Neocon 101

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					                                              Empire Builders
                                                   Neocon 101
                                       Some basic questions answered.
What do neoconservatives believe?
"Neocons" believe that the United States should not be ashamed to use its unrivaled power – forcefully if
necessary – to promote its values around the world. Some even speak of the need to cultivate a US empire.
Neoconservatives believe modern threats facing the US can no longer be reliably contained and therefore
must be prevented, sometimes through preemptive military action.
Most neocons believe that the US has allowed dangers to gather by not spending enough on defense and
not confronting threats aggressively enough. One such threat, they contend, was Saddam Hussein and his
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Since the 1991 Gulf War, neocons relentlessly advocated Mr.
Hussein's ouster.
Most neocons share unwavering support for Israel, which they see as crucial to US military sufficiency in a
volatile region. They also see Israel as a key outpost of democracy in a region ruled by despots. Believing
that authoritarianism and theocracy have allowed anti-Americanism to flourish in the Middle East, neocons
advocate the democratic transformation of the region, starting with Iraq. They also believe the US is
unnecessarily hampered by multilateral institutions, which they do not trust to effectively neutralize threats
to global security.
What are the roots of neoconservative beliefs?
The original neocons were a small group of mostly Jewish liberal intellectuals who, in the 1960s and 70s,
grew disenchanted with what they saw as the American left's social excesses and reluctance to spend
adequately on defense. Many of these neocons worked in the 1970s for Democratic Senator Henry
"Scoop" Jackson, a staunch anti-communist. By the 1980s, most neocons had become Republicans, finding
in President Ronald Reagan an avenue for their aggressive approach of confronting the Soviet Union with
bold rhetoric and steep hikes in military spending. After the Soviet Union's fall, the neocons decried what
they saw as American complacency. In the 1990s, they warned of the dangers of reducing both America's
defense spending and its role in the world.
Unlike their predecessors, most younger neocons never experienced being left of center. They've always
been "Reagan" Republicans.
What is the difference between a neoconservative and a conservative?
Liberals first applied the "neo" prefix to their comrades who broke ranks to become more conservative in
the 1960s and 70s. The defectors remained more liberal on some domestic policy issues. But foreign policy
stands have always defined neoconservatism. Where other conservatives favored détente and containment
of the Soviet Union, neocons pushed direct confrontation, which became their raison d'etre during the
1970s and 80s.
Today, both conservatives and neocons favor a robust US military. But most conservatives express greater
reservations about military intervention and so-called nation building. Neocons share no such reluctance.
The post 9/11-campaigns against regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate that the neocons are not
afraid to force regime change and reshape hostile states in the American image. Neocons believe the US
must do to whatever it takes to end state-supported terrorism. For most, this means an aggressive push for
democracy in the Middle East. Even after 9/11, many other conservatives, particularly in the isolationist
wing, view this as an overzealous dream with nightmarish consequences.
How have neoconservatives influenced US foreign policy?
Finding a kindred spirit in President Reagan, neocons greatly influenced US foreign policy in the 1980s.
But in the 1990s, neocon cries failed to spur much action. Outside of Reaganite think tanks and Israel's
right-wing Likud Party, their calls for regime change in Iraq were deemed provocative and extremist by the
political mainstream. With a few notable exceptions, such as President Bill Clinton's decision to launch
isolated strikes at suspected terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998, their talk of preemptive
military action was largely dismissed as overkill.


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Despite being muted by a president who called for restraint and humility in foreign affairs, neocons used
the 1990s to hone their message and craft their blueprint for American power. Their forward thinking and
long-time ties to Republican circles helped many neocons win key posts in the Bush administration.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 moved much of the Bush administration closer than ever to
neoconservative foreign policy. Only days after 9/11, one of the top neoconservative think tanks in
Washington, the Project for a New American Century, wrote an open letter to President Bush calling for
regime change in Iraq. Before long, Bush, who campaigned in 2000 against nation building and excessive
military intervention overseas, also began calling for regime change in Iraq. In a highly significant nod to
neocon influence, Bush chose the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) as the venue for a key February
2003 speech in which he declared that a US victory in Iraq "could begin a new stage for Middle Eastern
peace." AEI – the de facto headquarters for neconservative policy – had been calling for democratization
of the Arab world for more than a decade.
What does a neoconservative dream world look like?
Neocons envision a world in which the United States is the unchallenged superpower, immune to threats.
They believe that the US has a responsibility to act as a "benevolent global hegemon." In this capacity, the
US would maintain an empire of sorts by helping to create democratic, economically liberal governments in
place of "failed states" or oppressive regimes they deem threatening to the US or its interests. In the
neocon dream world the entire Middle East would be democratized in the belief that this would eliminate a
prime breeding ground for terrorists. This approach, they claim, is not only best for the US; it is best for
the world. In their view, the world can only achieve peace through strong US leadership backed with
credible force, not weak treaties to be disrespected by tyrants.
Any regime that is outwardly hostile to the US and could pose a threat would be confronted aggressively,
not "appeased" or merely contained. The US military would be reconfigured around the world to allow for
greater flexibility and quicker deployment to hot spots in the Middle East, as well as Central and Southeast
Asia. The US would spend more on defense, particularly for high-tech, precision weaponry that could be
used in preemptive strikes. It would work through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations
when possible, but must never be constrained from acting in its best interests whenever necessary.
                                                 Key figures
                                           To the left are some of neoconservatism's most influential
                                           leaders. Click on a person to learn about his background.



Irving Kristol
              Widely referred to as the "godfather" of neoconservatism, Mr. Kristol was part of the "New
              York Intellectuals," a group of critics mainly of Eastern European Jewish descent. In the late
              1930s, he studied at City College of New York where he became a Trotskyist. From 1947 to
              1952, he was the managing editor of Commentary magazine, later called the "neocon bible."
              By the late 1960s, Kristol had shifted from left to right on the political spectrum, due partly to
what he considered excesses and anti-Americanism among liberals. Kristol built the intellectual framework
of neoconservatism, founding and editing journals such as tTe Public Interest and The National Interest.
Kristol is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and author of numerous books, including
"Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea." He is the father of Weekly Standard editor and oft-
quoted neoconservative William Kristol.
Norman Podhoretz
              Considered one of neoconservatism's founding fathers, Mr. Podhoretz studies, writes, and
              speaks on social, cultural, and international matters. From 1990 to 1995, he worked as editor-
              in-chief of Commentary magazine, a neoconservative journal published by the American
              Jewish Committee. Podhoretz advocated liberal political views earlier in life, but broke ranks
              in the early 1970s. He became part of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority founded in

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1973 by Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson and other intervention-oriented Democrats.
Podhoretz has written nine books, including "Breaking Ranks" (1979), in which he argues that Israel's
survival is crucial to US military strategy. He is married to like-minded social critic Midge Decter. They
helped establish the Committee on the Present Danger in the late 1970s and the Committee for the Free
World in the early 1980s. Podhoretz' son, John, is a New York Post columnist.
Paul Wolfowitz
              After serving as deputy secretary of defense for three years, Mr. Wolfowitz, a key architect of
              the Iraq war, was chosen in March 2005 by President Bush to be president of the World Bank.
              From 1989 to 1993, Wolfowitz served as under secretary of defense for policy in charge of a
              700-person team that had major responsibilies for the reshaping of military strategy and policy
              at the end of the cold war. In this capacity Wolfowitz co-wrote with Lewis "Scooter" Libby
the 1992 draft Defense Planning Guidance, which called for US military dominance over Eurasia and
preemptive strikes against countries suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction. After being
leaked to the media, the draft proved so shocking that it had to be substantially rewritten.
After 9/11, many of the principles in that draft became key points in the 2002 National Security Strategy of
the United States, an annual report. During the 1991 Gulf War, Wolfowitz advocated extending the war's
aim to include toppling Saddam Hussein's regime.
Richard Perle
              Famously nicknamed the "Prince of Darkness" for his hardline stance on national security
              issues, Mr. Perle is one of the most high-profile neoconservatives. He resigned in March 2003
              as chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board after being criticized for conflicts of
              interest. From 1981 to 1987 he was assistant secretary of defense for international security
              policy.
Perle is a chief architect of the "creative destruction" agenda to reshape the Middle East, starting with the
invasion of Iraq. He outlined parts of this agenda in a key 1996 report for Israel's right-wing Likud Party
called "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm."
Perle helped establish two think tanks: The Center for Security Policy and The Jewish Institute for
National Security. He is also a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, an adviser for the counter-
terrorist think tank Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, and a director of the Jerusalem Post.
Douglas Feith
              The defense department announced in January 2005 that Mr. Feith will resign this summer as
              undersecretary of defense for policy, the Pentagon's No. 3 civilian position, which he has held
              since being appointed by President Bush in July 2001. Feith also served in the Reagan
              administration as deputy assistant secretary of defense for negotiations policy. Prior to that, he
              served as special counsel to Richard Perle. Before his service at the Pentagon, Feith worked as
a Middle East specialist for the National Security Council in 1981-82.
Feith is well-known for his support of Israel's right-wing Likud Party. In 1997, Feith was honored along
with his father Dalck Feith, who was active in a Zionist youth movement in his native Poland, for their
"service to Israel and the Jewish people" by pro-Likud Zionist Organization of America at its 100th
anniversary banquet. In 1992, he was vice president of the advisory board of the Jewish Institute for
National Security Affairs. Mr. Feith is a former chairman and currently a director of the Center for Security
Policy.
Lewis "Scooter" Libby
              Mr. Libby is currently chief of staff and national security advisor for Vice President Dick
              Cheney. He's served in a wide variety of posts. In the first Bush administration, Mr. Libby
              served in the Department of Principal Deputy Under Secretary (Strategy and Resources), and,
              later, as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
              Libby was a founding member of the Project for the New American Century. He joined Paul
Wolfowitz, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, and others in writing its 2000 report entitled, "Rebuilding
America's Defenses - Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century."

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Libby co-authored the once-shocking draft of the 'Defense Planning Guidance' with Mr. Wolfowitz for
then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney in 1992. Libby serves on the advisory board of the Center for Russian
and Eurasian Studies of the RAND Corporation.
John Bolton
              In February 2005, Mr. Bolton was nominated US ambassador to the UN by President Bush. If
              confirmed, he would move to this position from the Department of State where he was Under
              Secretary for Arms Control, the top US non-proliferation official. Prior to this appointment,
              Bolton was senior vice president of the neoconservative think tank American Enterprise
              Institute. He also held a variety of positions in both the George H. W. Bush and Ronald
Reagan administrations.
Bolton has often made claims not fully supported by the intelligence community. In a controversial May
2002 speech entitled, "Beyond the Axis of Evil," Bolton fingered Libya, Syria, and Cuba as "other rogue
states intent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction."
In July 2003, the CIA and other agencies reportedly objected strongly to claims Bolton made in a draft
assessment about the progress Syria has made in its weapons programs.
Elliott Abrams
              In February of 2005 Elliott Abrams was appointed deputy assistant to the president and
              deputy national security adviser for global democracy strategy. From December 2002 to
              February 2005, Mr. Abrams served as special assistant to the president and senior director for
              Near East and North African affairs.
              Abrams began his political career by taking a job with the Democratic Senator Henry M.
"Scoop" Jackson. He held a variety of State Department posts in the Reagan administration.
He was a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute from 1990 to the 1996 before becoming president of the
Ethics and Public Policy Center, which "affirms the political relevance of the great Western ethical
imperatives." Abrams also served as chairman of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom.
In 1991, Abrams pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress about the Iran-Contra affair.
President George H. W. Bush pardoned him in 1992. In 1980, he married Rachel Decter, daughter of
neocon veterans Norman Podhoretz and Midge Decter.
Robert Kagan
              Mr. Kagan writes extensively on US strategy and diplomacy. Kagan and fellow
              neoconservative William Kristol co-founded the Project for a New American Century (PNAC)
              in 1997. Kagan signed the famous 1998 PNAC letter sent to President Clinton urging regime
              change in Iraq.
              After working as principal speechwriter to Secretary of State George P. Shultz from 1984-
1985, he was hired by Elliott Abrams to work as deputy for policy in the State Department's Bureau of
Inter-American Affairs.
He is a senior associate at the Carnegie endowment for International Peace (CEIP). He is also an
international affairs columnist for The Washington Post, and contributing editor at The New Republic and
The Weekly Standard. He wrote the bestseller "Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New
World Order." Kagan's wife, Victoria Nuland, was chosen by Vice President Dick Cheney as his deputy
national security adviser.
Michael Ledeen
              Seen by many as one of the most radical neoconservatives, Mr. Ledeen is said to frequently
              advise George W. Bush's top adviser Karl Rove on foreign policy matters. He is one of the
              strongest voices calling for regime change in Iran.
              In 2001, Ledeen co-founded the Coalition for Democracy in Iran. He served as Secretary of
              State Alexander Haig's adviser during the Reagan administration. Ledeen is resident scholar in
the Freedom Chair at the American Enterprise Institute, where he works closely with Richard Perle. he is
also a member of the Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs' advisory board and one of its founding
organizers.

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He was Rome correspondent for the New Republic magazine from 1975-1977, and founding editor of the
Washington Quarterly. Ledeen also wrote "The War Against the Terror Masters," which advocates regime
change in Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.
William Kristol
               Son of "godfather" of neoconservatism Irving Kristol, Bill Kristol is currently chairman of the
               Project for a New American Century, which he co-founded with leading neoconservative
               writer Robert Kagan. He is also editor of the influential Weekly Standard.
               Like other neoconservatives Frank Gaffney Jr. and Elliott Abrams, Kristol worked for
               hawkish Democratic Sen. Henry "Scoop" Jackson. But by 1976, he became a Republican. he
served as chief of staff to Education Secretary William Bennett during the Reagan administration and chief
of staff to former Vice President Dan Quayle during the George H. W. Bush presidency.
Kristol continuously called for Saddam Hussein's ouster since the 1991 Gulf War. With the like-minded
Lawrence Kaplan, Kristol co-wrote "The War Over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission." He is
on the board of advisers of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, established as a
counterterrorist think tank after 9/11.
Frank Gaffney Jr.
               Mr. Gaffney is the founder, president, and CEO of the influential Washington think tank
               Center for Security Policy, whose mission is "to promote world peace through American
               strength."
               In 1987, President Reagan nominated Gaffney to be assistant secretary of defense for
               international security policy. he earlier served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy under then-Assistant Secretary Richard Perle. In the late 1970s,
Gaffney served as a defense and foreign policy adviser to Sen. Henry "Scoop" Jackson.
He is columnist for the Washington Times and a contributor to Defense News and Investor's Business
Daily. He is a contributing editor to National Review Online, WolrdNetDaily.com and
JewishWorldReview.com. Gaffney is also one of 25 mostly neoconservative co-signers of the Project for a
New American Century's Statement of Principles.
                                        Q&A: Neocon power examined
        The Monitor asked award-winning author, US military historian, and self-described neocon Max Boot to discuss the
        extent of neocon power.
        How much power do neoconservatives have within the Bush administration? Within
        Washington?
The power of neocons is much exaggerated – unfortunately. On the question of Iraq their views generally
won the day. Not because they were all-powerful but simply because 9/11 brought various doubters
including Bush and Cheney around to the neocon point of view.
But on many other issues the administration policy remains unsettled and neocons are by no means in the
drivers seat.
One example: Iran. The neocon position is to push for regime change by encouraging Iranian democrats.
Is this the administration position? Hard to say; some elements in the administration clearly favor this view
– the Defense Department for one – while others, like the State Department, favor a more status quo
policy. The president hasn't made a clear policy decision.
The reason why neocons are said to have so much influence is that their ideas are clearly and forcefully
articulated – and they were proven right about so many things – such as the need to remain engaged in the
world in the 1990s. I do think they have a lot of influence on the foreign policy debate but that doesn't
mean that even in this administration they're going to win every argument over policy.
How does the push to implement a neoconservative vision affect the war on terrorism? Would a
neoconservative America breed more terrorist attacks, as some critics fear?
A neocon approach to terrorism would address the "root causes" more, that being the lack of liberal
democracy in the Muslim world and the surfeit of hate-spewing regimes. Encouraging democracy in Iran


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and other places would a centerpiece of this strategy. This would be combined with military attacks on
obvious terrorist outposts like the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Over time this dual-prong approach is more likely to deliver "victory" in the "war on terrorism" than any
other strategy I'm familiar with. I don't see any evidence that it will breed more terrorists; on the contrary,
it should reduce their number.
What type of foreign policy/security strategy would an Al Gore administration have set after Sept.
11? How different would it have been from the one that emerged from the Bush White House?
I think it's likely that the Gore administration would have invaded Afghanistan after 9/11. I think it's
unlikely they would have invaded Iraq. That's the big difference.
The Gore administration probably would have deferred to the doubts of various European countries, the
UN, etc. – everyone who was opposed to intervening in Iraq. In the short term, this might have been a
smart strategy politically, in that the consequences of leaving Saddam Hussein in power would not
immediately be obvious (it would take him years to acquire nuclear weapons) while the costs of intervening
(such as the continued guerrilla attacks on US soldiers) are immediately apparent.
But long term, I think the Gore approach would have been a continuation of the Clinton approach of
letting dangers fester, and that this would have been an irresponsible policy from the longterm security
needs of the United States. Of course there would be many similarities between the Gore and Bush foreign
policies. Both would try to promote democracy, free markets, etc. Both would be willing to undertake
humanitarian interventions in places like Liberia, both would try to get along with China and Russia, both
would clash with some European nations over issues like Kyoto, etc.
How significant is the emergence of neoconservative thought within the broader history of
American foreign policy? What kind of shift are we witnessing? Which American president best
embodied neoconservative beliefs?
I think the emergence of neocon thinking is very significant. In essence, I think neocons combine the best
of the two dominant strains of US foreign policy thinking: Wilsonian idealism and Kissingerian realpolitik.
They have Wilson's devotion to promoting democracy while at the same time recognizing ” as Wilson did
not – that this often requires force and that the US cannot rely on international treaties alone. Many
presidents have embodied this thinking: both Roosevelts, Truman, Reagan, George W Bush.
What's next for the 'axis of evil'? How do neocon strategists intend to confront N. Korea and Iran?
What about China?
I think North Korea and Iran are the two biggest threats to the United States at the moment because of
their nuclear weapons programs and tyrannical governments. Our policy in both cases should be
preemption –: not necessarily military preemption, which is a last resort, but rather seeking to democratize
those countries so that they no longer seek to threaten their neighbors or the US.
In the case of Iran, we need to do more to back the democracy demonstrators who want to overthrow the
mullahs. In the case of North Korea we need to more to bring pressure on the government to cause its
collapse. Among the steps we should take: apply more pressure to South Korea and China to cut off all
subsidies and fuel shipments to the North and also undertake selective intercepts of North Korean ships
carrying illicit weapons and drugs, a main revenue source for the regime. Only if democracy eventually
prevails in Pyongyang and Tehran can the West breathe easy.
China is a much more cautious state and not an immediate threat. Here, too, we should encourage the
forces of democracy. Recent developments in Hong Kong are very positive. Eventually China may become
a serious competitor to the US militarily but this won't happen for decades. We don't need to worry about
China nearly as much as we worry about N. Korea or Iran.
Will neoconservative policies endure after Bush is out of office?
Yes. In the case of Iraq, regime change is something that both Democrats and Republicans are committed
to. More broadly, I think there is a wide consensus in US politics in favor of what are essentially neocon
policies of promoting US ideals while keeping America strong.
Is America comfortable taking on the role of empire?


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It's hard to speak for all Americans. Some are, some aren't. I would say most are comfortable with the role
but not the actual title "empire." America has been an empire of liberty – Jefferson's phrase – since at least
the Louisiana Purchase.
Now we are acting like a liberal empire by getting involved in the internal workings of Afghanistan, Bosnia,
Kosovo, Iraq, and other countries. I think most Americans realize this is vital to our national security
broadly interpreted – that if we don't address sources of terrorism, ethnic cleansing, instability, nuclear
proliferation, etc., we will suffer a heavy price, as we already did on 9/11.
• Max Boot is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
                                    Q&A: Neocons' niche in American history
The Monitor asked a leading US foreign policy expert, Walter Russell Mead, to place neoconservative beliefs in historical
context.
Which leaders in US history would be neocons today?
It's possible that Teddy Roosevelt would be a neocon. I think it's almost certain he would have supported
the war in Iraq. And he wouldn't have cared about the lack of a UN resolution. I'm not sure who else
would be a neocon in foreign policy. In some ways [neocons] are very original.
Is there a particular point in the history of US foreign policy that reminds you of today's foreign
policy environment?
In some ways, it reminds me of the period around 1946-47 when we were trying to figure out what the
cold war was going to mean. The country realizes we have a challenge on our hands, but we're not quite yet
sure how we're going to meet it ultimately.
There's also the period in the early part of the 20th century when it was clear that the British empire was
not going to be as strong and the United States was growing. And you had people like Teddy Roosevelt
and others beginning to think ... "What if America is going to become an imperial nation? What does that
look like?"
What makes neocons unique throughout the history of US foreign policy?
When we think of Wilsonianism now, we tend to think of secular, humanist ideas - building a world
government - sort of a Europeanist foreign policy. If you went back a hundred years or so, Wilsonianism
was carried out by people like missionaries who thought that the way to make America safe was to make
the rest of the world believe the way we do and act the way we do. But they weren't as concerned about the
institutional aspect.
The neocons of today have sort of revived this older Wilsonian tradition. They are no longer concerned,
say, about the United Nations, which is what we think Wilsonians are mostly thinking about ... or the
World Court. In fact, they think that stuff gets in the way to some degree. But they are more concerned
about basic American values and spreading those.
So it's a different Wilsonianism from what we've all grown up thinking about. It's non-institutional and it's
values-based. To some degree, it's a conservative Christian value base. Even though many conservatives are
Jews, the sort of basic values that they are promoting are very much the sort of Protestant, Christian values
that were dominant in 19th-century America.
Do you think neoconservatives have had their "moment in the sun" with their successful push for
a preemptive war against Iraq? Do you think that the broad support they might enjoy now will
wane?
I think they're still in business. The weak spot, obviously, for them, is that ... if we are taking 20 casualties a
month in Iraq a year from now, there may not be a lot of people thanking them for this. But, on the other
hand, we were in the [Vietnam War] for years before people really turned against it. And even then, I think
... other than elite opinion ... the thing that bothered most ordinary Americans wasn't that we were fighting
or that our strategy was too hawkish, but they couldn't see that we had a strategy for victory ... that it
looked like it was going to be a deadlock forever.
It may well be that if the American people remain convinced that the war in Iraq is necessary for national
security ... and even if the war goes on for a long time ... if they feel that we have a strategy that will win


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and that is necessary, people may support it for a very long time. It's hard to say. If it goes well, even after a
while, the neoconservatives will be strengthened.
What would be some other factors that would put the neoconservatives out of business, or
enhance their standing even more?
I think failure is always bad.... If the public judgment is, "We took their advice and we've ended up in a hell
hole," then we won't be asking [neocons] for advice for a while. I think it's the public judgment on the
success of the policies that they've proposed.
Where does world opinion factor into this?
Probably not very much. Except if you reached a point where the unpopularity of American foreign policy
was in some way making it impossible for the US to conduct the policy that it wanted to. It's hard for me
to see how that would happen.
What do you see as the neocons' biggest obstacles in the future?
They have the problem that all Wilsonians have. Wilsonians always want more foreign policy, in a way. If
you think about democratizing the Middle East ... that's an incredibly tall order. That could take us a very
long time. And it's not completely sure that everybody in the US is going to want to make those sacrifices
... especially if it involves troops, maybe not just in Iraq, but in other places ... some of whom will be
getting shot at from time to time.
• Walter Russell Mead is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Spheres of influence
                        Neoconservative think tanks, periodicals, and key documents.
Top neocon think tanks
Project for the New American Century (PNAC)
Established in 1997 by William Kristol and Robert Kagan, PNAC's goal is "to promote American global
leadership." Creating a blueprint for the US' current role in the world, PNAC's original Statement of
Principles called for the US to return to a "Reaganite foreign policy of military strength and moral clarity."
American Enterprise Institute (AEI)
Founded in 1943, this influential Washington think tank is known as the headquarters of neoconservative
thought. In a crucial speech in the leadup to the war in Iraq, US President George W. Bush said this to an
audience at AEI: "You do such good work that my administration has borrowed 20 such minds."
Jewish Intitute for National Security Affairs (JINSA)
Based in Washington, JINSA "communicates with the national security establishment and the general
public to explain the role Israel can and does play in bolstering American interests, as well as the link
between American defense policy and the security of Israel." Some of the strongest supporters of Israel's
right-wing Likud Party in the already pro-Israel neoconservative circles are on JINSA's board of advisers.
Center for Security Policy (CSP)
CSP's 2001 annual report boasts of its influence saying it "isn't just a 'think tank' – it's an agile, durable, and
highly effective 'main battle tank' in the war of ideas on national security." Securing neoconservatives'
influence at the nexus of military policymakers and weapons manufacturers, CSP's mission is "to promote
world peace through American strength."
Others...
The Hudson Institute
The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies
Ethics and Public Policy Center
The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies

Top neoconservative periodicals
Commentary
Describing itself as "America's premier monthly journal of opinion," Commentary magazine is widely
regarded as the leading outlet for neoconservative writing. Founded in 1945, this American Jewish
Committee publication steadily gained ideological influence under the editorships of Iriving Kristol and

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Norman Podhoretz, two of neoconservatism's founding fathers. Today, Commentary advocates passionate
support for Israel, and regime change in at least half a dozen countries deemed hostile to US and Israeli
security and interests.
National Review
Founded in 1955 by precocious conservative William F. Buckley, National Review promised to stand
"athwart the path of history, yelling Stop!" AntiCommunist in stance, Catholic in judgment, Republican in
preference, the magazine has weaned generations of conservative leaders. Its continued emphasis on
traditional moral values and limited government put it outside the neoconservative camp, but in recent
years, the magazine has increasingly adopted neocon attitudes.
The Weekly Standard
Weekly Standard editors comprise a "who's who" of neoconservative figures. Currently led by William
Kristol and Fred Barnes, the magazine has, since its founding in 1995, encouraged the cultivation of an
American empire.
The New Republic
Like neoconservatism's own founding, The New Republic's roots tap into an unlikely intellectual resevoir.
Begun as a progressive oriented journal in 1914, the magazine initially supported the Soviet Union and
opposed the Vietnam war, but later supported President Reagan's foreign policy and both Gulf Wars.
Today, its advocacy of a muscular, pro-Israel, pro-interventionist US foreign policy -coupled with its
embrace of Democratic centrist domestic policies -make it a leading neocon voice.
The National Interest
The National Interest claims "it's where the great debates begin." Founded in 1985 by Irving Kristol, the
quarterly journal examines international relations from a broad perspective that embraces social issues,
religion, and history. Though it does not always promote neocon causes, the journal's editorial board is
dominated by some of the movement's most influential voices, including Midge Decter, Samuel P.
Huntington, Charles Krauthammer, Richard Perle, and Daniel Pipes.
The Public Interest
When he founded the magazine in 1965, Irving Kristol defined the aim of The Public Interest: "to help all
of us when we discuss issues of public policy, to know a little better what we are talking about – and
preferably in time to make such knowledge effective." The Public Interest focuses more on American
domestic culture and politics rather than international affairs. As a result, its contributors reflect a wide
diversity of ideological perspectives.

Key Documents
Draft of the 1992 "Defense Planning Guidance" [excerpts]
This classified document, which called for US military preeminence over Eurasia and preemptive strikes
against countries suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction, circulated for several weeks at
senior levels in the Pentagon. After it was leaked to the media in 1992, it proved so shocking that it had to
be substantially rewritten. Many aspects of this document are included in the US' 2002 National Security
Strategy
"A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm"
Prepared in 1996 by a group led by Richard Perle for Israel's right-wing Likud Party and published by the
Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, an Israeli think tank, this report called for "a clean
break" with the policies of negotiating "land for peace" with the Palestinians. It also advocated
"reestablishing the principle of preemption."
"Toward a Neo-Reaganite foreign policy"
Published by Foreign Affairs in the summer of 1996, this neoconservative manifesto by William Kristol
and Robert Kagan set the course for the modern neocon cause. By linking Reagan's foreign policy
approach with neoconservative ideas, the authors energized Republican foreign policy and moved it away
from both Pat Buchanan's "neoisolationism," or Henry Kissinger's "realism."
PNAC letter to Clinton

                                                       9
Leading conservatives, many of whom became senior officials in the Bush Administration, wrote this open
letter to then-President Bill Clinton in 1998. The letter, sponsored by the Project for a New American
Century, expressed the urgent need to topple Saddam Hussein's regime.
PNAC letter to Bush
Written just weeks after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, this open letter from PNAC to President George W.
Bush urging Saddam Hussein's ouster marked the beginning of a concerted effort by neoconservatives to
persuade President Bush to take action against Iraq. The letter stated, in part: "...even if evidence does not
link Iraq directly to the [9/11] attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors
must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq." The relentless campaign
worked. Within two years years, US forces would occupy Iraq.
President Bush's speech to AEI
Less than a month before the US-led coalition launched its attack on Saddam Hussein's regime, President
Bush symbolically chose the de facto headquarters of neoconservative thought, the American Enterprise
Institute (AEI), as a venue to outline his vision for a new Iraq – and a new Middle East. AEI had been
arguing for regime change in Iraq and democratization of the Middle East for over a decade.
"Beyond the Axis of Evil"
In this controversial May, 2002 speech to the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, US Under
Secretary for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton accuses Libya, Syria, and Cuba of
actively developing weapons of mass destruction programs.
                                                     In their own words
                                      A collection of quotes by neoconservatives
"A neoconservative is a liberal who's been mugged by reality. A neoliberal is a liberal who's been mugged by reality but has
refused to press charges."
     - Irving Kristol
"Change - above all violent change - is the essence of human history."
     - Michael Ledeen
"Ultimately, this WTC/Pentagon attack is anchored to a terror network embedded in Saudi royal politics. I don't think we
will win this war if we do not begin to honestly examine the full nature of Saudi politics and behavior. This is truly the key
issue."
     - David Wurmser
"American power should be used not just in the defense of American interests but for the promotion of American principles."
     - William Kristol
"The President of the United States, on issue after issue, has reflected the thinking of neoconservatives."
     - Richard Perle
"It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the
same world."
     - Robert Kagan
"Iraq is just one battle in a larger war, bringing down the regime in Iran is the central act, because Iran is the world's most
dangerous terrorist country."
     - Michael Ledeen
"On the outcome of the confrontation with Tehran, more than any other, rests the future of the Bush Doctrine - and, quite
possibly, the Bush presidency - and prospects for a safer world."
     - William Kristol
"Republicans are good at wielding power, but they're not so wonderful when it comes to the more idealistic motives of liberal
internationalism. The Democrats are better at liberal internationalism, but they're not so good at wielding power. I would say
that if there were a Joe Lieberman/John McCain party, I'm in the Joe Lieberman/John McCain party."
     - Robert Kagan
"We are going to have to take the war against [the terrorists] often to other people's territory, and all of the norms of
international order make it difficult to do that. So the president has to reshape fundamental attitudes toward those norms, or


                                                              10
we are going to have our hands tied by an antiquated institution [the traditional international system] that is not capable of
defending us."
     - Richard Perle
                                                 Birth of a superpower
                            Timeline of key events in the history of US foreign policy.
1783 - The Paris Peace Treaty
The Paris Peace Treaty formally ends the American Revolution. Some historians consider it - and not the
Declaration of Independence in 1776 - the true birth of the United States of America. The treaty
recognizes the USA as a sovereign nation and officially defines its borders. The US is a young nation
without the military and economic clout to oust European powers from all the territory it would like to
claim in North America. Leaders such as Benjamin Franklin and John Adams used diplomatic finesse to
exploit the longstanding rivalry between Britain and France. Thanks in part to a British attempt to lure
Americans away from an alliance with the French, Adams and Franklin win generous boundaries for the
US.
1823 - The Monroe Doctrine
President James Monroe declares European countries are not to interfere in the Americas or attempt to re-
colonize them. Such intervention, he asserts, would be "dangerous to [US] peace and safety." In return, the
US would not interfere in the existing colonies or internal affairs of Europe. The doctrine represents one
of the first examples of US unilateralism: James Monroe and John Quincy Adams refuse a British alliance
agreement to keep the other Europeans out of the Western hemisphere. It is also unprecedented in that it
proclaims an enormous amount of land as a US protectorate. Ironically, the British fleet enforces the
doctrine, since the US lacks strong naval capability until the end of the 19th century.
1898 - Spanish-American War
The US declares war on Spain on April 25, 1898, two months after the USS Maine battleship sinks in
Havana. By war's end, just eight months later, Spain loses control of its overseas empire, including Cuba,
Puerto Rico, the Philippine islands, and Guam. Victory in what President Theodore Roosevelt would later
dub "the splendid little war" shows the world that the US has global interests. While some Americans
question what they view as imperialism, Mr. Roosevelt's "big stick" approach guides US foreign policy for
years to come. In 1904, Roosevelt claims that the US is "the policeman of the Western Hemisphere," and
says the US will intervene in the affairs of any nation that threatens US interests. This declaration would
later be known as the "Roosevelt Corollary" of the Monroe Doctrine. In 1907, the president flexes the
country's new naval muscles by sending the "Great White Fleet," 16 new battleships painted white, around
the world to demonstrate the US has arrived as a major power.
1899 - Open Door Policy
Throughout the 19th century, Europeans and Americans covet the opening of Asia's markets. European
powers crave formal control over Asian colonies, but Americans believe that formal control, or even
"spheres of influence," is the wrong approach, especially toward China, seen as an enormous trade and
investment opportunity. Threatened by its own weakness and European aggressiveness, the US maintains
that China should remain open to all countries. In 1898, President McKinley expresses his desire for an
"open door" policy with China. A year later, the US and European powers agree to respect the territorial
integrity of China. The US policy of free trade would later become one of the most important principles in
US diplomacy.
1915 - Sinking of the Lusitania
The sinking of the luxury liner Lusitania by a German U-boat on May 7, 1915 while en route from the US
to England, sets the stage for the US entrance into World War I. Some 1,200 people are killed in the attack,
including 128 Americans. Until then, most Americans had demanded neutrality in the intensifying
European conflict. In fact, President Woodrow Wilson had pushed for a neutral stance in 1914. But the
news of the Lusitania's sinking, prompted by a retaliation-minded press, helps fuel anger toward Germany
and by 1917 pushes the US to join the World War.
1920 - Defeat of Versailles Treaty

                                                             11
After the horrors of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson seeks to prevent another world war by
creating an international alliance called the League of Nations (the precursor to the United Nations). His
principles are revolutionary because they institutionalize a new world order, and are embraced by the global
community. But the US Senate defeats the treaty in 1920, symbolizing American isolationism during the
1920s and 30s. Though unilateralists strongly opposed to binding the US to the treaty's security
commitments win the day, Mr. Wilson's larger ideas, about self-determination and the rule of law in
international affairs, eventually become the cornerstone of global foreign policy.
1941 - Pearl Harbor
From the end of World War I, through the Great Depression, and into the beginning of World War II, the
US withdraws from much of the rest of the world. This rise of isolationism is due in part to the sense that
US participation in WWI was a failure. In addition, the complex domestic problems of the Great
Depression cause the US to look inward. The US signs several neutrality acts between 1935 to 1941,
preventing US involvement in international disputes. But on the morning of December 7, when Japanese
airplanes attack the US naval base at Pearl Harbor, killing 2,300, Americans are thrust onto the
international stage. The following day, President Roosevelt calls Dec. 7 "a date which will live in infamy,"
and signs a declaration of war. A day later, Germany and Italy, as partners of Japan in the Tripartite Pact,
declare war on the US.
1947 - Truman Doctrine/Marshall Plan
The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 end World War II, and set off the arms
race that would characterize the cold war. In 1947, President Truman, aiming to challenge Soviet
ambitions, asks Congress for $400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey, a move that would become
known as the Truman Doctrine. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, convinced that the poverty-stricken
nations of post-World War II Europe need US support, develops a $13.3 billion plan (more than $100
billion in today's dollars) for economic revival in Western Europe, later dubbed the Marshall Plan. Both
policies sought to stifle Soviet involvement in weakened countries in Europe. For the next half century, the
US would commit enormous amounts of money and military power in the name of protecting its national
interests and containing Soviet influence. The US would become involved in regional conflicts in Latin
America, North Korea, and eventually Vietnam - making the cold war a global political, economic, and
military struggle.
1962 - Cuban Missile Crisis
The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 is a cold war turning point. In the fall of that year, the Soviet
Union denies installing nuclear weapons in Cuba, only 90 miles from the US. But US aerial reconnaissance
confirms the contrary. For two weeks in October, the world sits on edge, as President John F. Kennedy
and Premier Nikita Khrushchev struggle to divert a nuclear standoff. Afterwards, both countries intensify
the nuclear arms race, even as they sought to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. But while direct military
confrontation between the two superpowers is averted, the US commits itself to standing firm against the
spread of Soviet communism.
1972 - Nixon's visit to China
In 1972, the staunchly anticommunist President Richard Nixon shocks the world by becoming the first
American president to visit mainland China while in office. That visit, and subsequent diplomatic meetings
between high-level officials in both countries, would later be dubbed "triangular diplomacy," as the US
exploits divisions between the Soviet Union and China to better its relationship with both. The visit
exemplifies the Nixon-Kissinger "realpolitik": Veering from earlier notions that the US is obliged to spread
its values around the globe, Mr. Nixon's administration bases its foreign policy on realist principles. Nixon
believes the US should pursue its interests, restoring a balance of power among the world's major players.
The perception that Nixon minimized moral considerations in foreign policy produces a backlash from the
right and left in the 1970s and 1980s; both sides suggest he is abandoning American values.
1973 - OPEC boycott
Since the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia in the 1930s, the relationship between the US and the Middle
East has revolved around oil, along with, after World War II, the status of Israel. Ensuring access to

                                                     12
abundant and cheap oil has topped the foreign policy agenda ever since. The catalyst for the 1973 boycott
by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is the Yom Kippur War and US support
for Israel. Saudi Arabia leads a boycott against countries supporting Israel and oil prices go through the
roof. Boycotters demand a complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory. The boycott causes
major economic upheaval worldwide, and pushes the US to the forefront of Israeli-Arab peace
negotiations. After OPEC's boycott, every US president acts compelled to take an active role in Mideast
politics and policy.
1979 - Iran Hostage Crisis
US support for Iran's Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlevi by an Islamic revolutionary government in 1979 leads
to a steady deterioration of Iran-US relations. In November, Iranian students seize the American embassy
in Tehran and hold 52 people hostage for two years. Both diplomacy and a military attempt fail to release
the captives. US impotence in the face of the students' demands underscores US military weakness. In fact,
the US failure to resolve the crisis contributes to Ronald Reagan's victory over President Jimmy Carter in
the presidential election. The hostages are released in 1981, the same day Reagan is sworn into office. The
Iran hostage crisis engraves terrorism into the American public consciousness and forces US policymakers
to grapple with Islamic extremism.
1982 - Reagan's Evil Empire Speech
President Ronald Reagan considers foreign policy a moral issue, and throughout his presidency targets the
Soviet Union. By the time he steps into office, he is in a race to reclaim American power. He blames the
administrations before him for allowing the Soviet threat to grow while American defense waned. He
launches the largest peacetime military build-up in American history, pulls back on arms control talks with
the Soviets, and pushes anticommunist guerrilla movements around the world. A centerpiece of his
presidency is the Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed Star Wars, a plan that reverses two decades of US
defense policy by challenging the Soviet Union to a technological competition. Targeting the Soviet Union
as the "evil empire" reshapes the world's strategic landscape. From then on, US foreign policy focuses
more intently on the "evil" communist sphere that threatens US preeminence, underlining a "them against
us" syndrome. This stark depiction would resurface 20 years later with President George W. Bush's "axis of
evil" speech.
1989 - Fall of Berlin Wall
The ultimate symbol of East versus West, the Berlin Wall was constructed in 1961 at the height of cold war
tensions. The wall was intended to stop the flow of people under communist rule from escaping to the
more prosperous economies of the West. When it topples on November 9, 1989, citizens across the world
cheer for what they believe will be the emergence of a new world order. But by the time the cold war ends
with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US has already emerged as the world's sole superpower.
The new world order would be crafted largely in America's image and likeness.
2001 - 9/11
American economic might and global clout in the 1990s seemed uncontested. President Bill Clinton used
US forces quite often in his two terms, virtually all for limited combat operations in regional conflicts. The
cumulative effect of these deployments gives rise to the idea of the US as "global policeman." The stunning
terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center on Sept. 11, 2001 shatters America's confidence
in its security, bringing the US into a full-scale "war on terrorism." The Bush doctrine of targeting terrorists
- and states that harbor them - leads the US into two wars, the first to end the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan, the second to oust Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. America's aggressive new foreign policy,
marked by a willingness to "go it alone," and a "you're with us, or you're with the terrorists" mentality,
could signal new battles against "rogue" states and dramatic changes in long-standing alliances.
                                                   Neocon quiz
                           Are you a neoconservative? Take this quiz to find out.
                        http://www.csmonitor.com/specials/neocon/neoconQuiz.html
1. Which best describes your attitude about US efforts to secure peace between Israelis and
Palestinians?

                                                      13
     The US has compelling strategic interests in the region. America must be an "honest broker" between
     Israelis and Palestinians. By working with regional partners, the US can help bring about a secure
     Israel and a free state of Palestine. US efforts in the Mideast help its diplomatic standing in the world
     immensely.
     It's an arrogant fantasy to think the US can "bring peace" to the Mideast. US reliance on foreign oil
     has embroiled it in crisis after crisis there. The people of the Middle East must set their own course.
     Recent history shows that Arab countries respect power, not paper treaties that purport to trade
     "land for peace." In many ways, the road to peace in Jerusalem had to pass through Baghdad. In the
     wake of America's victory over Saddam Hussein, US negotiators have new leverage to demand steps
     toward peace. But the US can never tolerate terror. There will be no compromise on Israel's borders
     or security.
     The US is morally obligated to stop Mideast violence. It's clear there is no military solution to the
     conflict. In order to broker the peace, the US must be more neutral. This means stop giving billions
     in aid to Israel, and start condemning its preemptive assassinations of Palestinian leaders.
2. The US campaign in Vietnam was...
     A disaster. What threat did Vietnam pose to American security? More than 50,000 US troops died in
     support of a theory about "dominoes."
     A failure. The American objective was strategically and morally bankrupt.
     A quagmire. The US had the right strategy - it was important to contain communist expansion into
     Asia - but executed the wrong tactics. High casualty rates and low public support put the US in an
     unwinnable war.
     A hard-won victory. US forces paid a high - but necessary - price to contain Communism in
     Southeast Asia.
3. What type of relationship should the US form with China?
     The US must hedge China's rise to great-power status. The policy of preemption includes China, and
     US military leaders must strategically contain China's armed forces, while US policymakers maintain
     America's economic preeminence. Above all else, China must not be encouraged to think it can
     challenge America's superpower status.
     China's bullying - of Tibet, Falun Gong, and Taiwan - is atrocious. America's "normalization" of
     trade with China has allowed it to continue its human rights abuses, while costing countless American
     jobs. The US must not sacrifice its moral high ground at the altar of trade.
     China presents great potential dangers - and rewards - to American interests in the 21st century.
     While the US must affirm China's progressive steps and opening economy, it cannot ignore its
     repressive human rights behavior, trade violations, and bullying of Taiwan. Ultimately, opening China
     to American goods and services spreads American values that will influence China for the better.
     The US should neither appease nor aggravate China. China is a bellicose regional power and its
     human-rights record is appalling. But it doesn't threaten US interests. The US must stop giving China
     preferential trade treatment and do more to protect American jobs, but it needn't contain or confront
     China.
4. How should the US approach relations with Iran?
     The US must remember its history with Iran. Pro-West reform efforts - including the 1953 CIA coup
     that installed the Shah - incited the Islamic Revolution. US-led regime change would once again
     empower the most backward and hardline elements of radical Islam. The people of Iran must set
     their own course for freedom. Meanwhile, the US must turn to its EU partners to push for stricter
     inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities.
     The US is simply not positioned to stop Iran's seemingly inevitable drive to acquire nuclear weapons.
     But as it did with the Soviet Union and China before, America can contain and deter Iran's mullahs
     and their nuclear leverage. Hard-line Islamic rule in Iran is bankrupt and doomed to failure -
     democratic reformers will eventually seize the day. Patience and pressure, not preemptive war should


                                                     14
     guide America's approach toward Iran.
     Iran's hardline Islamic regime, proven connections to terrorists networks, and obvious desire for
     nuclear weapons make it a particularly dangerous threat. The mullahs who run Iran have repressed
     freedom at every turn, and show no evidence of ending ties to terrorism. To ensure that Iran does
     not threaten US security, American forces must be prepared to do to Tehran what they did to
     Baghdad.
     Iran presents a serious foreign policy challenge. Most Iranians clearly embrace democratic reform,
     but its hardline Islamic government seems intractable. Aggressive support for reformer efforts may
     be unwise at this time. The US must make a concerted effort with its European and regional allies to
     pressure Iran's regime to cease its nuclear ambitions.
5. How should the US deal with the North Korea nuclear threat?
     Seattle or Pyongyang? At some point soon, President Bush must decide which city he values more.
     The N. Korea nuclear threat is for real, and even tough negotiations with the US, China, Japan, and
     South Korea won't deter Kim Jong Il. The unpleasant, but only, option the US has is to prepare to
     launch a preemptive strike against select N. Korean targets.
     The nature of the North Korea crisis makes the Bush doctrine inoperative. The region is such a
     tinderbox that military action taken against N. Korea could lead to a full-blown conflagration.
     However, China, Japan, and South Korea - working together - can apply enough pressure on Kim
     Jong Il to contain the nuclear threat he poses. For now, the US must rely on multilateral talks while it
     repositions US forces in the peninsula to make them less vulnerable.
     The US has a moral obligation to battle both the starvation of North Korea's people and deter Kim
     Jong Il's nuclear threats. There's no easy solution, but the US can make progress with a carrot-and-
     stick approach of foreign aid and tough diplomacy. The US must work with the UN to keep
     Pyongyang in check.
     US policy in the Korean peninsula is outdated. Why should US troops be sitting ducks for Kim Jong
     Il's million-man army and nuclear threats? After 50 years, it's time South Korea protected itself.
     There's no point in "talking" with N. Korea, and all-out war is unthinkable. The US must move its
     troops out of the demilitarized zone.
6. The war against Saddam Hussein's regime was...
     Not America's finest hour of diplomacy, but a necessary and righteous action.
     A political and intelligence farce, a diplomatic disaster, a human tragedy, and now, a growing
     quagmire.
     Another example of America's costly imperial aims.
     Long overdue. Bringing democracy to Iraq is the first great step in democratizing the Middle East.
7. What do you think of America's superpower status?
     Unrivaled US power is crucial to America's defense. But using power to "Americanize" the world, act
     as policeman in the far corners of the globe, or to leverage trade agreements is sheer imperialism.
     US superpower status was key to warding off Soviet aggression during the cold war. Today, however,
     that power is increasingly a liability. 9/11 was a vicious blowback to the US bullying around the
     world, especially its trampling on the Middle East.
     American power was vital to the victory of freedom over totalitarianism. In the post-cold war world,
     American power is equally necessary to preserve peace, foster freedom, and expand global trade. To
     be effective, this power must be used selectively, with clear, pragmatic aims, and carry the weight of
     allied consensus.
     American power can spread peace and democracy across the globe. The world can't put its faith in
     the United Nations to thwart terrorists and tyrants. Diplomatic history shows that all regimes
     recognize power. Only unrivaled US power, and the demonstrated willingness to use it, can create the
     conditions that allow peace and prosperity to flourish.
8. How should the US approach alliances with foreign powers?

                                                     15
     When the US leads, the world follows. The world is too full of danger for the US to take its foreign
     policy cues from the UN Security Council, or even the consensus of European allies. American
     security and interests must not be compromised to mollycoddle US allies unwilling or unable to face
     up to evil threats.
     To preserve this country's sacred sovereignty, Americans must heed President George Washington's
     warning against "entangling alliances." Washington knew then, and we must understand now, that
     ceding control to foreign nations, let alone a world bureaucracy like the UN, chips away at the
     essence of the American Republic.
     The US needs its allies now more than ever. The UN may not be perfect, but it remains humanity's
     best hope of creating world peace. America's unilateral actions are hurting vital relationships with
     traditional allies in Europe, Asia, and across the globe.
     The US must march to the beat of its own drum, but its power is sapped when it marches alone.
     Healthy multilateral relations are vital to effective US diplomacy. America may not always agree with
     UN policy or even its best allies, but it can't afford to act alone.
9. How can the US win the war on terrorism?
     American hypocrisy and hubris led to the Sept. 11 attacks. To answer the question "Why do they hate
     us?" Americans must question the "might makes right" approach of US foreign policy. To win the
     war against terrorism, US leaders must remove the conditions that breed anti-American hatred.
     Terrorists can't be negotiated with. They must be killed or captured. "They hate us" because they -
     Muslim extremists - hate freedom. In the post-9/11 world, the US cannot wait for "imminent"
     threats. It must aggressively - even preemptively and unilaterally, if necessary - wipe out terrorist
     networks and the governments that support them. At the same time, the US can work to emasculate
     terrorism by aggressively promoting the cause of freedom and democracy around the world.
     As 9/11 so viciously illustrates, terrorism knows no boundaries. To win the war against terrorism, the
     US must lead a truly global effort to root out terror networks and compel broad-based reform for
     regimes that harbor terrorists.
     The US should not apologize for spreading American values around the globe, but its imperial
     behavior helped inspire the terrible Sept. 11 attacks. The US must relentlessly prosecute terrorists and
     work to undercut regimes that support them, but to prevent another Sept. 11, the US must stay truer
     to its founding as a republic by protecting the American people and staying out of other nations'
     business.
10. Does the US have the right balance between foreign and domestic priorities?
     President George W. Bush rightly made the nation's security his No. 1 priority after 9/11. The
     growing deficit is unfortunate, but increased spending is certainly justified. The US didn't start the
     war on terrorism, but it will finish it, even if that moves some domestic concerns to the back burner.
     The US is spending billions per month to help Iraqis, but millions of US workers can't find jobs.
     Managing a global empire is unconscionably costly.
     The billions spent on homeland security and far-flung bombing campaigns haven't made the US any
     safer. With the money it wastes killing civilians abroad and chipping away at civil liberties at home,
     the US government could provide health insurance to all Americans.
     If the cold war was World War III, 9/11 began the opening shots of World War IV. This is no time
     to "go wobbly" by whining about the federal budget deficit. Compared with the sacrifices Americans
     made in WWII, there is little to complain about. The cost to win the war on terrorism may be quite
     high, but the US truly cannot afford to lose this fight.
       Quiz results

      [ Results are not scientific. ]
Neocon quiz results
Based on your answers, you are most likely a neoconservative. Read below to learn more about each
foreign policy perspective.


                                                     16
                                                 Isolationist
The term isolationist is most often used negatively; few people who share its beliefs use it to describe their
own foreign policy perspective. They believe in "America first." For them, national sovereignty trumps
international relations. Many unions, libertarians, and anti-globalization protesters share isolationist tenets.
Isolationists…
     Are wary of US involvement in the United Nations
     Oppose international law, alliances, and agreements
     Believe the US should not act as a global cop
     Support trade practices that protect American workers
     Oppose liberal immigration
     Oppose American imperialism
     Desire to preserve what they see as America's national identity and character
Historical isolationist: President Calvin Coolidge
Modern isolationist: Author/Commentator Pat Buchanan
                                                    Liberal
Liberals…
     Are wary of American arrogance and hypocrisy
     Trace much of today's anti-American hatred to previous US foreign policies.
     Believe political solutions are inherently superior to military solutions
     Believe the US is morally bound to intervene in humanitarian crises
     Oppose American imperialism
     Support international law, alliances, and agreements
     Encourage US participation in the UN
     Believe US economic policies must help lift up the world's poor
Historical liberal: President Woodrow Wilson
Modern liberal: President Jimmy Carter
                                                     Realist
Realists…
     Are guided more by practical considerations than ideological vision
     Believe US power is crucial to successful diplomacy - and vice versa
     Don't want US policy options unduly limited by world opinion or ethical considerations
     Believe strong alliances are important to US interests
     Weigh the political costs of foreign action
     Believe foreign intervention must be dictated by compelling national interest
Historical realist: President Dwight D. Eisenhower
Modern realist: Secretary of State Colin Powell
                                               Neoconservative
Neoconservatives…
     Want the US to be the world's unchallenged superpower
     Share unwavering support for Israel
     Support American unilateral action
     Support preemptive strikes to remove perceived threats to US security
     Promote the development of an American empire
     Equate American power with the potential for world peace
     Seek to democratize the Arab world
     Push regime change in states deemed threats to the US or its allies
Historical neoconservative: President Teddy Roosevelt
Modern neoconservative: President Ronald Reagan



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