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Lecture 4 The Demand for Labor

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Lecture 4 The Demand for Labor Powered By Docstoc
					    LABOR MARKET
     CONTRACTS
       AND WORK
      INCENTIVES
1         Hewi-Lin Chuang, Ph.D.
                      2010/04/15
PENSION PLANS
CLASSIFIED BY BENEFIT
DETERMINATIONS
 Defined   Benefit Plans 確定給付制
     Ex. 勞退舊制
 Defined   Contribution Plans 確定提撥制
     Ex. 勞退新制、美國 401(k) plans
 Hybrid   Plans
     Ex. 現金餘額養老金計劃(cash balance pension)


                                            2
    DB VERSUS DC PLANS
   確定給付制 ( DB )
       係指雇主透過精算方式預估所需之退休金給 付成本,再決定提撥期
    間提撥率之制度。此一制度之優點為具有所得重分配的功能,可減少老
    年生活的貧富差距,並賦予勞動者撫養退休人口的責任,且給付額度按
    退休前之薪資而定,受通貨膨脹影響較小。惟其缺點在於目前人口老化
    問題嚴重,撫養比例逐漸提高,勞動者的負擔將會愈來愈沈重;另退休
    給付會受到工作年資、 薪資成長、通貨膨脹、員工異動率等影響,故難
    以預知退休給付金額。另勞工如更換雇主,或是雇主不繼續雇用勞工,
    則其年資中斷,無法領到退休金,對員工而言 相當不利。
   確定提撥制( DC )
       係指雇主及員工按月提撥一定比例之薪資, 存入勞工個人帳戶中,
    等到員工退休時再提領個人帳戶中之基金收益。此制度之優點為員工離
    職時可攜帶退休金,不必擔心因公司關廠或離職而領不到退休金,且員
    工可自行監督雇主有無按期提存退休準備金,另雇主定期按照個人提存
    比率提存,制度上較為公平。惟其缺點在於退休準備金是逐期提撥,易
    受通貨膨脹影響,員工 所領之退休金無法因應老年退休生活所需。  3
HYBRID PLANS
   混合制 ( Hybrid Plans )
        通常是確定給付制 ( DB )但同時擁有確定提撥制( DC )
    特性之制度。以現金餘額養老年金計畫( Cash Balance Pension
    Plan)為例,此制度於退休時給付一筆特定金額(以一特定計
    算公式依據個人之貢獻與薪資水平等作計算基準,類似DB制
    度),然而同時亦提供一個虛擬個人帳戶,去累積個人退休基
    金( 類似DC制度 )。
         也就是說,如果你離開目前的雇主,你的個人虛擬帳戶可
    以設算一筆固定金額的退休金,而這筆金額,你可以選擇轉入
    你自己的個人退休帳戶( IRA),或是新雇主的退休計畫中。

    相關資訊可參考下列網址:
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/FAQs/faq_consumer_cashbalanceplans.html
                                                                  4
勞退舊制 VERSUS勞退新制
   退休金制度改制原因為舊制設計不良
    1.   請領條件嚴苛(企業平均壽命低於要求退休年資)
    2.   年資累計不利轉業
    3.   雇主退休金成本不易估計
    4.   雇主未提撥之罰則輕
    5.   中高年齡勞工就業不易




                                  5
•   根據2009年三月底通過
    之修正條文:
    在同一單位工作十年以
    上,年滿六十歲者亦可
    自請退休。




                   6
7
REFERENCE

 勞動基準法

 勞工退休金條例

 行政院勞工委員會勞工保險局
   http://www.bli.gov.tw/
 行政院勞工委員會勞工退休基金監理會
   http://www.lpsc.gov.tw/



                             8
LABOR MARKET CONTRACTS AND
WORK INCENTIVES
    ~ The Structure of Compensation ~

 Another set of factors influencing job choice and
 work effort decisions: employer compensation
 policies both at one point in time and over several
 period of time.


                                                       9
1. THE ECONOMICS OF FRINGE
      BENEFITS
1) Employee Preferences:
     Two categories of benefits:
a)   Payment in kind: compensation in the form of
     some commodity, e.g., insurance, paid vacation.
     Other things equal, people would rather receive
     $X in cash than a commodity that costs $X.
     However, „other things” are not equal. In kind
     payments offer employees a sizable tax
     advantage because for the most part, they are not
     taxable under current income tax regulations.       10
b)   Deferred compensation: compensation that is
     earned now but will be paid in the form of money
     later on. E.g., pension benefits
     Deferred compensation schemes enjoy a tax
     advantage over current cash payments. Because of
     lower income and special tax advantages given the
     elderly, the tax rates actually paid are relatively low.
Note: With both kinds of benefits there is a loss of
      discretion in spending one‟s total compensation,
      which tends to render fringes inferior to cash
      payments in generating utility. On the other hand,
      the special tax advantage of benefits as compared
      with cash payments tend to increase the demand 11
      for fringe.
2) Employer Preferences
   Suppose employers are totally indifferent about
    whether to spend $X on wages or $X on fringes,
    then the composition of total compensation is a
    matter of indifference to the employers, only the
    level of compensation is of concern.
   Suppose a firm must pay its workers $X per years to
    remain competitive in both the labor and the product
    markets.
→ The various compensation packages a firm is willing
  to offer fall along the zero-profit isoprofit curve
  drawn between wages and fringes.                    12
 Wage Rate


                          Employer‟s Zero-Profit Isoprofit Curve


                                    Nominal Employer Cost of
                                    Fringe Benefits
The slope of the isoprofit curve is negative reflecting the fact that
the firm can increase fringes only if it reduces wages. In this case,
the isoprofit curve has a slope of –1, reflecting employer‟s
indifference about the composition of compensation.

Note: By increasing compensation in the form of fringes rather than
      wages, employers can often avoid taxes and required insurance
      payments that are levied as a fraction of payroll. This will make
      it more costly for an employer to increase compensation by 13
      increasing salaries than by increasing benefits.
→A dollar spent on fringes could cost employers more or
 less than a dollar nominally spent on wages or salaries.
 When fringes enhance productivity more than a similar
 expenditure on wages would, the isoprofit curve will
 flatten. When fringes increase other costs or reduce
 productivity, the isoprofit curve will be steeper.

  Wage Rate

       X

                A


                 B

                                   Nominal Employer          14
                         X         Cost of Fringe Benefits
3) The Joint Determination of Wages and Fringes
 Wage Rate
      X
                  Worker Y
     WY
                                             XX traces out the actual offers
                                             made by all firms in this labor market.

                                  Worker Z
     WZ
                                       Nominal Employer Cost
             FY              FZ      X of Fringe Benefits

Those employees who attach relatively great importance to the
availability of current spendable cash will choose to accept offers
in which total compensation comes largely in the form of wages.
(such as worker Y) employees who may be less worried about
current cash income but more interested in the tax advantages of
                                                                   15
fringe benefits will accept offers in which fringe benefits form a
higher proportion of total compensation. (worker Z)
Note: Because firms that pay high wages usually also
      offer very good fringe benefits, it often appears
      to the casual observer that wages and fringes are
      positively related. Casual observation in this
      case is misleading because it does not allow for
      the influences of other factors, such as the
      demands of the job and the quality of workers
      involved.




                                                          16
2. CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE PROSPECT
    OF FRINGE BENEFITS
1) Current Status
     There are three major types of benefits provided to
     employees:
a)   Paid: vacations, holidays, sick leave maternity leave
     etc.
b)   Insurance Plans: medical care, life, disability etc.
c)   Retirement and Saving Plans: defined benefit pension,
     profit sharing, employee stock ownership etc.
d)   Additional Benefits: parking, educational assistance,
     employee discount etc.
                                                            17
2) Future Prospect
   Over the past few decades there have been
   considerable changes in the composition of
   employee benefits offered to workers. While many
   of these changes have brought a new philosophy,
   and a new administration of employee benefits, all
   indications point to a continual expansion and
   redefinition of employee benefits packages.


                                                        18
a) Early Retirement
   Early retirement programs are designed to assist an
   organization in achieving some measure of cost
   savings in their direct wage bill. Typically, as
   employees‟ tenure with an organization has grown in
   years, these employees‟ salaries have risen to high
   levels.
 →The key issue in early retirement programs is to
   provide enough incentive for the employee to
   voluntarily take an early retirement, while
   simultaneously allowing for the direct wage bill of the
   organization to be reduced.
                                                        19
b) Parental Leave
   Parental leave can be defined as any leave from work,
   paid or unpaid, for employees to attend to child care
   responsibilities for a newborn infant or newly adopted
   child.
  →Although the Family and Medical Leave Bill permits
   this time off, there is a financial concern: The 9 to 5
   organization estimates that fewer than 40 percent of
   working women would be financially able to take an
   unpaid leave.
  →There was an even greater controversy surrounding
   parental leave-do fathers deserve the same time off as
   mothers with respect to family leave?                   20
c) Children and Eldercare
  Another major trend affecting corporations today is the push
  for an increase in child- and elder-care benefits.
 →Dual-career couples with children and/or elderly live-in
  parents need to have some assurance that child- or eldercare
  programs are available to them without major disruptions to
  their lives.
 →Companies are beginning to recognize that when its
  employees are faced with a choice between their jobs and
  their families, the vast majority of employees clearly place
  their job second.
 →American Express, IBM, Work Family Directions, and
  Allstate Insurance have joined forces to offer quality
  childcare at a facility that is in close proximity to all of their
  employees. In coming years, we can only expect such              21
  cooperative arrangements to continue when they are feasible
  to both the employer and the employee.
d) Flexible Benefits: A benefit program in which
    employees are permitted to pick benefits that most
    meet their needs, within monetary limits imposed.
   1.   Flexible Spending Accounts.
   2.   Modular Plans.
   3.   Core-plus Options Plans.
   4.   Add-on Plans.




                                                         22
3. THE COMPENSATION OF EXECUTIVES

 There has been a lot of interest in recent years in
 the salaries of high-level executives, such as chief
 executive officers, or CEOs. American CEOs have
 much higher salaries than their counterparts in
 Germany and Japan. For example, the average
 salary of the top 20 executives in the United States
 is $4.8 million, as compared to $1.8 million in
 Germany, and $530,000 in Japan.


                                                        23
1999年 董 事 長 薪 資 統 計 資 料
排名 產業別(樣本數 )                             平均值       標準差        最大值       最小值
                   環境衛生及污染防治服務業、社會服務業、
 1     ind8(2)                           7941000   4823882   11352000   4530000
                   出版業、廣播電視業、娛樂業及旅館業。
                   資料處理設備製造、資料儲存媒體製造、資
 2    ind314(37)   料終端裝置製造、資料輸入週邊設備製造、   6987516   6146558   35561000    70000
                   電腦零組件製造業。
                   電力及電子機械器材,運輸工具製造配修、
 3    ind3(119)                          5819706   5727460   39674000      0
                   精密機械製造、及其他工業製品。
                   電子管製造、半導體製造、光電材料及元件
 4    ind317(41)                         5439781   6350059   39674000      0
                   製造、被動元件製造業。
                   運輸業、倉儲業、通信業、金融業、保險業
 5     ind6(78)                          5207227   5446836   32186000   125000
                   及不動產業。
                   建築及工程技術服務業、商品經紀業、顧問
 6     ind7(4)     服務業、資訊服務業、廣告業、及其他工商   4940750   2174278   7335000    2981000
                   服務業。
                   化學材料製造、化學製品製造、石油及煤製
                   品、橡膠製品、塑膠製品、非金屬礦物製
 7    ind2(105)                          4203594   3121513   14677000      0
                   造、金屬基本工業、金屬製品製造、機械設
                   備製造配修業。
 8     ind5(16)    批發、零售、及餐飲業。           4174288   2695108   11445000    24000
                   食品及飲料製造、紡織業、成衣服飾品、家
 9     ind1(66)                          3842774   2836575   13941000    76000
                   具及裝設品、紙類、及印刷有關事業。
 10    ind4(21)    水電燃氣業、營造業。            3765139   2151109   9736319    738000
                   有線通信器材製造、無線通信器材製造、其
 11   ind316(14)                         2721929   2173319   7556000     6000
                                                                          24
                   他通信器材製造業。

 資料來源:高階經理人薪酬的揭露程度與公司治理-劉念琪(中央大學助理教授)、李思瑩(中央大學碩士)
2000董 事 長 薪 資 統 計 表
排名 產業別(樣本數)                                平均值        標準差         最大值       最小值
                   環境衛生及污染防治服務業、社會服務業、出版
 1     ind8(2)                             8545500   6158192.9   12900000   4191000
                   業、廣播電視業、娛樂業及旅館業。
                   資料處理設備製造、資料儲存媒體製造、資料終
 2    ind314(52)   端裝置製造、資料輸入週邊設備製造、電腦零組   8291264   12372835    80806000      0
                   件製造業。
                   電子管製造、半導體製造、光電材料及元件製
 3    ind317(58)                           7225657   11326955    70916000      0
                   造、被動元件製造業。
                   電力及電子機械器材,運輸工具製造配修、精密
 4    ind3(176)                            6786179   9735585     80806000      0
                   機械製造、及其他工業製品。
                   建築及工程技術服務業、商品經紀業、顧問服務
 5     ind7(5)                             5608600   4117007.3   11231000   522000
                   業、資訊服務業、廣告業、及其他工商服務業。
                   運輸業、倉儲業、通信業、金融業、保險業及不
 6     ind6(81)                            5110894   4970794.5   30953000   180000
                   動產業。

 7     ind5(14)    批發、零售、及餐飲業。             4984263   2548457.2   11445000   1360000
                   化學材料製造、化學製品製造、石油及煤製品、
 8    ind2(116)    橡膠製品、塑膠製品、非金屬礦物製造、金屬基   4503687   3417734.7   19054000      0
                   本工業、金屬製品製造、機械設備製造配修業。
                   有線通信器材製造、無線通信器材製造、其他通
 9    ind316(19)                           4380743   2582013.5   9791000     18000
                   信器材製造業。
                   食品及飲料製造、紡織業、成衣服飾品、家
 10    ind1(72)                            3822326   3223166.4   19549000      0
                   具及裝設品、紙類、及印刷有關事業。
 11    ind4(23)    水電燃氣業、營造業。              3465417   2059382.9   7423000       0
                                                                             25

資料來源:高階經理人薪酬的揭露程度與公司治理-劉念琪(中央大學助理教授)、李思瑩(中央大學碩士)
1999年 總 經 理 薪 資 統 計 資 料
 排名   產業別(樣本數)                              平均值       標準差         最大值       最小值
                    環境衛生及污染防治服務業、社會服務業、出版
  1     ind8(1)                             9703000      _       9703000    9703000
                    業、廣播電視業、娛樂業及旅館業。
                    資料處理設備製造、資料儲存媒體製造、資料終
  2    ind314(26)   端裝置製造、資料輸入週邊設備製造、電腦零組   6517337   7424517    40016000   120000
                    件製造業。
                    電子管製造、半導體製造、光電材料及元件製
  3    ind317(35)                           5914440   5367500    30164000   1580000
                    造、被動元件製造業。
                    電力及電子機械器材,運輸工具製造配修、精密
  4     ind3(99)                            5306580   5249470    40016000    28000
                    機械製造、及其他工業製品。
                    運輸業、倉儲業、通信業、金融業、保險業及不
  5     ind6(67)                            4564938   2889486    15560000   386058
                    動產業。
                    食品及飲料製造、紡織業、成衣服飾品、家具及
  6     ind1(46)                            4425384   3575602    22793000    30000
                    裝設品、紙類、及印刷有關事業。
                    化學材料製造、化學製品製造、石油及煤製品、
  7     ind2(81)    橡膠製品、塑膠製品、非金屬礦物製造、金屬基   4404152   2900219    16655000    72000
                    本工業、金屬製品製造、機械設備製造配修業。
                    建築及工程技術服務業、商品經紀業、顧問服務
  8     ind7(3)                             3487333   887361.4   4406000    2635000
                    業、資訊服務業、廣告業、及其他工商服務業。
                    有線通信器材製造、無線通信器材製造、其他通
  9    ind316(12)                           3466600   2296103    8032000     28000
                    信器材製造業。

 10     ind5(10)    批發、零售、及餐飲業。             3186174   1686555    6192000    1348000
 11     ind4(17)    水電燃氣業、營造業。              2902130   1697768    6377776    300000
                                                                             26

資料來源:高階經理人薪酬的揭露程度與公司治理-劉念琪(中央大學助理教授)、李思瑩(中央大學碩士)
1999年 總 經 理 薪 資 統 計 資 料
 排名   產業別(樣本數)                              平均值       標準差         最大值       最小值
                    環境衛生及污染防治服務業、社會服務業、出版
  1     ind8(1)                             9703000      _       9703000    9703000
                    業、廣播電視業、娛樂業及旅館業。
                    資料處理設備製造、資料儲存媒體製造、資料終
  2    ind314(26)   端裝置製造、資料輸入週邊設備製造、電腦零組   6517337   7424517    40016000   120000
                    件製造業。
                    電子管製造、半導體製造、光電材料及元件製
  3    ind317(35)                           5914440   5367500    30164000   1580000
                    造、被動元件製造業。
                    電力及電子機械器材,運輸工具製造配修、精密
  4     ind3(99)                            5306580   5249470    40016000    28000
                    機械製造、及其他工業製品。
                    運輸業、倉儲業、通信業、金融業、保險業及不
  5     ind6(67)                            4564938   2889486    15560000   386058
                    動產業。
                    食品及飲料製造、紡織業、成衣服飾品、家具及
  6     ind1(46)                            4425384   3575602    22793000    30000
                    裝設品、紙類、及印刷有關事業。
                    化學材料製造、化學製品製造、石油及煤製品、
  7     ind2(81)    橡膠製品、塑膠製品、非金屬礦物製造、金屬基   4404152   2900219    16655000    72000
                    本工業、金屬製品製造、機械設備製造配修業。
                    建築及工程技術服務業、商品經紀業、顧問服務
  8     ind7(3)                             3487333   887361.4   4406000    2635000
                    業、資訊服務業、廣告業、及其他工商服務業。
                    有線通信器材製造、無線通信器材製造、其他通
  9    ind316(12)                           3466600   2296103    8032000     28000
                    信器材製造業。

 10     ind5(10)    批發、零售、及餐飲業。             3186174   1686555    6192000    1348000
 11     ind4(17)    水電燃氣業、營造業。              2902130   1697768    6377776    300000
                                                                             27

資料來源:高階經理人薪酬的揭露程度與公司治理-劉念琪(中央大學助理教授)、李思瑩(中央大學碩士)
1) The Principal-Agent Problem
   The analysis of CEO compensation also raises a
    number of important questions in economics. In
    particular, what should be the compensation package
    of a person who runs the firm, yet does not own it?
   The CEO is an agent for the owners of the firm (the
    owners are also called the principals). The owners of
    the firm, who are typically the shareholders, want the
    CEO to conduct the firm‟s business in a way that
    increases their wealth.

                                                          28
   The inevitable conflict between the interests of the
    principals and the interests of the agent is known as
    the principal-agent problem. The structure of CEO
    compensation can be interpreted in terms of a
    tournament where the vice-presidents compete for
    promotion, and where the winner runs the company.
    This interpretation explains why the “prize spread” is
    larger when executives are promoted to CEO than
    when executives are promoted from junior to middle-
    level management.

                                                         29
TOURNAMENTS

 Firmsaward promotions on the basis of the relative
 ranking of the workers.
 A tournament  might be used when it is cheaper to
 observe the relative ranking of a worker than the
 absolute level of the worker‟s productivity.
 Workers allocate more effort to the firm when the prize
 spread between winners and losers in the tournament is
 very large. A large prize spread, however, also creates
 incentives for workers to sabotage the efforts of other
 players or to quit along the way.
                                                       30
THE ALLOCATION OF EFFORT
IN A TOURNAMENT

Dollars
                                  The marginal cost curve gives
                          MC
                                  the “pain” of allocating an
                 Y                additional unit of effort to a
                         MRHIGH
                                  tournament. If the prize spread
                                  between first and second place
                                  is large, the marginal revenue
          X
                         MRLOW    to an additional unit of effort is
                                  very high (MRHIGH) and the
                                  worker allocates more effort to
                         Effort   the tournament.
          Flow   Fhigh
                                                                  31
2) The Link between CEO Compensation and Firm
   Performance


   There is a positive correlation between the
    compensation of CEOs and the performance of the
    firm, but the correlation is weak.
   It is unlikely, therefore, that CEOs have the “right”
    incentives to take only those actions that benefit the
    owners of the firm.


                                                         32
4. INCENTIVE PAY
PAY SYSTEMS: PIECE RATES
      rates are used by firms when it is cheap to
 Piece
 monitor the output of workers.
           compensation systems attract the most able
 Piece-rate
 workers and elicit high levels of effort from these
 workers.
 Workers in these firms, however, may stress quantity
 over quality, and may dislike the possibility that
 incomes fluctuate significantly over time.
                                                         33
    THE ALLOCATION OF EFFORT BY PIECE-
    RATE WORKERS
                                     The piece rate is r dollars, so the
Dollars                              marginal revenue of an additional
                                     unit of output equals r. The
               MC           MCABLE
                                     worker gets disutility from
                                     producing output, as indicated by
                                     the upward-sloping marginal cost
                                     of effort curve. The level of effort
r                            MR      chosen by a piece-rate worker
                                     equates marginal revenue to
                                     marginal cost, or q* units. If it is
                                     easier for more-able workers to
                                     allocate effort to their jobs, they
                              Output
          q*        qABLE            face lower marginal cost curves
                                     and produce more output.          34
 PAY SYSTEMS: TIME RATES


 Timerates are used by firms when it is costly
 or impossible to monitor the output of workers.




                                                   35
EFFORT AND ABILITY OF WORKERS IN PIECE-
RATE AND TIME-RATE JOBS
                                            All workers, regardless of
Utility
                                            their abilities, allocate the
                               Piece-Rate
                                            same minimal level of effort
                               Workers
                                            to time-rate jobs. Because
                                            more-able workers find it
                                            easier to allocate effort, they
                           Time-Rate        will allocate more effort to
r                          Workers          piece-rate jobs and will have
                                            higher earnings and utility.
                                            Workers with more than x*
                                Ability     units of ability sort
    Worker A   x*   Worker B                themselves into piece-rate
                                            jobs, and less-able workers       36
                                            choose time-rate jobs.
BONUSES, PROFIT-SHARING, AND
TEAM INCENTIVES

 Unlike piece-rate systems, profit-sharing programs
 suffer from the incentive problems that afflict all
 team efforts, particularly the free-riding problem.
 Evidencesuggests that profit-sharing plans increase
 productivity.




                                                        37
WORK INCENTIVES AND DELAYED
COMPENSATION

 Upward-sloping    age-earnings profiles might arise
 because delaying the compensation of workers until
 later in the life cycle encourages them to allocate
 more effort to the firm.
 A delayed-compensation    contract implies that at some
 point in the future the contract must be terminated,
 thus explaining the existence of mandatory retirement
 in the labor market.
                                                        38
INDIFFERENCE BETWEEN A CONSTANT WAGE
AND UPWARD-SLOPING AGE-EARNING PROFILE

Earnings                       If the firm could monitor a
                               worker easily, she would get paid
                C              her constant value of marginal
                               product (VMP) over the life cycle.
                               If it is difficult to monitor output,
           B                   workers will shirk. An upward-
D                   VMP        sloping age-earnings profile (such
                               as AC) discourages workers from
A                              shirking. Workers get paid less
                               than their value of marginal
                    Years on   product during the first few years
0          t*   N   the Job    on the job, and this “loan” is
                                                                   39
                               repaid in later years.
EFFICIENCY WAGES

 Some firms might want to pay wages above the
 competitive wage in order to motivate the work force
 to be more productive.
 Theefficiency wage is set such that the elasticity of
 output with respect to the wage is equal to 1.
 Efficiencywages create a pool of workers who are
 involuntarily unemployed.


                                                          40
    THE DETERMINATION OF
    THE EFFICIENCY WAGE

                                        The total product curve
Output                                  indicates how the firm‟s
                        Z               output depends on the wage
               X                        the firm pays its workers.
qe                      Total Product   The efficiency wage is given
                        Curve           by point X, where the
                                        marginal product of the wage
q                                       (the slope of the total product
            Y
                                        curve) equals the average
                                        product of the wage (the
                                        slope of the line from the
                                        origin). The efficiency wage
                            Wage        maximizes the firm‟s profits.
    0      w       we                                                41
 WHY IS THERE A LINK BETWEEN WAGES
 AND PRODUCTIVITY?

 A high wage makes it costly for workers to shirk (i.e.,
 they lose the wage if caught).
 People who are well-paid might work harder even if
 there is no threat of dismissal.
 Efficiencywages reduce the quit rate and increase
 output and profits.
 A firm that pays efficiency wages attracts a more
 qualified pool of workers, increasing the productivity
 and profits of the firm.                                   42

				
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