Toyota: Lost in the lean

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					Toyota: Lost in the lean

Editor's Note
   Strict control of quality was a home-Toyota magic, respected by the industry to be
added to the "lean mode" it was once a manufacturing scale.
Today, Toyota recalls constantly turning wheel of different markets around the world
staged the same time, we ask: how a Toyota?
Toyota was sick, very sick. Expansion and reduce costs, in essence, not wrong. But if
any one of the mad pursuit of the "ultimate" level, will no doubt
be ignored in certain areas, which are ignored may exist some hidden dangers and
crises. It seems that this once highly respected automotive giant does need to reflect
on the.
Toyota: Lost in the lean
Kou Jiandong
   January 29, the official car on the Ren Fengtian president Akio Toyoda less than
one year in Davos, Switzerland Hotel has just appeared, he was surrounded by a
swarm of paparazzi outside. Related issues and Davos, journalists are more concerned
with the fourth generation descendant of the family as Toyota Toyota regain his power,
how to treat nearly 10,000 of the global recall of Toyota.
"For consumers uneasy concerned, I am deeply sorry." Thrown
a word, Toyoda M hurriedly got into a black Audi.
January 29, the official car on the Ren Fengtian president Akio Toyoda less than one
year in Davos, Switzerland Hotel has just appeared, he was surrounded by a swarm of
paparazzi outside. Related issues and Davos, journalists are more concerned with the
fourth generation descendant of the family as Toyota Toyota regain his power, how to
treat nearly 10,000 of the global recall of Toyota.
"For consumers uneasy concerned, I am deeply sorry." Thrown
a word, Toyoda M hurriedly got into a black Audi.
I do not know whether the realized Akio Toyoda, who ride as the official car of the
Audi Forum in Davos in almost 24 years ago encountered the same problems with the
current Toyota. In 1986, Audi sold in the U.S. 5000 (that is, the Audi 200) for
"uncontrollable acceleration" and mess up, the parking lot full
of "Do not Audi" sign. Until 15 years later, Audi was restored in
the U.S. market reputation and regain trust.
And Audi devastating blow that almost different, the Toyota greater tro uble. January
21, 2009, Toyota announced that due to the accelerator pedal problem in the United
States and Canada to recall 2.3 million vehicles; January 27, for the same reason,
Toyota recalled 1.09 million in the U.S. additional. After one day, FAW Toyota recall
from March 2009 to January 2010 production of the RAV4 7.5 万辆. This problem
also spread to Europe, involving 1.8 million.
January 26, Toyota announced plans in 2010 sales, the figure was 8.27 million,
representing growth of 6% in 2009. A loss in 2009 for the first time this year, Toyota
also plans to turn around, but now it seems that goal has become very slim.
Mongolia Grey's "Tau"
One day in August 2009, the families of Americans Makesaile is undoubtedly the
darkest. On this day, in California Highway Patrol's Makesele work to do
after driving his Lexus ES350 sedan driving on Interstate 125 on the way, vehicle
suddenly lost control, lit fires, Seiler and his family were killed.
Alarm telephone records show that 1 minute before the accident, and the Seiler family
with a car called police, said auto throttle can not rebound, braking also does not work.
Highway Traffic Safety Board investigators said they found at the scene of a rubber
mat, longer than the standard size models. Time of the accident, it may get stuck or
cover the gas pedal.
Was found at the scene of the rubber eventually proved to be the culprit cause of the
accident; then, the accident led to Toyota in the U.S. market, the largest one Recall -
September 29, 2009 Toyota announced: plans to recall 3.8 million sold in the U.S. car.
Toyota Motor Corporation in the United States issued the recall, has a number of legal
disputes from the public, particularly Toyota and former employees 迪米特斯比勒
Texas litigation lawyers 托德特雷西, etc. These issues are further exposed . And for
the same reason the recall also is not the first place. In 2007, because the problem
pads Toyota recalled 55,000 in the U.S. Camry and Lexus ES350. That time, these
two brands used by the pad slide forward easily lead to abnormal situation throttle.
In China, Toyota also perilous. April 21, 2009, the world's eyes are fixed
on Shanghai Auto Show, all the car manufacturers are hoping that China's
auto show perfect present their products more competitive. Contrast with the
enthusiasm of the exhibition hall, exhibition hall outside the message to
Toyota's delight half. On this day, "CCTV" in
different time periods produced in Guangzhou Toyota Camry series models exist
brake problems were reported.
4 months later, Toyota also hit a record in the Chinese market is not proud of another
record: nearly 70 million cars electric window switches because of quality problems
and were recalled.
Toyota slightly painful humming: "Why do I always hurt?"
Used     to     guarantee the quality             and   credibility    of the Toyota
"cow-standard",               is     now        being     layers    of
"cloud" overshadowed.
Comprehensive "transformation"
"New York Times" reporter in Detroit 米什莱恩梅 Nader in
her book "The decline of Detroit," one wrote:
"Toyota has been hampered because of standing pat while the situation.
However, some of its managers to see if Toyota will have access to change
management development, and they are to achieve the company's goals
and strategies to find the right way. "
米什莱恩梅 Nader wrote these words, Toyota has started to become no longer
cautious and conservative, but take a very quick, even aggressive expansion strategy.
In 1995, as Toyota president Hiroshi Okuda, Maynard wrote in his book:
"that he promoted the expansion of Toyota's manufacturing in
the United States, Indiana, he bought a farm in Princeton, established truck production
factory. then Okuda proposed to enter the light truck market, Toyota, and he played in
the choice of successor, a key role. his successor Cho is now pushing his plan into
actual operation of the stage. "
In 1974, when Cho was assigned to assist Taiichi Ohno (TPS (Toyota Production
System) is the originator) to improve the efficiency of the company's
administration, he has worked 14 years at Toyota. Worked with all the staff at Toyota,
as Cho and deep understanding of TPS zeal. The early 70s of the 20th century,
Japan's economy and recession, so, he streamlined the Toyota's
extra-wide business in Japan, saving a few million yen. Fujio hope this action will be
appreciated by Taiichi Ohno, but the result was reprimanded. "Are you
stupid?" Taiichi Ohno bellowed. In Ohno seems Cho knew reduce
inventory, but did not notice the development prospects of the company, did not
notice from the recession in Japan is to get out. Taiichi Ohno said: "We are
going to rapid development, we need is more inventory, not the crunch!"
He told Cho, do not always bound by past and present, should learn to look ahead.
Cho is on this matter, is a profound lesson, but also a vivid lesson. Hard to say after
21 years as president of Toyota Fujio Cho Toyota set a global goal of the first related
to this, but presumably he will not forget that Ono was on his teachings and
Toyota's rapid expansion in the United States, 2006 to invest 850 million
U.S. dollars of the Toyota Tundra (Tundra) plant production for the sign and reached a
peak. This indicates that Toyota is not only economical and luxury cars in the field of
competition for the U.S. market, also plans to all automotive vehicles to competing
with the United States.
To VI from CCC21
The human brain is how to control the body's various functions? Migratory
birds flying over the Himalayas each year has the characteristics of what?
This is a Toyota in April 2005 started, "Value Innovation Programme (VI,
Value Innovation)", it's R & D personnel thought.
"VI program multiple components combined into standard components,
and elimination of unnecessary components, thereby reducing the cost of components.
Our goal is to reduce by half the number of parts." Former president of
Toyota Katsuaki Watanabe said, VI areas involved in more than a single project to be
based on "cost to build the 21 st Century Competitiveness"
program (CCC21, Construction of Cost Competitiveness 21st Century).
CCC21 was president when Cho Ren Fengtian car in 1999 proposed a cost
improvement program, aim for 3 consecutive years of cuts will cost an average of
30% of control level. The plan shocked the world auto industry, the outside, the cost
level is close to the limit of Toyota once again a significant reduction in the cost is
almost impossible task. June 2005, Katsuaki Watanabe succeeded Fujio Cho as
president of Toyota Motor. In the CCC21 basis, he proposed a VI program.
And CCC21 different, VI is a great unit as the benchmark for cost control. Past the
whole process from design to lower vehicle production cost chain, a step forward now
extends to include the design concept stage, that stage in the design concept must take
into account the benefit of the entire production chain of production costs of all links
in the control of problem.
To avoid waste and lean manufacturing has always been the essence of TPS, while in
the late 90 century, the rapid expansion of the road onto the Toyota really need such a
cost control program. "We must focus on two aspects: One is to improve
quality, and the second is to reduce costs. Our products must be best in the world, the
speed of introduction of new products to be the fastest, lowest cost of production must
be." Watanabe said that only this can support the expansion of Toyota.
CCC21 and VI of the Toyota's contribution is obvious. The mid 90s in the
20th century, Toyota's revenue is not nearly compelling. 1993 to 1998,
Toyota's average annual net income of about 2.5 billion U.S. dollars,
compared to 4.5 billion General Motors, Ford was 73 million. However,
CCC21's implement a plan in 2006 Toyota's net profit Qiju E
Dadao time in its history of Zuigao level, Tai Yue Wei 17 billion U.S. dollars. As
expected, VI annual savings for the Toyota over 200 billion yen (about 20 billion U.S.
dollars) in production costs.
July 2006, Toyota recall vehicles in the Japanese market that the cumulative scale of
110 million vehicles, and this data is the 2002 Toyota global recall of more than
double the total number of 485,000. The Japanese domestic market, the largest recall
involving nearly 10 vehicles, mostly in January 2001 to 10 during the month of
December 2009, the U.S. federal regulators began to Toyota Corolla and Matrix cars
for vehicle computer systems for electronic control unit (ECU) sudden extinction of
the way there to conduct preliminary investigations, the ECU is precisely VI in 2006,
Toyota plans focus on improvement projects.
No evidence of frequent large-scale recall in Toyota and CCC21 and direct
relationship between the VI, but this "coincidence", but can not
let Toyota to re-examine its cost reduction plan.
Clumsy elephant
The pressure from the outside, Toyota recall the beginning of large-scale
"perpetrators," Toyota pedal manufacturer - CTS Corporation
American feeling very bad.
Head of investor relations CTS Mitchell Walorsk some complain: CTS for the Toyota
supply gas pedal and without any quality problems, fully comply with product
specifications; Moreover, Toyota is also involved in the design of this pedal,
production and testing, quality control is strictly in accordance with the provisions,
the "otherwise why Toyota to 'strict quality control'
known it?"
Is indeed true. Down almost to madness cost plan will no doubt be ignored in certain
areas - these are definitely not ignored initiative. However, for the automotive industry,
from product design (including parts), calibration, testing, shaping, to mass
production, no link has been found of the possible, not to mention has been known to
lean Toyota.
Tragedy finally happened.
Research or an inspection tour of the Toyota production methods, will certainly
remember that Toyota has a factory production line can readily reach the
"safety light rope." When a team staff member who discovered
the problem while pulling the rope, the alarm light will light up, the whole assembly
line automatically stop running. Coherence in all this process, problems can occur
without delay. The workers know very early on, and find it more and more important
thing is to find and point out where the problem is, even if it slows the whole process
to a halt.
In the long years, the "safety lamp cord" has become
Toyota's corporate culture throughout the company - the
company's management, pulling "safety lamp cord"
means the production line as they make the team as an immediate alert of the problem,
whether the problem is What. But this time, no one go pull it ourselves,
"rope" of.
In 1989, the second generation Camry start running the U.S. market, but soon, the
United States Vehicle Safety Research Center has received complaints that some
Camry electrical failure exists, leading to the door and the door can not open.
Communication with no results after Toyota, Vehicle Safety Research Center to the
United States, "Consumer Reports" magazine broke the news
"proposal Camry driver in the car to bring a hammer to broken windows to
escape when in danger." To response to these reports, Toyota recalled more
than 50 million problem Camry. This is Toyota's 50 years since the last
century into the U.S. market, the first such large-scale recall.
Later, Toyota after an internal investigation found that the root causes of
unresponsiveness is responsible for the design of the product engineers in Japan, the
United States is responsible for manufacturing production managers and sales
managers lack the necessary communication.
This is a time to give Toyota learn from the mistakes of the most important
opportunity, however, Toyota has not done so. Until 2003, most Japanese of sea lions
Toyota car company - a 58-member board of directors, members of all Japanese men -
the same period, Honda, and only a 25- member board of directors, another Japanese
car enterprises Nissan are working hard to reduce its board to seven people.
"I am sick of the signs of large enterprises. As a company, Gui Mo has
been the development of very large, the organization very complicated. Tuichi solve
the problem, after all maintain the status quo is also a trend. President, vice president,
should be made as soon as possible decisions and to implement the means to
overcome the disease of large enterprises. "officially in 2005 on Ren
Fengtian car news conference President, Katsuaki Watanabe says. However, after two
years, Watanabe said in an interview, now I do not need brakes; However, once found
dangerous, I will not hesitate to brake.
So now is the Toyota did not hesitate to time to brake it?
Reporter observed VIEW
Back to the start
   Toyota to recall successive endless shame, or even be regarded as a myth of the
Toyota Production System (TPS) are overshadowed. There is no doubt, platform
strategy, components GM, and Toyota's unique procurement and supply
system and reducing the cost of crazy schemes, leading to a series of recalls of direct
incentives. But behind it is "Toyota Way" (TW, The Toyota Way,
is also translated as "Toyota") is lost.
   TW made in 2001 by Toyota to replace the TPS. With different well-known TPS
(TPS are the two pillars of "self" and "Just in
Time"), TW's two pillars of "continuous
improvement"                 (Continuous             improvement)             and
"respect" (Respect for People).
   Here the "people", both clients, including employees and
suppliers. "Customer first" is one of Toyota's core
principles. The customers of this concept is not limited to end-users. On the assembly
line, the next station before the user is a client workstation. "This means
we need to strengthen the team. If you Neng abide by this principle, yo u will always
reflect on his order to perfect the job done not to trouble left customers. And it will
train you find problems. If You can carefully observe the problem, it will bring about
improvement or continuous improvement. "Toyoda male predecessor, Mr.
Watanabe       received      in  2007,"        Harvard       Business     Review,
"described an interview with the main points of its two pillars TW between
internal relations, "After all, Toyota is dissatisfied with the status
   "Dissatisfaction with the status quo" is not wrong, otherwise
Toyota would not stand in the global car industry's peak, receiving
multitudes worship. But the problem is that Toyota's original
"continuous improvement" Faith is growing dim. Toyoda M in
2009 after the president issued a formal warning on Renfeng Tian, "Toyota
is facing 'lazy compromise, or life and death' of the
   Toyota has been sick, very sick at this time it entered the Jim Collins (Jim Collins)
as outlined in the "disappearance of five-steps" in the third
phase - "deny the existence of the risks and dangers." Collins to
the stage described as "business operators at this stage dismissive of
negative information, only data on the happy clamor big plus for those who only do
positive ambiguous interpretation of data." When the "big risk
in taking risks and not deny the results of those in power will bring serious threats to
enterprise security start, they went straight to the fourth stage - looking for life-saving
   Fortunately, Akio Toyoda said Collins did not take radical action, but
"U-turn back to strong growth of those who gave its business principle of
the road." Akio Toyota inaugurated president before, he had said to lead
the Toyota "back to the start." What is the origin of Toyota?
There is no doubt, is the TPS and "Toyota Way."
   Large-scale recall is not terrible, as Collins put it, "out of the dark road
is from those who have been awakened, and naturally would not have discouraged
those who started the tenacious quality. Should be aware that failure is not the cause
of failure, as did mental incurable, the decline of the success and rise again, the cycle
is endless. "
   Crashing down to strong will, but they often stand up again.
(From: China Business Network)

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