NORMS, CULTURE AND LOCAL
CEDI Brunel University (UK)
& IZA (Germany)
Inrecent years there has been a renewed
interest to analyse whether the varied
economic paths of different societies over
time can be traced to differences in
culture, customs, social norms and
religion (e.g., Guiso and Zingales, 2006).
The present paper builds on this literature
to assess the role of norms and culture on
the provision of local public
infrastructure, which remains little
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
Public goods are not allocated through markets.
Collective action is key to the provision of public
goods, but it can often give rise to the problem of
conflicting community preferences.
Norms and culture could however help reconcile the
conflicting community preferences.
We explore one possible way through which norms
and culture can affect a community’s choice of local
THE INDONESIAN CASE
The analysis is based on information from 314 Indonesian
communities drawn from 13 provinces over a period of
Indonesia is an important case in point. Indonesians are
grappling with the problems of living in a world of differing
ideas of norms.
There are long-standing efforts to shape lives in an Islamic way;
There are even longer standing and diverse efforts to share them
according to complex local norms and tradition called adat.
Indonesians have been trying to reconcile these diverse ideas
over time, as the concept of the nation state evolves under
different forms of governments since the 1950s.
A CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
TO THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS
Social norms may influence social organisation in different ways:
Individualist cultural beliefs led to the formation of efficient
agency relations in middle ages (Grief 1994)
Ethnically linked parochial groups could achieve high
levels of cooperation in informal contracts while
engaging in exclusionary practices (Bowles and Gintis, 2004).
Religious norms could also play an important role in community
development in an intriguing way.
Religious people and institutions may be agents of
advocacy, funding innovation, empowerment, social
movement and service delivery.
Religious people and institutions can also incite
violence, oppose empowerment, deflect advocacy, absorb
funding and cast aspersions on service delivery.
A POSSIBLE MECHANISM
People may find it easier to trust those who have
faith in the same norms, which in turn may affect
optimal investment in social capital.
The latter could be facilitated by the perception of
a common external threat, giving rise to feelings
of loyalty and norms of solidarity to protect
Social and religious norms could thus help
reconcile conflicting preferences within a
community, thus resulting in preferences (or lack
of it) for certain local public infrastructural goods
as opposed to others.
ADAT NORMS IN INDONESIA
Indonesia’s pluralistic identity gives rise to a coexistence of
traditional adat laws, Islamic Sharia laws and positive laws of
the modern state.
Literally ‘adat community’ translates to ‘autonomous’
groups of indigenous people who are able to manage their
lives without knowing western laws and established their
own regulations and social control.
Adat laws are a set of local and traditional laws concerning
marriage, inheritance and dispute resolution systems.
Adat livelihoods are often linked to land, water and natural
resources, thus giving rise to a culture that is primarily rural
ISLAMIC NORMS IN INDONESIA
In addition, there has been a historical division
between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ Islamic
values/practices in Indonesia:
One can distinguish ‘Muslim modernists’, who seek to
reform Indonesia, from the traditional ones.
While the traditional Islamic practices lean on Sharia
laws, Muslim modernists have close ties with the positive
laws of the state.
Islam is the main religion in more than 80% of the sample
communities while it is so in more than 86% of the
communities which strongly adheres to adat. Thus adat
communities are predominantly Islamic communities.
ISLAMIC LAW AND ADAT ENCOUNTER
Indonesians have successfully harmonized the two legal
traditions, namely adat and Islamic laws.
It is envisaged that Adat and Islamic laws have existed side by side
long before the intervention of the colonial powers in Indonesian
The dialogue between the two sets of laws persists even in
modern Indonesia which has been reflected in Indonesian laws on
conditional repudiation, common property in marriage,
obligatory bequest and also conflict resolution.
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Suharto’s New Order Period starting in the late 1970s
witnessed efforts to undermine the ethnic identities of adat
communities with a view to promote the integration of the
nation. This has been implemented through policies and
programmes, e.g., significant changes in property rights in land
and other natural resources, which threatened the very basis of
This period has witnessed efforts to boost investment in
infrastructural development. Several major projects were
undertaken, which have significantly improved the availability
of community-level infrastructure and public services in the
Onset of the economic crisis of the 1990s had however cast a
major blow to the infrastructural investment/ development in
the country, which was further undermined by the introduction
of decentralisation at the turn of the century.
NORMS & LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN INDONESIA
The Dutch colonial rule recognized village governments as
lawful entities and encouraged self-rule according to Adat
laws, which were in place until Suharto took power in 1978.
While adat laws were formally banned during Suharto’s
regime, the formal ban did not result in the abandonment of
these adat laws and the extensive decentralization process that
followed the demise of Suharto only reinstated them in 2001.
Given this long-standing tradition of political
decentralisation, community culture is likely to reflect the
preferences of the community for the provision of local
infrastructure through decentralised community decision
STRUCTURE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Local government consists of a headman assisted by an appointed
village assembly (LMD) throughout the country.
Until 2001, the headman was generally elected every 8 years and was
accountable to the district government. Development projects and
assistance were managed by community resilience boards (LKMD)
who allocated development grants (mainly from the central
government) across households and projects.
Law 22/99, enacted by January 2001 gave villages more autonomy in
raising local revenues replacing central grants (i.e., fiscal
decenralisation). Elections for both the headman and the council now
take place every five years and the headman is directly accountable to
COMMUNITY DECISION MAKING
Although the headman is generally elected, there could be
one of the four ways of electing the headman:
Local government institutions
Similar methods are used to make decision making regarding
provision of local public goods.
While the IFLS data provides information on selection of
headman as well decision making process, we do not include
nature of governance in analysing community’s choice of
local infrastructure, as it is likely to be endogeneous to the
choice of public goods that we determine.
We use 4 available rounds of Indonesian Family Life Survey
(IFLS) data for the years 1993, 1997, 2000 and 2007 to
study the provision of local infrastructure.
This includes data from 314 rural and urban communities
in 13 provinces including, Jakarta, Bali, Java (central, east
and south), Sumatra (north, west and south), Lampung,
Wntenara and south Kalimantan.
The panel nature of the data allows us to control for the
potential endogeniety bias arising from community-level
unobserved heterogeneity. Time span of our sample also
allows us to control for time fixed effects.
LIST OF PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURAL GOODS
We consider a number of basic infrastructural goods, both
physical and social, that can directly impact on sustainable
livelihoods and provide opportunities for all, especially for
Since culture economic backwardness and poverty in the country
have often been caused by remoteness and isolation, roads and
different modes of motorized transport have a crucial role for
economic development and poverty alleviation.
Similarly, communication goods like post and telephone have a role
in reducing the disadvantages related to location and distance.
We include two more essential infrastructural
services, namely, banks and markets that could facilitate formal
exchange, thus contributing to the process of economic
LIST OF SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURAL GOODS
We consider two types of social infrastructure, namely, share
of government schools (elementary, junior and senior schools)
and government health facilities (health centres and health
posts) in the community.
An important distinction between social and physical infrastructure like
transport is worth highlighting here. Social infrastructure could boost
exchange both within/outside the community, as it enhances skills and
productivity of the community population. Transport and communication
infrastructure, in contrast, brings different communities closer and thus has
the innate feature of improving exchange with the external communities.
ACCESS TO LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURAL GOODS
Table 1 summarises the sample communities’ access to
various local public infrastructure during 1993-2007.
There has been an improvement in the provision of a
number of public goods over this period, especially in the
The progress slowed down somewhat after the crisis for
some infrastructural goods most notably banks. The latter
could be linked to the fact that the 1997 crisis started in the
financial and banking sector though it quickly spilled over to
the real sector.
Introduction of fiscal decentralisation in 2001 has a mixed
effect. While access to PTO has gone up significantly, access
to many other local infrastructure has declined in 2007.
ACCESS TO LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURE 1993-2007
% of total sample communities Mean
Community’s 1993 1997 2000 2007 1993-2007
Bus 33.1 27.3 43.9 32.69 0.35 (0.48)
Public transport 78.6 78.9 81.0 75.0 0.78 (0.41)
Public telephone 42.4 50.8 64.6 75.32 0.60 (0.62)
Post office (PO) 25.2 26.7 30 24.68 0.31 (0.66)
Pucca Road 71.3 79.7 83.3 99.36 0.84 (0.20)
Electricity 91 96.2 98.1 99.4 0.97 (0.22)
Market (MKT) 36.9 39.7 45.3 45.19 0.43 (0.63)
Bank (BANK) 41.9 40.3 15.4 18.59 0.36 (0.74)
Despite the overall improvement over the sample period,
inter-community heterogeneity has been pronounced. One
could classify a community to be strongly adat (those who
strongly adhere to adat norms and laws) and others.
Table 2 summarises the mean differences in the provision of a
range of basic infrastructural goods communities.
Clearly, access to motorized public transport, telephone office,
post office, cemented road are significantly lower in the under-
The difference is however not statistically significant in case of
share of health facilities while adat communities tend to have
significantly higher share of public schools in our sample.
STRONGLY ADAT & OTHER COMMUNITIES
Variables Strongly Others T-stat
Access to busstop 0.26 0.38 -3.913**
Access to any motorized 0.73 0.81 -2.888**
Access to market 0.35 0.47 -3.427**
Access to PTO 0.47 0.66 -4.250**
Access to PO 0.14 0.35 -6.912**
Access to bank 0.23 0.35 -3.492**
Access to pucca Road 0.76 0.86 -4.023**
Access to electricity 0.95 0.98 -2.470**
Access to piped water 0.48 0.63 -4.958**
Share of government schools 0.67 0.60 4.204**
Share of government health 0.57 0.58 -0.919
Rural 0.60 0.38 6.674**
Border with sea 0.48 0.44 1.010
District HQ or Provincial 0.17 0.20 -1.531
If Islam is the main religion 0.86 0.78 3.750**
Size of largest population 91 79 11.833**
Ethnic heterogeneity 0.11 0.26 -7.387**
Community size 4706 4368 0.170
Population (number) 7040 11005 -6.181**
IDENTIFICATION OF ADAT COMMUNITIES
Adat communities have the following
relatively larger in size but have significantly lower
population so that population density is lower.
Ethnic heterogeneity is significantly lower.
Predominantly rural and have borders with sea
Islam is the main religion
A lower proportion of these communities have district
head quarter or provincial capital.
There is considerable variation in culture, geography and environment
across the country. Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the
selected community characteristics across the sample provinces.
In general, provinces with higher average population per community,
higher proportion of university educated population and lower
proportion of adat communities tend to have better provision of all
types of public infrastructural goods under consideration;
Also more developed provinces tend to have relatively lower
proportion of under-developed communities.
A significantly higher proportion of strong adat communities in our
sample is concentrated in Sulawesi, Lampung, south Kalimantan, Bali,
Mean (standard deviation)
Population University educated Strong Islam is the main Under-developed
population adherence to religion
Jakarta 30023.25 (14228.6) 0.19 (0.26) 0.03 (0.17) 0.31 (0.46) 0.11 (0.32)
West Java 10056.3 (9693.6) 0.08 (0.12 0.20 (0.40) 0.98 (0.14) 0.14 (0.35)
East Java 7424.09 (5740.1) 0.69 (0.88) 0.38 (0.49) 0.96 (0.21) 0.24 (0.43)
Central Java 6513.25 (6275.7) 0.12 (0.32) 0.20 (0.40) 0.97 (0.17) 0.22 (0.42)
North Sumatra 5562.9 (5639.8) 0.14 (0.49) 0.15 (0.36) 0.46 (0.50) 0.19 (0.40)
South Sumatra 3869.6 (2499.6) 0.25 (1.10) 0.13 (0.34) 0.87 (0.34) 0.20 (0.40)
West Sumatra 2453.4 (1099.2) 0.11 (0.15 0.29 (0.46) 0.93 (0.26) 0.21 (0.42)
Bali 8624.3 (1599.6) 0.19 (0.22) 0.50 (0.51) 0 (0) 0.27 (0.45)
Wntenara 8206.4 (4621.3) 0.05 (0.71) 0.50 (0.63) 0.87 (0.33) 0.63 (0.49)
Ykarta 13411.00 (10081.7) 0.19 (0.25) 0.26 (0.44) 1.00 (0.00) 0.16 (0.37)
Lampung 5016.09 (2771.4) 0.03 (0.03) 0.45 (0.51) 0.81 (0.39) 0.27 (0.45)
Sulawesi 4897.0 (5218.15) 0.08 (0.13) 0.63 (0.49) 0.63 (0.49) 0.31 (0.47)
South 3850 (4040.6) 0.08 (0.12) 0.46 (0.51) 0.85 (0.37) 0.15 (0.37)
MAP OF INDONESIA
DETERMINATION OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE
AND INDICES OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
We estimate the following equation
Yit = ’Xit + i +uit
Yit is i-th community’s access to selected infrastructural goods in year
Yit refer to
binary indictors of access to various public infrastructural goods
a composite index of access to various physical infrastructural
goods, using factor analysis.
the likelihood of a community being underdeveloped. The latter is
based on whether a community has been selected for the major
anti-poverty programme IDT in the country during this period.
We argue that in a politically decentralised
system, community norms would account for community
preferences for different public infrastructure (physical and
Initial descriptive statistics suggest that traditional communities
tend to have more social rather than physical infrastructure
considered in our analysis. It is possible that typically traditional
communities would be averse to those physical (as opposed to
social) infrastructural goods that removes barriers to distance and
isolation in a bid to preserve their indigenous identity. In the
absence of a prior we empirically explore this hypothesis.
MEASURING NORMS & CULTURE
It is not easy to measure norms and culture perfectly.
IFLS data provides information on whether a community
strongly adheres to adat laws.
However initial analysis suggests that the concept of adat
has many dimensions.
It is closely linked to the location (e.g., rural and access to sea)
of the community
Often it is closely linked to the dominant religion of the
country, namely, Islam.
In order to exploit this multi-dimensional aspect of norms
and culture in our context, we use factor analysis to
construct a composite index of strong adherence to adat
laws, strong adherence to Islam, rural location and access
to sea and label it as PCNORM.
We compare the estimates using this composite index with
that using the individual constituent factors of adat to test
the robustness of our estimates.
OTHER CONTROL VARIABLES
A competing hypothesis would be investments in physical
infrastructure have been neglected in traditional communities because
they were deemed less justified in economic terms.
We thus control if the district head quarter and/or provincial capital is
located in the community.
In order to ascertain the nature of collective action, one needs to
control for group size and sustainability as well.
To this end, we include community population, proportion of total
households with junior high school and also if the largest population group
has 90% or more population.
Finally, characteristics of the headman may importantly influence the
community preferences for one public good or other.
To this end, we include community leader’s characteristics , e.g. if
the leader has senior high school education or more, if his/her
tenure in the community has been >=10 years.
ECONOMETRIC ISSUES AND SPECIFICATIONS
Often social and religious norms tend to be persistent and change only
slowly, even when they are no longer efficient. We could thus take
indices measuring norms to be exogenously given. Reverse causality is
For each dependent variable of our choice, we try three specifications:
We start with conventional covariates group size, its sustainability and
community leader’s characteristics.
We then include adat, Islam, access to sea and rural location individually
We replace individual constituent factors of adat culture by the composite
measure of culture, namely PCNORM.
We argue that given the multidimensional nature of social norms, the composite index
PCNORM is a better measure of norms in our context .
For the binary indicators of infrastructural goods and
also community development we apply binary probit
RE or logit FE models.
Composite index of selected physical infrastructural
goods (PCDEV) is continuous in nature – so in this
case we consider standard fixed and random effects
Similarly, share of government schools and
government health facilities are continuous in nature.
Hence, in these cases too we use standard fixed and
random effects regression models.
For each case we also estimate the corresponding
pooled model. For robustness checks, we compare
pooled results with the panel estimates.
FIXED VS. RANDOM EFFECTS ESTIMATES
We use Hausman test to choose between fixed/random
effects model for determining the continuous variable
PCDEV. The null hypothesis is that i is uncorrelated; in
other words, acceptance of the null implies an acceptance of
random effects estimates.
We consider the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test when the
dependent variable is binary in nature. The LM test boils
down to a test of significance of ρ. Rejection of the null
hypothesis that ρ=0 leads to an acceptance of the random
Given that the parameter ρ is statistically significant, we
focus our attention on the random effects estimates.
An advantage of these random effects estimates is that we can directly
control for the time-invariant factors (e.g., social norms).
Even after controlling for all other factors, composite index of adat
norms is statistically significant for the provision of pucca road, post
office, telephone office. In other words, communities with strong
adherence to adat norms tend to have less access to these local
Contrasting effect of local norms for access to social infrastructural
goods is noteworthy. Communities strongly adhering to adat norms
seem to significantly greater share of public schools while the effect is
not statistically significant for the share of government health facilities
(the coefficient is still positive).
PANEL ME ESTIMATES OF INDIVIDUAL PHYSICAL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES pubtrans pto po proad market bank
Population 0.182* 1.084*** 0.691*** 0.683*** 0.955*** 0.479***
(0.107) (0.152) (0.167) (0.162) (0.225) (0.119)
Hhs with JHS 2.058*** 3.491*** 2.222*** 4.216*** 1.492 1.826***
(0.525) (0.646) (0.756) (0.880) (1.013) (0.544)
Largest pop group>90% -0.0319 -0.370 0.718 -0.0961 0.148 0.844*
(0.454) (0.541) (0.601) (0.706) (0.700) (0.488)
Head>=shs 0.109 0.224 0.186 0.148 0.123 0.0629
(0.146) (0.173) (0.213) (0.180) (0.218) (0.162)
Tenure>=10 0.0821 0.0325 -0.0179 0.201 0.188 0.0367
(0.125) (0.142) (0.159) (0.160) (0.163) (0.128)
District HQ/PC 0.882*** 0.580*** 0.711*** 0.219 0.629*** 0.434***
(0.201) (0.197) (0.176) (0.258) (0.200) (0.167)
Pcnorm -0.0631 -0.344*** -0.260* -0.252* -0.0452 -0.114
(0.0936) (0.116) (0.137) (0.136) (0.172) (0.103)
Constant -1.119 -10.99*** -9.156*** -6.256*** -10.21*** -5.992***
(0.972) (1.383) (1.572) (1.436) (2.012) (1.108)
Province Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lnsig2u -0.423* -0.4452* 0.629*** 0.646** 1.570*** -0.7460***
(0.248) (0.258) (0.233) (0.299) (0.208) (0.248)
Observations 1183 1181 1181 1183 1181 1181
Number of commid 310 310 310 310 310 310
There is confirmation that larger communities tend to have
more access to different public infrastructure considered here.
Community’s proximity to district head quarter or provincial
capital is highly significant for its access to most infrastructural
Communities with higher proportion of JHS educated
households are more likely to get most public goods
(interesting exception being share of govt. schools).
Leader’s characteristics are not so significant except for the
likelihood of underdevelopment. Communities with shs
educated leaders are less likely to be underdeveloped.
COMPOSITE PUBLIC GOODS, SOCIAL
INFRASTRUCTURE & UNDERDEVELOPMENT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES pcdev shgov_sch shgov_hlth undev
Population 0.266*** -0.0255** 0.0248*** -0.229**
(0.0443) (0.0126) (0.00421) (0.0958)
Hhs with JHS 1.190*** -0.209*** 0.0517** -1.221***
(0.213) (0.0604) (0.0206) (0.465)
Largest pop group>90% -0.107 0.0468 0.0179 0.987**
(0.186) (0.0510) (0.0187) (0.420)
Head>=shs 0.142** 0.0260 -0.00110 -0.301**
(0.0659) (0.0170) (0.00766) (0.152)
Tenure>=10 0.0779 0.0308** -0.00255 -0.107
(0.0532) (0.0137) (0.00629) (0.138)
Rural -0.131* -0.00265 0.00435 -0.286*
(0.0776) (0.0214) (0.00778) (0.166)
Close to sea 0.00971 -0.00380 -0.000971 0.0991**
(0.0202) (0.00517) (0.00239) (0.0406)
dhq_pc 0.329*** -0.00512 -0.00145 -0.0819
(0.0676) (0.0175) (0.00780) (0.203)
pcnorm -0.0807** 0.0191* 0.00371 0.101*
(0.0348) (0.00977) (0.00338) (0.0575)
Province Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -2.802*** 0.963*** 0.522*** 0.493
(0.416) (0.118) (0.0402) (0.908)
Observations 1181 1177 1160 1183
Number of commid 310 310 310 310
ESTIMATES OF COMPOSITE PHYSICAL
In this case we consider a composite index of access to
various public goods (PCDEV) namely, motorized
transport, road, post office, public telephone office,
bank and market, obtained by using factor analysis.
Given the value of the Hausman statistic, we choose
the random effects estimates.
These estimates confirm that strong adat communities
tend to have lower provision of composite public
goods in our sample.
LIKELIHOOD OF COMMUNITY UNDER-
Finally, we determine an index of under-development,
which is a binary variable indicating whether a community
has been selected for the on-going IDT programme in the
Given that ρ is significant, we choose the random effects
Clearly these random effects estimates highlight that, ceteris
paribus, traditional communities with strong adherence to
adat are more likely to be underdeveloped.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 1
Other things being equal, cultural considerations seem
to exert a significant impact on the provision of local
infrastructure in our sample.
In particular, traditional rural communities (with
strong adherence to adat and Islam) tend to have
significantly lower access to key physical
infrastructure (e.g., road and communication
goods), which may reduce barriers of distance and
We argue that this is a reflection of these community’s
lack of preference for these goods, especially in
response to a common threat of modernisation. The
latter may give rise to feelings of solidarity within
traditional community members to protect their
indigenous livelihoods, generally from land and
TABLE A1. POOLED PROBIT
VARIABLES pubtrans pto po proad bank market
Population 0.0306* 0.311*** 0.113*** 0.0383*** 0.101*** 0.164***
(0.0169) (0.0325) (0.0188) (0.00988) (0.0200) (0.0241)
Hhs with JHS 0.410*** 1.020*** 0.282*** 0.244*** 0.376*** 0.254**
(0.0834) (0.143) (0.0846) (0.0587) (0.0907) (0.110)
Largest pop -0.0271 -0.0427 0.131 0.00613 0.198** -0.0574
(0.0786) (0.129) (0.0843) (0.0336) (0.0915) (0.105)
Head>=shs 0.0331 0.0365 0.0489 0.0246 0.0218 -0.0514
(0.0316) (0.0509) (0.0344) (0.0151) (0.0359) (0.0447)
Tenure>=10 0.0197 0.0435 0.0187 0.0110 0.0232 0.0806**
(0.0254) (0.0428) (0.0294) (0.00974) (0.0303) (0.0360)
District HQ/PC 0.160*** 0.223*** 0.261*** 0.0174 0.292*** 0.269***
(0.0231) (0.0516) (0.0424) (0.0135) (0.0456) (0.0436)
pcnorm2 -0.0139 -0.0950*** -0.0543*** -0.0155** -0.0204 0.00840
(0.0155) (0.0268) (0.0181) (0.00721) (0.0187) (0.0218)
Province Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1183 1052 1181 1183 1181 1181
TABLE A2: POOLED OLS/PROBIT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES pcdev shgov_sch shgov_hlth undev
lvpop 0.253*** -0.0232** 0.0249*** -0.0527**
(0.0356) (0.00948) (0.00408) (0.0240)
pjhs 1.140*** -0.203*** 0.0526*** -0.319***
(0.169) (0.0447) (0.0193) (0.117)
pop11 -0.114 0.0577 0.0192 0.311***
(0.163) (0.0431) (0.0186) (0.114)
headshs 0.165** 0.0307* -0.00106 -0.0868*
(0.0666) (0.0176) (0.00765) (0.0457)
tenure10 0.105* 0.0195 -0.00254 -0.0354
(0.0548) (0.0145) (0.00628) (0.0391)
dhq_pc 0.452*** 0.000538 -0.00145 -0.0424
(0.0686) (0.0182) (0.00780) (0.0532)
pcnorm2 -0.120*** 0.0109* 0.00426 -0.00891
(0.0333) (0.00664) (0.00381) (0.0225)
Province Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -2.759*** 0.933*** 0.521***
(0.324) (0.0866) (0.0372)
Observations 1181 1177 1160 1183
R-squared 0.350 0.392 0.674
PANEL ESTIMATES USING CULTURE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES shgov_hlth shgov_sch pcdev undev
Population size 0.0237*** -0.0259** 0.263*** -0.277***
(0.00429) (0.0128) (0.0450) (0.0980)
Hh edn>=jhs 0.0516** -0.204*** 1.189*** -1.256***
(0.0206) (0.0604) (0.213) (0.464)
Largest popn group 0.0132 0.0477 -0.121 0.866**
(0.0191) (0.0516) (0.189) (0.423)
Head edn>=shs -0.00132 0.0265 0.142** -0.310**
(0.00766) (0.0171) (0.0659) (0.153)
Tenure>=10 -0.00285 0.0318** 0.0794 -0.114
(0.00630) (0.0137) (0.0534) (0.138)
dhq_pc -0.000914 -0.00524 0.330*** -0.0658
(0.00781) (0.0175) (0.0677) (0.202)
sea -0.00198 0.0152 0.0300 0.234*
(0.00725) (0.0172) (0.0654) (0.142)
rural 0.00404 -0.00241 -0.130* -0.274*
(0.00779) (0.0214) (0.0777) (0.166)
adat1 0.000628 0.0291 -0.141** -0.113
(0.00651) (0.0197) (0.0692) (0.146)
islam 0.0161* 0.0310 -0.109 0.671***
(0.00953) (0.0253) (0.0929) (0.234)
Province Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.521*** 0.929*** -2.643*** 0.458
(0.0399) (0.118) (0.415) (0.909)