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EARLY WARNING IN ETHIOPIA ANALY

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					     EARLY WARNING IN ETHIOPIA:
                       ANALYSIS




              Human Rights & Genocide Clinic
                   Cardozo School of Law
Written by: Christina Holder, Zeba Huq, Mary Catherine Ryan
    Supervised and edited by: Sheri P. Rosenberg, Director
             and Matt Miller, Teaching Assistant
                       December 2006



                                                              1
                                                             TABLE OF CONTENTS
II. BACKGROUND ..........................................................................................................................................5
   1. 1994 CONSTITUTION ...................................................................................................................................6
   2. 2005 ELECTIONS .........................................................................................................................................7
III. GENERAL WARNING SIGNS ...............................................................................................................8
   1. EXISTENCE OF AN ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS GROUP AT RISK ..................................................................9
      (a) Ethnic groups at risk ............................................................................................................................9
      (b) Religious groups at risk .......................................................................................................................9
      (c) Concentration of power in EPRDF and growing authoritarianism................................................10
   2. VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, WHICH MAY BECOME MASSIVE OR SERIOUS .....................11
      (a) Violations of civil and political rights...............................................................................................11
      (b) Lack of framework to seek justice .....................................................................................................13
      (c) Serious or massive violations of economic, social and cultural rights...........................................14
   3. HISTORY OF GENOCIDE ..........................................................................................................................15
      (a) Red Terror...........................................................................................................................................15
IV. INDIVIDUAL GROUP ANALYSIS......................................................................................................16
   A. AMHARA ..................................................................................................................................................16
      Warning Signs Implicated........................................................................................................................18
   B. TIGRAY ....................................................................................................................................................20
      Warning Signs Implicated........................................................................................................................21
   C. OROMO ....................................................................................................................................................22
      Warning Signs Implicated........................................................................................................................24
   D. SOMALI ....................................................................................................................................................27
      Warning Signs Implicated........................................................................................................................28
   E. SIDAMA....................................................................................................................................................30
      Warning Signs Implicated........................................................................................................................30
   F. GURAGE....................................................................................................................................................31
      Warning Signs Implicated........................................................................................................................32
V. ETHIOPIA’S LEGAL OBLIGATIONS ................................................................................................33
   INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS .............................................................................................................34
     1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR.)...........................................................................34
     2. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) ...................................................34
     3. International Convention on Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights (ICECSR) ...........................35
   OTHER TREATY BASED OBLIGATIONS WITH REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ......................................37
     1. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) ...37
     2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).........38
     3. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) ...................................................................................39
     4. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
     (CAT).........................................................................................................................................................41
   HUMANITARIAN LAW ..................................................................................................................................42
     The Geneva Conventions and Domestic Prohibitions on War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
     ...................................................................................................................................................................42
   GENOCIDE PROHIBITION ............................................................................................................................42
     Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide ................................................................42
   CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................43
VI. ENTRY POINTS ......................................................................................................................................43


                                                                                                                                                                        2
  TO THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT: .........................................................................................................43
  TO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS:..........................................................................................44
  TO INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS: ......................................................................................................44
  TO THE SPECIAL ADVISOR: .......................................................................................................................45

APPENDIX 1: Partial Warning Signs that Might Lead to Genocide
APPENDIX 2: Chart of Legal Violations




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I. INTRODUCTION


        Although Ethiopia has struggled to form a united national identity “[t]he history of the modern
state of Ethiopia has been punctuated by failed attempts to develop a multiethnic unitary state in which all
citizens feel a primary allegiance to the state itself rather than to their particular ethnic group.”1 With
dozens of ethnic groups within its borders, Ethiopia challenges the relevant actors to untangle the myriad
ethnic, political, and religious interactions among its citizens. Ethiopia seems neatly divided into nine
ethnically based regions and two special cities. The reality, however, is far more complicated with over
eighty ethnic groups and the progressive convergence of ethnic and political identities. During times of
instability or under authoritarian rule, such convergence obfuscates (perhaps intentionally) the line
between political and ethnic discrimination/persecution. As a result, any meaningful analysis of early
warning signs of genocide cannot be focused on groups in isolation but must examine the interaction of
the groups to determine patterns of ethnic violence or discrimination.
        With the support and encouragement of the United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on the
Prevention of Genocide ("Office of the Special Advisor") this paper provides a genocide early warning
analysis of Ethiopia. This analysis does not seek to determine whether genocide is occurring, but rather
utilizes the early warning framework developed by the Office of the Special Advisor in order to highlight
the fault lines of potential Ethiopian conflict targeting or disproportionately affecting minority groups.
This report utilizes an early warning approach that gathers facts of human rights violations and links
violations to the “likelihood of a buildup of momentum toward mass murder” 2 or genocide, including
genocide by attrition. This report takes a long term, process-oriented approach and describes the
environment that may lead to genocide, long before the momentum towards genocidal acts builds.3
        The report utilizes the list of warning signs of the Office of the Special Advisor and is
supplemented, where appropriate, with warning signs compiled from early warning literature, and broadly
includes: the existence of an ethnic or religious group(s) at risk, violations of human rights and
humanitarian law which may become massive or serious, and a history of genocide or discrimination.4 It
is the authors' hope that this paper will aid the larger goal of reinforcing the international community’s
commitment to "the responsibility to protect" and to take action when faced with clear indications of
mounting ethnic violence or genocide.
        Within the ethnic and political context of Ethiopia, a state with no ethnic majority, all ethnic
groups are at risk of targeted discrimination or violence because all groups are a minority in some respect.
For purposes of this paper, minority groups fall into two categories, with some overlap: (1) numerical
minorities, which comprise less than 40% of Ethiopian society,5 and (2) structural minorities, which are
excluded from political power.6


                                                                                                              4
        This analysis will focus on the Amhara, Tigray, Oromo, Somali, Sidama, and Gurage. The
Amhara,7 Tigray,8 and Oromo 9 represent the most powerful ethnic and political groups in Ethiopia and
form the fault lines along which violence is most likely to erupt. The Somali10 currently find themselves
in the middle of tensions between the Ethiopian and Somalian governments. The Sidama,11 although
small in number and influence nationally, comprise the largest ethnic group in Southern Nations,
Nationalities, and Peoples (SNNP) and have effectively organized advocacy groups. The Gurage12 have
been aligned closely with the Amhara and probably face the same risks as the Amhara. Information on
many groups, particularly the smaller minorities, is scarce most likely due to restrictions on freedom of
press and poor organization on the part of Ethiopian civil society.13
        There is a growing consensus among Ethiopian scholars, citizens, and activists that a distinct
possibility exists for violence to erupt along ethnic lines. Possible violence may either be (1) country-
wide situations involving more than two groups, or (2) smaller scale targeting of one specific ethnic
identity. Although some situations are more likely to lead to violence than others, the Tigray will almost
certainly be involved in any outbreak of ethnic violence, though whether as the perpetrators or victims
remains to be determined. The Tigray currently dominate the ruling political party, the Ethiopian
Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), but comprise only 7% of the population.14 Because
the Tigray are a numerical minority, they are physically vulnerable should nation-wide dissatisfaction
with the EPRDF amount to violence. However, since the Tigray still dominate the ruling party, they have
the power and resources to organize violence against dissident groups. If violence should occur, inter-
ethnic conflict in Ethiopia is most likely to break out along the following fault lines:
        •   Ruling Minority Group against Non-Ruling Groups: Tigray v. Other Ethnic Groups. If
            focused on one group, Tigray could mobilize the others against the target group.
        •   Historically Ruling Group against Current Ruling Group: Amhara v. Tigray. Amhara are
            well organized politically, well funded, and they have historical sense of entitlement since
            they have always been in power. There is a prevalent sense that the Amhara were “robbed”
            of power when EPRDF took over in 1991.15
        •   Non-Privileged Groups against Privileged Groups: Other Ethnic groups v. Tigray or
            Amhara. Other ethnic groups could decide to rebel against Tigray. Alternatively, the
            Amhara would be easy to target since they are spread throughout the country and are
            minorities in most regions.




II. BACKGROUND

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        Emperor Haile Selassie’s reign from 1931 to 1974 modernized Ethiopia and integrated it into
post-World War II international relations.16 Although he proclaimed Ethiopia a constitutional monarchy
in 1931, Haile Selassie ruled with royal absolutism. The centralization of power coupled with
modernization led to the development of a secularized, professional bureaucracy, a professional army, and
a middle class.17 Ethiopia witnessed an expansion of the modern educational system, abolition of slavery,
construction of roads and other public works, local police forces, and publication of newspapers in
Amharaniya.
        In the early 1970s, the Emperor failed to respond to devastating droughts and famines and
ignored the social and economic demands of the urban populace. 1974 marked a series of military
mutinies throughout the country. The soldiers rioted, not over ideology, but over their basic economic
needs, including salary and terms of service.18 Coup leaders, claiming they were motivated by patriotism,
organized under the banner “Ethiopia First” and called themselves the Derg, an Amharic word meaning
“committee.”19 Emperor Haile Selassie and his family were strangled in the palace. The Derg, led by
Mengistu Haile-Mariam, intended to move away from feudalism and capitalism toward scientific
socialism, and engaged in a brutal campaign, the “Red Terror,” to eliminate opposition.20 Among the
most significant changes was the nationalization of land and its redistribution to a previously landless
peasant base.21
        By the end of the 1980s, the Derg had overextended its military fighting insurgencies in the
Tigray region and Eritrea, while droughts and famine ravaged the country. During the 1970s, a portion of
the Tigray formed an armed resistance movement to create an independent republic. The Tigrayan
People's Liberation Front (TPLF) redefined its objectives to seek political autonomy within democratic
Ethiopia. Since the Tigray are a numerical minority, the TPLF enlisted support of several other ethnic
groups (Amhara, Oromo, SNNP) to form a coalition, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF) led by now-Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, in 1989. EPRDF forces entered Addis Ababa
in May 1991 and Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe where he still resides.22


1. 1994 Constitution
        Following the formation of a transitional government, democratic elections in 1995 placed the
EPRDF firmly in power. As the bedrock of this democratic transition, the 1994 Ethiopian constitution is
commendable for its vision of a state that ensures political and ethnic autonomy to its many ethnic
groups.23 The peoples and nations of Ethiopia are all endowed with a corporate right to organize as a self-
governing state or local government.24 Article 39 includes the unconditional right to self-determination,
including the right to secession.25 The Constitution also provides an extensive bill of rights with thirty-
five articles elaborating the rights of nations, peoples, and individuals. Moreover, the Constitution


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requires all laws to comply with the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on
Human Rights and International instruments adopted by Ethiopia.”26
        Although the Constitution expanded the political power base from urban elites to previously
marginalized regions, the Constitution’s scheme for division of power into ethnically-based regions may
serve as a basis for divide-and-rule by the central government. The Tigray, a numerical minority, have
been accused of using the regional structure to maintain power by pitting groups against each other and
encouraging splintering within groups. Even when the regional plan was announced, Ethiopian
nationalists both at home and abroad “violently opposed what they saw as the balkanization of
Ethiopia.”27 Significantly, the EPRDF can potentially maintain control by taking advantage of economic
dependency on the central government for provision of resources. Access to resources is a serious issue
because though it is growing economically,28 Ethiopia has a high poverty rate,29 high disease rate,30 high
infant mortality rate,31 high HIV/AIDS rate,32 low life expectancy,33 low literacy rate,34 low per capita
income,35 and low GDP.36 Because the regional structure is integral to distributing resources and may
exacerbate the high poverty rate in rural Ethiopia, there is a danger that the government is manipulating
precious resources to maintain political power.


2. 2005 Elections
        Poverty, growing ethnic stratification, and increasingly open dissatisfaction with the EPRDF led
to troubling results in the 2005 nation-wide elections. The run-up to the May 2005 election was filled
with optimism as opposition parties consulted with the EPRDF, genuine political competition emerged,
and open debate between parties and among citizens flowed. Immediately following the May 15, 2005,
elections reports suggested the elections had been conducted fairly although there were scattered
instances of intimidation at various polling locations.37 The main opposition coalition, the Coalition for
Unity and Democracy (CUD), made tremendous gains in parliament but refused to accept the election
results because exit polls indicated that they should have also won Addis Ababa. The CUD has accused
the central government of fraud, and the EPRDF has accused CUD members of conspiring to overthrow
the government, treason, and genocide.
        The CUD emerged as a reorganized form of one faction of the All Amhara People’s Organization
(AAPO), a party formed during the democratic transition in the early 1990s. During the constitutional
drafting process, the Amhara had only been represented by the Amhara National Democratic Movement
(ANDM), an EPRDF affiliate, so the AAPO formed to represent independent Amhara interests. One
faction believed the AAPO must remain an Amhara party. Another faction contended that the Amhara
would have to form multi-ethnic alliances in order to gain power. This pro-coalition faction supported the
privatization of land and doing away with the ethnic federal system. They proposed redrawing the map to


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create new federal regions that eliminated ethnic lines.38 This faction left the AAPO and eventually
returned as the CUD, which advocates the principles and policies of this faction. The CUD receives
enormous amounts of financial, political, and moral support from the Ethiopian Diaspora, especially in
the United States.
        After the elections, the central government banned public assemblies but protests nonetheless
erupted in June 2005 in Addis Ababa. The police and military retaliated with unnecessary force, and then
arrested several thousand opposition supporters throughout the country. In June in Addis Ababa, security
forces opened fire on demonstrators, some of whom were throwing rocks and blocking roads. In this
incident alone, security forces killed more than thirty people and injured more than one hundred.39 The
government and the leading opposition parties attempted to negotiate in November but these talks
collapsed and fresh violence erupted. Ethiopian security forces killed at least forty-six and arrested more
than four thousand in Addis Ababa.40 The government also ordered several high-profile arrests of
opposition leaders, human rights activists, professors, and journalists.41 On December 21, the government
brought charges including treason, inciting violence and planning to commit genocide42 against 131
people—including prominent CUD politicians Hailu Shawel, Mesfin Woldemariam and the newly elected
CUD mayor of Addis Ababa, Berhanu Nega. Several civil society activists and thirteen journalists were
also charged.43 In rural areas, opposition supporters, students and people with no political affiliation have
been threatened, beaten and detained by federal police in the Oromiya and Amhara regions, often in
nighttime raids. The federal police have worked with local government officials and local government-
backed militias to intimidate and coerce opposition supporters.44
        Reports compiled by the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), an independent advocacy
groups, describe specific instances of killings, beatings, arrests, and intimidation.45 In Addis Ababa, it is
difficult to determine which if any ethnic groups have suffered as a result of their support of the CUD.
The Addis Ababa community is ethnically diverse and the violence appears to be targeted at political, not
ethnic groups. Additionally, some of the rioters included restless, unemployed youths with no particular
political affiliation. The unemployed youth could easily be incited and the CUD could mobilize these
young men to demonstrate to the EPRDF that they have widespread political support.46
        According to the report recently released by the independent panel commissioned by the
government to examine post-election violence, the central government is responsible for killing 193
civilian and 6 police officers.47 The property damage totals over 4.45 million Birr (approximately $500
million). 48 The judge who led the inquiry panel has received threats and has since fled Ethiopia.49 The
EPRDF has denied any wrongdoing.50


III. GENERAL WARNING SIGNS

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        The information in the following section is organized according to warning signs as presented in
Appendix 1 that affect all sectors of Ethiopian society. 51 Following is a more detailed analysis of the
Amhara, Tigray, Oromo, Somali, Sidama, Gurage.


1. Existence of an ethnic or religious group at risk


(a) Ethnic groups at risk
        As noted above, all ethnic groups are potentially at risk of some form of violence, particularly as
ethnic groups progressively become identified with a specific political opinion or identity. The Amhara
and Tigray show the greatest potential for violence against each other based on the Amhara’s historical
power and the Tigray’s current political domination. The Oromo, the largest minority in Ethiopia, have
largely been excluded from political participation in an Ethiopian central government, which is due to the
“ancient hatred,” general disdain, and the perception that Oromo are incapable of leadership.52 In
addition, should religious conflict erupt within Ethiopia or war with Islamist Somalia becomes a reality,
the Somali are vulnerable because of their Muslim identity. As will be explored further below, with the
constitutional conflation of ethnicity and politics the possibility of ethnic discrimination and persecution
increases. For example, one may use politics as a proxy for ethnic discrimination, should one choose, or
more subtly, action directed at political targets often disproportionately affects a certain group.


(b) Religious groups at risk
        Ethiopia is the historical home to the three Abrahamic religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam,
as well as to traditional animist faiths. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church is the predominant Christian
denomination with 35% to 40% of the population,53 and with Orthodox practices pervading secular
Ethiopian life.54 Protestants, notably newly emerging Evangelical communities, also have a small
presence in Ethiopia.55 Muslims have lived in Ethiopia since soon after the founding of the religion, and
continue to comprise approximately 45% to 50% of Ethiopia.56 The Jewish population of Ethiopia has
largely immigrated to Israel, with a small population still in the country. The Amhara and Tigray are
predominately Ethiopian Orthodox, while the Somali are predominantly Muslim.57 Members of other
ethnic groups observe various religions, with smaller subgroups following a single faith.58
        As political and ethnic tensions rise within Ethiopia and radical Islam spreads throughout the
world, religion is a potentially explosive fault line in Ethiopian society. The divide between Muslims and
Christians has always existed, manifested by entrenched and diverging religious and cultural practices.59
However, religion is an increasingly polarizing distinction among Ethiopians as Islamists come to power


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in volatile neighboring Somalia and Ethiopia is seen by the United States as an ally in the “war on
terror.”60 Ethiopia has traditionally existed as a distinctly Christian nation, with Christian Amhara rulers
holding power. The Tigray now maintain the Christian identity of the state, and increasingly feel
threatened by Islamist tendencies in Somalia and the Somali Region. Ethiopia recently passed domestic
anti-terrorism legislation,61 and Meles can, or maybe already is, using “terrorism” as a cloak to persecute
legitimate opposition groups within Ethiopia.62 Ethiopia has already identified some of its resistance
groups, such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), as
terrorist organizations. Additionally, in the post-election crackdown, detainees are being charged with
conspiracy and treason and there exists the possibility that the government could expand its definition of
terrorist activity. Religion can be a mobilizing factor, used by the EPRDF, the Ethiopian Orthodox
Council, the Ethiopian Islamic Supreme Council, or one of the opposition groups affiliated with a religion
to commit violence against others.


(c) Concentration of power in EPRDF and growing authoritarianism
        Over the past decade, and particularly since the 2005 elections, the central government of
Ethiopia dominated by the EPRDF has become increasingly authoritarian. The government has redefined
politics as ethnicity, and has blended ethnos with demos in a volatile combination of false distinctions and
hardening suspicions. The government’s near absolute control of land and resources has encouraged
competition between the regions, fostered resentment against groups perceived to receive favorable
treatment, and ensured compliance with central policy. The current situation in Ethiopia presents dangers
that could affect all ethnic groups in the future. Troubling indicators include the “usurpation of the
powers of governance at all levels by party leaders, coupled with increasing political repression and
corruption.”63 Also worth noting are Ethiopia’s “non-transparent, centralized structures in which military
leaders appear to play significant roles.”64
        Ethiopia’s political structure lends itself to the centralization of power in the federal government.
On paper, the central government has narrow responsibilities that include typical national duties such as
collecting taxes, setting national social and economic policy, conducting foreign policy and national
defense, and setting monetary policy. However, an overwhelming amount of political power rests in the
central government and an asymmetrical form of federalism that is “hyper-centralized” has evolved.65
The prime minister must be selected by the House of People’s Representatives, but once in power the
prime minister has unchecked freedom to command armed forces, control the cabinet, appoint high
civilian officials and federal judges. Additionally, even though Article 39 provides for secession, a
feature designed to empower the regions, the process requires federal approval, a difficult feat that could
easily deter small groups without adequate resources or numbers. Crucially, the federal government owns


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all land and “must enact legislation to establish the possessory rights of peasants and pastoralists, to
provide for long-term leases for private investors and for the private exploitation of resources.”66
         The EPRDF has “systematically neutralized political opposition” by appointing loyalists in
positions of power and authority at the regional level.67 Although the regions theoretically function
independently, the government has created a “shadow” government to oversee regional activity and
ensure compliance with the central government’s policy.68 The Derg developed the kebele system,69 the
most local form of government that reports to the central government, as a means to keep tight control
over its citizens and continues to be a means to harass political opposition.70 The kebele system maintains
regional armies that answer to the central government, even though the armies are comprised of members
of that region’s ethnic group.
         The EPRDF’s tightening control over intellectuals, students, and the press also represents a
worrisome trend of centralization of power that should be monitored.


2. Violations of human rights law, which may become massive or serious
         Data collection of human rights violations in an early warning analysis “treats information about
violations in their own right, but also connects those violations to predictions of the likelihood of a
buildup of momentum toward mass murder.”71 Thus, the following early warning analysis considers the
array of rights violations reportedly committed against various minority groups in Ethiopia, noting
whether the violations appear to be isolated, widespread, or systemic. Part V of this report analyzes the
international, regional, and national human rights standards that apply and to which Ethiopia is bound.


(a) Violations of civil and political rights
         Events following the 2005 elections raise many grave concerns about the status of human rights
among political/ethnic minorities. There are many documented instances of torture, arbitrary detention,
false imprisonment, unnecessary use of arms by the police, prolonged detention, trumped up charges
(including attempting to destroy the constitution, genocide, and treason) and home invasion in response to
political protest. These actions are directed at CUD leaders and CUD supporters, particularly youth and
intellectuals.
         The federal police have been active in beating and firing shots on large protests in Addis Ababa
and cities in other areas. Notably, in the Amhara and Tigray dominated Addis Ababa , the federal police
is almost exclusively made of SNNP soldiers, possibly indicating another manifestation of the EPRDF’s
pitting of ethnic groups against each other and exaggerating the “otherness” of groups.72 Members of all
ethnic groups are affected by the EPRDF’s repressive policies, but the Oromo, as the largest ethnic group
historically excluded from power, have reportedly been increasingly targeted. Numerous human rights


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violations have been documented involving the Oromo and in the Oromiya region. See infra Part IV,
Section C: Oromo.
        The EPRDF has severely curtailed free speech and free press rights. The government is hostile
towards journalists, students, professors and teachers across the country. During 2005, the government
allowed professors to conduct research in their disciplines but prohibited them from espousing political
sentiments.73 No teachers at any level could deviate from official lesson plans and authorities
discouraged political activity on university campuses.74 There were reports that uniformed and
plainclothes police officers were present on campuses prior to the June protests.75 During the course of
the year, the government arrested students and teachers.76 Many reporters were arrested after the 2005
elections on charges of treason and genocide.77 Dissent-oriented editors who are still operating work
under threat of harassment.78 Some journalists working for foreign media have had their licenses
revoked, while others have been expelled from the country.79 In the wake of the June disturbances, the
state telecommunications monopoly disabled mobile-phone text messaging, a block that remained largely
in place at year’s end, claiming that the CUD used text messaging to call for antigovernment actions.80
        Internal displacement due to drought and conflict situations presents serious human rights
concerns, particularly since the government has failed to adopt a coherent internally displaced persons
(IDP) policy.81 Families in drought-prone rural areas reported forced displacement, although the
government claimed its resettlement program was voluntary.82 The resettlement program moved families
from drought prone areas to more fertile lands, but opposition parties accused local authorities in some
rural areas of tampering with resettlement rosters to target opposition supporters.83 Non-governmental
organizations alleged the central government forcibly resettled people in areas with no existing
infrastructure or clean water, leading to abnormally high infant mortality rates.84 The U.N. Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has reported that between 100,000 and 280,000
Ethiopians are internally displaced. There is also a report that in rural Oromiya, Somali, and SNNP
regions, thousands of individuals may have been forcibly displaced in the political repression following
the May 2005 elections.85 Internally displaced persons face a heightened security risk because they must
compete with other ethnic groups for local land, kebele power, and access to food.86 The risk is
compounded by the government’s denial that conflict-induced internal displacement exists.87 The SNNP
region is less densely populated and more fertile than the rest of Ethiopia, possibly serving as an area for
future government resettlement of displaced persons from the overpopulated and degraded highlands.88
        The Annuak have particularly suffered at the hands of the EPRDF. Between December 13 and
15, 2003, Ethiopian government troops in uniform, along with non-Anuak Ethiopians locally known as
“highlanders,” 89 allegedly massacred 424 indigenous Anuak, in Abobo, Itang, Gog and Gambella town in
the Gambella region.90 Additionally, over 200 persons were wounded and approximately 85 people


                                                                                                           12
remained unaccounted for.91 Reportedly, entire villages were burned to the ground, killing 1,100 people,
Anuak women and girls were systematically raped, several educated men had been subjected to selective,
politically motivated extrajudicial executions and several hundred persons, including community leaders,
have reportedly been arbitrarily arrested and subjected to torture.92 This incident has been well-
documented by various human rights organizations and advocates.93 To date, no government officials
have been held accountable for the massacre. A government sponsored massacre of a particular ethnic
group that goes unpunished, sets a very worrisome precedent in a country with numerous ethnic groups
and simmering ethnic tensions. Although this appears to be an isolated incident, it is possible that
instances of ethnic violence may target small ethnic groups like the Annuak and begin to erupt in bursts
rather than in a wide-scale campaign of violence.94 Prior to the massacre, the Anuak had received very
little national or international attention and it is difficult to determine who the “next Anuak” might be due
to the lack of information circulating on many of Ethiopia’s smaller groups.95


(b) Lack of framework to seek justice
        The EPRDF decentralized and restructured the judiciary along federal lines by establishing courts
at the district, zonal, and regional levels.96 The Ethiopian legal system at the local, or kebele, level is a
complex combination of customary and religious law.97 The 1994 Constitution allows for the existence of
traditional religious and customary courts, in which parties to a dispute must assent to jurisdiction, and
empowers federal and regional legislatures to recognize other courts as well.98 Islamic courts have
jurisdiction over religious and family law matters involving Muslims.99 In addition to the Ethiopian
courts, traditional justice systems like informal councils of elders that are not sanctioned by law continue
to function in many parts of Ethiopia.100 These traditional mechanisms resolve most disputes between
Ethiopian citizens in rural areas who have little access to the formal justice system.101
        The strained judiciary system does not provide adequate redress for human rights violations. The
Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but the judiciary is weak and overburdened.102
Shortages of trained personnel and financial limitations in many regions often effectively deny citizens
the protections accorded to them in the Constitution. Most rural residents resolve their disputes in kebele
religious, customary, or social courts which have little or no knowledge of human rights law and are
traditionally made up of male judges.103 International human rights conventions explicitly recognized in
the Ethiopian Constitution have not been incorporated into Ethiopian discourse and are rarely cited by
lawyers or in court decisions even at the regional, or woreda, and federal levels.104 Questions of
constitutional interpretation are removed from the courts and referred to the House of Federation.
Although this process leaves potentially thorny ethnic disputes to an elected representative body, it also
strips the court of the ability to enforce the constitution.105 The Ethiopian Federal Minister for Capacity-


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Building admitted in May 2002 that the justice system was incapable of enforcing constitutional
guarantees.106
        Most Ethiopians have little access to justice because of the high costs of litigation, long delays in
court proceedings, lack of legal aid and human rights knowledge, and little independence of the judiciary
at the woreda level.107 Little or no monitoring or accountability seems to exist for implementation of
laws, policies, and programs even though regional offices of the Federal Ministry of Justice are required
to monitor local judicial developments.108 Although a vast number of human rights violations occur in
Ethiopia, victims are denied due process because of the lack of independence of the judiciary, the absence
of human rights legal discourse in judicial proceedings, and administrative shortcomings. Overall,
government forces act with impunity.


(c) Serious or massive violations of economic, social and cultural rights
        The EPRDF may use control of access to economic and natural resources to reward or punish
certain groups.109 There is disagreement among scholars and aid workers in Ethiopia whether resources
are simply scarce and therefore some regions have less or whether certain favored political/ethnic groups
are privileged over others. This is an area that should be monitored.110 Because resources are so scarce,
any disparity in distribution can have a large impact. In addition to land, the government uses basic needs
resources (e.g., roads, clinics, schools, fertilizer) as carrots and sticks to garner and maintain political
support. Access to resources is very difficult to map because Ethiopia’s practices are not transparent.
During 2005 there continued to be credible reports from EHRCO and opposition parties that in certain
rural areas in the Oromiya Region, Amhara Region, and the SNNP Region, local officials used threats of
land redistribution and withholding of food aid and fertilizer to garner support for the ruling coalition.111
The fallout following the 2005 elections has also spread to economic rights since members of opposition
parties have alleged government forces destroyed and set fire to homes, livestock and food.112
        Due to its vast tax collecting powers, the central government dominates revenue generation and
the states must rely heavily on transfers from the central government to cover their expenses. According
to World Bank figures from 1996 to 1997, the federal government controlled eighty to ninety percent of
all revenue.113 Foreign aid fills a great demand for basic needs that the government cannot provide.114
        The EPRDF’s control over resources is facilitated by the structure of local government. At the
regional level, expenditure patterns are centrally monitored and spending decisions are heavily influenced
by priorities set nationally since local officials are generally party loyalists.115 Kebele officials wield
great influence over citizens since these local officials control obtaining land, farming aid, access to
health care and education, and identity cards.116 Thus, maintaining good relationships with kebele




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officials is crucial to accessing goods and resources. Internally displaced persons face particular
challenges in forming the right connections with kebele officials.117
        Instances of abuse of power at the kebele level arise across Ethiopia and do not appear to be
limited to one ethnic group in particular. Local officials in the Amhara region withheld rural credit and
confiscated land from individuals.118 In September 2002, local officials in SNNP allegedly evicted eight
farmers from their land due to their participation in the opposition party United Ethiopia Democratic
Party (UEDP) and told the farmers opposition party members could not hold land.119 Also in 2002, at an
All-Ethiopia Unity Organization (AEUO) meeting, kebele officials in Amhara threatened to evict people
from their land and withhold food aid.120 Some farmers have reported being evicted from their lands so
private investors could use the land. In April 2001, the local administrator in Oromiya allegedly ordered
the eviction of 250 Amharas to provide the land to a business investor.121


3. History of Genocide122


(a) Red Terror 123
        The former pro-Amhara Derg regime carried out the “Red Terror,” for which individuals are
currently being prosecuted in absentia124 under the prohibition of genocide in the Ethiopian Penal Code.125
During his 1974 to 1991 military Marxist rule, former dictator Mengistu Haile-Mariam126 committed
countless human rights violations including systematic executions, tortures, disappearances, and
imprisonments.127 The Red Terror targeted those opposed to military rule, primarily the Ethiopian
Peoples’ Revolutionary Party (EPRP), 128 formed by student radicals who demanded a civilian
government.129 Accordingly, the violence disproportionately affected the youth and student population of
Ethiopia.130 Anti-EPRP literature seethed with violence, and one publication by a Derg-affiliated group
declared: “We are ready to unleash red terror on the EPRP fascists. Their blood shall serve as the
water with which (we will) put out the fire of counter-revolution.”131 Mengistu orchestrated a well-
coordinated, undisguised campaign of violence against “counter-revolutionaries,” a diverse collection of
opponents that included students, judges, soldiers, intellectuals, and peasants.132 The brutality and rigor
of the Red Terror is striking: thousands were gunned down in peaceful demonstrations in Addis Ababa,
bodies were strewn in the street with Marxist slogans pinned to them, those who fled the cities for rural
areas were hunted down and executed, and thousands more simply disappeared.133
        When the EPRDF captured Addis Ababa in 1994, they arrested and detained about two thousand
people they believed were involved in some of the most serious human rights violations (summary
execution, torture, genocide, illegal detention) perpetrated by the Derg. By 1997, Ethiopia had filed
charges against 5,198 individuals but could detain only less than half that number.134 The Special


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Prosecutor’s Office plans to prosecute thousands, and the Special Prosecutor has described this
undertaking as the “largest investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses since Nuremberg.”135
        The guiding piece of legislation in these trials is Article 281 of the Penal Code, the genocide
provision.136 Distinct from the international definition of genocide, Article 281’s definition explicitly
includes political groups and lays the foundation for prosecution of the Derg’s politically-motivated mass
killings.137 The Derg trials may be seen as a delayed justice, finally recognizing the Derg’s atrocities by
prosecuting those responsible. These trials could represent an important step in preventing another form
genocide by enforcing the genocide prohibition and creating precedent clearly establishing intolerance for
mass killing committed by the state. However, the severely protracted trials and lack of convictions or
punishments for crimes committed up to thirty years ago may provide little deterrence to a group with the
means to perpetrate large-scale violence.
        The Derg trials stand in sharp contrast to the trials currently conducted for crimes related to the
2005 post-election crackdown. The EPRDF is manipulating the Ethiopian genocide laws to prosecute
political dissidents, mostly CUD supporters, after the 2005 parliamentary elections. See infra Part IV,
Section A: Amhara, 2(a) Violations of civil and political rights.


IV. INDIVIDUAL GROUP ANALYSIS


A. Amhara
        Emperor Haile Sellasie’s vision of a modern Ethiopia entailed the creation of a national identity
based on Amhara identity. The Shoa Amhara had been the traditional ruling class of Ethiopia under the
emperors 138 and Haile began a vigorous “Amharization” of Ethiopia.139 Haile Selassie wanted to create
an educated elite comprised of Amhara and Tigray and heavily recruited young intellectuals from urban
areas to serve in his government. He emphasized education for the Amhara and Tigray and largely
ignored the poor and culturally subordinate ethnic groups.140 Upper level local administrators were
Amhara and Amharic was the language of local administration.141 In all aspects of social and economic
policy, Amhara, Tigrays, and elites from other ethnic groups that had been assimilated into the dominant
culture were favored over the rest of society.142
        Sellasie's attempts to Amharize Ethiopia and its culture inhibited other groups’ access to
schooling, stymied opportunities to develop social capital, and marginalized people.143 A deep-seated
resentment of the ruling class developed amongst the other marginalized groups.144 Haile failed to
acknowledge the necessity of building a genuine Ethiopian national identity among the majority of
Ethiopia’s ethnic groups, and he did not design or implement any policies that would actually enable
political integration.145 Sellasie's attempt at nationalization cemented Amhara political and economic


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superiority in Ethiopia and laid the groundwork for vehement anti-Amhara sentiment following the fall of
the Derg.
        Due to their historical status as the ruling group, the Amhara had gradually spread throughout the
country and settled in almost every major city. Their presence in small numbers made them easy targets
of ethnic violence in the early 1990s.   During this period of democratic transition, the Amhara found
themselves at physical and political risk as ethnically-inspired conflicts manifested other groups’ long-
simmering frustration with a century of Amhara expansionism and domination.146 More than any other
group, the Amhara felt the implications of the TGE and EPRDF’s “aggressive” insistence on imposing
ethnicity on all aspects of life.147 Additionally, Amhara were attacked by anti-Amhara opposition148 in the
Somali and Oromiya regions and faced targeted discrimination by Oromos to the point where intervention
by the EPRDF was necessary.149
        The AAPO formed in 1991 after the Derg fell to defend Amhara interests during the creation of
the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) and the drafting of the new constitution. The Tigray and
other ethnic groups had organized parties to convene a national conference to draft the new constitution,
but the Amhara were not represented outside of the EPRDF-affiliated ANDM. The TGE immediately
started imprisoning AAPO members, even jailing the founder.150
        The AAPO later reorganized as the CUD and presented a major political challenge to the EPRDF
in the 2005 elections. The CUD is often perceived as an ethnic Amhara party because almost of all its
leadership were members of the AAPO during the early 1990s. Prior to the 2005 election, the CUD
refused to negotiate with the government to discuss electoral law and procedures.151 Other opposition
parties such as the UEDF met with the EPRDF several times to negotiate details such as voter
registration.152 Despite the strong electoral results, realistically, the CUD would not win a majority in
Ethiopian parliament because the party is perceived as an Amhara and Gurage party.153 Following the
election, the CUD contested the results and then refused to take their seats.
        The 2005 post-election crackdown most vividly depicts current violence against the Amhara. In
the Amhara region, it has been reported that kebele officials (generally members of the ANDM) played a
key role in identifying individuals and guiding the federal police to their homes at night, where federal
police beat and sometimes arrested them.154 In the Amhara region, forty-six elected officials or party
members of the CUD were imprisoned.155
        The CUD and the larger Amhara are backed by a very powerful Diaspora community, situated
primarily in the United States. The Diaspora community has been influential in securing funding for
Ethiopia and bringing human rights issues to the attention of U.S. legislators.156 The better educated
among the Diaspora tend to romanticize Haile Selassie and the notion of an Ethiopian identity.157 The
Diaspora appears to be more radical in its expectations of change within Ethiopia and more suspect of the


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Tigray than Amhara still living in Ethiopia.158 Even though the CUD has experienced a recent fracturing,
as long as the Diaspora holds the purse strings, it can control what policies the CUD pursues.




Warning Signs Implicated


1. Existence of an ethnic group at risk
        The Amhara, along with the Tigray, show the greatest potential for violence from other groups
and each other. The Amhara exist in small pockets throughout the country and face the risk of being
overwhelmed by other ethnic groups if tensions escalate. In addition to ethnic differences, religious
differences might also play a role in anti-Amhara activity. Because there are islands of Amhara in urban
areas surrounded by non-Christian groups, opposition could mobilize if not on ethnic than on religious
grounds.159 In particular, there are grave concerns about Amhara being targeted in the primarily Muslim
Somali region if there is a coup.160
        The most likely scenario for violence against the Amhara would occur in the urban areas
throughout the country where other ethnic groups outnumber them.161 Most of Ethiopia is very rural, and
people do not typically interact with people of other ethnic groups. However, urban areas have highest
unemployment and most people competing for fewest resources. Violence is most likely to erupt in
cities, and since Amhara have settled in urban areas in all regions, they are most likely victims of
violence.162


(a) Specific Identification of groups and their association with a specific political identity or opinion
    The Amhara are associated with the historical ruling elite, the Derg, and the CUD. Their association
with the historical elite and the Derg make them vulnerable to the resentment of any of the ethnic groups,
but their leadership of the CUD makes them especially vulnerable to violence by the EPRDF and
Tigrayans.


(b) Concentration of Power in one or few groups to the detriment of other
        The Amhara were formerly the ruling class and continue to be disproportionately educated and
wealthy, with other groups resenting them for their privilege.




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2. Violations of human rights law, which may become massive or serious


(a) Violations of civil and political rights
        The civil and political rights of the Amhara tend to be violated based on the popular conflation of
the Amhara ethnicity with the CUD. Thus, individual Amhara are at risk of political discrimination as a
proxy for ethnic discrimination, both of which are prohibited by the non-discrimination clauses of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), African Charter of Human and Peoples’
Rights (African Charter), and the Ethiopian Constitution.163
        In parts of the Amhara region where kebele officials are aligned with the EPRDF, Amhara
political dissidents, community leaders, and intellectuals have experienced violations of first order civil
and political rights. For example, the oppression of political opposition following the 2005 election
resulted in murder and police-backed beatings of perceived CUD in violation of their right to life,164
personal security,165 and freedom to choose their political status.166 Widespread reports of political arrests
and charges in excess of the committed crime violate the right to liberty and security of person,167 and
growing restrictions on free speech and the media constitute systematic violations free expression.168
Finally, the de-facto criminalization of affiliation with the CUD constitutes a violation of freedom of
association.169 Over eighty CUD members currently face genocide charges. See supra Part II: 2005
elections and Part III, Section 2(a) Violations of civil and political rights.
        In contrast to the legitimate use of the Ethiopian genocide provision in the Derg trials, the EPRDF
is currently utilizing the genocide law to punish its political opponents. In addition to CUD officials
elected to parliament, the accused include journalists and civil rights activists.170 They are charged with
treason, “outrages against the Constitution,” armed conspiracy, and “genocide.”171 The genocide charges
relate to alleged attacks on members of the Tigray community.172 The Ethiopian government is devaluing
the potency of the genocide provision by using it as a form of political manipulation, illustrating the
danger of including political groups in the definition of genocide. Although these trials are directed at
political dissidents, the EPRDF is using the Tigray ethnicity as a tool in the prosecutions, setting up the
Amhara and other groups in opposition and entangling the political and ethnic identities of the accused.


(b) Violations of economic, social and cultural rights
        Kebele officials, as the local agents of the EPRDF, have discriminated against individuals living
in the Amhara region by conditioning land ownership rights and the provision of food and agricultural aid
on EPRDF support.173 Political opposition has resulted in land confiscation, the denial of rural credit, and


                                                                                                              19
the destruction of property and food supplies.174 While Ethiopia is steeped in poverty, the government’s
politicized denial of the means of subsistence constitutes a violation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) principle of non-discrimination, which constitutes an
immediately binding obligation on States Parties to the treaty.175 While ethnic and region-disaggregated
data on economic and social rights such as access to food, housing, education, healthcare and clean water
has generally not been forthcoming, the government recently provided disaggregated data related to
maternal health to the Committee on the Rights of the Child. The data indicated that in 2005, 42% of
women in the Amhara region received prenatal care (compared with 39% in the Tigray region and 4% in
the Somali region), though only 12.3% received medical care during delivery (compared with 34.4% in
the Tigray region and 3% in the Somali region).176 The data, if accurate, indicates that individuals in the
Amhara region may be at risk of discriminatory access to at least some healthcare resources.


3. A History of Genocide or discrimination
        The Derg regime was dominated by Amhara, but many Amhara opposed the Derg’s extremist
actions. During the Red Terror, opposition, including Amhara fled or were killed or jailed. This exodus
of youth and intellectuals created a devastating brain drain and a strong diaspora community in
neighboring states and in the United States.177 The Amhara thus stand in a distinctive position as both the
victimizers and the victimized, and could again potentially be the victimizers or the victimized.178 It is
more likely that other ethnic groups would view the Derg as another phase, albeit a particularly gruesome
phase, of Amhara domination and lash out against the Amhara.


B. Tigray
        In the 1970s, the Tigray formed an armed resistance movement to create an independent republic.
They eventually redefined their objectives to seek political autonomy within a democratic Ethiopia. The
Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) enlisted support of several other ethnic groups (including
Amhara, Oromo, Southern Peoples) to form a coalition—EPRDF—and overthrew the Derg.179 In July
1991, the EPRDF established the TGE, and EPRDF President Meles Zenawi and members of the TGE
dedicated themselves to the creation of a multi-party democracy.180 In 1994, the TGE held elections for a
547-member constituent assembly, which adopted the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia.181 Elections for the first popularly chosen national parliament and regional legislatures took
place in 1995, but many opposition parties boycotted these elections and the EPRDF received a landslide
victory.182 In 1995, the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was installed.183
        In power since the TGE was established, the Tigray comprise only 7% of the Ethiopian
population.184 At the national level, Tigray hold a disproportionate share of important positions in the


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government. Locally, the Tigray region has suffered historically and continues to be very poor, even
though Tigrayans expressed levels of satisfaction with the central government’s performance higher than
any other ethnic group.185 Observers offer conflicting opinions as to whether truth exists to the
perception that the Tigray region is better off than other regions.186 The Amhara and Oromo often claim
they are receiving less than the Tigray, but there is no clear, empirical evidence.187 If true, extra
distribution probably happens through informal mechanisms.188 This resentment has manifested itself in
subtle ways, such as observations that Amhara have stopped giving money to Tigrayan beggars on Addis
streets.189
         Many other ethnic groups in Ethiopia harbor negative sentiment towards the Tigrayans and view
them as an elite ruling class that deprives other groups of natural resources and funnels them to other
Tigrayans. In addition, other groups also perceive that the Tigray receive other social benefits, such as an
advanced education, more government positions, and better health care.190 Members of other groups
sometime boycott businesses based on the owner’s support of the EPRDF.191


Warning Signs Implicated


1. Existence of an ethnic group at risk


(a) Specific Identification of groups and their association with a specific political identity or opinion
         The Tigray, along with the Amhara, show the greatest potential for violence from other groups
and from each other. Due to the great number of Tigray in the EPRDF, the line between the EPRDF and
the Tigray frequently blurs and Tigray face a real risk of being targeted due to their popular association
with the EPRDF. Because of the EPRDF’s harsh policies, use of violence, and possible manipulation of
resources, there is a risk of retaliation against the Tigray by other groups.


(b) Demonization of groups in political and social discourse
         Because of the Tigray’s current position of power and privilege, suppressed ethnic groups are
suspicious of the Tigray. The Tigray’s status as the political majority but numerical minority invokes
troubling associations with pre-genocide Rwanda and places all Tigrayans, not just EPRDF members, at
great risk of ethnic groups seeking revenge.192 The Amhara, in particular, resent what they perceive as
the Tigray’s belief that Tigrayans are superior to other ethnic groups. The internet appears to be a
powerful tool for encouraging anti-EPRDF discourse—certain blogs simmer with resentment of the
EPRDF and provide a forum for users to vent their frustrations.193 Although this is politically motivated
speech, Tigray as a group can be implicated through their predominance in the EPRDF.


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2. Violations of human rights or humanitarian law, which may become massive or serious


(a) Violations of civil and political rights
        The Tigray-dominated EPRDF has targeted, arrested, and murdered political dissidents,
community leaders, and intellectuals of various ethnic groups. Tigray who do not affiliate with the
EPRDF could be targeted for their political beliefs. Reprisals by other groups, while likely to be aimed at
individual Tigrays, could mirror those experienced by political dissidents of other ethnicities: murder,
violence, arrest, torture, surveillance, and restrictions on freedom of speech and expression.
        While government discrimination against the Tigray has not been widely reported, at least one
non-governmental organization has noted the substandard treatment of child prisoners in the Tigray
region, including prison overcrowding, mixing of child and adult prisoners, and lack of child units.194 It is
not clear from the report whether the young people are ethnically Tigray or on what bases they have been
imprisoned.


(b) Serious or massive violations of economic, social and cultural rights
        The EPRDF may be using financial and natural resources to ensure political loyalty and play
groups against one another. The provision of resources based on political party loyalty is an express
violation of the non-discrimination principle that permeates the ICESCR.195 However, the government’s
report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child indicated that health services in the Tigray region were
comparable to the national average in 2005 and expenditures were roughly proportional to the Tigrayan
population.196


3. A history of Genocide or discrimination
        Government forces committed a massacre against the Anuak, but have thus far gone unpunished
by the EPRDF, an alarming example of the state acting with impunity. Because the EPRDF is largely
comprised of Tigray individuals and there is a growing trend of conflating political and ethnic identities
in Ethiopia, the Tigray are at risk of other groups targeting them for their “complicity” in human rights
violations. The reality is that most Tigray are not involved in the EPRDF’s policies of repression, but
there is a risk that members of other ethnic groups may violently react against Tigray individuals based
upon their perceived 'complicity' because of their ethnic identity.


C. Oromo



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        The Oromo are the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, comprising approximately 40% of the entire
population,197 but have historically held little influence and representation within the Ethiopian
government.198 Oromiya, the regional state in which the majority of Oromo live, is the largest in land
area and population of Ethiopia’s nine states.199 Although the Oromo are concentrated in Oromiya, parts
of the population are spread throughout the country and have assimilated with the Amhara.200 The Oromo
are extremely diverse—various subgroups have different cultures, social organizations, and religions—
and have historically lived in small societies comprised of villages and clans rather than in an organized,
cohesive state.201 However, the group speaks a common language, Afan Oromo, and has increasingly
developed a distinct ethnic identity,202 both of which have been suppressed by the past and present
Amhara and Tigray dominated governments.203 The Oromo have historically been discriminated against
by other Ethiopian ethnic groups because they are considered incapable of leadership and generally
inferior to highland Ethiopians.204 This prejudice dates back to conflicts between the ruling class and
Oromo in the fifteenth century.205
        Oromiya is governed by the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), which was
formed by the TPLF in 1990 and integrated into the EPRDF coalition that controls Ethiopia today.206 The
OLF, which formed as a reaction to oppression under Haile Selassie, enjoys wide support in Oromiya.207
It has waged an armed struggle against the government through its armed wing, the Oromo Liberation
Army (OLA), since 1992 when the OLF withdrew from the post-Derg transitional political process.208
Most of the OLF leadership is based in Eritrea, but part of the OLA is stationed in Somalia.209 In
response to opposition, the OPDO has banned the OLF and governs Oromiya with policies of
repression.210
        The EPRDF government has allegedly been inciting leaders of the Guji and Borena Oromo
subgroups, who have historically, peacefully alternated control of the region.211 The current Borena
leader was apparently told by the EPRDF to retain his post instead of ceding it to the next Guji leader and
to annex Guji land.212 Due to government-spurred divisiveness, the two tribes have clashed, with each
group kidnapping members of the other group and committing crimes such as rape and castration against
the abducted.213 Inter-ethnic conflict in Oromiya in 2005, involving the Gabra, Guji and Borena, was
reported to result in forty thousands displaced persons.214
        Recent sectarian violence between Muslims and Orthodox Christians in the Oromiya region has
been reported since September 15, 2006.215 Fifteen people have been killed since, while eight hundred
homes and three religious centers have been destroyed.216




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Warning Signs Implicated


1. Existence of an ethnic group at risk


(a) Pattern of discrimination with the purpose or effect of impairing the enjoyment of certain human
rights and Exclusionary Ideologies that purport to justify discrimination
          Since the Oromo have historically been accorded an inferior status by the Amhara and Tigray
leadership, they have suffered discrimination in many forms. The Oromo have been excluded from
political power, except for the few who have assimilated into Amhara culture, because they are seen as
incapable of leadership. The Oromiya Region has also suffered from deprivation of natural resources
under the current and past regimes because of discrimination.


(b) Specific Identification of groups and their association with a specific political identity or opinion and
External support to groups that could become targets due to being seen as collaborators with external
enemies
          Oromo resistance groups, including the OLF have united against the EPRDF, resulting in
violence by the central government directed against suspected members of opposition groups. 217
Individuals who are suspected of OLF membership are beaten, arrested, and sometimes killed by EPRDF
forces.218 The OLF also allies with Eritrea, an adversary of Ethiopia, which only increases the EPRDF’s
disdain for the organization.219


2. Violations of human rights law, which may become massive or serious


(a) Violations of civil and political rights and Lack of framework to seek justice
          The EPRDF has treated Oromo nationalists harshly since its rise to power, but there appears to be
increased political oppression since 2002.220 State-sanctioned human rights abuses against the Oromo are
widespread and violations run the gamut of murder, torture, arbitrary detention, and long term patterns of
surveillance and harassment, and suppression of the media.221 Because the OLF is banned, the OPDO
allegedly arrests individuals on charges of OLF or other opposition group involvement as a pretext to
detain critics of the government and silence others.222 The courts eventually intervene and order the
release of detainees when the police fail to produce evidence against them.223 However, courts often
allow detainees to remain incarcerated for several months after court-imposed deadlines by accepting


                                                                                                          24
police requests for more time to gather evidence.224 The already strained judiciary system does not
provide adequate redress for human rights violations involving Oromo. Even when the judiciary is
involved, delays cause obstruction of due process.
        Leaders of Oromo civil society organizations, the Oromo television services, and the Human
Rights League in Oromiya have been arrested and accused of terrorism and treason.225 Prominent
Oromos have been arrested and detained for up to three years or longer with no evidence to support the
charges against them.226 The Oromo civil society group that helped foster a united Oromo identity and
whose leaders have been arrested numerous times, Mecha Tulema, had its license revoked by the
government for organizing and performing political activities.227 After the OLF in exile called for an
Oromo uprising in November 2005, reports of widespread arrests of student activists and suspected
opposition supporters in the Oromo region increased and were continuing in April 2006.228
        Since protests in 2004 by Oromo students in Addis Ababa and Oromiya, where thousands of
students were allegedly arrested and mistreated in prison, the OPDO has instituted a policy of monitoring
and controlling the speech and conduct of students and teachers.229 The Committee on the Rights of the
Child, in its Concluding Observations to Ethiopia’s report on the implementation of the Convention,
voiced its concern that Oromo children face “stigmatization and persecution by armed forces, including
torture, rape, and killings.”230 In rural Oromiya, local officials enforce harsh penalties for default on
debts, seize farm property, or withhold agricultural aid from impoverished farmers or if they exhibit any
opposition to their government or policies.231 Prior to the May 2005 election, the regional Oromiya
government created quasi-governmental institutions to control the rural Oromo population through
surveillance and imposing restrictions of movement, association, and speech.232
        Violence against and imprisonment of members of opposition parties in Oromiya were cited by
EHRCO after the May 2005 parliamentary elections.233 During the largely peaceful November and
December 2005 protests, thousands of students (many secondary school students under age eighteen),
along with teachers, farmers, businesspeople and others, were arrested and detained, incommunicado,
without charge or trial.234 The demonstrations reportedly occurred after called for by the OLF with
individuals making political demands, including the release of Oromo political prisoners like officials of
the Mecha Tulema Association.235 Numerous demonstrators were reportedly shot dead by security forces
and others were allegedly tortured in prison.236 More than a thousand are still believed to be held in
various prisons and police stations, while only a few have been charged and brought to trial.237 Federal
police in the Oromo and Amhara Regions, sometime through nighttime raids, have threatened, beaten,
and detained opposition supporters, students, and individuals with no political ties. The federal police,
local government officials, and local government-backed militias reportedly intimidated opposition
supporters after the elections.238 Reports from political opponents and human rights organizations


                                                                                                            25
indicate that thousands of people, many of whom are Borena, had to leave their homes because of
repression after the elections.239
        The OLF claim genocide by the EPRDF through extra-judicial killings, "disappearances", illegal
arrests, torture, gang rape, confiscation of property, extended detentions, famine, environmental
degradation, and disease.240


(b) Serious or massive violations of economic, social and cultural rights
        The Oromiya region in general appears to sorely lack infrastructure. This area was the hardest hit
by the drought in early 2006 and was greatly affected by the recent floods, along with the Somali
region.241 Oromiya has poor healthcare facilities, bad roads, little access to potable water, and weak
education systems.242 An aid worker in the region reported that as compared to other regions, Oromiya
has the least government institutions in place for health care or education and organizations trying to work
with government offices to institute programs find no government partner in the area.243 According to the
government’s recent report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, prenatal and delivery-related
healthcare is more limited in the Oromiya region than in the Tigray and Amhara regions, though better
than in the Somali region.244 The relative lack of infrastructure and resources may indicate intentional
government neglect. In rural Oromiya, local officials withhold agricultural aid from poor farmers if they
exhibit any opposition to their government or policies.245 Under past regimes, Oromo needs were
considered secondary to those of the highlanders when the government distributed scarce resources, even
though Oromo areas were the main source of Ethiopia’s chief export crops of coffee, oil, seeds, hides, and
skins.246 The past deprivation of resources to the Oromo region by Amhara governments can be attributed
to the historical discrimination of the Oromo, despite being the backbone of the Ethiopian economy.247


(c) Forced Relocations
        Many Oromos have been displaced because of political repression248 and the conflict with
Somalis. Concerns over their resettlement include possible conflict over traditional rights to resources or
increased ethnic conflict, particularly if resettlement occurs inter-regionally.249 The government continues
to deny the existence of conflict-induced displacement, however, putting the Oromo at risk of invisibility
and ineligibility for government food aid.250


3. A History of Genocide or Discrimination
        The Oromo have historically faced discrimination ranging from exclusion from governmental
positions because of the perception that they are unable to lead to deprivation of resources because they
are considered inferior. The plight of the Oromo, as a group excluded from power, discriminated against,


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and subjected to human rights abuses, is long standing and well documented by the international
community. Such history indicates that the Oromo must be monitored because of their potential to be
perpetrators or victims. Their history of discrimination predisposes them towards victim status, but if
they gain power or ally with another group, they could react by lashing out against the elite Amhara or
Tigray who have been responsible for the Oromo’s historic inferior status.


D. Somali
        The Somali region in the south of Ethiopia, bordering Somalia, has been characterized by tension
and conflict based on religion, control of land resources, and principles of self-rule.251 The area is largely
Muslim and has resisted Amhara and Tigray Christian influences.252 Somali social and political structures
are largely clan-based with male clan elders balancing power between the various Somali groups.253
However, with the increased politicization of Somali communities, both inside and outside of Ethiopia, a
“political clanship” has been created as a way to mobilize the Somali for political or military purposes.254
Although the Somali region is very large, Somalis are not well represented in the central government and
have historically resisted the EPRDF.255 The Somali are often characterized as hostile toward nearby
ethnic groups.256 The ONLF is an armed Somali opposition group based in Eritrea and allied with the
OLF.257 Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya (the Islamic Union Party) is also a prominent Somali opposition group.258
Both seek independence for Ethiopia’s Somali Ogaden provinces.259
        Fighting between Oromos and Somalis claiming land ownership and rights has been reported
since 2003.260 During 2004 and 2005 there were three separate episodes of serious conflict between the
Oromos and Somalis in areas along the border between the Oromiya and Somali regional states.261 A
border referendum in October 2004 resulted in a two transfers of land from Somali to Oromiya control,
creating further animosities between the two ethnic groups. Ethnic clashes reportedly caused up to one
hundred deaths, many injuries, and forced approximately 8,500 in the region to leave their homes.262
More conflicts between Oromos and Somalis were reported in July 2005.263
        Approximately ten to twenty thousand people are displaced in Oromiya and 29,000 to 34,000 are
displaced in the Somali region, although these estimates may have been manipulated.264 The lack of
resources and strife from the drought and ensuing flood can exacerbate existing conflicts over resources
and lead to more displaced persons.265
        The upheaval in nearby Somalia can have a destabilizing effect on the Somali region and Ethiopia
in general. Ethiopia is opposed to an Islamic state in Somalia, where Islamic courts are gaining control.
In October 2006, Somalia’s Islamists declared “holy war” against Ethiopia and Ethiopia responded by
sending troops to across the border.266 Eritreans support Somalia and the Islamists, much to Ethiopia’s




                                                                                                            27
chagrin, further complicating the situation.267 In addition, intra-Somali clashes have increasingly been
reported, the latest in an area close to the Somalia border.268


Warning Signs Implicated


1. Existence of an ethnic group at risk


(a) Exclusionary Ideologies that purport to justify discrimination, Specific Identification of groups and
their association with a specific political identity, External support to groups that could become targets
due to being seen as “collaborators” with external enemies
        Because of the Christian identity of past Amhara and present Tigray leaders, Ethiopia is a
distinctly Christian nation.269 With the rise of Islamism, the EPRDF has been adamantly opposed to an
Islamic state in neighboring Somalia and Islamist tendencies in its own Somali region. The Somali
region’s large percentage of Muslims, some of whom are agitating for independence through organized
opposition groups, may be the reason for EPRDF violence directed at Somalis and the deprivation of
resources and lack of infrastructure in the region. The EPRDF may associate Muslims in the Somali
region with radical Islamists or with Somalia, seeing them as a serious threat to Ethiopia and its coalition
government.


2. Violations of human rights law that may become massive of serious


(a) Violations of civil and political rights and Lack of framework to seek justice
        Reports of widespread, government-sponsored human rights violations exist, but are largely
unsubstantiated because access to the Somali region is restricted.270 Arbitrary detentions and killings
have been linked to the ONLF activity in the Somali region.271 Security forces often arrest Somali
civilians whom they claim are members of the ONLF or Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya, and detain these civilians
for long periods of time—sometimes incommunicado and without a trial.272 Hundreds or more people
have been detained without trial in recent years and reports exist that many have been extrajudicially
executed or tortured on suspected ties with opposition groups.273 Despite these alarming reports, leading
human rights organizations have been unable to investigate and confirm violations due to military
restriction in the Somali region.274 The Ogaden Human Rights Committee, a non-partisan human rights
organization in the Somali region, documented disappearances, suspected detentions, rape, and torture.275
Renewed activity by the ONLF was reported in December 2005 and January 2006 with a total of fifteen




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separate attacks against Ethiopian government forces in different areas of the Somali regional state.276
Government reprisals for this activity have not been documented, but can be expected to be harsh.


(b) Serious or massive violations of economic, social and cultural rights
          While government violations of civil and political rights may be difficult to confirm, deprivation
of economic and social rights is undeniable. The Somali region, along with Oromiya, was the hardest hit
by drought in early 2006 and then by the recent floods.277 This area, much like parts of Oromiya, seems
to have the fewest resources in Ethiopia.278 The Somali region is characterized by lack of health care,
educational systems, proper roads, and other infrastructure, indicating government neglect.279 Aid
workers confirm that government agencies are not operating in the area and they have no government
partner to help them implement health programs.280 Even the government’s own report to the Committee
on the Rights of the Child indicated a gaping disparity between access to health services in Somali and in
other regions.281
          Although the Somali region has adequate natural resources, it has lagged behind the highland
regions of Ethiopia in investment and economic development.282 Reasons cited for this lag include
ethnic/clan conflicts, political instability, lack of infrastructure, and less reliable peace and security.283
Efforts by the federal government to increase development in the Somali region include a scheme
entitling tax free holidays and various other incentives to investors who invest in the region.284
          Scholars on Ethiopia cite the lack of political stability as an important reason that Somali region
has lagged behind the rest of the state.285 The region had six presidents between 1991 and 1998 and the
State Council was unable to issue a law for many years since its establishment.286 Many leaders were
removed because of clan sentiments, corruption, or abuse of power.287 The nearby and unstable Somalia
is another reason for the chaos, and potentially the related dearth of investor confidence and infrastructure
development, in the Somali region of Ethiopia.288


(c) Forced relocations
          Many Somalis are displaced because of the conflict with Oromos. Concerns over their
resettlement include possible conflict over traditional rights to resources or increased ethnic conflict,
particularly if resettlement occurs inter-regionally.289 The government’s denial of the existence of
conflict-displaced Somalis could further jeopardize their access to economic resources and critical food
aid.290




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E. Sidama
        The Sidama, the largest ethnic group in the SNNP region, are located in Sidama Land, one of the
most densely populated areas of Ethiopia.291 The Sidama have a traditional system of social stratification,
much like a caste system, which creates marginalized minorities who are at risk of discrimination and
persecution by other Sidama groups.292 The Sidama regional election results are mixed between the
EPRDF and the CUD, indicating no strong political affiliation of the group as a whole.293 Sidama
respondents to an identity study placed the interests of Ethiopia ahead of any nationality group and put
unity of the Ethiopian state before an ethnic group’s right to self-determination.294 The Sidama National
Liberation Organization (SNLO) has historically agitated for greater Sidama rights. The SNLO is
increasingly supported by the Sidama people and the region reportedly has been experiencing greater
suppression due to that support, however reports from objective observers are scarce.295


Warning Signs Implicated


1. Existence of an ethnic group at risk


(a) Specific Identification of groups and their association with a specific political identity
        The Sidama are agitating for more rights and increased autonomy from the central EPRDF
government. The increased activity of the SNLO and other Sidama groups is somewhat united against the
EPRDF, resulting in violence directed against them from the central government.


2. Violations of human rights law that may become massive of serious


(a) Violations of civil and political rights and Lack of framework to seek justice
        Widespread violation of Sidama civil and political rights has been pronounced for at least the last
few years. On May 24, 2002 in Awassa, the SNNP regional state capital, approximately thirty peaceful
demonstrators were shot dead by government troops and dozens detained without trial until 2004.296
EPRDF armed forces indiscriminately opened machine gun fire on seven thousand individuals protesting
the government’s proposed change in the political status of the regional capital Awassa. 297 The Sidama
refer to the incident as the “Looqe Massacre” and claim that more than one hundred were killed and over
three hundred wounded.298
        The Sidama staged a protest in Awassa and other southern towns in February and March of 2006,
demanding the Sidama administrative zone be upgraded to its own regional state from its current zonal
status in the SNNP Region. Several hundred demonstrators were arrested and some Sidama alleged


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shooting and beatings by government officers.299 There have been reports of torture and ill treatment of
the Sidama prisoners and numerous individuals have been detained without charge or trial.300 Most
detainees have no access to the justice system and remain in jail indefinitely.
        The SNLO claims genocide against the Sidama people by the EPRDF through deprivation of
resources, environmental destruction, displacement, violence, propaganda, and other means.301


(b) Serious or massive violations of economic, social and cultural right
        Sidamas claimed high levels of dissatisfaction with health care, the court system, and food
security issues.302 Sidama residents were satisfied with the local government’s provision of education,
but extremely dissatisfied with food security.303 Data on the actual distribution of government resources is
scarce, though the government claims that individuals in the SNNPR region enjoy healthcare benefits at
or above the national average.304


(c) Forced relocations
        Though the Sidama themselves are not reported to be at risk for displacement,305 relocation of
other displaced persons into the region could fuel political instability and resource competition. Because
the SNNP region is less densely populated and more fertile than the rest of Ethiopia, it could serve as an
area for future government resettlement of displaced persons from the overpopulated and degraded
highlands.306 Since the government has yet to develop an IDP strategy, potentially problematic
relocations into the SNNP Region should be monitored closely.307


III. A history of genocide or discrimination
        The “Looqe Massacre” is an indication of the increasing political repression in Ethiopia by the
government, placing the Sidama at risk of falling victim to further human rights violations by the EPRDF.


F. Gurage
        The Gurage are the second largest ethnic group in the SNNP region.308 Some Gurage are
Christian or Muslim, but most practice a traditional religion that runs through most parts of social life.309
The Gurage have a reputation for being entrepreneurial and although they are somewhat concentrated in
the SNNP regional state, they are spread across many areas and present in most urban cities across
Ethiopia. Gurage merchants were among the beneficiaries of the Derg Regime’s nationalization policy
since it removed the expatriate sector and created opportunities for indigenous entrepreneurs.310 Many of
the wealthiest individuals in Ethiopia are Gurage. Although the Gurage as a unified group has never been
in power in Ethiopia, they are often linked with the Amhara as part of a ruling class. The Gurage support


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the CUD because of their interest in privatization and rejection of government interference, and
historically align themselves politically with the Amhara. The Amhara and Gurage call themselves the
“Rainbow Coalition.”311 Gurage merchants and intellectuals have been strong supporters of Ethiopian
unity and skeptical of ethnic liberation movements.312


Warning Signs Implicated


1. Existence of an ethnic group at risk


(a) Specific Identification of groups and their association with a specific political identity
        Because of their position of privilege and wealth, other ethnic groups have associated the Gurage
with the Amhara/CUD, towards which these other groups already have heightened animosity.


2. Violations of human rights law which may become massive or serious


(a) Violations of civil and political rights
        Gurage have been targets of sporadic civil and political rights violations, and their popular
identification with the Amhara could put them at risk for further harm. Gurage businesses were reported
to be the most affected by the government crackdown after the 2005 parliamentary elections. Notably, a
Muslim subgroup of the Gurage formally splintered from the mainstream Gurage group in the
elections.313 This seems to be part of the EPRDF’s campaign to divide and conquer, emphasizing
differences to prevent the group from forming a coalition in violation of internationally recognized
standards of freedom of opinion314 and political affiliation.315 However, the Silte have had a distinct
ethnic identity since the 1990s when young, moderately educated Silte men in Addis Ababa began to
promote this separate identity and agitate for political claims.316


(b) Forced displacement
        Like the Sidama, the Gurage face the prospect of relocation of other groups into the
comparatively fertile SNNP region. If such relocation were to occur, bringing ethnic groups who have
been polarized against each other into close contact and competition, the Gurage could be put at risk for
ethnic, religious, political, and class-based conflict.




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V. Ethiopia’s Legal Obligations


        On paper, Ethiopia is committed to an array of international norms related to the protection of
human rights, including the rights of minorities. The Ethiopian Constitution enshrines the country’s
international human rights obligations into its domestic legal regime by requiring that the “fundamental
rights and freedoms” listed in the Constitution be “interpreted in a manner consistent with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights and International instruments
adopted by Ethiopia."317 This provision is of considerable import, as Ethiopia has ratified or acceded to
most major human rights treaties without reservation, thus bringing squarely within its legal framework
the protection of civil and political rights, economic and social rights, racial and ethnic minority rights,
women’s rights, children’s rights, and the right to be free from torture.318 Independently, the Constitution
includes robust guarantees of Human Rights319 and Democratic Rights,320 including comprehensive due
process protections; prohibition against inhuman treatment; women’s, children’s, and people’s rights;
peasant and farmer property rights; and equal access to national resources. Ethiopia has acceded to the
four Geneva Conventions and the Optional Protocols on the protection of victims of international and
internal armed conflict,321 as well as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.322 Its Constitution and Penal Code incorporate these legal norms into domestic law by
criminalizing genocide,323 war crimes,324 and crimes against humanity.325 Finally, Ethiopia has ratified
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter), thus affirming the particular
importance of both individual and group rights in the context of African society.326
        Yet despite Ethiopia’s ambitious legal framework for the protection of human rights, continued
violations of the rights of minorities belie its official commitments. The preceding analysis suggests that
the government engages with impunity in the widespread violation of fundamental civil, political,
economic, and social rights.327 Ethiopia’s state practice is not transparent, as it has largely failed to
comply with its obligations to submit reports documenting the implementation of its treaty obligations.328
Since the EPRDF came to power, the country has only submitted reports to the Committee on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Committee on the Rights of the
Child, though a report to the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is
reportedly forthcoming.329 Reports, when finally submitted, tend to disregard reporting protocol and fail
to discuss issues related to the rights of minorities.330
        The following section will explore the scope of Ethiopia’s obligations under international human
rights law, as well as regional and domestic law, to illuminate areas in which the international community
may support the country in bringing its treatment of minorities into compliance with human rights norms.




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International Bill of Rights


1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR.)
        The UDHR, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, is the cornerstone of the modern
human rights movement.331 While its provisions on the protection of civil, political, economic, and social
rights are not formally binding, through frequent invocation they may have reached the status of
customary international law.332 The normative weight of the UDHR for Ethiopia is evidenced by its
explicit incorporation into the country’s constitution.333
        The UDHR is traditionally understood to define the rights of the individual against the duties of
the state.334 However, article 29(1) of the UDHR extends the concept of responsibility to the individual,
who has “duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is
possible.” The African Charter elaborates upon the concept of individual duties to society, requiring
“every individual . . . to respect and consider his fellow beings without discrimination.”335 Together, the
UDHR and African Charter provide a legal framework for holding not only the EPRDF, but also non-
state actors, responsible for violations of the rights of minorities.


2. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
        Ethiopia acceded to the ICCPR without reservation in 1993,336 thus committing itself “to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory” the rights enumerated in the Covenant 337 and to submit
periodic reports to the Human Rights Committee.338 The country has not ratified the Optional Protocols
related to individual complaints procedures or abolition of the death penalty.339 The ICCPR creates an
immediately binding obligation on States Parties to respect the rights of its citizens, without regard to
distinctions such as ethnicity or political status.340 The rights enumerated in the ICCPR include
protections of physical integrity, procedural fairness, equal protection, individual liberties, and political
participation.341 Most of these protections are reiterated, and in some cases expanded, by Ethiopia’s
Constitution.342
        The ICCPR also includes a unique provision, not present in the UDHR, related to the protection
of minority rights. Article 27 proclaims:
                   In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
                   persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
                   community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
                   culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own
                   language.343




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The provision was elaborated upon by Human Rights Committee General Comment 23, which
characterizes minority rights as “distinct from, and in addition to” the other rights contained in the
Covenant, including non-discrimination and equal protection clauses which protect minorities as
individuals rather than collectively.344 The scope of a state’s duty under Article 27 is broad and includes
the positive obligation to ensure that the right of minority groups to exist is not violated by the state or by
private actors.345 Ethiopia’s Constitution contains a comparable provision on the rights of nations,
nationalities, and peoples to express, develop, promote and preserve their cultures, though the bulk of the
article relates to self-determination and secession rights.346 The African Charter, in contrast, directly
addresses the issue of minority discrimination by declaring the equality of all peoples, prohibiting the
domination of one people by another,347 and affirming a group’s right to existence and to freely determine
its political status.348
         The Ethiopian government regularly violates the rights included in the ICCPR through its
participation and complicity in politically motivated murders, violence against political opponents,
arbitrary arrests, prolonged detentions, lack of access to judicial redress, and limitations on freedom of
expression.349 These violations appear to occur across political and ethnic lines, where individuals and
groups are perceived to threaten state authority. While the government has complied with its obligation
to adopt national laws in accordance with the ICCPR,350 widespread political repression and a
dysfunctional justice system demonstrate that the country has not yet effectuated the ICCPR in any
meaningful way. Moreover, to the extent government policy threatens the existence of ethnic and
religious minority groups through discrimination, forced displacement, or ethnic, political, and religious
warfare designed to undermine group cohesion, Ethiopia may be in grave violation of ICCPR Article 27,
African Charter Articles 19 and 20, and Article 39 of its Constitution.351
         Despite the ICCPR’s requirement that States Parties submit a progress report to the Human
Rights Committee within one year of the treaty’s entry into force, and thereafter upon the Committee’s
request,352 Ethiopia has never submitted a report.353 This failure deprives Ethiopia of the opportunity to
critically assess its policies, and the Committee the opportunity to provide feedback on the
implementation of the treaty. To address this transparency gap, the Committee should request a report on
the status of civil and political rights and require the inclusion of disaggregated data to reflect the relative
rights of political and ethnic minorities.


3. International Convention on Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights (ICECSR)
         Ethiopia acceded to the ICECSR without reservation in 1993. The ICECSR creates a binding
obligation on states parties to “take steps . . . to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the [Covenant’s] rights.”354 Like the ICCPR, the ICESCR


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requires States Parties to submit progress reports to the Committee on Economic and Social Rights upon
consultation with relevant specialized agencies.355 Rights under the ICESCR are expansive, ranging from
basic life necessities such as food, drinking water, housing, education, and healthcare to higher social
aspirations such as fair wages, leisure, and participation in cultural life.356 While the ICECSR’s rights
regime is progressive, the state is nonetheless required to give immediate effect to its obligation under
Article 2(2) to guarantee the Covenant’s rights without discrimination of any kind.357 This interpretation
is supported by the Committee’s General Comment 3 on States Parties’ Obligations Under Article 2(1),358
as well as references to non-discrimination in General Comments related to housing359 and education.360
Ethiopia’s Constitution also requires non-discrimination in the promotion of economic, social, and
cultural rights by guaranteeing each Ethiopian “equal access to publicly funded social services.”361
        While Ethiopia is a severely impoverished country, it is incumbent upon the government to
ensure that individuals, regardless of their ethnic, political, or religious affiliation, are given equal access
to the nation’s limited resources and services. Ethiopia may be violating this obligation with respect to
the Amhara, Oromo, and Sidama vis-à-vis discriminatory resource distribution schemes at the kebele
level and threats to withhold resources to political opponents at local and national levels. From most
accounts, individuals in the Somali region are deprived of basic life necessities at a level far greater than
most other individuals in other regions.362 If Somali resource and infrastructure deprivation is a function
of government discrimination, the government is in grave breach of its obligations under Article 2(2).
         Perhaps not surprisingly, the government has largely failed to provide ethnic and region-
disaggregated data on access to economic and social rights. The Committee on the Rights of the Child
requested such data, but the government did not produce a comprehensive analysis.363 Healthcare was the
only sector in which a comparison among regional groups was meaningfully attempted, suggesting that
the government is either unable or unwilling to undertake such analysis with respect to other sectors.364
This lack of information raises particular concern in the areas of food aid, forced evictions, and education,
where the rights of minorities are particularly affected. Credible reports that the government has
conditioned food aid in the Amhara365 and Oromiya366 regions on support of the EPRDF is an express
violation of the anti-discrimination obligation that automatically attaches to ICESCR Article 11(1) on the
right to adequate food and Article 11(2) on the right to be free from hunger.367 Similarly, reports indicate
that the government has violated the right to housing by threatening to evict political opponents in the
Amhara region,368 evicting peasants to make way for private investors in the Oromiya region,369 forcing
Oromo to relocate because of political repression following the May 2005 election,370 and forcibly
resettling people in areas with no infrastructure or water access.371 These forced evictions violate the
peasant’s protection against eviction372 and the pastoralist’s protection against displacement 373 described
in the Constitution’s section on The Right to Property. Forced evictions also violate the ICESCR. The


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Committee’s General Comment 7 emphasizes that “ethnic and other minorities . . . suffer
disproportionately from the practice of forced eviction” and that states must ensure that evictions are not
discriminatory.374 Thus, the state has a positive obligation to make sure that its evictions are not caused
by, and do not result in, discrimination on the basis of political affiliation or ethnicity. The treaty imposes
an even more stringent obligation with regard to equal access to education, which General Comment 13
on the Right to Education characterizes as an “empowerment right”375 that must be “accessible to all,
especially the most vulnerable groups, in law and in fact, without discrimination.”376 Reports of a
virtually non-existent educational system in the Somali region,377 as well as grossly inadequate
educational opportunities for students who are minorities in other regions,378 indicate a failure of the
Ethiopian state to ensure the equal right to education.
        Considering the inadequacy of data to evaluate the level of attainment of economic and social
rights among Ethiopia’s minority groups, it is imperative that the government submit a progress report to
the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. To date, Ethiopia has not submitted a report to
the Committee.379 The country should seek technical and economic assistance, if necessary, to complete a
country analysis including ethnic and region-disaggregated data, particularly related to the fundamental
sectors of food aid, housing, education, and healthcare. Such data would assist Ethiopia and the
international community in ensuring that the economic and social rights of all Ethiopians are protected
now, and as the country develops its economy.


Other Treaty Based Obligations With Reporting Requirements


1. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)
        Ethiopia acceded to the ICERD in 1976 without reservation,380 thus submitting to an assortment
of both negative and positive obligations to eliminate racial (including ethnical) discrimination within its
territory.381 The ICERD obligates States Parties to submit a progress report to the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination within one year after the entry into force of the treaty and every two
years thereafter.382 Under the ICERD, officials are prohibited from discriminating against individuals or
groups based on racial or ethnic grounds, and must ensure that all state institutions operate in a non-
discriminatory manner.383 States are also required to take “special and concrete measures” to guarantee
equal enjoyment of rights for all racial and ethnic groups and individuals.384 The ICERD affirms the right
of all racial and ethnic groups to equal access to justice, physical security, political participation, civil
rights, and economic and cultural rights including the rights to housing and education.385 The ICERD
protects the rights of individuals as members of a particular racial, ethnic, or national group and includes




                                                                                                                37
protections that go beyond the non-discrimination provisions found in either the Ethiopian Constitution386
or African Charter.387
        Since politics and ethnicity are often inextricably intertwined in Ethiopia, one might assert that
violent crackdowns on political opposition are tantamount to civil and political rights violations based on
the impermissible ground of ethnic discrimination.388 If this view is accepted, then the EPRDF has
violated its obligations under the ICERD in any area where it has engaged in political repression,
violence, or discriminatory deprivation of economic and social rights. The treaty not only bars Ethiopia
from participating in racial and ethnic discrimination, but also requires it to ensure that victims of past
discrimination are given assistance to enable them to enjoy civil, political, economic, and social rights on
par with more socially powerful groups. Considering this framework, the government’s requirement to
allocate resources to improve the lives its poorest ethnic minorities becomes a legal responsibility rather
than an act of largesse.
        While Ethiopia submitted six country reports to the Committee between 1977 and 1987, it has not
submitted a report since then.389 The country, which owes reports from 1989 - 2005, is due to submit a
combined report by March 2007.390 Ethiopia should be encouraged to ensure the next report’s inclusion
of ethnic and region-disaggregated data to illuminate differential realization of rights among ethnic
groups. If the report does not contain such data, the Committee should consider requesting it upon
evaluation of the country’s report. This strategy was undertaken by the Committee on the Rights of the
Child in its evaluation of Ethiopia’s Third Periodic Report, and resulted in a government response that
addressed—albeit in a limited way— minority issues.391


2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
        The government of Ethiopia ratified the CEDAW in 1981 with one reservation,392 and has not
signed the Optional Protocol to allow the Committee to hear individual complaints.393 Pursuant to Article
18 of the treaty, States Parties are required to submit a progress report within one year of entry into force
of the treaty, and every four years thereafter.394 Among its declaratory provisions, the CEDAW
recognizes that the elimination of ethnic discrimination is required for the full realization of women’s
rights.395 The CEDAW requires governments to pursue “without delay” a policy to end discrimination
against women 396 and to “ensure that public authorities and institutions” do not discriminate against
women.397 Ethiopia’s Constitutional provisions on the Rights of Women include many of the same rights
expressed in the CEDAW, such as equal protection398 and affirmative action399, and goes beyond the
treaty in its treatment of certain economic and social rights.400
        While the CEDAW does not enumerate a woman’s right to be free from state violence among its
provisions, widespread sexual violence committed by EPRDF soldiers against women and girls 401 falls


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within the prohibition of state-sponsored discrimination against women. Available reports of sexual
violence in Ethiopia focus on the government’s targeting of Anuak women; however, all women
associated with political and ethnic minorities are potentially at risk of sexual violence. Underscoring this
reality, the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s Concluding Observations on Ethiopia’s Third Periodic
Report expressed serious concern over numerous allegations of child rape by soldiers.402
          The international community should closely monitor Ethiopian armed forces for reports of sexual
violence against women and girls. It is now widely recognized that the intersection of gender and
ethnicity puts women and girls at heightened risk of sexual violence during conflict situations.403 The
International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) has held that acts of sexual violence intended to
prevent births within a protected group may constitute genocide.404 The ICTR’s founding statute includes
widespread and systematic rape, sexual slavery, and forced prostitution directed against civilian
populations among crimes against humanity405 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
which Ethiopia has not ratified,406 includes various forms of sexual violence in its definition of genocide
and crimes against humanity.407 Regrettably, Ethiopia’s last report to the Committee, which was
submitted in 2002 and reviewed in 2004, did not mention ethnicity in its evaluation of the rights of
women in Ethiopia. The Committee failed to point out this omission in its Concluding Observations to
Ethiopia’s periodic report. Future reports submitted to the Committee should include sex, ethnic, and
region-disaggregated data to provide a complete understanding of the status of women’s rights throughout
the country’s regions and among ethnic groups.


3. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
          Ethiopia acceded to the CRC in 1991 without reservation.408 Article 44 of the treaty requires
States Parties to report on the implementation of the treaty within two years of its entry into force, and
every five years thereafter.409 The CRC obligates the state to “respect and ensure” a broad range of civil,
political, economic, social, and cultural rights to children within its territory without regard to factors such
as political opinion, ethnicity, or religion.410 An important consequence of the non-discrimination
principle, which attaches to each right listed in the CRC, is that the government is required to use its
resources to provide equal access to such rights as free primary education 411 and access to healthcare.412
While the Ethiopian Constitution does contain an article on the Rights of Children, the scope of protection
is comparatively limited.413 The African Charter does not include a separate provision on children’s
rights.
          The EPRDF has engaged in serious violations of children’s rights to physical integrity, procedural
fairness, equal protection, and individual liberty. Thousands of Oromo students were reportedly arrested
and mistreated in prison following protests in 2004 414 and 2005.415 There are also reports of murder and


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torture of Oromo demonstrators in the period leading up to the 2005 election.416 Children were among
those murdered, tortured, and raped in the political repression surrounding the election in violation of
their inherent right to life417 and freedom from torture, cruel, and other degrading treatment.418 Children
also suffered arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention in violation of their rights to liberty,419 shortest
possible detention,420 and humane treatment while imprisoned.421 The Committee on the Rights of the
Child noted in its Concluding Observations that it is “seriously concerned . . . over the information that
children continue to be victims of torture, cruel and degrading treatment by the police and military,” rape,
and violent attacks while at school.422 The Committee expressed particular concern regarding the
situation of children who are ethnic minorities.423 Noting that crimes against children occur with
impunity, the Committee recommended that the state hold police and military officials accountable by
initiating immediate investigations, punishing perpetrators, and providing recovery services and
compensation for child victims.424 Though few shadow reports were available online, a report submitted
by the Relief Society of Tigray listed prison overcrowding, non-separation of child and adult
prisoners, and lack of child units among the violations of children in the Tigray region.425
        Ethiopia’s Third Periodic Report to the Committee demonstrates both the promise and the
challenge of bringing the country into compliance with its international obligations. Ethiopia’s reporting
under the CRC constitutes a “best practice” for the country. It submitted a report in September 1998
(considered by the Committee in January 2001)426 and again in April 2005427 (considered by the
Committee in September 2006). Ethiopia’s latest report, while submitted two years late, represents at the
very least an effort to comply with its duties under international children’s rights law. The report should
therefore be both welcomed as an indication of the country’s will and capacity to fulfill its reporting
obligations, and critiqued as an incomplete evaluation of the rights of all children within the country.
Despite the Concluding Observations following Ethiopia’s Second Periodic Report, which expressed
concern over discrimination against children who were minorities in their region 428 and recommended that
the government strengthen the implementation of constitutional protections of minorities,429 the Third
Periodic Report merely reiterated the Constitution’s protection of the “rights and freedoms of individuals,
and ethnic groups”430 and referenced the creation of separate schools for language minority groups in
urban areas.431 The only disaggregated data related to teenage pregnancy rates, government funds for
AIDS programming, and availability of Voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT) centers.432 In general,
the report ignored the situation of minority groups, though the omission did not go unnoticed by the
Committee. The Concluding Observations cited the following concerns: insufficient budgetary
allocations for minority children;433 repression of civil society groups working on behalf of children;434
reports of widespread arbitrary arrests of children;435 discrimination against minority children; 436 murder
and violence against student demonstrators, including attacks at school which disproportionately affected


                                                                                                              40
minority and street children;437 torture, rape, and inhuman treatment by the military;438 lack of access to
healthcare in rural areas; 439 ethnic and regional disparities in access to education;440 and lack of data
concerning ethnic minorities, particularly Anuak and Oromo.441 The CRC represents the most current
dialogue between Ethiopia and the international community concerning minority rights and should serve
as a basis for continued discussion, especially where minority children’s right to physical integrity is at
stake.


4. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)
         Ethiopia acceded to the CAT in 1994 without reservation,442 thus accepting the treaty’s
mandatory reporting requirement443 and the authority of the Committee to undertake independent and
confidential investigations into reports of systematic, state-sponsored torture.444 Torture is defined by the
CAT as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on a person” to obtain information, punish, intimidate, or for any discriminatory reason when the abuse is
inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting within official capacity.”445 The scope of the prohibition is expansive, encompassing both
official acts and omissions that result in torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Similar
prohibitions are found in the African Charter’s proscription of “exploitation and degradation. . .
particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, [and] cruel inhuman or degrading punishment,”446 and the
Ethiopian Constitution’s Prohibition Against Inhuman Treatment447 and prohibition of Crimes Against
Humanity, which includes the crime of torture.448
         The elements of the crime of torture may exist in Ethiopia. First, military and police officials
have allegedly committed brutal violations of the corporal integrity of children, thus fulfilling the
government agent element.449 Second, at least some sources report that violations are or have been
widespread.450 Finally, violations have been committed in the context of punishment or on the
discriminatory basis of repressing political opposition.451 The act of torture or inhuman treatment
constitutes a breach of Ethiopia’s obligations under the CAT, the African Charter, and its Constitution.
         Ethiopia has never submitted a report to the Committee Against Torture.452 The international
community should encourage the country to promptly commence preparation of its first report, addressing
specifically the treatment of children and minorities in Ethiopian prisons and allegations of sexual and
other types of torture perpetrated by government agents against members of minority groups.453 If
Ethiopia does not voluntarily address allegations of torture within its borders, the international
community should consider sending a special rapporteur to investigate violations, or seeking Ethiopia’s
permission to initiate an investigation into allegations of state-sponsored torture under Article 20.




                                                                                                              41
Humanitarian Law


The Geneva Conventions and Domestic Prohibitions on War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
           Ethiopia signed the four Geneva Conventions in 1949 ratified them without reservation in 1969,
and has also ratified the two Optional Protocols.454 The Geneva Conventions are non-self executing and
thus require states to effectuate their protections through implementing legislation. Ethiopia has largely
fulfilled this official requirement by criminalizing war crimes in its Penal Code455 and crimes against
humanity in its Constitution.456
           The full protections of the Geneva Conventions only apply in situations of armed conflict, though
some of its protections may have attained the status of customary international law and therefore would
apply even outside the context of war. While it is debatable whether the situation in Ethiopia rises to the
level of an armed conflict, Ethiopia as a High Contracting Party would be bound by its obligations under
Common Article 3 if an internal armed conflict were determined to exist. Common Article 3 protects the
most fundamental rights of those affected by war, including: (1) the humane treatment of persons not
taking part in hostilities, without discrimination; (2) prohibition of violence including murder, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture; (3) prohibition of hostage taking; (4) prohibition of humiliating and degrading
treatment; (5) prohibition of extra-judicial sentencing and execution; (6) and care for the wounded and the
sick.457
           Even if the current situation does not constitute armed conflict under international law, Ethiopia
is nonetheless bound by its Constitutional prohibition of crimes against humanity. These crimes, which
are criminal whether or not they occur in the context of war, include genocide, summary executions,
forcible disappearances, torture, and other acts defined as crimes against humanity by instruments to
which Ethiopia is a party.458


Genocide Prohibition


Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide
           The laws of genocide, with their focus on the protection of life-integrity rights from a group-
based perspective, may provide a valuable tool in the prevention and punishment of genocide and related
human rights abuses in Ethiopia. 459 The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Genocide, which Ethiopia was the first country to ratify,460 defines genocide in Article 2 as committing
acts “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”461 In a
poor, multi-ethnic society such as Ethiopia, careful attention should be paid to the ethnic and cultural
contexts of “policy-based” famine and drought as potential violations of Article 2(c), which names as an


                                                                                                               42
act of genocide the “deliber[ate] inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part.”462 In the event that the “intent to eliminate” element of genocide
cannot be identified, preventative measures may be taken under the “prevention” aspect of the Genocide
Convention as evidenced by its title, or under the standard international human rights treaty system.
Notably, the Genocide Convention excludes political groups from the sphere of protection. However,
Article 281 of the Ethiopian Penal Code preserves “political groups” under its definition of genocide.463
The inclusion of “political groups,” as a protected group, especially in a multi-ethnic tapestry such as
Ethiopia, may alleviate a traditional barrier to genocide prevention and prosecution. On the other hand,
the broad scope of the term may allow for authoritarian prosecutorial abuses against opposition groups.464


Conclusion


        The government of Ethiopia has manifested its intent to be bound by the international human
rights treaty regime through its accession to most conventions without reservation and its submission of
reports to some treaty committees. Now, the international community must take Ethiopia to task by using
all available means—whether diplomatic pressure, the provision of technical reporting assistance, or the
initiation of an investigation—to come into compliance with the human rights norms to which it is
committed. Increased transparency in the government’s treatment of minorities would assist in creating
an environment in which genocide cannot occur.


VI. ENTRY POINTS


    To the Ethiopian Government:


    1. Compliance with Reporting Requirements: Ethiopia should submit its overdue reports and
        report particularly on the rights of ethnic and political subgroups (the Ethiopia Country
        Presentation drafting committee for the CERD recommended it submit its overdue CERD reports
        in its draft document). All country reports should include data disaggregated by ethnic group and
        region to provide a complete understanding of the status of minorities throughout the country.
    2. Domestic Human Rights Monitoring: Under the Constitution and formalized through
        legislation in 2000, Ethiopia committed itself to establishing a National Human Rights
        Commission and an Ombudsman to mediate human rights issues. As of 2005, these institutions
        were still not operational, but appointments of the Chair of the Commission and the Ombudsman
        have since been made. This is significant progress toward improving the human rights situation


                                                                                                             43
    and accountability, and the governments should continue its efforts to establish the Commission
    and provide for its effective functioning.


To Non-governmental Organizations:


3. Increased Awareness: It is imperative that the governments within the international community
    be educated on the growing authoritarianism and ethnic violence in Ethiopia. Grass roots efforts
    are important to educate the public so that they in turn can influence and educate their
    government officials and private and government donors. Education must also be targeted to
    government officials and donors themselves.
4. Development of Civil Society: Ethiopian civil society is virtually nonexistent, the result being
    that ethnic groups are not organized to respond to current issues. This is due to lack of resources
    and rising government authoritarianism. The international community must aid Ethiopia in
    developing its civil society by providing much needed resources and pressuring the government
    to allow the development and free operation of such organizations. This effort must be focused
    on influencing the EPRDF to allow the operation of a free and independent press.
5. Incitement Watch: Monitor papers, TV, radio, and internet for possible hate speech targeting
    ethnic or religious groups. Blogs are already posting angry messages vocalizing frustration at the
    EPRDF policies. Incitement against religious groups requires careful attention because it is a
    potent rallying point to bring ethnic groups together against a common enemy.


To International Governments:


6. International Human Rights Monitoring: The international community must call for the
    government to permit access to the region to international human rights monitors, media, and
    diplomatic representatives. The international community should also consider requesting the
    government’s permission to allow a special rapporteur to investigate the situation of at-risk
    minority groups in the country. If the government prohibits access, the Committee Against
    Torture should consider resorting to the independent inquiry procedure authorized by Article 20
    of the Convention.465
7. International Commitments: Ethiopia has received the highest amount of foreign food aid of
    any African country in the past few years. Donor governments providing such aid must urge the
    government to abide by its commitments under international law - perhaps making aid contingent
    on upholding human rights oblications. Donor states should publicly condemn specific violations


                                                                                                      44
         and pressure the EPRDF to address them by holding any government officials accountable for
         their complicity in such acts.
    8. Military Assistance: Donor governments must make military assistance to Ethiopia contingent
         on the government’s adherence to international human rights and humanitarian law. Suppliers
         must monitor the use of military aid to ensure they are not used to commit human rights
         violations and any units implicated in abuses should be denied assistance.


    To The Special Advisor:


    9. Collaborate with NGOs: Work in partnership with NGOs, who can provide independent
         assessment within their area of expertise, to strengthen civil society, increase awareness, and
         monitor incitement.
    10. Quiet Diplomacy: Maintain relations with Ethiopian government, EPRDF officials, and political,
         religious, social leaders. The Special Advisor should seek to strengthen the core of moderates on
         all sides and support them to address contentious issues through inclusive political processes
         instead of violent means.

1
   Edmond J. Keller, Making and Remaking State and Nation in Ethiopia, in BORDERS, NATIONALISM, AND THE
AFRICAN STATE 87 (Ricardo Rene Laremont ed., 2005).
2
  ISRAEL W. CHARNY, “HOW CAN W E COMMIT THE UNTHINKABLE?” G ENOCIDE: THE HUMAN CANCER 288 (1982).
3
  This approach is in conformance with Kofi Annan's charge to the Special Advisor who is mandated to collect
information on massive and serious human rights violations that could lead to genocide and bring potential
genocidal situations to the attention of the UN Security Council. According to his mandate, Special Advisor Juan
Mendez’s responsibilities are to:
          (1) collect existing information, in particular from within the United Nations system, on massive and
          serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of ethnic and racial origin that, if not
          prevented or halted, might lead to genocide; (2) act as an early-warning mechanism to the Secretary-
          General to the Security Council, by bringing to the latter’s attention potential situations that could result in
          genocide; (3) make recommendations to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, on actions to
          prevent or halt genocide; (4) liaise with the United Nations system on activities for the prevention of
          genocide and work to enhance the United Nations capacity to analyze and manage information relating to
          genocide or related crimes.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights:
Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Five Point Action Plan and Activities of the Special
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/84 (Feb. 1, 2006).
4
  Id. at Annex. See also infra Appendix 1. This report has incorporated “3. Additional warning signs” into “1. The
existence of national, ethnic, racial or religious group(s) at risk” and “2.Violation of human rights and humanitarian
law, which may become massive or serious.”
5
  This report uses the Oromo as its reference for numerical minorities, since at 40%, they comprise the largest ethnic
group in Ethiopia.
6
  More or less all groups but the Tigray are structural minorities. However, the Amhara have a history of power and
stand poised to be the group that takes power in a clash with the Tigray. Additionally, the Oromo have a long
history of political disenfranchisement regardless of which group was in power. This lack of power is especially
striking given the percentage of Oromo in Ethiopia.




                                                                                                                       45
7
  Ethnic Amhara comprise 25% of the Ethiopian population. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE:
ETHIOPIA (2005), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2859.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
8
  Tigray comprise 7% of the Ethiopian population. Id.
9
  Oromo, the largest ethnic group, constitute 40% of the population. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD
FACTBOOK: ETHIOPIA (2006), http://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/et.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
10
   Ethnic Somali, located primarily in the Somali region bordering Somalia, represent 6% of Ethiopia’s population.
Id.
11
   The Sidama comprise only 9% of the overall population. Id.
12
   At 2% of the population, the Gurage are one of Ethiopia’s smaller groups. Id.
13
   Interview with Anonymous Member of the Anuak Justice Council, N.Y. (Nov. 14, 2006); see infra Part III,
Section 2(a) on freedom of press violations.
14
   U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 7.
15
   Interview with Anonymous Member of the Anuak Justice Council, supra note 13.
16
   Ethiopia successfully resisted Italian occupation during the 1930s and became one of the first states to join the
United Nations. Id.
17
   Keller, supra note 1, at 93
18
   Keller, supra note 1, at 100.
19
   Id. at 101.
20
   James C.N. Paul, Ethnicity and the New Constitutional Orders of Ethiopia and Eritrea, in AUTONOMY AND
ETHNICITY: NEGOTIATING COMPETING CLAIMS IN MULTI-ETHNIC STATES 185 (Yash Ghai ed., 2000). On December
12, 2006 Mengistu Haile Mariam was convicted of genocide by the Federal High Court in Addis Ababa. He and
other convicted members of his regime face the death sentence.
21
   Id.
22
   Id.
23
   A "Nation, Nationality or People" for the purpose of this Constitution, is a group of people who have or share
large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or
related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous
territory.” CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL D EMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA art. 39(5) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTION].
24
   The Constitution’s portion on Democratic Rights includes broad provisions on the right to culture and the rights of
“Nations, Nationalities, and People” to define their own political entities:
           1. Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination,
           including the right to secession.
           2. Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to speak, to write and to develop its own
           language; to express, to develop and to promote its culture; and to preserve its history.
           3. Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self-government
           which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to
           equitable representation in state and Federal governments.
           4. The right to self-determination, including secession, of every Nation, Nationality and People shall come
           into effect:
                     (a) When a demand for secession has been approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of
                     the Legislative Council of the Nation, Nationality or People concerned;
                     (b) When the Federal Government has organized a referendum which must take place within three
                     years from the time it received the concerned council’s decision for secession;
                     (c) When the demand for secession is supported by majority vote in the referendum;
                     (d) When the Federal Government will have transferred its powers to the council of the Nation,
                     Nationality or People who has voted to secede; and
                     (e) When the division of assets is effected in a manner prescribed by law.
Id. art. 39.
25
   The Somali region has long been considered by the Ethiopian public to be a “prime candidate for early secession
under Article 39 of the new Constitution.” BERTUS PRAEG, ETHIOPIA AND POLITICAL RENAISSANCE IN AFRICA 155
(2006).
26
   CONSTITUTION art. 13.
27
   Keller, supra note 1, at 105.
28
   See generally WORLD BANK, AFRICA: DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (2006).


                                                                                                                   46
29
   50% of Ethiopians live below the poverty line. CIA, supra note 9.
30
   Degree of risk for major infectious diseases is “very high.” Id.
31
   There are 93.62 deaths per 1,000 live births. Id.
32
   According to 2004 estimates, 1.5 million Ethiopians are living with HIV/AIDS. Id. Based on 2003 estimates,
120,000 deaths per year are attributable to HIV/AIDS and the adult prevalence rate is 4.4%. Id.
33
   The average lifespan of the total population is 49.03 years. For men, the average lifespan is slightly less at 47.86
years, and for women, slightly higher at 50.24 years. Id.
34
   The literacy rate for the total population is 42.7%. Among men, the rate is higher at 50.3%, and among women,
lower at 35.1%. Id.
35
   GDP on a purchasing power parity basis divided by the population is $900 based on 2005 estimates. Id.
36
    According to estimates from 2005, Ethiopia’s GDP was $64.73 billion, a 2% decline from the previous year. Id.
37
   The Carter Center determined the election results following the May 15 elections were “credible and reflect[ed]
competitive conditions.” CARTER CENTER, FINAL STATEMENT OF THE CARTER CENTER OBSERVATION OF THE
ETHIOPIA 2005 NATIONAL ELECTIONS 10 (2005), available at http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2199.pdf (last
visited Nov. 13, 2006). By contrast, when the E.U. released its final election report the E.U. Observer Mission
declared the elections “fell short of international principles for genuine democratic elections.” EUROPEAN UNION
ELECTION O BSERVATION MISSION TO ETHIOPIA, FINAL REPORT ON THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 1 (2005), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/ethiopia/
2005_final_report.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2006).
38
   Not incidentally, the redrawing would divide regions into smaller pieces so the Amhara would no longer be
overwhelmed by smaller groups.
39
   Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: Hidden Crackdown in Rural Areas (Jan. 13, 2006),
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/12/ethiop12417.htm [hereinafter Hidden Crackdown].
40
   HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COUNTRY SUMMARY: ETHIOPIA 1 (2006).
41
   While most of the June detainees have reportedly been released, thousands of people arrested in November and
afterwards remain in detention. Human Rights Watch, Hidden Crackdown, supra note 39.
42
   Note that the definition of genocide according to Article 281 of the Ethiopian Penal Code includes political
groups.
43
   Human Rights Watch, Hidden Crackdown, supra note 39.
44
   Id.
45
   According to figures compiled between March 2005 and February 2006, 5 people were killed by government
armed forces; 54 wounded by bullet shots, beaten, or suffering with light and heavy bodily injuries; 202 illegally
imprisoned but released after imprisonment; 82 still in prison; 103 unjustly discharged from work; 14 dispossessed
of home and property; 2 missing; 15 heads of household lost property worth 2.352 million Birr. ETHIOPIAN HUMAN
RIGHTS COUNCIL, THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ETHIOPIA: 24 TH REGULAR REPORT 1 tbl. 1 (2006), available at
http://www.ehrco.org/Reports/reg24.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2006). Of the five killed, one was 18, three were 23,
and one was 30. Id. at 1-2. All five were men, and all lived in Addis Ababa. Id. Of the fifteen wounded by bullets,
twelve were in their late teens and early twenties. Id. In Addis Ababa, Seven members of the Ethiopian Teacher’s
Association were illegally imprisoned. Id. at 12.
46
   Telephone Interview with Anonymous Professor of Political Science (Oct. 11, 2006).
47
   See, e.g., Andrew Cawthorne, Ethiopia Inquiry Finds 199 Died in Post-Poll Violence, 25 October 2006,
WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 25, 2006, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/10/25/AR2006102501143.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2006); Anthony Mitchell, Judge Says
Ethiopia Forces Killed 193, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 18, 2006, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/10/18/AR2006101800242.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006); Ethiopia Row over “Massacre”
Leak, BBC NEWS, Oct. 19, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/6067386.stm (last visited Oct. 20,
2006).ACTUAL REPORT
48
   Id.
49
   Top Ethiopian Judge Flees Threat, BBC NEWS, Nov. 6, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/africa/6121854.stm (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
50
   Ethiopia Denies Excessive Force Used After Protesters Killed, CNN, Oct. 26, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/10/26/ethiopia.human.rights.ap/index.html (last visted Oct. 30, 2006);
James Butty, Ethiopia: “We Didn’t Massacre Any Body,” V OICE OF A MERICA, Oct. 23, 2006,
http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-10-23-voa6.cfm?renderforprint=1 (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).



                                                                                                                    47
51
   Barbara Harff posits that the Ethiopian government has met four of the six “risk factors” that indicate potential for
genocide: (1) Prior Geno-/Politicides (1976-1997); (2) Upheaval since 1986 (High); (3) Minority Elite (Tigray); and
(4) Type of Regime (Autocracy). Factors not implicated were “Exclusionary Ideology” and “Trade Openness”
(Medium). Other states that met four risk factors were Congo, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Algeria, and
Afghanistan since 2002. Barbara Harff, No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and
Political Mass Murder since 1955, 97 A M. POL. SCI. REV. 57, 71 tbl. 5 (2003).
52
   Telephone Interview with Anonymous Political Scientist (Oct. 12, 2006).
53
   CIA, supra note 9.
54
   Interview with Anonymous Ethiopian Student, N.Y. (Nov. 14, 2006). Orthodox Greetings are used by many
Ethiopians, regardless of religion. Id.
55
   Id.
56
   CIA, supra note 9.
57
   Interview with Anonymous Ethiopian Student, supra note 54.
58
   For instance, the Silte subgroup of the Gurage are all Muslim, while most are animist and some are Christian.
59
   Interview with Anonymous Ethiopian Student, supra note 54; see Eloi Ficquet, Flesh Soaked in Faith: Meat as
Marker of the Boundary between Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia, in MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN ENCOUNTERS IN
AFRICA (Benjamin F. Soares ed., 2006). For instance, Ethiopian Muslims and Orthodox Christians will not eat meat
slaughtered by a member of the other faith. This means that Muslims and Christians eat at different restaurants and
often will not eat at each other’s homes. Vegetarian dishes sometimes provides a neutral fare that both will share.
Id.
60
   Ken Silverstein, Ethiopian Generals and Somali Warlords: The Bush Administration’s Dubious Allies in the Horn
of Africa, HARPER’ S, Aug. 2, 2006, http://harpers.org/sb-ethiopian-generals-200608024848.html (last visited Oct.
26, 2006).
61
   Dagnachew Teklu, Government to Adopt Law on Terrorism, THE DAILY MONITOR, Oct. 10, 2006,
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200610100493.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
62
   Much like the Uighurs in China and the Chechens in Russia, political dissidents in Ethiopia may be severely
repressed by the state in the name of the war on terror.
63
   Paul, supra note 20, at 193.
64
   Id.
65
   Keller, supra note 1, at 107.
66
   Paul, supra note 20, at 190. See also Office to Issue Landholding Certificates to 82,640 Farmers, THE ETHIOPIAN
HERALD, Oct. 6, 2006, http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200610060705.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
67
   Keller, supra note 1, at 108.
68
   Telephone Interview with Anonymous Political Scientist, supra note 52.
69
   This term refers to urban neighborhoods and groupings of roughly 100,000 households in rural areas.
70
   CEDRIC BARNES, ETHIOPIA: A SOCIOPOLITICAL ASSESSMENT, A WRITENET INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS
COMMISSIONED BY U NITED NATIONS H IGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (2006).
71
    CHARNY, supra note 2, at 287-88.
72
   Interview with Anonymous Ethiopian Student, supra note 54 . The SNNP federal police officers tend to be
physically distinguishable from the “highlander” residents of Addis Ababa. See infra note 89.
73
   U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ETHIOPIA: COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2005 (2006), available
at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61569.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2006) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS
2005].
74
   Id.
75
   Id.
76
   Id.
77
   Id.
78
   Id.
79
   See, e.g., 40. Ethiopia expels foreign reporter, BBC N EWS, Jan. 23, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/africa/4638956.stm (last visisted Oct. 19, 2006).
80
   U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, H UMAN RIGHTS 2005, supra note 73.
81
   NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
MONITORING CENTRE WITH REGARD TO INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN ETHIOPIA 2 (FEB. 5 2006) (unpublished report,
on file with Cardozo Human Rights and Genocide Clinic) [hereinafter ALTERNATIVE IDP REPORT].



                                                                                                                     48
82
   U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Hum. Rts., The Right to Food: Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Mission to Ethiopia , ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/47/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005)
[hereinafter Right to Food].
83
   Id.
84
   U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, H UMAN RIGHTS 2005, supra note 73.
85
   NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE IDP REPORT, supra note 81, at 2.
86
   Id. at 1-3.
87
   Id. at 3.
88
   Paul, supra note 20, at 181.
89
   The elite groups of Ethiopia, including the Amhara and Tigray, are often collectively referred to as “highlanders”
because of their historic residence in the northern areas of Ethiopia. However, in the Gambella town, any non-
Anuak residents were all grouped under the term “highlanders.” The term itself is very vague and is often used by
one group to refer to any host of other ethnic groups.
90
   U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Indigenous Issues: Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/88/Add.1 (Feb. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Indigenous People].
91
   Id.
92
   Id.
93
   See generally H UMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TARGETING THE ANUAK: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY IN ETHIOPIA’S G AMBELLA REGION (2005), available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/ethiopia0305/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2006); GENOCIDE WATCH AND SURVIVORS’ RIGHTS
INTERNATIONAL, “TODAY I S THE DAY OF KILLING ANUAKS”: CRIMES A GAINST HUMANITY, A CTS OF GENOCIDE AND
ONGOING ATROCITIES AGAINST THE ANUAK PEOPLE OF SOUTHWESTERN ETHIOPIA (2004), available at
http://www.genocidewatch.org/Today%20is%20the%20Day%20of%20Killing%20Anuaks.htm (last visited Nov. 9,
2006); Anuak Justice Council, http://www.anuakjustice.org (last visited Dec. 3, 2006).
94
   Interview with Anonymous Member of Anuak Justice Council, supra note 13.
95
   Id.
96
   U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ETHIOPIA; COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2004 (2005),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41603.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2006) [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS 2004].
97
   ECOSOC, Right to Food, supra note 82.
98
   U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, H UMAN RIGHTS 2004, supra note 96.
99
   Id.
100
    Id.
101
    Id.
102
    Id.
103
    ECOSOC, Right to Food, supra note 82.
104
    Id.
105
    Paul, supra note 20, at 190.
106
    ECOSOC, Right to Food, supra note 82.
107
    Id.
108
   Id.; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS 2004, supra note 96.
109
    In particular, the Oromiya and Somali regions are desperately lacking in resources and infrastructure. This
reality is not surprising given historical prejudice against the Oromo and the fissure in identity between the
highlander Ethiopians and the Somalis.
110
    See generally K ASAHUN WOLDEMARIAM, MYTHS AND REALITIES IN THE D ISTRIBUTION OF SOCIOECONOMIC
RESOURCES AND POLITICAL POWER IN ETHIOPIA (2006); Telephone Interview with Anonymous Aid Worker (Oct.
12, 2006).
111
    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, H UMAN RIGHTS 2005, supra note 73.
112
    ECOSOC, Right to Food, supra note 82, at ¶ 49. For example, on Nov. 10, 2002, “local kebele officials and
militia in the Kuchit and Batay Farmers Association in East Gojjam reportedly set on fire the home of one AEUO
member, destroying his house, livestock and food.” Id.
113
    Keller, supra note 1, at 109. Addis Ababa finances almost all its spending from its own revenue. Oromo,
Amhara, and SNNP also collect large percentages of revenue. Id. at 111.



                                                                                                                  49
114
    See, e.g., Dagnachew Teklu, U.S. Earmarks $250 Million for HIV/AIDS Fight, THE DAILY MONITOR, Nov. 7,
2006, http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200611070964.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2006); Ethiopia Receives $37
Million in U.S. Food Aid, CNN, Nov. 8, 2006, http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/11/08/ethiopia.us.reut
(last visited Nov. 9, 2006); UN Agency Sends Food for Tens of Thousands of Flood Victims in Ethiopia, UN NEWS
SERVICE, Nov. 3, 2006, http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200611030386.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2006);
Ethiopia Food Aid “Habit” Worsens, BBC N EWS, Nov. 1, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/africa/6105790.stm (last visited Nov. 2, 2006); EU Agrees to Grant Ethiopia 155 mln Euros for Roads
Construction, SUDAN TRIBUNE, Oct. 13, 2006, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article18094 (last visited Oct.
17, 2006); German NGO Sign 43 Million Birr Grant for Water, Sanitation in Amhara, THE DAILY MONITOR, Oct.
13, 2006, http://allafrica.com/stories/200610130811.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2006) ; Ethiopia: NGOs Carrying Out
Dev't Projects, ETHIOPIAN HERALD, Nov. 10, 2006, http://allafrica.com/stories/200611100596.html (last visited
11/14/06); Ethiopia Receives $37 Million Food-Aid From U.S., THE DAILY MONITOR, Nov. 10, 2006,
http://allafrica.com/stories/200611100686.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2006); UN Agency Welcomes Food Aid but
Says More Assistance Needed, IRIN, Nov. 10, 2006,
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/85d3779a75efe75d6b5abb1ea6b8ed0d.htm (last visited Nov. 14,
2006); Institute Loans 12.3 Mln. Birr for Unemployed Youth, ETHIOPIAN HERALD, Nov. 11, 2006,
http://allafrica.com/stories/200611120098.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2006); Nation to Secure Over 16 Bln. Birr in
Loan and Aid, ETHIOPIAN HERALD, Nov. 12, 2006, http://allafrica.com/stories/200611120106.html (last visited Nov.
13, 2006).
115
    Keller, supra note 1; Paul, supra note 57; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Political Scientist (Oct. 12,
2006), supra note 52.
116
    NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE IDP REPORT, supra note 81, at ¶¶ 25-29.
117
    Id.
118
    ECOSOC, Right to Food, supra note 82, at ¶ 48.
119
    Id.
120
    Id.
121
    Id. at ¶ 49.
122
    Harff includes prior genocides as a factor in the possibility of future genocide because “perpetrators of genocide
often are repeat offenders, because elites and security forces may become habituated to mass killing as a strategic
response to challenges to state security and, also, because targeted groups are rarely destroyed in their entirety.”
Harff, supra note 51, at 62. In the case of Ethiopia, it is worth noting that a regime change has occurred since the
Derg politicide. The Anuak incident, although isolated, could lay the groundwork for more “isolated” bursts of
ethnic violence.
123
    Harff estimates 10,000 people were killed in a politicide between 1976 and 1979. Harff, supra note 51, at 60 tbl.
1. Yacob Haile-Mariam notes that in 1977, “it was estimated that thirty to fifty thousand people were executed
without ever having charges brought against them.” Haile-Mariam, 678.
124
    See, e.g., Anne L. Quintal , Rule 61: The "Voice of the Victims" Screams Out For Justice, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 723, 739 (1998). As noted above, Mengistu Haile-Mariam was convicted of Genocide by an
Ethiopian court on December 12, 2006.
125
    Article 281 reads:
           Whosoever, with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, religious or political group,
           organizes, orders or engages in, be it in time of war or in time of peace:
                    (a) killings, bodily harm or serious injury to the physical or mental health of members of the
                    group, in any way whatsoever; or
                    (b) measures to prevent the propagation or continued survival of its members or their progeny; or
                    (c) the compulsory movement or dispersion of peoples or children, or their placing under living
                    conditions calculated to result in their death or disappearance,
           is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from five years to life, or, in cases of exceptional gravity, with
           death.
THE PENAL CODE OF THE EMPIRE OF ETHIOPIA OF 1957, art. 281 [hereinafter PENAL CODE]. Although the trials are
being conducted by the current government, the Penal Code of 1957 was the governing law during the period
covering the commission of the crime.
126
    Mengistu has been subject to scathing criticism: “Fond of mouthing Marxist slogans, burning with hatred,
Mengistu was, in reality, Ethiopia’s last and most brutal emperor and his Leninist regime was probably the most
repressive in Africa during an era of military despotisms. Paul, supra note 20, at 185.


                                                                                                                        50
127
   Yacob Haile-Mariam, The Quest for Justice and Reconciliation: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
and the Ethiopian High Court, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 667, 676 (1999).
128
    Although the Derg primarily targeted the EPRP, other groups that “strongly and violently opposed military rule”
also suffered: Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF), Oromo Liberation
Front (OLF) and other insurgent groups. HAILE-MARIAM, supra note 127, at 677.
129
    Paul, supra note 20, at 185.
130
    Most of the victims were between the ages of fourteen and thirty. See also DADIMOS HAILE, ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR CRIMES OF THE PAST AND THE CHALLENGES OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION : THE CASE OF ETHIOPIA 15 (2000).
131
    HAILE, supra note 130, at 13.
132
    HAILE-MARIAM, supra note 127, at 677-678.
133
    HAILE-MARIAM, supra note 127, at 678.
134
    HAILE-MARIAM, supra note 127, at 679. Many Derg members, most notably Mengistu himself, fled the country
or sought refuge in the Italian embassy. Id.
135
    HAILE-MARIAM, supra note 127, at 680.
136
    See supra note 125.
137
    Id.
138
    The Emperors Tewodros II (1855-68), Johannes IV (1872-89), and Menelik II (1889-1913) consolidated the
ancient Abyssinian kingdom and began Ethiopia’s transition from medieval isolation to modern interaction with the
international community. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 7.
139
    Paul, supra note 20 at 184.
140
    Keller, supra note 1, at 95, 97.
141
    Paul, supra note 20 at 184.
142
    Keller, supra note 1, at 97.
143
    Keller, supra note 1, at 95.
144
    Id. at 97.
145
    Id. at 95
146
    PRAEG, supra note 25 at 98.
147
    Id. Praeg goes as far as calling this period of violence against the Amhara an “ethnocide.” Id.
148
    It is unclear who exactly the attackers were. Anti-Amhara sentiment ran high and the Amhara could have been
put at risk by a range of attacker such as organized groups or subsidiaries of the EPRDF or just informal street
gangs.
149
    PRAEG, supra note 25, at 99.
150
    Id. at 100-102.
151
    Interview with Anonymous Political Scientist, supra note 52.
152
    Id.
153
    Id.
154
    Human Rights Watch, Hidden Crackdown, supra note 39.
155
    EHRCO, supra note 45, at 18-20.
156
    Most recently, U.S. Representative Christopher Smith (R-NJ) presented H.R. 5680 to the U.S. House of
Representatives. This bill calls on the Ethiopian government to end human rights abuses and to live up to its
international human rights obligations. Ethiopia Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights Advancement Act of
2006, H.R. 5680, 109th Cong. (2006). See also Ethiopia’s Troubled Situation: Hearing on H.R. 5680 Before the H.
Subcomm. on Africa, Global Hum. Rts. & Int’l Operations of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 109th Cong. (2006).
157
    Telephone Interview with Anonymous Political Scientist, supra note 53.
158
    Interview with Anonymous Member of Anuak Justice Council, supra note 13.
159
    Interview with Anonymous Political Scientist, supra note 53.
160
    Id.
161
    Id.
162
    Id.
163
    International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], art. 2(1), adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force
March 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination [ICERD], art. 2(1), adopted Dec. 21, 1965, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, 660
UNTS 195 (1966); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 2, adopted June 27, 1981, entered into force
Oct. 21, 1986, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev.5 (1982) [hereinafter African Charter]; CONSTITUTION art. 25.
164
    See, e.g., ICCPR art. 6, supra note 163.


                                                                                                                   51
165
    See, e.g. African Charter art. 6, supra note 163.
166
    See, e.g., id. art. 31.
167
    See, e.g., ICCPR art. 9(1), supra note 163.
168
    See, e.g., id. art. 19(2).
169
    See, e.g., id. art. 22(1).
170
    Press Release, Amnesty International, Ethiopia: Treason trial of prisoners of conscience opens in Addis Ababa
(May 2, 2006), http://news.amnesty.org/index/ENGAFR250152006 [hereinafter Treason Trial].
171
    Id. In 2004, Ethiopia adopted a new criminal code. The current genocide charge reads:
           Whoever, in time of war or in time of peace, with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a nation,
           nationality, ethnical, racial, national, colour, religious or political group, organizes, orders or engages in:
                     (a) killing, bodily harm or serious injury to the physical or mental health of members of the group,
                     in any way whatsoever or causing them to disappear; or
                     (b) measures to prevent the propagation or continued survival of its members or their progeny; or
                     (c) the compulsory movement or dispersion of peoples or children or their placing under living
                     conditions calculated to result in their death or disappearance, is punishable with rigorous
                     imprisonment from five years to twenty-five years, or, in more serious cases, with life
                     imprisonment or death.
THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA art. 269 (2004) [hereinafter CRIMINAL
CODE].
172
    Amnesty International, Treason Trial, supra note 170.
173
    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, H UMAN RIGHTS 2005, supra note 73.
174
     ECOSOC, Right to Food, supra note 82, at ¶¶ 48-49.
175
     See U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’ R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [OHCHR], International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights [ICESCR] General Comment 3, The Nature of States Parties Obligations, ¶ 1, U.N.
DOC. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter ICESCR General Comment 3] (the Covenant . . . imposes various
obligations which are of immediate effect . . . [one of which] is the “undertaking to guarantee” that relevant rights
“will be exercised without discrimination”). See also U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
[OHCHR], International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights [ICESCR] General Comment 12, The
Right to Adequate Food,, ¶ 18, U.N. DOC. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999) (reaffirming the immediately binding
character of the non-discrimination principle with respect to access to food).
176
    Committee on the Rights of the Child [CRC Comm.], Written Replies by the Government of Ethiopia Concerning
the List of Issues (CRC/C/ETH/Q/2) Received by the Committee on the Rights of the Child Relating to the
Consideration of the Third Periodic Report of Ethiopia, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/ETH/3 (Aug. 25, 2006) [hereinafter
Written Replies by the Government of Ethiopia].
177
    Paul, supra note 20, at 185.
178
    See generally Harff, supra note 51.
179
    See, e.g., Paul, supra note 20 at 187; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 7.
180
    Keller, supra note 1, at 103-105; U.S. D EPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 7.
181
    Id.
182
    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 7.
183
    Id.
184
    Id.
185
    Keller, supra note 1, at 116.
186
    Among even the people interviewed for this report, there was no consensus on the issue of privilege in the Tigray
region but the majority opinion is that Tigray privilege is exaggerated. Telephone Interview with Anonymous
Political Scientist, supra note 52; Interview with Anonymous Professor of Political Science, supra note 46;
Interview with Anonymous Member of Anuak Justice Council, supra note 13; Interview with Anonymous Aid
Worker, supra note 110.
187
    Even if the Tigrayans do receive special treatment from the central government, recent reports of foreign aid
donations indicate that the international community is sending a great deal of money and support to projects in the
Amhara region. This is not entirely surprising given the strength of the Diaspora community.
188
    Telephone Interview with Anonymous Professor of Political Science, supra note 46, Telephone Interview with
Anonymous Political Scientist, supra note 52.
189
    Telephone Interview with Anonymous Professor of Political Science , supra note 46.



                                                                                                                       52
190
    Interview with Anonymous Member of Anuak Justice Council, supra note 13. Education is mandatory in the
Tigray region up to the twelfth grade, while all other regions of Ethiopia only require education up to the tenth
grade. This is seen by other groups as a tool to hinder the social and economic progress of other ethnic groups. Id.
191
    Interview with Anonymous Ethiopian Student, supra note 54. For instance, some people will not go to the newly
built Sheraton because the owner has come out in support of the central government. Id.
192
    See, e.g., Harff, supra note 51.
193
    See, e.g., EthioBlog, http://nazret.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
194
     See RELIEF SOCIETY OF TIGRAY, WORKSHOP TO REVIEW THE FIRST D RAFT OF A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS STUDY
ON CHILDREN IN TIGRAY REGION (2006). This and other Alternative Country Reports are available on the Child
Rights Information Network’s Alternative CRC Report database at http://www.crin.org/resources/find_altrep.asp.
195
    See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR] art. 2(2) adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
entered into force Jan. 3, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
196
    See generally CRC Comm., Written Replies by the Government of Ethiopia, supra note 176.
197
    P.T.W. Baxter, Towards Identifying some of the Moral Components of an Oromo National Identity, in ETHNICITY
AND THE STATE IN EASTERN A FRICA 51 (M.A. Mohamed Salih & John Markakis eds. 1998).
198
    KJETIL TRONVOLL, MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INTERNATIONAL REPORT, ETHIOPIA: A N EW START 8 (2000).
199
    CHRIS ALBIN-LACKEY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SUPPRESSING DISSENT: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND POLITICAL
REPRESSION IN ETHIOPIA’ S OROMIA REGION 7 (2005).
200
    Under Haile Selassie, the most successful Oromo were those who chose to become assimilated into the Amhara
culture, even adopting Christian names. Keller, supra note 1, at 98.
201
    WORLD DIRECTORY OF MINORITIES 413 (Minority Rights Group International ed., 1997)
202
    ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 199, at 7. In responses to a study on identity, Oromos were the most likely to feel
that the interests of ethnic groups trumped those of the Ethiopian society as a whole. The Oromo only had a slight
margin over some other groups, however (54%). Keller, supra note 1, at 124.
203
    ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 199, at 7; TRONVOLL, supra note 198, at 8.
204
    Telephone Interview with Anonymous Political Scientist, supra note 52.
205
    Id.
206
    ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 199, at 7.
207
    Id.
208
    Id.
209
    BARNES, supra note 70, at ¶ 5.2.1.
210
    ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 199, at 1.
211
    Telephone Interview with Anonymous Aid Worker, supra note 110.
212
    Id.
213
    Id.
214
    INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE [IDMC], ETHIOPIA: GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION OF CONFLICT
IDPS CRUCIAL TO ADDRESSING THEIR PLIGHT 4 (2006) [hereinafter CONFLICT IDPS].
215
    15 Killed in Ethiopia’s Sectarian Violence, SUDAN TRIBUNAL, Oct. 16, 2005,
http://www.sudantribune.com/imprimable.php3?id_article=18155 (last visited Oct. 17, 2006); Death Toll in
Ethiopia’s Sectarian Violence Reaches 15, REUTERS ALTERTNET, Oct. 15, 2006,
http://www.alertnet.org/printable.htm?URL=/thenews/newsdesk/L15437677.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
216
    Id.
217
    Tadesse Taye, a 73 year old businessman and resident of Addis Ababa, was arrested on May 27, 1993 for his
alleged membership in the OLF. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Civil and
Political Rights, Including the Question of Torture and Detention: Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No.4/2004: Ethiopia, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.1, (Nov. 19, 2004). Mr.
Taye has reportedly been detained without charge or trial since that time. Id. at ¶ 6.
218
    Id.
219
    Interview with Anonymous Aid Worker, supra note 110.
220
    BARNES, supra note 70, at ¶ 5.5.1.
221
    ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 199, at 12.
222
    Id.
223
    Id. at 15.
224
    Id.
225
    Id. at 16-17.


                                                                                                                 53
226
    Id.
227
    BARNES, supra note 70, at ¶ 5.3.7.
228
    Id. at 5.2.1.
229
    ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 199, at 24-25.
230
    Comm. on the Rights of the Child [CRC Comm.], Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Art. 44 of the Convention, Concluding Observations: Ethiopia, ¶ 79, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/ETH/CO/3 (Sept. 29, 2006)
[hereinafter Concluding Observations].
231
    ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 199, at 27.
232
    Id. at 27-39.
233
    EHRCO, supra note 45, at 5. Hailu Worku, member of Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement, was allegedly
beaten by members of the armed forces on September 23, 2006; Gulilat Workineh, was beaten on October 7, 2005
by members of the armed forces for entreating people to vote for the CUD in the May 2005 elections; Jonse
Itichawas arrested by police for allegedly being a supporter of the CUD on November 11, 2005; Many others have
been arrested and detained without trial for their support of the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement, Oromo
National Congress, OLF, and CUD. Id. at 5, 12-13.
234
    AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ETHIOPIA: PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE ON TRIAL FOR TREASON: O PPOSITION PARTY
LEADERS, HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS AND JOURNALISTS 13 (2006) [hereinafter P RISONERS OF CONSCIENCE].
235
    Amnesty International, Detention without charge/fear of torture or ill-treatment, (January 2006).
236
    AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ETHIOPIA: PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE ON TRIAL FOR TREASON: O PPOSITION PARTY
LEADERS, HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS AND JOURNALISTS 13 (2006).
237
    Id.
238
    Human Rights Watch, Hidden Crackdown, supra note 39.
239
    IDMC, CONFLICT IDPS supra note 214.
240
    See generally Oromia Online, http://www.oromia.org/genocide-1.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2006).
241
    IDMC, CONFLICT IDPS supra note 214.
242
    Telephone Interview with Anonymous Aid Worker, supra note 110. Oromiya residents were the least satisfied
with central government service provision according to a recent study. They were most dissatisfied with health care
delivery and road development and maintenance in the area. Keller, supra note 1, at 116. The Guji and Borena
regions in Oromiya have been especially hard hit by the natural disasters and have little access to health care or
education. See Ethiopia: Special report on the Borana, IRIN, June 26, 2006,
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=28512&SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa&SelectCountry=ETHIOPIA
(last visited Nov. 15, 2006); Ethiopia: Focus on education in Borena, IRIN, June 27, 2006,
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=28537&SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa&SelectCountry=ETHIOPIA
(last visited on Nov. 15, 2006).
243
    Telephone Interview with Anonymous Aid Worker, supra note 110.
244
    CRC Comm., Written Replies by the Government of Ethiopia, supra note 176, at 5.
245
    ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 199, at 27.
246
    Keller, supra note 1, at 99.
247
    Id.
248
    AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 234, at 13.
249
    ECOSOC, Right to Food, supra note 82, at ¶ 36.
250
    NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE IDP REPORT, supra note 81, at 2.
251
    TRONVOLL, supra note 198, at 9.
252
    Id.
253
    Id.
254
    Id.
255
    Id.
256
    Id.
257
    UNITED NATIONS H IGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES COUNTRY INFORMATION AND POLICY UNIT, ETHIOPIA
ASSESSMENT, ¶ 5.42 (2001).
258
    Id.
259
    Id.
260
    IDMC, CONFLICT IDPS, supra note 214, at 5.
261
    BARNES, supra note 70, at ¶ 5.6.2.
262
    IDMC, CONFLICT IDPS, supra note 214, at 5; BARNES, supra note 70, at ¶ 5.6.2.


                                                                                                                54
263
    Id.
264
    BARNES, supra note 70, at ¶ 5.6.2.
265
    Id.
266
    See, e.g., Former Somalia pres declares jihad on Ethiopia, GAROWE ONLINE NEWS, Nov. 7, 2006,
www.garoweonline.com/stories/publish/printer_5888.shtml. (last visited Nov. 9, 2006); Ethiopia, Eritrea back rival
Somali factions, LONDON FREE PRESS, Oct. 28, 2006, http://lfpress.ca/newsstand/News/International/2006/10/28/pf-
2155287.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006); Ethiopia is “technically at war,” BBC N EWS, Oct. 25, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/6083854.stm (last visited Oct. 26, 2006); Tom Regan, Somalia’s
Islamists vow holy war on Ethiopia, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 10, 2006,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1010/dailyUpdate.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
267
    Interview with Anonymous Aid Worker, supra note 110.
268
    BARNES, supra note 70, at ¶ 5.6.2
269
    Interview with Anonymous Ethiopian Student, supra note 54.
270
    AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 234, at 13.
271
    Id.
272
    HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2006 (2006).
273
    AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 234, at 13.
274
    HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT supra note 272, at 13.
275
    BARNES, supra note 70, at ¶ 5.5.2.
276
    Id.
277
    IDMC, CONFLICT IDPS, supra note 214, at 4; see also BARNES, supra note 70.
278
    Telephone Interview with Anonymous Aid Worker, supra note 110.
279
    Id.
280
    Id.
281
    See generally CRC Comm., Written Replies by the Government of Ethiopia, supra note 176.
282
    PRAEG, supra note 25, at 149.
283
    Id.
284
    Id. at 150.
285
    Id. at 155.
286
    Id.
287
    Id.
288
    Id.
289
    ECOSOC, Right to Food, supra note 79, at ¶ 36
290
    NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE IDP REPORT, supra note 81, at 2-3.
291
    TRONVOLL, supra note 198, at 9.
292
    Id.
293
    Interview with Anonymous Professor of Political Science, supra note 46.
294
    Keller, supra note 1, at 124-25.
295
    See generally The Sidama Concern, www.sidamaconcern.com (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
296
    BARNES, supra note 70, at ¶ 5.5.3.
297
    The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression reported 25 people, including 13
children, were killed and 26 people, including 7 children, were wounded. Thirty six people, including 3 children,
were reportedly arrested and detained without charges. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Hum.
Rts., Civil and Political Rights, Including Questions of Freedom of Expression: The Right to Freedom of Opinion
and Expression, ¶ 211, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/67/Add.1 (Feb. 20, 2003).
298
    Seynoun Hameso, The Politics of Genocide – The Case of Sidama, July 2002, at 6, available at
http://www.sidamaconcern.com/paper_on_genocide.pdf; Halale Xawissa, The Heroes and the Villains in the Sidama
Liberation Struggle: Undoing the Misinformation, January 4, 2005, at 2, available at http://www.sidamanational-
liberation.org/documents/hero_1.pdf.
299
    BARNES, supra note 70, at ¶ 5.5.3.; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 234, at
14; Press Release, The Sidama Concern, Awassa Prisoners may be tortured, Amnesty International Fears (April 5,
2006), http://www.sidamaconcern.com/news2006/awassa_prisoners_may_be_tortured.htm.
300
    Id. Tefera Janba, a student arrested after a March 12 2006 protest in the Sidama Region, is reportedly ill after
being tortured by official in jail. Others detainees are at risk of torture in prison. Id.
301
    Seynoun Hameso, The Politics of Genocide, supra note 298, at 3.


                                                                                                                 55
302
    Keller, supra note 1, at 119.
303
    Id. at 121.
304
    See CRC Comm., Written Replies by the Government of Ethiopia, supra note 176.
305
    NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE IDP REPORT, supra note 81, at 2.
306
    Paul, supra note 20, at 181.
307
    See generally N ORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE IDP REPORT, supra note 81.
308
    TRONVOLL, supra note, at 9.
309
    Id.
310
    John Markakis, The Politics of Identity—The Case of the Gurage in Ethiopia, in ETHNICITY AND THE STATE IN
EASTERN A FRICA 138 (M.A. Mohamed Salih & John Markakis eds., 1998).
311
    Telephone Interview with Anonymous Professor of Political Science, supra note 46.
312
    Markakis, supra note 310, at 137-138.
313
    Telephone Interview with Anonymous Professor of Political Science, supra note 46.
314
    See, e.g. ICCPR art. 19, supra note 163 (on the “freedom to hold opinion without interference”).
315
    See, e.g., ICCPR art. 21 (on freedom of association). See also African Charter, art. 20, supra note 163 (on right
of peoples to self-determination and to choose their political status).
316
    Markakis, supra note 310, at 141. Other factors that distinguish the Silte from the rest of the Gurage are their
location which is the farthest of the Gurage from Addis Ababa, their later transition into trade from migrant manual
labor, their strong identification and adherence to Islam, and their reluctance to send children to state schools (thus
falling behind other Gurage in education). Their region is generally considered less developed than the rest of
Gurage land.
317
     CONSTITUTION art. 28.
318
    For a list of the major international human rights treaties to which Ethiopia is a party, see O FFICE OF THE HIGH
COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [OHCHR], Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights
Treaties (June 9, 2004), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf [hereinafter Status of Ratifications].
319
    CONSTITUTION Ch. III, Part 1.
320
    Id. at Part 2.
321
    OHCHR, Status of Ratifications, supra note 318.
322
    Id.
323
    See CONSTITUTION art. 28(1). See also PENAL CODE art. 281; CRIMINAL CODE art. 269.
324
    PENAL CODE, art. 282.
325
    CONSTITUTION art. 13(2).
326
    AFRICAN COMMISSION ON H UMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, List of Countries Which Have Signed,
Ratified/Adhered to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights as of 19 August 2003 (Aug. 19, 2003),
available at http://www.achpr.org/english/_doc_target/documentation.html?../ratifications/
ratification_charter_en.pdf.
327
    See generally supra Part IV: Individual Group Analysis.
328
    See Press release, Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD], Committee on Elimination of
Racial Discrimination discusses situation in Ethiopia and Papua New Guinea (Mar. 2, 2006),
 http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/HMYT-6MJRRZ?OpenDocument [hereinafter Situation in
Ethiopia].
329
    Id.
330
    Committee on the Rights of the Child [CRC Comm.], Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 44 of the Convention: Third Periodic Report of Ethiopia, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/129/Add.8 (April 27,
2005) [hereinafter Third Periodic Report].
331
    See Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR], Dec. 10, 1948, U.N.G.A. Resolution 217A(III).
332
    HENRY STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 143 (2d ed. 2000).
333
    CONSTITUTION art. 28. The UDHR is the only international declaration or covenant incorporated into the
Ethiopian Constitution by name.
334
     STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 332, at 144.
335
    See generally African Charter, supra note 163, ch. 2. Chapter 2 art. 27(1) declares: “Every individual shall have
duties towards his family and society, the State and other legally recognized communities and the international
community.” Id. ch. 2 art. 27. Chapter 2 art. 28 addresses the individual duty of non-discrimination. Chapter 2 art.
29 includes eight additional duties owed to the family, to the nation, and to African society. Id. ch. 2 art. 28.
336
    OHCHR, Status of Ratifications, supra note 318.


                                                                                                                     56
337
    ICCPR, supra note 163, art. 2(1).
338
    ICESCR, supra note 195, art. 40.
339
    OHCHR, Status of Ratifications, supra note 318.
340
    ICCPR, supra note 163, art. 2(1).
341
     STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 334, at 144-45.
342
    Compare, for example, freedom of the press under CONSTITUTION art. 29(3) and ICCPR art. 19(2). The former
goes beyond international standards by explicitly guaranteeing freedom of the press and prohibiting “any form of
censorship.” CONSTITUTION art. 29(3). African Charter art. 9(1) provides the least elaborated protection, providing
only that “every individual shall have the right to receive information.” African Charter, supra note 163, art. 9(1).
343
    ICCPR, supra note 163, art. 27.
344
    HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE [HRC], General Comment 23: Art. 27, ¶ 1-2, U.N. Doc. HRI\Gen\1\Rev.1 (1994)
[hereinafter General Comment 23].
345
    Id. at ¶ 6.1.
346
    CONSTITUTION art. 39.
347
    African Charter, supra note 163, art. 19.
348
    Id. art. 20(1).
349
    See generally supra Part IV: Individual Group Analysis.
350
    ICCPR, supra note 163, art. 2(2).
351
     See HRC, General Comment 23, supra note 344 (explaining that “the protection of [minority] rights is directed
towards ensuring the survival and continued development of the cultural, religious and social identity of the
minorities concerned, thus enriching the fabric of society as a whole”).
352
    ICCPR, supra note 163, art. 40(1)(a-b).
353
    See University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, Human Rights Committee Comments on Country Reports
Database, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/uncountryreports.html#E (last updated Apr. 7,
2004).
354
    ICESCR, supra note 195, art. 2(1).
355
    Id. art. 16(1) & 17(1).
356
    See generally ICESCR, supra note 195.
357
    Id. art. 2(2).
358
    OHCHR, ICESCR General Comment 3, supra note 175, at ¶ 1.
359
    U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [OHCHR], International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights [ICESCR] General Comment 7, The Right to Adequate Housing, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22,
annex IV (June 28, 1998) [hereinafter ICESCR General Comment 7].
360
    U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [OHCHR], International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights [ICESCR] General Comment 13, The Right to Education, ¶ 6(b), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10
(Dec. 8, 1999) [hereinafter ICESCR General Comment 13].
361
    CONSTITUTION art. 41(3).
362
    Interview with Anonymous Aid Worker, supra note 110. See also CRC Comm., Written Replies by the
Government of Ethiopia, supra note 176. The report illustrates the relative lack of access to healthcare in the Somali
region.
363
    CRC Comm., Written Replies by the Government of Ethiopia, supra note 176.
364
     Id. The government provided very limited region-disaggregated data on student-teacher ratios in primary and
secondary schooling.
365
    See supra Part IV, Section A: Amhara.
366
    See supra Part IV, Section C: Oromo.
367
    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, H UMAN RIGHTS 2005, supra note 73.
368
    See supra Part IV, Section A: Amhara.
369
    See supra Part IV, Section C: Oromo.
370
    Id.
371
    See supra Part III(2)(a): Violations of civil and political rights.
372
    ICESCR, supra note 195, art. 40(4).
373
    Id. art. 40(5).
374
    See OHCHR, ICESCR General Comment 7, supra note at 359, at ¶ 10.
375
    See OHCHR, ICESCR General Comment 13, supra note 360, at ¶ 1.
376
    Id. at ¶ 6.


                                                                                                                   57
377
    Interview with Anonymous Aid Worker, supra note 110.
378
    CRC Comm., Concluding Observations, supra note 230, at ¶ 53.
379
    See University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, supra note 353.
380
    OHCHR, Status of Ratifications, supra note 318.
381
    ICERD, supra note 163, art. 1(1).
382
    Id. art. 9(1).
383
    Id. art. 2(1)(a).
384
    Id. art. 2(2).
385
    Id. art. 5.
386
    CONSTITUTION art. 25 (on the right to equality).
387
    African Charter, supra note 163, art. 2-3.
388
    ICERD, supra note 163, art. 5(c-d).
389
    CERD, Situation in Ethiopia, supra note 328.
390
    Id.
391
    See Committee on the Rights of the Child [CRC Comm.], List of Issues Received by the Committee on the Rights
of the Child Relating to the Consideration of the Third Periodic Report of Ethiopia, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/ETH/Q/3
(Aug. 25, 2006).
392
     The reservation concerns arbitration of disputes regarding the interpretation or application of Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW], art. 40, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, entered into
force Sept. 3, 1981, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, at 193 (1979).
393
    OHCHR, Status of Ratifications, supra note 318.
394
    See generally CEDAW, supra note 392.
395
    Id. ¶ 11.
396
    Id. art. 2.
397
    Id, art. 2(d).
398
    CONSTITUTION art. 35(1).
399
    Id. art. 35(3).
400
    See, e.g., CONSTITUTION art. 35(5)(a-b) (guaranteeing full pay for maternity leave and in some cases prenatal
leave); id. art. 35(6) (guaranteeing women’s right to consultation in national development projects).
401
    GENOCIDE WATCH AND SURVIVORS’ RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL: O PERATION SUNNY MOUNTAIN: SOLDIERS, OIL &
ONGOING STATE TERROR A GAINST ANUAK & OTHER INDIGENOUS MINORITIES OF SOUTHWESTERN ETHIOPIA (2004)
available at http://www.genocidewatch.org/EthiopiaAnuakOperationSunnyMountainGWSRIRIReport1.
402
    CRC Comm., Concluding Observations, supra note 230, at ¶ 35.
403
    See generally Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (Sept. 2, 1998).
404
    Id. at ¶¶ 507-08.
405
    Id. at ¶ 577.
406
    OHCHR, Status of Ratifications, supra note 318.
407
    Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 6(d) & 7(g), July 17, 1998, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf.
408
    OHCHR, Status of Ratifications, supra note 318.
409
    Convention on the Rights of the Child [CRC], art. 44, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, entered into force Sept. 2, 1990,
G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/44/49, at 166 (1989).
410
    Id. art. 2(2).
411
    Id. art. 28(1).
412
    Id. art. 24(1).
413
    See generally CONSTITUTION art. 36.
414
    ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 157, at 24-25.
415
    AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 234, at 13.
416
    See NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE IDP REPORT, supra note 81.
417
    CRC, supra note 409, art. 6(1). See also CONSTITUTION art. 36(1)(a).
418
    CONSTITUTION art. 37(a).
419
    Id. art. 37(b).
420
    Id.
421
    Id. art. 37(c).
422
    CRC Comm., Concluding Observations, supra note 230, at ¶ 35.


                                                                                                                   58
423
    Id.
424
    Id. at ¶ 36.
425
    See RELIEF SOCIETY OF TIGRAY, WORKSHOP TO REVIEW THE FIRST D RAFT OF A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS STUDY
ON CHILDREN IN TIGRAY REGION (2006), available at http://www.crin.org/resources/find_altrep.asp.
426
    Committee on the Rights of the Child [CRC Comm.], Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 44 of the Convention: Second Periodic Report of Ethiopia, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/70/Add.7 (Sept. 28,
1998) [hereinafter Second Periodic Report].
427
    CRC Comm., Third Periodic Report, supra note 330.
428
    Committee on the Rights of the Child [CRC Comm.], Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Art. 44 of the Convention, Concluding Observations: Ethiopia, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.144 (June 12,
2001).
429
    Id. at ¶ 31.
430
    CRC Comm., Third Periodic Report, supra note 330, at ¶ 66.
431
    Id. at ¶ 69.
432
    Id. at ¶ 44.
433
    CRC Comm., Concluding Observation, supra note 230, at ¶ 17.
434
   Id. at ¶ 23.
435
    Id. at ¶ 22.
436
    Id. at ¶ 24.
437
    Id. at ¶ 27.
438
    Id. at ¶ 35.
439
    Id. at ¶ 53.
440
    Id. at ¶ 64(b).
441
    Id. at ¶ 79.
442
    OHCHR, Status of Ratifications, supra note 318.
443
    Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 40, Dec.
1984, entered into force June 26, 1987, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (requiring states to submit
progress reports within one year after the entry into force of the treaty, and thereafter every four years).
444
    Id. art. 20.
445
    Id. art. 1(1).
446
    African Charter, supra note 163, art. 5.
447
    CONSTITUTION art. 18.
448
    Id. art. 28.
449
   CRC Comm., Concluding Observations, supra note 230, at ¶ 35.
450
    Id. at ¶ 27.
451
    See generally CRC Comm., Concluding Observations, supra note 230. The Concluding Observations suggest
that political repression—i.e. political discrimination— is the root cause of military and police brutality against
children.
452
    See University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, supra note 353.
453
    CRC Comm., Concluding Observations, supra note 230, at ¶ 27-35.
454
    Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex
I, 1125 UNTS no. 17512; Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims in Non-International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978,
U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex II, 1125 UNTS no. 17513.
455
    See PENAL CODE art. 281 (criminalizing war crimes against the civilian population); id. art. 283 (criminalizing
war crimes against the wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons); and id. art. 284 (criminalizing war crimes against
prisoners or interned persons).
456
    CONSTITUTION art. 28.
457
    See Common Article 3, the “grave breaches” section included in all four Conventions, including Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, adopted Aug. 12, 1948, entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950, 75 UNTS 287.
458
    CONSTITUTION art. 28(1).
459
    For instance, Ethiopia is currently prosecuting thousands of members of the brutal Derg regime, many in
absentia, for genocide and crimes against humanity during the reign of Mengistu Haile-Mariam.


                                                                                                                59
460
    Ethiopia ratified the Convention on July 1st, 1949, with no reservations. See OHCHR, Status of Ratifications,
supra note 318.
461
    United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [Genocide Convention],
UNGA Res. 26A (III), December 9, 1948, entered into force January 12, 1951, 78 UNTS 277 (1948).
462
    Id. art. 2(c).
463
    PENAL CODE art. 281.
464
    For instance, Ethiopia is currently prosecuting 111 people for the crime, among others, of genocide, for acts such
as joining anti-government protests. See, Amnesty International, Treason Trial, supra note 170. The inclusion of
political groups was an issue of contention for the International Genocide Convention. “Genocide,” as first coined
by Raphael Lemkin, meant any systematic elimination of a group. Early drafts of the Genocide Convention
included “political” groups among those protected. This wording was eliminated as part of a compromise with the
Soviets.
465
    See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Bodies: Complaint Procedures,
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2006).




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