the warring parties as legitimate targets, a situation that
jeopardizes the delivery of essential humanitarian assistance to more
than three million people, or half of Darfur’s population.121
Partners of the AU pledged some US$ 292 million to assist the African
Mission in Sudan (AMIS), according to figures released by the AU
Commission. The pledges were made on 31 May, 2005 at a conference
organised here by the Commission. The largest financial pledge to AMIS
came from Canada to the tune of US$ 133 million. The European Union
promised US$ 77.4 million and the United States US$ 50 million. Other
pledges were (in US$): United Kingdom (12), the Netherlands (8,1),
Norway (5,2), France (2,9), Sweden (1,5), Germany (1,3); Turkey (US$
500,000), Organisation of Islamic Conference (US$ 250,000), League of Arab
States (US$ 100,000), Mauritania (US$ 50,000) and Ghana (US$ 30,000).122
Labado, a town of 27,000 people was levelled by Sudanese government-
backed forces in late December in order to drive out rebel forces. In
January, the AU sector commander in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur
state, heard that government-directed forces were about to attack again.
He rushed about 100 troops to Labado and the nearby town of Muhajira
and prevented a second attack. AMIS also stationed troops in Labado
and thousands of displaced persons have returned. Earlier this year,
AMIS heard that a government-backed militia known as the Janjaweed
was about to attack Khor Abeche, a town north of Nyala. AMIS started
sending in patrols to protect the village. Without this proactive
deployment, the village "would have been torched," said a US military
officer who has worked closely with the AU troops.123

121 Ibid.
122 “Pledging conference raises US$ 292 million for AU force in Sudan”, PANA, Sudan Tribune, 31
May, 2005.
123 Ibid.

The budget for the AU force this year is about US$ 220 million, with the
European Union putting up US$ 100 million and the US, US$ 45 million.
The US is building the bases – headquarters and a secondary base in
each of eight sectors, plus police facilities – through a State Department
contract with Pacific Architects & Engineers. AU officials say that
deployments were delayed because PAE fell behind schedule. However,
the facilities, which are tent camps, are largely completed and the force
is approaching full strength. Canada and the Netherlands are supplying
helicopters and crews and the United Kingdom is supplying about 650
vehicles. Donors pay the salary of the force and supply basic equipment
such as helmets, protective vests and communications gear. Tactical
radio communications are adequate, but commanders lack reliable, high
speed satellite internet connections to aid their communications with
In an interview with the Head of AU mission in Sudan, Baba Gana
Kingibe on 19 July, 2005, the role of the AU in calming situations in
Darfur was clarified. He stated that: “Over the last few months the
security situation on the ground in Darfur has generally calmed down in
the sense that fixed combat between the parties – the two principal rebel
movements and government troops – has more or less vanished. What
we had in the run-up to the resumption of the Abuja peace talks in June,
from May to the first half of June, was fighting between the rebel
elements. I take it they were just skirmishes for territory in the run-up to
the talks; that too has now died down. What we now have is sort of
usual banditry. From time to time inter-tribal fights flare up, but very
sparingly. You can say the security situation on the ground is calm. That
assists those who deliver humanitarian assistance to those in need.
However, because of other factors, not necessarily to do with the
absence of security, the humanitarian situation is not really something
cheerful, and the prognosis also doesn’t look good. There are attacks

124   Ibid.

on convoys, particularly food convoys, and fraud in the distribution of
humanitarian materials in the camps. But all told, we as AMIS try to
assist the humanitarian agencies and NGOs to do their work in a more
peaceful environment. From a purely humanitarian point of view, I
wouldn’t say they have access everywhere, but there are many places
they can go. Right now the number of war-affected is rising; we are
looking at something like three million. Quite a number – about 200,000
– are new arrivals, so there is a lot of work that needs to be done.”125
The AMIS in Darfur has contributed to the reduction in combat through
its limited presence and its reporting. It has had some success in
reducing insecurity for civilians in the areas where it has deployed.
Examples include:
              – Following months of daytime violence in Kebkabiyah (North
      Darfur), AMIS established a permanent mission there in late 2004, with the
      result that the Janjaweed no longer terrorise residents and IDPs inside the
      town; markets have re-opened; and humanitarian NGOs operate in a more
      secure environment;126
              – Deployment to Labado (South Darfur) in January 2005 thwarted
      new attacks against that town and neighbouring Muhajaria and enabled
      some civilians to return home;
              – Positioning a Military Observer Group in Geraida (South Darfur)
      in February 2005 allowed the road to Buram to be opened and contributed to
      reducing violence between the Masalit and Habaniya tribes;
             – In some locations, AMIS does liaise with traditional leaders to
      address citizen concerns, while striving to forge local reconciliation
      agreements to prevent cattle rustling from escalating into large-scale

  Interview with Baba Gana Kingibe, head of AU mission in Sudan, IRIN, 19 July, 2005.

126However, civilians and IDPs continue to live in fear of Sudanese security and police forces in
town and are unable to venture outside it due to persistent attacks and rapes by Janjaweed militias.

              – AMIS has frequently ferried civilians who have been raped or
      attacked to hospitals or clinics, sometimes despite resistance from
      government forces seeking to conceal the targeting of civilians; and
             – AMIS firewood patrols in several sectors protect women from
      assault and rape outside the camps.127

1.4.3 Limitations of the AU Mission in Sudan
Despite the limited successes in curbing violence, there are many
limitations concerning the role of the African Union in Darfur. The
limitations are partially a consequence of AU inexperience in
peacekeeping and the nascent stage of its PSC mechanisms, particularly
in mission management and force generation. But beyond these
institutional problems, the AU military operations in Darfur face
constraints that would hamstring even the most experienced
peacekeeping force: an inadequate mandate, insufficient forces and
capabilities, and political failure to acknowledge that the Sudanese
government has consistently failed to meet its responsibilities to
neutralize the militias and protect its citizens. With a restrictive mandate
and limited forces, AMIS tries to establish security primarily by
deploying across parts of the eight regional sectors.128 It does not
routinely patrol those sectors but rather sends small groups of military
observers (MILOBS) to selected outposts or areas of interest. These
teams, which are usually accompanied by squad or platoon-sized
elements from the protection force, resolve local social or security
disputes through diplomacy and interact with the community but
cannot sustain operations without daily assistance from their sector
headquarter or local base.129

127 “The AU’s Mission in Darfur: Briding the Gaps”, International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing N°.
28, 6 July, 2005, pp. 5-6.
128 “The AU’s Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps”, International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing No.

28, 6 July, 2005, p. 6.
129 Ibid.

The AU is by all serious military accounts under-manned, under-
equipped, without the logistical or transport capacity required to
operate in Darfur, increasingly inefficient, often poorly motivated – and
operating without a meaningful mandate for civilian protection. In the
strikingly honest assessment of the UN’s Guterres (following his recent
Darfur assessment mission): “‘The AU force cannot effectively protect
the people of Darfur ... and in some cases even themselves,’ [Guterres]
said, likening the task facing the fledgling force to placing one
policeman in London and asking him to stop all crime there.”130 More
circumspectly, the ICG recently reported: “It is common thinking in
Brussels that increased troop numbers in the AU Mission in Sudan have
been accompanied by declining efficiency. One EU official claimed the
mission is operating at 40-50% capacity, while another asserted the
mission conducted fewer patrols in September than in April and May
when it had a least 2,000 fewer troops.”131
The African Union does not have much experience in conflict
resolutions. The AU has only existed since 2002, and its peace and
security structures have only been in place since mid-2004. It is still
developing its political credibility as the de facto representative of the
African continent as a whole. Under-funding is another vital cause for
the inability of the AU in dealing with the Darfur conflict. According to
the ICG, The EU's support through the European Commission and
members States has, as noted, largely been directed at helping AMIS
meet its logistical requirements. EU advisers, however, have also
supplemented the mission's planning and operational capabilities. The
EU's financial contributions are paid to the AU out of the Peace Facility
approximately six weeks from the time of request.132

130 Reuters, October 21, 2005.
131  International Crisis Group, “The EU/AU Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet a Winning
Combination”, Brussels, October 25, 2005.
132 Ibid, p. 9.

It is stated by the ICG that, while the UN and international non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) have taken the lead in responding
to growing humanitarian needs and authorising accountability
measures against those responsible for atrocities, the African Union has
taken the lead for reaching a political solution to the conflict and
monitoring the humanitarian and ceasefire agreements. The AMIS has
had a positive impact on security in some areas by often going beyond
the strict terms of its mandate, but its ability to protect civilians and
humanitarian operations is hamstrung by limited capacity, insufficient
resources and political constraints.133 The Sudanese government has
consistently failed to protect civilians in Darfur, and the AU alone
cannot fulfil the international responsibility to do so. The concept of
African solutions for African problems has given US and European
policy-makers a convenient excuse to do no more than respond to AU
requests for financial and logistical support.134
The rapidly deteriorating security situation in Darfur, particularly in
West Darfur and South Darfur states, yet again highlights what has been
conspicuously obvious to any honest observer for months: the African
Union force in Darfur is radically inadequate to the task of protecting
civilians and humanitarian operations. Nor can the AU begin to provide
the security that will allow for a resumption of meaningful agricultural
production in Darfur, leaving millions entirely dependent upon
international food aid. The pretence that the AU – without a mandate for
civilian protection, and without adequate manpower, material
resources, transport, logistics, or administrative capacity – is capable of
providing security in Darfur represents an increasingly deadly
complicity in ongoing conflict destruction.135

133 Ibid, p. 1.
134 Ibid, p. 14.
135 Eric Reeves, “The Failure of the African Union in Darfur”, Sudantribune, 8 September, 2005.

According to Eric Reeves, over the past fourteen months of deployment,
the African Union has failed to demonstrate either the military capacity or
the political will necessary to protect Darfur’s acutely vulnerable civilian
populations and critical humanitarian operations. Most conspicuously,
the AU has not demanded of Khartoum an explicit mandate for civilian
protection, but has suggested instead that its forces will create a "de facto"
mandate. While this has proved true on a very limited scale, with heroic
measures on the part of some AU officers, too many officers and troops
are without sufficient motivation. As a result, the epidemic of rape and
sexual violence continues throughout Darfur; smaller-scale but
immensely threatening violence (including ‘banditry’ – see below)
abounds; insecurity continues to displace as many as 3 million Darfurians;
and humanitarian organizations are forced ever closer to withdrawing in
the face of intolerable risks to their operations.136
According to above mentioned points, Khartoum seeks to dilute the
impact of UN Security Council Resolutions 1591 and 1593. Its
commitments do not run deep, as evidenced by its superficial
implementation of measures adopted at the tribal reconciliation
conferences.137 Though pressed increasingly to cease attacks on
humanitarian operations, return to the negotiating table, and unify their
movements, the SLA and JEM continue to splinter internally, making the
quest for a political solution ever more elusive and contributing

137 According to ICG, Resolution 1591 (29 March, 2005) extended a Darfur arms embargo to the
government, set up a mechanism for targeted sanctions against individuals posing “a threat
to stability in Darfur and the region”, and demanded an end to offensive military flights over Darfur.
Resolution 1593 (31 March, 2005) referred the Darfur situation to the International Criminal Court
(ICC). The Arab-Fur agreement in Khartoum and subsequent tribal meetings in Nyala, Um Kadada,
and Kutum have been dismissed by many in Darfur as a shame, orchestrated more for external
purposes than genuine reconciliation and allegedly involving large cash pay-outs. Outraged Fur tribe
members demanded the lead signatory, Yusuf Bakheit, retract his action. A government official
admitted the reconciliation process was partially an attempt to render Resolution 1593 irrelevant by
encouraging tribes to address their grievances through tribal agreements.

to worsening insecurity in Darfur.138 The gap between public postures
and on-the-ground commitments, particularly by the government,
ensures persistence of four trends.
First, a basic cause for the decline in large attacks is the degree to which
Khartoum has achieved its counter-insurgency objective as a result of
the displacement and death that has already occurred. In many places,
the government's focus has shifted from displacement to controlling
internally displaced persons (IDPs). In those areas, civilians fear
government security forces and police – the very institutions the UN and
AU have relied on to protect civilians – as much as the Janjaweed.139
The early calls by the UN for bringing criminals in Darfur was clamed
down as the peace process and implementation of Comprehensive Peace
Process started. A former Sudanese chief justice said his committee on
Darfur has identified suspects who should be investigated and perhaps
tried for human rights abuses that violated international law. Chief
Justice Dafaalla Al Hajj Yusuf, at a news conference, called for
discussing a report on Darfur that he submitted to the president, insisted
Sudan was capable of trying the suspects itself. He charged bias was
evident in a report by a UN commission that had recommended Darfur
suspects be brought before the International Criminal Court, the world's
first permanent war crimes tribunal. 140
Attacks on women represents a threat to Darfur social fabric. About 500
women in Darfur have been treated for rape in the early months of 2005
and most said their attackers were militiamen or soldiers, according to
an aid agency report obtained by Reuters. But the real number of rape
victims is likely to be even higher as many are afraid to report the crime

138  “Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur”, 10 May, 2005, S/2005/305; Opheera
McDoom, “Darfur Rebels Delay Peace Talks – UN Envoy”, Reuters, 25 May, 2005.
139 “The AU’s Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps”, International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing No.

28, Nairobi/Brussels, 6 July, 2005, p. 3.
140 “Government committee identifies suspects in human rights abuses”, Associated Press, Sudan

Tribune, 9 February 2005.

for fear of stigmatisation and mistreatment, said the study prepared by
Medecins Sans Frontières.141
The limitations of the AU in Darfur started from the beginning. The
initial decision by the AU to settle for a monitoring, rather than a civilian
protection, mission grew out of the "ceasefire" negotiated between
Khartoum and the insurgency movements in N’Djamena (Chad), April
8, 2004. Notably, the AU did not insist that the Janjaweed be a party to
the "ceasefire," a state of affairs that continues to the present, creating a
highly asymmetrical negotiating situation. Without including the
Janjaweed – indisputably a critical military ally of Khartoum –
discussions of troop dispositions, military stand-down, separation of
forces, and a general ceasefire are hopelessly inadequate from the
insurgents’ perspective.
To be sure, the deployment of only 360 personnel in July 2004 dictated
the initial nature of the AU mission: such a force could do little more
than observe, and as quickly became apparent, mere observing had
virtually no effect on the actions of the Janjaweed, Khartoum, or the
insurgents. But when the AU Peace and Security Council agreed on an
expanded mission in Darfur (October 20, 2004), there was still no
political will to demand of Khartoum a civilian protection mandate.
Though the enhanced mission would eventually consist of 3,320
personnel (2,241 military, including 450 military observers, and 815
civilian police), there was only the very narrowest provision for
protection of civilians: AU forces can "protect civilians whom it
encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within
resources and capability, it being understood that protection of the
civilian population is the responsibility of the government of Sudan"

141   “Rape campaign continues in Darfur-aid agency”, Reuters, Sudan Tribune, 7 March, 2005.

(point 7, paragraph 6, AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué,
October 20, 2004).142
There could no longer be any mistaking the crippling trade-off the AU
was willing to make in enlarging its mission in Darfur: it would ask
Khartoum for no strengthening of its mandate, thereby creating many of
the weaknesses currently conspicuous even with a still larger
deployment (6,700 personnel as of late October 2005). As the BR report
notes, "Sudanese officials have adamantly insisted that any increase in
troop numbers be allowed only if the mandate does not change" (page
17). So long as the AU has no mandate to protect civilians or
humanitarians, so long as the AU cannot confront or pre-empt the
Janjaweed in its brutal predations, Khartoum will not object to larger
numbers of personnel.143
1.4.4 Internal Displaced in Darfur
According to the Secretary-General report on Darfur, the widespread
climate of insecurity is having a significant impact on the ability of the
humanitarian community to have access to people in need. Steps have
been taken to continue assisting the affected populations in the face of
current constraints, including through the use of helicopters and private
contractors, but such operations are costly and may be untenable over
the long run. According to the report, during a meeting with the tribal
leaders who control the routes to Kerainik and Mornei in Western
Darfur, the United Nations brokered a safe passage agreement for areas
east of Geneina. However, the fighting between the government forces
and rebels in Masteri, Kongo, Haraza and Beida, together with militia
attacks in the Jebel Moon, Silea and Kulbus areas, have forced the
withdrawal of all international NGOs from those areas, leaving
approximately 140,000 people without assistance. Militia attacks on

142 Eric Reeves, “Ghosts of Rwanda: The Failure of the African Union in Darfur (1)”, Sudantribune,
13 November.
143 Ibid.

Tawila in Northern Darfur have similarly forced international NGOs in
the area to temporarily relocate their staff.
On the other hand banditry has affected humanitarian convoys on an
almost daily basis. In Northern Darfur, a Sudan Red Crescent Society
driver was killed in an apparent act of banditry. However as a result of
the efforts of the NGOs, malnutrition and mortality rates have dropped
significantly since 2004. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that significant
returns of displaced persons will take place in early 2006. Almost 1.8
million internally displaced persons currently residing in camps will
remain in their temporary settlements for the foreseeable future.144
1.4.5 Peace Process in Darfur
According to Sudan Tribune, an agreement has been reached at the
Abuja peace talks on 14 December, 2005 between the government
delegation and the Darfur rebel movements on all the points in the first
clause regarding the wealth-sharing framework, which is related to the
concepts and special principles on wealth sharing. In a press statement
to the Sudanese radio, the official spokesman of the government
delegation, Omar Adam Rahamah, said all the issues related to this
clause were agreed upon after being discussed. The AU mission in the
Sudan spokesperson, Noureddine Mezni, said in a press release, that the
wealth-sharing commission concluded consideration of Item 1 of its
Agenda – Concepts and General Principles for Wealth Sharing –, and
commenced discussion on Item 2 – Fiscal Federalism and
Intergovernmental Relations. During the session, the ideas and views of
the sides regarding the second clause, which centres on wealth and deals
with financial federalism and government relations, would also be
discussed. He also pointed out that the first clause on the wealth
framework discussed many issues regarding development, the
displaced, refugees and the victims of war and how to create a suitable
atmosphere for them to return to their regions. He said the discussion

144   UN Secretary-General Report on Darfur, S/2006/ 59, 30 January, 2006.

also touched on the general concepts of land and monopoly and how to
resolve them, besides an agreement on setting up an action team to
specify the needs.145

1.5 Political Parties
Sudanese opposition parties embraced the CPA between the
government and southern rebels and thousands at the Khartoum airport
welcomed the return of the government delegation that negotiated the
deal. "The signing of the peace agreement is a big step toward
establishing democracy and a just peace," Sadiq el-Mahdi, the leader of
Umma, Sudan's largest opposition party, told state-run Omdurman
radio. El-Mahdi, the country's last democratically elected prime minister
who was overthrown by President Omar el-Bashir in 1989, said the
peace agreement should be approved by all national political parties to
"turn the bilateral agreement into a national peace agreement."146
According to Osman Taha, the agreement includes several stations,
which, it says, should be open for the participation of the political forces.
For example, there is the first station, which is the drafting of the interim
constitution. This is a station which would enable the political forces to
participate and express their opinion on how to prepare the substance of
the upcoming interim constitution, which would govern the interim
phase. A number of commissions and institutions would be set up to
implement the provisions of the agreement. These commissions and
institutions would be formed on a national basis. They will not be
confined to the two sides only. There would be political, legislative and
executive institutions, and there would be room here for the
participation of these forces. This participation may have begun

145“Sudan, Darfur rebels agree on wealth-sharing framework”, Sudantribune, 14 December, 2005.
146“Sudanese opposition parties welcome peace agreement”, Sudan Tribune, Associated Press, 1
January, 2005.

symbolically, but this is the nature of transformation and agreement in
all parts of the world.147
A group of opposition parties have agreed to change the National
Covenant signed on first June 2005 into a political declaration, to give
the opportunity to parties under the umbrella of the opposition NDA to
sign up. Parties which have already signed the declaration are the
Umma Party, the Popular National Congress, the Bath Party Regional
Authority, The Arab Socialist Nasserist Party, the Democratic Unionist
Nasserist, the original Justice Party, the Beja Congress and the Sudanese
Democratic Movement. The new opposition coalition is to be known as
National Forces Coalition. The new declaration advocates seeking peace
and democracy and equality among all Sudanese people, in addition to
distributing the wealth of the nation in a fair and equitable manner. It
urges the use of civil disobedience to change the status quo in the
country and promises to honour ceasefire agreements and those
ensuring the safety of civilians. Moreover the charter espouses the
establishment of a transitional national government to run the affairs of
the nation temporarily, and requests the convening of a national
reconciliation conference to chart out a proper direction for governing
the country. However it has not revealed the make-up of its leadership
although observers expect that former Prime Minister Al-Mahdi in all
probability will head it.148
On the other hand, as a result of the political atmosphere created by
signing the CPA, Sudanese authorities in June 2005 released prominent
Islamist Hassan Turabi, detained last year on suspicion of plotting a
coup, in a step toward reconciliation among Khartoum’s political elite.
Hundreds of supporters shouting "God is great!" welcomed Turabi, a
former ally of President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, to his Popular Congress

147  “INTERVIEW – Sudan Vice-President defends government over peace concessions”, Sudan
Tribune, Al-Jazirah satellite TV, interview by Mohamed Al-Kabir al-Qutbi, 9 January, 2005.
148 “Group of Sudanese opposition parties sign political declaration”, Sudan Tribune, 1 June, 2005.

party headquarters in the Sudanese capital. In a speech, Bashir said that
his government had decided to release all political prisoners and
undertake other reform measures. The political climate in Khartoum has
improved since the government and southern rebels signed the CPA.149
It is stated that because of their exclusion from the Naivasha
negotiations, most opposition parties and leaders feel little commitment
to the provisions of the CPA regarding wealth sharing and power
sharing between the NCP and SPLM. The parties to the CPA ignored
calls by the main faction of the Umma Party and other opposition and
civil society groups soon after the signature of the peace accord for an all
inclusive conference to be held in Sudan to endorse and build consensus
around it.
A decade of severe repression in the 1990s, followed by aggressive NCP
efforts aimed at discrediting party leadership through cooption left
opposition parties ineffectual and highly factionalized. At least three
smaller factions splintered away from the Umma Party, and the
Democratic Unionist party witnessed similar splits. These divisions are
both a result of the weakness of the opposition and a direct consequence
of the NCP’s active divide-and-rule politics. As a result, the GoNU is
based on a broad coalition that, in addition to the two CPA partners,
includes eight NCP satellite political entities.
Shortly after the establishment of the GoNU, three main opposition
parties took the lead in assembling a “Loyal Opposition” to it, namely
the Umma Party, Hassan al-Turabi’s Popular Congress Party and the
Communist Party of Sudan.150
1.5.1 National Congress Party
The NCP is faced with new realities after the signing of the CPA.
According to the agreement the legacy of the totalitarian regime has

149   “Sudan frees Islamic leader Turabi, lifts party ban”, Reuters, 30 June, 2005.
150   International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 106, 31 March, 2006, p. 24.

been partially eroded. The former fighter of the central government now
became part of the GoNU, with a half share in oil revenues. This
situation caused polarization inside the NCP between those who
supports the CPA and those who thinks that too much was given to the
South. Some observers suggest that there is a power struggle occurring
inside the NCP between Taha and the architects of Naivasha, and Bashir
and those around him who are more critical of the CPA. The struggle
centres over control of political power and leadership of the country,
including implementation of the CPA. Having personally negotiated the
Naivasha deal with John Garang, Taha is seen as more vested in its
implementation, as his political career is tied to the CPA. The critics feel
Taha gave away too much for the sake of securing peace. Moreover,
they view Taha as a “man of the West”, who seeks to appease the
Americans and Europeans at the expense of the party’s northern Islamic
constituency.151 These criticisms escalated after Taha went to Brussels in
early March to discuss with EU, US and AU officials the transition to a
UN force in Darfur and then travelled to Tripoli to meet the leaders of
the Darfur rebel movements, Minni Minawi and Khalil Ibrahim. Critics
attacked him for selling out the nationalist cause in Brussels while
Sudanese rallied in the streets against the UN deployment, and for
seeking to strike another Naivasha accord with the Darfurian rebels.
Taha, upon his return to Khartoum, adopted a harsher line regarding the
transition to a UN force in Darfur. Many others suggest that the
differences between the two groups are overstated. NCP tactics have
often been to portray fictitious internal division.
1.5.2 Popular Congress Party
Twenty-one military personnel pleaded not guilty on 5 January, 2005 to
allegedly plotting to overthrow Sudan's president last year. The 21
defendants, including six officers, were arrested along with 74 civilians
in March and October 2004, in an alleged coup plot that the government

151   Crisis Group interviews, Khartoum, March 2006.

of President Omar el-Bashir has linked to the Popular Congress party's
leader, detained Islamic fundamentalist Hassan Turabi. Turabi, who
hasn't been charged, helped el-Bashir engineer his own 1989 coup to
topple Sudan's last democratically elected prime minister, Sadiq el-
Mahdi, but later fell out of favour with the president who believed his
former aide was trying to make a grab for power. Sixty-one of the 74
detained civilians, mostly members of Turabi's party, also pleaded not
guilty in a civil court to plotting to overthrow el-Bashir's regime.152
1.5.3 The National Democratic Party
According to ICG, the NDA's negotiations with the government, the
peculiar "suspended" agreement, and the last moment participation in
the Commission have been controversial within the organisation. The
Darfur rebels and east Sudan insurgents distanced themselves. The
latter reignited the eastern front days after the Cairo ceremony by
attacking several government garrisons in the region and abducting
government troops.153 The second largest NDA Party, the Sudan
Communist Party, vehemently denounced the Cairo accord and said it
would not join the new government even if the NDA did.154 The
discomfited NDA leadership instructed exiled cadres to return to Sudan
and join the political process but the chairman and other top figures
declared they would not return until the two pending issues were
settled. More broadly, the NDA continues to stress the need to
restructure the army, civil service, judiciary and security services along
national, non-partisan principles.155

152 “21 Sudanese plead not guilty in plot to overthrow president”, Sudan Tribune, Associated Press,
5 January.
153 The government retaliated by launching air raids on civilian targets, according to the rebels. Khartoum

also lodged a complaint at the UN Security Council against Eritrea, which it believes is behind the rebels.
154 "Nugud insists on Marxism; troops build-up on border with Eritrea; in Khartoum, al-Mahdi

indicates confrontation against the bilateralism of al-Bashir/Garang", in Arabic, al-Hayat, 29 June, 2005.
155 “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace”, International Crisis Group, Africa

Report No. 96, 25 July, 2005, p. 4.

1.5.4. The Sudanese Communist Party
The president of the republic, Omar Al-Bashir, received at the Guest
House the Secretary-General of the Sudanese Communist Party,
Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud. First Vice-President, Ali Osman Mohamed
Taha, and Minister of Information and Communications, Abdul-Basit
Sabdarat, attended this meeting. Following the meeting, Nugud said to
the Sudan News Agency that he responded to an invitation by the
President of the Republic, where discussions focused on the political
situations and issues facing the country, and the means of resolving
them, as well as unification of the political forces and participation of all
political forces without any exclusion. Sabdarat, on his part, described
the meeting of the President of the Republic with the Secretary General
of the Communist Party as a discussion on the issues of the homeland,
as the Sudan is passing a turning point and entering the stage of the
interim constitution, adding that the meeting was fruitful in discussing
all issues that concern all the people of Sudan.156
1.5.5 Unrest in Eastern Sudan
A Beja tribal representative on 30 January 2005, said at least 25 people
were killed and 196 injured in clashes in Port Sudan, raising the death
and injury toll provided by the tribe. A UN spokesperson claimed police
in Port Sudan fired on peaceful demonstrators, members of the Beja tribe
who had complained of neglect in the impoverished area. The Red Sea
governor on Saturday said 14 people had died in the riots, while a tribal
representative in Saudi Arabia claimed that 23 were killed. Amina
Dhirar, head of the Beja Congress movement in Khartoum, told The
Associated Press that at least 25 demonstrators had been killed and said
the figure could be higher since "some parents buried their dead,
preferring not to bring them to the morgue." The Beja Congress, an
exiled group representing numerous eastern Sudan tribes, rejected a
January 17 accord between the government and opposition groups to

156   “Sudanese president receives Communist party leader”, Sudan News Agency (SUNA), 27 June, 2005.

end a 16-year, low-intensity conflict. The group said the accord failed to
meet its demands for a share of wealth and power in the north-eastern
region. 157
On the other hand, a group of unshaven, uniformed men squatted on a
dusty floor, drinking coffee and talking softly, inured to the din of a
dawn chorus and the occasional braying of a donkey. The men had
recently returned from kidnapping six Sudanese officials and were now
relaxing in Hamesh Koreb – a simple sprawl of mud buildings in eastern
Sudan and the largest town in territory held by the rebel Beja Congress
Army. "We attacked the road to capture government soldiers and show
them we are a force," said Ali Hamed, a rebel company commander
dressed in tunic and sandals. "We are ready to fight against the
government until we get justice and equality in Sudan," he added. Like
better-known rebel groups in the western Sudanese region of Darfur, the
Beja are angry about the lack of development in their homeland and
accuse the central government in Khartoum of marginalising them. The
Beja rebels have held a small territory – around 15,000 square miles
(40,000 km2) – since 1997. Now they are threatening to step up attacks
after a lull in large-scale activities since 2002.158
Eastern Sudanese rebels have captured three government garrisons
south of Port Sudan and taken 10 prisoners, including an officer, an
eastern opposition party spokesperson said. Idriss Nour, spokesperson
of the Easten Front rebel movement based in Asmara, capital of Eritrea,
told Reuters the fighting began and continued for two days. "We took
three government garrisons and are near Tokar," he told Reuters by
telephone. "We have 10 prisoners including one officer." Tokar is about
120 km (75 miles) south of Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast. Sources in
the Sudanese armed forces in Khartoum confirmed there had been

157 “At Least 25 Killed In Port Sudan Protest-Tribal Official”, Sudan Tribune, Associated Press, 30
January, 2005.
158 Ed Harris, “Eastern rebels threaten new troubles in Sudan”, Reuters, 13 June, 2005.

fighting but would not give further details. Nour said the Eastern Front,
in a joint mission with a rebel group from Darfur, the JEM, had also
seized arms and equipment from government forces including a Land
Cruiser, five machineguns and rocket-propelled grenades.159 Sudan has
called for general mobilisation of its army reserves in the eastern region
bordering Eritrea to secure roads and an oil pipeline after rebels
kidnapped three politicians in May 2005, a local official said. Eastern
rebels joined with an insurgent group from the Darfur to kidnap three
local politicians in May on a major road in Sudan's poor east. "We called
our troops for mobilisation. This is to call all the reserves, in Red Sea
state and in Kassala state," governor Hatim al-Wasiyla stated.160
As a result of the offensive attacks on the governmental garrisons in the
east in June 2005, the Sudanese government has launched an intensive
aerial bombing campaign on civilian targets in its eastern Red Sea state
in an apparent bid to halt a rebellion in the region, two rebel groups
said. The groups, which attacked government positions south of Port
Sudan claimed to have made significant advances since, and accused
Khartoum of pursuing a policy similar to that used in its troubled
Darfur region. They said the bombing began in the Barka Valley and
resulted in a large but unknown number of civilian casualties who filled
hospitals in Port Sudan and the town of Tokar, 120 kilometres (75 miles)
south. "A lot of livestock were killed and the bombing is still going on,"
said Salah Barqueen, a senior official with the Eastern Front, a coalition
of rebel groups that complain their region has been marginalized by
Khartoum. "Many people are injured but we don't have figures," he said.
"The hospitals in Tokar and Port Sudan are closed because there are so
many people in the emergency rooms… They are bombing because they
failed to face our troops on the ground, so now they are doing the same
as in Darfur," Barqueen told reporters in the Eritrean capital of Asmara,

159   “East Sudan rebels report capturing government posts”, Reuters, 20 June, 2005.
160   “Sudan mobilises army reserves in east”, Reuters, 1 June, 2005.

where the Eastern Front has offices. "They don't bomb our troops
because they are afraid of being shot down by our defences," he said.161

Some Facts about the Eastern Rebels:
               – The movement is called the Eastern Front, a name taken in February
2005 from the amalgamation of two rebel groups called the Beja Congress and
the Rashaida Free Lions.
         – Like the rebels in Darfur and former insurgents in south Sudan, the
Eastern Front also says it is fighting neglect and discrimination against the
outlying regions from the central government in Khartoum.
          – The eastern rebels have held a small piece of territory adjacent to
neighbouring Eritrea – estimated at some 15,000 km2 – since 1997.
        – Until recently, there had been a lull in large-scale military activities
for about three years. But the Eastern Front says it has stepped up activities of
late, including capturing 20 government troops from an attack on three bases.
          – The rebels are from the Beja ethnic group. Some two million Beja – a
traditionally nomadic group – live in Sudan, with another 400,000 in
neighbouring Egypt and Eritrea, according to aid groups who work there.
        – Eastern Sudan is an arid, inhospitable landscape. But it contains the
nation's only port and is thus vital to Sudan's growing oil industry.
          – Sudan's government recently tried to appease the Beja by offering
some US$ 88 million over three years for development and infrastructure near
Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast.
         – Foreign analysts have said eastern Sudan could become the next
battleground in Africa's largest country, where the Darfur conflict has brought
international condemnation and a 21-year-old war in the South only ended a
few months ago.
          – One of the Darfur rebel groups, the JEM says it has sent members to
fight alongside the Eastern Front, despite a ceasefire agreement with Khartoum.

161   “Khartoum bombs civilians in Red Sea state – rebels say”, Agence France Presse, 24 June, 2005.

          – Khartoum accuses Eritrea of giving military backing to the eastern
rebels. The Eritrean government denies that, but acknowledges giving them
moral and political support.
         – Aid workers describe conditions in rebel-held eastern Sudan as
"medieval", with malnutrition rife.162

1.5.6 Unrest in Northern Sudan
According to the Sudan Tribune, five days after the meeting of the
Council of Hamdab dam affected People in the Marawi area, army
soldiers were patrolling the area day and night. In December 2005,
soldiers were occupying water wells seized by the Chinese contractors
from the nomads of the area earlier in the week, and an unknown
number of nomads’ animal died due to thirst and many nomad families
were leaving the area in search for water. The meeting of the affected
people in December was tightly surrounded by army soldiers armed
with heavy artillery and automatic machineguns. Journalists who
attended the meeting said that an eminent bloodshed was narrowly
avoided. They said the elderly people played a critical role in diffusing
the tension among more than seven thousand villagers who attended
the meeting, urging them to disperse peacefully and avoid confrontation
with army soldiers who were taking firing positions around the meeting
place. Four people were confirmed dead after the army soldiers diverted
the lorry carrying them to drive among the hills. Injuries of four others
are said to be serious. Recent report from the area said that the army is
diverting trucks carrying goods to the area or travelling through
towards villages on the Nile bank. The diversion route, which is 75 km
longer than that which runs through Sani, has caused a sudden and
sharp increase in consumer goods in the villages down on the river
banks. Events in the Sani area (30 km of the Nile bank opposite the dam
in Bayouda desert), escalated when a Chinese contractor hired by
Hamdab dam authorities and supported by the dams’ security forces,

162   “Facts about eastern Sudan rebels”, Reuters, 24 June, 2005.

occupied the water wells of the nomads living in the area, depriving
them from water. “The Chinese need water for work and use”, the
Chinese workers told the nomads, reports say. The US$ 1.8 billion
Hamdab dam project on the Nile fourth cataracts is financed by Arab
Funds and constructed by Chinese Contractors. Conflict between dam
authorities and the affected communities (75,000 people) arose when the
dam authorities refused to negotiate with the representatives of the
communities to ensure their rights and entitlements.163

163   “Tension looms after bloody clashes in Sudan’s Hamadab area”, Sudan Tribune, 12 December, 2005.

Part II

2.1 Sudan-US Relations
The United States have promised to support the implementation of the
CPA in Sudan. "We are firmly committed to normalizing our
relationship with the new government that will be formed as a result of
the North-South accord and to assisting with reconstruction and
development, but this can only take place with a Sudan that is at peace,
with the peace process being implemented throughout the entire
country," Powell said.164 In March 2005, US backed down from a threat to
veto a resolution on referral of Darfur war crimes to the ICC, having
obtained immunity guarantees for US staff.165
On the security cooperation of Sudan with the United States,
fundamentalists in London say that the unprecedented attack on the
Sudanese government by Ayman al-Zawahri, the number one ally of the
leader of Al-Qaida Organization Osama ben Laden, in his new tape that
was broadcast by the Qatari satellite channel Al-Jazeera (June 17) was
due to Khartoum's handing over to Washington files on Al-Qaida's
leaderships. Hani al-Subaie the director of Al-Maqrizi Research Centre
in London told Al-Sharq al-Awsat "Khartoum has turned over files with
photographs for most of the leaderships of Al-Qaida and the Egyptian
Jihad" who used to live in the Sudanese capital until they broke off and
left Sudan in 1995. He said that most of the fundamentalists who lived in
Khartoum used fictitious names or forged passports for security reasons,
but the Sudanese government knew their identities by virtue of a special
agreement between the security bodies and the leaders of the Islamic
groups. Ayman al-Zawahri, the number two man in Al-Qaida
Organization criticized "the American visualization of reforms" and

164   “US will help Sudan implement peace deal – Powell”, Sudan Tribune, Reuters, 1 January, 2005.
165   International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch No. 20, 1 April, 2005, p. 3.

attacked, according to the tape, the Sudanese, Saudi and Egyptian
governments according to what the channel cited.166
In her visit to Sudan, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urged the
African Union on, to cut through any bureaucratic or political obstacles
and speed up its deployment of troops to Sudan’s war-ravaged region of
Darfur. Rice also welcomed the formation of a unity government in
Sudan as a "positive development" but stayed prudent on a lifting of US
sanctions or the return of a US ambassador to Khartoum after eight
years’ absence.167
In hopes of keeping the peace process in the African state on track after
the death of former rebel leader and Vice-President John Garang, the
United States dispatched two senior envoys to Sudan: Connie Newman,
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Roger Winter,
Special Representative for Sudan, headed for Khartoum and the
country’s South. The two would "confer with the parties and encourage
them to maintain momentum on the comprehensive peace agreement"
signed in January and to press efforts to end the crisis in Darfur.168
In spite of promises of reviving diplomatic relations with Sudan, US President
George W. Bush has extended for one year sanctions against Sudan, a country the
United States considers a sponsor of terrorism, the White House announced. In a
press statement to the state-run SUNA, Haroun said all the reasons on which
Washington had relied in the past to impose the sanctions had been completely
eliminated pointing out that the decision to extend the sanctions had not taken this
into consideration.
Haroun said the reasons included the civil war in South Sudan and the
issue of human rights and since then a peace agreement had been
signed, a GoNU had been formed and the SPLM leader had been
nominated First Vice-President, which was the highest position in the
government. The other reasons, Haroun said, included accusations of

166 “Al-Qaida said angry at Sudan for passing data to US”, Al Sharq al-Awsat, 18 June, 2005.
167 “US Rice urges accelerated AU deployment in Darfur”, Agence France Presse, Sudan Tribune, 20
July, 2005.
168 “US dispatches top African envoys after Garang death”, Agence France Presse, 1 August, 2005.

Sudan shaking the regions’ stability. He explained that these accusations
were no longer valid since Sudan at present enjoyed cordial relations
with all the countries in the region.169
2.2 Sudan-European Union Relations
The European Union offered 400 million euros to Sudan following the
peace agreement, ending a 14-year freeze on development aid. But it
warned the release of the money over the next three years depended on
the effective implementation of the peace deal and increased efforts to
end a separate conflict in Darfur.170 The European Union restored ties
with Sudan and offered 50 million euros (US$ 65 million) in aid to help
boost the CPA. Senior EU and Sudanese officials signed a cooperation
agreement, which the European Commission said would launch an
immediate aid package of 25 million euros for the northern region and a
further 25 million for the South. "This meeting is the starting point of
normal relations between the European Union and Sudan," EU
Development and Humanitarian Aid Commissioner Louis Michel told
reporters. The EU, the world's leading aid donor, suspended cooperation
with Sudan during the war in 1990. It resumed political dialogue with
Khartoum in 1999 but did not re-launch cooperation. Normal relations
between Khartoum and Brussels will mean that Sudan now also has
access to a 400-million-euro development aid package from the EU's
Executive Commission.171
The European Union (EU) has allocated three million euros for boosting
the basic education in Sudan toward enforcing the signed CPA. The
federal Minister of Education, Ahmed Babiker Nahar, made this
declaration, after receiving an EU work team for educational support
programmes on 12 February 2005. The minister affirmed that Sudan is
confronted with the problems of educational dropout, poverty control,

169 “Sudan regrets renewed US sanctions”, Sudantribune, 4 November, 2005.
170 “EU offers to end aid freeze following Sudan peace deal”, Sudan Tribune, Associated Press, 2
January, 2005.
171 “EU restores ties with Sudan, offers quick aid”, Sudan Tribune, Reuters, 25 January, 2005.

improvement of the educational environment and lack of food, adding
that the EU support will help in the educational capacity-building.
2.3 Sudan-United Nations Relations
Welcoming the initialling of the final two protocols of the CPA, the
Security Council on 5 January voiced hope that the agreement will play
a role in resolving the separate conflict engulfing the country's Darfur
region in the west. In a press statement read out by Argentina's
Ambassador César Mayoral, Council President for January, the 15
members said they hoped the agreement "would have a positive impact
on the situation in Darfur,"172 The UN Security Council voted to
strengthen Darfur arms embargo and impose an asset freeze and travel
ban on those deemed to impede peace.173 According to the UN, in
March, violence was ongoing; it pulled staff out of most of western
Darfur following threats from the Janjaweed militia; and raised its
mortality estimates from 70,000 to at least 180,000, while accepting that
the true figure might be higher.174
The Security Council voted 24 March to send 10,000 troops and 700
civilians as a peacekeeping mission in South Sudan amidst fears over
stalling implementation of North-South Naivasha peace. The mission
was also sent to “foster peace in Darfur”.175 In a former report to the
Security Council, Secretary-General Kofi Annan said the force will help
Khartoum implement the CPA signed in Nairobi, Kenya, on January 9.
The contingent will include 750 military observers, 160 officers, small
peacekeeping units totaling 5,070 personnel and a protection force of
4,150 soldiers. An additional force of 755 police officers is proposed.176

172 “Security Council hopes South deal will help resolve Sudan's Darfur crisis”, Sudan Tribune, UN
News Centre, 5 January, 2005.
173 International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, 1 April, 2005, No. 20, p. 3.

174 Ibid.

175 Ibid.

176 “Annan asks for more than 10,000 peacekeepers for Sudan”, Agence France Presse, Sudan

Tribune, 1 Feburary, 2005.

The cost of deploying UN peacekeepers to help enforce the CPA will top
$1 billion in the first year, Annan said in a report. The estimate is based
on the phased deployment of 10,130 military personnel, 755 civilian
police, 1,018 international staff, 2,623 national staff and 214 United
Nations Volunteers, Annan said.177
The pace of the United Nations’ military deployment has increased but
remains behind schedule owing largely to delays in the force generation
process. As of 13 December, 2005, the strength of the military contingent
stood at 4,291 personnel, or 40 per cent of an expected total of 9,880.
Presently, 154 staff officers, 468 military observers and 3,669 TCC troops
are deployed from 51 countries. According to revised plans, the total
number of deployed military personnel should exceed 7,000 by mid-
February 2006. However, this is far below the foreseen requirement.
Although deployment of UNMOs should be completed by the end of
January 2006, the delayed mobilization of essential aviation, engineering
and demining units by several TCCs raises serious concerns as to
whether the monitors will have the logistical and other support that is so
critical to their effectiveness across the vast area of the ceasefire zone.
Moreover, delay in deployment of enabling units has consequences that
limit protection capacities.178
The CJMC has held fifteen meetings under the chairmanship of the
UNMIS Force Commander and continues to work effectively. It is
developing as a forum for oversight, coordination and liaison between
the parties, facilitating both parties’ implementation of the ceasefire
agreement. Most movements are now notified to the CJMC seven days
in advance. While considerable progress has been made in the collection
of data to permit verification and monitoring, both parties have yet to
provide complete data for all sectors. The CJMC has succeeded in
forging consensus on a number of disagreements between the parties,

177 “UN's Annan: Sudan peacekeepers would cost $1B in first year”, Associated Press, Sudan

Tribune, 23 Feburary, 2005.
178 UN Secretary-General Report on Sudan, 27 December, 2005.

for example, the entry of SPLA troops dedicated to JIU formation into
Abyei and Torit. UNMIS has also resolved a series of stand-offs at sector
level, including the deployment of SPLA forces into the former garrison
towns of Juba and Kadugli, and contributed to the restoration of security
following tribal clashes in Yambio. The CJMC has registered one
ceasefire violation by the SPLM/A, who have fallen behind the CPA
schedule for redeployment of troops from the East. 179
The SAF have nominated all of their JIU troops, but just over half this
amount are deployed so far. The SPLA have nominated approximately
60 per cent of their JIU, but inducted half of their total contribution. The
parties should form the Joint Defense Board (JDB) immediately in order
to provide command and control to these forces through the
establishment of suitable operational headquarters, as well as logistical
support and pay for the troops. The funding of the JIUs is a critical issue
that needs to be tackled by the GoNU through the establishment of the
The special UN envoy to Sudan counselled against the secession of
South Sudan which he said would destabilize regional and
international security, the Sudanese governmental SUNA agency said.
"If the Sudan does not remain one state, this will pose a threat to the
region and to international peace and security," said Jan Pronk at a
forum held at Khartoum University on the January North-South peace
accord. He called on the Sudanese people to make unity "an attractive
option in a referendum in South Sudan by the end of the six-year
transitional period" in 2011. A key point of the deal is the six-year
interim period of autonomy for the South after which it will hold a
referendum on secession. Pronk cited "the maintenance of peace, respect
for the rights of the minorities, states and women and equality in
revenue and power sharing," as conditions favouring the preservation of
a unified Sudan. He said the UN would help the former warring parties

179   Ibid.
180   Ibid.

disarm fighters, remove landmines, support development projects and
provide services essential for the repatriation of some four million
refugees that are starting to come back. The international body also
began deploying peacekeepers that are part of a 10,000-strong force.181
In the public information in Khartoum, the UNMIS Radio is ready to go
on air, but the Government has not allocated a frequency and is seeking
assurances that the content of all radio broadcasts will be linked to
UNMIS’ mandate. The UNMIS has given such assurances to the
Minister of Communication, but there has been no further progress on
this issue. Under a draft Memory of Understanding, UNMIS and the
Sudan Radio and Television Commission (SRTC) will cooperate at the
technical level, although UNMIS’ offer to provide technical training has
been rejected. The SRTC has stated that UNMIS will not be able to
broadcast independently in Darfur or areas in East Sudan, but may be
allowed some airtime on Government transmitters. In light of UNMIS’
overall mandate and the larger problem to be addressed in Darfur after
the reaching of a peace agreement, such a limitation will severely restrict
UNMIS’ broadcasting capability. In South Sudan, UNMIS is planning to
start radio transmission from new premises in Juba following positive
negotiations with the GoSS Minister of Information and Juba Radio and
TV. UNMIS will provide technical assistance to Juba Radio and TV in
exchange for the use of their facilities.182
The UN is deeply concerned about deployment of stronger force in
Darfur. When asked about the future UN peacekeeping operation in
Darfur, the Secretary-General said such a force would have a completely
different concept of operation than the current one. He described the
future force as a highly mobile one that would be able to crisscross the
territory in armored personnel carriers and jeeps. Furthermore, the force

181   “UN Sudan envoy counsels against any southern secession”, Agence France Presse, 2 June, 2005.
182   UN Secretary-General Report on Sudan, 27 December, 2005.

would also have tactical air assets to be able to be on the ground when
there is an SOS, not to arrive after the harm had been done.183
2.4 Sudan-International Criminal Court (ICC) Relations
The International Criminal Court (ICC) launched a formal investigation
into allegations of war crimes in Sudan's troubled Darfur region,
officials familiar with the case said. The court had been analyzing the
situation in Darfur since the United Nations referred to it allegations of
rape, murder and plunder in April, following a UN Security Council
vote. Dozens of court officials began preparing for the investigation, the
largest and most important yet to be handled by the fledgling body since
it was established in July 2002. Prosecutors were to announce the
decision to move forward in Darfur, and Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-
Ocampo was to brief the UN about his plans starting in June in New
York, the officials said, adding that they could not comment officially
until the investigation had been formally announced by the court.184 On
the other hand, the government gave its first Cabinet-level response to
the International Criminal Court to begin investigating war crimes in
Darfur, as the UN Security Council had mandated it to do. "Our decision
not to hand any Sudanese national for trial outside the country remains
valid and has not changed," Justice Minister Ali Karti was quoted
as saying by the official Sudan Media Center. He added that the
government had not yet been officially notified of the ICC investigation.185
2.5 Sudan-World Bank Relations
Barely in March 2005, two months after the signing of the CPA, the
World Bank considered normalising relations with the heavily indebted
country within a year, a local daily reported. The Sudan Vision quoted
Ishac Diwan, new World Bank country director in Sudan, as saying that

183 “Annan Envisions Mobile, Equipped UN Force for Darfur”, United Nations, Secretary-General, 9
February , 2006.
184 “ICC to probe Darfur war crimes”, Associated Press, 5 June, 2005.

185 “Sudan will not hand citizens to ICC over Darfur crimes – official”, Associated Press, 8 June, 2005.

Britain had taken the lead in normalising relations with Sudan, which
fell out of favour with international lenders when it failed to honour
debt repayments. "Sudan has been outside the international financial
community for about 20 years now and so, there are arrears to the
international community, to the private sector, to financial institutions,
to countries, and all this needs to be sorted out before Sudan can borrow
again," the private-owned newspaper quoted Diwan as saying in an
Sudan Foreign Minister al-Zubayr Ahmad al-Hassan estimated in early
June 2005 that 90% of national foreign debts will be erased. He said that
the General Manager of the World Bank will visit Sudan in late July
2005, and that the World Bank intends to open a permanent office in
Sudan and appoint permanent staff. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) also intends to open a permanent office in Sudan. The percentage
of debts of Sudan reaches 1500% of exports, and 150% of GDP; these
debts come to $25 billion.187
The World Bank has announced plans to reopen its offices in Sudan after
a 10-year absence, a sign of the international community's desire to help
the new government with its reconstruction efforts after decades of civil
war. The Bank plans to reopen its offices, which were closed in 1993, in
Khartoum for the North, and a second office for South Sudan, to be
based initially in Nairobi," said a statement by the World Bank.188
2.6 Sudan-Norway Relations
The new Norwegian minister of international development, Erik
Solheim, visited Khartoum for an official six-day visit during which he
meet government officials. Eric Solheim replaced Hilde Johnson. The
Norwegian official held talks on issues of joint concern within the
framework of bilateral relations, as well as on the important role played

186 “World Bank considers relations with Khartoum”, PANA, Sudan Tribune, 12 March 2005.
187 “Sudanese foreign debts about $25 billion”, Al Khaleej Newspaper, 28 August, 2005.
188 “World Bank to reopen offices in Sudan”, Sudan Tribune, Xinhua, 20 January 2005

by his country in the realization of the CPA and the organization of the
Oslo donors meeting that pledged to provide some US$ 4.5 billion for
the implementation of the CPA. Norway has been selected to head the
evaluation and follow-up commission on the implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.189
2.7 Sudan-China Relations
According to the Sudan Tribune, China’s trade and oil interests in Sudan
have induced the permanent UN Security Council member to provide
diplomatic cover for the government. Sudan has had its ‘back against
the wall’ of the UN headquarters in New York during the past 18
months over the conflict in Darfur, where tens of thousands of people
have died as a result of violence the United States has called genocide.
But the spectre of a Chinese veto has shielded Sudan from possible
sanctions over the conflict and in turn protected a growing source of
much-needed oil for Beijing. “This is Real Politik,” said Adwoa Kufuor,
a human rights analyst on Sudan, “yes, China has economic interests ...
and yes, China will not risk offending the government of Sudan.”
China’s heavy but understated presence in Sudan is symbolised by the
vast, walled compound housing its embassy on prime real estate in
Khartoum. It dominates Sudan’s crude oil sector, which produces
around 330,000 bbl/d, and is building roads, bridges and dams. China
has become Sudan’s biggest foreign investor with US$ 4 billion in
projects. "In key countries, China is becoming the new IMF of Africa
without the strings, or at least only with strings that are tied to Chinese
national commercial interests," said Martyn Davies, director of the
Centre for Chinese Studies at South Africa’s Stellenbosch University.190
2.8 Sudan-Egypt Relations
The strong relations with Egypt were temporarily affected due to the
death of a number of refugee Sudanese who were protesting in the

189   “Norwegian minister to visit Sudan on Monday 14 November”, Sudantribune, 12 November, 2005.
190   “China’s interests in Sudan bring diplomatic cover”, SudanTribune, 17 December, 2005.

centre of Cairo calling for rehabilitation into European countries.191 On
the other hand, UNHCR expressed deep shock and sadness over a
violent confrontation in Cairo between Egyptian police and Sudanese
protesters that left several people dead and injured. "There is no
justification for such violence and loss of life, High Commissioner
António Guterres said. This is a terrible tragedy and our condolences go
to all the families of those who died and to the injured."192 On the other
side, the Commercial Attaché at the Sudanese Embassy to Egypt, Fuad
Ibrahim Farah, said that Sudan and Egypt have affirmed the importance
of the establishment of basic infrastructures between the two countries
such as roads and railways toward pushing ahead the trade exchange
between them. In a press statement to the state-run SUNA, he said that
the two countries have adopted practical steps to implement the project of
a coastal highway between the Egyptian Suez and Port Sudan cities,
adding that the construction of this road is due to be completed in the
year 2006.
Sudan and Egypt agreed on 13 November to open their respective markets
for their products and to promote the role of the private sector in the fields
of trade and investment. Farah further said that the two sides also agreed
on the establishment of a road between Dongola-Halfa-Gastal, adding that
funding for this project has been provided. He pointed out that the volume
of the trade exchange between Sudan and Egypt amounted to US$ 175
million, below the aspirations of the two countries. The Sudanese diplomat
said that the joint Higher Sudanese-Egyptian Committee in its recent
meeting called for an increase of the trade exchange between the two
countries and removal of any hindrances in this regard. He said that the
recent fourth session of the Joint Higher Committee also stressed the
importance of reactivating the trade of meat between Sudan and Egypt,
adding that the Egyptian Prime Minister, during his meeting with

191 “UN’s Annan says saddened by the death of Sudanese refugees”, United Nations, 30 December,
192 “UN says shocked over Cairo deaths”, Geneva, 30 December, 2005.

Sudanese and Egyptian businessmen on the sidelines of the Joint Higher
Committee’s meeting, underscored the competitive quality of the Sudanese
meat and the capacity of the Egyptian market to absorb a bigger quantity of
2.9 Sudan-Ugandan Relations
The protocol allowing Uganda to enter Sudan and hunt for Joseph Kony,
the leader of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels, has expired. Defence
State Minister Ruth Nankabirwa stated that there was a need to extend the
protocol "so that we continue to cooperate with Sudan to oust Kony." The
protocol expired on 31 December, 2004. She said on the telephone that the
objectives of the protocol had to be achieved. “The main objective is to
make sure that Kony is no more and that the people of South Sudan and
Uganda are at peace, The protocol was giving responsibility to both
countries to wipe out Kony,” she added.194
2.10 Sudan-Japan Relations
The Japanese Government confirmed its contribution of Japanese Yen
568 million (about US$ 5.16 million) to support UNICEF-assisted
interventions in Sudan aimed at improving access to primary health care
and to contribute to the eradication of polio, prevention of measles, and
reduction in the malaria cases among children under-five and pregnant
women. The Exchange of Notes between the Government of Japan and
UNICEF took place on 22 August, 2005 at the Japanese Embassy in
Khartoum. This is the fifth year that the Japanese Government has
provided multi-million dollar support to the health sector in Sudan.
UNICEF and its partners, mainly the Ministry of Health, WHO, UNFPA,
the US Centers for Disease Control, Rotary International and many
NGOs, are targeting over 2 million children and women over the course
of the next 12 months with services, supplies and technical support.

193 “Sudan, Egypt to establish joint infrastructures, boost trade exchange”, Sudantribune, 22
December, 2005.
194 “Uganda, Sudan deal to pursue rebels expires”, Sudan Tribune, New Vision, 5 January, 2004.

“The Japanese Government is honoured to continue its support in the
area of women’s and children’s health,” said Mr. Masayuki Makiya,
Japan’s Ambassador to Sudan, “Malaria, measles and polio are still
major health problems and we must keep up the battle against them. For
that purpose, this contribution is intended to improve the routine
immunization programme as well as other health services.” He noted
that without a strong national immunization programme, efforts to
eradicate polio from the country would not be successful.
Some 1.9 million returnees and residents in host communities in the
southern states, the transition regions, the eastern region and the
Khartoum IDP areas, plus 150,000 people in Darfur are targeted in the
coming year with funds from the Japanese Government. This includes
410,000 children under five years old and 150,000 pregnant women.
While the contribution will be used to improve overall access to health
care, a focus will be maintained, as in past years, on polio eradication,
reducing child deaths due to measles, and reducing the number of
malaria cases and deaths from malaria amongst children and pregnant
women. Japan has been a major contributor to the polio eradication
programme in Sudan for several years. As of July, 151 polio cases have
been confirmed, including 126 in 2004 and 25 in 2005. Measles may
affect as many as 30 per cent of all children in between 9 and 59 months,
claiming up to 12,000 lives annually. The funds will be used to improve
immunization coverage against measles. Between 7 and 8 million
malaria cases occur in Sudan every year. The Japanese funds will
provide over 300,000 long-lasting treated mosquito nets for the
protection of 410,000 under five children and 150,000 pregnant women.
They will also be used to purchase Artemesinin-based Combination
Therapy (ACT) for at least 328,000 cases of malaria.
“Providing treatment for various childhood diseases is important but
not enough,” said UNICEF’s highest ranking officer in Sudan,
Kadayapreth Ramachandran. “That’s why this year’s generous
contribution from the Japanese Government will also be used to

promote good skills for parents and other child care takers. This will
improve the management of childhood illnesses in the home.”195

Sudanese crude oil production and exports have risen rapidly over the past few
years, with the Sudanese Energy Ministry expecting production to reach
500,000 bbl/d in 2005. Exploration and production are expected to increase as a
result of the CPA. Sudan's economy was almost exclusively agricultural until
the start of significant oil production in 1999.
Stable prices resulting from International Monetary Fund (IMF)-
approved macroeconomic policies have led to a slowdown in currency
depreciation and an improved fiscal balance. In 2004, Sudan 's real GDP
grew 6.5 per cent and is expected to grow 6.2 per cent in 2005. Exports
have increased sharply since the completion of a main oil export
pipeline in 1999, although the country ran a current account deficit of
US$ 727 million in 2003. Despite its economic progress, Sudan faces
various developmental obstacles, including limited infrastructure and
an external debt estimated in 2003 at US$ 24 billion. Continued
economic improvements are contingent on the country qualifying for
massive debt relief. Sudan contains proven reserves of 563 million
barrels of oil, more than twice the 262 million barrels estimated in 2001.
Because much of Sudanese oil exploration has been limited to the central
and south-central regions, Sudanese Energy Ministry representatives
estimate proven reserves at 700 million barrels and total reserves at five
billion barrels, including potential reserves in northwest Sudan, the Blue
Nile Basin, and the Red Sea area in eastern Sudan. Oil production has
risen steadily since the completion of an export pipeline in July 1999.
Crude oil production averaged 343,000 bbl/d in 2004, up from 270,000
bbl/d during 2003. In December 2004, Sudanese Energy Minister Awad
al-Jaz announced that oil production will likely increase to 500,000 bbl/d

  “$5 million Japanese Aid to Back UNICEF Children’s Health Programs”, Sudan Tribune, 22

August, 2005.

in 2005. Sudanese production may reach 750,000 bbl/d by late 2006 if
increases in output progress as planned.196 The recent peace agreement
between the government and the SPLA will likely lead to substantial
investment in both production facilities and new exploration initiatives
in the country. In January 2005, after the official signing of the CPA,
Total SA, Marathon Oil Corporation, and the Kuwait Foreign Petroleum
Company renewed their exploration rights in South Sudan .197
In 1996, Canadian independent Arakis Energy (Arakis) began
development of the Heglig and Unity fields (Blocks 1, 2, and 4),
estimated to contain recoverable reserves of 600 million to 1.2 billion
barrels. Because the fields were not located near the Red Sea coast,
Arakis entered into a consortium with the Greater Nile Petroleum
Operating Company (GNPOC) to raise investment for a 994-mile
pipeline from the fields to the Suakin oil terminal near Port Sudan. In
September 1999, the first cargo of "Nile Blend" crude departed the export
terminal. Although the pipeline from the fields to an export terminal
near Port Sudan was originally built to move 150,000 bbl/d, its capacity
reportedly can be expanded to 450,000 bbl/d. In January 2005, GNPOC
reported production of 325,000 bbl/d from Blocks 1, 2, and 4. In March
2003, Talisman sold its stake in GNPOC (acquired through its purchase
of Arakis) to India's national oil company, ONGC Videsh, due to
pressure from human rights organizations. In August 2004, ONGC
agreed to facilitate Sudan's purchase of the 25% stake. ONGC also plans
to give Sudapet a two per cent stake in Block 5A and a one per cent stake
in Block 5B. In June 2004, Petrodar, a consortium of the China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) (41%), Petronas (40%), Sudapet (8%),
Gulf Oil Petroleum (6%), and the Al-Thani Corporation (5%) awarded a
$239 million contract to Malaysia's Ranhill International and Sudan's
Petroneeds Services International for development work on blocks 3 and
7. The blocks contain the Adar Yeil and Tale fields, anticipated to come

196   “Sudan”, US Government Energy and Information Administration, March 2005.
197   Ibid.

online in 2005 with a combined capacity of 200,000 bbl/d. Capacity is
expected to increase to 300,000 bbl/d by late 2006. Construction will
include a 300,000 bbl/d central processing facility at Al-Jabalayan,
production facilities at Palogue, and a pipeline linking the two. CNPC's
Block 6 also came online in November 2004 at a rate of 10,000 bbl/d,
expected to eventually reach 170,000 bbl/d.198
Sudan has been self-sufficient in producing all petroleum products except
aviation fuel since the June 2000 opening of the Khartoum Oil Refinery.
The Khartoum refinery, built and operated by CNPC, produces benzene
and butane gas for domestic consumption and export, as well as gasoline
for local consumption. Although the Khartoum refinery has a named
crude refining capacity of 50,000 bbl/d, this reportedly increased to 70,000
bbl/d in June 2004.199 In August 2004, ONGC agreed to invest US$ 200
million in a 460-mile Sudanese pipeline in return for payment in crude oil.
The pipeline will have a capacity of 18,330 bbl/d and will transport gas,
oil, and gasoline from the Khartoum refinery to Port Sudan. Completion
is expected in October 2005. In addition to refineries at Khartoum and
Port Sudan, the country has two other refineries – El Gaily, with a
capacity of 50,000 bbl/d and El Obeid, with a capacity of 10,000 bbl/d.200
PetroSA, South Africa's national oil company, is to send technicians to
the Sudan to establish whether there are commercially exploitable
quantities of oil in an exploration block that it has been allocated.
President Thabo Mbeki paid a visit to Khartoum where he met his
Sudanese counterpart, President Omar Al-Beshir. The two leaders
agreed to encourage co-operation in the field of oil exploration. The
department of foreign affairs said in a statement before Mbeki's visit that
several South African companies had interests in the Sudan including

198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid.

the Global Railway Engineering Consortium of South Africa and
In Feburary, India was keenly looking to acquire more exploration blocks
in Sudan where it already has equity stakes in three concessions,
including the Greater Nile Oil Project producing around 15 million tons
annually. State-owned ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL), the overseas arm of Oil
and Natural Gas Corp (ONGC), expressed interest in two of the
exploration blocks that were to be awarded by Sudan. Sudan consumes
only 100,000 bbl/d and exports most of the current oil production of over
300,000 bpd, mainly from the Greater Nile project, a joint venture in
which India's OVL holds 25 per cent stake while the remaining is held by
Chinese, Malaysian and Sudanese partners. OVL is one of the bidders for
Blocks 12 and 15, along with Chinese and companies from other
countries, the minister al-Jaz said. Besides exploration, OVL has now
entered the downstream sector in Sudan having undertaken the funding
and construction of a 714-km petroleum products pipeline from
Khartoum Refinery to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. "We have another Block
13, adjacent to Block 115, which would be offered later for bidding after
Block 12," al-Jaz. Of the five more blocks that are to be offered for
exploration, a few more may be offered this year, the minister said. 202
Oil and Natural Gas Corp (ONGC), which is laying the 741-km long
petroleum product pipeline in Sudan, will also build a US$ 1.2 billion oil
refinery. "We had previously awarded the work of building a 100,000-
bbl/d refinery at Port Sudan to Malaysian firms, but the project could
not take off. We have now mandated ONGC to build the refinery,"
Sudanese Minister of Energy and Mining Awad Ahmed al-Jaz said.
Sudan wants to build the sixth refinery mainly for export of petroleum
products to south and east African countries, he said. ONGC will build

201 “PetroSA to explore oil possibilities in the Sudan”, Sudan Tribune, The Business Report, 5
January, 2005.
202 “India seeking more exploration blocks in Sudan”, Hindustan Times, Sudan Tribune, 1 February,


the refinery, which will refine Nile Blend crude oil produced in South
Sudan, on a build, operate and transfer (BOT) basis. It will take 32
months to build the refinery from the date of final signing of the
concession agreement. Sudan has also mandated ONGC to build a US$
200 million multi-product pipeline from Khartoum refinery to Port
Sudan. "Work on the pipeline is expected to be completed by August
2005," he said.203
An oil dispute between Khartoum and former southern rebels is proving
to be the first challenge to the peace deal they reached, but analysts and
officials say there is no risk to stability. The rhetoric has escalated between
the southern Sudanese authority and Khartoum over conflicting deals
signed respectively with British oil start-up White Nile and French giant
Total. The British firm signed a contract in July 2004 with the Nile
Petroleum Corp., which is the body set up by the former rebel movement
of SPLM to manage oil concessions. White Nile, a company co-founded
by former England cricketer Phil Edmonds, grabbed the headlines in
February 2005 when its share value multiplied 13 fold on the London
stock exchange after announcement of the deal. But in December 2004,
before the peace deal was signed, Total had renewed with Khartoum a
contract for the same oil fields it had signed more than 20 years ago.204
Indian explorations in Sudan are increasing. ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) is
expected to rake in around US$ 850 million during the current financial
year from its share in the Greater Nile oilfield in Sudan. OVL expects to
get around 3.3 million tons of crude this year as its share in the Greater
Nile oilfield and, like all other companies, has to pay a corporate tax on
its profits. The 25 per cent stake in the field was acquired for US$ 670
million and another US$ 160.4 million has been spent on developing it.
The sweet crude from the oilfield is considered as the same quality as

203 “India's ONGC to build US$ 1.2 billion refinery in Sudan”, Asia Pulse, Sudan Tribune, 3
February 2005.
204 “Oil causes first crack in Sudan peace deal but stability not endangered”, Agence France Presse,

Sudan Tribune, 9 March, 2005.

Nigeria's Bonny Light variety. "The average price could conservatively
work out to around US$ 46 per barrel for the year," a senior company
official told The Telegraph. According to petroleum ministry sources,
OVL's share in the balance proven oil reserves of the Greater Nile project
works out to around 20.4 million tons. However, this figure could go up
as the field is developed further. An ONGC official said, "It is quite
common to upgrade the reserves of good oilfields as they are developed
further and more oil is found in-place." The joint operating company,
which includes the Chinese national oil company and Malaysian
national company Petronas, is expected to invest another $350 million
for further exploration and development of the Greater Nile project
during 2005-9. OVL will have to foot 25 per cent of this cost, which
works out to US$ 87.5 million. Having established its credentials
through the Greater Nile project, OVL has gone on to acquire a 24.1 per
cent interest in exploration Block 5A and a 23.5 per cent share in Block
5B in Sudan. The Indian company has paid $135 million for the two
blocks and spent another $13 million on exploration and development
since then.205
Chinese integrated oil giant Petrochina has pre-emptive right to acquire
upstream assets held by its parent, state-owned China National Petroleum
Corp, in Sudan, the company's chief financial officer Wang Guoliang said.
In a media briefing announcing the company's agreement with CNPC to
buy the latter's overseas oil and gas assets under a newly formed joint
venture, Wang said both companies agreed not to include the Sudanese
upstream assets in their deal after studying this possibility for some time
because of the "sensitive" nature of the matter. However, "We have also
agreed that Petrochina will have the pre-emptive rights to acquire the
Sudan assets from CNPC" once the political upheaval in Sudan is
resolved, Wang said.206

205   “Indian OVL to garner $850 m from oil investment in Sudan”, The Telegraph, 13 March, 2005
206   “PetroChina has pre-emptive right over Sudan oil assets”, Platts, Sudan Tribune, 10 June, 2005.

Petroleum National Bhd (Petronas) aims to increase oil output at its
Sudan joint venture to one million bbl/d by 2007, The Sun reported,
citing Petronas president and chief executive Mohd Hassan Marican. He
said that the current output at its Sudan venture with China National
Petroleum Corp and Sudanese National Oil Corp was 300,000 bpd.
Petronas has been involved in the exploration and production of oil in
Sudan since 1997 and it holds a 30 per cent stake in the joint venture.
Mohd Hassan said Petronas is looking to increase its involvement in
developing the oil industry in the Organization of Islamic Conference
countries. Among the countries Petronas is entering is Iraq, where it is
involved mainly in the upstream sector. Petronas also has operations in
Iranýs Pars liquefied natural gas project and talks are ongoing on the
Despite the ongoing conflict in Darfur, it looks as if the North-South
peace deal could finally bring an end to the long-running Sudanese civil
war. The South is to be allowed self-government for a period of seven
years before a referendum on the fate of the region is held. Several
economic questions still need to be addressed, not least the division of
the country’s hydrocarbon revenues. The future of the oil sector was
obviously of paramount interest to the two sides in the peace
negotiations. An agreement to divide the revenues has been reached
although the final percentages have yet to be determined. The oil sector
is likely to provide the lion’s share of revenues for both sides for a long
time to come and it is vital for a deal to be struck that will take into
account fluctuating production. With average output of 343,000 bbl/d in
2004, Sudan is now the seventh biggest oil producer in Africa, after
Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Angola, Egypt and Equatorial Guinea.
According to the country’s minister of energy, Awad al-Jaz, output
could top 500,000 bbl/d by the end of 2005, reaching 750,000 bbl/d by
early 2007. While disputes over the split of oil revenues could lead to
renewed conflict between the two sides, the hydrocarbons sector could

207   “Petronas to raise Sudan oil output to 1 mln bpd by 2007”, AFX, Sudan Tribune, 22 June, 2005.

equally serve to improve relations between the two. Most oil is exported
via pipeline from South Sudan to Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast. It
would profit neither side if intensification of the conflict resulted in the
pipeline’s closure; as a result of improved pumping technology, pipeline
capacity is being increased from 150,000 bbl/d to 450,000 bbl/d, further
strengthening the North-South economic ties. In addition, CNPC has
begun work on construction of a new 200,000 bbl/d pipeline from the
Melut Basin fields on Block 6 in Western Kordofan to an oil refinery in
Khartoum. However, further export pipelines – probably connecting
oilfields with the oil export terminal at Port Sudan – may be required if
any new finds are made. Several projects already under development are
expected to take up all existing oil transportation capacity in the country.
With 40% equity, CNPC is the biggest stakeholder in the GNPOC, which
accounts for most production in the country. The other shareholders in
the company include Petronas of Malaysia (30%), India’s Oil and Natural
Gas Corporation (ONGC) (25%), and Sudan’s national oil company
Sudapet (5%). GNPOC controls the key Unity and Heglig fields on blocks
1, 2 and 4. The government’s production target for this year will be met if
another CNPC-led consortium is able to bring production on Blocks 3 and
7 in the Melut Basin on stream as planned. Output on the two blocks is
expected to rise sharply to 170,000 bbl/d before increasing to 300,000 bbl/d
within two years.
Malaysian National oil corporation Petroleum National Bhd (Petronas)
said it has won its first offshore oil and gas project in Sudan. Petronas
said it was awarded an area known as Block 15, covering a region of
28,655 square kilometers in the Red Sea Basin, after signing an
exploration and production sharing agreement. The move follows its
purchase of a 50 per cent stake in a refinery project in Sudan, to produce
high-quality petroleum products. Petronas Carigali Overseas, a unit of
Petronas, will hold a 35 per cent interest in Block 15, where half the
acreage is located in deep waters. The remaining equity is shared
between the CNPC, Sudan’s national oil company SUDAPET, Express

Petroleum of Nigeria and the Sudanese High Tech Group, it said in a
Sudan’s proven oil reserves stand at just 563 million barrels, which does
not place the country among the world’s, or even the region’s, most
important oil powers. However, remarkably little exploration work has
been carried out in the country as a result of the civil war, so the
eventual figure could be many times greater than this. Geologists have
talked enthusiastically for many years about Sudan’s potential and if the
peace deal holds, oil companies could return in force to explore large
swathes of the country that have so far been almost inaccessible. Oil
revenues not withstanding, a great deal of work remains to be done to
turn South Sudan into an economically viable state. The international
community is acutely aware that Africa has more than its fair share of
failed states and seems prepared to help finance the new territory, partly
in order to prevent a return of war in Sudan. A South Sudan donors’
conference was held in the Norwegian capital of Oslo in April with the
aim of raising US$ 2.6 billion to help establish the new territory. In the
event, a total of US$ 4.5 billion was pledged, although such conferences
are notorious for generating far more in pledges than is ever actually
handed over.
In fact, the failure of the SPLM to have secured either the Finance
Ministry or the Ministry for Mining and Energy marks the most
consequential defeat of southern hopes for meaningful representation in
the national government. For real political power now flows to the
government from huge oil revenues, not from any popular support
anywhere in Sudan, North or South. And these revenues are staggering.
Various wire reports and petroleum analysts indicate that current oil
production is in excess of 300,000 bbl/d, growing to perhaps 500,000 bbl/d
as production from Eastern Upper Nile comes on line later this year
(current production comes almost entirely from Western Upper Nile;

208   “Petronas wins first offshore project in Eastern Sudan”, Sudan Tribune, 31 August, 2005.

Upper Nile Province is all in South Sudan). At US$ 60/barrel, the lower
range of production translates into almost US$ 7 billion per year in annual
gross oil revenues; the upper rate of production would translate into US$ 11
billion per year. Much goes to the government’s Asian oil partners (China,
Malaysia, India), but the largest portion goes to the government itself.209
South Sudan has always looked to East Africa more than to Khartoum
and the North African states beyond. The war in South Sudan and the
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebellion in northern Uganda effectively
cut all links between the region and the rest of eastern Africa but the
new South Sudan government is likely to seek to forge closer ties with
Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania and perhaps eventually join the East
African Community (EAC). The new government is likely to comprise a
number of the main south Sudanese factions, although it is almost
certain to be headed by SPLA. The greatest symbol of the region’s future
is the proposed rail link with the Kenyan port of Mombasa. A tender has
recently been launched to manage services on the existing line that runs
from Mombasa to Nairobi and on to the Ugandan capital Kampala.
Plans have been drawn up to construct a new railway from the southern
Sudanese town of Juba to connect with the Kampala-Mombasa line. Not
only would this give south Sudan access to the sea via one of Africa’s
most important ports, but it would also help to bond the region
psychologically with East Africa. The New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (Nepad) is particularly keen to support cross-border
infrastructural projects along these lines and seems eager to champion
the railway. Under the terms of the peace deal, hammered out over
several years in Nairobi, southern Sudanese are guaranteed 30% of all
jobs in the Khartoum administration and civil service. In practice, the
South will have to look to itself for employment and to East Africa for
trade. Creating a viable country out of a war-torn region will not be easy

  Eric Reeves, “The Slow Collapse of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for South Sudan; The

Government of ‘National Unity’ serves as a fig-leaf for NIF ambitions”, 24 September, 2005.

but analysts believe Sudan may have taken the first steps on the road to
a peaceful future.210
Sudan’s economy is set to expand 13.4 per cent next year, from an
expected 8.3 per cent in 2005, amid higher oil output and profits, the
International Monetary Fund stated. In its mid-year review of the
Sudanese economy, the IMF said the increase in oil production from
new fields next year was "opportune", given reconstruction needs
following the end of more than 20 years of civil war. Sudan’s oil
revenues are expected to be 22 per cent higher than originally planned
this year, because of increases in world oil prices and despite delays in
the start-up of the new fields, the IMF said.211
Sudanese economic growth has been stable and the economy is expected
to grow by about eight per cent this year. The 12-month rate of inflation
was 14 per cent in July but fell to 8 per cent in September. High world oil
prices and capital inflows are strengthening the balance of payments
and contributing to exchange rate appreciation. During the first eight
months of this year, the Sudanese dinar appreciated by 17.5 per cent in
real effective terms. Despite higher oil prices and additional revenue, the
central government balance is projected to be in deficit of 0.6 per cent of
GDP in 2005 mainly because of the emergence of a large subsidy on
domestic fuels of about 2.9 per cent of GDP. The main priorities for
Sudan at the turn of 2005/2006 are (i) to agree on an all-Sudan poverty
reduction strategy; and (ii) to ensure full transparency of the oil sector.212

On 22 December, 2005 Sudanese Second Vice-President Ali Osman
Mohamed Taha met a Pakistani military delegation at the secretariat
general of the council of ministers in Khartoum, at the end of its visit
which lasted the whole week. The delegation was headed by the

210 “Sudanese Oil, Could it Now Bring About the Peace?” The Middle East, 31 July, 2005.
211 “Oil output, profits prop up Sudan economy”, Sudan Tribune, 13 December, 2005.
212 “UN Secretary-General Report on Sudan”, S/2005/821, 27 December, 2005.

Director General of the Joint Staff of the Pakistani Army, Lieutenant-
General Shahid Siddiq Tirmizey, and the Minister of National Defence,
Lieutenant-General Abdel Rahim Muhamed Hussein. The meeting
tackled the joint military cooperation at all levels. An agreement was
also signed to hold a series of meetings in the future in order to develop
and advance the capability of Sudan’s armed forces. It is worth recalling
that the Pakistani military delegation included representatives from
Pakistan’s air and naval forces.213

213   “Sudan’s Second VP meets Pakistani Military Delegation”, Sudan Tribune, 23 December, 2005.


                               Annex 1

                   The Draft Constitutional Text

                            16 March, 2005


We the people of the Sudan

Grateful to Almighty God who has bestowed upon us the wisdom and
will reach a Comprehensive Peace Agreement that has definitively put
an end to the longest running conflict in Africa.
Having survived the tragic consequences that have characterized that
debilitating conflict;
Committed to establish a decentralized democratic system of
governance in which power shall be peacefully transferred;
Further committed to gearing governance, in the coming phase of our
political advancement, towards the enhancement of economic
development, promotion of social harmony, deepening of religious
tolerance and building trust and confidence in the society generally;
Fully recognizing the right of self-determination for the people of South
Sudan so that the unity of the country is based on the free will of its
people and is made an attractive option; and
Guided by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January 2005, the
1998 Constitution, erstwhile Sudanese constitutional experiences and
other relevant experiences;

Do Hereby Adopt This Constitution
                        Part One
          The State, Constitution and Guiding Principles
                           Chapter One
                    The State and the Constitution
Nature of the State
The Republic of the Sudan is a sovereign, democratic, decentralized,
multicultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-
lingual State; Committed to the respect and promotion of human dignity
and founded on justice, equality and the advancement of human rights
and freedoms. It is an all embracing homeland wherein races and
cultures coalesce and religions co-exist in harmony.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 1
Machakos Protocol: 1.1 and Preamble
Sovereignty of the nation is vested in its people and shall be exercised in
accordance with the provision of this Constitution and the law, without
prejudice to the autonomy of Southern Sudan and the states;
Power Sharing: 1.4 1 Schedule F
Supremacy of the Interim Nation is vested in its people and shall be the
supreme law of the land. The Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan,
State constitutions and all laws shall comply with it.
Machakos Protocol: 3.1
Power Sharing 2.12.11 and 2.12.12
Fundamental Bases of the Constitution
This Constitution is predicated upon and guided by the following

(a) The unity of the Sudan shall be based on the fee will of its people, the rule of
law, democratic governance, accountability, equality, respect and justice for all
(b) Religion, beliefs, customs and traditions are a source of moral strength and
inspiration for the Sudanese people.
(c) The cultural and social diversity of the Sudanese people shall be the
foundation of national cohesion and shall not be used for causing division.
(d) The authority and powers of government emanate from the sovereign will
of the people exercised by them in free, direct and periodic elections conducted
through universal adult suffrage in secret balloting.

Machakos Protocol:
Sources of legislation
1) Nationally enacted legislation having effect only in respect of states outside
Southern Sudan shall have as its sources of legislation Shar‘ia and the
consensus of the people.
2) National enacted legislation applicable to Southern Sudan and/or states of
southern Sudan shall have as its sources of legislation popular consensus, the
values and the customs of the people of the Sudan, including their traditions
and religious beliefs, having regard to the Sudan’s diversity.
3) Where national legislation is currently in operation or is enacted and its
source is religious or customary law, then a state, and subject to Article 26(a)
herein in case of Southern Sudan, the majority of whose residents do not
practice such religion or custom may:
(a) Either introduce legislation so as to allow or provide for institutions or
practices in that state consistent with their religion or customs; or
(b) Refer the law to the Council of States for it to approve by a two-thirds
majority or initiate national legislation which will provide for such necessary
alternative institutions as is appropriate.

Machakos Protocol: 3.2.2. and 3.2.3

Religious Rights
The State shall respect the following rights:
(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief and to
establish and maintain places for these purposes.
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian
(c) To make, acquire and use the necessary articles and materials related to the
rites or customs of a religion or belief.
(d) To write, issue and disseminate religious publications.
(e) To teach religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes.
(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contribution from
individuals and private and public institutions.
(g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called
for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief.
(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in
accordance with the precepts of religious beliefs.
(i) To communicate with individuals and communities in matters of religions
and belief at national and international levels.

Machakos Protocol: 6.5
Nationality and Citizenship
1) Citizenship shall be the basis for equal rights and duties for all Sudanese.
2) Every person born to a Sudanese mother for father shall have a non-alienable
right to enjoy Sudanese nationality and citizenship.
3) The law shall regulate citizenship and naturalization; no naturalized
Sudanese shall be deprived of his/her acquired citizenship except in accordance
with the law.
4) A Sudanese national may acquire a nationality of another country as shall be
regulated by law.
Two Areas: Preamble
The 1998 Constitution: Article 22

1) All indigenous languages of the Sudan are national languages and shall be
respected, developed and promoted.
2) Arabic language is the widely spoken national language in the Sudan.
3) Arabic, as a major language of the national level, and English shall be the official
working language of the national government and the languages of instruction for
higher education.
4) In addition to Arabic and English, the legislature of any sub-national level of
government may adopt any other national language(s) as additional official working
language(s) at its level.
5) There shall be no discrimination against the use of either Arabic or English an
any level of government or state of education.
Power Sharing: 2.8
National Symbols
The law shall specify the national flag, national emblem, national
anthem, public seal, medals, national festivals and commemorations of
the State.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 5 and Schedule A:24

                                 Chapter 11

                   Guiding Principles and Directives

National Economy
The State shall develop and manage the national economy inorder to
promote prosperity, create an efficient and self-reliant economy; it shall
also enhance regional economic integration. The overarching aim of
economic development shall be the eradication of poverty within the
Millennium Development Goals, the minimization of inequalities of
income, and promotion of a decent quality of life for all citizens.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 8
Wealth Sharing: 1.4
Environment and Natural Resources
(1) The right of the people of the Sudan to a clean and diverse environment
shall be guaranteed and safeguarded; and the State and the citizens have the
duty to preserve and promote the country’s biodiversity. The State shall not
pursue any policy or take or permit any action, which may seriously affect the
existence of any species of animal or vegetarian life or their natural or adopted
(2) The State shall promote, through legislation, sustainable utilization of
natural resources and best practices with respect to management and control
Wealth Sharing Agreement: 1.10
Social Justice
1) The State shall develop strategies and policies to ensure social justice among
all people of the Sudan, especially through safeguarding means of livelihood
and opportunities of employment. To that end the State may also encourage
mutual assistance, self-help and charity.

2) No qualified person shall be denied access to a profession or employment on
the basis of physical disability; person with physical disabilities shall have the
right to participate in the social, vocational, creative or recreational activities.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 11
Education, Science, Art, Culture and Cultural Heritage
1) (a) The State shall promote education at the primary, secondary and tertiary
levels, all over the Sudan and shall ensure free education at the primary level
and in illiteracy eradication programmes.
(b) Any person or group of persons shall have the right to establish and
maintain private schools and other educational institutions at all levels in
accordance with the conditions and standards provided by law.
2) The State shall mobilize public, private and popular resources and capacities
for enhancement of education and development of scientific research, especially
Research and Development and information technology.
3)The State shall encourage and promote arts and crafts and performing arts
and foster their patronization by government institutions and individual
4) The State shall recognize the richness of the Sudan’s cultural diversity and
shall encourage such multiple cultures to harmoniously flourish and find
expression, especially through the official media and education.
5) The State shall protect Sudan’s cultural heritage, such as monuments and
places and objects of national, historic or religious importance, from
destruction, discretions, unlawful removal or illicit export;
The 1998 Constitution: Article 12
Two Areas: Preamble
Children, Youth and Sports
1) The State shall direct policies and provide facilities for youth welfare and
ensure that they develop morally and physically; the State shall also protect
children from moral and physical abuse and abandonment.

2) The State shall promote sports, especially in public education institutions and
through community centres, and facilitate for the youth to develop their
potential and enjoy their leisure in a healthy environment.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 14
Family, Women and Marriage
1) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to the protection of the law; the right of men and women of
marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized, according
to their respective family, laws and no marriage shall be entered into without
the free and full consent of the intending spouses;
2) The State shall emancipate women from injustice, promote gender equality
and encourage the role of women in family and public life.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 15
Power Sharing:
Morals and Public Integrity
1) The State shall enact laws to protect society from corruption, delinquency,
and social evils and steer the society as a whole towards acceptable social
values consistent with cultural and religious diversity of the Sudan;
2) To ensure integrity in public life, the State shall create institutions and enact
laws to eliminate corruption and inhibit abuse of power.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 16
Foreign Policy
1) The foreign policy of the Sudan shall serve, first and foremost, the national
interest. Foreign policy shall be conducted in an independent and transparent
manner with a view to achieving, inter alia, the following:
(a) Promotion of international cooperation, especially within the UN family and
other international and regional organizations, for the purposes of
consolidating universal peace, respecting International law and treaty
obligation and fostering a just world economic and political order.
(b) Enhancement of economic cooperation among countries of the global south.

(c) Fulfilment of African and Arab economic integration, each within the
ongoing regional plans and forums as well as promoting African and Arab
Unity and Afro-Arab cooperation as foreseen in those plans.
(d) Non-Interference in the affairs of other States, promotion of good
neighbourliness and mutual cooperation with all neighbours and maintaining
just and honourable relations with other countries.
(e) Combating international and trans-boundary organized crime and terrorism.
(f) Enhancement of respect for fundamental rights and basic freedoms in
regional and international affairs.
(g) Promotion of dialogue among civilians.
(2) The President of the Republic shall guide and supervise the foreign policy of
the State and ratify treaties and international agreements with the approval of
the National legislature.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 17
Power Sharing:,,, 2.9.14,
Defence of the Country
Defending the Country is an honour and a duty; the State shall care for
the combatants afflicted in war and the families of the martyrs.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 7
Security Arrangement: 1(b)
Ceasefire Agreement: 16.2
Public Health
The State shall promote public health and provide basic medial services
and facilities
The 1998 Constitution: Article 13
Fiscal Levies and Tariffs
No taxes, fees, tariffs or other fiscal dues, including Zakat on Muslims,
shall be levied save by law.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 28(2), 10

National Reconciliation
The State shall initiate a comprehensive process of national
reconciliation and healing that shall promote national harmony and
peaceful co-existence among all Sudanese.
Power Sharing: 1.7
Protocol on Abyei: Article 9
Unless this Constitution otherwise provides, or a duly enacted law
guarantees the rights and liberties described in this Chapter, the
provisions contained in this Chapter are no by themselves enforceable in
a court of law; however, the principles expressed herein are basic to
governance and the State is duty-bound to be guided by them, especially
in making laws;
The 1998 Constitution: Article 19

                               Chapter 111
                           Duties of the Citizens
Duties of the Citizens
1) It shall be the duty of every Sudanese citizen to owe allegiance to the
Republic of the Sudan, abide by this Constitution and respect the institutions
created thereunder, safeguard the territorial integrity of the country, having
due regard, in the later case, to the right of the citizens of Southern Sudan
provided for in Party Fifteen of this Constitution;
2) In particular every citizen shall:
(a) Defend the country and respond to the call for national defence within the
terms of this constitution.
(b) Abjure violence and instead, promote harmony, fraternity and tolerance
among all people of the Sudan transcending religious, regional, linguistic and
sectoral divisions.
(c) Preserve public assets and respect legal and financial obligations towards the
State and others.
(d) Avert and thwart corruption.
(e) Participate fully in the development of the country.
(f) Take part in the general elections and referenda as stipulated in this
Constitution and provided for by the law.
(g) Co-operate with the law enforcement agencies in the maintenance of law (h)
and order as provided for by law.
(i) Preserve the natural environment.
(j) Generally be guided and informed in his/her actions by the interests of the
nation, and the tenets enshrined in the Constitution.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 35

                                      Chapter 5

                The Decentralized System of Governance

Level of Government

The Sudan is a decentralized State, with the following levels of government:
(a) The national level of government, which shall exercise authority with a view
to protect the territorial integrity and the national sovereignty of the Sudan and
promote the welfare of its people.
(b) Southern Sudan level of government, which shall exercise authority in
respect of the people and states in Southern Sudan.
(c) The state governments throughout the Sudan, which shall exercise authority
at the state level and render public services through the level of government
close to the people.
(d) The level of local government throughout the Sudan.
Power Sharing:
Devolution of powers
The following principles shall guide the devolution and distribution of powers
between all levels of government:
(a) Recognition of both the sovereignty of the nation, as vested in its people, as
well as the autonomy of the Government of Southern Sudan and the states
throughout the Sudan.
(b) Affirmation of the need for norms and standards of governments and management
at national, as well as Southern Sudan and state levels, so as to reflect the unity of the
country while asserting the diversity of the Sudanese people.
(c) Acknowledgement of the role of the State in the promotion of the welfare of
the people and protect their human rights and fundamental freedoms.
(d) Recognition of the need for the involvement and participation of all
Sudanese people, particularly the people of Southern Sudan, at all levels of
government as an expression of the national unity of the country.

(e) Pursuit of good governance, accountability, transparency, democracy and
the rule of law at all levels of government to consolidate lasing peace.
Power Sharing 1.4
Intergovernmental Linkages
In the administration of the decentralized system of the country, the following
principles of inter-governmental linkages shall be respected:
(a) The linkage between the national government and the state in Southern
Sudan shall be through the Government of Southern Sudan
(b) In their relationship with each other or with other government organs, all
levels of government and particularly national, Southern Sudan and State
governments shall observe the following:
1) respect each others’ autonomy
2) collaborate in the task of governing and assist each other in fulfilling their
respective constitutional obligations
(c) Government organs at all levels shall perform their functions and exercise
their powers so as:
1) not to encroach on the powers or functions of other levels
2) not to assume powers for functions conferred upon any other level by this
3) to promote co-operation between all levels of government
4) to promote open communication between all levels of government
5) to render assistance and support to other levels of government
6) to advance good co-ordination of governmental functions,
7) to adhere to procedures of inter-governmental interaction,
8) to promote amicable settlement of disputes before attempting litigation
9) to respect the status and institutions of other levels of government
d) The harmonious and collaborative interaction of the different levels of
government shall be within the context of national unity and for the
achievement of a better quality of life for all.
Power Sharing Protocol: and

                                  Part 2
                            The Bill of Rights
Nature of the Bill of Rights
This Bill of Rights is a covenant between the Sudanese people and
between them and their government at every level and also a
commitment to respect and promote the human rights and fundamental
freedoms enshrined in this Constitution, it is the cornerstone of social
justice, equality and democracy in the Sudan; the Sate shall guarantee,
protect and fulfil this Bill; all rights and freedoms enshrined in
international human rights treaties, covenants and instruments ratified
by the Republic of the Sudan shall be an integrated part of this Bill.
Power Sharing: 1.6.1
Life and Human Dignity
Every human being has the inherent right to life, dignity and the
integrity of his/her person, which shall be protected by law; no one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his/her life.
The 1998 Constitution: 20
Power Sharing:
Personal Liberty
Every one has the right to liberty and security of persons; no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary detention nor be deprived of his/her liberty except
on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are
established by law.
Power Sharing:

Slavery and the slave trade in all their forms shall be prohibited; no one
shall be held in slavery or servitude. No one shall be required to perform
forced or compulsory labour except as a penalty by a court of law for
certain crimes as determined by law.
Power Sharing:
Equality before the Law
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled, without any
discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religious creed, political
or other opinion, national, social or ethnic origin, property, birth or other
status, to the equal protection of law.
The Constitution: Article 21
Protocol on Power Sharing:,
Equal rights of Men and Women
The equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and
political rights and all social, cultural and economic rights, including the
right of equal pay for equal work, shall be ensured.
Protocol of Power Sharing:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
Protocol on Power Sharing:
Fair Trial
1) Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons
for his/her arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against
2) In the determination of any criminal charges or rights and obligations in a
law suit, the accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a
competent independent and partial court of law.

3) Everyone charged with an offence shall be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law.
4) No one shall be held guilty on account of any sect or omission which did not
constitute an offence under national, Southern Sudan or state laws, or
international law at the time when it was committed;
5) In the determination of any criminal charge against anybody, he/she shall be
entitled to be tried in his/her presence without any undue delay and to defend
himself/herself in person or through legal assistance of his/her own choice and
to have legal aid assigned to him/her where the interest of justice so require.
Power Sharing:
Right to Litigation
(1) The right to litigate shall be guaranteed for all persons and no one shall be
denied the right to sue.
(2) Every one has the right to have any dispute, that can be resolved by the
application of law, decided in a fair public hearing before a court of law, or
where appropriate, before any other independent and impartial tribunal or
forum specified by law or agreement.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 33
Sanctity from Death Penalty
No death penalty shall be inflicted save as retribution or punishment for
extremely serious offences in accordance with the law.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 31
The private life of the citizens shall be inviolable, no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his/her privacy,
family, home or correspondence, the privacy of citizens shall not be
violated save with a judicial warrant or in accordance with the law.
Power Sharing:

Freedom of Creed and Worship
Every one shall have the right to the freedom of conscience and religious
creed, and shall have the right to declare his/her religion or creed and
manifest the same, subject to the requirements of law and public order,
by way of worship, education, practice, or performance of rites or
ceremonies; no one shall be coerced to adopt such faith, as he/she does
not believe in, nor to practice rites or services to which he/she does not
voluntarily consent.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 24
Power Sharing
Freedom of Expression of The Media
1) Every citizen shall have the right to the freedom of expression, reception of
information, publication and access to the press without prejudice to order
safety and public morals as determined by law.
2) The state shall guarantee the freedom of press and other media including the
right to information in a competitive environment as shall be regulated by law
in a democratic society.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 25
Power Sharing:
Freedom of Assembly and Association
1) The right of peaceful assembly shall be guaranteed; every one shall have the
right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join
political parties, associations and trade or professional unions for the protection
of his/her interests.
2) The right to establish political parties, associations and trade or professional
unions shall be guaranteed, the law shall regulate the exercise of this right as is
necessary in a democratic society;
3) No association shall function as a political party at the national level unless it:
(a) has its membership open to all Sudanese irrespective of religion, ethnic
origin, sex or place of birth

(b) has a programme that upholds the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and
conforms to this Constitution
(c) has a democratically elected leadership and institutions
(d) has disclosed and transparent sources of funding
The 1998 Constitution: Article 26
Power Sharing:
Right to Vote
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without
distinctions and unreasonable restrictions, to take part in the conduct of
public affairs, through voting and standing for election in genuine
periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal adult suffrage
and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the
will of the electors.
Protocol on Power Sharing:
Freedom of Movement and Residence
1) Every citizen shall have the right to the freedom of movement and the liberty
to choose his/her residence except for reasons of public health and safely as
shall be regulated by law.
2) Every citizen shall have the right to leave the country and return thereto as
shall be regulated by law.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 23
Power Sharing:
Right to Property
1) Every person shall have the right to acquire or own property;
2) No private property may be expropriated save by law in the public interest
and in consideration for prompt and fair compensation;
The 1998 Constitution: Article 28 (1)

Right to Education
1) Education is a right for every citizen and the State shall provide equal access
to education without discrimination as to religion, ethnic origin, gender or
physical disability.
(2) The State shall provide free primary education.

Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Persons with disabilities are entitled to enjoy all the rights and freedoms set out
in this Constitution; in particular, respect of their human dignity, access to
suitable education and employment and full participation in society shall be

Equal access to Public Health Care
All citizens shall have access to public health care and basic medical services.

Ethnic and Cultural Communities
Ethnic and cultural communities shall have the right to freely enjoy and
develop their particular cultures, practice their beliefs, use their
languages, observe their religions and raise their children within the
framework of their respective cultures.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 27
Sanctity of Rights
No derogation from the rights and freedoms enshrined in this Bill shall
be made except in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution
and only with the approval of the National legislature. This Bill of
human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be upheld, protected,
applied and enforced by the Constitutional Court and other competent
courts; the Human Rights Commission shall monitor its application and
The 1998 Constitution: Article 34
Power Sharing: (b) and (c)

                               Part 3
                       The National Executive
                         Chapter 1
       Composition and Powers of the National Executive
Composition of the National Executive
The National Executive shall consist of the Institution of Presidency and
the National Council of Ministers.
Power Sharing: 2.3.1
Powers of the National Executive
The National Executive shall exercise the executive powers and
competencies in respect of the matters in Schedules A and D, read
together with Schedules E and F, and as conferred upon it by this
Power Sharing: 2.3.2

                                   Chapter 11
                                 The Presidency
The Institution of the Presidency
1) The Institution of the Presidency shall consist of the President of the Republic
and the two Vice-Presidents.
2) There shall be partnership and collegial decision-making within the
Institution of the Presidency in order to safeguard stability in the country and
implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
Power Sharing: 2.3.2 and 2.3.4
The President of the Republic
1) There shall be a President for the Republic of the Sudan to be directly elected
by the people in national elections according to the law and the regulations set
by the National Electoral Commission.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 36
Power Sharing 2.3.7
Eligibility for the Office of the President
A Candidate for the office of the President of the Republic shall;
(a) be a Sudanese
(b) be of a sound mind
(c) be at least forty years of age
(d) not have been convicted, during the previous seven years, of an offence
connected with honesty or moral turpitude.
The 1998 Constitution : Article 37
Nomination and Election of the President
1) Any eligible voter may nominate whomever he/she deems fit for the office of
the President of the Republic, however, the Presidential candidate shall be
seconded by a number of eligible voters as shall be specified by law.
2) The Presidential candidate who wins more than fifty per cent of the total
shall be the President elect.

3) Where the percentage mentioned in sub-Article (2) above is not achieved,
there shall be a run off election between the two presidential candidates who
have obtained the highest number of votes.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 38
Postponement of Presidential Elections
1) When election of the President of the Republic is not possible for any reason,
as shall be decided by the National Electoral Commission according to the
electoral law, the National Electoral Commission shall fix a new date for the
elections as soon as practicable, but not later than sixty (60) days from the
scheduled date,
2) Pending the conduct of the postponed elections, the incumbent President of
the Republic shall continue as a caretaker President; and his/her tenure shall be
extended until the President takes the oath of office.

Oath of the President
To assume office, the President of the Republic elect shall take the
following oath before a meeting of the National legislature:
“I …….. swear by God the Almighty, that as the President of the
Republic of the Sudan, I shall be faithful and bear true allegiance to the
Republic of the Sudan and shall diligently and honestly discharge my
duties and responsibilities in a consultative manner to promote the
welfare and development of the nation; that I shall obey, preserve and
defend the Constitution and abide by the laws of the Republic; and shall
protect the sovereignty of the country, consolidate the democratic
decentralized system of government and preserve the integrity and
dignity of the people of the Sudan, as God is my witness.”
The 1998 Constitution: Article 40

Tenure of the President
The tenure of the President of the Republic shall be five years,
commenting from the date of assumption of office, and the same
President may be re-elected for only one more term.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 41
Functions of the President
(1) The President of the Republic is the Head of the State and Government and
represents the will of the people, he/she shall exercise the powers vested in
him/her by this Constitution and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and
shall, inter alia, perform the following functions:
(a) preservation of the security of the country and protection of its integrity.
Supervision of the executive constitutional institutions and provision leadership
in public affairs.
(b) Appointment of holders of constitutional and judicial posts in accordance
with the provisions of this Constitution and the law,
(c) Presiding over the National Council of Ministers
(d) Summoning, adjourning or proroguing the National Legislature,
(e) Declaration of war in accordance with the provision of this Constitution and
the law,
(f) Declaration state of emergency in accordance with the provision of this
Constitution and the law,
(g) May initiate draft constitution amendments and legislations and assent to
(h) Approving of death sentences, granting pardon, and remitting conviction or
penalty according to this Constitution and the national law.
(i) Representation of the State in its foreign relations, appointment of
ambassadors of the State, and accreditation of foreign ambassadors,
(j) Generally representing the authority of the State and the will of the people.
(k) Any other function as may be prescribed by this Constitution or the law.

2) Notwithstanding sub-Article (1) above, the President of the Republic shall, in
respect of the following matters, take decision with the consent of the First Vice-
(a) declaration and termination of a state of emergency,
(b) declaration of war,
(c) appointments that the President is required to make according to the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement,
(d) summoning, adjourning or proroguing the National legislature.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 43
Power Sharing: 2.36
Vacation of the President’s office
The office of the President of the Republic shall fall vacant in any of the
following cases:
(a) expiry of his/her tenure
(b) death
(c) mental infirmity or physical incapacity as determined by a resolution of the
National Legislature adopted by a three-quarters majority of all members,
(d) impeachment in accordance with the provision of this Constitution,
(e) presenting his/her written resignation to the National legislature,
The 1998 Constitution: Article 42
Immunity and Impeachment of the President
1) The President of the Republic shall be immune from any legal proceedings
and shall not be charged or sued in any court of law during his/her tenure.
2) Notwithstanding sub-Article (1) above, and in case of high treason, gross
violation of this Constitution or gross misconduct in relation to State affairs, the
President may be charged before the Constitutional Court upon a resolution
passed by two-thirds of all members of the National Legislature.
(1) In the event of conviction of the President of the Republic,
pursuant to sub-Article (2) above, the National Legislature may,
by a motion approved by three-quarters majority of all members,
remove the President from his/ her office.

The 1998 Constitution: Article 45
Contesting Acts of the President
Any person aggrieved by an act of the President of the Republic or of
the Institution of the Presidency, may contest such an act;
(a) before the Constitutional Court, if the alleged act involves a violation of this
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the decentralized system of government, or the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
(b) before the competent court of law, if the allegation is on other legal grounds.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 46
Vice-Presidents and Advisors
1) The elected President shall have two Vice-Presidents, one from Southern
Sudan and the other from Northern Sudan. If the elected President is from the
north, the position of the First Vice-President shall be filled by the person who
has been elected to the post of the President of the Government of Southern
Sudan, as the President’s appointee to the said position. In the event that a person
from the south wins the Presidential elections, he/she shall appoint the First Vice-
President from the north. All the other provisions in this Constitution relating to
the Presidency shall continue to apply;
2) The First Vice-President and the Vice-President shall fulfil the conditions of
eligibility for the office of the President.
3) The President of the Republic may appoint advisors, and define their
functions and seniorities.
4) To assume their respective offices, the two Vice President and the advisors shall
take, before the President of the Republic, the same oath taken by the President.
Power Sharing: 2.3.7
The 1988 Constitution: Article 37 and 44

Fuctions of the Vice-Presidents
1) The Vice-President shall have the following functions:
(a) act in the absence of the President,
(b) be a member of the National Council of Minsters,
(c) be member of the National Security Council,
(d) be a member of the Presidential Council in the pre-election period and
Chairman of the said Council in the post election period in the event of the
office of the President falling vacant,
(e) any other function or duty that may be assigned to him/her by the President.
2) The Vice-President shall have the following functions:
(a) act in the absence of the President and the First Vice President,
(b) be a member of the National Council of Ministers,
(c) be a member of the Presidential Council and Commander-in-Chief of Sudan
Armed Forces (SAF) in case of a vacancy in the office of the President according
to Article 65 and 66 herein,
(d) be a member of the National Security Council
(e) any other function or duty that may be assigned to him/her by the President
taking into account the hierarchy within the Institute of the Presidency.
Power Sharing : 2.3.3.
Vacation of the Office of the First Vice-President
If the office of the First Vice-President falls vacant, the President of the
Republic shall, subject to Article 68 below, appoint a new First Vice-
President in accordance with this Constitution.
Power Sharing 2.3.11

                             Chapter 111
                Interim Provisions for The Presidency
The Interim President and the First Vice-President
Prior to the elections that shall be held during the Interim Period
pursuant to Article 216 of this Constitution:
(a) The current incumbent President, or his successor, shall be the President of
the Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF),
(b) The current Chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement , or his
successor, shall be the First Vice-President and shall at the same time be the
President of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and Commander-in-
Chief of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).
Power Sharing 2.3.5
Vacation of President’s Office before Elections
Should the office of the President of the Republic fall vacant before the
(a) The functions of the President shall be assumed by a Presidential Council
comprising the Speaker of the National Assembly, the First Vice-President and
the Vice-President.
(b) The Speaker of the National Assembly shall be chairperson to the
Presidential Council.
(c) The Presidential Council shall take its decisions by consensus.
(d) The Vice-President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan Armed Forces.
(e) The Office of the President, notwithstanding Article 52 above or any other
provision of this Constitution, shall be filled by the nominee of the National
Congress Party (NCP) within two weeks of the date of the occurrence of the
such vacancy.
Power Sharing and 2.3.9

Vacation of the President’s Office after Elections
Should the office of the President of the Republic fall vacant after the
(a) the functions of the President shall be assumed by the Presidential Council
referred to in Article 66 (a) above,
(b) the First Vice-President shall be the chairperson of the Presidential Council
(c) The Presidential Council shall take its decision by consensus.
(d) The Vice-President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan Armed Forces.
(e) The post of the President shall be filled through presidential elections that
shall be conducted within sixty days in accordance with Article 52 of this
Power Sharing and 2.3.9
Vacation of the First Vice-President’s Office
1) Should the office of the First Vice-President fall vacant prior to elections, not
withstanding Article 64 above, it shall be filled by the nominee of the SPLM
within two weeks of the occurrence of that vacancy.
2) Should the vacancy mentioned above occur after the elections, the President shall
appoint the First Vice President in accordance with this Constitution.
Power Sharing : and
Interim Provision for Tenure of the President and the First Vice-
1) If the outcome of the referendum on self-determination confirms unity, the
President of the Republic and the First Vice-President shall complete the tenure
of their offices in accordance with the Provisions of Article 57.
2) In the event of a vote for secession by the people of Southern Sudan, the
President of the Republic or the First-Vice President, whoever is from the north,
shall continue; and whoever of the two is from the south shall be deemed to
have resigned, while the other shall continue as President to complete the
tenure to the next election.

                                  Chapter 4
                   The National Council of Ministers
Composition and Authority of the National Council of Ministers
1) The President of the Republic in consultation within the Institution of the
Presidency shall appoint the National Council of Ministers.
2) The President of the Republic, the First Vice-President and the Vice-
Presidency shall appoint the National Council of Ministers.
3) The National Council of Ministers shall be the highest national executive
authority in the State in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and
the law; the decision thereof shall be adopted by consensus, or in case of voting,
by simple majority.
4) Without prejudice to the powers reserved to the President of the Republic
and the Institution of the Presidency by this Constitution, decision of the
National Council of Ministers shall prevail over all other executive decisions.
5) There shall be National State Ministers appointment by the President of the
Republic, in consultation within the Institution of the Presidency, who shall
assist National Ministers and may act in their absence; they shall take the same
oath of office of the National Ministers.
The 1998 Constitution Article 47
Power Sharing 2.3.13 and 2.3.15
Global Matrix Appendix B: B2 (2)
Oath of the National Minsiter
The National Minister shall, upon his/her appointment, assume the
function of his/her office upon taking the following oath before the
President of the Republic:
“I …… having been appointed as National Minister, do hereby swear by
God the Almighty that I will at all times be faithful to the Republic of the
Sudan; that I will obey and respect the Constitution of the Republic of
the Sudan and abide by all laws of the country; loyally defend the
independence of the country, its unity and the democratic decentralized

system of government and faithfully serve the people and the country to
the best of my ability; as God is my witness.”
The 1998 Constitution: Article 48
Functions of the National Council of Ministers
The National Council of Ministers shall have the following functions:
(a) Policy planning for, and management of the State.
(b) Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
(c) Initiation of national legislative bills, provisional decrees, public budget,
international treaties and bilateral or multilateral agreement.
(d) Receiving reports about national executive performance for review and
(e) Receiving reports on the executive performance of states for information and
coordination, provided that in the case of states of Southern Sudan, reports
shall be received through the Government of Soutern Sudan.
(f) Receiving reports for supervision and decision on matters that are
concurrent, or residual, as provided for in Schedules E and F herein or
(g)Working out its internal regulations.
Any other function conferred thereupon by the President of the Republic or the
The 1998 Constitution: Article 49
Power Sharing, Schedule F
Functions of the National Minister
1) The National Minister shall be the head of his/her ministry, his/her
2) decision.
3) The President of the Republic may suspend the decision of a National
Minister pending review by the National Council of Ministers.
4) The National Minister and corresponding Ministers of Government of
Southern Sudan and the states shall collaborate in the task of governing and
assist each other in fulfilling their respective constitutional obligations.

5) Perform any public or political role and provide leadership in public affairs
to achieve the objectives of national policy.
6) Any other functions or power to be assigned by law or delegation.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 50
Power Sharing (b)
Collective and Individual Responsibility of National Ministers
1) Answerable to the President of the Republic, the National Council of
Ministers and the National Assembly.
2) Collectively and individually responsible before the National Assembly for
the performance of the National Council of Ministers.
3) Bound by the decisions of the National Council of Ministers.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 61
Power Sharing 2.3.12
Prohibition of Commercial Business
1) All Executive and legislative constitutional office holders, all justice and all
senior civil service officials shall, upon assumption of their duties, make a
confidential declaration of their assets and liabilities including those of their
spouses and children.
2) The President of the Republic, the Vice-Presidents, the Presidential Advisors,
the President of Government of Southern Sudan, National, Southern Sudan and
State Ministers or Governors shall, during their tenure, neither practice any
private profession, transact commercial business, nor receive compensation or
accept employment of any kind from any source other than the National
Government of Southern Sudan or a State government as the case may be.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 52
Vacation of the Office of National Minister
The office of national minister shall fall vacant in any of the following cases:
(a) Acceptance of resignation by the President of the Republic.
(b) Relief from office by the President of the Republic after consultation within
the Institution of the Presidency.

(c) Death.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 53
Confidentiality of Deliberations of the National Council of
Deliberations of the National Council of Ministers shall be confident;
and no proceedings of the Council or any information brought under
consideration, concerning a minister shall be disclosed, communicated
or revealed to any person except as may be required for the purpose of
public information or due discharge of his/her ministerial functions save
with permission of the Council.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 54
Contesting Ministerial Acts
An aggrieved person may contest an act of the National Council of
Ministers or a National Minister:
(a) before the Constitutional Court if the alleged act involves a violation of this
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the decentralized system of government or the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
(b) Before the competent authority or court of law if the allegation is on other
legal grounds.
The 1998 Constitution: Article 55
The whole text of Constitution available at

                                   Annex 2

  Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the Sudan
 People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) And the South Sudan Defense
                        Forces (SSDF)
                                January 8, 2006
The SPLA and SSDF having met in Juba between the 6th and 8th January, 2006
and fully aware of the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
regarding the status of the Other Armed Groups (OAG’s).
- Committed to upholding and defending the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
and its full implementation;
- Motivated by their desire for peace, reconciliation and unity among the people
of Southern Sudan;
- Determined to end all forms of conflict and hostilities among themselves, so as
to usher a new era of hope, stability and sustainable development in Southern
- Further determined to build trust and confidence among themselves and to
avoid past mistakes that have led to divisions and internecine conflict between
themselves and among the people of Southern Sudan in general;
- Cognizant of the fact that the SPLM led Government has already included
members of the SSDF in the institutions of Government of National Unity, the
Government of Southern Sudan and the Governments of the States to ensure
SSDF participation;
- Acknowledging that the people of Southern Sudan have one indivisible destiny;
- Inspired by the struggle and the immense sacrifices and suffering of our
people in defence of their land, freedom, dignity, culture identity and common
history; and
- Remembering our fallen heroes, heroines and martyrs who paid the ultimate
price for the freedom of our people and to ensure that these sacrifices are not in

Do hereby make the following Declaration to be known as the Juba
Declaration on Unity and Integration:
Complete and unconditional unity between the SPLA and SSDF.
- Agree to immediately integrate their two forces to form one unified, non
partisan Army under the name of SPLA as stipulated in the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement.
- Immediate and total cessation of all forms of hostilities and to ensure that all their
forces and persons under their control observe and comply with this declaration.
- Guarantee freedom of movement of people, goods and services in all areas in
Southern Sudan. Declaration of general amnesty covering any criminal acts
committed during the past period of hostilities between the two forces.
- Appeal to any armed persons or groups outside the two forces to join the
process of unity and reconciliation in order to promote peace, stability and
development throughout Southern Sudan.
- The unified Movement shall mobilize the people of Southern Sudan behind
this agreement and to support its implementation.

In implementation of this declaration the two parties agree to form the
following committees:
1. High Political Committee
There shall be a High Political Committee to oversee the overall
implementation of this unity agreement. It shall be established by the Chairman
of the SPLM and C- in - C of SPLA in consultation with Major- General Paulino
Matip Nhial, Chief of Staff of the SSDF.
2. Military Technical Committee
There shall be established a Military Technical Committee consisting of equal
numbers to implement the terms of this declaration. It shall be established by
the Chairman of the SPLM and C- in - C of SPLA in consultation with Major
General Paulino Matip Nhial, Chief of Staff of the SSDF. The Joint Military
Technical Committee shall report to the High Political Committee and handle
inter alia the following issues:

Integration of SSDF into the SPLA and its command structures and all its
component units including the Joint Integration Units.
-Harmonisation of ranks and deployment of forces and to report to the principals.
-Handle issues of demobilisation and downsizing of forces in accordance with
the provisions of the CPA.
-Report to the High Political Committee on all matters relating to this Unity Declaration.
3. Administrative and Civil Service Committee
This committee shall deal with the integration of non military personnel of
SSDF into the Civil Service of the Government of Southern Sudan and the
Governments of the States.
Call on the NCP and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) calls upon
its partner the NCP and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) to support this
agreement which has been guided by the provision of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement regarding the status of the Other
Armed Groups (OAG’s). The decision by the SSDF to be integrated into
the SPLA is a legitimate decision which will consolidate peace and
security in Southern Sudan and the Sudan at large. The two parties
signatory to the agreement call on all other Sudanese political forces to
support this declaration.
1.     Appeal to the International Community

The two parties also appeal to the international community to support
this agreement as it will consolidate peace in the Sudan and bring about
lasting peace among the people of Southern Sudan.
H.E Lt. General Salva Kiir Mayardit, 1st Vice President of the Republic
of Sudan, Chief of Staff of Southern Sudan, Chairman of the SPLM and
Commander- in-Chief of SPLA.
Major General Paulino Matip Nhial President of the Government of
South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF)
                            Witnessed by
     Mr. Aaron R. Tuikong S.S. Chief Executive, Moi Africa Institute (MAIN)


ABC     Abyei Boundary Commission
AEC     Assessment and Evaluation Commission
AJMC    Areas Joint Military Commission
AMIS    African Union Mission in Sudan
AU      African Union
CJMC    Ceasefire Joint Military Commission
CNPC    China National Petroleum Corporation
CPA     Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPC     Ceasefire Political Commission
CPMT    Civilian Protection Monitoring Team
GNPOC   Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
GoNU    Government of National Unity
GoS     Government of Sudan
GoSS    Government of South Sudan
ICC     International Criminal Court
ICG     International Crisis Group
IDP     Internal Displaced People
IGAD    Inter-Governmental Authority for Development
JDB     Joint Defence Board
JEM     Justice and Equality Movement
JIU     Joint Integrated Units
JMT     Joint Military Teams
LRA     Lord’s Resistance Army
NCP     National Congress Party
NCRC    National Constitutional Review Commission
NDA     National Democratic Alliance
NIF     National Islamic Front

NMRD      National Movement for Reform and Development
OAG       Other Armed Groups
ONGC      Oil and Natural Gas Corp
OVL       ONGC Videsh Limited
SAF       Sudan Armed Forces
SLA/SLM   Sudan Liberation Army/Movement
SNAF      Sudan's National Armed Forces
SPLM/A    Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SSDF      South Sudan Defence Forces
UNMIS     United Nations Mission in Sudan


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